    Military Training: Funding Requests for Joint Urban Operations
    Training and Facilities Should Be Based on Sound Strategy and
    Requirements (08-DEC-05, GAO-06-193).

    DOD emphasizes the need for joint training to prepare U.S. forces
    to conduct joint operations in urban terrain. It defines joint
    training as exercises involving the interaction of joint forces
    and/or joint staffs under a joint headquarters. To guide the
    services' plans to train forces for urban operations and
    construct related facilities, in May 2002, the Senate Armed
    Services Committee directed DOD to establish facility
    requirements and, in May 2005, the committee directed DOD to
    complete its efforts and provide a requirements baseline for
    measuring training capabilities within the services and across
    DOD by November 1, 2005. Due to DOD's focus on joint urban
    operations and congressional interest in synchronizing service
    training and facility plans, GAO, on the authority of the
    Comptroller General, reviewed the extent to which (1) DOD has
    developed a joint urban operations training strategy and related
    requirements, (2) exercises offer opportunities for joint urban
    operations training, and (3) DOD has incorporated lessons learned
    from ongoing operations into its training.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-193
        ACCNO:   A42837
      TITLE:     Military Training: Funding Requests for Joint Urban
    Operations Training and Facilities Should Be Based on Sound
    Strategy and Requirements
         DATE:   12/08/2005
      SUBJECT:   Combat readiness
    	     Defense capabilities
    	     Interagency relations
    	     Lessons learned
    	     Military forces
    	     Military training
    	     Performance measures
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Training utilization
    	     Joint forces

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    GAO-06-193

    Report to Congressional Committees

    December 2005

    MILITARY TRAINING

    Funding Requests for Joint Urban Operations Training and Facilities Should
    Be Based on Sound Strategy and Requirements

    Contents

    Tables

    Figures

    December 8, 2005Letter

    Congressional Committees

    Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the challenges
    facing U.S. forces as they conduct military operations in urban
    environments, typically referred to as urban operations. These challenges
    include the presence of large numbers of noncombatants, a high density of
    buildings that complicate the coordination of firing weapons, a diminished
    effectiveness of communications equipment, and an increased ability of
    insurgents or guerrilla fighters to conceal their whereabouts. Based on
    ongoing operations, which often require U.S. forces to conduct urban
    operations, military commanders have increasingly called for more training
    in this area. In response, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
    military services have begun placing a higher priority on urban operations
    training. DOD has also increasingly emphasized the importance of joint
    training, including exercises to prepare U.S. forces to conduct joint
    urban operations. DOD defines a joint exercise as the interaction of joint
    forces or joint staffs conducted under a joint headquarters according to
    joint doctrine that prepares forces/staffs to respond to operational
    requirements. DOD has designated the Joint Forces Command as the command
    responsible for joint training, and in particular, to act as the executive
    agent, for urban operations training.

    As the military services continue to develop plans for urban operations
    training and to construct or upgrade training facilities, and submit
    related funding requests, the Senate Armed Services Committee has directed
    DOD to develop requirements to guide the services' plans. Specifically, in
    May 2002, Senate Report 107-151, accompanying the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, directed DOD to establish facility
    requirements and, in May 2005, Senate Report 109-69, accompanying the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, directed DOD to
    complete its efforts and provide a requirements baseline for measuring
    training capabilities within each service and across DOD by November 1,
    2005. In the latter report, the Senate Armed Services Committee noted the
    services will continue to address urban operations training requirements
    and expend resources independently with minimal coordination and
    cooperation until a comprehensive joint training plan and investment
    strategy are approved and implemented within the department. In response,
    the Joint Forces Command has been working with the military services to
    develop an overall training strategy that addresses the need for troops to
    train jointly for urban operations, and related facility and training
    requirements. According to Joint Forces Command, this strategy and the
    related requirements, once complete, is intended to satisfy the baseline
    required by Senate Report 109-69.

    Because of DOD's focus on joint urban operations and congressional
    interest in synchronizing service training and facility plans, we, on the
    authority of the Comptroller General, reviewed the extent to which (1) DOD
    has developed a joint urban operations training strategy and related
    requirements, (2) exercises offer opportunities for joint urban operations
    training, and (3) DOD has incorporated lessons learned from ongoing
    operations into its training.

    To address these objectives, we interviewed knowledgeable DOD officials,
    and analyzed relevant documents including DOD training doctrine, the draft
    urban operations training strategy, and the results of joint urban
    operations working group meetings. Additionally, we visited several
    service training installations and combat training centers in the United
    States as well as overseas, observed exercises, and analyzed training
    documents to identify the extent of joint participation in exercises and
    improvements made to urban operations training as a result of lessons
    learned from ongoing operations. We also conducted interviews with
    training personnel and troops recently returned from Iraq and Afghanistan
    to obtain their views on the type of urban operations training needed to
    realistically train troops as they will fight. We determined that the data
    we analyzed were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review. We
    performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government
    auditing standards from January 2005 through September 2005. More details
    on our scope and methodology are presented in appendix I.

    Results in Brief

    Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall joint
    strategy for urban operations training and related facility and training
    requirements. In response to congressional direction, the Joint Forces
    Command contracted for a study, completed in early 2005, to identify
    facility and training requirements. In May 2005, the Joint Forces Command
    began working with the services to review the study's results and develop
    the detailed facility and training requirements needed to form the basis
    for a joint training strategy. While the services have identified some
    facility needs, Joint Forces Command and service representatives have been
    unable to reach consensus on the level or types of joint training
    necessary to prepare troops for urban operations. As a result, Joint
    Forces Command has been unable to finalize the strategy or the facility
    and joint training requirements that will form the baseline for measuring
    capabilities within each service and across DOD. DOD officials told us
    they will not be able to deliver the required baseline by November 1,
    2005, and instead plan to provide criteria for the Congress to use in
    evaluating service facility plans. Until Joint Forces Command develops an
    overall strategy for joint urban operations training and related
    requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will have
    a sound basis for evaluating service facility and training plans, and
    related funding requests. As a result, we are recommending that DOD
    finalize development of its joint urban operations training strategy,
    including development of training and facility requirements, before
    approving service plans to construct or upgrade training facilities to
    support urban operations training.

    Despite DOD's increased emphasis on the importance of training for joint
    urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently exist for
    joint urban operations training that places troops from different services
    on the ground working under a joint headquarters. Joint and service
    doctrine both require forces to be prepared to operate as a joint team
    across the full range of military operations. Furthermore, DOD guidance
    calls for transforming military training to better enable joint force
    operations by increasing the level of joint context in military training.
    Many existing urban operations training exercises include some joint
    aspects, such as training on coordination between ground forces and the
    Air Force, and a few exercises have also incorporated the use of a joint
    headquarters to train its battle staff on joint command and control.
    However, most urban operations training events fall short of the
    definition of a joint exercise as articulated in DOD's joint training
    policy-the interaction of joint forces or joint staffs conducted under a
    joint headquarters in a manner that prepares forces/staffs to respond to
    operational requirements. Various factors account for the lack of joint
    urban operations training opportunities, such as the services' focus on
    service-specific skills, and the lack of an overall strategy requiring
    joint urban operations training, specific joint urban operations training
    requirements, and a formal mechanism for the services to schedule joint
    urban operations training at each other's facilities. Without a strategy,
    defined requirements, and a joint scheduling mechanism, DOD cannot be
    assured that joint urban operations training will occur or that it will
    maximize the joint usage of training facilities. To increase the
    opportunities for joint urban operations training, we are recommending
    that DOD establish a mechanism for joint scheduling of joint urban
    operations training at major training centers.

