Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and	 
Equipment Need to be Reexamined (20-OCT-05, GAO-06-170T).	 
                                                                 
Since September 2001, the National Guard has experienced the	 
largest activation of its members since World War II. Currently, 
over 30 percent of the Army forces now in Iraq are Army National 
Guard members, and Guard forces have also carried out various	 
homeland security and large-scale disaster response roles.	 
However, continued heavy use of the Guard forces has raised	 
concerns about whether it can successfully perform and sustain	 
both missions over time. In the short term, the National Guard is
seeking additional funding for emergency equipment. GAO was asked
to comment on (1) the changing role of the Army National Guard,  
(2) whether the Army National Guard has the equipment it needs to
sustain federal and state missions, and (3) the extent to which  
DOD has strategies and plans to improve the Army National Guard's
business model for the future.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-170T					        
    ACCNO:   A40017						        
  TITLE:     Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization,
and Equipment Need to be Reexamined				 
     DATE:   10/20/2005
  SUBJECT:   Reserve Forces 				        
                                                                 

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GAO-06-170T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT RESERVE FORCES

Thursday, October 20, 2005

 Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined

Statement of David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States

GAO-06-170T

[IMG]

October 20, 2005

RESERVE FORCES

Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to Be Reexamined

  What GAO Found

The heavy reliance on National Guard forces for overseas and homeland
missions since September 2001 has resulted in readiness problems which
suggest that the current business model for the Army National Guard is not
sustainable over time. Therefore, the business model should be reexamined
in light of the current and expected national security environment,
homeland security needs, and fiscal challenges the nation faces in the
21st century. Under post-Cold War planning assumptions, the Army National
Guard was organized as a strategic reserve to be used primarily in the
later stages of a conflict after receiving additional personnel, equipment
and training. Therefore, in peacetime Army National Guard units did not
have all the equipment and personnel they would need to perform their
wartime missions. However, over 70,000 Guard personnel are now deployed
for federal missions, with thousands more activated to respond to recent
natural disasters. To provide ready forces, the Guard transferred large
numbers of personnel and equipment among units, thereby exacerbating
existing personnel and equipment shortages of non-deployed units. As a
result, the preparedness of non-deployed units for future missions is
declining.

The need to reexamine the business model for the Army National Guard is
illustrated by growing equipment shortages. As of July 2005, the Army
National Guard had transferred over 101,000 equipment items to units
deploying overseas, exhausting its inventory of some critical items, such
as radios and generators, in non-deployed units. Nondeployed Guard units
now face significant equipment shortfalls because: (1) prior to 2001, most
Army National Guard units were equipped with 65 to 79 percent of their
required war-time items and (2) Guard units returning from overseas
operations have left equipment, such as radios and trucks for follow-on
forces. The Army National Guard estimates that its units left over 64,000
items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas. However, the Army cannot
account for over half of these items and does not have a plan to replace
them, as DOD policy requires. Nondeployed Guard units now have only about
one-third of the equipment they need for their overseas missions, which
hampers their ability to prepare for future missions and conduct domestic
operations. Without a plan and funding strategy that addresses the Guard's
equipment needs for all its missions, DOD and Congress do not have
assurance that the Army has an affordable plan to improve the Guard's
equipment readiness.

DOD is taking some steps to adapt to the new security environment and
balance the Army National Guard's overseas and homeland missions. For
example, the Army has embarked on reorganization to a modular, rotational
force. Also, DOD issued a strategy for homeland defense and civil support
in June 2005. However, until DOD develops an equipping plan and funding
strategy to implement its initiatives, Congress and DOD will not have
assurance that these changes will create a new business model that can
sustain the Army National Guard affordably and effectively for the full
range of its future missions.

United States Government Accountability Office

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the critical role of the National
Guard in conducting missions at home and overseas as well as equipment
issues affecting the Army National Guard. Recent and ongoing military
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and new homeland missions have led to
higher demands on the reserve component, particularly the Army National
Guard. As we described in our previous report and testimony on the
Department of Defense's (DOD) use of the National Guard, the launch of the
Global War on Terrorism has resulted in the largest activation of National
Guard forces for overseas missions since World War II. In addition, Guard
members have been called upon to perform new homeland security missions as
well as state missions ranging from fighting forest fires to providing
hurricane relief. As of July 2005, more than 30 percent of the Army forces
deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom are National Guard members and as of
September 2005 over 50,000 National Guard personnel from over 48 states, 2
U.S. territories and the District of Columbia supported the hurricane
disaster response in the Gulf Coast.

Before I address the primary subject of this hearing, I would like to
bring an important matter to the attention of this committee relating to
the Guard and Reserves. This past Saturday evening, I had the privilege
and pleasure to attend the Annual Freedom Awards Banquet sponsored by the
National Committee of Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve here in
Washington. This year's banquet honored 15 employers, including Enterprise
Rent-a-Car and Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. who demonstrated their above
and beyond commitment to their employees who are members of the Guard or
Reserves. During the evening it became clear to me that the U.S.
Government is not leading by example or practicing what it preaches in
connection with employer support for the Guard and Reserves. GAO would
like to be able to do what many of the awardees have already done but we
are limited in doing so under current law. Namely, we believe federal
agencies should be able to make up any salary differential that activated
Guard and Reserve members might otherwise lose out of our annual
appropriation. We would also like to be able to be sure that applicable
employees and their family members continue to receive their employer
provided benefits. We and other federal employers need your help to make
this a reality.

