Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: Poor Planning Has Complicated
DOE's Plutonium Consolidation Efforts (07-OCT-05, GAO-06-164T).
Plutonium is very hazardous to human health and the environment
and requires extensive security because of its potential use in a
nuclear weapon. The Department of Energy (DOE) stores about 50
metric tons of plutonium that is no longer needed by the United
States for nuclear weapons. Some of this plutonium is in the form
of contaminated metal, oxides, solutions, and residues remaining
from the nuclear weapons production process. To improve security
and reduce storage costs, DOE plans to establish enough storage
capacity at its Savannah River Site (SRS) in the event it decides
to consolidate its plutonium there until it can be permanently
disposed of. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which DOE
can consolidate this plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS's capacity to
monitor plutonium storage containers.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-164T
ACCNO: A39257
TITLE: Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: Poor Planning Has
Complicated DOE's Plutonium Consolidation Efforts
DATE: 10/07/2005
SUBJECT: Counterterrorism
Hazardous substances
Health hazards
Homeland security
Nuclear facility security
Nuclear fuel plant security
Nuclear waste management
Nuclear waste storage
Radiation safety
Safety standards
Strategic planning
Nuclear waste disposal
Radioactive waste disposal
Monitoring
Nuclear materials
Plutonium
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GAO-06-164T
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 9:30 a.m. EDT SECURING U.S. NUCLEAR
Friday, October 7, 2005
MATERIALS
Poor Planning Has Complicated DOE's Plutonium Consolidation Efforts
Statement of Gene Aloise, Director Natural Resources and Environment
GAO-06-164T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the Department of
Energy's (DOE) efforts to consolidate surplus plutonium. My testimony
today is based on our report issued in July 2005, entitled Securing U.S.
Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to Take Action to Safely Consolidate
Plutonium (GAO-05-665).
DOE stores about 50 metric tons of plutonium that is no longer needed by
the United States for nuclear weapons. Some of this plutonium is in the
form of contaminated metal, oxides, solutions, and residues remaining from
the nuclear weapons production process. When the United States stopped
producing nuclear weapons in 1989, it had plutonium inventories located in
numerous DOE facilities throughout the United States, including the
Hanford Site in Washington, the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site
in Colorado, the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, and the Savannah
River Site (SRS) in South Carolina. DOE recognizes that consolidation
could reduce costs and improve security for stored plutonium. Although DOE
has not made a final decision to consolidate, it has proceeded with plans
to establish enough storage capacity at SRS in the event it decides to
consolidate its plutonium at SRS until it can be processed into a form for
permanent disposition and disposed of in a geological repository at Yucca
Mountain, Nevada.
Plutonium is very hazardous to human health and the environment. Inhaling
a few micrograms creates a long-term risk of lung, liver, and bone cancer
and inhaling larger doses can cause immediate lung injuries and death. In
certain forms, plutonium can spontaneously combust in the presence of
oxygen at temperatures above room temperature. Because of these hazards,
plutonium must be stabilized and packaged appropriately to minimize the
risk of accidental release. In addition, facilities storing plutonium must
be properly equipped with safety systems that prevent it from escaping
into the surrounding air, land, or water in the event a storage container
is breached.
In 2003, DOE issued a technical standard for plutonium storage that it
believes will allow it to safely store plutonium for a minimum of 50
years. DOE is nearing completion of a multiyear effort to stabilize and
package plutonium at its sites across the United States into 5-inch-wide,
10-inchlong storage containers. Under DOE's standard, once the plutonium
is safely packaged, DOE must periodically monitor the storage containers
for changes in the plutonium's condition, particularly any pressurization
or
corrosion of the containers. Such monitoring includes annually x-raying a
sample of storage containers to evaluate potential pressurization. Storage
containers may also be cut open to evaluate the plutonium inside and the
container itself for potential corrosion. An effective monitoring program
is intended to detect damaged storage containers or inadequately
stabilized plutonium and will help ensure the continued safe storage of
the material.
In addition to plutonium's health and environmental hazards, DOE has long
recognized that a successful terrorist attack on a site containing
plutonium could have devastating consequences for the site and its
surrounding communities. Therefore, plutonium requires extensive security
because of its potential use in a nuclear weapon; to create an improvised
nuclear device; and to create a so-called "dirty bomb," in which
conventional explosives are used to disperse radioactive material. For
many years, a key component of DOE security has been the development of
the design basis threat, a classified document that identifies the
potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces. Since September 11,
2001, the size of the potential threat has increased significantly and DOE
is facing challenges in improving its security measures to respond to the
1
increased threat.
