Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Production and
Installation of Army Truck Armor during Current Wartime
Operations (22-MAR-06, GAO-06-160).
In April 2005, GAO reported on factors affecting the timely
production of up-armored high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled
vehicles (HMMWV) and add-on armor kits for HMMWVs, as well as
other items critically needed by deployed forces during Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Due to high interest by Congress and the public
regarding vehicle armor, GAO initiated this subsequent engagement
to examine issues affecting the production and installation of
armor for medium and heavy trucks. The objectives were to (1)
determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and
installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what
factors affected the time to provide truck armor, and (3)
identify what actions the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
Army have taken to improve the timely availability of truck
armor. To address these objectives, GAO collected and analyzed
supply data for medium and heavy tactical trucks used by Army
forces.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-160
ACCNO: A49617
TITLE: Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Production
and Installation of Army Truck Armor during Current Wartime
Operations
DATE: 03/22/2006
SUBJECT: Army procurement
Army supplies
Defense capabilities
Logistics
Military land vehicles
Military materiel
Military operations
Schedule slippages
Strategic planning
Timeliness
Army Heavy Equipment Transporter System
Army Palletized Load System
DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle
M915 Truck
M939 Truck
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GAO-06-160
* Report to Congressional Committees
* March 2006
* defense logistics
* Several Factors Limited the Production and Installation of Army
Truck Armor during Current Wartime Operations
* Contents
* Results in Brief
* Background
* Deployed Army Forces Face a Significant Threat from IEDs
* Outfitting Army Trucks with Armor
* Processes for Developing Truck Armor Requirements and
Solutions
* Process for Developing Wartime Requirements
* Development of Truck Armor Solutions
* Army Expects to Have Met Most Truck Armor Requirements by January
2006
* Several Factors Lengthened the Time to Provide Truck Armor Kits
* Army Did Not Fully Capitalize on Truck Armor Requirements
Identified Prior to Operations in Iraq
* Army's Awarding of Contracts for Less Than the Total
Requirement Constrained Armor Kit Production
* Awarding Contracts at Less Than the Total Requirement
Lengthened the Time to Meet Requirements
* Truck Armor Requirements Increased Due to Changing
Operational Conditions
* Incremental Funding Lagged Behind Requirements,
Delaying Contract Awards
* Material Shortages Affected Availability of Army Truck Armor
Kits
* Limited Installation Rates Constrained the Availability of
Tanker Armor Kits
* DOD and the Army Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability
* DOD and the Services Took Actions to Improve Availability of
Truck Armor during Current Operations
* Army Has Developed a Long-term Plan to Address the
Availability of Truck Armor for Future Operations
* Conclusions
* Recommendation for Executive Action
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* Scope and Methodology
* Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts
* Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
* Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet
Identified Requirements
* Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
* Contracts Constrained Production
* Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production
* Heavy Equipment Transporter
* Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet
Identified Requirements
* Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
* Contracts Constrained Production
* Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production
* Palletized Load System
* Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet
Identified Requirements
* Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
* Contracts Constrained Production
* Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production
* M939 5-Ton Truck
* Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet
Identified Requirements
* Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Availability of Armor
Kits
* Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
* Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet
Identified Requirements
* Contracts Constrained Production
* Contracts Affected Price
* M915 Truck Family
* Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet
Identified Requirements
* Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
* Contracts Constrained Production
* Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production
* Tankers
* Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet
Identified Requirements
* Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
* Contracts Constrained Availability of Armor Kits
* Limited Installation Rates Paced Availability of Armor
Kits
* Comments from the Department of Defense
* GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements
Report to Congressional Committees
March 2006
DEFENSE LOGISTICS
Several Factors Limited the Production and Installation of Army Truck
Armor during Current Wartime Operations
Contents
Tables
Figures
Abbreviations
March 22, 2006Letter
The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate
The Honorable Duncan Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
When combat operations were declared over during Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF), U.S. and coalition forces transitioned to stabilization operations
to restore public order and infrastructure in Iraq. Since that time, U.S.
forces have come under frequent and deadly attacks from insurgents using a
variety of weapons that include improvised explosive devices (IED),
mortars, and rocket launchers. During this situation there have been
numerous attacks on military convoys as they carry supplies and equipment
throughout the region. The threat of IEDs, in particular, has become
increasingly frequent and has been ranked as the number one killer of U.S.
troops in Iraq. The explosives used in IEDs consist mainly of dynamite,
land mines, old artillery shells or other types of military ordnances.
Many IEDs are hidden and disguised along traffic routes and are remotely
detonated against unsuspecting military personnel.
As a result of experiences in Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and
the services have taken several immediate steps to improve the protection
of military forces operating in the region. Among these is the fielding of
new capabilities to counter emerging threats encountered in Iraq, to
include such improvements as add-on-armor for trucks and systems for
detecting and defeating IEDs.
Since the onset of OIF, we have reported on several supply chain
management issues that have impeded support to the warfighter.1 For
example, after visiting the theater in 2003, we provided our preliminary
observations on the effectiveness of logistics support during OIF. 2
Among the problems we observed were the unavailability of spare parts,
hundreds of backlogged shipments, and an inability to track shipments at
the distribution centers. In April 2005, we reported on shortages of a
number of critical items during OIF, to include certain protective items
such as body armor and armored high mobility multi-purpose wheeled
vehicles (HMMWV).3 We identified a number of systemic causes for these
shortages, including inaccurate requirements, delayed funding, and
ineffective distribution processes. As a result, we made several
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense calling for actions, such as
ensuring the accuracy of Army war reserve requirements and developing and
exercising deployable distribution capabilities, to improve DOD's system
for supplying items to U.S. forces.
Due to high interest by Congress and the public regarding the availability
of armor for HMMWVs and other vehicles, we initiated this subsequent
engagement under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United
States to examine issues affecting the production and installation of
armor for medium and heavy trucks used by Army forces during OIF and other
ongoing operations in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
responsibility.4 Our objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which
truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements,
(2) identify what factors affected the time to provide truck armor to
deployed forces, and (3) identify what actions DOD and the Army have taken
to improve the timely availability of truck armor.
In conducting this review, we focused on medium and heavy tactical trucks
used by Army forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, which included
those in Iraq and Afghanistan.5 We also reviewed the production and
installation of truck armor for Marine Corps forces, which we will report
separately. To identify the extent to which truck armor was produced and
installed to meet identified requirements, we visited numerous DOD and
Army organizations to obtain data on the requirements, funding,
production, and installation of truck armor kits. We considered the armor
requirement as met for each type of truck when the quantity of armor kits
produced and installed onto vehicles equaled the requirement. Based on the
information gathered, we identified factors that affected the time to
provide truck armor kits to deployed forces. We also identified DOD's and
the Army's short-term and long-term efforts to improve the availability of
truck armor. We assessed the reliability of the data we obtained and
determined that they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report. We performed our review from April 2005 to January 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A
detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is located in appendix I.
Results in Brief
The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the production
and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 except for fuel
tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for tankers is expected by
January 2007. Although the Army first identified a requirement for 3,780
truck armor kits for five types of trucks in November 2003, it did not
produce all of the kits until February 2005 and did not install the kits
to fully meet the initial requirement until May 2005-18 months after the
requirement was identified. However, by that time, requirements had
increased substantially. As subsequent requirements for an additional
7,847 kits, excluding tankers, were identified, the time lag to meet them
lessened. Until add-on armor kits were installed, units in the theater
developed their own interim improvised armor of locally fabricated steel
armor plates to obtain some level of protection for their vehicles.
We identified a number of factors that contributed to the time to provide
truck armor kits to deployed troops, placing them at greater risk as they
conducted wartime operations in vehicles that were not equipped with the
preferred level of protection. The factors we identified include:
o The Army did not fully capitalize on approved operational requirements
for truck armor that were established in 1996. The 1996 requirements were
similar to those developed in 2003 in response to experiences in Iraq and
Afghanistan, addressing similar threats for most of the same types of
trucks. Generally, official requirements such as these lead to the
development and production of new systems to address the specified
required capabilities. Production of armor kits based on the 1996
requirements may have increased the availability of truck armor for
current operations in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East.
o The Army's award of contracts to armor contractors for amounts less than
the total requirement caused production schedules to be longer than they
might have otherwise been. Instead of awarding contracts in a way that
maximized production rates, the Army awarded contracts in amounts less
than the total requirement because requirements increased due to
operational conditions and the Army received its allocation of funding
from DOD at less than the total requirement. Funding was not always
available to award contracts at the time requirements were identified, but
neither DOD nor Army officials could explain or document why increased
funding was not provided earlier or how funding decisions were made. In
April 2005, we reported that insufficient and delayed funding also
contributed to critical wartime shortages of armored vehicle track shoes,
lithium batteries, and tires, and that we could not determine why
sufficient funding was not provided earlier because adequate documentation
of funding requests was not available. Without formal documentation and
communication of urgent wartime funding requirements and the disposition
of funding decisions, the rationale for funding decisions and the
officials and organizations accountable for making those decisions may not
be subject to effective oversight by Congress or the Secretary of Defense.
o Material shortages impacted the availability of Army truck armor. For
example, production levels for several Army kits were constrained, in
part, by shortages of material and components such as steel and door
handles. Further, competition between the Army and Marine Corps for
limited contractors and materials exacerbated problems with limited
availability of materials.
o Limited installation rates affected the Army's ability to install armor
kits onto tankers. The rotation of fuel trucks into the maintenance area
as they returned from missions paced the installation of armor. In
addition, unique requirements to coat the tankers with a protective
chemical limited the numbers of armor installation sites available for
armor installation due to the need for controlled environmental
conditions. As a result, the total length of time to field tanker armor
was stretched out over a longer period.
