    Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Production and
    Installation of Army Truck Armor during Current Wartime
    Operations (22-MAR-06, GAO-06-160).

    In April 2005, GAO reported on factors affecting the timely
    production of up-armored high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled
    vehicles (HMMWV) and add-on armor kits for HMMWVs, as well as
    other items critically needed by deployed forces during Operation
    Iraqi Freedom. Due to high interest by Congress and the public
    regarding vehicle armor, GAO initiated this subsequent engagement
    to examine issues affecting the production and installation of
    armor for medium and heavy trucks. The objectives were to (1)
    determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and
    installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what
    factors affected the time to provide truck armor, and (3)
    identify what actions the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
    Army have taken to improve the timely availability of truck
    armor. To address these objectives, GAO collected and analyzed
    supply data for medium and heavy tactical trucks used by Army
    forces.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-160
        ACCNO:   A49617
      TITLE:     Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Production
    and Installation of Army Truck Armor during Current Wartime
    Operations
         DATE:   03/22/2006
      SUBJECT:   Army procurement
    	     Army supplies
    	     Defense capabilities
    	     Logistics
    	     Military land vehicles
    	     Military materiel
    	     Military operations
    	     Schedule slippages
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Timeliness
    	     Army Heavy Equipment Transporter System
    	     Army Palletized Load System
    	     DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom
    	     Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
    	     Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
    	     High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
    	     Vehicle

    	     M915 Truck
    	     M939 Truck

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    GAO-06-160

         * Report to Congressional Committees
              * March 2006
         * defense logistics
              * Several Factors Limited the Production and Installation of Army
                Truck Armor during Current Wartime Operations
         * Contents
              * Results in Brief
              * Background
                   * Deployed Army Forces Face a Significant Threat from IEDs
                   * Outfitting Army Trucks with Armor
                   * Processes for Developing Truck Armor Requirements and
                     Solutions
                        * Process for Developing Wartime Requirements
                        * Development of Truck Armor Solutions
              * Army Expects to Have Met Most Truck Armor Requirements by January
                2006
              * Several Factors Lengthened the Time to Provide Truck Armor Kits
                   * Army Did Not Fully Capitalize on Truck Armor Requirements
                     Identified Prior to Operations in Iraq
                   * Army's Awarding of Contracts for Less Than the Total
                     Requirement Constrained Armor Kit Production
                        * Awarding Contracts at Less Than the Total Requirement
                          Lengthened the Time to Meet Requirements
                        * Truck Armor Requirements Increased Due to Changing
                          Operational Conditions
                        * Incremental Funding Lagged Behind Requirements,
                          Delaying Contract Awards
                   * Material Shortages Affected Availability of Army Truck Armor
                     Kits
                   * Limited Installation Rates Constrained the Availability of
                     Tanker Armor Kits
              * DOD and the Army Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability
                   * DOD and the Services Took Actions to Improve Availability of
                     Truck Armor during Current Operations
                   * Army Has Developed a Long-term Plan to Address the
                     Availability of Truck Armor for Future Operations
              * Conclusions
              * Recommendation for Executive Action
              * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * Scope and Methodology
         * Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts
              * Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck
                   * Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet
                     Identified Requirements
                   * Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
                        * Contracts Constrained Production
                        * Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production
              * Heavy Equipment Transporter
                   * Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet
                     Identified Requirements
                   * Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
                        * Contracts Constrained Production
                        * Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production
              * Palletized Load System
                   * Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet
                     Identified Requirements
                   * Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
                        * Contracts Constrained Production
                        * Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production
              * M939 5-Ton Truck
                   * Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet
                     Identified Requirements
                   * Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Availability of Armor
                     Kits
              * Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
                   * Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet
                     Identified Requirements
                   * Contracts Constrained Production
                   * Contracts Affected Price
              * M915 Truck Family
                   * Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet
                     Identified Requirements
                   * Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
                        * Contracts Constrained Production
                        * Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production
              * Tankers
                   * Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet
                     Identified Requirements
                   * Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits
                        * Contracts Constrained Availability of Armor Kits
                        * Limited Installation Rates Paced Availability of Armor
                          Kits
         * Comments from the Department of Defense
         * GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements

    Report to Congressional Committees

    March 2006

    DEFENSE LOGISTICS

    Several Factors Limited the Production and Installation of Army Truck
    Armor during Current Wartime Operations

    Contents

    Tables

    Figures

    Abbreviations

    March 22, 2006Letter

    The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
    Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

    The Honorable Duncan Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
    Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

    When combat operations were declared over during Operation Iraqi Freedom
    (OIF), U.S. and coalition forces transitioned to stabilization operations
    to restore public order and infrastructure in Iraq. Since that time, U.S.
    forces have come under frequent and deadly attacks from insurgents using a
    variety of weapons that include improvised explosive devices (IED),
    mortars, and rocket launchers. During this situation there have been
    numerous attacks on military convoys as they carry supplies and equipment
    throughout the region. The threat of IEDs, in particular, has become
    increasingly frequent and has been ranked as the number one killer of U.S.
    troops in Iraq. The explosives used in IEDs consist mainly of dynamite,
    land mines, old artillery shells or other types of military ordnances.
    Many IEDs are hidden and disguised along traffic routes and are remotely
    detonated against unsuspecting military personnel.

    As a result of experiences in Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and
    the services have taken several immediate steps to improve the protection
    of military forces operating in the region. Among these is the fielding of
    new capabilities to counter emerging threats encountered in Iraq, to
    include such improvements as add-on-armor for trucks and systems for
    detecting and defeating IEDs.

    Since the onset of OIF, we have reported on several supply chain
    management issues that have impeded support to the warfighter.1 For
    example, after visiting the theater in 2003, we provided our preliminary
    observations on the effectiveness of logistics support during OIF.  2
    Among the problems we observed were the unavailability of spare parts,
    hundreds of backlogged shipments, and an inability to track shipments at
    the distribution centers. In April 2005, we reported on shortages of a
    number of critical items during OIF, to include certain protective items
    such as body armor and armored high mobility multi-purpose wheeled
    vehicles (HMMWV).3 We identified a number of systemic causes for these
    shortages, including inaccurate requirements, delayed funding, and
    ineffective distribution processes. As a result, we made several
    recommendations to the Secretary of Defense calling for actions, such as
    ensuring the accuracy of Army war reserve requirements and developing and
    exercising deployable distribution capabilities, to improve DOD's system
    for supplying items to U.S. forces.

    Due to high interest by Congress and the public regarding the availability
    of armor for HMMWVs and other vehicles, we initiated this subsequent
    engagement under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United
    States to examine issues affecting the production and installation of
    armor for medium and heavy trucks used by Army forces during OIF and other
    ongoing operations in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
    responsibility.4 Our objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which
    truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements,
    (2) identify what factors affected the time to provide truck armor to
    deployed forces, and (3) identify what actions DOD and the Army have taken
    to improve the timely availability of truck armor.

    In conducting this review, we focused on medium and heavy tactical trucks
    used by Army forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, which included
    those in Iraq and Afghanistan.5 We also reviewed the production and
    installation of truck armor for Marine Corps forces, which we will report
    separately. To identify the extent to which truck armor was produced and
    installed to meet identified requirements, we visited numerous DOD and
    Army organizations to obtain data on the requirements, funding,
    production, and installation of truck armor kits. We considered the armor
    requirement as met for each type of truck when the quantity of armor kits
    produced and installed onto vehicles equaled the requirement. Based on the
    information gathered, we identified factors that affected the time to
    provide truck armor kits to deployed forces. We also identified DOD's and
    the Army's short-term and long-term efforts to improve the availability of
    truck armor. We assessed the reliability of the data we obtained and
    determined that they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
    report. We performed our review from April 2005 to January 2006 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A
    detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is located in appendix I.

    Results in Brief

    The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the production
    and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 except for fuel
    tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for tankers is expected by
    January 2007. Although the Army first identified a requirement for 3,780
    truck armor kits for five types of trucks in November 2003, it did not
    produce all of the kits until February 2005 and did not install the kits
    to fully meet the initial requirement until May 2005-18 months after the
    requirement was identified. However, by that time, requirements had
    increased substantially. As subsequent requirements for an additional
    7,847 kits, excluding tankers, were identified, the time lag to meet them
    lessened. Until add-on armor kits were installed, units in the theater
    developed their own interim improvised armor of locally fabricated steel
    armor plates to obtain some level of protection for their vehicles.

    We identified a number of factors that contributed to the time to provide
    truck armor kits to deployed troops, placing them at greater risk as they
    conducted wartime operations in vehicles that were not equipped with the
    preferred level of protection. The factors we identified include:

    o The Army did not fully capitalize on approved operational requirements
    for truck armor that were established in 1996. The 1996 requirements were
    similar to those developed in 2003 in response to experiences in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, addressing similar threats for most of the same types of
    trucks. Generally, official requirements such as these lead to the
    development and production of new systems to address the specified
    required capabilities. Production of armor kits based on the 1996
    requirements may have increased the availability of truck armor for
    current operations in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East.

    o The Army's award of contracts to armor contractors for amounts less than
    the total requirement caused production schedules to be longer than they
    might have otherwise been. Instead of awarding contracts in a way that
    maximized production rates, the Army awarded contracts in amounts less
    than the total requirement because requirements increased due to
    operational conditions and the Army received its allocation of funding
    from DOD at less than the total requirement. Funding was not always
    available to award contracts at the time requirements were identified, but
    neither DOD nor Army officials could explain or document why increased
    funding was not provided earlier or how funding decisions were made. In
    April 2005, we reported that insufficient and delayed funding also
    contributed to critical wartime shortages of armored vehicle track shoes,
    lithium batteries, and tires, and that we could not determine why
    sufficient funding was not provided earlier because adequate documentation
    of funding requests was not available. Without formal documentation and
    communication of urgent wartime funding requirements and the disposition
    of funding decisions, the rationale for funding decisions and the
    officials and organizations accountable for making those decisions may not
    be subject to effective oversight by Congress or the Secretary of Defense.

    o Material shortages impacted the availability of Army truck armor. For
    example, production levels for several Army kits were constrained, in
    part, by shortages of material and components such as steel and door
    handles. Further, competition between the Army and Marine Corps for
    limited contractors and materials exacerbated problems with limited
    availability of materials.

    o Limited installation rates affected the Army's ability to install armor
    kits onto tankers. The rotation of fuel trucks into the maintenance area
    as they returned from missions paced the installation of armor. In
    addition, unique requirements to coat the tankers with a protective
    chemical limited the numbers of armor installation sites available for
    armor installation due to the need for controlled environmental
    conditions. As a result, the total length of time to field tanker armor
    was stretched out over a longer period.