The Army National Guard's heavy involvement in recent operations and
growing equipment problems are a reflection of the significant changes in
the security environment-changes that are occurring at a time when our
nation is threatened by growing fiscal imbalances stemming, in large part,

from an aging population and rising health care costs. If left unchecked,
these fiscal imbalances will ultimately impede economic growth, which
could impact our ability to address key national and homeland security
needs. To assist the Congress in reviewing and reconsidering federal
programs in light of changing security threats and fiscal challenges, we
have identified a number of fundamental questions that we believe
policymakers will need to address in the coming years to ensure that
federal programs and organizations are focused on the nation's highest
priority challenges and are affordable in light of fiscal projections. To
facilitate a process of reexamining the base of federal government, we
issued a report in February 2005 that identifies a number of 21st century
challenges and includes 12 reexamination areas.1 One of these areas is the
need to reassess defense programs and practices that stem from the Cold
War era. Within defense, a specific issue we believe bears review is the
need to reexamine the current business model for the reserve component.
The current business model is unsustainable, especially in light of recent
changes in how the DOD uses its reserve units. In essence, we believe that
policymakers need to focus on helping to assure that DOD has an
appropriate model for the National Guard that adequately balances the
demand for forces with appropriate human capital policies, readiness
standards, and equipping policies for all of the National Guard's
missions.

My statement today focuses on (1) challenges facing the Army National
Guard as a result of its changing role and high pace of operations, (2)
whether the Army National Guard has the equipment needed to maintain
readiness for future missions, and (3) the extent to which DOD is
transforming the Army National Guard to enhance its equipment posture and
preparedness for the future. In conjunction with this testimony, we have
also prepared a report2 at the committee's request, on Army National Guard
equipment issues and the Army's plans to convert the Army National Guard
to a modular force that equips units to support continuous overseas
operations.

1 GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb., 2005).

2 GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard
Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Transformation
Initiatives,

GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2005).

To address these objectives, we drew from previous reports on the National
Guard's use for overseas and homeland security missions3 and collected and
analyzed data to assess the status of Army National Guard equipment. To
determine the status of equipment, we analyzed information on the types
and quantities of Army National Guard equipment that have been used in
overseas operations; determined the equipment status of nondeployed units;
assessed the extent to which Army National Guard equipment has been
retained overseas to support ongoing operations; and identified some of
the equipment issues associated with responding to homeland security
missions and natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina. To assess DOD's
transformation plans, we evaluated the Army's plans to convert Guard units
to modular brigades and develop a rotational deployment model to equip
units to support continuous overseas operations. We interviewed officials
in the DOD, the Department of the Army, the National Guard Bureau, and the
Army National Guard and supplemented this information with visits to Army
commands and two units-the 30th Brigade Combat Team in North Carolina,
which deployed in February 2004, and the 48th Brigade Combat Team in
Georgia, which deployed in May 2005. We selected these units because they
enabled us to evaluate how the process used to prepare units has changed
with subsequent rotations to Operation Iraqi Freedom. We also discussed
the National Guard's response to Hurricane Katrina with senior leaders of
the National Guard and visited National Guard officials in Louisiana and
Mississippi to gain their perspectives. We conducted our review of the
National Guard's equipment status from December 2004 to October 2005 and
determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for our
objectives.

Summary 	The significant use of Army National Guard forces for overseas
and homeland missions since September 11, 2001 has resulted in declining
readiness, weakening the Army National Guard's preparedness for future
missions and indicating that DOD's business model for the Army National
Guard is unsustainable and needs to be reassessed. The current heavy
reliance on the Army National Guard for overseas operations represents a
fundamental change from the Guard's planned role as a strategic reserve
force whose principal role was to deploy in the later stages of a major

3GAO, Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in
Overseas and Homeland Missions, GAO-04-670T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29,
2204.) and Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National
Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions, GAO-05-21 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004).

conflict if needed. Under this model, which still governs how resources
are provided to the Guard, the majority of Army National Guard combat
forces are only provided with 65 to 74 percent of the people and 65 to79
percent of the equipment needed to conduct their assigned wartime
missions. Units are generally expected to receive additional personnel,
training, and equipment during a mobilization period before deploying to
support military operations. However, for operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, combatant commanders have required the Army National Guard to
provide large numbers fully manned and equipped units to conduct stability
operations on an ongoing basis. To meet these demands, the Army National
Guard has transferred thousands of personnel and equipment from
nondeployed units to support deploying units. As a result, the
preparedness of nondeployed units for future missions is declining, and
DOD's strategy of transferring large numbers of equipment and personnel
among units is showing signs of increased stress. The declining readiness
of nondeployed units could also make it more difficult for the Guard to
respond to homeland security and disaster response missions. Importantly,
DOD has not developed a system for measuring the Guard's preparedness for
such missions.

Worsening equipment shortfalls affecting the Army National Guard
illustrate the need for DOD to reexamine its strategy and plans for the
Army National Guard. As we noted in our report, National Guard Bureau
officials estimate that the Guard's nondeployed units had only about 34
percent of their essential warfighting equipment as of July 2005, after
subtracting equipment that has been left overseas, substitute items that
may be incompatible with the active component's equipment, or items that
are undergoing maintenance after being overseas. As of July 2005, the
National Guard had transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from
nondeploying units to fully equip deploying units. This practice has
depleted the Army National Guard's inventories of more than 220 critical
items, such as armored humvees, and reduced the Guard's remaining
inventory of other mission-essential items. In addition to planned
equipment shortfalls, another key reason why the equipment condition of
nondeployed units has worsened in recent months is that the Army has
required units returning from deployment to leave significant quantities
of equipment overseas for use by follow-on forces. As of June 2005, Army
National Guard units had left more than 64,000 pieces of equipment, valued
at more than $1.2 billion, overseas to support continuing operations.
Moreover, the Army cannot account for over half the equipment Army
National Guard units have left overseas and has not developed replacement
plans for the equipment as, DOD policy requires. Further, extensive use of
the Guard's equipment overseas has significantly

reduced the amount of equipment available to state governors for domestic
needs. National Guard officials believe that the National Guard's response
to Hurricane Katrina was more complicated because significant quantities
of critical equipment, such as satellite communications equipment, radios,
trucks, helicopters, and night vision goggles, were deployed to Iraq. In
the absence of a plan and funding strategy that addresses the Guard's
equipment needs for all its missions, DOD and the Congress currently do
not have assurance that the Army National Guard will be well prepared for
future missions at home or abroad, particularly those that arise on short
notice.