    While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing
    operations into its training program, training and troop personnel we
    interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational
    experience, for further enhancing training. One of DOD's training goals is
    to train as it expects to fight. On the basis of feedback from ongoing
    operations, DOD has made several adjustments to its urban operations
    training, including expanding and upgrading its urban training structures
    to more closely reflect urban conditions that troops can expect to face in
    current operations, using civilian role players to a greater extent to
    simulate the presence of urban populations, building convoy operations
    training courses, and training troops in techniques to counter emerging
    enemy tactics such as the use of improvised explosive devices. Discussions
    held with troops and training personnel revealed additional items that
    they believed could further enhance training, such as the need for
    additional live-fire capability, a larger number of civilian role players
    and more cultural awareness training to prepare troops for the required
    interaction with a large civilian populace once in theater, and training
    with newly fielded equipment such as the High-Mobility Multipurpose
    Wheeled Vehicle, the Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight, and the Blue Force
    Tracker. While DOD plans additional improvements to current training,
    until it develops specific training requirements, it will lack a solid
    basis to evaluate suggestions and make improvements and investment
    decisions.

    DOD concurred with our recommendation on finalizing the joint urban
    operations training strategy and related requirements. DOD did not concur
    with our recommendation for establishing a mechanism to schedule joint
    urban operations training at major training centers. Our report shows that
    the lack of a formal mechanism for scheduling joint urban operations
    training at major training centers is one of the key factors accounting
    for the limited number of joint urban operations training opportunities.
    Our recommendation is intended to facilitate increased multi-service
    participation in urban operations training events. Without implementing
    this recommendation, DOD will continue to rely on the current
    service-centric scheduling systems that have resulted in few joint urban
    operations training opportunities that meet DOD's definition of a joint
    exercise. Therefore, we continue to believe our recommendation has merit.
    The department also provided technical clarifications, which we
    incorporated as appropriate.

    Background

    Half the world's population lives in urban areas, and the trend towards
    global urbanization is continuing. Within the last 40 years, the United
    States military has conducted urban operations in locations such as
    Saigon, Hue, Beirut, Panama City, Kuwait City, Mogadishu, and the villages
    of the Balkans. Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted
    the trend towards urban operations and the many challenges they present
    U.S. forces. Military planners recognize this trend and acknowledge the
    likelihood that enemies will continue to draw U.S. forces into cities to
    degrade U.S. military advantages. According to DOD, in the future, U.S.
    forces will likely conduct military operations in urban areas, which are
    characterized by multiple structures, numerous noncombatants, and complex
    infrastructure. These areas are also political, cultural, and economic
    centers, as well as hubs for transportation, information, and
    manufacturing. Thus, the urban environment constrains many of the
    advantages that U.S. forces currently enjoy in open environments,
    increasing the risks of high casualties to friendly forces and
    noncombatants, and extensive collateral damage.

    Moreover, once deployed, forces generally find themselves part of joint
    operations. In testimony the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
    Readiness reiterated comments made earlier by the Secretary of Defense:

    As part of its Training Transformation Program, DOD is attempting to
    provide more of a joint context to its training.2 DOD defines a joint
    exercise as the interaction of joint forces and/or joint staffs conducted
    under a joint headquarters according to joint doctrine that prepares
    forces/staffs to respond to operational requirements. To develop a
    stronger program of joint training, DOD designated the Joint Forces
    Command as the joint trainer for DOD to support the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff as well as senior commanders worldwide in meeting joint
    training objectives. In 2002, DOD published its Doctrine for Joint Urban
    Operations3 and, recognizing the need to place a stronger emphasis on
    urban operations training, assigned the role of joint urban operations
    executive agent for training to Joint Forces Command. While the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall
    responsibility for training policies, Joint Forces Command, as DOD's
    executive agent, is the "primary DOD point of contact and proponent for
    joint urban operations doctrine, training, and equipment," and is to lead,
    coordinate, and integrate the activities of the other DOD components on
    such matters. In this role, Joint Forces Command has conducted experiments
    on concepts of operations for joint urban operations and monitored lessons
    learned from ongoing urban operations.

    The training of U.S. forces for urban operations is primarily the
    responsibility of the services. Both the Army and Marine Corps, the
    services that conduct most urban operations, have developed fairly robust
    urban operations training programs for their ground forces. Figure 1 shows
    an Army training facility at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, with structures
    built to train troops in conducting urban operations.

    Figure 1: Army Urban Operations Training Site at Fort Campbell, Kentucky

    The services train ground forces for urban operations based on a
    building-block approach beginning with specialty-focused individual
    training at their assigned installation, which normally focuses on
    individual basic skills needed to successfully conduct operations in urban
    terrain. Then they progress through collective training that sometimes
    includes other services on a limited basis. Training ends with a
    culminating exercise at a major training center, such as the Joint
    Readiness Training Center or Twenty-Nine Palms, and is based on real-time
    scenarios that troops may encounter in the urban environment. The Army and
    Marine Corps currently have plans to construct new or upgrade existing
    facilities to support urban operations training.

    Consensus Has Not Been Reached on DOD's Joint Urban Operations Training
    Strategy

    Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall joint
    strategy for urban operations training and related facility and training
    requirements. In response to direction from the Senate Armed Services
    Committee in May 2002, Joint Forces Command, designated as DOD's executive
    agent for urban operations training, contracted for a study, completed in
    early 2005, to identify facility and training requirements. In May 2005,
    the committee directed DOD to establish joint urban operations facility
    requirements and a training requirements baseline by November 1, 2005. In
    May 2005, Joint Forces Command began working with the services to review
    the study's results and develop the detailed facility and training
    requirements needed to form the basis for a joint training strategy. While
    the services have identified some facility needs, Joint Forces Command and
    service representatives have been unable to reach consensus on the level
    or types of joint training necessary to prepare troops for urban
    operations. As a result, Joint Forces Command has been unable to finalize
    the strategy or the facility and joint training requirements that will
    form the baseline for measuring capabilities within each service and
    across DOD. DOD officials told us they will not be able to deliver the
    baseline as required by November 1, 2005, and instead plan to provide
    criteria for the Congress to use in evaluating service facility plans.
    Until Joint Forces Command develops an overall strategy for joint urban
    operations training and related requirements, neither the Secretary of
    Defense nor the Congress will have a sound basis for evaluating service
    facility and training plans, and related funding requests.

    DOD Directed to Develop Urban Operations Training and Facility
    Requirements

    In the committee report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense
    Authorization Act,4 the Senate Armed Services Committee required a report
    by the Secretary of Defense that would establish requirements for
    facilities that support urban operations training within DOD. In response
    to the committee's direction, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
    the joint urban operations executive agent, Joint Forces Command,
    contracted for a study that would examine urban operations training
    requirements and the resulting facilities that would be needed to conduct
    the necessary training.