    DOD and the Army have taken several actions to improve truck armor
    availability. Several short-term solutions to increase the rate of
    production were instituted during operations in Iraq. For example, to
    mitigate the effects of funding requirements at less than the total
    requirements, the Army used money budgeted for other procurement programs
    to award contracts for production of armor kits before additional armor
    funds arrived. In addition, Army headquarters also developed the initial
    armor kit requirements based on emerging needs 5 months before units in
    the theater formally submitted their requirements for validation, which
    allowed it to begin seeking funds for armor kits and award contracts for
    design and production earlier. The Army also expanded its armor
    installation capacity to increase installation rates. Further, the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff (Joint Staff) established a team, called the Joint Armor
    Fusion Cell, to monitor the progress of armoring trucks as well to provide
    assistance to the Army to expedite the availability of armor kits. For
    example, the Joint Armor Fusion Cell helped identify and deploy personnel
    from the Air Force and Navy to perform armor installations in the theater
    and in the United States, thereby speeding up the availability of truck
    armor to the units. The Army is also developing a long-term plan to
    address future truck armoring needs. While we did not evaluate the plan's
    potential for success, we did note that it is aimed at identifying
    long-term requirements for truck armor and developing solutions to address
    these requirements.

    We are expanding upon a recommendation in our April 2005 report that was
    directed at improving the effectiveness of the Army's wartime supply
    support-to address a broader systemic problem that affected the
    availability of truck armor. To ensure that funding needs for urgent
    wartime requirements are identified quickly, requests for funding are well
    documented, and funding decisions are based on risk and an assessment of
    the highest priority requirements, we are recommending that the Secretary
    of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to establish a process to
    document and communicate all urgent wartime funding requirements for
    supplies and equipment at the time they are identified and the disposition
    of funding decisions.

    In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense stated
    it agreed with the intent of our recommendation but stated that it
    believes the Army's current requirements validation process conforms to
    the process described in our recommendation. Our work has demonstrated,
    however, that once requirements are validated, funding must be made
    available to execute programs to respond to those requirements. Because,
    as we noted in this report and in April 2005, funding requests from the
    Army to DOD to resource validated requirements and the corresponding
    decisions as to the amount and timing of funding to be provided were not
    adequately documented, we were unable to determine the reasons why funding
    was not made available to respond to urgent wartime requirements as
    needed. We continue to believe these events in the funding process for
    urgent wartime requirements must be fully documented to provide effective
    program oversight and to ensure funding decisions are made based on risk
    and an assessment of the highest priority requirements. The Department's
    responses are reprinted in appendix III and our evaluation of them appears
    later in this report.

    Background

    Army convoys carrying supplies and equipment in the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility have been subjected to deadly attacks by insurgents using
    IEDs and other weapons. In response to these attacks, the Army has
    undertaken several force protection measures such as adding armor to a
    number of medium and heavy trucks operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
    other CENTCOM locations.

    Deployed Army Forces Face a Significant Threat from IEDs

    Army convoys operating in the CENTCOM area of responsibility have been
    subjected to deadly attacks by enemy forces. In particular, attacks in
    Iraq by insurgents using IEDs have placed trucks and personnel at
    tremendous risk as they carry supplies and equipment throughout the
    region. In May 2003, U.S. and coalition forces began stabilization
    operations in Iraq that continue today. However, since that time, the
    United States has incurred more casualties than during major combat
    operations, mostly due to ambushes and IED attacks by insurgents operating
    in Iraq. The threat from IEDs has grown progressively, from single mortar
    rounds, to multiple explosives linked together, to suicide car bombs. In
    the spring of 2004, nearly every attack from an IED resulted in a
    coalition casualty. In particular, U.S. military convoys have been the
    targets of these types of attacks. In addition to attacks in Iraq, U.S.
    forces operating in Afghanistan have been subjected to IED attacks.

    IEDs take a variety of shapes and sizes and have been employed in a number
    of different ways. They can contain commercial or military explosives,
    homemade explosives, or military ordnance and ordnance components. For
    example, mortar and artillery projectiles have been employed as IEDs in
    Iraq. In addition, IEDs have been placed in many vehicles-from small
    sedans to large cargo trucks-and stationed along the roadways.
    Furthermore, "person-borne" suicide bombs have also been used, with
    explosives contained in a vest, belt, or clothing that is specifically
    modified to conceal and carry this material.

    Outfitting Army Trucks with Armor

    In light of the threat posed by IEDs and other weapons, such as mortars
    and rocket launchers, the Army has taken several force protection measures
    to include adding armor to a number of medium and heavy trucks operating
    in Iraq, and Afghanistan.6 The Army's medium and heavy tactical trucks
    that are being armored include: M939 5-ton trucks, family of medium
    tactical vehicles (FMTV), heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMTT),
    heavy equipment transporters (HET), palletized load systems (PLS), the
    M915 truck family, and tankers. Appendix II contains a detailed
    description of each Army vehicle in addition to a discussion of the armor
    kit availability and the significant factors that affected armor
    availability for each truck.

    The Army's medium tactical trucks include the M939 5-ton and FMTV. The
    M939 tactical truck is a general-purpose military vehicle, primarily
    designed for tactical, off-road use. The M-939 is a 5-ton capacity,
    six-wheel drive cargo truck used for transportation of all types of
    supplies and comes in various vehicle types, including a cargo truck, dump
    truck, and wrecker. The Army's FMTV addresses medium tactical-vehicle
    requirements for unit mobility and unit resupply, and transportation of
    equipment and personnel. The FMTV consists of the light medium tactical
    vehicle, which has a 2.5-ton capacity, and the medium tactical vehicle,
    which has a 5-ton capacity.

    The Army's heavy tactical trucks include the HEMTT, HET, PLS, M915, and
    tankers. The Army utilizes the HEMTT to provide transport capabilities for
    the resupply of various combat vehicles and weapons systems. The HET is
    used to transport, deploy, recover, and evacuate main battle tanks and
    other heavy tracked and wheeled vehicles to and from the battlefield. The
    PLS performs long distance and local hauls and unit resupply in the
    tactical environment to support combat units. The PLS consists of a truck
    with self-loading capabilities and a trailer. The Army's family of M915
    trucks consists of highway tractors used primarily for the long distance
    transport of containers, which is similar to commercial tractor-trailer
    trucks.

    The Army uses its tankers to haul and dispense bulk fuel. Four models of
    fuel tankers are involved in the Army's armoring program: the M967, the
    M969, the M978, and the M1062. The primary component of the tanker
    armoring effort is a self-sealing coating material that is sprayed onto
    the exterior of the fuel tank. When a small arms round penetrates the
    coating material and the fuel tank, the hole self seals and the fuel leak
    is stopped within minutes. A secondary component is composed of a set of
    armor panel kits mounted at select locations on the fuel tanker to protect
    critical equipment that is not protected by the coating material.

    Processes for Developing Truck Armor Requirements and Solutions

    The Army identified wartime truck armor requirements and initiated a
    procurement program to develop an armor solution, which involved seeking
    funding from a variety of sources, identifying and contracting with
    suppliers for armor materials and components, designing and testing armor
    solutions, and installing armor onto trucks in the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility or other installation sites in the United States and
    Europe.

    Process for Developing Wartime Requirements

    When a need for new equipment is identified by Army warfighters deployed
    to Iraq and other CENTCOM locations in support of the global war on
    terrorism, official requirements for these items are developed through the
    submission of the Army's operational needs statement (ONS). Army field
    commanders prepare an ONS, which documents the urgent need for a materiel
    solution to correct a deficiency or to improve a capability that impacts
    mission accomplishment. The ONS is sent forward through the unit's chain
    of command to the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) for
    theater-level approval, while an information copy is provided directly to
    Army headquarters for an initial check to ensure the requested capability
    and operational concept are clearly stated.

    Once approved by CFLCC, the ONS is forwarded to the Office of the Deputy
    Chief of Staff G-3 at Army headquarters where it is reviewed and validated
    by the Army Strategic Planning Board (ASPB).7 The ASPB is chaired by the
    G-3, with representatives from other Army headquarters staff offices and
    major Army commands. In the case of truck armor, once the requirement is
    validated by the ASPB, it is transmitted to the Program Executive
    Office-Combat Support and Combat Service Support, which manages the
    procurement of truck armor through its Project Manager for Tactical
    Vehicles (Project Manager). Validated requirements are also passed to the
    Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-8 and the Army Budget Office to
    obtain the necessary funding.

    Development of Truck Armor Solutions

    To address validated requirements for truck armor, the Army initiated a
    procurement program to develop an armor solution for its deployed trucks.
    Procurement is funded through congressional appropriations. However, at
    the time requirements for current operations were identified in November
    2003, there were no truck armor kit procurement programs in place.
    Consequently, funding for armor kits in the current Army procurement
    budgets did not exist. Because no funding was available at the time the
    requirements were identified, the Army obtained funding for its program
    from a variety of sources. While the Army can reprogram a small amount of
    funds from one program budget to another, the majority of funding had to
    be approved by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
    and in some cases, Congress. Specifically, to obtain funding for truck
    armor, the Army sought approval from the DOD Comptroller and Congress to
    reprogram funding from other procurement or appropriations

    accounts,8 requested funding from the DOD-managed Iraqi Freedom Fund,9 and
    requested armor funding through supplemental appropriations.