DOD is undertaking some initiatives to improve the Guard's equipment
readiness and to balance its multiple roles in overseas and domestic
operations. However, it is not clear whether these initiatives will be
effective in enhancing the Army National Guard's equipment posture because
DOD has not yet developed detailed plans and included funding for all the
initiatives in its budget. The Army has begun reorganizing Army National
Guard units into modular brigades and is planning to implement a
rotational deployment model in which it expects Guard units would deploy
overseas no more than about once every 6 years. However, the Army has not
yet worked out many details of these initiatives, such as what readiness
standards units will be required to maintain after returning from
deployments, what specific types of equipment Guard modular brigades will
receive and how their equipping levels will differ from the active
component, and how quickly Guard units will be provided new equipment
needed for modular formations after converting to the new modular
structure. In addition, DOD has not yet fully assessed the Guard's role
and requirements for homeland defense and civil support missions. In June
2005, DOD published a strategy for homeland defense and civil support
missions that recognizes the Army National Guard's federal and state roles
and sets out the department's overall approach to securing the nation from
attack. However, the department has not determined how it will implement
the strategy, nor has it clarified the responsibilities of the National
Guard or established specific personnel and equipment requirements for
these missions, as we recommended in our 2004 report. Until these
initiatives are more fully developed and key implementation decisions are
made, the Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh the
affordability and effectiveness of DOD's strategy for positioning the Army
National Guard to remain a relevant and sufficiently equipped force for
the future.

In the report we are publishing with this testimony, we are recommending
that DOD develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy that

Background

addresses the equipment needs of the Army National Guard and a plan for
the effective integration of the Army National Guard into its rotational
force model and modular force initiatives. DOD agreed with our
recommendations and said that it is taking actions to posture Army
National Guard forces for prolonged operations by building a rotational
force and developing resource plans for all Army units. It further noted
that the Army is taking steps to implement stricter accountability over
Guard equipment currently left in theater and is working to develop
replacement plans for these items.

As we have previously testified,4 legislative proposals involving
substantial long-term costs and commitments should be considered in the
context of the serious fiscal challenges facing this country. The federal
government's liabilities and commitments have grown from $20.4 trillion to
$43.3 trillion from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2004. This amount
continues to increase due to continuing deficits, known demographic
trends, and compounding interest costs. Furthermore, our long-range budget
simulations show that this nation faces a large and growing structural
deficit. Given the size of our projected deficit, we will not be able to
eliminate the deficit through economic growth alone. The long-term fiscal
pressures created by the impending retirement of the baby boom generation,
rising health care costs, and increased homeland security and defense
commitments intensify the need to weigh existing federal budgetary
resources against emerging new priorities. In our 21st Century Challenges
report,5 we noted that it is time for a baseline review of all major
federal programs and policies, including the military's reserve
components. 6 We have previously reported on a number of military force
management issues in the active and reserve components, including roles

4 See GAO, Long-Term Fiscal Issues: The Need for Social Security Reform,
GAO-05-318T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2005); Budget Process: Long-term
Focus Is Critical, GAO-04-585T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2004);
Long-term Budget Issues: Moving from Balancing the Budget to Balancing
Fiscal Risk, GAO-01-385T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6, 2001).

5 See GAO-05-325SP.

6 The reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces are the Army National
Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the
Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air
Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. The Selected Reserve consists
of military members assigned to organized reserve units and reservists who
participate in at least 48 scheduled drills or training periods each year
and serve on active duty for training of not less than 14 days during each
year.

and missions of the Army and Air National Guard 7and the Army Reserve8 and
the process for assessing the numbers of active duty military forces.9 We
have also reported on a number of military personnel issues, including
military compensation, health care, and recruiting and retention. In each
of these areas, questions have arisen as to whether DOD has the right
strategies to cost effectively sustain the total force in the future. In
the case of the National Guard, how this is accomplished is of particular
importance in light of its dual missions of supporting overseas operations
as well as its considerable responsibilities in its state and homeland
security roles.

The National Guard of the United States consists of two branches: the Army
National Guard and the Air National Guard. The National Guard Bureau is
the federal entity responsible for the administration of both the Army
National Guard and the Air National Guard. The Army National Guard, which
is authorized 350,000 soldiers, makes up more than one-half of the Army's
ground combat forces and one-third of its support forces (e.g., military
police and transportation units). Army National Guard units are located at
more than 3,000 armories and bases in all 50 states and 4 U.S.
territories. Traditionally, the majority of Guard members are employed on
a part-time basis, typically training 1 weekend per month and 2 weeks per
year. The Guard also employs some full-time personnel who assist unit
commanders in administrative, training, and maintenance tasks. In the past
2 years, the Army National Guard has faced increasing challenges in
recruiting new soldiers to fill authorized positions.

Army National Guard personnel may be ordered to duty under three general
statutory frameworks - Titles 10 or 32 of the United States Code or
pursuant to state law in a state active duty status. In a Title 10 status,
Army National Guard personnel are federally funded and under federal
command and control. Personnel may enter Title 10 status by being ordered
to active duty, either voluntarily or involuntarily (i.e., mobilization)
under appropriate circumstances. When Army National

7 See GAO-05-21.

8 See GAO, Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan is Needed to Address Army
Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages, GAO-05-660 (Washington, D.C.:
Jul. 2005).

9 See GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Conduct a Data-Driven Analysis
of Active Military Personnel Levels Required to Implement the Defense
Strategy, GAO-05-200 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2005).

Guard forces are activated10 under Title 10, the National Guard is subject
to the Posse Comitatus Act,11 which prohibits it from law enforcement
activities unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or law.
Personnel in Title 32 status are federally funded but under state control.
Title 32 is the status in which National Guard personnel typically perform
training for their federal mission. In addition, the federal government
reimburses states for Guard units' activities in response to
federallydesignated disasters, such as hurricane response. Personnel
performing state missions are state funded and under state command and
control. Under state law, a governor may order National Guard personnel to
respond to emergencies, civil disturbances, or perform other duties
authorized by state law. While the Army National Guard performs both
federal and state missions, the Guard is organized, trained, and equipped
for its federal missions, and these take priority over state missions.