    The study was completed in early 2005. According to DOD officials, while
    the study results have helped to inform the process, the detailed training
    and facility requirements contained in the study have not been formally
    adopted because there was not enough agreement among the services as to
    the usefulness or veracity of the identified urban operations training
    requirements in that study. Consequently, in May 2005 Joint Forces Command
    convened a working group to develop joint urban operations training and
    facilities requirements on which to base a joint urban operations training
    strategy.

    In the committee report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense
    Authorization Act,5 the Senate Armed Services committee directed DOD to
    complete its efforts to establish the requirements for facilities and also
    directed it to establish, by November 1, 2005, a training requirements
    baseline against which the ability to train for urban operations within
    the services and across DOD could be measured. In the report, the
    committee expressed concern that the services would otherwise continue to
    address urban operations training requirements and expend resources
    independently with minimal coordination and that a critical opportunity to
    develop capabilities for joint training in urban operations was not being
    effectively pursued. In response to congressional direction, Joint Forces
    Command began working with the services to develop an overall strategy for
    joint urban operations and related facility and training requirements.
    According to DOD, this effort is intended to meet the congressional
    directive for a requirements baseline.

    Current Strategy Focuses on Need for Facilities

    To date, the draft Joint Urban Operations Training Strategy, as currently
    drafted, primarily focuses on the need to enhance training facilities to
    accommodate larger, more realistic joint urban operations training events.
    The current draft strategy's focus is to identify the necessary locations
    for joint urban operations training for two audiences: (1) troops
    executing urban operations at the tactical level and (2) officers serving
    on the staffs of commanders conducting urban operations. As envisioned,
    the troops that execute the operations would undergo training that places
    members of different services together to learn to operate together and to
    overcome differences in standard practices, terms, and organizational
    cultures that can limit the effectiveness of operations. The draft
    strategy also envisions using three training range complexes comprised of
    existing training facilities in the western, central, and eastern United
    States, as well as improvements and expansions planned for some of these
    training facilities.

    For its second audience, the strategy suggested building new facilities in
    order to train staff officers in the skills associated with serving on a
    joint staff of a commander conducting urban operations. According to DOD,
    officers serving on a joint staff rarely receive significant and realistic
    training for this complex role in which they are called upon to make
    recommendations to the joint task force commander based on a myriad of
    facts and assumptions in a limited time frame. The draft strategy notes
    that many officers often spend more time in the course of their careers
    working on command staffs than they do in command of troops. In order to
    establish staff training, the strategy proposes building four new joint
    staff training centers large enough to handle battalion or
    combatant-command-level staffs to replicate the sort of command and
    control arrangements and joint staff processes they will encounter while
    serving as staff officers under a joint force commander. According to a
    Joint Forces Command official, these centers can provide adequate
    throughput for staff training if used in conjunction with the current
    Joint Operations Centers in Grafenwoehr, Germany, and at Joint Forces
    Command in Suffolk, Virginia.

    Lack of Consensus on Joint Training Requirements Stalls Strategy

    The services have identified their respective facility needs to support
    urban operations training. However, the Joint Forces Command has not been
    able to finalize a draft joint urban operations training strategy because
    command officials and service representatives have not been able to agree
    upon joint urban operations training requirements. Specifically, there is
    a lack of agreement on the need for joint urban operations training events
    that place significant numbers of troops from different services together
    in urban settings. As Joint Forces Command officials continue to develop
    the draft strategy, they have pledged to continue working with the
    services and combatant commands to develop the joint urban operations
    training requirements through the working group process. To date, Joint
    Forces Command has provided only a very broad, overarching statement of
    the tasks that are unique to or significantly challenged by urban
    environments, with a focus on conducting joint urban operations at the
    operational level.

    Representatives from the Army and Marine Corps in attendance at the second
    session of the joint urban operations training strategy working group in
    August 2005 repeatedly emphasized the need for more specifically defined
    training requirements for joint urban operations before they could
    evaluate the draft joint urban operations training strategy and assess
    their services' commitment to it. Given the key role the services and
    combatant commands play in training forces-both troops on the ground and
    staff personnel-consensus on joint urban operations training requirements
    is necessary for the implementation of a joint urban operations training
    strategy.

    Because of the lack of consensus in the draft joint urban operations
    training strategy and related requirements, DOD has not yet developed
    joint training requirements to use as a baseline against which to measure
    capabilities within and across the services. As a result, DOD officials
    told us they will not be able to deliver the requirements baseline to the
    Congress by the November 1, 2005, deadline. DOD officials stated that,
    instead, they plan to provide a set of questions for the Congress to use
    as interim criteria in considering service funding requests for urban
    operations training facilities. These questions are intended to assist the
    Congress in evaluating the potential for joint usage of proposed
    facilities. Until Joint Forces Command develops an overall strategy for
    joint urban operations training and related requirements, neither the
    Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will have a sound basis for
    evaluating service facility and training plans, and related funding
    requests.

    Despite DOD's Goals, Few Opportunities Exist for Forces to Train Together
    for Joint Urban Operations

    Despite DOD's increasing emphasis on the importance of training for joint
    urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently exist for
    joint urban operations training that places troops from different services
    on the ground working under a joint headquarters. Various factors account
    for the lack of joint urban operations training, such as the services'
    focus on training service-specific skills, and the lack of an overall
    strategy requiring joint urban operations training, specific joint urban
    operations training requirements, and a formal mechanism for scheduling
    joint urban operations training at service-owned facilities. Without a
    training strategy, defined requirements, and a joint scheduling mechanism,
    DOD cannot be assured that joint urban operations training will occur or
    that DOD will maximize the joint usage of urban operations training
    facilities.

    Few Urban Operations Training Opportunities Exist that Meet DOD's
    Definition of Joint Training

    DOD's Joint Training Policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    Instruction 3500.01B, defines a joint exercise as a joint military
    maneuver, simulated wartime operation, or other Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff/combatant commander-designated event involving planning,
    preparation, execution, and evaluation in which forces of two or more
    services interact as joint forces and/or joint staffs and the event is
    conducted based on approved joint doctrine that prepares joint forces or
    staffs to respond to operational requirements established by the combatant
    commander. Although there is often some level of jointness incorporated
    into Marine Corps and Army urban operations training events, these efforts
    fall short of DOD's definition of a joint training event because they do
    not include a joint headquarters and focus on service, rather than joint,
    training objectives. Marine Corps officials said that the Marine Corps
    includes some joint scenarios in its events and incorporates to some
    extent other service participation in performing certain specialty roles,
    such as air-ground coordination. The Army simulates some of the joint
    aspects of a battlefield in its training as well, such as the joint
    command and control structures troops are expected to encounter in
    theater, and it incorporates special operations forces when possible.
    According to Joint Forces Command officials, the Joint Operations Center
    at Joint Forces Command in Suffolk, Virginia, and the Joint Multinational
    Training Center in Grafenwoehr, Germany,6 are used to provide some
    officers with the type of joint staff officer training called for in the
    draft strategy. We observed the Joint Operations Center, which is used to
    provide officers with command and control training, at the Joint
    Multinational Training Center. Officers we spoke with stated that this was
    a great addition that increased the level of joint urban operations
    training.