    The Army's approved armor protection for medium and heavy tactical
    vehicles consisted of add-on armor kits to be installed on vehicles
    already in use in the theater of operations or prior to deployment. These
    kits included armor panels and ballistic glass, as well as other
    components such as air conditioners. For all trucks except the M939 5-ton,
    the Army awarded contracts to armor companies to produce add-on kits for
    each type of truck. According to Army officials, as needed production
    quantities increased, the Army modified these contracts to reflect the
    additional quantities and revised prices. In the case of the 5-ton truck,
    the armor kits were produced by the Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise
    (GSIE), an Army organization of depots and other facilities.10 Instead of
    a contract, agreements on quantities and costs for work were provided
    through Military Inter-departmental Purchase Requests (MIPR), which were
    issued to GSIE for each new production order. Once armor kits were
    produced by contractors or Army depots, they were shipped to installation
    sites in the United States, Middle East, and Europe, where they were
    installed onto trucks by military or contractor personnel.

    Army Expects to Have Met Most Truck Armor Requirements by January 2006

    The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the production
    and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 except for fuel
    tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for tankers is expected by
    January 2007. Figure 1 shows the overall production and installation
    quantities of truck armor as compared to requirements. The Army's solution
    to addressing truck armor requirements focused on developing add-on armor
    kits to be attached to the vehicles. These add-on armor kits included
    armor panels and ballistic glass, as well as other components such as air
    conditioners.

    Figure 1: Production and Installation of Truck Armor Kits to Meet Army
    Requirements

    Although the Army first identified a requirement for 3,780 truck armor
    kits for five types of trucks in November 2003, it did not produce all of
    the kits until February 2005 and did not install the kits to fully meet
    the initial requirement until May 2005, or 18 months later. As shown in
    table 1, the time to produce and install armor kits to meet initial
    requirements varied by truck type, and ranged from 15 to 18 months.
    However, as shown in figure 1, by that time requirements had increased
    substantially. More detailed information on requirements, production, and
    installation times for each specific truck is provided in appendix II.

    Table 1: Time to Meet Initial Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type

    Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

    Note: Does not include the 5-ton truck or fuel tankers, which had not been
    identified at the time of the initial November 2003 requirement.

    As subsequent requirements for an additional 7,847 kits, excluding
    tankers, were identified, the time lag to meet them lessened. The Army now
    estimates that the total demand for all 11,627 required truck armor kits,
    excluding tankers, will have been met in January 2006, or 10 months after
    the latest requirements increase was validated in March 2005.11 Table 2
    shows the time needed to complete production and installation of armor
    kits to meet the latest validated requirements increase from March 2005.
    The Army estimates that production of a sufficient number of tanker kits
    to meet requirements will be completed by May 2006, but does not expect to
    complete installation of tanker kits until January 2007.

    Table 2: Time to Meet Latest Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type

    Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

    Note: Does not include the 5-ton truck, for which requirements decreased
    in March 2005 or tankers, for which requirements did not increase in March
    2005. As of September 2005, the current 5-ton truck armor requirement was
    2,592 and the tanker requirement was 1,192.

    Before armor kits were available, units operating in the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility developed their own interim improvised armor, consisting of
    locally fabricated steel armor plates, to obtain some level of protection
    for their vehicles. As a result, interim armor with minimum protection
    standards in accordance with Army policy was in place on some vehicles by
    the time the preferred add-on armor kits were available for installation.
    In addition, CFLCC issued a directive in February 2005 stating that no
    unarmored vehicles would be allowed to operate in Iraq outside of secured
    forward operating bases. During congressional testimony held in the spring
    and summer of 2005, Army officials confirmed that this policy had been
    fully implemented with use of approved interim improvised armor or add-on
    armor kits.

    Several Factors Lengthened the Time to Provide Truck Armor Kits

    We identified a number of factors that contributed to the time to provide
    truck armor to deployed troops. First, the Army did not fully capitalize
    on a requirement for truck armor that had been identified prior to
    operations in OIF. Second, availability of armor kits was constrained by
    the Army's funding of contracts at less than the total requirement. Third,
    material shortages also affected the availability of armor kits. Finally,
    limited installation rates lengthened the time to provide armor kits for
    tankers. As a result, troops were placed at greater risk as they conducted
    wartime operations in vehicles not equipped with the preferred level of
    protection.

    Army Did Not Fully Capitalize on Truck Armor Requirements Identified Prior
    to Operations in Iraq

    The Army did not fully capitalize on an earlier operational requirement
    for truck armor that was identified several years before current
    operations in Iraq began, which caused the Army to lose an opportunity to
    have a significant number of armor kits already available when operational
    needs arose in Iraq for this capability. An official requirement for truck
    add-on armor kits was identified and approved by the Army in 1996 to
    address threats similar to what deployed forces are currently facing in
    Iraq. On January 19, 1996, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command
    (TRADOC) issued an operational requirement document (ORD) for the tactical
    wheeled vehicle crew protection kit.12 Generally, official requirements
    documents lead to the development and production of new systems to address
    the specified required capabilities.

    According to Army officials, the Army developed this ORD because officials
    recognized that operations in Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia exposed troops to
    a civilian threat and led to concerns over countermine protection for
    supply and troop transport vehicles. The crew protection kit was to
    provide increased crew survivability in tactical wheeled vehicles against
    small arms fire, artillery/mortar fire, mines, submunitions, and IEDs
    where needed while operating throughout an area of operations. The ORD
    described the threat against U.S. forces usually consisting of small arms,
    hand portable antitank weapons such as light antitank weapons and rocket
    propelled grenades, and IEDs. According to the document, tactical wheeled
    vehicles at that time lacked armor protection to provide crew
    survivability against these threats. No existing ballistic protection
    systems had met this requirement, with one exception of the Up-Armored
    Heavy HMMWV. According to the ORD, the kit's capabilities would enable all
    units to provide ballistic protection to crews of tactical wheeled
    vehicles, including most of the same types of trucks being armored today
    in the Middle East.

    Once the ORD was approved, the Army Tank-Automotive Research, Development
    and Engineering Center built prototype armor kits for the HMMWV and 5-ton
    truck, and blast testing was also done at Fort A.P. Hill. The ORD
    specified a number of kits to be built and available to add on to vehicles
    as operations dictated the need for them. However, the Army never fully
    addressed this requirement. The need for armor kits after Somalia never
    materialized, and, according to Army officials, the ORD was not completed
    because funding was not available to fully meet the 1996 requirement due
    to other higher funding priorities in the Army. According to one Army
    official, given the amount of effort expended to develop and approve the
    ORD, it is relatively uncommon for an ORD not to be funded through
    production, especially when research and development funds had been spent,
    prototypes developed, and blast testing performed.

    Even though the 1996 requirement was not fully addressed, a small number
    of armor kits were produced around this time period for two types of
    trucks, the HEMTT and the PLS, to support operations in Bosnia.13
    According to the Army's Project Manager, development of these kits was
    initiated in response to an ONS from units deployed to Bosnia. The ONS was
    submitted prior to completion of the ORD. However, these kits did not meet
    all the protective requirements specified in the ORD, such as providing
    blast protection. The Bosnia kits were never installed on vehicles and
    were placed into storage because the need for them was never realized.

    The Army's November 2003 armor requirement, developed in response to
    experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, addressed the same vehicles
    confronting similar threats as those found in the January 1996 ORD. This
    November 2003 requirement for the crew protection kit validated an
    operational wartime need for add-on armor kits for light, medium, and
    heavy tactical wheeled vehicles in support of OIF and OEF. The requirement
    cites the January 1996 ORD as providing the basis for add-on armor and
    extends the requirement to continue identifying alternative capabilities
    for development, testing, and procurement. The November 2003 requirement
    noted that the armor kits are necessary to provide a capability to protect
    against small arms fire, IEDs, mine blast protection, and artillery
    fragmentation; and to minimize degradation of the vehicle mission. Army
    officials in theater modified the November 2003 requirement by changing
    the distribution of armor and prioritizing armor needs; however, the
    amounts of armor kits required remained the same. Table 3 shows the 1996
    and 2003 requirements, as well as the most recent armor requirements.

    Table 3: Comparison of Types of Vehicles Requiring Armor Kits in 1996,
    2003, and 2005 and Quantities of Kits Needed and Available

    Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

    NOTE: The kits for the HEMTT and PLS were not developed in response to the
    1996 ORD. Rather, they were developed in response to anticipated needs for
    operations in Bosnia and did not meet the blast protection requirements
    specified in the ORD.

    Because not all the kits required under the 1996 ORD were developed, the
    Army went into Iraq with less protective capability than it might
    otherwise have done. However, the Army's work done in support of the ORD
    and the Bosnia kits laid a foundation to meet future truck armor
    requirements. For example, the limited number of kits developed for
    military operations in Bosnia was pulled from storage and used in Iraq.
    Furthermore, according to Army officials, the knowledge gained and the
    processes for design, research, development, and testing of these kits, as
    well as the kits themselves, were used to address and meet the need for
    armor during current operations. Based on these efforts, the Army's
    Project Manager for truck armor in 2003 had knowledge of the concepts of
    designing and building armor kits, the necessary materials in terms of
    weight and protective capabilities, and system performance requirements
    and technical specifications for ballistic protection. In addition, the
    2003 requirement for kits cites the January 1996 ORD as providing the
    basis for add-on armor.

    Army's Awarding of Contracts for Less Than the Total Requirement
    Constrained Armor Kit Production

    The Army's award of armor contracts for quantities less than the total
    requirement constrained the production of armor kits. The award of
    contract quantities in amounts less than the total requirements instead of
    all at one time affected production rates and caused production schedules
    to be longer than they might otherwise have been. The award of contracts
    in this manner was, in part, a result of several increases in requirements
    over time due to changing operational conditions. Another factor that
    contributed to obtaining less than the total requirement was the delayed
    flow of funding available for armor kits.

    Awarding Contracts at Less Than the Total Requirement Lengthened the Time
    to Meet Requirements

    For all of the Army trucks we reviewed except for the 5-ton truck, the
    Army's award of contracts for quantities less than the total requirement
    instead of all at one time caused production schedules to be longer than
    they might otherwise have been. Contractors tend to size their production
    levels to the contract orders they have on hand. Thus, larger contract
    quantities generally mean increased production rates. Larger up-front
    contracts can affect a contractor's production capacity for a number of
    reasons. For example, according to one contractor producing armor kits for
    all four of the Army's heavy trucks, ordering smaller quantities of armor
    kits caused a lack of continuity for its supply base and fluctuations in
    kit deliveries. More specifically, the contractor experienced (1) a lack
    of supplier commitment, which wavered with the uncertainty of future
    orders; (2) fluctuations in its labor force; (3) constrained ability to
    make process improvements to expedite production, such as the creation of
    specialized tooling, due to a short-term focus of work; and (4)
    insufficient support for investment and facility decisions that would have
    resulted in more efficient production operations for the contractor and
    its supply base.