The Guard can also be tasked with homeland security missions under the
state governors or, when activated, by DOD under command of the President.
DOD refers to its contributions to the overall homeland security effort as
"homeland defense." Homeland defense activities include military missions
within the United States, such as flying armed patrols over U.S. cities
and guarding military installations. DOD also supports civilian
authorities to provide quick response or capabilities that other agencies
do not have. The U.S. Northern Command provides command and control for
DOD's homeland defense missions, including land, air, aerospace, and
maritime defense operations, and coordinates DOD's support to civil
authorities for homeland security missions.

10 Activation refers to the ordering of units and individual members of
the reserve component, which includes the Army National Guard, to active
duty under the statutory authority granted to the President, the Congress,
or the secretaries of the military departments.

11 18 U.S.C. S: 1385. The Army and Air Force are prohibited by the Act and
the Navy and Marine Corps are prohibited by Defense Directive
5525.5.E.4.1.3.

  Declining Preparedness from High Pace of Operations Signifies A Need to
  Reexamine the Army National Guard's Business Model

As we previously reported, the high number of Army National Guard forces
used to support overseas and homeland missions since September 11, 2001,
has resulted in decreased preparedness of nondeployed Guard forces12 which
suggests the need to reassess DOD's business model for the Army National
Guard. We have previously reported that high-performing organizations must
reexamine their business models to ensure that their structures and
investment strategies enable them to meet external changes in their
operational environments efficiently and effectively.13 To meet the demand
for forces since September 11, especially for forces with special skills
that reside heavily in the Army National Guard, such as military police,
over 50 percent of Army National Guard members have been called upon to
deploy. At the same time, the Army National Guard's involvement in
operations at home has taken on higher priority since 2001. The change in
the roles and missions of the Army National Guard has not been matched
with a change in its equipping strategy that reflects its new high pace of
operations, and as a result the Army National Guard's ability to continue
to support ongoing operations is declining.

In keeping with post-Cold War planning assumptions, most Army National
Guard units were not expected to deploy in the early days of a conflict,
but to augment active duty units in the event of an extended conflict.
Therefore, the Army accepted some operational risk by providing the Army
National Guard fewer soldiers than it would need to fully equip its units
and less equipment than it would need to deploy, on the assumption that
there would be time to provide additional personnel, equipment, and
training during the mobilization process before units would deploy. For
example, as of 2004, the Army National Guard's force structure called for
about 375,000 soldiers, but it was authorized about 350,000 soldiers. In
addition, Army National Guard combat units are only provided from 65 to 74
percent of the personnel and from 65 to 79 percent of the equipment they
would need to deploy, depending on the priority assigned to their
warfighting missions.

However, after September 11, 2001, the President authorized reservists to
be activated for up to 2 years, and approximately 280,000 Army National
Guard personnel have been activated to support recent operations. As of
July 2005, about 35,500 Army National Guard members were deployed to

12 See GAO-05-21.

13 See GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002).

Iraq-nearly one-third of the 113,000 U.S. forces in theater. Army National
Guard personnel deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq are expected to serve 1
year in these countries and to spend up to several additional months
mobilizing and demobilizing. As figure 1 shows, the number of activated
Army National Guard personnel for federal missions has declined since its
peak in December 2004 and January 2005. However, the Army National Guard
continues to provide a substantial number of personnel to support current
operations.

Figure 1: Army National Guard Activity under Federal Command and Control
from September 2001 through July 2005

The Army National Guard has begun adapting its forces to meet the
warfighting requirements of current operations, but some measures taken to
meet immediate needs have made sustaining future operations more
challenging. Because its units did not have all the resources they needed
to deploy at the outset of current operations, the Army National Guard has
had to transfer personnel and equipment from nondeploying units to prepare
deploying units. We reported in November 2004 that as of May 2004, the
Army National Guard had performed over 74,000 personnel transfers and
shifted over 35,000 pieces of equipment to deploying units. These initial
transfers worsened personnel and equipment shortages in

units that were then alerted for deployment and had to be staffed and
equipped through more transfers. The cumulative effect of these personnel
and equipment transfers has been a decline in the readiness of Army
National Guard forces for future missions, both at overseas and at home.

Even as significant numbers of personnel and equipment are supporting
overseas operations, since September 11, 2001, the Army National Guard's
role in homeland security and civil support has taken on greater priority,
as demonstrated by the Guard's recent involvement in responding to
Hurricane Katrina. Since September 11, 2001, the Guard has performed other
operational duties such as providing airport security and supporting
events such as the 2004 Democratic and Republican national conventions. In
the pre-September 11 security environment, it was assumed that the
National Guard could perform its domestic roles with the personnel and
equipment it was supplied for its warfighting missions. While the Army
National Guard is implementing pilot programs to strengthen capabilities
to respond to homeland security needs, such as improving critical
infrastructure protection, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the
full spectrum of the Guard's roles and requirements for homeland security,
as we recommended.14 Until such an analysis is completed, congressional
policymakers may not be in the best position to assess whether the Army
National Guard's current structure and equipment can enable it to sustain
increased homeland security responsibilities in addition to its overseas
missions.

14 See GAO-05-21.

  Critical Equipment Shortages Have Degraded the Readiness of Nondeployed Army
  National Guard Units for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions

Increasing equipment shortages among nondeployed Army National Guard units
illustrate the need for DOD to reexamine its equipping strategy and
business model for the Army National Guard. The amount of essential
warfighting equipment nondeployed National Guard units have on hand has
continued to decrease since we last reported on the Army National Guard in
2004. Compounding the equipment shortages that have developed because most
Army National Guard units are still structured with lesser amounts of
equipment than they need to deploy, Army National Guard units have left
more than 64,000 equipment items valued at over $1.2 billion in Iraq for
use by follow-on forces; however, the Army has not developed replacement
plans for this equipment as required by DOD policy. In addition, DOD has
not determined the Army National Guard's equipment requirements for
homeland security missions, and some states are concerned about the
Guard's preparedness for future missions.

