DOD's High-Risk Areas: High-Level Commitment and Oversight Needed
for DOD Supply Chain Plan to Succeed (06-OCT-05, GAO-06-113T).
Since 1990 the Department of Defense's (DOD) supply chain
management processes have been on GAO's list of high-risk areas
needing urgent attention and fundamental transformation to ensure
that they function in the most economical, efficient, and
effective manner possible. Recently in collaboration with the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), DOD developed a plan to
address some of the systemic weaknesses as a first step toward
removing supply chain management from the list. DOD's plan
focuses on three areas for improvement: accuracy of supply
requirements forecasts, distribution of material, and asset
visibility. GAO was asked to provide its views on (1) the
importance of supply chain management in DOD, (2) why GAO listed
it as a high-risk area, (3) GAO's assessment of DOD's plan to
improve supply chain processes, and (4) GAO's plans to follow up
on DOD's efforts. This testimony contains GAO's views on what
remains to be done to improve DOD's supply chain management and
bring about lasting solutions. Continued efforts to complete and
implement DOD's plan as well as continued oversight by Congress
are essential.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-06-113T
ACCNO: A39177
TITLE: DOD's High-Risk Areas: High-Level Commitment and
Oversight Needed for DOD Supply Chain Plan to Succeed
DATE: 10/06/2005
SUBJECT: Accountability
Combat readiness
Defense capabilities
Internal controls
Inventory control
Military inventories
Military operations
Property and supply management
Strategic planning
******************************************************************
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GAO-06-113T
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:30 p.m. EST DOD'S HIGH-RISK AREAS
Thursday, October 6, 2005
High-Level Commitment and Oversight Needed for DOD Supply Chain Plan to Succeed
Statement of William M. Solis, Director Defense Capabilities and Management
GAO-06-113T
[IMG]
October 6, 2005
DOD'S HIGH-RISK AREAS
High-Level Commitment and Oversight Needed for DOD Supply Chain Plan to Succeed
What GAO Found
It is important for DOD to have effective supply chain management because
of (1) its impact on military readiness and operations and (2) the
substantial investment in inventory. While DOD maintains military forces
with unparalleled capabilities, timely supply support is critical to
sustaining them. For example, to support Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD
moved more than 2 million tons of cargo, but shortages of items such as
vehicle track shoes and tires hampered operations. In addition, DOD spends
billions on supplies. For example, its supply inventory levels have grown
in recent years from $62.3 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $77.4 billion in
fiscal year 2004. DOD expects to spend approximately $50 billion in fiscal
year 2005 for such items and associated operations.
In 1990, we identified DOD's inventory management processes as "high risk"
because of long-standing problems such as excess inventory levels,
inadequate controls, and cost overruns. Since then, GAO's work has shown
that the problems adversely affecting supply support to the warfighter
involved the entire supply chain. As a first step toward removing supply
chain management from GAO's high-risk list, DOD in cooperation with OMB
prepared a plan to address weaknesses in three key areas: accuracy of
supply requirements forecasts, distribution of material, and asset
visibility.
DOD's plan to improve supply chain management provides a good start and
framework for addressing long-term systemic weaknesses and in focusing the
multiyear effort to improve supply support to the warfighter. However,
successful resolution of DOD's supply chain management problems will
require continued efforts to complete and successfully implement the plan.
Based on GAO's criteria for removing programs from the high-risk
designation, it is important for DOD to sustain top leadership commitment
and long-term institutional support for the plan; obtain necessary
resource commitments from the military services, the Defense Logistics
Agency, and other organizations; implement proposed improvement
initiatives across the department to address root causes; identify
performance metrics and valid data to use in monitoring the initiatives;
and demonstrate progress toward meeting performance targets.
As part of GAO's periodic reassessment of high-risk areas across the
federal government, GAO will be assessing DOD's progress in resolving
supply chain management and its other high-risk areas. GAO plans to follow
up on DOD's actions to improve supply chain management in three ways.
First, GAO will assess DOD's progress in implementing recommendations made
in prior GAO reports. Second, GAO anticipates evaluating several of DOD's
supply management activities as part of our planned engagements over the
next 2 years. Third, GAO expects to work with other audit agencies,, as
well as DOD and OMB, to coordinate audit coverage of the initiatives,
metrics, and data system validity.
