Alternative Mortgage Products: Impact on Defaults Remains	 
Unclear, but Disclosure of Risks to Borrowers Could Be Improved  
(20-SEP-06, GAO-06-1112T).					 
                                                                 
Alternative mortgage products (AMPs) can make homes more	 
affordable by allowing borrowers to defer repayment of principal 
or part of the interest for the first few years of the mortgage. 
Recent growth in AMP lending has heightened the importance of	 
borrowers' understanding and lenders' management of AMP risks.	 
GAO's report discusses the (1) recent trends in the AMP market,  
(2) potential AMP risks for borrowers and lenders, (3) extent to 
which mortgage disclosures discuss AMP risks, and (4) federal and
selected state regulatory response to AMP risks. GAO used	 
regulatory and industry data to analyze changes in AMP monthly	 
payments under various scenarios; reviewed available studies; and
interviewed relevant federal and state regulators and mortgage	 
industry groups, and consumer groups.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-1112T					        
    ACCNO:   A61191						        
  TITLE:     Alternative Mortgage Products: Impact on Defaults Remains
Unclear, but Disclosure of Risks to Borrowers Could Be Improved  
     DATE:   09/20/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Consumer protection				 
	     Debt						 
	     Federal regulations				 
	     Homeowners loans					 
	     Housing						 
	     Information disclosure				 
	     Lending institutions				 
	     Loan defaults					 
	     Loan repayments					 
	     Mortgage interest rates				 
	     Mortgage loans					 
	     Risk assessment					 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-06-1112T

     

     * Background
     * AMP Lending Rapidly Grew and Borrower Characteristics Change
     * Borrowers Could Face Payment Shock; Lenders Face Credit Risk
     * Borrowers May Not Be Well-informed of AMP Risks and Mortgage
          * Mortgage Advertising May Not Clearly or Effectively Explain
          * Federal Disclosures May Not Clearly and Completely Explain A
     * Federal Banking Regulators Issued Guidance, Sought Industry
     * Most States in Our Sample Responded to AMP-Lending Risks wit
     * GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
          * Order by Mail or Phone

Testimony

Before the Subcommittees on Housing and Transportation and Economic
Policy, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Wednesday, September 20, 2006

ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE PRODUCTS

Impact on Defaults Remains Unclear, but Disclosure of Risks to Borrowers
Could Be Improved

Statement of Orice M. Williams, Director Financial Markets and Community
Investments

GAO-06-1112T

Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on alternative mortgage
products (AMPs). As you know, an increasing number of borrowers have
turned to AMPs, such as interest-only and payment-option adjustable rate
mortgages (ARMs), to purchase homes they might not be able to afford with
conventional fixed-rate mortgage payments. These products initially keep
borrowers' payments low by allowing consumers in the short term to defer
principal payments or make payments that do not cover principal or all
accrued interest. However, unless the borrower refinances the mortgage or
sells the property, the monthly payments eventually will increase when the
interest-only and deferred payment periods end and higher, fully
amortizing payments begin.

My remarks will summarize the findings from the report being released
today, which was prepared at the request of the Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation.1 Specifically, I will discuss:
(1) recent trends in the AMP market, (2) the impact of AMPs on borrowers
and on the safety and soundness of financial institutions, (3) the extent
to which mortgage disclosures discuss the risks of AMPs, (4) the federal
regulatory response to the risks of AMPs for lenders and borrowers, and
(5) selected state regulatory responses to the risks of AMPs for lenders
and borrowers. We gathered information from federal and state banking
regulators, consumer groups, and the mortgage industry on AMP-lending
trends and risks to borrowers and lenders, including laws and regulations
on mortgage disclosures. We also reviewed a sample of disclosures to
determine the extent to which they addressed AMP risks.

In summary, we found the following:

           o  AMP lending tripled over a 3-year period, and many borrowers
           were using interest-only or payment-option adjustable-rate
           products to purchase homes in high-priced markets. AMP lending has
           been concentrated in the higher-priced regional markets on the
           East and West Coasts in states such as California, Washington,
           Virginia, and Maryland.

           o  Lenders may have increased risks to themselves and their
           customers by relaxing underwriting standards and through
           "risk-layering", which includes combining AMPs with less stringent
           income and asset verification requirements or lending to borrowers
           with lower credit scores and higher debt-to-income ratios.
           However, it is too early to determine the extent to which high
           foreclosure rates will result or whether lenders will be affected.