Equipment Status of Nondeployed Units Has Worsened in Recent Months due to
Challenges in Supporting Overseas Operations with Current Inventory Levels

While most Army National Guard combat units are typically provided from 65
to 79 percent of the equipment they would need for their wartime missions,
for recent operations, combatant commanders have required units to deploy
with 90 to100 percent of the equipment they are expected to need and with
equipment that is compatible with active Army units. While the Army can
supply deploying Army National Guard forces with additional equipment
after they are mobilized, nondeployed Guard units will be challenged to
maintain readiness for future missions because they transferred equipment
to deploying units and have less equipment to train with or to use for
other contingencies.

The Army National Guard began transferring people and equipment to ready
units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan in the early days of the Global
War on Terrorism and the number of transfers has grown as overseas
operations have continued. In June 2004 the Army National Guard had
transferred more than 35,000 pieces of equipment to ready units for
overseas operations.15 By July 2005, the number of equipment items
transferred among Army National Guard units had grown to more than 101,000
items. As a result of these transfers, the proportion of nondeployed units
that reported having the minimum amount of equipment they would need to
deploy16 dropped from 87 percent in

15 See GAO-05-21.

16 To meet minimum deployment criteria, a unit must generally have at
least 80 percent of its mission-essential equipment items on hand.

October 2002 to 59 percent in May 2005. However, Army National Guard
officials estimated that when substitute items which may be incompatible
with active forces, equipment undergoing maintenance, and equipment left
overseas for follow-on forces are subtracted, nondeployed units had only
about 34 percent of their essential warfighting equipment as of July 2005.
Further, as of July 2005, the Army National Guard reported that it had
less than 5 percent of the required amount or a quantity of fewer than 5
each of more than 220 critical items. Among these 220 high-demand items
were generators, trucks, and radios, which could also be useful for
domestic missions.

Retaining Army National Guard Equipment Overseas without Plans for
Replacement Hinders the Guard's Ability to Prepare and Train Units

To address equipment requirements for current overseas operations, the
Army now requires units, in both the active and reserve components, to
leave certain essential items that are in short supply in Iraq for
follow-on units to use,17 but it has not developed plans to replace Army
National Guard equipment as DOD policy requires. 18 The Army's requirement
for leaving equipment overseas is intended to reduce the amount of
equipment that has to be transported from the United States to theater, to
better enable units to meet their deployment dates, and to maintain stocks
of essential equipment in theater where it is most needed. While this
equipping approach has helped meet current operational needs, it has
continued the cycle of reducing the pool of equipment available to
nondeployed forces for responding to contingencies and for training.

The Army National Guard estimates that since 2003, it has left more than
64,000 equipment items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas to support
continuing operations, but the Army lacks visibility and cannot account
for all this equipment and has not developed plans to replace it.
According to Army officials, even though DOD policy requires the Army to
replace equipment transferred to it from the reserve component for more
than 90 days,19 the Army neither created a mechanism in the early phases
of the

17 The Army has directed that equipment purchased specifically for
Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, or other key items
currently in short supply such as armored vehicles, improvised explosive
device jammers, long-range surveillance systems, and generator sets,
remain in theater for the duration of operations.

18 DOD Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve Forces, April 7, 2005.

19 Replacement plans for removed equipment and supplies are not required
for transfers in support of force restructuring adopted as result of the
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process decisions approved
by the Secretary of Defense.

war to track Guard equipment left in theater nor prepared replacement
plans for this equipment because the practice of leaving equipment behind
was intended to be a short-term measure. As operations continued, in June
2004, the Army tasked the Army Materiel Command with overseeing equipment
retained in theater. However, according to Army and National Guard
officials, the Army Materiel Command developed plans to track only certain
high-demand equipment items that are in short supply, such as armored
humvees and other items designated to remain in theater for the duration
of the conflict. As of July 2005, the National Guard Bureau estimates that
the Army Material Command was only tracking about 45 percent of the over
64,000 equipment items the Army National Guard units have left in theater.
The tracking effort does not include over half of the equipment items,
such as cargo trucks, rough terrain forklifts, and palletized load trucks
Guard units have left behind that were only documented at the unit level
through unit property records, even though these items may remain in
theater for up to 3 years. As a result, the Guard does not know when or
whether its equipment will be returned, which challenges its ability to
prepare and train for future missions.

As operations have continued, the amount of Guard equipment retained in
theater has increased and has hampered the ability of returning Guard
units to maintain a high level of readiness and train new personnel. For
example, according to Army National Guard officials, three Illinois Army
National Guard military police units were required to leave almost all of
their humvees, about 130, in Iraq when they returned home from deployment,
so they could not conduct training to maintain the proficiency they
acquired while overseas or train new recruits. In all, the National Guard
reported that 14 military police companies left over 600 humvees and other
armored trucks overseas, and these items are expected to remain in theater
for the duration of operations.