United States Government Accountability Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss GAO's list of
"high-risk" areas within the Department of Defense (DOD) and, more
specifically, DOD's plan to show to progress toward the long-term goal of
resolving problems and removing supply chain management from our list. At
the onset, I would like to thank the Subcommittee for its continued
encouragement of the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) effort to
work with agencies over the next several years to reduce risk in each of
the 25 high-risk areas we reported in January 2005. The active involvement
of this Subcommittee is essential to ultimately ensuring DOD's continued
progress in addressing and resolving its high-risk areas, while enhancing
public confidence in DOD's stewardship of the hundreds of billions of
taxpayer funds it receives each year.
Briefly, our high-risk list focuses on major government programs and
operations that either need urgent attention and transformation to ensure
that the U.S. government functions in the most economical, efficient, and
effective manner possible, or that are at high risk because of their
greater vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. DOD is
responsible for 14 of the 25 high-risk areas, including 8 that are
specific to DOD and 6 others that are government-wide in scope. This year
we added DOD's approach to business transformation to our list of
high-risk areas because of our concerns over the department's lack of
adequate management responsibility and accountability, as well as other
concerns. Business transformation efforts are critical if DOD is to
successfully address systemic management problems related to other
high-risk areas, including supply chain management. In our view, an
essential element to business transformation is strong and sustained
executive leadership. As you know, we have recommended a chief management
official or similar official be created by statute within the department
of oversee DOD's business transformation efforts. We believe that two
other essential elements of DOD's business transformation are (1) an
integrated strategic plan coupled with a well-defined blueprint-referred
to as a business enterprise architecture-to guide and constrain
implementation of such a plan and (2) central control of investments in
business systems modernization.
DOD's business transformation efforts are likely to have a profound impact
across many areas of the department, including supply chain management.
For 15 years, DOD's supply chain management processes have been on our
list of high-risk areas needing urgent attention and fundamental
transformation to ensure that they function in the most
economical, efficient, and effective manner possible. Senior
administration leaders and advisors-including the Secretary of Defense,
the nominee for Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Director of
the Office of Management and Budget-have recently demonstrated a
commitment to addressing DOD's management challenges. To his credit, OMB's
Deputy Director for Management and his staff have been steadfast in their
message to DOD about the need for meaningful action and followthrough on
resolving problems associated with all 14 of DOD's high-risk areas. For
supply chain management, OMB has worked with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and his staff to help
DOD develop an action plan for improving supply chain management that
could reduce its vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement
and place it on the path toward removal from our list of high-risk areas.
OMB has proposed using DOD's plan describing how it expects to address one
of its high-risk areas as a template for other areas on our high-risk
list.
During the development of DOD's plan, we were frequently consulted by OMB
and DOD. Based on our analysis of prior reports, we suggested three areas
to DOD that would be critical to addressing our supply chain management
concerns. After consultation with OMB, DOD identified these three as focus
areas for the plan. They are
o improving material requirements forecasts,
o improving distribution of material, and
o improving asset visibility.
In response to DOD's request for our thoughts on its draft plan, we
focused on key elements that needed to be in the plan based on work we
have done, recommendations we have made, and our criteria for removal from
our list of high-risk areas. We provided OMB and DOD with GAO and DOD
reports citing deficiencies in these areas. As guidance for formulating
the supply chain management improvement plan, we also provided OMB and DOD
with reports containing our criteria for assessing agencies' progress
toward resolving a high-risk problem and determining whether to remove the
high-risk designation. We also provided examples where other agencies have
succeeded in having the high-risk designation removed.
Today, I would like to provide our perspectives on (1) the importance of
supply chain management in DOD; (2) why we have listed it as a high-risk
area; (3) our assessment of DOD's plan to improve supply chain processes;
and (4) our plans to follow up on DOD's efforts.
Background
In summary, Mr. Chairman, DOD's plan is a good first step in improving
supply chain management in support of the warfighter. Notwithstanding this
positive first step, the department faces challenges and risks in
successfully implementing its proposed changes across the department and
measuring progress.