    Although the services are taking these actions to increase jointness,
    training exercises are still primarily focused on service-derived, rather
    than joint, training objectives and for the most part do not include a
    joint headquarters to command the exercise. For example, an Air Force
    representative who was involved in supporting the Army's Air Warrior II
    training exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana, which was designed to prepare
    troops for urban operations before they deployed, stated that the value of
    the training was limited for the Air Force because the training was
    designed around the accomplishment of Army training objectives.
    Additionally, an Air Force representative in Germany experienced similar
    difficulties in getting Air Force training objectives added to Army
    exercises. Furthermore, the troops and training personnel we interviewed,
    many of whom had recent operational experience in ongoing operations,
    emphasized the importance of training jointly for urban operations in
    order to maximize familiarity with the services' respective ways of
    operating and overall interoperability.

    Several Factors Contribute to the Lack of Joint Urban Operations Training

    One important factor contributing to the lack of joint urban operations
    training is the services' focus on service-specific skills training. The
    two services that perform the bulk of urban operations training, the Army
    and Marine Corps, are proactively working to ensure that their troops are
    trained in the individual skills needed for operations in urban terrain.
    Soldiers and Marines are exposed to individual urban tasks in their basic
    training and specialty schools. The Army and Marine Corps primarily
    concentrate their urban operations training on enhancing the capabilities
    of individual soldiers and small units-primarily squads, platoons, and
    companies. As noted in our June 2005 report,7 historically, service
    training has focused on individual service competencies or
    mission-essential tasks, with less emphasis on joint operations. While
    this has allowed the services to meet their core training
    responsibilities, it has also contributed to the problem of forces often
    entering combat without prior experience or training in joint urban
    operations.

    Second, in the absence of a joint urban operations training strategy,
    there is currently no specific requirement for the services to train
    jointly for urban operations. While it is not urban-specific, the DOD
    Directive 1322.18, which advocates joint training, states: "To the maximum
    extent possible, the DOD components shall conduct joint training in
    accredited events at certified facilities, and shall synchronize schedules
    to integrate training events." However, the directive does not define what
    is meant by "to the maximum extent possible" and therefore provides the
    services much leeway in how much they participate in joint training.
    Absent a directive requiring the services to train for joint urban
    operations tasks at a specified level and specific joint urban operations
    training requirements, the services are likely to continue to focus their
    training on service-specific skills and tasks for which they are held
    accountable. As discussed earlier, Joint Forces Command expects the joint
    urban operations training strategy it is developing to include such
    requirements.

    Lastly, the services own the facilities used to conduct urban operations
    training and are currently using them primarily for service-specific
    training requirements. While the services agree that joint urban
    operations training is needed, there is no formal mechanism in place to
    ensure that joint training requirements are incorporated into the
    different services' training schedules. Urban training that involves
    placing two or more battalions together is usually reserved for the combat
    training centers and these training centers are limited in throughput
    capacity. For example, the Joint Readiness Training Center normally
    sponsors 10 training rotations per year and is limited in its ability to
    expand the amount of rotations it can host per year to increase joint
    usage. Even though Joint Forces Command is the executive agent for joint
    urban operations, it does not have the authority to direct the services or
    combatant commands to modify their training plans to accommodate joint
    urban operations training. It is the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    for Personnel and Readiness that has overall authority over DOD training
    policies. Table 1 lists those facilities that can currently support large
    joint urban operations training exercises and staff officer training.

    Table 1: Current Training Facilities that Can Support Joint Urban
    Operations Training

                                                  Facilitates joint  Facilitates
                                                  urban operations      urban
            Facility             Location        training for troops  operations
                                                  (battalions from   training for
                                                 different services) officers on
                                                                     joint staffs
    Joint Readiness    Fort Polk, Louisiana   Yes                 Yes
    Training Center
    Twenty-Nine Palms  Twenty-Nine Palms,     Yes                 Yes
                          California
    National Training  Fort Irwin, California Yes                 Yes
    Center
    Joint              Grafenwoehr/Hohenfels,
    Multinational      Germany                Yes                 Yes
    Training Center
    Joint Warfighting  Suffolk, Virginia      No                  Yes
    Center
    Sites with ability
    to link into Joint Various service
    Training and       installations          No                  Yes
    Experimentation
    Network

    Source: Joint Forces Command.

    Note: We are using the definition of Joint Training from DOD's joint
    training policy-the training event includes two or more forces and/or
    joint staffs, is conducted according to joint doctrine, and is run by a
    joint headquarters.

    In a June 2002 report,8 we recommended that DOD create a database that
    identifies all ranges available to the department and what they offer,
    regardless of service ownership, so that commanders can schedule the best
    available resources to provide required training. Without a mechanism to
    schedule joint urban operations training at each other's facilities, DOD
    cannot be assured that joint urban operations training will occur or that
    DOD will maximize the joint usage of urban operations training facilities.

    While DOD Has Incorporated Lessons Learned, Troops and Training Personnel
    Suggested Further Training Enhancements

    While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing
    operations into its training program, training and troop personnel we
    interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational
    experience, for further enhancing training. One of DOD's training goals is
    to train as it expects to fight. The services have been using both formal
    and informal means to collect and disseminate lessons learned from ongoing
    operations to be incorporated into their training events. Based on this
    feedback, during the site visits we made, we observed that the services
    have made many improvements in their urban operations training such as:
    expanding and upgrading their urban training structures, using role
    players to a greater extent to simulate the presence of urban populations,
    building convoy operations training courses, and training troops in
    techniques to counter emerging enemy tactics such as the use of improvised
    explosive devices. Our discussions held with troops and training personnel
    revealed additional items that they believed could further enhance
    training to better reflect current operating conditions such as the need
    for additional live-fire capability, adding larger numbers of role players
    and providing more cultural awareness training to adequately prepare
    troops for the required interaction with a large civilian populace once in
    theater, and training with newly fielded equipment. While DOD plans
    additional improvements to current training, until it develops a strategy
    and specific facility and training requirements as discussed previously,
    it will lack a solid basis to guide its improvement efforts.

    The Services Use Both Formal and Informal Means to Collect and Disseminate
    Lessons Learned from Ongoing Operations

    The Army and Marine Corps utilize both formal and informal means for
    capturing and disseminating lessons learned. According to service
    officials, to obtain information from ongoing operations, they send
    subject matter experts into theater with deploying units and capture
    lessons learned from troops returning from recent ongoing operations. Both
    services maintain databases, which are used to disseminate lessons learned
    information within and among the services. These databases include
    numerous lessons learned related to ongoing urban operations. For example,
    the Marine Corps database contains lessons learned on urban operations
    including basic Arabic language training, information on convoy operations
    tactics, and search techniques. Additionally, Joint Forces Command also
    sends subject matter experts into theater and its Joint Center for
    Operational Analysis maintains a database of lessons learned and helps
    facilitate the sharing of joint lessons among the services. Both the Army
    and Marine Corps formally disseminated the information collected through
    publications such as handbooks, newsletters, and official Web sites. For
    example, the Army's Center for Lessons Learned issued a tactical convoy
    operations handbook that was also used by the Marine Corps and the Special
    Operations Command, according to Army Center for Lessons Learned
    officials. Another formal method the Army uses to disseminate information
    is the "smart card," which is a compact card that easily fits in a
    soldier's pocket, thus providing quick access to information. The Army
    recently issued a smart card that served as a guide for knowledge about
    Iraqi culture.