In May 2005, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
expressed concerns about the significant amount of equipment Army National
Guard units have left overseas and directed the Army to develop
replacement plans as required by DOD policy.20 The Army expects to
complete its plans to replace stay behind equipment by October 2005. While
Army officials have stated that the equipment tracked by individual

20 The Comptroller General plans to initiate additional work on
accountability for equipment left overseas this fall. That work will
further explore strategies to manage this equipment and address the
ramifications of plans for the disposition of this equipment.

units may eventually be returned to the Guard, both Army and Army National
Guard officials said that even if this equipment is eventually returned,
its condition is likely to be poor given its heavy use and some of it will
likely need to be replaced. Until the Army develops plans to replace the
equipment, including identifying timetables and funding sources, the
National Guard will continue to face critical equipment shortages that
reduce its readiness for future missions and it will be challenged to
train and prepare for future missions. In the report we are publishing
concurrently with the testimony,21 we recommended that DOD develop and
submit to the Congress a plan and funding strategy that address the
equipment needs of the Army National Guard for the Global War on Terrorism
and how the Army will transition from short-term equipping measures to
long-term equipping solutions. DOD agreed with this recommendation,
stating in its written comments that the Army needs to determine how Army
National Guard forces will be equipped to meet state disaster response and
potential homeland defense requirements and include these requirements in
its resource priorities. We believe that such a plan should address the
measures the Army will take to ensure it complies with existing DOD
directives to safeguard reserve component equipment readiness.

States Are Concerned about Preparedness for Future Domestic Missions in
Light of Growing Army National Guard Equipment Shortages

While Army National Guard forces have supported a range of homeland
security missions since September 11, 2001, states are concerned about the
Guard's ability to perform future domestic missions given its declining
equipment status. For example, New Jersey officials told us that Army
National Guard units lacked some essential equipment, such as chemical
protective suits and nerve agent antidotes; they needed to respond to a
terrorist threat in December 2003. More recently, Louisiana Army National
Guard units lacked some key items they needed to conduct large-scale
disaster response. According to National Guard officials, at the time
Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf coast, much of the Guard's most modern
equipment was deployed to Iraq while less capable equipment remained in
the United States. We are currently examining the federal response to
Hurricane Katrina, including the roles of DOD's active duty and reserve
forces. At the time of the hurricane over 8,200 personnel and two brigade
sets of equipment from the 155th Armored Brigade of Mississippi and the
256th Infantry Brigade of Louisiana were deployed in support of Operation
Iraqi Freedom and were not available to perform their domestic missions.

21 See GAO-06-111.

Furthermore, the Adjutant General of Louisiana reported to the Army
National Guard in August 2005 that based on their analysis of the state
Guard's equipment for state missions, even after the 256th Infantry
Brigade returned home from deployment, the brigade would lack about 350
essential equipment items needed for hurricane response including trucks,
humvees, wreckers, and water trailers because it was required to leave a
majority of its equipment items in Iraq. When we visited the area in
October 2005, Louisiana National Guard officials particularly noted that
more radios would have enabled them to communicate with other forces and
more vehicles that could be used in high water would have been very
helpful.

Louisiana and Mississippi, like many other states, have entered into
mutual assistance agreements with other states to provide additional
National Guard forces in times of need, typically to facilitate natural
disaster response.22 Under such agreements, in August and September 2005,
over 50,000 National Guard personnel from 48 states, 2 U.S. territories
and the District of Columbia responded to the devastation caused by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the Gulf Coast region. According to
Louisiana officials, state partners were proactive in identifying troops
to send to the area when the magnitude of the storm was anticipated. These
forces brought with them additional equipment such as key command and
control equipment and aviation assets.

22 While the mutual support arrangements, called Emergency Management
Assistance Compacts, have been useful in responding to natural disasters,
it is not clear whether these arrangements will always meet the states'
needs for forces or capabilities for homeland security missions because
states can withhold forces if they are needed in their home state.

  DOD and Army Have Some Initiatives to Improve Future Readiness of Army
  National Guard Forces but Has Not Developed Detailed Implementation and
  Funding Plans

DOD, and the Army have recognized the need to transform the Army National
Guard to meet the new threats of the 21st century and support civil
authorities, and are undertaking some initiatives to improve the Guard's
organization and readiness for these missions. However, it is too early to
determine whether these initiatives together comprise a sustainable
equipping and funding model for the future because implementation plans
are not complete and funding strategies have not been fully identified.
For example, the Army has not decided how to manage equipment to ready
forces as they move through the proposed rotational force model. In
addition, while DOD has produced a strategy for homeland defense and civil
support in June 2005, it has not yet completed a plan to implement that
strategy, including clarifying the Army National Guard's role and
assessing what capabilities the Guard will require for domestic missions,
as we previously recommended. Until these initiatives are more fully
developed and key implementation decisions are made, DOD and the Congress
will not be in a sound position to weigh their affordability and
effectiveness, and the Army National Guard will be challenged to train and
prepare for all its future missions.

Army Converting Guard to Modular Designs, but Plans and Cost Estimates for
Equipping Units Are Incomplete

In 2004, the Army developed a plan to restructure Army forces, including
the Army National Guard, to become more flexible and capable of achieving
a wide range of missions, but it has not yet completed detailed
implementation plans or cost estimates for its transformation. Rather than
being organized around divisions, the Army will transform to an
organization based on standardized, modular brigades that can be tailored
to meet the specific needs of the combatant commander. Two primary goals
of this new structure are to standardize designs and equipment
requirements for both active and reserve units and maintain reserve units
at a higher level of readiness than in the past. While the Army plans to
convert most Army National Guard units to the modular organizational
structure by 2008, Guard forces will not be fully equipped for the new
design until 2011 at the earliest. The Army had originally planned to
convert Guard units on a slower schedule by 2010, but at the request of
the Army National Guard, accelerated the conversions so that Guard units
would share the new standardized organizational designs with the active
component at least 2 years earlier, which is expected to help avoid
training soldiers for the previous skill mix and better facilitate
recruiting and retention efforts. However, our work indicates that
accelerated modular conversions will exacerbate near-term equipment
shortfalls for three key reasons. First, according to current plans, units
will be expected to convert to the new modular designs with the equipment
they have on hand. However, because of existing shortages and the large
number of

equipment items that deployed units have left in Iraq or that need repair
or replacement due to heavy use, units will not have the equipment needed
for their new unit designs. For example, converted Guard units expect
initially to be without some key equipment items that provide improved
capabilities, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, single channel ground and
airborne radio systems, and Javelin antitank missiles. Second, the Army
has not planned funding to provide equipment based on the new conversion
schedule. Instead, the Army plans to proceed with the original equipping
schedule, which will not equip the Guard's modular force until at least
2011. Army resourcing policy gives higher priority to units engaged in
operations or preparing to deploy than those undergoing modular
conversions. As a result, the requirements of ongoing operations will
continue to deplete the Army National Guard's equipment resources and will
affect the pace at which equipment will be available for nondeployed units
to transform to the modular design. In the meantime, modular Guard units
are expected to continue using equipment that may be older than their
active counterparts' and will initially lack some key enablers, such as
communications systems, which are the basis for the improved effectiveness
of modular units.