DOD and the Army have taken several actions to improve truck armor
availability. Several short-term solutions to increase the rate of
production were instituted during operations in Iraq. For example, to
mitigate the effects of funding requirements at less than the total
requirements, the Army used money budgeted for other procurement programs
to award contracts for production of armor kits before additional armor
funds arrived. In addition, Army headquarters also developed the initial
armor kit requirements based on emerging needs 5 months before units in
the theater formally submitted their requirements for validation, which
allowed it to begin seeking funds for armor kits and award contracts for
design and production earlier. The Army also expanded its armor
installation capacity to increase installation rates. Further, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (Joint Staff) established a team, called the Joint Armor
Fusion Cell, to monitor the progress of armoring trucks as well to provide
assistance to the Army to expedite the availability of armor kits. For
example, the Joint Armor Fusion Cell helped identify and deploy personnel
from the Air Force and Navy to perform armor installations in the theater
and in the United States, thereby speeding up the availability of truck
armor to the units. The Army is also developing a long-term plan to
address future truck armoring needs. While we did not evaluate the plan's
potential for success, we did note that it is aimed at identifying
long-term requirements for truck armor and developing solutions to address
these requirements.
We are expanding upon a recommendation in our April 2005 report that was
directed at improving the effectiveness of the Army's wartime supply
support-to address a broader systemic problem that affected the
availability of truck armor. To ensure that funding needs for urgent
wartime requirements are identified quickly, requests for funding are well
documented, and funding decisions are based on risk and an assessment of
the highest priority requirements, we are recommending that the Secretary
of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to establish a process to
document and communicate all urgent wartime funding requirements for
supplies and equipment at the time they are identified and the disposition
of funding decisions.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense stated
it agreed with the intent of our recommendation but stated that it
believes the Army's current requirements validation process conforms to
the process described in our recommendation. Our work has demonstrated,
however, that once requirements are validated, funding must be made
available to execute programs to respond to those requirements. Because,
as we noted in this report and in April 2005, funding requests from the
Army to DOD to resource validated requirements and the corresponding
decisions as to the amount and timing of funding to be provided were not
adequately documented, we were unable to determine the reasons why funding
was not made available to respond to urgent wartime requirements as
needed. We continue to believe these events in the funding process for
urgent wartime requirements must be fully documented to provide effective
program oversight and to ensure funding decisions are made based on risk
and an assessment of the highest priority requirements. The Department's
responses are reprinted in appendix III and our evaluation of them appears
later in this report.
Background
Army convoys carrying supplies and equipment in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility have been subjected to deadly attacks by insurgents using
IEDs and other weapons. In response to these attacks, the Army has
undertaken several force protection measures such as adding armor to a
number of medium and heavy trucks operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
other CENTCOM locations.
Deployed Army Forces Face a Significant Threat from IEDs
Army convoys operating in the CENTCOM area of responsibility have been
subjected to deadly attacks by enemy forces. In particular, attacks in
Iraq by insurgents using IEDs have placed trucks and personnel at
tremendous risk as they carry supplies and equipment throughout the
region. In May 2003, U.S. and coalition forces began stabilization
operations in Iraq that continue today. However, since that time, the
United States has incurred more casualties than during major combat
operations, mostly due to ambushes and IED attacks by insurgents operating
in Iraq. The threat from IEDs has grown progressively, from single mortar
rounds, to multiple explosives linked together, to suicide car bombs. In
the spring of 2004, nearly every attack from an IED resulted in a
coalition casualty. In particular, U.S. military convoys have been the
targets of these types of attacks. In addition to attacks in Iraq, U.S.
forces operating in Afghanistan have been subjected to IED attacks.
IEDs take a variety of shapes and sizes and have been employed in a number
of different ways. They can contain commercial or military explosives,
homemade explosives, or military ordnance and ordnance components. For
example, mortar and artillery projectiles have been employed as IEDs in
Iraq. In addition, IEDs have been placed in many vehicles-from small
sedans to large cargo trucks-and stationed along the roadways.
Furthermore, "person-borne" suicide bombs have also been used, with
explosives contained in a vest, belt, or clothing that is specifically
modified to conceal and carry this material.
Outfitting Army Trucks with Armor
In light of the threat posed by IEDs and other weapons, such as mortars
and rocket launchers, the Army has taken several force protection measures
to include adding armor to a number of medium and heavy trucks operating
in Iraq, and Afghanistan.6 The Army's medium and heavy tactical trucks
that are being armored include: M939 5-ton trucks, family of medium
tactical vehicles (FMTV), heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMTT),
heavy equipment transporters (HET), palletized load systems (PLS), the
M915 truck family, and tankers. Appendix II contains a detailed
description of each Army vehicle in addition to a discussion of the armor
kit availability and the significant factors that affected armor
availability for each truck.
The Army's medium tactical trucks include the M939 5-ton and FMTV. The
M939 tactical truck is a general-purpose military vehicle, primarily
designed for tactical, off-road use. The M-939 is a 5-ton capacity,
six-wheel drive cargo truck used for transportation of all types of
supplies and comes in various vehicle types, including a cargo truck, dump
truck, and wrecker. The Army's FMTV addresses medium tactical-vehicle
requirements for unit mobility and unit resupply, and transportation of
equipment and personnel. The FMTV consists of the light medium tactical
vehicle, which has a 2.5-ton capacity, and the medium tactical vehicle,
which has a 5-ton capacity.
The Army's heavy tactical trucks include the HEMTT, HET, PLS, M915, and
tankers. The Army utilizes the HEMTT to provide transport capabilities for
the resupply of various combat vehicles and weapons systems. The HET is
used to transport, deploy, recover, and evacuate main battle tanks and
other heavy tracked and wheeled vehicles to and from the battlefield. The
PLS performs long distance and local hauls and unit resupply in the
tactical environment to support combat units. The PLS consists of a truck
with self-loading capabilities and a trailer. The Army's family of M915
trucks consists of highway tractors used primarily for the long distance
transport of containers, which is similar to commercial tractor-trailer
trucks.
The Army uses its tankers to haul and dispense bulk fuel. Four models of
fuel tankers are involved in the Army's armoring program: the M967, the
M969, the M978, and the M1062. The primary component of the tanker
armoring effort is a self-sealing coating material that is sprayed onto
the exterior of the fuel tank. When a small arms round penetrates the
coating material and the fuel tank, the hole self seals and the fuel leak
is stopped within minutes. A secondary component is composed of a set of
armor panel kits mounted at select locations on the fuel tanker to protect
critical equipment that is not protected by the coating material.
Processes for Developing Truck Armor Requirements and Solutions
The Army identified wartime truck armor requirements and initiated a
procurement program to develop an armor solution, which involved seeking
funding from a variety of sources, identifying and contracting with
suppliers for armor materials and components, designing and testing armor
solutions, and installing armor onto trucks in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility or other installation sites in the United States and
Europe.
Process for Developing Wartime Requirements
When a need for new equipment is identified by Army warfighters deployed
to Iraq and other CENTCOM locations in support of the global war on
terrorism, official requirements for these items are developed through the
submission of the Army's operational needs statement (ONS). Army field
commanders prepare an ONS, which documents the urgent need for a materiel
solution to correct a deficiency or to improve a capability that impacts
mission accomplishment. The ONS is sent forward through the unit's chain
of command to the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) for
theater-level approval, while an information copy is provided directly to
Army headquarters for an initial check to ensure the requested capability
and operational concept are clearly stated.
Once approved by CFLCC, the ONS is forwarded to the Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff G-3 at Army headquarters where it is reviewed and validated
by the Army Strategic Planning Board (ASPB).7 The ASPB is chaired by the
G-3, with representatives from other Army headquarters staff offices and
major Army commands. In the case of truck armor, once the requirement is
validated by the ASPB, it is transmitted to the Program Executive
Office-Combat Support and Combat Service Support, which manages the
procurement of truck armor through its Project Manager for Tactical
Vehicles (Project Manager). Validated requirements are also passed to the
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-8 and the Army Budget Office to
obtain the necessary funding.
Development of Truck Armor Solutions
To address validated requirements for truck armor, the Army initiated a
procurement program to develop an armor solution for its deployed trucks.
Procurement is funded through congressional appropriations. However, at
the time requirements for current operations were identified in November
2003, there were no truck armor kit procurement programs in place.
Consequently, funding for armor kits in the current Army procurement
budgets did not exist. Because no funding was available at the time the
requirements were identified, the Army obtained funding for its program
from a variety of sources. While the Army can reprogram a small amount of
funds from one program budget to another, the majority of funding had to
be approved by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
and in some cases, Congress. Specifically, to obtain funding for truck
armor, the Army sought approval from the DOD Comptroller and Congress to
reprogram funding from other procurement or appropriations
accounts,8 requested funding from the DOD-managed Iraqi Freedom Fund,9 and
requested armor funding through supplemental appropriations.
The Army's approved armor protection for medium and heavy tactical
vehicles consisted of add-on armor kits to be installed on vehicles
already in use in the theater of operations or prior to deployment. These
kits included armor panels and ballistic glass, as well as other
components such as air conditioners. For all trucks except the M939 5-ton,
the Army awarded contracts to armor companies to produce add-on kits for
each type of truck. According to Army officials, as needed production
quantities increased, the Army modified these contracts to reflect the
additional quantities and revised prices. In the case of the 5-ton truck,
the armor kits were produced by the Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise
(GSIE), an Army organization of depots and other facilities.10 Instead of
a contract, agreements on quantities and costs for work were provided
through Military Inter-departmental Purchase Requests (MIPR), which were
issued to GSIE for each new production order. Once armor kits were
produced by contractors or Army depots, they were shipped to installation
sites in the United States, Middle East, and Europe, where they were
installed onto trucks by military or contractor personnel.