           o  A wider spectrum of borrowers that are now using AMPs may not
           fully understand their risks because (1) AMP loans often have
           complicated terms and features, (2) AMP advertising sometimes
           emphasizes the benefits of AMPs over their risks, and (3) mortgage
           disclosures can be unclearly written and may be hard to
           understand. Moreover, current federal disclosure requirements do
           not require lenders to address AMP-specific terms and risks.

           o  Federal banking regulators collectively responded to
           AMP-lending concerns by issuing draft guidance that called for
           tightened underwriting, enhanced risk-management policies, and
           better information for consumers. Regulators also have
           individually responded by monitoring AMP lending, beginning to
           update the regulation governing mortgage disclosures, Regulation
           Z, and reinforcing the message about managing AMP risks to the
           mortgage industry.

           o  State regulators included in our review generally addressed
           concerns about AMP lending through their licensing and examination
           processes, although a few states have started to collect more
           AMP-specific information as a prelude to other possible actions.

           Given the complexity of AMPs and their more widespread use,
           mortgage disclosures that can help borrowers make informed
           decisions are important. Although federal banking regulators have
           taken a range of proactive steps to address AMP lending, current
           federal standards for disclosures do not require information on
           AMP-specific risks. Therefore, we recommended in our report that
           as the Federal Reserve Board reviews Regulation Z, it consider
           improving the clarity and comprehensiveness of mortgage
           disclosures by requiring language that explains key features and
           potential risks specific to AMPs.

           Background
			  
			  Borrowers obtain residential mortgages through either mortgage
           lenders or brokers. Mortgage lenders can be federally or
           state-chartered banks or mortgage lending subsidiaries of these
           banks or of bank holding companies. Independent lenders, which are
           neither banks nor affiliates of banks, also may fund home loans to
           borrowers. Mortgage brokers act as intermediaries between lenders
           and borrowers, and for a fee, help connect borrowers with various
           lenders that may provide a wider selection of mortgage products.

           Federal banking regulators-Office of the Comptroller of the
           Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
           System (Federal Reserve), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
           (FDIC), National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and Office of
           Thrift Supervision (OTS)-have, among other things, responsibility
           for ensuring the safety and soundness of the institutions they
           oversee. To pursue this goal, regulators establish capital
           requirements for banks; conduct on-site examinations and off-site
           monitoring to assess their financial conditions; and monitor their
           compliance with applicable banking laws, regulations, and agency
           guidance. As part of their examinations, for example, regulators
           review mortgage lending practices, including underwriting,
           risk-management, and portfolio management practices, and try to
           determine the amount of risk lenders have assumed. From a safety
           and soundness perspective, risk involves the potential that either
           anticipated or unanticipated events may have an adverse impact on
           a bank's capital or earnings. In mortgage lending, regulators pay
           close attention to credit risk-that is the concerns that borrowers
           may become delinquent or default on their mortgages and that
           lenders may not be paid in full for the loans they have issued.

           Certain federal consumer protection laws, including the Truth in
           Lending Act and its implementing regulation, Regulation Z, apply
           to all mortgage lenders and brokers that close loans in their own
           names. Each lender's primary federal supervisory agency has
           responsibility for enforcing Regulation Z and generally uses
           examinations and consumer complaint investigations to check for
           compliance with both the act and its regulation. In addition, the
           Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is responsible for enforcing
           certain federal consumer protection laws for brokers and lenders
           that are not depository institutions, including state-chartered
           independent mortgage lenders and mortgage lending subsidiaries of
           financial holding companies. However, FTC is not a supervisory
           agency. FTC uses a variety of information sources in the
           enforcement process, including FTC investigations, consumer
           complaints, and state and federal agencies.

           State banking and financial regulators are responsible for
           overseeing independent lenders and mortgage brokers and generally
           do so through licensing that mandates certain experience,
           education, and operations requirements to engage in mortgage
           activities. States also may examine independent lenders and
           mortgage brokers to ensure compliance with licensing requirements,
           review their lending and brokerage functions, and look for unfair
           or unethical business practices. In the event such practices or
           consumer complaints occur, regulators and attorneys general may
           pursue actions that include license suspension or revocation,
           monetary fines, and lawsuits.