    The services also utilize informal mechanisms for capturing and
    disseminating lessons learned. Officials we spoke with from the Army's
    Joint Multinational Training Center in Germany indicated that they rely
    more heavily on informal mechanisms, such as electronic messages from
    troops in the field and the "right seat/left seat" transition program.
    Under this program, incoming commanders learn the latest urban tactics by
    shadowing outbound individuals conducting urban operations. For example,
    incoming company commanders shadow outgoing commanders to learn about the
    intricacies of the local operating area and what practices have proved
    useful in conducting missions. Further, training center officials and
    troops we talked with indicated that they shared information on ongoing
    operations via available DOD databases.

    Integration of Lessons Learned Is Improving Urban Operations Training

    The Army and the Marine Corps have recently made significant improvements
    in urban operations training curriculum and facilities based on lessons
    learned from ongoing operations and training events. Specifically, these
    services have adjusted their training curriculum to place greater emphasis
    on urban operations. While the Marine Corps introduced its revised
    combined arms exercise and security and stabilization operations training
    in 2003, it was not mandatory predeployment training until the summer of
    2005, according to Marine Corps officials. The Army recently incorporated
    urban operations tasks into its Advanced Individual Training Program to
    ensure that soldiers receive predeployment training on warrior tasks and
    battle drills regardless of their occupational specialties, according to
    officials from the Army's Collective Training Directorate. Further, in
    June 2004, the Army issued guidance stating that it intends to provide all
    deploying brigade and battalion commanders and staff training on urban
    stability and support operations through its Battle Command Training
    Program.

    At training sites in Germany we visited, we found that Army trainers
    incorporated real-time scenarios from ongoing operations in their
    exercises to provide troops with training that realistically reflects the
    urban environment. For example, they incorporated Iraqi elections into the
    mission rehearsal exercise in July 2005 in anticipation of the conditions
    they would face once deployed. Other examples of curriculum changes that
    services had made to provide troops with more of the skills necessary to
    effectively face urban challenges included:

    o developing mobile training teams that deploy to training sites to
    provide instruction to Marines on the handling of detainees at detention
    operations;

    o placing more emphasis on search procedures related to dwellings, caves,
    and vehicles to locate insurgents or weapons;

    o delivering training on how to respond to improvised explosive device
    incidents;9 and

    o training troops on how to conduct convoy operations.

    During our visits to training sites, we also observed that the facilities
    used for urban operations training had been expanded and upgraded to more
    closely reflect urban conditions troops can expect to face in current
    operations. For example, we observed small towns that had been enhanced to
    replicate urban terrain by including mosques, open markets, and
    flat-roofed dwellings. Figure 2 depicts Marines practicing raid procedures
    on flat-top roofs to simulate the type of buildings they would encounter
    in current urban operational environments.

    Figure 2: Marines Execute a Helicopter-Borne Raid Exercise Using Flat-Top
    Roofs

    Both services have populated these urban training facilities with role
    players that portray government officials, tribal leaders, religious
    leaders, and officials from interagency organizations. For example, the
    Joint Multinational Training Center has increased the total number of
    civilian role players to up to 600 participants, though not all are used
    in each training event. Our discussions with soldiers who had returned
    from operations in Iraq, however, stated that exercises need to include a
    larger number of role players to more realistically represent the urban
    environment. We noted that the Joint Readiness Training Center replicates
    the media and incorporates nongovernmental organizations and civilian role
    players in its training. Figure 3 shows an Army exercise that incorporates
    civilian role players to simulate local inhabitants in a Middle Eastern
    environment.

    Figure 3: Army Troops Practice Communicating with Role Players as Part of
    Their Training Exercise in Hohenfels, Germany

    Furthermore, we observed that the Marine Corps and Army have included
    newly built live-fire or simulated convoy courses in some of their urban
    operations facilities. Those with live-fire courses are emphasizing the
    importance of training troops on them at night and in adverse weather.
    Figure 4 shows training on a live-fire convoy operations training course
    in Germany. The services are also updating training to reflect changes to
    enemy tactics such as the use of improvised explosive devices. We saw
    incorporation of simulated improvised explosive devices at Fort Campbell,
    Kentucky, and observed the newly developed training site for explosive
    devices at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Germany.

    Figure 4: Army Live-Fire Convoy Training Exercise in Germany

    In addition to recent improvements, the services are currently planning
    further enhancements to existing training facilities. For instance, the
    Marine Corps is requesting funds to construct a large-scale urban training
    facility at Twenty-Nine Palms, California. The new facility will have up
    to 1,500 buildings, including live-fire capability, and outlying
    components such as an airfield, port, and villages. According to Marine
    officials, the facility will be large enough to accommodate joint training
    exercises with the Army. It is also expected to provide a venue from which
    to experiment, develop, and exercise joint/interagency urban operations
    with the Joint National Training Capability. The Marine Corps also plans
    to add a night driving course to pre-deployment training. Additionally,
    the Marines plan to add shoot houses at Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune, and
    Marine Corps Base Quantico. Likewise, the Army is in the process of
    improving its combat training centers by adding more buildings and
    instrumentation, and its major installations by providing shoot houses,
    urban assault courses, breach facilities, and combined arms collective
    training facilities. Army officials at the Joint Multinational Training
    Center have initiated an effort to enhance training through the
    development of an Expeditionary Instrumentation System, which is a new
    mobile instrumentation capability that provides feedback to the battalion
    at any training site that lacks instrumentation. According to its
    developers, the mobile nature of the system will also help alleviate
    capacity concerns throughout the Army, turning any location into an
    instrumented range. See appendix II for a description of major ongoing and
    planned urban operations training facility enhancements.

    Troops and Training Personnel Identified Further Training Enhancements
    That They Believe Would Better Reflect Current Operating Conditions

    One of DOD's training goals is to train as it expects to fight and
    discussions held with troops and training personnel revealed additional
    items that they believe could further enhance training to better reflect
    current operating conditions. Personnel identified enhancements such as
    the need for additional live-fire capability, adding more civilian role
    players in exercises and providing additional information gathering and
    cultural awareness training, and having newly fielded equipment available
    to train with at the training centers.

    Additional Live-Fire Training

    The troops we spoke with stated that the live-fire training they received
    prior to deployment was infrequent and did not sufficiently prepare them
    to use their weapons in an urban setting. Training personnel at facilities
    we visited stated that the facilities' live-fire capability is limited due
    to environmental issues and concerns about safety when training in urban
    operations training sites with role players. In lieu of live-fire
    training, urban operations facilities have simulated shooting drills,
    including video and target instrumentation, to provide the experience of
    live-fire urban operations.

    More Role Players and Greater Emphasis on Cultural Awareness Training

    Further, although we observed role players included in the training
    exercises we visited, troops noted that more were needed and additional
    cultural awareness training would be beneficial. They noted operating in
    an urban environment, against an elusive enemy with the ability to hide
    among the civilian population, requires troops to be able to work more
    closely with local people, in many cases on an individual basis, to
    conduct stability and support operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian
    missions, and the gathering of information. Troops we spoke with indicated
    that the number of role players included in exercises is not sufficient to
    adequately prepare them for the density and level of persistent contact
    that is typical of noncombatants in the urban environment. In addition,
    troops and training personnel we interviewed wanted the role players to
    more actively engage the troops during the exercises to better replicate
    operational conditions. The troops and trainers also indicated that more
    cultural awareness training, which would include basic language training,
    would be helpful to establish and maintain communication with local
    civilians so that they could better interact with civilians and minimize
    civilian interference with military operations. Currently, training
    exercises contain some level of cultural awareness and civil affairs
    training by including role players that interact with troops, and
    exercises that we observed emphasized the use of translators when working
    with the local population. However, access to translators in training is
    limited, and officials and troops agreed that translators were not often
    available for everyday interaction with civilians and so further training
    would be beneficial. Both the Marine Corps and Army have taken steps to
    improve this training; the Marine Corps has established an advanced
    cultural awareness center and according to an Army official, the Army
    continually updates its cultural awareness training to reflect conditions
    in current operations.