Our July 2005 report examined (1) the extent to which DOE can consolidate
its plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS's capacity to monitor plutonium storage
containers. We reviewed plutonium storage, monitoring, and security plans
and reports prepared by DOE's Office of Environmental Management, DOE's
Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, and National Nuclear
Security Administration; DOE's operating contractor for SRS (Westinghouse
Savannah River Company); and DOE's security contractor for SRS (Wackenhut
Services, Inc.). In addition, we reviewed studies on plutonium storage at
SRS and interviewed officials with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, an independent federal agency established by the Congress in 1988
to oversee the safety of DOE's nuclear weapons complex. The work on our
report was conducted from June 2004 through June 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
1See GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before
It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-623 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 27, 2004) and GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under
Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt,
Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-05-611
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2005).
In summary, DOE cannot consolidate all of its plutonium at SRS. DOE has
not yet completed a plan to process the plutonium into a form for
permanent disposition, as required by the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without such a plan, DOE cannot ship additional
plutonium to SRS. In addition, DOE's plutonium consolidation efforts have
been hindered because DOE relied upon its individual sites to
independently develop plans to achieve their own goals instead of
developing an integrated consolidation plan. Specifically, Hanford was
preparing to ship plutonium to SRS as part of its efforts to accelerate
the cleanup and demolition of its closed nuclear facilities. About
one-fifth of Hanford's plutonium is in the form of 12-foot-long nuclear
fuel rods. Because disassembling the fuel rods would delay cleanup
activities, Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan calls for shipping these
rods intact to SRS inside special shipping containers. However, SRS's
storage plan assumed Hanford would disassemble the fuel rods and package
the plutonium in DOE's standard storage containers. Despite these
inconsistencies, DOE approved both Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan and
SRS's plutonium storage plans. Although SRS's plutonium storage facility
has sufficient space to store the fuel rods, several steps are necessary
before DOE would be able to ship the fuel rods to SRS, including obtaining
Department of Transportation certified shipping containers for the fuel
rods. However, until DOE develops a plan to process the plutonium for
permanent disposition, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS and
DOE will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that
plutonium consolidation could offer. In particular, continued plutonium
storage at Hanford will cost approximately $85 million more annually
because of increasing security requirements and will threaten that site's
achievement of the milestones in its accelerated cleanup plan.
In addition, DOE currently lacks the capability at SRS to fully monitor
the plutonium storage containers as required by DOE's storage standard.
According to the Safety Board, the facility at SRS that DOE plans to use
to store the plutonium-Building 105-K-is not equipped to conduct the
needed monitoring of storage containers. In fact, because Building 105-K
lacks adequate fire protection, ventilation, and filtration, DOE's
standard storage containers cannot be removed from their outer
packaging-35gallon steel drums used to ship the containers to SRS. Without
a monitoring capability that would detect whether the stored plutonium is
becoming unstable and damaging the storage containers, DOE faces increased
risks of an accidental plutonium release at SRS that could harm workers,
the public, and the environment. Because Building 105-K lacks the
capability to monitor stored plutonium, DOE had planned to construct
a monitoring capability in another building at SRS-Building 235-F-that
already had the ventilation and filtration systems needed to work with
plutonium. However, following changes in 2004 to DOE's design basis
threat, Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security to conduct
all of the monitoring activities required by DOE's storage standard. In
addition, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has reported that,
like Building 105-K storage facility, Building 235-F lacks adequate fire
protection as well as having other serious safety concerns. Given these
challenges, DOE announced in April 2005 that it would have Building 105-K
upgraded to allow storage and monitoring activities to be centralized in
one facility.
In our report, we made two recommendations to ensure that DOE develops a
comprehensive strategy for plutonium consolidation, storage, and
disposition and that its facilities cleanup plans are consistent with this
strategy. DOE generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that
its recently created Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation
Coordination Committee will develop a strategic plan for the consolidation
and disposition of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Since our report
was issued in July 2005, DOE's committee has been continuing with its work
developing the strategic plan.
To address the problems associated with unstable forms of plutonium and
inadequate packaging for long-term storage, DOE established a standard for
the safe storage of plutonium for a minimum of 50 years that sets
plutonium stabilization and packaging requirements. Stabilization is
achieved by heating the material to remove moisture that could lead to a
buildup of pressure, which would increase the risk of rupturing a
container. Plutonium storage containers designed to meet the standard
consist of an inner and outer container, each welded shut. The inner
container is designed so that it can be monitored for a buildup of
pressure using analytical techniques, such as radiography, that do not
damage the container. Containers must also be resistant to fire, leakage,
and corrosion.