           
           AMP Lending Rapidly Grew and Borrower Characteristics Changed as
			  Consumers Sought Mortgage Products That Increased Affordability
				 
			  From 2003 through 2005, AMP lending grew rapidly, with
           originations increasing threefold from less than 10 percent of
           residential mortgages to about 30 percent. Most of the
           originations during this period consisted of interest-only ARMs
           and payment-option ARMs, and most of this lending occurred in
           higher-priced regional markets concentrated on the East and West
           Coasts. For example, based on data from mortgage securitizations
           in 2005, about 47 percent of interest-only ARMs and 58 percent of
           payment-option ARMs were originated in California, which contained
           7 of the 20 highest-priced metropolitan real estate markets in the
           country. On the East Coast, Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and
           Florida as well as Washington, D.C., exhibited a high
           concentration of AMP lending in 2005. Other examples of states
           with high concentrations of AMP lending include Washington,
           Nevada, and Arizona. These areas also experienced higher rates of
           home price appreciation during this period than the rest of the
           United States.

           In addition to this growth, the characteristics of AMP borrowers
           have changed. Historically, AMP borrowers consisted of wealthy and
           financially sophisticated borrowers who used these specialized
           products as financial management tools. However, today a wider
           range of borrowers use AMPs as affordability products to purchase
           homes that might otherwise be unaffordable using conventional
           fixed-rate mortgages.
			  
			   Borrowers Could Face Payment Shock; Lenders Face Credit Risk but
				Appear to Be Taking Steps to Manage the Risk

           Although AMPs have increased affordability for some borrowers,
           they could lead to increased payments or "payment shock" for
           borrowers and corresponding credit risk for lenders. Unless the
           mortgages are refinanced or the properties sold, AMPs eventually
           reach points when interest-only and deferred payment periods end
           and higher, fully amortizing payments begin. Regulators and
           consumer advocates have expressed concern that some borrowers
           might not be able to afford these higher monthly payments. To
           illustrate this point, we simulated what would happen to a
           borrower in 2004 that made minimum monthly payments on a $400,000
           payment-option ARM. As figure 1 shows, the borrower could see
           payments rise from $1,287 to $2,931, or 128 percent, at the end of
           the 5-year payment-option period.2 In addition, with a wider range
           of AMP borrowers now than in the past, those with fewer financial
           resources or limited equity in their homes might find refinancing
           their mortgages or selling their homes difficult, particularly if
           their loans have negatively amortized or their homes have not
           appreciated in value.

           Figure 1: Increase in Minimum Monthly Payments and Outstanding
           Loan Balance with an April 2004 $400,000 Payment-Option ARM,
           Assuming Rising Interest Rates

           In addition, borrowers who cannot afford higher payments and may
           become delinquent or default on their mortgages may pose credit
           risks to lenders because these borrowers may not repay their loans
           in full. Lenders also may have increased risks to themselves and
           their customers by relaxing underwriting standards and through
           risk-layering. For example, some lenders combined AMPs with less
           stringent income and asset verification requirements than
           traditionally permitted for these products or lent to borrowers
           with lower credit scores and higher debt-to-income ratios.

           Although regulatory officials have expressed concerns about AMP
           risks and underwriting practices, they said that banks and lenders
           generally have taken steps to manage the resulting credit risk.
           Federal and state banking regulatory officials and lenders with
           whom we spoke said most banks have diversified their assets to
           manage the credit risk of AMPs held in their portfolios, or have
           reduced their risk through loan sales or securitization. In
           addition, federal regulatory officials told us that while
           underwriting trends may have loosened over time, lenders have
           generally attempted to mitigate their risk from AMP lending. For
           example, OCC and Federal Reserve officials told us that most
           lenders qualify payment-option ARM borrowers at fully indexed
           rates, not at introductory interest rates, to help ensure that
           borrowers have financial resources to manage future mortgage
           increases, or to pay more on their mortgages than the minimum
           monthly payment. OCC officials also said that some lenders may
           mitigate risk by having some stricter criteria for AMPs than for
           traditional mortgages for some elements of their underwriting
           standards. Although we are encouraged by these existing risk
           mitigation and management strategies, most AMPs issued between
           2003 and 2005, however, have not reset to require fully amortizing
           payments, and it is too soon to tell how many borrowers will
           eventually experience payment shock or financial distress. As
           such, in our report we agree with federal regulatory officials and
           industry participants that it was too soon to tell the extent to
           which AMP risks may result in delinquencies and foreclosures for
           borrowers and losses for banks that hold AMPs in their portfolios.
           However, we noted that past experience with these products may not
           be a good indicator for future AMP performance because the
           characteristics of AMP borrowers have changed.
			  