    In some cases, increases in requirements caused contracts to be awarded in
    an intermittent fashion. In other cases, funding was not available to
    award complete contract quantities to meet requirements at the time
    requirements were identified. Although it is difficult to determine the
    exact effects of intermittent contracting on the availability of armor
    kits, we identified a number of specific cases where it lengthened the
    production schedule. For example, there were breaks in production for
    three different types of truck kits (the FMTV, HEMTT, and HET) because the
    contractors had completed their current contact orders and new orders were
    not placed early enough to maintain continuous production. In one of these
    cases regarding an armor kit for the FMTV, the contractor received an
    additional contract from the Army in December 2004 for 1,049 kits as it
    neared completion of its current requirement of 771 kits. Although the new
    requirement for additional kits was validated by the Army in April 2004,
    funding was not available to award the new contract until December 2004,
    which was not early enough to overcome the required 15-week material lead
    time. As a result, production stopped and new production did not resume
    until 2 months later. According to the contractor, production could have
    been maintained or even accelerated if the new contract had been awarded
    in time to meet the long lead time item requirements.

    In the cases of the HEMTT and the HET armor kits, the production lines
    stopped when the contractor completed the current contract quantities of
    1,598 and 665 armor kits respectively. The contractor did not receive
    additional contract awards of 791 HEMTT kits and 131 HET kits until April
    2005, or about a month after completion of the previous contract
    quantities in March 2005. By that time, production had already stopped,
    employees and subcontractors were released, and equipment and facility
    space were given up for other uses. As a result, there was a two and a
    half month break in production. The reason the additional production
    quantities were not awarded earlier was that validated requirements did
    not increase until March 2005, which, according to Army Project Manager
    officials, was too late to avoid a production stoppage.

    In another example of the impact of intermittent contract awards, the
    initial armor kit production contract for the M915 was awarded in April
    2004 for 250 kits, which was based on the validated Army requirement at
    the time. However, when subsequent contracts for 240 and 136 kits were
    awarded in September and October 2004 respectively, due to increasing Army
    requirements, the manufacturer, an Israeli subcontractor to the primary
    contractor, did not have sufficient capacity to keep up with the demand.
    This was due, in part, to other commitments the manufacturer already had
    for producing Marine Corps truck armor. As a result, the production levels
    for M915 kits were lower than desired based on the new requirements and
    remained so until July 2005 when the contractor was able to transition
    production from the Israeli subcontractor to its own facilities in the
    United States. According to contractor officials, if they had known in the
    beginning that the total quantities needed by the Army would have been as
    high as they were, they would have proceeded differently from the outset,
    such as using a different manufacturer.

    In one instance, the quantities of contracts also adversely affected the
    costs of armor kits. Specifically, the first contract for the FMTV armor
    kits was awarded in February 2004 for 270 kits. Subsequently, in March
    2004, a second contract was placed for 501 kits. According to the
    contractor, the quantity in the initial contract was too low for the Army
    to receive the highest price break, which was received for the second
    contract. As a result, the first 270 kits cost the Army over $1.7 million
    more than if the two production quantities had been combined. The Army
    made the two orders separately because funding was not available to award
    all quantities at one time.

    Truck Armor Requirements Increased Due to Changing Operational Conditions

    The Army's requirements for truck armor increased numerous times since
    November 2003 due to changing operational conditions. Army headquarters
    developed and approved the first requirement for truck armor kits in
    November 2003 in consultation with Army officials from the theater of
    operations. Army headquarters validated an operational wartime need for
    kits in support of OIF and other CENTCOM operations, and approved 3,780
    armor kits for medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles. According to
    Army officials, this requirement arose based on an identification of the
    need for truck armor and an August 2003 requirement from Army units in the
    theater for additional up-armored HMMWVs. All subsequent requirements for
    specific numbers of armor kits have been generated by Army theater
    commanders in the field and forwarded to Army headquarters for approval
    and funding.

    The Army has continued to validate additional requirements for truck armor
    as the need has evolved and increased over the course of operations to the
    present, with March 2005 being the most recent date for validated
    requirements increases. In September 2005, the total requirement for truck
    armor decreased slightly based on revised unit needs.14 Army theater level
    commanders have requested additional kits by documenting their
    requirements in ONSs. Army headquarters validated these requirements on
    several occasions between April 2004 and March 2005. Figure 2 illustrates
    the increases in the Army's requirements for truck armor according to the
    approval of the multiple ONSs.

    Figure 2: Army Truck Armor Requirements, November 2003 through September
    2005

    Increasing requirements for truck armor from the first requirement in
    November 2003 were a direct result of operational conditions. Army
    officials from the theater of operations attributed these increasing
    requirements to the enemy's changing tactics and the increase in frequency
    and lethality of IEDs. In addition, the number of trucks in Iraq increased
    over time, which drove a corresponding increase in truck armor
    requirements. As noted previously, changing requirements necessitated the
    Army awarding production contracts in an intermittent manner; and, in some
    cases, led directly to gaps in production levels.

    Incremental Funding Lagged Behind Requirements, Delaying Contract Awards

    The flow of funding for truck armor kits was initially provided in amounts
    less than total requirements and lagged significantly behind validated
    requirements. As a result, the Army could not award contracts for the full
    required quantities of armor kits at the time requirements were validated.
    Instead, the Army awarded contracts as funding became available. Figure 3
    shows the availability of funding for truck armor kits as compared to
    armor kit requirements.15

    Figure 3: Availability of Funding Compared to Truck Armor Requirements

    Although funding was not always available to award contracts at the time
    requirements were identified, the Army did provide some advanced funding
    to the contractors to buy items with long lead times, such as steel and
    ballistic glass, to mitigate some of the effects of delayed production
    contracts. To do this, the Army Project Manager used funds designated for
    the installation of armor kits already under contract until sufficient
    armor kit production funding was made available. However, according to
    Army Project Manager officials, they only used this advanced funding
    approach when they were certain additional funding would be
    administratively approved, because of the risks associated with using
    these installation funds and not being able to replace them.

    We could not specifically determine why the required funds for armor kits
    were not made available when the Army first identified the requirements
    because neither the Army nor DOD could provide us with sufficient records
    to track when the Department of the Army requested funding from the DOD
    Comptroller. Special funding requests from the Army to the DOD Comptroller
    were required because funding for armor kits was not available in the
    Army's procurement budget. According to Army officials, the Army requested
    full funding for the truck armor requirements when first identified, but
    the DOD Comptroller denied the requests and provided only a limited amount
    of funding over several months. However, the Army was not able to document
    these funding requests.

    Additionally, DOD Comptroller officials were unable to verify or document
    how much funding the Army asked for and when it was requested. DOD
    Comptroller officials further noted that although there was sufficient
    funding available in the Iraqi Freedom Fund to fund all of the truck armor
    requirements at the time they were initially identified by the Army, there
    were other competing funding priorities that would have prevented DOD from
    fully funding the entire truck armor requirement at once. Examples of
    these competing priorities include other force protection requirements
    such as the procurement of up-armored HMMWVs and night vision equipment,
    IED countermeasures, reimbursements to other coalition forces for
    logistics support, operational costs associated with deploying a Marine
    Expeditionary Force to Iraq, financing clearance of captured munitions,
    and funding for various classified programs.

    In April 2005, we reported that insufficient and delayed funding also
    contributed to critical wartime shortages of armored vehicle track shoes,
    lithium batteries, and tires. However, we could not determine why
    sufficient funding was not provided earlier because adequate documentation
    was not available to track when the Army requested the

    additional funding from DOD.16 Without formal documentation and
    communication of urgent wartime funding requirements and the disposition
    of funding decisions, the rationale for funding decisions and the
    officials and organizations accountable for making those decisions may not
    be subject to effective oversight by Congress or the Secretary of Defense.

    Material Shortages Affected Availability of Army Truck Armor Kits

    Material shortages negatively impacted the Army's ability to meet
    requirements for all of its vehicles except for the FMTV and tankers. For
    example, the contractor producing armor kits for the Army's heavy trucks
    stated that shortages of armor-grade steel and aluminum constrained
    production rates for the HEMTT, HET, PLS, and M915 armor kits between July
    2004 and November 2004. The shortage was alleviated through Army, Joint
    Staff, and congressional efforts to work directly with material suppliers
    to increase the amount of armor plates for the military.

    In addition, shortages of material negatively impacted the production of
    M939 5-ton armor kits, which were produced by the Army depots. According
    to GSIE officials, the production capacity for 5-ton truck armor kits was
    established based on the availability of material and components that are
    used to build the armor kits. When GSIE was asked to accelerate the
    production of M939 5-ton kits, the lack of availability of certain
    materials limited GSIE's ability to increase production levels. Examples
    of items that were difficult to obtain included several sizes and types of
    steel, door handles, and wiper components.

    Army and Marine Corps officials also found themselves in competition for
    armor contractors and materials, which exacerbated the problems with
    material shortages. For example, as mentioned previously, the initial
    manufacturer for the Army's M915 armor kits did not have sufficient
    capacity to meet needed production levels as requirements increased. This
    was due, in part, to the fact that the company had committed most of its
    capacity to producing Marine Corps truck armor by the time additional Army
    requirements were identified. Although minor schedule improvements were
    achieved as a result of discussions and agreements on joint schedules
    between the two services, it was still insufficient to meet the Army's
    needs. As a result, the Army moved production of the M915 to another
    company in the United States, which created further delays.