    New Equipment Available for Training Prior to Deployment

    Troops and training personnel identified a third area for further
    enhancement: the ability to train with newly fielded equipment prior to
    deployment. Troops we interviewed who had returned from ongoing operations
    stated that there were several pieces of equipment that they used in
    theater that had not been available to train with prior to deployment.
    These items had been developed to help alleviate the difficulties of
    conducting urban operations by addressing the adversaries' tactics, such
    as improvised explosive devices, and the adversaries' ability to conceal
    themselves in an urban environment. According to training personnel and
    DOD officials, limited production quantities and the need for the items in
    theater to respond to rapidly changing operational environments makes it
    difficult for the training centers to initially have the items. Some
    examples of newly fielded equipment that are in limited supply but DOD
    believes will improve troops' ability to conduct urban operations include
    the following.

    o Up-armored High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). These
    vehicles are not available at some training facilities and only the
    soft-top HMMWVs were on hand for training exercises, according to
    officials at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Hohenfels and
    Twenty-Nine Palms. Traveling in the up-armored HMMWVs provides greater
    protection from improvised explosive devices while maintaining transport
    mobility for forces, civil affairs teams, and engineers operating in urban
    areas. However, Army and Marine Corps officials and troops that we
    interviewed stated that the up-armored HMMWVs used in theater were
    top-heavy, difficult to maneuver, and required different tactical
    procedures from the soft-top HMMWVs when used in combat.

    o The Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight. This gunsight is another piece of
    equipment used in conducting urban operations that has been quickly
    fielded into theater, but limited quantities prevented its use in training
    prior to deployment. Officials stated that this item greatly enhanced
    troops' ability to precisely target long-distance hostile forces in all
    lighting conditions, which is critical to an urban setting where lighting
    plays a key role.

    o New improvised explosive device detection and disabling equipment. These
    devices were not at some training facilities we visited, and some troops
    noted that their absence hampered the troops' use of the items in theater
    because the instructions were difficult to understand. Officials at the
    Joint Readiness Training Center, Joint Multinational Training Center, and
    Camp Lejeune stated that more specific training on the use of improvised
    explosive device detection equipment would facilitate its use in theater.

    o Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below System, also known as Blue
    Force Tracker. Blue Force Tracker is a satellite-based tracking and
    communication system that gives an all-weather, near real-time picture of
    the battlefield. Troops we interviewed stated that they were not exposed
    to Blue Force Tracker in training, although it has been essential in
    conducting urban operations in Iraq because of its ability to distinguish
    friendly forces from adversaries.

    Officials and troops agreed that exposure to these items before arriving
    in theater would have better prepared them to operate in the urban
    environment. Training center and other DOD officials stated that they
    would like to see a greater priority given to placing high-demand items
    like the ones mentioned at the training centers to increase the troops'
    level of exposure to this equipment before deployment. While DOD plans
    additional improvements, until it develops a strategy and specific
    facility and training requirements, it will lack a solid basis to evaluate
    suggestions and make improvements and investment decisions.

    Conclusions

    DOD has continually emphasized the importance of joint training, including
    to prepare U.S. forces to conduct joint military operations in urban
    environments. The inherent complexities of operating in urban
    environments, DOD's expectation that urban environments will play a
    significant role in future military operations, and that most of these
    operations will be conducted jointly, coupled with the combatant
    commanders' interest in ensuring U.S. forces are sufficiently prepared,
    are significant incentives for Joint Forces Command and services to
    develop and implement an overall joint training strategy and related
    requirements. In addition, the fact that U.S. forces are currently
    involved in urban operations adds a tangible sense of urgency for joint
    training. Notwithstanding these incentives, current training exercises
    offer few opportunities for U.S. forces to train jointly for urban
    operations. An overall strategy requiring joint urban operations training
    and clearly defined facility and training requirements, and a mechanism
    for scheduling joint training at training facilities, would provide a
    framework to assign accountability, synchronize the services' training
    efforts to ensure they include joint training, and maximize the joint
    usage of training facilities. In the absence of this framework, DOD risks
    that the services will continue to pursue their respective
    service-specific training and facility plans. Until DOD develops an
    overall strategy for joint urban operations training and related
    requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will have
    a sound basis for evaluating service training and facility plans, and
    related funding requests. To its credit, DOD and the services have
    actively sought to incorporate lessons learned during ongoing operations
    and made several adjustments to make the training environment more
    reflective of operational conditions. To further enhance training, the
    troops and training personnel we interviewed identified several additional
    adjustments that they believed would further enhance urban operations
    training. However, until DOD develops a strategy and related requirements,
    it lacks a solid basis to evaluate suggestions, and make improvements and
    investment decisions.

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    To improve DOD's approach to joint urban operations training, we are
    recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, Joint
    Forces Command to:

    o Finalize development of the joint urban operations training strategy and
    related requirements including joint training tasks and standards, level
    and types of joint training exercises to be conducted, and facility needs.
    Once established, we envision this framework would be used to guide the
    review and approval of service training and facility plans, and to guide
    efforts to make additional improvements to existing urban operations
    training curriculum, including evaluating any suggestions from training
    and troop personnel.

    To increase opportunities for joint training and maximize the joint usage
    of training facilities, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense

    o direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
    establish a mechanism for scheduling joint urban operations training at
    major training centers to facilitate increased multiservice participation
    in urban operations training.

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our first
    recommendation and did not concur with the second. DOD concurred with our
    first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander,
    Joint Forces Command, to finalize development of the joint urban
    operations training strategy and related requirements including joint
    training tasks and standards, levels, and types of joint training
    exercises to be conducted. DOD stated that current efforts, when
    completed, will adequately address this recommendation without further
    direction from the Secretary of Defense. DOD also noted its view that we
    seemed to blur the distinction between what it characterized as two
    separate actions-Joint Forces Command's efforts to develop a joint
    training strategy for urban operations and DOD's efforts to develop
    criteria for evaluating service plans to construct training facilities. We
    note that efforts to develop the joint strategy have been underway for
    some time and continue to believe that the lack of consensus within DOD
    regarding the draft strategy may delay the completion of this effort
    without further emphasis and monitoring from the Secretary of Defense.
    Furthermore, we believe that the strategy and evaluation criteria should
    not be viewed as separate actions, but rather must be clearly linked. As
    discussed in our report, until Joint Forces Command develops an overall
    strategy for joint urban operations training and related requirements,
    neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will have a sound basis
    for evaluating service facility and training plans, and related funding
    requests.