			  Borrowers May Not Be Well-informed of AMP Risks and Mortgage 
			  Disclosures May Not Effectively Describe These Risks to Consumers

           Regulatory officials and consumer advocates expressed concern that
           some AMP borrowers may not be well-informed about the terms and
           risks of their complex AMP loans. Obstacles to understanding these
           products include advertising that may not clearly or effectively
           convey AMP risks, and federal mortgage disclosure requirements
           that do not require lenders to tailor disclosures to the specific
           risks of AMPs to borrowers.
			  
			  Mortgage Advertising May Not Clearly or Effectively Explain AMP Risks
			  
           Marketing materials that we reviewed indicated that advertising by
           lenders and brokers may not clearly provide information to inform
           consumers about the potential risks of AMPs. For example, one
           advertisement we reviewed promoted a low initial interest rate and
           low monthly mortgage payments without clarifying that the low
           interest rate would not last the full term of the loan.

           In other cases, promotional materials emphasized the benefits of
           AMPs without effectively explaining the associated risks. Some
           advertising, for example, emphasized loans with low monthly
           payment options without effectively disclosing the possibility of
           interest rate changes or mortgage payment increases. One print
           advertisement we reviewed for a payment-option ARM emphasized the
           benefit of a low initial interest rate but noted in small print on
           its second page that the low initial rate applied only to the
           first month of the loan and could increase or decrease thereafter.
			  
			  Federal Disclosures May Not Clearly and Completely Explain AMP
			  Specific Risks

           Regulatory officials noted that current Regulation Z requirements
           address traditional fixed-rate and adjustable-rate products, but
           not more complex products such as AMPs that feature risks such as
           negative amortization and payment shock. To better understand the
           quality of AMP disclosures, we reviewed eight interest-only and
           payment-option ARM disclosures provided to borrowers from
           federally regulated lenders. These disclosures were provided to
           borrowers between 2004 and 2006 by six federally regulated lenders
           that collectively made over 25 percent of the interest-only and
           payment option ARMs produced in 2005.We found that these
           disclosures addressed current Regulation Z requirements, but some
           did not provide full and clear explanations of AMP risks such as
           negative

           amortization or payment shock. For example, as shown in figure 2,
           the disclosure simply states that monthly payments could increase
           or decrease on the basis of interest rate changes, which may be
           sufficient for a traditional ARM product, but does not inform
           borrowers about the potential magnitude of payment change, which
           may be more relevant for certain AMPs. In addition, most of the
           disclosures we reviewed did not explain that negative
           amortization, particularly in a rising interest rate environment,
           could cause AMP loans to reset more quickly than borrowers
           anticipated and require higher monthly mortgage payments sooner
           than expected.

           Figure 2: Example of 2005 Interest-only ARM Disclosure Explaining
           How Monthly Payments Can Change

           In addition, the AMP disclosures generally did not conform to
           leading practices in the federal government, such as key "plain
           English" principles for readability or design. For example, the
           Securities and Exchange Commission's "A Plain English Handbook:
           How to Create Clear SEC Disclosure Documents (1998)" offered
           guidance for developing clearly written investment product
           disclosures and presenting information in visually effective and
           readable ways. The sample disclosures we reviewed, however, were
           generally written with language too complex for many adults to
           fully understand. Most of the disclosures also used small,
           hard-to-read typeface, which when combined with an ineffective use
           of white space and headings, made them even more difficult to read
           and buried key information.
			  
			   Federal Banking Regulators Issued Guidance, Sought Industry
				Comments, and Took Other Actions to Respond to Concerns about AMP
				Lending

           Federal banking regulators have taken a range of actions-including
           issuing draft interagency guidance, seeking industry comments,
           reinforcing messages about AMP risks and guidance principles in
           many forums, and taking other individual regulatory actions-to
           respond to concerns about the growth and risks of AMP lending.
           Federal banking regulators issued draft interagency guidance in
           December 2005 that recommended prudent underwriting, portfolio and
           risk management, and information disclosure practices related to
           AMP lending. The draft guidance calls for lenders to consider the
           potential impact of payment shock on borrowers' capacity to repay
           their mortgages and to qualify borrowers on their ability to make
           fully amortizing payments on the basis of fully indexed interest
           rates. It also recommends that lenders develop written policies
           and procedures that describe portfolio limits, mortgage sales and
           securitization practices, and risk-management expectations. In
           addition, to improve consumer understanding of AMPs, the draft
           guidance suggests that lender communications with borrowers,
           including advertisements and promotional materials, be consistent
           with actual product terms, and that institutions avoid practices
           that might obscure the risks of AMPs to borrowers. When finalized,
           the guidance will apply to all federally regulated financial
           institutions.3