    Limited Installation Rates Constrained the Availability of Tanker Armor
    Kits

    A significant factor that affected the availability of armor kits for
    tankers was a limited installation rate. For example, the installation of
    add-on armor kits was slowed by the rate of rotation of trucks into the
    in-theater installation facilities as they returned from missions.
    Operational constraints limited the number of vehicles that could be taken
    out of use at any one time. In addition, unique requirements to coat the
    tankers with a protective chemical prior to installing armor panels also
    limited the installation rate. The primary component of the tanker
    armoring effort is a self-sealing coating material that is sprayed onto
    the exterior of the fuel tank. When a small arms round penetrates the
    coating material and the fuel tank, the hole self-seals and the fuel leak
    stops. The proper application of the chemical coating requires controlled
    environmental conditions, such as humidity and temperature, which has led
    to a limited number of spray locations accessible to the Army. Thus,
    although production of armor kits for tankers is expected to be completed
    by May 2006, because of these constraints, installation of enough kits to
    meet requirements is not expected to be finished until 8 months later in
    January 2007.

    DOD and the Army Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability

    DOD and the Army have taken a number of actions to improve the timely
    availability of truck armor. Some of the actions were short-term and were
    meant to address the immediate armor need for deployed forces in Iraq and
    other CENTCOM locations. Other efforts are long-term plans designed to
    improve the overall availability of truck armor for future operations.

    DOD and the Services Took Actions to Improve Availability of Truck Armor
    during Current Operations

    DOD and the Army have taken a number of short-term actions to improve the
    availability of truck armor to meet the needs of forces deployed for OIF
    and other CENTCOM operations. Examples of these efforts include the
    following:

    o Leveraging of available Army funds. The Army's Project Manager for
    Tactical Vehicles took a number of steps to leverage available funding in
    an attempt to mitigate the effects of an inadequate funding flow for truck
    armor. For example, it used funding designated for future armor kit
    installations to buy long lead time materials and award some contracts for
    armor kits until additional armor kit funding could be made available. In
    addition, when the Project Manager received funding for armor kits from
    Army headquarters, it allocated the funding among all the armor kit
    contracts to maintain sufficient work flow to keep all production lines
    open, rather than fund some truck kits to the full level of requirements.
    While these efforts may have improved the timely availability of armor
    kits, as we noted earlier, the inadequate availability of funding still
    contributed to a longer schedule in many cases.

    o Early identification of Army requirements. Army headquarters developed
    the initial requirements for truck armor based on emerging needs before
    formal requirements were submitted by units in the theater. As noted
    earlier, the first requirement for truck armor was developed and validated
    by Army headquarters in November 2003, while the first requirements
    submitted from units in the theater were not actually validated until
    April 2004. As a result, the Army was able to begin seeking funding and
    awarding contracts for design and production of armor kits earlier than if
    it had waited for an official request from units in the theater.

    o Addition of armor installation sites. To reduce armor installation time,
    as requirements and production levels for truck armor increased, the Army
    expanded its installation capacity in the CENTCOM area of responsibility
    through the addition of installation sites, going from one initial
    facility in Kuwait to nine facilities in Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan
    between August 2004 and July 2005. As indicated in figure 1, during this
    period, production levels increased dramatically from 220 kits per month
    in August 2004 to a peak level of almost 1,800 kits per month by May 2005.
    After increasing the numbers of installation facilities, according to Army
    officials, total installation capacity has grown from approximately 50
    kits per week to more than 350 kits per week.

    o Establishment of Joint Staff fusion cell. In December 2004, the Joint
    Staff's Directorate of Logistics established a team, called the Joint
    Armor Fusion Cell, to monitor the progress of the services' armoring
    efforts to enhance visibility of the program to DOD and congressional
    leadership. In addition, the armor fusion cell was established to
    accelerate the availability of armor kits by identifying and fixing gaps
    in the supply chain. For example, the Joint Staff armor fusion cell,
    working with the Army, helped identify and deploy certified welders from
    the Air Force and Navy to assist with production and installation of armor
    in the United States and in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, thereby
    speeding up the availability of truck armor to the units. The cell also
    worked with the U.S. Transportation Command to increase the use of airlift
    for armor kits within the CENTCOM area of operations, which reduced the
    need for ground transportation and increased the speed of deliveries to
    armor installation sites.

    Army Has Developed a Long-term Plan to Address the Availability of Truck
    Armor for Future Operations

    The Army is taking long-term actions to improve the availability of truck
    armor for future operations through the development of a long-term
    armoring plan. While we did not evaluate the plan's potential for success,
    we did note it is aimed at identifying long-term requirements for truck
    armor and developing solutions to address these requirements.

    The Army's long-term plans, designed to improve the overall availability
    of truck armor for future operations, are outlined in the Army Tactical
    Wheeled Vehicle Long Term Armoring Strategy. The Army's G8 division for
    programming, analysis, and materiel integration tasked TRADOC to develop
    this plan in January 2005. The Long Term Armoring Strategy incorporates
    the Army's plan to provide add-on armor to its tactical wheeled vehicle
    fleet. Under the plan, add-on armor will consist of two kits, one that
    includes hardware to be placed on the vehicle to receive the armor, and
    another that contains the actual armor. The plan also includes provisions
    to facilitate the production and availability of armor. Estimated costs
    for the armor are based on current armor models that use heavy metals,
    such as steel and aluminum; however, according to Army program office
    officials, they are considering the use of lighter metals for greater
    efficiency but at higher costs.

    According to the Long Term Armoring Strategy, its purpose is to
    demonstrate the Army's deliberate process to outline a path forward and
    avoid long response times for providing truck armor in the future. The
    plan further notes that the framework supports a balanced approach for
    procurement of armoring kits that mitigates risk and enhances safety and
    force protection. According to the plan, the end state is a tactical
    wheeled vehicle fleet that provides the commanders with flexibility to
    increase the protection level when needed and ensures the Army's ability
    to rapidly acquire additional kits. The initial draft concept was
    completed in March 2005 and a final plan was presented to the G8 division
    in June 2005. According to the program office, Army headquarters approved
    the plan in August 2005 with a few outstanding issues to be resolved. The
    necessary protection level for trucks is based on the Department of the
    Army's approved threat assessment, developed by the intelligence
    community, which spans through 2018. The Long Term Armoring Strategy will
    be implemented in concert with the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and
    Trailer Modularity and Modernization Strategy,17 which is aimed at
    addressing the Army's truck needs through fiscal year 2018.

    The Army's long-term plan for add-on armor for trucks requires two kits.
    The A kit provides a basic framework of fixtures for all trucks ready to
    accept armor and includes hard to install parts and permanent mounting
    provisions for the B kit. The B kit contains the actual armor to be
    applied to all trucks fitted with an A kit and includes modular components
    to be installed and removed by two crewmen. The B kits will be procured
    based on operational and training requirements, while all trucks will be
    outfitted with A kits. The A kits will be installed by 2018 on current
    trucks during recapitalization and on newly produced vehicles at the
    factory. The second quarter of fiscal year 2006 is the program manager's
    proposed deadline to begin installing all trucks with A kits; however, as
    of September 2005 the date was not finalized. Program officials advocate
    the use of lighter materials for producing the kits instead of the heavier
    metals currently being used. According to these officials, lighter
    materials like ceramics are more expensive but could provide greater
    efficiencies such as reducing the amount of weight on a vehicle,
    preventing wear and tear, and allowing for more weight to be apportioned
    for operational purposes.

    The long-term plan includes provisions to facilitate the production and
    availability of armor in the future. As part of the plan, the Army will
    own the blueprints for the armor to expand competition from multiple
    sources and avoid relying on one contractor at critical decision points
    when more kits are needed. According to Army officials, contractors
    currently own the blueprints, and the Army's ability to buy quantities on
    demand could be restricted by the contractors' production capabilities.
    Technical requirements to facilitate the availability of armor in the
    future include maximizing the commonality of kit components among
    vehicles, and ensuring compatibility of the A and B kits with future armor
    upgrades.

    Army program officials stated that preliminary budget estimates for the
    armoring plan have been developed and included in the Army's future budget
    plans for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. However, these estimates are
    based on the costs of the current armor kits produced with heavy metals
    and do not include estimates of the costs of lighter armor as advocated by
    the program office. Final cost estimates and a decision about the types of
    armor to be used have not yet been finalized.

    Conclusions

    A number of challenges hindered the Army's ability to provide truck armor
    in the timeliest manner to its deployed forces operating in the Middle
    East. While some of these challenges may have resulted from operational
    conditions in the region that the Army and DOD had little control over,
    other limitations were a direct result of key decisions and ineffective
    supply processes within the Army and DOD. The availability of truck armor
    was limited by the Army's decision not to fully fund previously identified
    requirements, numerous increases in requirements, the Army's inability to
    timely obtain funding for current wartime needs from DOD or within its own
    budget, and limited industrial base resources.

    In our prior report examining critical supply shortages during Operation
    Iraqi Freedom, we recommended that the Army take actions to address two of
    these same issues.18 Specifically, we recommended the Army expedite the
    funding process to support timely and sufficient funding for wartime
    requirements, and assess the industrial base capacity to minimize
    acquisition delays. One of these recommendations, to assess the industrial
    base, would also apply to the Army's approach to armoring trucks. The
    other related recommendation to improve the timeliness of the funding
    process was specific to the individual types of supplies we examined, and
    may not be directly applicable to truck armor as it was written.

    The results of both our current and prior work indicate a broader systemic
    problem of not documenting and communicating urgent wartime funding
    requirements and the disposition of funding decisions. We reported in
    April 2005 that funding delays also contributed to critical wartime
    shortages of armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, and tires,
    but we could not determine why sufficient funding was not provided earlier
    because adequate documentation of funding requests was not available.
    Without formal documentation and communication of urgent wartime funding
    requirements and the disposition of funding decisions, the rationale for
    funding decisions and the officials and organizations accountable for
    making those decisions may not be subject to effective oversight by
    Congress or the Secretary of Defense. It is likely DOD could again face
    urgent requirements to rapidly develop and produce materiel solutions to
    improve force capability or protection of deployed forces. Without
    improving DOD's ability to provide that support to the warfighters in the
    timeliest manner, deployed military personnel and their missions may be
    placed at significant risk because they lack the necessary equipment and
    supplies at the critical times they may be needed.