Plutonium stabilization and packaging are completed at Rocky Flats,
Hanford, and SRS, and SRS has already received nearly 1,900 containers
from Rocky Flats. Stabilization and packaging are still ongoing at
Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories. Once
stabilization and packaging are completed, DOE estimates that it will have
nearly 5,700 plutonium storage containers stored at locations across the
United States that could eventually be shipped to SRS.
Background
SRS's plutonium storage plans originally called for the construction of a
state-of-the-art Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility that would have
provided long-term storage and monitoring of standard plutonium containers
in a secure environment. DOE changed its storage plans and cancelled the
project in 2001 because it expected to store the plutonium for only a few
years until a facility to process the plutonium for permanent disposition
was available. Instead of building a new facility, DOE decided to use two
existing buildings at SRS for plutonium storage and monitoring operations:
Building 105-K and Building 235-F. Building 105-K was originally a nuclear
reactor built in the early 1950s and produced plutonium and tritium until
1988. The reactor was then placed in a cold standby condition until its
complete shutdown in 1996. The major reactor components were removed and
the facility is now primarily used to store plutonium and highly enriched
uranium. Building 235-F was also constructed in the 1950s and was used
until the mid-1980s to produce plutonium heat sources that were used to
power space probes for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
and the Department of Defense. The building is currently used to store
plutonium.
After the design basis threat was changed in October 2004, SRS was forced
once again to reevaluate its storage plans. Because the new design basis
threat substantially increased the potential threat that SRS must defend
against, Building 105-K and Building 235-F would need extensive and
expensive upgrades to comply with the new requirements. SRS estimated the
total cost of this additional security at over $300 million. SRS further
estimated that it could save more than $120 million by not using Building
235-F for storage and therefore decided in April 2005 to consolidate
plutonium storage in Building 105-K.
DOE cannot consolidate its excess plutonium at SRS for several reasons.
First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium into a form
for permanent disposition, as required by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002.2 DOE proposed two facilities at
SRS to process its surplus plutonium into a form for permanent
disposition: a mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility to convert plutonium
into fuel rods for use in nuclear power plants and a plutonium
immobilization plant where plutonium would be mixed with ceramics, the
mixture placed in large canisters, and the canisters then filled with
high-
DOE Cannot Currently Consolidate Its Plutonium at SRS
2Pub. L. No. 107-107, S: 3155, 115 Stat. 1378 (2001).
level radioactive waste. The canisters would then be permanently disposed
of at Yucca Mountain. In 2002, citing budgetary constraints, DOE cancelled
the plutonium immobilization plant, eliminating the pathway to process its
most heavily contaminated plutonium into a form suitable for permanent
disposition. Section 3155 of the act provides that if DOE decides not to
construct either of two proposed plutonium disposition facilities at SRS,
DOE is prohibited from shipping plutonium to SRS until a plan to process
the material for permanent disposition is developed and submitted to the
Congress. To date, DOE has not developed a disposition plan for the
plutonium that would have been processed in the immobilization plant. In
its fiscal year 2006 budget, DOE requested $10 million to initiate
conceptual design of a facility that would process this plutonium.
However, it is uncertain when this design work would be completed and a
plan prepared.
Second, even if a plan to process this plutonium for permanent disposition
had been developed and DOE were able to ship the plutonium, SRS would
still be unable to accommodate some of Hanford's plutonium because
Hanford's accelerated cleanup plans and SRS's storage plans are
inconsistent with one another. DOE approved both plans even though
Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan called for shipping some of its
plutonium to SRS in a form that SRS had not planned on storing.
Hanford stores nearly one-fifth of its plutonium in the form of
12-foot-long nuclear fuel rods, with the remainder in about 2,300 DOE
standard 5-inchwide, 10-inch-long storage containers. The fuel rods were
to be used in Hanford's Fast Flux Test Facility reactor. The reactor has
been closed, and the fuel rods were never used. Hanford's plutonium is
currently being stored at the site's Plutonium Finishing Plant-the storage
containers in vaults and the nuclear fuel rods in large casks inside a
fenced area. Hanford was preparing to ship plutonium to SRS as part of its
efforts to accelerate the cleanup and demolition of its closed nuclear
facilities. Although Hanford's original cleanup plan called for
demolishing the Plutonium Finishing Plant by 2038, the plan was modified
in 2002 to accelerate the site's cleanup. Hanford's accelerated cleanup
plan that was approved by DOE's Office of Environmental Management now
calls for shipping the storage containers and nuclear fuel rods to SRS by
the end of fiscal year 2006 so that Hanford can demolish the Plutonium
Finishing Plant by the end of fiscal year 2008. To meet the new deadline,
Hanford planned to ship the fuel rods intact to SRS.