In addition to the equipment shortfalls and lack of comparability that are
projected for near-term Guard conversions, the Army's initial estimate of
$15.6 billion through 2011 for converting Guard units to modular designs
is incomplete and likely to grow for several reasons. First, the Army's
cost estimate was based on a less modern equipping plan than the design
the Army tested for the new brigades. Second, the estimate does not
include costs for 10 of the Guard's support units, nor does it include
nearly $1.4 billion that the Guard currently estimates is needed for
military construction costs associated with the modular conversion of the
Guard's 40 support units. Third, current cost estimates assume that Guard
equipment inventories will be at prewar levels and available for modular
conversions. This, however, may not be a reasonable assumption because as
discussed previously, Army National Guard units have left large amounts of
equipment overseas, some of which will be retained indefinitely, and the
Army has not provided plans for its replacement. The lack of complete
equipping requirements and cost estimates for converting the Army National
Guard to the new modular structure raises concerns about the affordability
and effectiveness of this multibillion dollar restructuring effort.
Furthermore, without more detailed data, the Congress may not have
sufficient information to fully evaluate the adequacy of the Army's
funding requests for its modular force initiative.

Army Plans for Managing Equipment under Its Rotational Force Model Are Not
Complete

While the Army plans to transform into a rotational force, it has not yet
finalized plans for how Army National Guard units will be equipped under
its new model. The rotational force model is intended to provide units
with a predictable cycle of increasing readiness for potential
mobilization once every 6 years. As such, it involves a major change in
the way the Army planned to use its reserve forces and has implications
for the amount and types of equipment that Army National Guard units will
need for training to improve their readiness as they progress through the
cycle. Under the rotational force concept, rather than maintain units at
less than full readiness, the Army would cycle Army National Guard units
through phases of increasing readiness and provide increasing amounts of
equipment to units as they move through three training phases and near
readiness with the goal of predictable availability for potential
deployment once in a 6-year period.

While the Army has developed a general proposal to equip units according
to the readiness requirements of each phase of the rotational force model,
it has not yet detailed the types and quantities of items required in each
phase. Under this proposal, the Army National Guard would have three types
of equipment sets: baseline sets, training sets, and deployment sets. The
baseline set would vary by unit type and assigned mission and the
equipment it includes could be significantly reduced from the amount
called for in the unit design, but plans call for it to provide at least
the equipment Guard units would need for domestic missions, although this
standard has not been defined. Training sets would include more of the
equipment units will need to be ready for deployment, but units would
share equipment that would be located at training sites throughout the
country. The deployment set would include all equipment needed for
deployment, including theater-specific equipment, items provided through
operational needs statements, and equipment from Army prepositioned
stocks. At the time of our report, the Army was still developing the
proposals for what would be included in the three equipment sets and
planned to publish the final requirements in December 2005.

At present, it is not clear how the equipment requirements associated with
supporting deployment under the new rotational readiness cycle will affect
the types and quantities of items available for converting the Army
National Guard to a modular force. Until the near-term requirements for
the rotational model and long-term requirements for a modular force are
fully defined and integrated, the cost of equipment needed to most
efficiently implement the two initiatives will not be clear. Without firm
decisions as to requirements for both the new modular structure and
rotational deployment model and a plan that integrates requirements, the

Army and Army National Guard are not in a position to develop complete
cost estimates or to determine whether the modular and rotation
initiatives will maintain the Guard's readiness for all its missions,
including warfighting, homeland security, and traditional state missions
such as disaster response. In our report,23 we recommend that DOD develop
and submit to the Congress a plan for the effective integration of the
Army National Guard into the Army's rotational force model and modular
initiatives. We recommended that this plan include the equipment
requirements, costs, timelines and funding strategy for converting Army
National Guard units to the modular force and the extent to which the Army
National Guard will have the types of equipment and equipment levels
comparable to the active modular units. We further recommended that the
plan include an analysis of the equipment the Army National Guard's units
will need for their missions in each phase of the rotational cycle and how
the Army will manage implementation risks to modular forces if full
funding is not provided on expected timelines. DOD agreed with our
recommendation.

DOD Has Developed a Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, but
Identification of Requirements and Readiness Measures Are Not Complete

In June 2005, DOD published its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
Support, which recognizes the National Guard's critical role in these
missions in both its federal and state capacities. However, the strategy
does not detail what the Army National Guard's role or requirements will
be in implementing the strategy. DOD has not yet completed a review of the
full range of the Army National Guard's missions and the assets it will
need to successfully execute them. In the absence of such requirements,
National Guard units will continue to be structured and funded largely for
their warfighting roles, and with the exception of certain specialized
units, such as weapons of mass destruction civil support teams, Army
National Guard forces are generally expected to perform civil support
missions with either the resources supplied for their warfighting missions
or equipment supplied by states.

In its homeland defense and civil support strategy,24 DOD sets goals of

(1) maximizing threat awareness; (2) deterring or defeating threats away
from the U.S. homeland; (3) achieving mission assurance in performance

23 See GAO-06-111.

24 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support
(Washington, D.C.: Jun. 2005).

of assigned duties under attack or after disruption; (4) supporting civil
authorities in minimizing the damage and recovering from domestic
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive mass
casualty attacks; and (5) improving national and international
capabilities for homeland defense and homeland security. The strategy
recognizes the need to manage risks in the homeland defense and civil
support mission areas given resource challenges the department faces in
performing all its missions. Therefore, the strategy puts first priority
on homeland defense missions that the department will lead, with second
priority on ensuring the department's ability to support civil authorities
in the event of multiple mass casualties from chemical, biological,
radiation, or nuclear incidents within the United States.