    DOD did not concur with our second recommendation that the Secretary of
    Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
    to establish a mechanism for scheduling joint urban operations training at
    major training centers to facilitate increased multiservice participation
    in urban operations training. In its response, DOD stated that it remains
    strongly committed to a decentralized training ranges and facilities
    management solution in supporting the services' Title 10 responsibilities.
    DOD also noted the Office of the Secretary of Defense is providing
    planning support, oversight, and policy guidance to ensure all its
    training resources support service, cross-service, and joint needs and
    goals. DOD further stated that it is committed to maximizing system
    integration, sharing of data, and facilitation of the services' scheduling
    processes to better leverage all assets for the full benefit of military
    readiness. However, we note that, to date, DOD has not given sufficient
    leadership attention to ensuring necessary coordinated action among the
    services to accomplish these goals. We believe the lack of progress is
    more an issue of leadership to ensure coordinated action among the key
    stakeholders than an issue of usurping the services' Title 10
    responsibilities. Our report shows that the lack of a formal mechanism for
    scheduling joint urban operations training at major training centers is
    one of the key factors accounting for the limited number of joint urban
    operations training opportunities. Our recommendation is intended to
    facilitate increased multiservice participation in urban operations
    training events. Without focused leadership efforts on the part of DOD to
    ensure coordinated action among the services to establish a mechanism to
    schedule joint training, we believe that DOD will perpetuate the current
    situation in which few exercises are joint according to its definition.
    Therefore, we continue to believe our recommendation has merit.

    DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided technical
    clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense,
    Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), and the Commander,
    U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will also make copies available to others
    upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
    the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
    contact me at (202) 512-9619. Contact points for our Offices of
    Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
    of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

    Sharon L. Pickup, Director Defense Capabilities and Management

    List of Congressional Committees

    The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
    Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

    The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
    Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

    Scope and Methodology Appendix I

    To determine DOD's overall approach to training for urban operations, we
    reviewed relevant DOD plans, policies, and guidance, and other
    documentation related to urban operations training. We discussed urban
    operations training with a variety of officials from the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense, service headquarters, Joint Forces Command,
    operational units of the Army and Marine Corps, training organizations,
    and other related organizations. Specifically, we did the following:

    o To determine the extent to which DOD has made progress in establishing a
    strategy for joint urban operations training, we discussed with officials
    at Joint Forces Command and the Office of the Secretary of Defense the
    process and associated timelines for strategy development and approval. We
    attended meetings of the joint urban operations training working group and
    reviewed the draft strategy as it evolved to monitor progress towards
    strategy development and gaining buy-in from the services and combatant
    commanders. Further, we analyzed DOD's draft strategy and assessed to what
    extent it included defined joint urban operations training requirements
    and identified who needed to accomplish the requirements. Lastly, we
    reviewed legislation pertaining to this issue and determined whether DOD's
    draft strategy would address the congressional directive that DOD
    establish joint urban operations facility requirements and a training
    requirements baseline by November 1, 2005.

    o To determine the extent to which current exercises provide opportunities
    for joint urban operations training, we analyzed joint and service urban
    operations training doctrine and policy to determine how joint urban
    operations training exercises are defined, and the level of joint training
    that is required by those documents. We interviewed officials from Joint
    Forces Command and Office of the Secretary of Defense to determine the
    number of joint urban operations training exercises that have occurred
    this year. In addition, we interviewed troops who had returned from
    operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to determine how much joint urban
    training they receiving before deploying and how they felt the training
    prepared them for conducting urban operations they took part in. Lastly,
    we interviewed service trainers and observed some exercises to determine
    the level of joint urban operations training incorporated into current
    training events.

    o To determine the extent to which DOD has incorporated lessons learned
    into its urban operations training to reflect current operational
    conditions, we observed Army and Marine Corps urban operations training,
    reviewed changes made to course curriculum to incorporate real-time
    scenarios troops could expect to encounter in theater, discussed with
    officials from the Army and Marine Corps lessons learned offices and
    training centers the means of collecting and disseminating lessons
    learned, and obtained documentation on changes made to training curriculum
    and facilities based on these lessons. Further, we reviewed lessons
    learned publications and databases to assess the type and amount of
    information dealing with urban operations that are readily available to
    troops. Lastly, we interviewed troops who had returned from operations in
    Afghanistan and Iraq, many of whom were readying for a second deployment,
    to assess how lessons learned were shared in theater and the extent to
    which training had been updated since their first deployment.

    Table 2: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment

          Organizations                          Locations
    Army                Headquarters, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.
                           Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA
                           Headquarters, Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA
                           Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS
                           Combat Training Center Directorate, Fort Leavenworth,
                           KS
                           Battle Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, KS
                           1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX
                           101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY
                           10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY
                           Joint Multinational Command Training Center,
                           Grafenwoehr, Germany
                           Joint Multinational Readiness Group, Hohenfels,
                           Germany
    Marine Corps        Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Training and Education
                           Command, Quantico, VA
                           Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA
                           Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Quantico, VA
                           Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, Quantico, VA
                           March Air Reserve Base, CAa
                           Marine Corps Base, Twenty-Nine Palms, CA
                           2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, NC
    Air Force           Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, VA
    Joint Organizations The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Programs and
                           Readiness
                           Joint Training and Ranges Office, Washington, D.C.
                           Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, VA

                           o Joint Urban Operations Office

                           o Joint Warfighting Center, Capabilities Group

                           o Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons
                           Learned

    Source: GAO.

    aAs of September 2005, Marine Corps training at March Air Reserve Base was
    moved to Twenty-Nine Palms.

    Major Ongoing and Planned Urban Operations Training Facility
    Enhancements Appendix II

                 ARMY
             Enhancement                           Description
                                The shoot house is a single story, multiroom
    Shoot housea             building with multiple points of entry designed
                                for individual, squad, and platoon live-fire
                                training.
                                The urban assault course is a five-station
                                training facility that is designed to train
                                individuals, squads, and platoons. It includes a
    Urban assault coursea    two-story offense/defense building, grenadier
                                gunnery, an underground trainer, and two
                                individual-through-platoon task/technique
                                training ranges.
                                The breach facility includes wall, door, and
    Breach facilitya         window breach locations and provides training for
                                individuals, teams, and squads in breaching
                                techniques and procedures.
                                A complex of 20 - 26 buildings that provides
    Combined arms collective combined arms collective training for platoon and
    training facilitya       company situational exercises and battalion task
                                force field training exercises.
                                Shoot houses and urban assault courses have
                                limited video capture and targetry control
                                capability for enhanced safety monitoring and
    Instrumentation          rapid training feedback (after action reviews).
                                Combined arms collective training facilities have
                                limited exterior and interior video, targetry
                                control, and a more comprehensive after action
                                review capability.
                                Installations plan to add structures (shanty
                                towns) and debris (salvage cars) to the combined
                                arms collective training facility for increased
    Additional buildings     realism. These are added at little or no
                                additional cost and require no sustainment. There
                                is no dedicated funding for additional buildings
                                at this time.

    Source: U.S. Army.

    aThe Army plans to have these structures at every Brigade Combat Team home
    station, at the Combat Training Centers, and at installations identified
    as Power Projection Platforms and Power Support Platforms as prioritized
    by the Army Campaign Plan and the Army Training and Doctrine Command.