Army Expects to Have Met Most Truck Armor Requirements by January 2006
The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the production
and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 except for fuel
tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for tankers is expected by
January 2007. Figure 1 shows the overall production and installation
quantities of truck armor as compared to requirements. The Army's solution
to addressing truck armor requirements focused on developing add-on armor
kits to be attached to the vehicles. These add-on armor kits included
armor panels and ballistic glass, as well as other components such as air
conditioners.
Figure 1: Production and Installation of Truck Armor Kits to Meet Army
Requirements
Although the Army first identified a requirement for 3,780 truck armor
kits for five types of trucks in November 2003, it did not produce all of
the kits until February 2005 and did not install the kits to fully meet
the initial requirement until May 2005, or 18 months later. As shown in
table 1, the time to produce and install armor kits to meet initial
requirements varied by truck type, and ranged from 15 to 18 months.
However, as shown in figure 1, by that time requirements had increased
substantially. More detailed information on requirements, production, and
installation times for each specific truck is provided in appendix II.
Table 1: Time to Meet Initial Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Note: Does not include the 5-ton truck or fuel tankers, which had not been
identified at the time of the initial November 2003 requirement.
As subsequent requirements for an additional 7,847 kits, excluding
tankers, were identified, the time lag to meet them lessened. The Army now
estimates that the total demand for all 11,627 required truck armor kits,
excluding tankers, will have been met in January 2006, or 10 months after
the latest requirements increase was validated in March 2005.11 Table 2
shows the time needed to complete production and installation of armor
kits to meet the latest validated requirements increase from March 2005.
The Army estimates that production of a sufficient number of tanker kits
to meet requirements will be completed by May 2006, but does not expect to
complete installation of tanker kits until January 2007.
Table 2: Time to Meet Latest Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Note: Does not include the 5-ton truck, for which requirements decreased
in March 2005 or tankers, for which requirements did not increase in March
2005. As of September 2005, the current 5-ton truck armor requirement was
2,592 and the tanker requirement was 1,192.
Before armor kits were available, units operating in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility developed their own interim improvised armor, consisting of
locally fabricated steel armor plates, to obtain some level of protection
for their vehicles. As a result, interim armor with minimum protection
standards in accordance with Army policy was in place on some vehicles by
the time the preferred add-on armor kits were available for installation.
In addition, CFLCC issued a directive in February 2005 stating that no
unarmored vehicles would be allowed to operate in Iraq outside of secured
forward operating bases. During congressional testimony held in the spring
and summer of 2005, Army officials confirmed that this policy had been
fully implemented with use of approved interim improvised armor or add-on
armor kits.
Several Factors Lengthened the Time to Provide Truck Armor Kits
We identified a number of factors that contributed to the time to provide
truck armor to deployed troops. First, the Army did not fully capitalize
on a requirement for truck armor that had been identified prior to
operations in OIF. Second, availability of armor kits was constrained by
the Army's funding of contracts at less than the total requirement. Third,
material shortages also affected the availability of armor kits. Finally,
limited installation rates lengthened the time to provide armor kits for
tankers. As a result, troops were placed at greater risk as they conducted
wartime operations in vehicles not equipped with the preferred level of
protection.
Army Did Not Fully Capitalize on Truck Armor Requirements Identified Prior
to Operations in Iraq
The Army did not fully capitalize on an earlier operational requirement
for truck armor that was identified several years before current
operations in Iraq began, which caused the Army to lose an opportunity to
have a significant number of armor kits already available when operational
needs arose in Iraq for this capability. An official requirement for truck
add-on armor kits was identified and approved by the Army in 1996 to
address threats similar to what deployed forces are currently facing in
Iraq. On January 19, 1996, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) issued an operational requirement document (ORD) for the tactical
wheeled vehicle crew protection kit.12 Generally, official requirements
documents lead to the development and production of new systems to address
the specified required capabilities.
According to Army officials, the Army developed this ORD because officials
recognized that operations in Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia exposed troops to
a civilian threat and led to concerns over countermine protection for
supply and troop transport vehicles. The crew protection kit was to
provide increased crew survivability in tactical wheeled vehicles against
small arms fire, artillery/mortar fire, mines, submunitions, and IEDs
where needed while operating throughout an area of operations. The ORD
described the threat against U.S. forces usually consisting of small arms,
hand portable antitank weapons such as light antitank weapons and rocket
propelled grenades, and IEDs. According to the document, tactical wheeled
vehicles at that time lacked armor protection to provide crew
survivability against these threats. No existing ballistic protection
systems had met this requirement, with one exception of the Up-Armored
Heavy HMMWV. According to the ORD, the kit's capabilities would enable all
units to provide ballistic protection to crews of tactical wheeled
vehicles, including most of the same types of trucks being armored today
in the Middle East.
Once the ORD was approved, the Army Tank-Automotive Research, Development
and Engineering Center built prototype armor kits for the HMMWV and 5-ton
truck, and blast testing was also done at Fort A.P. Hill. The ORD
specified a number of kits to be built and available to add on to vehicles
as operations dictated the need for them. However, the Army never fully
addressed this requirement. The need for armor kits after Somalia never
materialized, and, according to Army officials, the ORD was not completed
because funding was not available to fully meet the 1996 requirement due
to other higher funding priorities in the Army. According to one Army
official, given the amount of effort expended to develop and approve the
ORD, it is relatively uncommon for an ORD not to be funded through
production, especially when research and development funds had been spent,
prototypes developed, and blast testing performed.
Even though the 1996 requirement was not fully addressed, a small number
of armor kits were produced around this time period for two types of
trucks, the HEMTT and the PLS, to support operations in Bosnia.13
According to the Army's Project Manager, development of these kits was
initiated in response to an ONS from units deployed to Bosnia. The ONS was
submitted prior to completion of the ORD. However, these kits did not meet
all the protective requirements specified in the ORD, such as providing
blast protection. The Bosnia kits were never installed on vehicles and
were placed into storage because the need for them was never realized.
The Army's November 2003 armor requirement, developed in response to
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, addressed the same vehicles
confronting similar threats as those found in the January 1996 ORD. This
November 2003 requirement for the crew protection kit validated an
operational wartime need for add-on armor kits for light, medium, and
heavy tactical wheeled vehicles in support of OIF and OEF. The requirement
cites the January 1996 ORD as providing the basis for add-on armor and
extends the requirement to continue identifying alternative capabilities
for development, testing, and procurement. The November 2003 requirement
noted that the armor kits are necessary to provide a capability to protect
against small arms fire, IEDs, mine blast protection, and artillery
fragmentation; and to minimize degradation of the vehicle mission. Army
officials in theater modified the November 2003 requirement by changing
the distribution of armor and prioritizing armor needs; however, the
amounts of armor kits required remained the same. Table 3 shows the 1996
and 2003 requirements, as well as the most recent armor requirements.
Table 3: Comparison of Types of Vehicles Requiring Armor Kits in 1996,
2003, and 2005 and Quantities of Kits Needed and Available
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
NOTE: The kits for the HEMTT and PLS were not developed in response to the
1996 ORD. Rather, they were developed in response to anticipated needs for
operations in Bosnia and did not meet the blast protection requirements
specified in the ORD.
Because not all the kits required under the 1996 ORD were developed, the
Army went into Iraq with less protective capability than it might
otherwise have done. However, the Army's work done in support of the ORD
and the Bosnia kits laid a foundation to meet future truck armor
requirements. For example, the limited number of kits developed for
military operations in Bosnia was pulled from storage and used in Iraq.
Furthermore, according to Army officials, the knowledge gained and the
processes for design, research, development, and testing of these kits, as
well as the kits themselves, were used to address and meet the need for
armor during current operations. Based on these efforts, the Army's
Project Manager for truck armor in 2003 had knowledge of the concepts of
designing and building armor kits, the necessary materials in terms of
weight and protective capabilities, and system performance requirements
and technical specifications for ballistic protection. In addition, the
2003 requirement for kits cites the January 1996 ORD as providing the
basis for add-on armor.
Army's Awarding of Contracts for Less Than the Total Requirement
Constrained Armor Kit Production
The Army's award of armor contracts for quantities less than the total
requirement constrained the production of armor kits. The award of
contract quantities in amounts less than the total requirements instead of
all at one time affected production rates and caused production schedules
to be longer than they might otherwise have been. The award of contracts
in this manner was, in part, a result of several increases in requirements
over time due to changing operational conditions. Another factor that
contributed to obtaining less than the total requirement was the delayed
flow of funding available for armor kits.
Awarding Contracts at Less Than the Total Requirement Lengthened the Time
to Meet Requirements
For all of the Army trucks we reviewed except for the 5-ton truck, the
Army's award of contracts for quantities less than the total requirement
instead of all at one time caused production schedules to be longer than
they might otherwise have been. Contractors tend to size their production
levels to the contract orders they have on hand. Thus, larger contract
quantities generally mean increased production rates. Larger up-front
contracts can affect a contractor's production capacity for a number of
reasons. For example, according to one contractor producing armor kits for
all four of the Army's heavy trucks, ordering smaller quantities of armor
kits caused a lack of continuity for its supply base and fluctuations in
kit deliveries. More specifically, the contractor experienced (1) a lack
of supplier commitment, which wavered with the uncertainty of future
orders; (2) fluctuations in its labor force; (3) constrained ability to
make process improvements to expedite production, such as the creation of
specialized tooling, due to a short-term focus of work; and (4)
insufficient support for investment and facility decisions that would have
resulted in more efficient production operations for the contractor and
its supply base.