    Recommendation for Executive Action

    To ensure funding needs for urgent wartime requirements are identified
    quickly, requests for funding are well documented, and funding decisions
    are based on risk and an assessment of the highest priority requirements,
    we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to
    establish a process to document and communicate all urgent wartime funding
    requirements for supplies and equipment at the time they are identified
    and the disposition of funding decisions.

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the intent
    of our recommendation, but stated that it believes the Army Requirements
    and Resourcing Board (AR2B) process, previously the ASPB process discussed
    earlier in this report, conforms to the process described in our
    recommendation. As noted by DOD, the AR2B is a forum where urgent wartime
    requirements are reviewed, staffed, and validated. However, as
    demonstrated by our work, once requirements are validated, funding must be
    made available to execute programs to respond to those requirements. When
    sufficient funding is not available in the Army's budget for the validated
    requirement, the Army must seek additional funding through DOD. Because,
    as we noted in this report and in April 2005, funding requests from the
    Army to DOD to resource validated requirements and the corresponding
    decisions as to the amount and timing of funding to be provided were not
    adequately documented, we were unable to determine the reasons why funding
    was not made available to respond to urgent wartime requirements as
    needed. In addition, in April 2005 we also reported that funding requests
    for critical wartime supplies such as armored vehicle track shoes, lithium
    batteries, and tires also could not be tracked from the Army Materiel
    Command, where they originated, to Army headquarters for validation, which
    precluded our ability to determine why funding for these items lagged
    behind the time the need was identified. We continue to believe these
    events in the funding process for urgent wartime requirements must be
    fully documented to provide effective program oversight and to ensure
    funding decisions are made based on risk and an assessment of the highest
    priority requirements. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD
    also provided technical comments that have been incorporated where
    appropriate.

    We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
    committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army and the
    Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director of the
    Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to
    others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
    charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

    If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report,
    please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov . Contact points for
    our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
    the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
    this report are listed in appendix IV.

    William M. Solis, Director Defense Capabilities and Management

    Scope and Methodology Appendix I

    To address our objectives, we examined the Army's programs to produce and
    install armor for each of its medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles,
    or trucks, operating in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
    responsibility, which included Iraq and Afghanistan.1 The Army trucks we
    examined included the family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV), heavy
    expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT), heavy equipment transporter
    (HET), palletized load system (PLS), M915 truck tractor, M939 5-ton
    tactical truck, and fuel tankers. Descriptions of each of these trucks
    along with detailed information on the availability of armor for each
    truck are included in appendix II.

    To determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed to
    meet identified requirements, we interviewed DOD and Army officials
    involved in identifying armor requirements, providing funding, and
    acquiring truck armor for deployed forces. We also met with truck armor
    contractors from the industrial base. A complete list of the DOD and other
    organizations that we met with during this review is found in table 4. We
    also collected and analyzed armor supply data such as requirements,
    funding levels, contract order awards, production levels, and
    installations for the period November 2003 (when truck armor requirements
    were first formally identified) through September 2005, which we obtained
    from the Army based on source documents. We considered the armor
    requirement met for each type of truck when the quantity of armor kits
    installed onto vehicles equaled the requirement. We did not, however,
    visit the CENTCOM area of responsibility to validate the extent to which
    armor kits had been installed and were actually in use by trucks.

    Table 4: Organizations Interviewed during Review

    Source: GAO.

    To determine what factors affected the time to provide truck armor to
    deployed forces, we analyzed the armor supply data we collected to
    identify trends and isolate factors that impacted the timeliness of
    producing and installing armor. We also met with and collected additional
    information from DOD, Army and armor contractor officials involved with
    the armor acquisition programs to evaluate the significance of these
    factors and to determine the extent of their impact on the availability of
    truck armor.

    To determine what actions DOD and the Army have taken to improve the
    availability of truck armor for current and future operations, we
    interviewed military service and Joint Staff personnel to identify short-
    and long-term efforts to address supply shortages. We also reviewed
    documentation related to addressing future truck armor needs. However, we
    did not evaluate the identified solutions' potential for success.

    We assessed the reliability of the truck armor supply data we obtained for
    this review by interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data
    and corroborating it with other information gathered from other military
    service organizations and armor contractors, and by reviewing existing
    documentation about the data and the sources that produced the data. We
    determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
    this report. We performed our audit from April 2005 through January 2006
    in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts Appendix II

    We assessed the armoring efforts for each of the following medium and
    heavy trucks: heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks, heavy equipment
    transporters, palletized load systems, M939 5-ton trucks, family of medium
    tactical vehicles, M915 truck family, and tankers. For these seven types
    of trucks we reviewed, each assessment provides the status of the armoring
    efforts at the time of our review. The profile presents a general
    description of the truck and the approach to developing armor solutions.
    The assessments also include our evaluation of the extent to which armor
    kits were produced and installed to meet identified requirements and the
    significant factors that affected armor availability.

    The Army's efforts to armor its heavy and medium tactical wheeled vehicles
    have been hindered by awarding contracts for quantities less than the
    total requirement, material shortages, and a limited rate of installation.
    The Army's efforts to armor its trucks experienced 12 to 18 month delays
    between when initial requirements were identified and when the initial
    requirements were met, although requirements for all vehicles increased
    over time such that by the time the initial requirements were met, the
    actual requirements were in excess of that initial amount. The schedule
    for contract orders constrained the Army's ability to meet requirements
    for all vehicles except 5-ton trucks. Material shortages negatively
    impacted the Army's ability to meet requirements for all vehicles except
    for medium tactical vehicles and tankers. Limited installation rates
    constrained the availability of tanker armor.

    Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck

    The Army uses its heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) to
    provide transport capabilities for the resupply of various combat vehicles
    and weapons systems. Figure 4 shows an example of a HEMTT. To protect the
    HEMTT crew from enemy fire in Iraq, the Army contracted with Simula Inc.
    to develop and build add-on armor kits for installation on HEMTTs. The
    Army's armoring program involves applying armor kits to 2,705 HEMTTs.

    Figure 4: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck

    Simula developed about 180 armor kits for the HEMTT in 1996 to support
    operations in the Balkans. However, the kits were placed in storage and
    never actually used. When armor requirements were identified for
    operations in Iraq, the Army and Simula retrieved and tested the stored
    kits and subsequently shipped them to southwest Asia for use in Iraq. In
    February 2004, the Army contracted with Simula to begin production of new
    kits.

    Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
    Requirements

    Requirements for 1,080 HEMTT armor kits were first identified in November
    2003, but a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were not
    installed until February 2005, or 15 months after the first requirement
    was established. Identified requirements continued to grow to a level of
    2,430 armor kits by March 2005, but dropped slightly in September 2005 to
    2,246. However, as of September 2005 the total amount of kits installed
    was 2,088, or 158 fewer than the quantity required. Figure 5 compares the
    time elapsed from the identification of armor kit requirements to the time
    when kits were produced and installed. According to Army officials, the
    total number of required armor kits was installed by December 2005.

    Figure 5: Comparison of HEMTT Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and
    Installed

    Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits

    Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the
    HEMTT. First, the Army's lack of timeliness of contract awards over the
    life of the program constrained the overall production schedule. Second, a
    shortage of key materials, specifically steel and aluminum negatively
    impacted the contractor's ability to maximize production in the early
    stages of the program.

    Contracts Constrained Production

    The Army issued five contracts for HEMTT armor kits, which affected the
    contractor's ability to produce more kits faster. For example, according
    to contractor officials, they have not had capacity constraints in the
    building of HEMTT armor kits; however, they sized production capacity to
    meet the quantities in the contract that the contractor had been awarded.
    Therefore, production levels were lower than they could have been if the
    contractor had received a contract for larger quantities of kits upfront,
    which prevented production of more of the kits sooner. One reason for the
    Army's use of a contract in this manner was the fact that funding was
    received in amounts less than the total requirements and initially lagged
    several months behind requirements. As shown in figure 6, the availability
    of funding affected the pace of contract awards.

    Figure 6: Comparison of HEMTT Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
    Ordered

    Another reason for the lower quantity of contract orders was the changing
    requirements for HEMTT armor kits. For example, armor kit production
    output for the HEMTT dropped to zero in April and May because the
    contractor had completed production for the current requirement. However,
    subsequent contract orders were awarded after the contractor had ceased
    production. By the time that the contractor had received the last two
    contracts for 791 and 319 HEMTT armor kits, respectively, production had
    already stopped, employees and sub-contractors were released, and
    equipment and facility space were given up for other uses. Consequently,
    production of the 791 and 319 kits had to wait about two months until the
    contractor could restart this industrial base.

    Although an additional requirement had been identified in March 2005, a
    contract to meet this requirement was not awarded until April 2005, which
    was not soon enough to prevent the stoppage of the production line.
    According to the Army's program manager, to prevent a production stoppage
    the requirement would have had to be identified and the contract order
    issued several months earlier.

    Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production

    A shortage of armor materials, specifically steel and aluminum, negatively
    impacted the HEMTT armor kit program. Shortages of high hard armor steels
    and aluminum negatively affected the start up and pace of production
    through the end of 2004. The material shortages were eventually rectified
    by the intervention of the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set
    priorities and by various congressional staff appealing directly to the
    material suppliers.

    Heavy Equipment Transporter

    The heavy equipment transporter (HET) is a system used by the Army to
    transport, deploy, recover, and evacuate main battle tanks and other heavy
    tracked and wheeled vehicles to and from the battlefield. The HET system
    consists of a truck tractor and HET trailer, as shown in figure 7. The
    Army's armoring effort involves applying armor to a total of 796 HETs. In
    April 2004, the Army contracted with Simula Inc. to begin producing armor
    kits for the HET.

    Figure 7: Heavy Equipment Transporter

    Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
    Requirements

    Requirements for 500 HET armor kits were first identified in November
    2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were
    not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the first requirement
    was established. Identified requirements continued to grow to 758 by March
    2005, but dropped in September 2005 to 663. As of September 2005 the total
    number of kits installed was 700, or 37 greater than the quantity
    required. Figure 8 compares the time elapsed from the identification of
    armor kit requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed.