My statement is based on previous GAO reports and analysis. Our work was
performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
DOD is one of the largest and most complex organizations in the world to
manage effectively. While DOD maintains military forces with unparalleled
capabilities, it continues to confront pervasive, decades-old management
problems related to its business operations-which include outdated systems
and processes-that support these forces. These management weaknesses cut
across all of DOD's major business areas, such as human capital
management, including the department's national security personnel system
initiative; the personnel security clearance program; support
infrastructure management; business systems modernization; financial
management; weapon systems acquisition; contract management; and last, but
not least, supply chain management. All of these areas are on our
high-risk list for DOD.
DOD relies on a number of individual processes and activities, known
collectively as supply chain management, to purchase, produce, and deliver
items and services to the warfighter. Its goal for supply chain management
is to deliver the "right items to the right place at the right time" for
the warfighter in support of deploying and sustaining military
capabilities as described in the National Military Strategy. The
department relies on working capital (revolving) funds maintained by the
defense and service logistics agencies to finance the flow of these items
to the forces. Working capital funds allow these agencies to purchase
needed items from suppliers. Military units then order items from the
logistics agencies and pay for them with annually appropriated operations
and maintenance funds when the requested items-either from inventory or
manufacturers-are delivered to the units.
Effective Supply Chain Management Is Important to Supporting the Warfighter
and Ensuring Effective Investment of Resources
There are two primary reasons why it is important for DOD to have
effective supply chain management. First, supply support to the warfighter
affects readiness and military operations. In fact, the supply chain can
be the critical link in determining whether our front-line military forces
win or lose on the battlefield. Second, given the scope of the supply
requirements to support U.S. military operations, the investment of
resources in the supply chain is substantial.
While DOD maintains military forces with unparalleled capabilities, timely
supply support is critical to sustaining these forces as they are trained
and deployed to protect our national security. For example, to support
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), DOD moved more than 2 million tons of
cargo-including equipment, spare parts, supplies, and other items-
thousands of miles to the Persian Gulf. Conversely, supply shortages can
adversely affect the readiness of weapon systems. During OIF, for example,
shortages of items such as track shoes prevented large numbers of Abrams
tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles from operating during the summer of
2003. In another case, tire shortages caused units to strip and leave
otherwise good vehicles as well as supplies behind.
Shortages of supply items also could hurt the morale of those who employ
the weapon systems and raise concerns about forces' safety with their
families.
Furthermore, DOD has a significant investment in inventory and spends
billions for supplies each year. For example, at the end of fiscal year
2004, DOD had approximately $77.4 billion worth of items in its inventory,
an increase of over $15 billion since fiscal year 2001, when DOD had
approximately $62.3 billion worth. DOD estimates that the annual costs of
supplies and associated operations for fiscal year 2005 are expected to be
$51.4 billion, or about 12 percent of DOD's $419 billion requested budget.
Unless the department has a sound management plan and acts to invest
resources to buy and provide supplies to units, improve the supply system,
as well as invest in essential information systems, the risk of fraud,
waste, abuse, and mismanagement remains high at a time when DOD is
challenged to maintain a high level of military operations while competing
for resources in an increasingly fiscally constrained environment. We
recognize that improving DOD's supply chain management may not save money
in the near term because of necessary investments in information
technology and other enablers. However, improved systems with timely and
reliable data should lead to more effective investment of resources in the
future and thereby avoid future costs.
Supply Chain Management Is a High-Risk Area Because of Long-Standing
Weaknesses
For 15 years, DOD's supply chain management processes have been on our
list of high-risk areas needing urgent attention because of long-standing
systemic weaknesses that we have identified in our reports. In 1990, we
began a program to report on government operations that we identified at
high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. This program serves
to identify and help resolve serious weaknesses in areas that involve
substantial resources and provide critical services to the public. The
department's inventory management of supplies in support of forces was one
of the 14 operational areas identified as high risk in 1990 because, over
the previous 20 years, we had issued more than 100 reports dealing with
specific aspects and problems in DOD's inventory management. These
problems included excess inventory levels, inadequate controls over items,
and cost overruns. As a result of this work, we had suggested that DOD
take some critical steps to correct the problems identified. Since then,
our work has shown that the problems adversely affecting supply support to
the warfighter- such as requirements forecasts, use of the industrial
base, funding, distribution, and asset visibility-were not confined to the
inventory management system, but also involved the entire supply chain. In
2005 we modified the title for this high-risk area from "DOD Inventory
Management" to "DOD Supply Chain Management."