In some cases, increases in requirements caused contracts to be awarded in
an intermittent fashion. In other cases, funding was not available to
award complete contract quantities to meet requirements at the time
requirements were identified. Although it is difficult to determine the
exact effects of intermittent contracting on the availability of armor
kits, we identified a number of specific cases where it lengthened the
production schedule. For example, there were breaks in production for
three different types of truck kits (the FMTV, HEMTT, and HET) because the
contractors had completed their current contact orders and new orders were
not placed early enough to maintain continuous production. In one of these
cases regarding an armor kit for the FMTV, the contractor received an
additional contract from the Army in December 2004 for 1,049 kits as it
neared completion of its current requirement of 771 kits. Although the new
requirement for additional kits was validated by the Army in April 2004,
funding was not available to award the new contract until December 2004,
which was not early enough to overcome the required 15-week material lead
time. As a result, production stopped and new production did not resume
until 2 months later. According to the contractor, production could have
been maintained or even accelerated if the new contract had been awarded
in time to meet the long lead time item requirements.
In the cases of the HEMTT and the HET armor kits, the production lines
stopped when the contractor completed the current contract quantities of
1,598 and 665 armor kits respectively. The contractor did not receive
additional contract awards of 791 HEMTT kits and 131 HET kits until April
2005, or about a month after completion of the previous contract
quantities in March 2005. By that time, production had already stopped,
employees and subcontractors were released, and equipment and facility
space were given up for other uses. As a result, there was a two and a
half month break in production. The reason the additional production
quantities were not awarded earlier was that validated requirements did
not increase until March 2005, which, according to Army Project Manager
officials, was too late to avoid a production stoppage.
In another example of the impact of intermittent contract awards, the
initial armor kit production contract for the M915 was awarded in April
2004 for 250 kits, which was based on the validated Army requirement at
the time. However, when subsequent contracts for 240 and 136 kits were
awarded in September and October 2004 respectively, due to increasing Army
requirements, the manufacturer, an Israeli subcontractor to the primary
contractor, did not have sufficient capacity to keep up with the demand.
This was due, in part, to other commitments the manufacturer already had
for producing Marine Corps truck armor. As a result, the production levels
for M915 kits were lower than desired based on the new requirements and
remained so until July 2005 when the contractor was able to transition
production from the Israeli subcontractor to its own facilities in the
United States. According to contractor officials, if they had known in the
beginning that the total quantities needed by the Army would have been as
high as they were, they would have proceeded differently from the outset,
such as using a different manufacturer.
In one instance, the quantities of contracts also adversely affected the
costs of armor kits. Specifically, the first contract for the FMTV armor
kits was awarded in February 2004 for 270 kits. Subsequently, in March
2004, a second contract was placed for 501 kits. According to the
contractor, the quantity in the initial contract was too low for the Army
to receive the highest price break, which was received for the second
contract. As a result, the first 270 kits cost the Army over $1.7 million
more than if the two production quantities had been combined. The Army
made the two orders separately because funding was not available to award
all quantities at one time.
Truck Armor Requirements Increased Due to Changing Operational Conditions
The Army's requirements for truck armor increased numerous times since
November 2003 due to changing operational conditions. Army headquarters
developed and approved the first requirement for truck armor kits in
November 2003 in consultation with Army officials from the theater of
operations. Army headquarters validated an operational wartime need for
kits in support of OIF and other CENTCOM operations, and approved 3,780
armor kits for medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles. According to
Army officials, this requirement arose based on an identification of the
need for truck armor and an August 2003 requirement from Army units in the
theater for additional up-armored HMMWVs. All subsequent requirements for
specific numbers of armor kits have been generated by Army theater
commanders in the field and forwarded to Army headquarters for approval
and funding.
The Army has continued to validate additional requirements for truck armor
as the need has evolved and increased over the course of operations to the
present, with March 2005 being the most recent date for validated
requirements increases. In September 2005, the total requirement for truck
armor decreased slightly based on revised unit needs.14 Army theater level
commanders have requested additional kits by documenting their
requirements in ONSs. Army headquarters validated these requirements on
several occasions between April 2004 and March 2005. Figure 2 illustrates
the increases in the Army's requirements for truck armor according to the
approval of the multiple ONSs.
Figure 2: Army Truck Armor Requirements, November 2003 through September
2005
Increasing requirements for truck armor from the first requirement in
November 2003 were a direct result of operational conditions. Army
officials from the theater of operations attributed these increasing
requirements to the enemy's changing tactics and the increase in frequency
and lethality of IEDs. In addition, the number of trucks in Iraq increased
over time, which drove a corresponding increase in truck armor
requirements. As noted previously, changing requirements necessitated the
Army awarding production contracts in an intermittent manner; and, in some
cases, led directly to gaps in production levels.
Incremental Funding Lagged Behind Requirements, Delaying Contract Awards
The flow of funding for truck armor kits was initially provided in amounts
less than total requirements and lagged significantly behind validated
requirements. As a result, the Army could not award contracts for the full
required quantities of armor kits at the time requirements were validated.
Instead, the Army awarded contracts as funding became available. Figure 3
shows the availability of funding for truck armor kits as compared to
armor kit requirements.15
Figure 3: Availability of Funding Compared to Truck Armor Requirements
Although funding was not always available to award contracts at the time
requirements were identified, the Army did provide some advanced funding
to the contractors to buy items with long lead times, such as steel and
ballistic glass, to mitigate some of the effects of delayed production
contracts. To do this, the Army Project Manager used funds designated for
the installation of armor kits already under contract until sufficient
armor kit production funding was made available. However, according to
Army Project Manager officials, they only used this advanced funding
approach when they were certain additional funding would be
administratively approved, because of the risks associated with using
these installation funds and not being able to replace them.
We could not specifically determine why the required funds for armor kits
were not made available when the Army first identified the requirements
because neither the Army nor DOD could provide us with sufficient records
to track when the Department of the Army requested funding from the DOD
Comptroller. Special funding requests from the Army to the DOD Comptroller
were required because funding for armor kits was not available in the
Army's procurement budget. According to Army officials, the Army requested
full funding for the truck armor requirements when first identified, but
the DOD Comptroller denied the requests and provided only a limited amount
of funding over several months. However, the Army was not able to document
these funding requests.
Additionally, DOD Comptroller officials were unable to verify or document
how much funding the Army asked for and when it was requested. DOD
Comptroller officials further noted that although there was sufficient
funding available in the Iraqi Freedom Fund to fund all of the truck armor
requirements at the time they were initially identified by the Army, there
were other competing funding priorities that would have prevented DOD from
fully funding the entire truck armor requirement at once. Examples of
these competing priorities include other force protection requirements
such as the procurement of up-armored HMMWVs and night vision equipment,
IED countermeasures, reimbursements to other coalition forces for
logistics support, operational costs associated with deploying a Marine
Expeditionary Force to Iraq, financing clearance of captured munitions,
and funding for various classified programs.
In April 2005, we reported that insufficient and delayed funding also
contributed to critical wartime shortages of armored vehicle track shoes,
lithium batteries, and tires. However, we could not determine why
sufficient funding was not provided earlier because adequate documentation
was not available to track when the Army requested the
additional funding from DOD.16 Without formal documentation and
communication of urgent wartime funding requirements and the disposition
of funding decisions, the rationale for funding decisions and the
officials and organizations accountable for making those decisions may not
be subject to effective oversight by Congress or the Secretary of Defense.
Material Shortages Affected Availability of Army Truck Armor Kits
Material shortages negatively impacted the Army's ability to meet
requirements for all of its vehicles except for the FMTV and tankers. For
example, the contractor producing armor kits for the Army's heavy trucks
stated that shortages of armor-grade steel and aluminum constrained
production rates for the HEMTT, HET, PLS, and M915 armor kits between July
2004 and November 2004. The shortage was alleviated through Army, Joint
Staff, and congressional efforts to work directly with material suppliers
to increase the amount of armor plates for the military.
In addition, shortages of material negatively impacted the production of
M939 5-ton armor kits, which were produced by the Army depots. According
to GSIE officials, the production capacity for 5-ton truck armor kits was
established based on the availability of material and components that are
used to build the armor kits. When GSIE was asked to accelerate the
production of M939 5-ton kits, the lack of availability of certain
materials limited GSIE's ability to increase production levels. Examples
of items that were difficult to obtain included several sizes and types of
steel, door handles, and wiper components.
Army and Marine Corps officials also found themselves in competition for
armor contractors and materials, which exacerbated the problems with
material shortages. For example, as mentioned previously, the initial
manufacturer for the Army's M915 armor kits did not have sufficient
capacity to meet needed production levels as requirements increased. This
was due, in part, to the fact that the company had committed most of its
capacity to producing Marine Corps truck armor by the time additional Army
requirements were identified. Although minor schedule improvements were
achieved as a result of discussions and agreements on joint schedules
between the two services, it was still insufficient to meet the Army's
needs. As a result, the Army moved production of the M915 to another
company in the United States, which created further delays.
Limited Installation Rates Constrained the Availability of Tanker Armor
Kits
A significant factor that affected the availability of armor kits for
tankers was a limited installation rate. For example, the installation of
add-on armor kits was slowed by the rate of rotation of trucks into the
in-theater installation facilities as they returned from missions.