    Figure 8: Comparison of HET Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and
    Installed

    Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits

    Two significant factors affected the contractor's ability to produce armor
    kits for the HET. First, the award of contracts over the armoring
    program's life and a lack of contractor visibility into upcoming contracts
    affected HET production. Second, the HET armoring program was also
    negatively impacted by a material shortage.

    Contracts Constrained Production

    The Army issued four contracts for the HET, which lagged behind
    requirements. This limited the contractor's ability to maximize production
    of HET kits. Specifically, contractor officials told us that they did not
    have capacity constraints in the building of HET armor kits; however, they
    sized production capacity to meet the quantities in the contract orders
    that they had been awarded. Therefore, production levels were lower than
    they could have been if the contractor had received contract orders for
    larger quantities of kits upfront, which prevented production of more of
    the kits sooner. Significant reasons for awarding less than the total
    requirements were changing requirements and delayed and less than the
    total funding. Figure 9 demonstrates the relationship among timing of
    requirements, funding, and contracts.

    Figure 9: Comparison of HET Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
    Ordered

    A lack of contractor visibility into upcoming contract awards also
    affected HET production. Specifically, the Army awarded a contract for 131
    additional HET add-on-armor kits in April 2005. However, in February 2005
    the contractor's supply base had completed production for HET components
    related to the previous contract order for 66 HET kits. Consequently, the
    supply base required two months to reinitiate production of these
    components from a cold start. If the contractor had had visibility into
    the upcoming contract, it could have maintained the needed supply base and
    reduced production time for the additional 131 HETs by 2 months.

    Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production

    The HET armoring program was also negatively impacted by a material
    shortage. The shortage of materials, specifically of high-hard armor
    steels and aluminum, affected the start up of heavy tactical vehicle
    contract orders and the pace of production through the end of 2004. The
    material shortages were eventually rectified by the intervention of the
    Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set priorities and by various
    congressional staff appealing directly to the material suppliers.

    M939 5-Ton Truck

    The Army's M939 5-ton tactical truck is a general-purpose military
    vehicle, primarily designed for tactical, off-road use. The M-939 is a
    5-ton capacity, six-wheel drive cargo truck used for transportation of all
    types of supplies and comes in various vehicle types, including a cargo
    truck, dump truck, and wrecker. Figure 13 shows an example of an M-939
    5-ton truck.

    Figure 13: M939 5-Ton Truck

    The M939 5-ton truck armoring effort includes manufacturing armoring kits
    for 3,000 5-ton trucks at six army facilities through a program manager
    agreement with the Army's Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise (GSIE).1
    GSIE began producing truck kits in December 2004 and completed the last
    kits in July 2005.

    Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
    Requirements

    Requirements for 2,229 M939 5-ton truck armor kits were first identified
    in April 2004; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that
    requirement were not produced until June 2005, or 14 months after the
    first requirement was established. As of September 2005, 2,224 kits had
    been installed. Identified requirements grew to 3,073 by August 2004, but
    dropped 2,688 by March 2005, and dropped again slightly in September 2005
    to 2,592. By June 2005 a sufficient quantity of kits had been produced to
    meet those requirements. Figure 14 compares the time elapsed from the
    identification of armor kit requirements to the time when kits were
    produced and installed. The Army estimated the required quantity of kits
    would have been installed by January 2006. According to GSIE officials,
    GSIE does not anticipate any further production orders for the M939 armor
    kits.

    Figure 14: Comparison of M939 5-Ton Truck Armor Kit Requirements to Kits
    Produced and Installed

    Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Availability of Armor Kits

    Shortages of material negatively impacted the production of M939 5-ton
    armor kits. According to GSIE officials, the production capacity for the
    5-ton truck armor kits was established based on the availability of
    material and components that are used to build the armor kits. When GSIE
    was asked to accelerate the production of M939 5-ton kits, the lack of
    availability of certain materials limited GSIE's ability to increase the
    production quantity of the armor kit. Examples of items that were
    difficult to obtain included armor grade steel, door handles, and wiper
    components.

    Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles

    The Army's family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV) addresses medium
    tactical-vehicle requirements for unit mobility and unit resupply, and
    transportation of equipment and personnel. The FMTV consists of the Light
    Medium Tactical Vehicle, which has a 2.5-ton capacity, and the Medium
    Tactical Vehicle, which has a 5-ton capacity. Variants of the FMTV include
    cargo trucks and tractor, van, wrecker, and dump truck models. The FMTV
    armoring effort involves producing a total of 3,890 armor kits.

    The FMTV armoring production is split between two separate contractors,
    Radian Inc. and Stewart and Stevenson Inc. The Army's Tank-Automotive
    Research, Development and Engineering Center designed and produced a small
    number (approximately 35) of FMTV armor kits with components that bolt
    onto the cab. In March 2003, the Army arranged for Radian to help with the
    installation of these kits onto vehicles. In February 2004, Radian
    received a contract to produce 270 kits based on the Army design. The kit
    being produced by Radian is called the Radian Armor Crew Kit (RACK).
    Figure 15 shows an example of an FMTV RACK truck. Stewart and Stevenson
    produces an armored cab, called the Low Signature Armored Cab (LSAC), that
    replaces the FMTV cab in its entirety. Figure 16 shows an example of an
    FMTV LSAC truck. On its own initiative, in 2002, Stewart and Stevenson
    developed an FMTV armored cab design to protect against mine blasts.
    Subsequent to its first armored cab design, Stewart and Stevenson modified
    its design based on the emerging threats in Iraq, and in October 2004,
    after completing design and testing, received its initial contract from
    the Army to produce 385 LSAC cabs.

    Figure 15: FMTV RACK Truck

    Figure 16: FMTV LSAC Truck

    Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
    Requirements

    Requirements for 1,150 FMTV armor kits were first identified in November
    2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were
    not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the first requirement
    was established. Identified requirements continued to grow to 3,335 by
    March 2005, and again to 3,377 by September 2005. However, as of September
    2005 only 3,053 RACK and LSAC kits had been installed, or 324 fewer than
    the quantity required. Figure 17 compares the time elapsed from the
    identification of armor kit requirements to the time when kits were
    produced and installed. According to Army officials, the total number of
    required armor kits was installed by December 2005.

    Figure 17: Comparison of FMTV Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and
    Installed

    Contracts Constrained Production

    Orders for FMTV armor kits were awarded for less than the total
    requirement and lagged behind requirements. These contracts slowed
    production of armor kits for both FMTV contractors. For Radian, there was
    a complete break in production because the final contract for 1,049 FMTV
    armor kits was received after its long lead time for ordering items needed
    to maintain continuous production. According to the Radian officials,
    production could have been maintained or even accelerated if the
    requirements had been identified and funding provided in time to meet the
    long lead time. However, the contractor did not have any visibility into
    the pending requirements and was told by the Army that there would be no
    further contracts for kits. In addition, according to a Stewart and
    Stevenson official, if they had been awarded the contract for the final
    292 armor kits in the March/April 2005 time frame, they could have
    finished producing the kits in the July/August 2005 time frame, or 3
    months earlier than the October/November 2005 time frame when the kits
    were estimated to be completed. Significant reasons for ordering in this
    manner were changing requirements and delayed and less than total funding.
    Figure 18 demonstrates the relationship between timing of requirements,
    funding, and contracts.

    Figure 18: Comparison of FMTV Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
    Ordered

    Contracts Affected Price

    The award of contracts in quantities less than total requirements resulted
    in the Army not receiving the best price available for the RACK. The Army
    ordered FMTV kits from Radian in increments of 270 and 501 in February
    2004 and March 2004, respectively. The 270 kits that the government
    ordered did not allow for receiving the highest price break for production
    quantities, while the 501 kits the government ordered allowed for the best
    price break available. For the 272 kit contract, the cost was about
    $51,603 for each kit, and for the 501 kit contract, the cost was $45,271
    for each kit, a difference of $6,332 per kit. According to the Army
    program officials, the reason there were two contract awards was that
    funding was not available for the full quantity in February 2004.

    M915 Truck Family

    The Army's family of M915 trucks comprises highway tractors used primarily
    for the long distance transport of containers. The M915 is very similar to
    commercial tractor-trailer trucks. Figure 19 illustrates an M915 truck. To
    protect the M915 crew from enemy fire in Iraq, the Army contracted with
    Simula Inc., Radian Inc. and Armor Works Inc. to develop and build add-on
    armor kits. The Army's armoring program involves producing armor kits for
    2,026 M915s.

    Figure 19: M915 Truck Tractor

    Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
    Requirements

    Requirements for 250 M915 truck armor kits were first identified in
    November 2003, but a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement
    were not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the first
    requirement was established. Identified requirements continued to grow to
    1,877 armor kits by March 2005, but dropped slightly in September 2005 to
    1,805. However, as of September 2005 the total number of kits installed
    was 1,295, or 510 fewer than the quantity required. Figure 20 compares the
    time elapsed from the identification of armor kit requirements to the time
    when kits were produced and installed. Army officials estimated that the
    total number of required armor kits would have been installed by January
    2006.

    Figure 20: Comparison of M915 Family of Trucks Armor Kit Requirements to
    Kits Produced and Installed

    Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits

    Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the
    M915. First, the Army's award of contracts for less than the total
    requirement over the life of the program constrained production. Second, a
    shortage of key materials, specifically steel and aluminum, negatively
    impacted the contractor's ability to maximize production.

    Contracts Constrained Production

    Contracts for the M915 truck armor kits were awarded in quantities less
    than the total requirement and generally lagged behind requirements. This
    manner of contracting for M915 armor kits constrained production,
    particularly for Simula. The Army issued four contracts to Simula for
    1,228 of the M915 armor kits over a 9-month period. According to Simula
    officials, they subcontracted the workload to Plasan Sasa in Israel based
    on the first contract of 250. However, subsequent to the first contract,
    the Army validated additional requirements of 1,627 kits between April
    2004 and March 2005. However, Simula was not aware when the first contract
    was awarded that the total quantities could eventually exceed 1,600. Had
    the contractor been aware of this, it would have proceeded differently
    from the outset, such as using a different manufacturer. By the time the
    additional contracts came into Simula, Plasan Sasa was facing capacity
    constraints in the production of the M915 armor kits. Unable to overcome
    the capacity constraints at Plasan Sasa, Simula negotiated with Plasan
    Sasa to bring some of the M915 production to the United States. In total,
    Simula arranged to complete 738 of the 1,228 M915 armor kits in the United
    States. Significant reasons for awarding contracts in this manner were
    changing requirements and delayed and less than total funding. Figure 21
    demonstrates the relationship among timing of requirements, funding, and
    contracts.