Since 1995 we have issued over 70 reports on various deficiencies in DOD's
supply chain management system. Our assessment of these reports shows that
DOD generally concurred with our recommendations. Furthermore, these
reports had several common themes, including DOD's need for accurate
supply requirements forecasts, an effective distribution system, and
visibility over assets in inventory and while in transit. Moreover, in our
prior reports, we have noted problems with the information technology
systems supporting the supply chain. For example, DOD has not been able to
achieve total asset visibility for over 30 years in part because the
department has lacked necessary integration among its many inventory
management information systems and has not corrected long-standing data
accuracy and reliability within its existing systems. In addition, DOD's
nearly 2,000 logistics business systems have suffered from duplication,
limited interoperability, and unnecessarily costly operations and
maintenance. GAO has not been alone in criticizing these aspects of DOD's
supply chain management. DOD and audit organizations such as the
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General and the Army Inspector
General have also issued studies and reports addressing the supply
systems' problems.
DOD defines requirements as the need or demand for personnel, equipment,
facilities, other resources, or services in specified quantities
for specific periods of time or at a specified time. Accurately forecasted
supply requirements are a key first step in buying, storing, positioning,
and shipping items that the warfighter needs. However, in our April 2005
report on the effectiveness of logistics in support of OIF, we described
how DOD had not modeled wartime demands for supplies as required to
accurately forecast warfighter requirements. As a result, we found that
DOD underestimated the demand in Iraq for some items, such as armor
vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, meals-ready-to-eat, and tires, and
forces experienced supply shortages of these items.
Distribution is the process for synchronizing all elements of the
logistics system to deliver the "right things" to the "right place" at the
"right time" to support the warfighter. In our April 2005 report, we
describe several instances where the joint distribution system did not
support the forces in Iraq. We attributed these instances to conflicts in
doctrine about the authority over distribution, improper packaging of
shipments, insufficient transportation equipment and supply personnel in
theater, and the inability of the information systems to support the
requisition and shipment of supplies into and through Iraq. For example,
we found that DOD was not able to effectively distribute sufficient
quantities of items such as body armor, meals-ready-to-eat, tires, and
generators for Marine Corps amphibious vehicles because of problems with
supply chain management.
DOD describes asset visibility as the ability to provide timely and
accurate information on the location, quantity, condition, movement, and
status of supplies and the ability to act on that information. For over 30
years, the department has been attempting to improve the visibility over
its inventory as well as items in transit, and we have repeatedly reported
problems with its efforts. The continued lack of visibility over inventory
and shipments increases vulnerability to undetected loss or theft;
substantially increases the risk that millions of dollars will be spent
unnecessarily; and if items are not delivered when needed, may impair
warfighter readiness. We have recently reported on DOD's problems with
existing inventory systems being unable to share data on a near real-time
basis and concerns related to tracking critical supplies for Iraq. For
example, in December 2003 we reported a discrepancy of $1.2 billion
between the amount of material shipped to Army activities in Iraq and the
amount of material that those activities acknowledged they received. Since
then, in an April 2005 report we reported that the lack of visibility over
items in transit significantly affected distribution. For example,
incomplete identification tags attached to shipments resulted in the loss
of some body armor protection plates, delays in getting
meals-ready-to-eat, and the Marine Corps' ability to only
DOD's Plan Is a Good Start toward Resolving Supply Chain Management Weaknesses
that Will Require Continued Diligence to Succeed
verify the receipt of 15 of 140 amphibious assault vehicle generators that
were shipped. Improving asset visibility should not only improve data for
supply managers' decisions, but should also improve the warfighter's trust
in the supply system.