To accomplish these goals, DOD has noted that it will have to integrate
strategy, planning, and operational capabilities for homeland defense and
civil support more fully into its processes. It plans to implement its
strategy with dual-purpose forces that are simultaneously trained and
equipped for warfighting and homeland missions. The strategy recognizes
that National Guard forces not on federal active duty can respond quickly
to perform homeland defense and homeland security within U.S. territory
and are particularly well suited for civil support missions because of
their locations across the nation and experience in supporting neighboring
communities in times of crisis. Based on this strategy, U.S. Northern
Command has been tasked to develop detailed contingency plans to identify
the full range of forces and resources needed for the homeland missions
DOD may lead or the civil support missions in which active or reserve
forces should be prepared to assist federal or state authorities. However,
it is not clear when this effort will be completed.

DOD has taken some steps to develop additional information on the National
Guard's readiness for some of its domestic missions. In August 2005, the
Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) directed the National
Guard to include readiness assessments for both its Title 10 (federal
missions) and Title 32 (state missions conducted with federal funding) in
the department's new readiness reporting system, the Defense Readiness
Reporting System, which is scheduled for implementation in 2007. The new
system is expected provide officials better visibility into unit readiness
by reporting standardized metrics rather than general categories of
readiness. The National Guard Bureau is also preparing a report for the
Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) on concepts for
reporting the Guard's readiness for domestic missions and plans to prepare
a detailed implementation plan by mid-January 2006. Until detailed
concepts and implementation for these plans for domestic

readiness reporting are developed and approved, it is not clear whether
they will fully meet the recommendation in our prior report that DOD
establish readiness standards and measures for the full range of the
Guard's homeland missions so that readiness for these missions can be
systematically measured and accurately reported.

As we reported in 2004, some states expressed concerns about the Army
National Guard's preparedness to undertake state missions, including
supporting homeland security missions and disaster relief, given the
increase in overseas deployments and the shortages of personnel and
equipment among the remaining Guard units. Moreover, to meet new threats,
some homeland security missions could require training and equipment, such
as decontamination training and equipment that differ from that needed to
support warfighting missions. Some Guard officials noted that states have
limited budgets and that homeland security requirements compete with other
needs, although the states have funded some homeland security activities,
such as guarding critical infrastructure, and have purchased some
equipment for homeland security purposes.

To address some potential homeland security needs, DOD began establishing
weapons of mass destruction civil support teams within the Army National
Guard, as authorized by Presidential Directive and the Congress in fiscal
year 1999. These teams, which are comprised of 22 fulltime personnel, are
maintained at high readiness levels and can respond rapidly to assist
local officials in determining the nature of an attack, provide medical
and technical advice, and help identify follow-on federal and state assets
that might be needed. These teams are unique because they are federally
funded and trained, but perform their missions under the command and
control of the state governor. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the
Louisiana civil support team provided command and control technology that
was valuable in responding to this natural disaster.

Conclusions 	While strategies such as transferring large numbers of Army
National Guard personnel and equipment from non-deploying units to
deploying units and leaving Guard equipment overseas have met DOD's
immediate needs to support overseas operations, these strategies are not
sustainable in the long term, especially as increasing numbers of Army
National Guard personnel have already been deployed for as long as 2
years, recruiting challenges have arisen, and equipment challenges have
increased. The current status of the Army's equipment inventory is one
symptom of the much larger problem of an outdated business model. Critical
shortages of deployable equipment and the Army's lack of accountability
over the Army

National Guard's equipment retained overseas have created considerable
uncertainty about what equipment the Guard will have available for
training and domestic missions, and DOD has not developed detailed plans
that include timeframes and identify resources for replacing equipment
that has been heavily used or left overseas in the short term. Without
replacement plans for equipment its units left overseas, Army National
Guard units are unable to plan for training and equipping forces for
future missions. Moreover, without a broader rethinking of the basis for
Army National Guard equipment requirements that considers both overseas
and homeland security requirements, preparedness will continue to decline
and the Guard may not be well positioned to respond to future overseas or
homeland missions or contingencies. As a result, we are recommending that
DOD develop an equipping strategy that addresses how the Army National
Guard will transition from short-term equipping measures to long-term
solutions.

DOD and the Army are implementing some initiatives to transform the Army
National Guard so that it can better support a broader range of missions
in light of the new security environment characterized by new threats,
including global terrorism. These initiatives include establishing modular
brigades; establishing a rotational model that seeks to target equipment
to a unit's expected mission; and clarifying the Guard's role, training,
and equipment needs for homeland security missions. However, supporting
ongoing operations will continue to strain Army National Guard equipment
inventories, and, under current plans, equipping Guard units for new
modular designs will take several years. Further, it is not clear that
these initiatives will result in a comprehensive and integrated strategy
for ensuring that the Army National Guard is well prepared for overseas
missions, homeland security needs, and state missions such as responding
to natural disasters. We are therefore making recommendations to better
integrate its initiatives. In this regard, we believe that the Congress
and senior DOD leadership must be ready to play a key role in pressing the
Army to provide more detailed plans for these initiatives and outlining
the specific funding required to implement them in the most efficient
manner.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond
to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have.

GAO Contacts and 	For more information regarding this testimony, please
contact Janet St. Laurent, Director, at (202) 512-4402. Individuals making
key contributions

Acknowledgments 	to this testimony include Margaret Morgan, Assistant
Director; Frank Cristinzio; Alissa Czyz; Curtis Groves; Nicole Harms; Tina
Morgan Kirschbaum; Kim Mayo; Kenneth Patton; Jay Smale; and Suzanne Wren.

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