Nevertheless, SRS's July 2004 plutonium storage plan stated that Hanford
would cut the fuel rods and package the plutonium in approximately 1,000
DOE standard storage containers before shipping the material to SRS.
Although Building 105-K has space to store the fuel rods intact, several
steps would be necessary before DOE could ship the fuel rods from Hanford
to SRS. First, there is currently no Department of Transportationcertified
shipping container that could be used to package and ship the fuel rods.
In addition, SRS would be required, among other things, to prepare the
appropriate analyses and documentation under the National Environmental
Policy Act and update Building 105-K's safety documentation to include
storage of the fuel rods. Wherever the fuel rods are stored, they would
have to be disassembled before processing the plutonium for permanent
disposition. Hanford and SRS currently lack the capability to disassemble
the fuel rods, but DOE plans to study establishing that capability at SRS
as part of its conceptual design of a facility to process the plutonium
for disposition.
The challenges DOE faces storing its plutonium stem from the department's
failure to adequately plan for plutonium consolidation. DOE has not
developed a complexwide, comprehensive strategy for plutonium
consolidation and disposition that accounts for each of its facilities'
requirements and capabilities. Until DOE is able to develop a permanent
disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS, and DOE
will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that plutonium
consolidation could offer. According to DOE officials, the impact of
continued storage at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore will be relatively
minor because both laboratories had already planned to maintain plutonium
storage facilities for other laboratory missions. However, according to
Hanford officials, continued storage at Hanford could cost approximately
$85 million more annually because of increasing security requirements and
will threaten the achievement of the goals in the site's accelerated
cleanup plan. Specifically, maintaining storage vaults at Hanford's
Plutonium Finishing Plant will prevent the site from demolishing the plant
as scheduled by September 2008.
DOE Cannot Currently Fully Monitor the Condition of Stored Plutonium
Under DOE's plutonium storage standard, storage containers must be
periodically monitored to ensure continued safe storage. Without a
monitoring capability that can detect whether storage containers are at
risk of rupturing, there is an increased risk of an accidental plutonium
release that could harm workers, the public, and the environment.
Monitoring activities must occur in a facility that, among other things,
is equipped to confine accidentally released plutonium through effective
ventilation and appropriate filters. In addition, the facility must have a
fire
protection system to protect storage containers and prevent their contents
from being released in a major fire.
According to the Safety Board, Building 105-K is not currently equipped
with adequate ventilation or fire protection. Specifically, SRS removed
the High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters that were used in the
building's ventilation system when it was a nuclear reactor. Such filters
could prevent plutonium from escaping the building in the event of a
release from the storage containers. In addition, Building 105-K lacks
automatic fire detection or suppression systems. As a result, plutonium
storage containers cannot safely be removed from inside the outer
packaging used to ship the containers to SRS. The outer package-a 35gallon
steel drum-is used to ship a single storage container and is designed to
resist damage during transportation and handling. The outer package
confines the plutonium in the event the storage container inside is
breached. In addition, the outer package provides an additional layer of
protection from fire for the storage container inside.
Because monitoring requires x-raying individual storage containers and, in
some cases, puncturing and cutting storage containers to analyze the
condition of the container and the plutonium within, the storage
containers must be removed from their outer packaging. SRS plans to
establish a capability to restabilize the plutonium by heating it in a
specialized furnace in the event monitoring determines that the stored
plutonium is becoming unstable (i.e., increasing the risk of rupturing a
storage container). The restablized plutonium would then be packaged into
new storage containers. The only facility at SRS currently capable of
restabilizing and repackaging the plutonium has closed in preparation for
decommissioning.3
Because Building 105-K does not have the capability to monitor storage
containers, DOE had planned to install monitoring equipment in Building
235-F at SRS. Building 235-F was chosen primarily because it was already
equipped with filtered ventilation systems appropriate to handling
plutonium-multiple and redundant air supply and exhaust fan systems
3This facility-FB Line-was constructed in the early 1960s to convert
plutonium solutions into solid forms to be used in nuclear weapons
components. In recent years, its primary mission has been to stabilize
scrap plutonium from cleanup operations at SRS and package the stabilized
plutonium into storage containers. FB Line ceased operations and
transferred its remaining plutonium to Building 105-K in March 2005.
that use HEPA filters. Exhaust from the ventilation system is further
filtered through a sand filter before entering the outside atmosphere.4
Currently, Building 235-F is limited to removing storage containers from
their outer packaging and x-raying the containers to evaluate potential
pressurization. Although DOE has installed equipment in Building 235-F
that can puncture the storage container to relieve pressure, Building
235-F currently lacks the capability to conduct destructive examinations.