Operational constraints limited the number of vehicles that could be taken
out of use at any one time. In addition, unique requirements to coat the
tankers with a protective chemical prior to installing armor panels also
limited the installation rate. The primary component of the tanker
armoring effort is a self-sealing coating material that is sprayed onto
the exterior of the fuel tank. When a small arms round penetrates the
coating material and the fuel tank, the hole self-seals and the fuel leak
stops. The proper application of the chemical coating requires controlled
environmental conditions, such as humidity and temperature, which has led
to a limited number of spray locations accessible to the Army. Thus,
although production of armor kits for tankers is expected to be completed
by May 2006, because of these constraints, installation of enough kits to
meet requirements is not expected to be finished until 8 months later in
January 2007.
DOD and the Army Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability
DOD and the Army have taken a number of actions to improve the timely
availability of truck armor. Some of the actions were short-term and were
meant to address the immediate armor need for deployed forces in Iraq and
other CENTCOM locations. Other efforts are long-term plans designed to
improve the overall availability of truck armor for future operations.
DOD and the Services Took Actions to Improve Availability of Truck Armor
during Current Operations
DOD and the Army have taken a number of short-term actions to improve the
availability of truck armor to meet the needs of forces deployed for OIF
and other CENTCOM operations. Examples of these efforts include the
following:
o Leveraging of available Army funds. The Army's Project Manager for
Tactical Vehicles took a number of steps to leverage available funding in
an attempt to mitigate the effects of an inadequate funding flow for truck
armor. For example, it used funding designated for future armor kit
installations to buy long lead time materials and award some contracts for
armor kits until additional armor kit funding could be made available. In
addition, when the Project Manager received funding for armor kits from
Army headquarters, it allocated the funding among all the armor kit
contracts to maintain sufficient work flow to keep all production lines
open, rather than fund some truck kits to the full level of requirements.
While these efforts may have improved the timely availability of armor
kits, as we noted earlier, the inadequate availability of funding still
contributed to a longer schedule in many cases.
o Early identification of Army requirements. Army headquarters developed
the initial requirements for truck armor based on emerging needs before
formal requirements were submitted by units in the theater. As noted
earlier, the first requirement for truck armor was developed and validated
by Army headquarters in November 2003, while the first requirements
submitted from units in the theater were not actually validated until
April 2004. As a result, the Army was able to begin seeking funding and
awarding contracts for design and production of armor kits earlier than if
it had waited for an official request from units in the theater.
o Addition of armor installation sites. To reduce armor installation time,
as requirements and production levels for truck armor increased, the Army
expanded its installation capacity in the CENTCOM area of responsibility
through the addition of installation sites, going from one initial
facility in Kuwait to nine facilities in Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan
between August 2004 and July 2005. As indicated in figure 1, during this
period, production levels increased dramatically from 220 kits per month
in August 2004 to a peak level of almost 1,800 kits per month by May 2005.
After increasing the numbers of installation facilities, according to Army
officials, total installation capacity has grown from approximately 50
kits per week to more than 350 kits per week.
o Establishment of Joint Staff fusion cell. In December 2004, the Joint
Staff's Directorate of Logistics established a team, called the Joint
Armor Fusion Cell, to monitor the progress of the services' armoring
efforts to enhance visibility of the program to DOD and congressional
leadership. In addition, the armor fusion cell was established to
accelerate the availability of armor kits by identifying and fixing gaps
in the supply chain. For example, the Joint Staff armor fusion cell,
working with the Army, helped identify and deploy certified welders from
the Air Force and Navy to assist with production and installation of armor
in the United States and in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, thereby
speeding up the availability of truck armor to the units. The cell also
worked with the U.S. Transportation Command to increase the use of airlift
for armor kits within the CENTCOM area of operations, which reduced the
need for ground transportation and increased the speed of deliveries to
armor installation sites.
Army Has Developed a Long-term Plan to Address the Availability of Truck
Armor for Future Operations
The Army is taking long-term actions to improve the availability of truck
armor for future operations through the development of a long-term
armoring plan. While we did not evaluate the plan's potential for success,
we did note it is aimed at identifying long-term requirements for truck
armor and developing solutions to address these requirements.
The Army's long-term plans, designed to improve the overall availability
of truck armor for future operations, are outlined in the Army Tactical
Wheeled Vehicle Long Term Armoring Strategy. The Army's G8 division for
programming, analysis, and materiel integration tasked TRADOC to develop
this plan in January 2005. The Long Term Armoring Strategy incorporates
the Army's plan to provide add-on armor to its tactical wheeled vehicle
fleet. Under the plan, add-on armor will consist of two kits, one that
includes hardware to be placed on the vehicle to receive the armor, and
another that contains the actual armor. The plan also includes provisions
to facilitate the production and availability of armor. Estimated costs
for the armor are based on current armor models that use heavy metals,
such as steel and aluminum; however, according to Army program office
officials, they are considering the use of lighter metals for greater
efficiency but at higher costs.
According to the Long Term Armoring Strategy, its purpose is to
demonstrate the Army's deliberate process to outline a path forward and
avoid long response times for providing truck armor in the future. The
plan further notes that the framework supports a balanced approach for
procurement of armoring kits that mitigates risk and enhances safety and
force protection. According to the plan, the end state is a tactical
wheeled vehicle fleet that provides the commanders with flexibility to
increase the protection level when needed and ensures the Army's ability
to rapidly acquire additional kits. The initial draft concept was
completed in March 2005 and a final plan was presented to the G8 division
in June 2005. According to the program office, Army headquarters approved
the plan in August 2005 with a few outstanding issues to be resolved. The
necessary protection level for trucks is based on the Department of the
Army's approved threat assessment, developed by the intelligence
community, which spans through 2018. The Long Term Armoring Strategy will
be implemented in concert with the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and
Trailer Modularity and Modernization Strategy,17 which is aimed at
addressing the Army's truck needs through fiscal year 2018.
The Army's long-term plan for add-on armor for trucks requires two kits.
The A kit provides a basic framework of fixtures for all trucks ready to
accept armor and includes hard to install parts and permanent mounting
provisions for the B kit. The B kit contains the actual armor to be
applied to all trucks fitted with an A kit and includes modular components
to be installed and removed by two crewmen. The B kits will be procured
based on operational and training requirements, while all trucks will be
outfitted with A kits. The A kits will be installed by 2018 on current
trucks during recapitalization and on newly produced vehicles at the
factory. The second quarter of fiscal year 2006 is the program manager's
proposed deadline to begin installing all trucks with A kits; however, as
of September 2005 the date was not finalized. Program officials advocate
the use of lighter materials for producing the kits instead of the heavier
metals currently being used. According to these officials, lighter
materials like ceramics are more expensive but could provide greater
efficiencies such as reducing the amount of weight on a vehicle,
preventing wear and tear, and allowing for more weight to be apportioned
for operational purposes.
The long-term plan includes provisions to facilitate the production and
availability of armor in the future. As part of the plan, the Army will
own the blueprints for the armor to expand competition from multiple
sources and avoid relying on one contractor at critical decision points
when more kits are needed. According to Army officials, contractors
currently own the blueprints, and the Army's ability to buy quantities on
demand could be restricted by the contractors' production capabilities.
Technical requirements to facilitate the availability of armor in the
future include maximizing the commonality of kit components among
vehicles, and ensuring compatibility of the A and B kits with future armor
upgrades.
Army program officials stated that preliminary budget estimates for the
armoring plan have been developed and included in the Army's future budget
plans for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. However, these estimates are
based on the costs of the current armor kits produced with heavy metals
and do not include estimates of the costs of lighter armor as advocated by
the program office. Final cost estimates and a decision about the types of
armor to be used have not yet been finalized.
Conclusions
A number of challenges hindered the Army's ability to provide truck armor
in the timeliest manner to its deployed forces operating in the Middle
East. While some of these challenges may have resulted from operational
conditions in the region that the Army and DOD had little control over,
other limitations were a direct result of key decisions and ineffective
supply processes within the Army and DOD. The availability of truck armor
was limited by the Army's decision not to fully fund previously identified
requirements, numerous increases in requirements, the Army's inability to
timely obtain funding for current wartime needs from DOD or within its own
budget, and limited industrial base resources.
In our prior report examining critical supply shortages during Operation
Iraqi Freedom, we recommended that the Army take actions to address two of
these same issues.18 Specifically, we recommended the Army expedite the
funding process to support timely and sufficient funding for wartime
requirements, and assess the industrial base capacity to minimize
acquisition delays. One of these recommendations, to assess the industrial
base, would also apply to the Army's approach to armoring trucks. The
other related recommendation to improve the timeliness of the funding
process was specific to the individual types of supplies we examined, and
may not be directly applicable to truck armor as it was written.
The results of both our current and prior work indicate a broader systemic
problem of not documenting and communicating urgent wartime funding
requirements and the disposition of funding decisions. We reported in
April 2005 that funding delays also contributed to critical wartime
shortages of armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, and tires,
but we could not determine why sufficient funding was not provided earlier
because adequate documentation of funding requests was not available.
Without formal documentation and communication of urgent wartime funding
requirements and the disposition of funding decisions, the rationale for
funding decisions and the officials and organizations accountable for
making those decisions may not be subject to effective oversight by
Congress or the Secretary of Defense. It is likely DOD could again face
urgent requirements to rapidly develop and produce materiel solutions to
improve force capability or protection of deployed forces. Without
improving DOD's ability to provide that support to the warfighters in the
timeliest manner, deployed military personnel and their missions may be
placed at significant risk because they lack the necessary equipment and
supplies at the critical times they may be needed.
Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure funding needs for urgent wartime requirements are identified
quickly, requests for funding are well documented, and funding decisions
are based on risk and an assessment of the highest priority requirements,
we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to
establish a process to document and communicate all urgent wartime funding
requirements for supplies and equipment at the time they are identified
and the disposition of funding decisions.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the intent
of our recommendation, but stated that it believes the Army Requirements
and Resourcing Board (AR2B) process, previously the ASPB process discussed
earlier in this report, conforms to the process described in our
recommendation. As noted by DOD, the AR2B is a forum where urgent wartime
requirements are reviewed, staffed, and validated. However, as
demonstrated by our work, once requirements are validated, funding must be
made available to execute programs to respond to those requirements. When
sufficient funding is not available in the Army's budget for the validated
requirement, the Army must seek additional funding through DOD. Because,
as we noted in this report and in April 2005, funding requests from the
Army to DOD to resource validated requirements and the corresponding
decisions as to the amount and timing of funding to be provided were not
adequately documented, we were unable to determine the reasons why funding
was not made available to respond to urgent wartime requirements as
needed. In addition, in April 2005 we also reported that funding requests
for critical wartime supplies such as armored vehicle track shoes, lithium
batteries, and tires also could not be tracked from the Army Materiel
Command, where they originated, to Army headquarters for validation, which
precluded our ability to determine why funding for these items lagged
behind the time the need was identified. We continue to believe these
events in the funding process for urgent wartime requirements must be
fully documented to provide effective program oversight and to ensure
funding decisions are made based on risk and an assessment of the highest
priority requirements. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD
also provided technical comments that have been incorporated where
appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army and the
Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .
If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or [email protected] . Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix IV.
William M. Solis, Director Defense Capabilities and Management
Scope and Methodology Appendix I
To address our objectives, we examined the Army's programs to produce and
install armor for each of its medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles,
or trucks, operating in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
responsibility, which included Iraq and Afghanistan.1 The Army trucks we
examined included the family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV), heavy
expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT), heavy equipment transporter
(HET), palletized load system (PLS), M915 truck tractor, M939 5-ton
tactical truck, and fuel tankers. Descriptions of each of these trucks
along with detailed information on the availability of armor for each
truck are included in appendix II.
To determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed to
meet identified requirements, we interviewed DOD and Army officials
involved in identifying armor requirements, providing funding, and
acquiring truck armor for deployed forces. We also met with truck armor
contractors from the industrial base. A complete list of the DOD and other
organizations that we met with during this review is found in table 4. We
also collected and analyzed armor supply data such as requirements,
funding levels, contract order awards, production levels, and
installations for the period November 2003 (when truck armor requirements
were first formally identified) through September 2005, which we obtained
from the Army based on source documents. We considered the armor
requirement met for each type of truck when the quantity of armor kits
installed onto vehicles equaled the requirement. We did not, however,
visit the CENTCOM area of responsibility to validate the extent to which
armor kits had been installed and were actually in use by trucks.
Table 4: Organizations Interviewed during Review
Source: GAO.
To determine what factors affected the time to provide truck armor to
deployed forces, we analyzed the armor supply data we collected to
identify trends and isolate factors that impacted the timeliness of
producing and installing armor. We also met with and collected additional
information from DOD, Army and armor contractor officials involved with
the armor acquisition programs to evaluate the significance of these
factors and to determine the extent of their impact on the availability of
truck armor.
To determine what actions DOD and the Army have taken to improve the
availability of truck armor for current and future operations, we
interviewed military service and Joint Staff personnel to identify short-
and long-term efforts to address supply shortages. We also reviewed
documentation related to addressing future truck armor needs. However, we
did not evaluate the identified solutions' potential for success.
We assessed the reliability of the truck armor supply data we obtained for
this review by interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data
and corroborating it with other information gathered from other military
service organizations and armor contractors, and by reviewing existing
documentation about the data and the sources that produced the data. We
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this report. We performed our audit from April 2005 through January 2006
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts Appendix II
We assessed the armoring efforts for each of the following medium and
heavy trucks: heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks, heavy equipment
transporters, palletized load systems, M939 5-ton trucks, family of medium
tactical vehicles, M915 truck family, and tankers. For these seven types
of trucks we reviewed, each assessment provides the status of the armoring
efforts at the time of our review. The profile presents a general
description of the truck and the approach to developing armor solutions.
The assessments also include our evaluation of the extent to which armor
kits were produced and installed to meet identified requirements and the
significant factors that affected armor availability.
The Army's efforts to armor its heavy and medium tactical wheeled vehicles
have been hindered by awarding contracts for quantities less than the
total requirement, material shortages, and a limited rate of installation.
The Army's efforts to armor its trucks experienced 12 to 18 month delays
between when initial requirements were identified and when the initial
requirements were met, although requirements for all vehicles increased
over time such that by the time the initial requirements were met, the
actual requirements were in excess of that initial amount. The schedule
for contract orders constrained the Army's ability to meet requirements
for all vehicles except 5-ton trucks. Material shortages negatively
impacted the Army's ability to meet requirements for all vehicles except
for medium tactical vehicles and tankers. Limited installation rates
constrained the availability of tanker armor.
Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
The Army uses its heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) to
provide transport capabilities for the resupply of various combat vehicles
and weapons systems. Figure 4 shows an example of a HEMTT. To protect the
HEMTT crew from enemy fire in Iraq, the Army contracted with Simula Inc.
to develop and build add-on armor kits for installation on HEMTTs. The
Army's armoring program involves applying armor kits to 2,705 HEMTTs.
Figure 4: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
Simula developed about 180 armor kits for the HEMTT in 1996 to support
operations in the Balkans. However, the kits were placed in storage and
never actually used. When armor requirements were identified for
operations in Iraq, the Army and Simula retrieved and tested the stored
kits and subsequently shipped them to southwest Asia for use in Iraq. In
February 2004, the Army contracted with Simula to begin production of new
kits.
Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements
Requirements for 1,080 HEMTT armor kits were first identified in November
2003, but a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were not
installed until February 2005, or 15 months after the first requirement
was established. Identified requirements continued to grow to a level of
2,430 armor kits by March 2005, but dropped slightly in September 2005 to
2,246. However, as of September 2005 the total amount of kits installed
was 2,088, or 158 fewer than the quantity required. Figure 5 compares the
time elapsed from the identification of armor kit requirements to the time
when kits were produced and installed. According to Army officials, the
total number of required armor kits was installed by December 2005.
Figure 5: Comparison of HEMTT Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and
Installed
Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the
HEMTT. First, the Army's lack of timeliness of contract awards over the
life of the program constrained the overall production schedule. Second, a
shortage of key materials, specifically steel and aluminum negatively
impacted the contractor's ability to maximize production in the early
stages of the program.
Contracts Constrained Production
The Army issued five contracts for HEMTT armor kits, which affected the
contractor's ability to produce more kits faster. For example, according
to contractor officials, they have not had capacity constraints in the
building of HEMTT armor kits; however, they sized production capacity to
meet the quantities in the contract that the contractor had been awarded.
Therefore, production levels were lower than they could have been if the
contractor had received a contract for larger quantities of kits upfront,
which prevented production of more of the kits sooner. One reason for the
Army's use of a contract in this manner was the fact that funding was
received in amounts less than the total requirements and initially lagged
several months behind requirements. As shown in figure 6, the availability
of funding affected the pace of contract awards.
Figure 6: Comparison of HEMTT Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
Ordered
Another reason for the lower quantity of contract orders was the changing
requirements for HEMTT armor kits. For example, armor kit production
output for the HEMTT dropped to zero in April and May because the
contractor had completed production for the current requirement. However,
subsequent contract orders were awarded after the contractor had ceased
production. By the time that the contractor had received the last two
contracts for 791 and 319 HEMTT armor kits, respectively, production had
already stopped, employees and sub-contractors were released, and
equipment and facility space were given up for other uses. Consequently,
production of the 791 and 319 kits had to wait about two months until the
contractor could restart this industrial base.
Although an additional requirement had been identified in March 2005, a
contract to meet this requirement was not awarded until April 2005, which
was not soon enough to prevent the stoppage of the production line.
According to the Army's program manager, to prevent a production stoppage
the requirement would have had to be identified and the contract order
issued several months earlier.
Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production
A shortage of armor materials, specifically steel and aluminum, negatively
impacted the HEMTT armor kit program. Shortages of high hard armor steels
and aluminum negatively affected the start up and pace of production
through the end of 2004. The material shortages were eventually rectified
by the intervention of the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set
priorities and by various congressional staff appealing directly to the
material suppliers.
Heavy Equipment Transporter
The heavy equipment transporter (HET) is a system used by the Army to
transport, deploy, recover, and evacuate main battle tanks and other heavy
tracked and wheeled vehicles to and from the battlefield. The HET system
consists of a truck tractor and HET trailer, as shown in figure 7. The
Army's armoring effort involves applying armor to a total of 796 HETs. In
April 2004, the Army contracted with Simula Inc. to begin producing armor
kits for the HET.
Figure 7: Heavy Equipment Transporter
Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements
Requirements for 500 HET armor kits were first identified in November
2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were
not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the first requirement
was established. Identified requirements continued to grow to 758 by March
2005, but dropped in September 2005 to 663. As of September 2005 the total
number of kits installed was 700, or 37 greater than the quantity
required. Figure 8 compares the time elapsed from the identification of
armor kit requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed.