                  Marine Corps
                   Enhancement                          Description
                                           The Marine Corps is installing shoot
                                           houses to provide Marines with
                                           training on tactics, techniques, and
    Shoot houses                        procedures involved with urban
                                           shooting. The shoot houses will be
                                           installed at Camp Lejeune, Camp
                                           Pendleton, and Quantico Marine Corps
                                           bases.
                                           The live-fire convoy operations range
                                           is designed to simulate and provide
                                           live-fire convoy and counter-ambush
    Convoy operations range             training. The Marine Corps has
                                           installed a live-fire convoy range at
                                           Twenty-Nine Palms and Camp Lejeune
                                           Marine Corps bases.
                                           The non-live-fire urban operations
                                           training facilities are designed to
                                           support maneuver training, basic urban
                                           skills training, and security and
    Non-live-fire urban operations      stability training for battalion-sized
    training facilities                 units and below. The Marine Corps
                                           plans to install live-fire urban
                                           operations training facilities at
                                           Twenty-Nine Palms and Camp Lejeune
                                           Marine Corps bases.
                                           The live-fire urban operations
                                           training facility is designed to
                                           provide live-fire and maneuver
    Live-fire urban operations training training for company-sized units and
    facility                            below. The Marine Corps plans to
                                           install a live-fire urban operations
                                           training facility, consisting of 15 -
                                           30 buildings, at Camp Lejeune Marine
                                           Corps base.
                                           Adding capability at training sites to
                                           capture and record training events and
    Instrumentation                     to use the data for after action
                                           reviews, enabling the review of
                                           training events and the capture of
                                           lessons learned.
                                           Increasing the number of buildings at
                                           training sites to more realistically
    Additional buildings                replicate the urban environment where
                                           density of buildings complicates
                                           military maneuver.

    Source: U.S. Marine Corps.

    Comments from the Department of Defense Appendix III

    GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments Appendix IV

    Sharon Pickup (202) 512-9619

    In addition to the person named above, Laura Durland, Assistant Director,
    John Beauchamp, Jonathan Clark, Gina Ruidera, Susan Tindall, Cheryl A.
    Weissman, and Tracy Whitaker made key contributions to this report.

    Military Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned to Avoid Past Mistakes
    is Largely Untapped. GAO/NSIAD-95-152. Washington, D.C.: August 9, 1995.

    (350617)

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-193.

    To view the full product, including the scope

    and methodology, click on the link above.

    For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or
    PickupS@gao.gov.

    Highlights of GAO-06-193, a report to congressional committees

    December 2005

    MILITARY TRAINING

    Funding Requests for Joint Urban Operations Training and Facilities Should
    Be Based on a Sound Strategy and Requirements

    DOD emphasizes the need for joint training to prepare U.S. forces to
    conduct joint operations in urban terrain. It defines joint training as
    exercises involving the interaction of joint forces and/or joint staffs
    under a joint headquarters. To guide the services' plans to train forces
    for urban operations and construct related facilities, in May 2002, the
    Senate Armed Services Committee directed DOD to establish facility
    requirements and, in May 2005, the committee directed DOD to complete its
    efforts and provide a requirements baseline for measuring training
    capabilities within the services and across DOD by November 1, 2005. Due
    to DOD's focus on joint urban operations and congressional interest in
    synchronizing service training and facility plans, GAO, on the authority
    of the Comptroller General, reviewed the extent to which (1) DOD has
    developed a joint urban operations training strategy and related
    requirements, (2) exercises offer opportunities for joint urban operations
    training, and (3) DOD has incorporated lessons learned from ongoing
    operations into its training.

    What GAO Recommends

    GAO is making recommendations to improve DOD's approach to joint urban
    operations training. In written comments on a draft report, DOD did not
    concur with one of GAO's two recommendations. After reviewing DOD's
    comments, GAO continues to believe that both its recommendations are still
    valid.

    Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall joint
    strategy for urban operations training and related facility and training
    requirements. In response to congressional direction, Joint Forces
    Command, designated as DOD's executive agent for urban operations
    training, contracted for a study, completed in early 2005, to identify
    facility and training requirements. In May 2005, the Command began working
    with the services to review the study's results and to develop the
    detailed facility and training requirements needed to form the basis for a
    joint training strategy. While the draft strategy identifies some facility
    needs, as of October 2005, the Command and services have not reached
    consensus on the level or types of joint training exercises needed to
    prepare troops for urban operations. As a result, the Command has been
    unable to finalize the strategy or the facility and joint training
    requirements that will form the baseline for measuring capabilities within
    each service and across DOD. DOD officials told us they will not be able
    to deliver the required baseline on time and instead plan to provide
    criteria for the Congress to use in evaluating service facility plans.
    Until the Command develops an overall strategy for joint urban operations
    training and related requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor
    the Congress will have a sound basis for evaluating service training and
    facility plans, and related funding requests.

    Despite DOD's increasing emphasis on the importance of training for joint
    urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently exist for
    training that places troops from different services on the ground working
    under a joint headquarters. Joint and service doctrine both require forces
    to be prepared to operate jointly across the full range of military
    operations. Various factors account for the lack of joint training
    opportunities, such as the services' focus on service-specific skills, and
    the lack of an overall strategy requiring joint urban operations training,
    specific training requirements, and a formal mechanism to schedule joint
    training at service facilities. Without a strategy, defined requirements,
    and a joint scheduling mechanism, DOD cannot be assured that joint urban
    operations training will occur or that it will maximize the joint usage of
    training facilities.

    While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing
    operations into its training program, training and troop personnel GAO
    interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational
    experience, for further enhancing training. One of DOD's training goals is
    to train as it expects to fight. Based on feedback from ongoing
    operations, DOD has made several adjustments, including constructing urban
    structures, using civilian role players, and adding training on techniques
    to counter emerging enemy tactics. Persons GAO interviewed cited the need
    for more live-fire capability, larger numbers of role players, information
    gathering and cultural awareness training, and training with newly fielded
    equipment. While DOD plans more improvements, until it develops a strategy
    and specific requirements as discussed above, it lacks a solid basis to
    evaluate suggestions, and guide its improvement efforts and investment
    decisions.

    Related GAO Products

    Military Training: Some Improvements Have Been Made in DOD's Annual
    Training Range Reporting but It Still Fails to Fully Address Congressional
    Requirements. GAO-06-29R. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2005.

    Military Training: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to Transform
    Joint Training. GAO-05-548. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.

    Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing and
    Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support. GAO-05-556. Washington,
    D.C.: June 15, 2005.

    Military Training: Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to Improve
    Conditions of Military Training Ranges. GAO-05-534. Washington, D.C.: June
    10, 2005.

    Chemical and Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to Establish
    Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat Training Centers.
    GAO-05-8. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.

    Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management
    Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military
    Capabilities. GAO-05-70. Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2004.

    Combating Terrorism: DOD Efforts to Improve Installation Preparedness Can
    Be Enhanced with Clarified Responsibilities and Comprehensive Planning.
    GAO-04-855. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 2004.

    Military Training: DOD Report on Training Ranges Does Not Fully Address
    Congressional Reporting Requirements. GAO-04-608. Washington, D.C.: June
    4, 2004.

    Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment
    on Training Ranges. GAO-02-614. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2002.

    Military Capabilities: Focused Attention Needed to Prepare U.S. Forces for
    Combat in Urban Areas. GAO/NSIAD-00-63NI. Washington, D.C.: February 25,
    2000.
    *** End of document. ***