DOD's plan to improve supply chain management provides a good start and
framework for addressing long-term systemic weaknesses in DOD's supply
chain management and for focusing the multiyear effort that will be needed
to improve supply support to the warfighter. Notwithstanding this
important, positive first step, the department faces many challenges and
risks in its efforts to improve the supply chain. First, successful
resolution of its supply chain management problems will require DOD to,
among other things, diligently complete parts of the plan, fully implement
proposed changes across the department, and measure progress. Second,
resolution of supply chain management problems will require investment in
needed information technology. DOD's supply chain plan includes the
Business Management Modernization Program as one of its 10 initiatives. In
the plan, DOD recognizes that achieving success in supply chain management
is dependent on developing interoperable systems that can share critical
supply data. However, we recently reported that DOD had made limited
progress developing a common architecture for its business system
modernization investments despite having spent 4 years and about $318
million. Last week DOD, as part of its Business Management Modernization
Program, issued an overarching business enterprise architecture and an
enterprise transition plan for implementing the architecture. Under the
Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005,
we have 60 days to provide our assessment of the extent to which the
architecture and transition plan meet statutory requirements of 10 U.S.C.
section 2222.
Our assessment of DOD's plan to improve its supply chain management is
based on work we have performed, prior recommendations, and the criteria
cited in our November 2000 report on determining performance and
accountability challenges and high risks. We use these criteria to assess
an agency's progress toward resolving a high-risk problem and determine
whether to remove the high-risk designation. There are five essential
questions to be addressed:
1. Does DOD's plan demonstrate a strong commitment and top leadership
support to improve supply chain management?
The formulation of DOD's plan and its endorsement by the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is evidence of a
strong commitment by top leadership to improve DOD's supply chain
management. His recent referral to supply chain management as one of the
five business areas targeted for improvement by the department's Business
Practices and Processes Integrated Product Team as part of the current
Quadrennial Defense Review is further evidence of his commitment. However,
it is important for DOD to sustain this commitment as it goes forward in
implementing this multiyear plan while also engaged in departmentwide
business transformation efforts. Because improving supply chain management
may be one of several high-risk areas DOD will be addressing at one time,
it may take the involvement of the Deputy Secretary of Defense or a chief
management official, as proposed by the leadership of this Subcommittee,
to ensure that a long-term departmentwide commitment is sustained. In
addition, it is important that DOD act to institutionalize this effort by
incorporating the elements of the plan into key Office of Secretary of
Defense guidance, such as its Logistics Transformation Strategy and its
follow-on document called the Focused Logistics Roadmap, that are to guide
department activities.
2. Does DOD have the capacity, meaning people and other resources, to
resolve the problems with supply chain management?
If DOD makes implementation of its plan a priority, the department has
people and other resources to draw from in helping to resolve its supply
chain management problems. However, the plan was developed at the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense level, whereas most of the people and
resources needed to implement the plan are under the direction of the
Defense Logistics Agency and the services. Therefore, it is important for
the department to obtain the necessary resource commitments from the
military services; the Defense Logistics Agency; and other organizations,
such as U.S. Transportation Command, to ensure that the numerous
initiatives on which the multiyear plan depends are properly supported.
Obtaining these commitments might require the involvement of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense or a position such as a chief management official.
3. Does DOD have an action plan that defines root causes, identifies
effective solutions, and provides for substantially completing corrective
measures over the near term?
DOD's plan for improving supply chain management addresses some of the
root causes for problems in three key areas with potentially effective
solutions that it may be able to fully implement over the next few years.
By
committing to improve requirements forecasting, material distribution, and
asset visibility in this plan, DOD has focused its efforts on three areas
we frequently identified as impeding effective supply chain management.
DOD's plan for improvement proposes departmentwide implementation of 10
initiatives to help resolve supply chain management problems in the three
areas by addressing some of the causes. For example, implementing radio
frequency identification technology is expected to provide demand data for
forecasting requirements, improve distribution performance, and provide
fully automated visibility over assets in inventories and distribution
centers. However, the time frames for completing some of these 10
initiatives are of concern. For example, milestones for implementing the
Business Management Modernization Program, a critical enabler that will
provide the essential information technology underpinning for achieving
progress in all three focus areas, are not specifically linked to
improvements in requirements forecasting, distribution, and asset
visibility. Until the initiatives are substantially implemented across the
department, we will not know whether they provide effective solutions to
all of the root causes of DOD's supply chain management problems.