Figure 8: Comparison of HET Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and
Installed
Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
Two significant factors affected the contractor's ability to produce armor
kits for the HET. First, the award of contracts over the armoring
program's life and a lack of contractor visibility into upcoming contracts
affected HET production. Second, the HET armoring program was also
negatively impacted by a material shortage.
Contracts Constrained Production
The Army issued four contracts for the HET, which lagged behind
requirements. This limited the contractor's ability to maximize production
of HET kits. Specifically, contractor officials told us that they did not
have capacity constraints in the building of HET armor kits; however, they
sized production capacity to meet the quantities in the contract orders
that they had been awarded. Therefore, production levels were lower than
they could have been if the contractor had received contract orders for
larger quantities of kits upfront, which prevented production of more of
the kits sooner. Significant reasons for awarding less than the total
requirements were changing requirements and delayed and less than the
total funding. Figure 9 demonstrates the relationship among timing of
requirements, funding, and contracts.
Figure 9: Comparison of HET Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
Ordered
A lack of contractor visibility into upcoming contract awards also
affected HET production. Specifically, the Army awarded a contract for 131
additional HET add-on-armor kits in April 2005. However, in February 2005
the contractor's supply base had completed production for HET components
related to the previous contract order for 66 HET kits. Consequently, the
supply base required two months to reinitiate production of these
components from a cold start. If the contractor had had visibility into
the upcoming contract, it could have maintained the needed supply base and
reduced production time for the additional 131 HETs by 2 months.
Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production
The HET armoring program was also negatively impacted by a material
shortage. The shortage of materials, specifically of high-hard armor
steels and aluminum, affected the start up of heavy tactical vehicle
contract orders and the pace of production through the end of 2004. The
material shortages were eventually rectified by the intervention of the
Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set priorities and by various
congressional staff appealing directly to the material suppliers.
M939 5-Ton Truck
The Army's M939 5-ton tactical truck is a general-purpose military
vehicle, primarily designed for tactical, off-road use. The M-939 is a
5-ton capacity, six-wheel drive cargo truck used for transportation of all
types of supplies and comes in various vehicle types, including a cargo
truck, dump truck, and wrecker. Figure 13 shows an example of an M-939
5-ton truck.
Figure 13: M939 5-Ton Truck
The M939 5-ton truck armoring effort includes manufacturing armoring kits
for 3,000 5-ton trucks at six army facilities through a program manager
agreement with the Army's Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise (GSIE).1
GSIE began producing truck kits in December 2004 and completed the last
kits in July 2005.
Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements
Requirements for 2,229 M939 5-ton truck armor kits were first identified
in April 2004; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that
requirement were not produced until June 2005, or 14 months after the
first requirement was established. As of September 2005, 2,224 kits had
been installed. Identified requirements grew to 3,073 by August 2004, but
dropped 2,688 by March 2005, and dropped again slightly in September 2005
to 2,592. By June 2005 a sufficient quantity of kits had been produced to
meet those requirements. Figure 14 compares the time elapsed from the
identification of armor kit requirements to the time when kits were
produced and installed. The Army estimated the required quantity of kits
would have been installed by January 2006. According to GSIE officials,
GSIE does not anticipate any further production orders for the M939 armor
kits.
Figure 14: Comparison of M939 5-Ton Truck Armor Kit Requirements to Kits
Produced and Installed
Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Availability of Armor Kits
Shortages of material negatively impacted the production of M939 5-ton
armor kits. According to GSIE officials, the production capacity for the
5-ton truck armor kits was established based on the availability of
material and components that are used to build the armor kits. When GSIE
was asked to accelerate the production of M939 5-ton kits, the lack of
availability of certain materials limited GSIE's ability to increase the
production quantity of the armor kit. Examples of items that were
difficult to obtain included armor grade steel, door handles, and wiper
components.
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
The Army's family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV) addresses medium
tactical-vehicle requirements for unit mobility and unit resupply, and
transportation of equipment and personnel. The FMTV consists of the Light
Medium Tactical Vehicle, which has a 2.5-ton capacity, and the Medium
Tactical Vehicle, which has a 5-ton capacity. Variants of the FMTV include
cargo trucks and tractor, van, wrecker, and dump truck models. The FMTV
armoring effort involves producing a total of 3,890 armor kits.
The FMTV armoring production is split between two separate contractors,
Radian Inc. and Stewart and Stevenson Inc. The Army's Tank-Automotive
Research, Development and Engineering Center designed and produced a small
number (approximately 35) of FMTV armor kits with components that bolt
onto the cab. In March 2003, the Army arranged for Radian to help with the
installation of these kits onto vehicles. In February 2004, Radian
received a contract to produce 270 kits based on the Army design. The kit
being produced by Radian is called the Radian Armor Crew Kit (RACK).
Figure 15 shows an example of an FMTV RACK truck. Stewart and Stevenson
produces an armored cab, called the Low Signature Armored Cab (LSAC), that
replaces the FMTV cab in its entirety. Figure 16 shows an example of an
FMTV LSAC truck. On its own initiative, in 2002, Stewart and Stevenson
developed an FMTV armored cab design to protect against mine blasts.
Subsequent to its first armored cab design, Stewart and Stevenson modified
its design based on the emerging threats in Iraq, and in October 2004,
after completing design and testing, received its initial contract from
the Army to produce 385 LSAC cabs.
Figure 15: FMTV RACK Truck
Figure 16: FMTV LSAC Truck
Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements
Requirements for 1,150 FMTV armor kits were first identified in November
2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were
not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the first requirement
was established. Identified requirements continued to grow to 3,335 by
March 2005, and again to 3,377 by September 2005. However, as of September
2005 only 3,053 RACK and LSAC kits had been installed, or 324 fewer than
the quantity required. Figure 17 compares the time elapsed from the
identification of armor kit requirements to the time when kits were
produced and installed. According to Army officials, the total number of
required armor kits was installed by December 2005.
Figure 17: Comparison of FMTV Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and
Installed
Contracts Constrained Production
Orders for FMTV armor kits were awarded for less than the total
requirement and lagged behind requirements. These contracts slowed
production of armor kits for both FMTV contractors. For Radian, there was
a complete break in production because the final contract for 1,049 FMTV
armor kits was received after its long lead time for ordering items needed
to maintain continuous production. According to the Radian officials,
production could have been maintained or even accelerated if the
requirements had been identified and funding provided in time to meet the
long lead time. However, the contractor did not have any visibility into
the pending requirements and was told by the Army that there would be no
further contracts for kits. In addition, according to a Stewart and
Stevenson official, if they had been awarded the contract for the final
292 armor kits in the March/April 2005 time frame, they could have
finished producing the kits in the July/August 2005 time frame, or 3
months earlier than the October/November 2005 time frame when the kits
were estimated to be completed. Significant reasons for ordering in this
manner were changing requirements and delayed and less than total funding.
Figure 18 demonstrates the relationship between timing of requirements,
funding, and contracts.
Figure 18: Comparison of FMTV Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
Ordered
Contracts Affected Price
The award of contracts in quantities less than total requirements resulted
in the Army not receiving the best price available for the RACK. The Army
ordered FMTV kits from Radian in increments of 270 and 501 in February
2004 and March 2004, respectively. The 270 kits that the government
ordered did not allow for receiving the highest price break for production
quantities, while the 501 kits the government ordered allowed for the best
price break available. For the 272 kit contract, the cost was about
$51,603 for each kit, and for the 501 kit contract, the cost was $45,271
for each kit, a difference of $6,332 per kit. According to the Army
program officials, the reason there were two contract awards was that
funding was not available for the full quantity in February 2004.
M915 Truck Family
The Army's family of M915 trucks comprises highway tractors used primarily
for the long distance transport of containers. The M915 is very similar to
commercial tractor-trailer trucks. Figure 19 illustrates an M915 truck. To
protect the M915 crew from enemy fire in Iraq, the Army contracted with
Simula Inc., Radian Inc. and Armor Works Inc. to develop and build add-on
armor kits. The Army's armoring program involves producing armor kits for
2,026 M915s.
Figure 19: M915 Truck Tractor
Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements
Requirements for 250 M915 truck armor kits were first identified in
November 2003, but a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement
were not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the first
requirement was established. Identified requirements continued to grow to
1,877 armor kits by March 2005, but dropped slightly in September 2005 to
1,805. However, as of September 2005 the total number of kits installed
was 1,295, or 510 fewer than the quantity required. Figure 20 compares the
time elapsed from the identification of armor kit requirements to the time
when kits were produced and installed. Army officials estimated that the
total number of required armor kits would have been installed by January
2006.
Figure 20: Comparison of M915 Family of Trucks Armor Kit Requirements to
Kits Produced and Installed
Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the
M915. First, the Army's award of contracts for less than the total
requirement over the life of the program constrained production. Second, a
shortage of key materials, specifically steel and aluminum, negatively
impacted the contractor's ability to maximize production.
Contracts Constrained Production
Contracts for the M915 truck armor kits were awarded in quantities less
than the total requirement and generally lagged behind requirements. This
manner of contracting for M915 armor kits constrained production,
particularly for Simula. The Army issued four contracts to Simula for
1,228 of the M915 armor kits over a 9-month period. According to Simula
officials, they subcontracted the workload to Plasan Sasa in Israel based
on the first contract of 250. However, subsequent to the first contract,
the Army validated additional requirements of 1,627 kits between April
2004 and March 2005. However, Simula was not aware when the first contract
was awarded that the total quantities could eventually exceed 1,600. Had
the contractor been aware of this, it would have proceeded differently
from the outset, such as using a different manufacturer. By the time the
additional contracts came into Simula, Plasan Sasa was facing capacity
constraints in the production of the M915 armor kits. Unable to overcome
the capacity constraints at Plasan Sasa, Simula negotiated with Plasan
Sasa to bring some of the M915 production to the United States. In total,
Simula arranged to complete 738 of the 1,228 M915 armor kits in the United
States. Significant reasons for awarding contracts in this manner were
changing requirements and delayed and less than total funding. Figure 21
demonstrates the relationship among timing of requirements, funding, and
contracts.