Destructive examinations consist of cutting containers open to take
samples of and analyze the gases inside and examining the containers
themselves for indications of corrosion. In addition, destructive
examination allows plutonium inside the container to be analyzed to detect
any changes in the plutonium's condition. Building 235-F also currently
lacks the capability to restabilize and repackage plutonium.
In addition, Building 235-F faced several other challenges that would have
affected its ability to monitor plutonium. Because of changes in the
design basis threat, Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security
to store Category I quantities of plutonium.5 SRS officials estimate that
972 storage containers contain Category I quantities of plutonium metal.
Although these storage containers are at relatively low risk for rupture,
SRS would have been unable to remove those containers from Building 105-K
to monitor their condition. According to SRS officials, security measures
could have been established in Building 235-F if a safety issue had arisen
that required opening a Category I container.
4Sand filters are large, deep beds installed in underground concrete
enclosures and filled with up to 10 feet of rock, gravel, and sand. As air
flows upward through the bed, the rock, gravel, and sand filter out
plutonium and other chemicals. The decontaminated air can then flow into
the outside atmosphere. Sand filters have been used in U.S. nuclear
facilities since 1948. Although initially expensive, sand filters can
remove a large amount of radioactive material, require relatively little
maintenance, and are fire resistant.
5Category I material includes specified quantities of plutonium or highly
enriched uranium in the following forms: (1) assembled nuclear weapons and
test devices; (2) pure products containing higher concentrations of
plutonium or highly enriched uranium; and (3) highgrade materials, such as
carbides, oxides, solutions, and nitrates. The risks associated with
Category I special nuclear material vary but include the nuclear
detonation of a weapon or test device at or near design yield, the
creation of improvised nuclear devices capable of producing a nuclear
yield, theft for use in a nuclear weapon, and the potential for sabotage
in the form of radioactive dispersal.
Furthermore, the Safety Board identified a number of serious safety
concerns with Building 235-F. Specifically, the Safety Board reported the
following:
o The building lacks fire suppression systems, and many areas of the
building lack fire detection and alarm systems.
o The building's nuclear criticality accident alarm system has been
removed. A nuclear criticality accident occurs when enough fissile
material, such as plutonium, is brought together to cause a sustained
nuclear chain reaction. The immediate result of a nuclear criticality
accident is the production of an uncontrolled and unpredictable radiation
source that can be lethal to people who are nearby.
o A number of the building's safety systems depend upon electrical
cables that are approximately 50 years old and have exceeded their
estimated life. When electrical cables age, they become brittle and may
crack, increasing the potential for failure.
o SRS has discovered two areas in the soil near the building that could
present a hazard in the event of an earthquake.
o The building's ventilation system still contains plutonium from its
previous mission of producing plutonium heat sources to power space
probes. This highly radioactive plutonium could be released, for example,
during a fire or earthquake and could pose a hazard to workers in the
building.
Once again, DOE's monitoring challenges demonstrate its failure to
adequately plan for plutonium consolidation. Instead of a comprehensive
strategy that assessed the monitoring capabilities needed to meet its
storage standard, DOE's plans went from constructing a state-of-the-art
storage and monitoring facility to using a building that the Safety Board
had significant concerns with. Moreover, DOE's plans have subsequently
changed again. In April 2005, after spending over $15 million to begin
modifications to Building 235-F, DOE announced that it would only use the
building to monitor plutonium temporarily. Now, DOE plans to install the
necessary safety systems and monitoring equipment in Building 105-K, a
50-year-old building that was not designed for such functions. This
decision underscores that DOE's lack of careful planning has forced SRS to
focus on what can be done with existing facilities, eliminating options
that could have been both more cost-effective and safer than current
plans.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
(360636)
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.
For further information on this testimony, please contact Gene Aloise at
(202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Office of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this statement. Sherry McDonald, Assistant Director; and Ryan T. Coles
made key contributions to this testimony.
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