4. Does DOD have a program to monitor and independently validate the
effectiveness and sustainability of corrective measures?
While DOD's plan recognizes the need and cites a general methodology for
evaluating progress associated with each of the 10 initiatives, the
department has not yet provided all of the information needed for this to
occur. DOD's plan cites a two-step approach. The first step is to have
DOD's organizations establish a methodology (internal process) for
monitoring the validity of data as part of implementing the initiatives
and reporting on metrics. DOD's second step is to rely on independent
groups, such as contractors and the Department of Defense Office of
Inspector General, to validate the data, and GAO to monitor the
department's progress in improving supply chain management as part of its
planned audits. Such validation processes are important because, as we
have frequently reported, DOD's systems do not have accurate and reliable
data, and without valid data, it will be difficult to accurately track
progress. However, until DOD specifies all of the metrics and systems it
plans to use to measure progress it cannot ensure comprehensive monitoring
within the department or that independent groups will know what data and
systems should be validated to confirm DOD's reported progress.
5. Does DOD have the ability to demonstrate progress in implementing
corrective measures?
DOD has the ability to demonstrate some progress in implementing the
initiatives. However, it has not identified all of the performance metrics
necessary to demonstrate how all of the initiatives are affecting supply
to the warfighter. DOD's plan identified some viable overall supply chain
management performance metrics, including the level of backorders, the
amount of customer wait time, and the percentage of orders on time. The
plan also identified baseline and annual performance targets for these
metrics to use in measuring progress. But it did not have any cost
baselines or cost performance targets. Furthermore, DOD has not yet
identified specific outcome metrics for many of the initiatives. For
example, DOD's plan shows that it expects to have radio frequency
identification technology implemented at 100 percent of its U.S. and
overseas distribution centers by January 2007, but noted that it has not
yet identified additional metrics that could be used to show the impact of
implementation on expected outcomes, such as receiving and shipping
timelines, asset visibility, or supply consumption data. In total, DOD's
plan identifies a need to develop such supply performance metrics for 6
initiatives, and 9 of the 10 initiatives lack cost metrics. Until DOD
develops and tracks the additional costs and supply impact metrics it has
promised, it will be difficult for the department to convincingly
demonstrate its progress in improving supply chain management and
providing timely logistics support to the warfighter.
As part of our periodic reassessment of high-risk areas across the federal
government, we will be assessing DOD's progress in resolving supply chain
management and its other high-risk areas. Our next high-risk update is due
in January 2007. We plan to follow up on DOD's supply chain management
improvement efforts in three ways. First, as a matter of routine practice
we will continue assessing DOD's progress in implementing the
recommendations made in our prior reports. Second, we also anticipate
evaluating several of DOD's supply management activities as part of our
planned engagements over the next 2 years. For example, next year we
expect to evaluate how the Defense Logistics Agency's and services' spare
parts inventory management initiatives have progressed in meeting their
performance objectives and timelines. Third, in August we met with
representatives of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
and service audit agencies as well as DOD and OMB to review DOD's plan and
begin the process of sharing information on planned audits. We expect to
meet periodically with these representatives in the future to coordinate
audit coverage of the initiatives, performance metrics, and data system
validity while minimizing audit duplication.
GAO Has Plans to Follow Up on DOD's Supply Chain Improvement Efforts
Along with OMB and the Congress, we look forward to doing our part by
monitoring DOD's progress as it works toward mitigating supply chain
management problems and achieving its goal of supporting the warfighter by
providing the "right items to the right place at the right time."
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared
statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have at this
time.
Staff Contacts and For further information regarding this testimony,
please contact me at 202512-8365 or [email protected]. Individuals making
contributions to this Acknowledgments testimony include Tom Gosling,
Assistant Director; Robert Brown; Richard Payne; John Pendleton; Dave
Schmitt; George Stalcup; and John Wren.
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