Figure 21: Comparison of M915 Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
Ordered
Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production
Shortages of strategic armor materials negatively impacted M915 armor kit
production. Shortages of high-hard armor steels and aluminum affected the
start up of contract orders and the pace of production through the end of
2004. The material shortages were eventually rectified by the intervention
of the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set priorities and by
various congressional staff appeals directly to the material suppliers.
Tankers
The Army uses its tankers to haul and dispense bulk fuel. There are four
models of fuel tankers involved in the Army's armoring program: the M967,
the M969, the M978, and the M1062. Figure 22 shows an example of an M969
tanker. The primary component of the tanker armoring effort is a
self-sealing coating material that is sprayed onto the exterior of the
fuel tank. When a small arms round penetrates the coating material and the
fuel tank, the hole self-seals and the fuel leak is stopped within
minutes. The second component of tanker armoring comprises armor panel
kits mounted at select locations on the fuel tanker to protect critical
equipment not protected by the coating material. VSE Corporation is
applying the self-sealing coating to the tankers and is manufacturing the
armor kit for the M967, the M969, and the M1062 tankers. Oshkosh Truck
Corporation is manufacturing the armor kit for the M978 tanker.
Figure 22: An M969 Tanker
Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements
Requirements for armoring 371 tankers were first identified in August
2004; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were
not produced and installed until August 2005, 12 months after the initial
requirement was identified. Identified requirements have continued to grow
to 1,375 armor kits by January 2005, but dropped in September 2005 to
1,192. However, as of September 2005 the total amount of armor kits
installed was 443, or 749 fewer than the quantity required. Figure 23
compares the time elapsed from the identification of armor kit
requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed. Army
officials estimate that the total number of required armor kits will be
produced by May 2006 and installed by January 2007.
Figure 23: Comparison of Tanker Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced
and Installed
Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for
tankers. First, the Army's award of contracts for less than the total
requirement over the life of the program constrained production. Second,
installation of armor kits was constrained by a limited rate of rotation
for tankers into installation facilities and unique requirements for
applying the protective spray-on coating.
Contracts Constrained Availability of Armor Kits
The production time line for one of the armor kits, for the M967 tanker,
is longer than it would have been if contract awards had been for the
total requirement. The Army awarded two contracts for M967 armoring with
quantities of 171 and 152, with an 8-month interval between the two
contracts. According to the contractor, if all 323 tanker kits had been
awarded together, the total production time line would have decreased due
to production efficiencies. Contracts for the other three tankers, the
M969, the M978, and the M1062, were awarded for the total requirement and,
therefore, the contractor stated that production has gone as efficiently
as possible.
Limited Installation Rates Paced Availability of Armor Kits
A significant factor that affected the availability of armor kits for
tanker trailers was a limited installation rate. For example, the
installation of add-on armor kits was slowed by the rate of rotation of
trucks into the in-theater installation facilities as they returned from
missions. Operational constraints limited the number of vehicles that
could be taken out of use at any one time. In addition, unique
requirements to coat the tankers with a protective chemical prior to
installing armor panels also limited the rate of installation. The proper
application of the chemical coating requires controlled environmental
conditions, such as humidity and temperature, which has led to a limited
number of spray locations accessible to the Army. Thus, although
production of armor kits for tankers is expected to be completed by May
2006, because of these constraints, installation of enough kits to meet
requirements is not expected to be finished until 8 months later in
January 2007.
Palletized Load System
The Army's palletized load system (PLS) performs long distance and local
haul, and unit resupply in the tactical environment to support combat
units. The PLS is supposed to facilitate the rapid movement of combat
configured loads of ammunition as well as all classes of supplies and
containers. The PLS consists of a truck with self-loading capabilities and
a trailer, as shown in figure 10.
Figure 10: Palletized Load System
According to contractor officials, the Army's Tank-Automotive Research,
Development and Engineering Center had developed and built around 30
armored kits to support operations in the Balkans; however, the kits were
placed in storage and never used. Subsequently, when armor requirements
were identified for operations in Iraq, the Army retrieved the kits from
storage and shipped them to southwest Asia for use in Iraq. In February
2004, the Army issued contract orders to Simula Inc. to produce additional
PLS armor kits. Simula Inc. has completed production of a total of 1,282
armor kits, which satisfies the current requirement for 914 armor kits and
provides 368 spare PLS armor kits for future requirements.
Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
Requirements
Requirements for 800 PLS armor kits were first identified in November
2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were
not installed until May 2005, or 18 months after the first requirement was
established. By March 2005, the identified requirements had increased by
114, which were met in July 2005. In September 2005, the identified
requirements increased again by 30, which were met in September 2005.
Figure 11 compares the time elapsed from the identification of armor kit
requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed. In
anticipation of a greater requirement, the Army program office ordered 338
kits above the Army's current requirement.
Figure 11: Comparison of PLS Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and
Installed
Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the
PLS. First, the Army's use of contracts for quantities less than total
requirements over the life of the program constrained the overall
production schedule. Second, a shortage of key materials, specifically
steel and aluminum, negatively impacted the contractor's ability to
maximize production.
Contracts Constrained Production
The Army issued four contracts for PLS kits, which initially lagged behind
requirements and affected the contractor's ability to maximize the
production of PLS kits. According to contractor officials, they have not
had capacity constraints in the building of PLS armor kits; however, they
sized production capacity to meet the quantities in the contracts that the
contractor had been issued. Therefore, production levels were lower than
they could have been if the contractor had received contracts for larger
quantities of kits upfront, which prevented the production of more of the
kits sooner. Significant reasons for awards for less than the total
requirements were changing requirements and delayed and less than total
funding. Figure 12 demonstrates the relationship among timing of
requirements, funding, and contracts.
Figure 12: Comparison of PLS Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
Ordered
Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production
The PLS armoring program was also negatively impacted by material
shortages. The shortage of materials, specifically of high-hard armor
steels and aluminum, affected the start up of heavy tactical vehicle
contract orders and the pace of production through the end of 2004. The
material shortages were eventually rectified by the intervention of the
Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set priorities and by various
Congressional staff appealing directly to the material suppliers.
Comments from the Department of Defense Appendix III
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements Appendix IV
William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or [email protected]
In addition to the contact named above, David Schmitt, Assistant Director;
Renee S. Brown, Judith C. Collins, Kenneth E. Patton, Richard G. Payne,
Jay Rangaram, Maria-Alaina I. Rambus, Paulina T. Reaves, Cary B. Russell,
Patricia Sari-Spear, Rebecca Shea, and John D. Strong also made key
contributions to this report.
(350658)
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-160 .
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact William Solis at (202) 512-8365 or
[email protected].
Highlights of GAO-06-160 , a report to congressional committees
March 2006
DEFENSE LOGISTICS
Several Factors Limited the Production and Installation of Army Truck
Armor during Current Wartime Operations
In April 2005, GAO reported on factors affecting the timely production of
up-armored high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and add-on
armor kits for HMMWVs, as well as other items critically needed by
deployed forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Due to high interest by
Congress and the public regarding vehicle armor, GAO initiated this
subsequent engagement to examine issues affecting the production and
installation of armor for medium and heavy trucks. The objectives were to
(1) determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed
to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what factors affected the
time to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what actions the Department
of Defense (DOD) and the Army have taken to improve the timely
availability of truck armor. To address these objectives, GAO collected
and analyzed supply data for medium and heavy tactical trucks used by Army
forces.
What GAO Recommends
Expanding on one of its April 2005 recommendations, GAO is recommending
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Army to establish a process to
document and communicate all urgent wartime funding requirements for
supplies and equipment when identified and the disposition of funding
decisions. DOD concurred with the intent of the recommendation.
The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the production
and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 except for fuel
tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for tankers is expected by
January 2007. Although the Army first identified a requirement for 3,780
truck armor kits for five types of trucks in November 2003, it did not
produce all of the kits until February 2005 and did not install the kits
to fully meet the requirement until May 2005 - 18 months after the initial
requirement was identified. However, by that time, requirements had
increased substantially. As subsequent requirements for an additional
7,847 kits, excluding tankers, were identified, the time lag to meet them
lessened.
Time to Meet Initial Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Note: Does not include the 5-ton truck or fuel tankers, which had not been
identified at the time of the initial November 2003 requirement.
A number of factors contributed to the time to provide truck armor kits to
deployed troops, placing them at greater risk as they conducted wartime
operations in vehicles not equipped with the preferred level of
protection. For example, the Army missed a valuable opportunity to have
substantial numbers of truck armor kits available for Operation Iraqi
Freedom by not fully capitalizing on approved operational requirements
established in 1996. In addition, production time lengthened because
contracts were awarded for amounts less than total requirements due to
increasing needs for truck armor and inadequate funding. As was the case
for other critical wartime shortages that GAO previously examined,
sufficient documentation was lacking to determine why funding was not
available when needed, limiting effective oversight over funding
decisions. Material shortages and limited tanker kit installation rates
also impacted the availability of truck armor.
DOD and the Army have taken a number of short-term actions, such as
leveraging available funding, to improve truck armor availability during
current operations. The Army is also developing a long-term armoring plan
to improve the availability of truck armor for future operations.
*** End of document. ***