    Figure 21: Comparison of M915 Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
    Ordered

    Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production

    Shortages of strategic armor materials negatively impacted M915 armor kit
    production. Shortages of high-hard armor steels and aluminum affected the
    start up of contract orders and the pace of production through the end of
    2004. The material shortages were eventually rectified by the intervention
    of the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set priorities and by
    various congressional staff appeals directly to the material suppliers.

    Tankers

    The Army uses its tankers to haul and dispense bulk fuel. There are four
    models of fuel tankers involved in the Army's armoring program: the M967,
    the M969, the M978, and the M1062. Figure 22 shows an example of an M969
    tanker. The primary component of the tanker armoring effort is a
    self-sealing coating material that is sprayed onto the exterior of the
    fuel tank. When a small arms round penetrates the coating material and the
    fuel tank, the hole self-seals and the fuel leak is stopped within
    minutes. The second component of tanker armoring comprises armor panel
    kits mounted at select locations on the fuel tanker to protect critical
    equipment not protected by the coating material. VSE Corporation is
    applying the self-sealing coating to the tankers and is manufacturing the
    armor kit for the M967, the M969, and the M1062 tankers. Oshkosh Truck
    Corporation is manufacturing the armor kit for the M978 tanker.

    Figure 22: An M969 Tanker

    Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
    Requirements

    Requirements for armoring 371 tankers were first identified in August
    2004; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were
    not produced and installed until August 2005, 12 months after the initial
    requirement was identified. Identified requirements have continued to grow
    to 1,375 armor kits by January 2005, but dropped in September 2005 to
    1,192. However, as of September 2005 the total amount of armor kits
    installed was 443, or 749 fewer than the quantity required. Figure 23
    compares the time elapsed from the identification of armor kit
    requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed. Army
    officials estimate that the total number of required armor kits will be
    produced by May 2006 and installed by January 2007.

    Figure 23: Comparison of Tanker Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced
    and Installed

    Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits

    Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for
    tankers. First, the Army's award of contracts for less than the total
    requirement over the life of the program constrained production. Second,
    installation of armor kits was constrained by a limited rate of rotation
    for tankers into installation facilities and unique requirements for
    applying the protective spray-on coating.

    Contracts Constrained Availability of Armor Kits

    The production time line for one of the armor kits, for the M967 tanker,
    is longer than it would have been if contract awards had been for the
    total requirement. The Army awarded two contracts for M967 armoring with
    quantities of 171 and 152, with an 8-month interval between the two
    contracts. According to the contractor, if all 323 tanker kits had been
    awarded together, the total production time line would have decreased due
    to production efficiencies. Contracts for the other three tankers, the
    M969, the M978, and the M1062, were awarded for the total requirement and,
    therefore, the contractor stated that production has gone as efficiently
    as possible.

    Limited Installation Rates Paced Availability of Armor Kits

    A significant factor that affected the availability of armor kits for
    tanker trailers was a limited installation rate. For example, the
    installation of add-on armor kits was slowed by the rate of rotation of
    trucks into the in-theater installation facilities as they returned from
    missions. Operational constraints limited the number of vehicles that
    could be taken out of use at any one time. In addition, unique
    requirements to coat the tankers with a protective chemical prior to
    installing armor panels also limited the rate of installation. The proper
    application of the chemical coating requires controlled environmental
    conditions, such as humidity and temperature, which has led to a limited
    number of spray locations accessible to the Army. Thus, although
    production of armor kits for tankers is expected to be completed by May
    2006, because of these constraints, installation of enough kits to meet
    requirements is not expected to be finished until 8 months later in
    January 2007.

    Palletized Load System

    The Army's palletized load system (PLS) performs long distance and local
    haul, and unit resupply in the tactical environment to support combat
    units. The PLS is supposed to facilitate the rapid movement of combat
    configured loads of ammunition as well as all classes of supplies and
    containers. The PLS consists of a truck with self-loading capabilities and
    a trailer, as shown in figure 10.

    Figure 10: Palletized Load System

    According to contractor officials, the Army's Tank-Automotive Research,
    Development and Engineering Center had developed and built around 30
    armored kits to support operations in the Balkans; however, the kits were
    placed in storage and never used. Subsequently, when armor requirements
    were identified for operations in Iraq, the Army retrieved the kits from
    storage and shipped them to southwest Asia for use in Iraq. In February
    2004, the Army issued contract orders to Simula Inc. to produce additional
    PLS armor kits. Simula Inc. has completed production of a total of 1,282
    armor kits, which satisfies the current requirement for 914 armor kits and
    provides 368 spare PLS armor kits for future requirements.

    Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified
    Requirements

    Requirements for 800 PLS armor kits were first identified in November
    2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement were
    not installed until May 2005, or 18 months after the first requirement was
    established. By March 2005, the identified requirements had increased by
    114, which were met in July 2005. In September 2005, the identified
    requirements increased again by 30, which were met in September 2005.
    Figure 11 compares the time elapsed from the identification of armor kit
    requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed. In
    anticipation of a greater requirement, the Army program office ordered 338
    kits above the Army's current requirement.

    Figure 11: Comparison of PLS Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and
    Installed

    Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits

    Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the
    PLS. First, the Army's use of contracts for quantities less than total
    requirements over the life of the program constrained the overall
    production schedule. Second, a shortage of key materials, specifically
    steel and aluminum, negatively impacted the contractor's ability to
    maximize production.

    Contracts Constrained Production

    The Army issued four contracts for PLS kits, which initially lagged behind
    requirements and affected the contractor's ability to maximize the
    production of PLS kits. According to contractor officials, they have not
    had capacity constraints in the building of PLS armor kits; however, they
    sized production capacity to meet the quantities in the contracts that the
    contractor had been issued. Therefore, production levels were lower than
    they could have been if the contractor had received contracts for larger
    quantities of kits upfront, which prevented the production of more of the
    kits sooner. Significant reasons for awards for less than the total
    requirements were changing requirements and delayed and less than total
    funding. Figure 12 demonstrates the relationship among timing of
    requirements, funding, and contracts.

    Figure 12: Comparison of PLS Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and
    Ordered

    Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production

    The PLS armoring program was also negatively impacted by material
    shortages. The shortage of materials, specifically of high-hard armor
    steels and aluminum, affected the start up of heavy tactical vehicle
    contract orders and the pace of production through the end of 2004. The
    material shortages were eventually rectified by the intervention of the
    Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set priorities and by various
    Congressional staff appealing directly to the material suppliers.

    Comments from the Department of Defense Appendix III

    GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements Appendix IV

    William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov

    In addition to the contact named above, David Schmitt, Assistant Director;
    Renee S. Brown, Judith C. Collins, Kenneth E. Patton, Richard G. Payne,
    Jay Rangaram, Maria-Alaina I. Rambus, Paulina T. Reaves, Cary B. Russell,
    Patricia Sari-Spear, Rebecca Shea, and John D. Strong also made key
    contributions to this report.

    (350658)

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-160 .

    To view the full product, including the scope

    and methodology, click on the link above.

    For more information, contact William Solis at (202) 512-8365 or
    solisw@gao.gov.

    Highlights of GAO-06-160 , a report to congressional committees

    March 2006

    DEFENSE LOGISTICS

    Several Factors Limited the Production and Installation of Army Truck
    Armor during Current Wartime Operations

    In April 2005, GAO reported on factors affecting the timely production of
    up-armored high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and add-on
    armor kits for HMMWVs, as well as other items critically needed by
    deployed forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Due to high interest by
    Congress and the public regarding vehicle armor, GAO initiated this
    subsequent engagement to examine issues affecting the production and
    installation of armor for medium and heavy trucks. The objectives were to
    (1) determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed
    to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what factors affected the
    time to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what actions the Department
    of Defense (DOD) and the Army have taken to improve the timely
    availability of truck armor. To address these objectives, GAO collected
    and analyzed supply data for medium and heavy tactical trucks used by Army
    forces.

    What GAO Recommends

    Expanding on one of its April 2005 recommendations, GAO is recommending
    that the Secretary of Defense direct the Army to establish a process to
    document and communicate all urgent wartime funding requirements for
    supplies and equipment when identified and the disposition of funding
    decisions. DOD concurred with the intent of the recommendation.

    The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the production
    and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 except for fuel
    tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for tankers is expected by
    January 2007. Although the Army first identified a requirement for 3,780
    truck armor kits for five types of trucks in November 2003, it did not
    produce all of the kits until February 2005 and did not install the kits
    to fully meet the requirement until May 2005 - 18 months after the initial
    requirement was identified. However, by that time, requirements had
    increased substantially. As subsequent requirements for an additional
    7,847 kits, excluding tankers, were identified, the time lag to meet them
    lessened.

    Time to Meet Initial Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type

    Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

    Note: Does not include the 5-ton truck or fuel tankers, which had not been
    identified at the time of the initial November 2003 requirement.

    A number of factors contributed to the time to provide truck armor kits to
    deployed troops, placing them at greater risk as they conducted wartime
    operations in vehicles not equipped with the preferred level of
    protection. For example, the Army missed a valuable opportunity to have
    substantial numbers of truck armor kits available for Operation Iraqi
    Freedom by not fully capitalizing on approved operational requirements
    established in 1996. In addition, production time lengthened because
    contracts were awarded for amounts less than total requirements due to
    increasing needs for truck armor and inadequate funding. As was the case
    for other critical wartime shortages that GAO previously examined,
    sufficient documentation was lacking to determine why funding was not
    available when needed, limiting effective oversight over funding
    decisions. Material shortages and limited tanker kit installation rates
    also impacted the availability of truck armor.

    DOD and the Army have taken a number of short-term actions, such as
    leveraging available funding, to improve truck armor availability during
    current operations. The Army is also developing a long-term armoring plan
    to improve the availability of truck armor for future operations.
    *** End of document. ***