           During the public comment period for the guidance, lenders and
           others suggested in their letters that the stricter underwriting
           recommendations were overly prescriptive and might put federally
           and state-regulated banks at a competitive disadvantage because
           the guidance would not apply to independent mortgage lenders or
           brokers. Lenders said that this could result in fewer mortgage
           choices for consumers. Consumer advocates questioned whether the
           guidance would actually help protect consumers. They noted that
           guidance might be difficult to enforce because it does not carry
           the same force as law or regulation. Federal banking regulatory
           officials are using these comments as they finalize the guidance.

           Even before drafting the guidance, federal regulatory officials
           had publicly reinforced their concerns about AMPs in speeches, at
           conferences, and through the media. According to a Federal Reserve
           official, these actions have raised awareness of AMP issues and
           reinforced the message that financial institutions and the general
           public need to manage risks and understand these products.

           Some regulatory officials have also taken agency-specific steps to
           address AMP lending, including reviewing high-risk lending, which
           would include AMPs, and improving consumer education about AMP
           risks. For example, FDIC officials told us that they have
           developed a review program to identify high-risk lending areas and
           evaluate risk management and underwriting approaches. NCUA
           officials said that they have informally contacted their largest
           credit unions to assess the extent of AMP lending at these
           institutions. OTS officials said that they have performed a review
           of OTS's 68 most active AMP lenders to assess and respond to
           potential AMP lending risks and OCC have begun to conduct reviews
           of their lenders' AMP promotional and marketing materials to
           assess how well they inform consumers. In response to concerns
           about disclosures, the Federal Reserve officials told us that they
           initiated a review of Regulation Z that includes reviewing the
           disclosures required for all mortgage loans, including AMPs, and
           have begun taking steps to consider disclosure revisions. During
           the summer of 2006, the Federal Reserve held hearings across the
           country on home-equity lending, AMP issues, and the adequacy of
           consumer disclosures for mortgage products. According to Federal
           Reserve officials, the Federal Reserve is currently reviewing the
           hearing transcripts and public comment letters to help develop
           plans and recommendations for revising Regulation Z. In addition,
           they said that they are currently revising their consumer handbook
           on ARM loans, known as the CHARM booklet, to include information
           about AMPs. Finally, in May 2006, FTC officials said that they
           sponsored a public workshop that explored consumer protection
           issues as a result of AMP growth in the mortgage marketplace and
           worked with federal banking regulators and other federal
           departments to create a brochure to assist consumers with mortgage
           information.
			  
			  Most States in Our Sample Responded to AMP-Lending Risks within
			  Existing Regulatory Frameworks, While Others Have Taken Additional
			  Actions

           State banking and financial regulatory officials from the eight
           states in our sample expressed concerns about AMP lending in their
           states; however, most relied on their existing regulatory system
           of licensing and examining mortgage lenders and brokers to stay
           abreast of and react to AMP issues. Most of the officials in our
           sample expressed concern about AMP lending and the negative
           effects it could have on consumers, including how well consumers
           understood complex AMP loans and the potential impact of payment
           shock, financial difficulties, or default and foreclosure. Other
           officials expressed concern about whether consumers received
           complete information about AMPs, saying that federal disclosures
           were complicated, difficult to comprehend, and often were not very
           useful to consumers.

           In addition to these general consumer protection concerns, some
           state officials spoke about state-specific issues. For example,
           Ohio officials expressed AMP concerns in the context of larger
           economic concerns, noting that AMP mortgages were part of wider
           economic challenges facing the state. Ohio already has high rates
           of mortgage foreclosures and unemployment that have hurt both
           Ohio's consumers and its overall economy. In Nevada, officials
           worried that lenders and brokers have engaged in practices that
           sometimes take advantage of senior citizens by offering them AMP
           loans that they either did not need or could not afford.

           Most of the state regulatory officials said that they have relied
           upon state law to license mortgage lenders and brokers and ensure
           they meet minimum experience and operations standards. Most said
           they also periodically examine these entities for compliance with
           state licensing, mortgage lending, and consumer protection laws,
           including applicable fair advertising requirements. As such, most
           of the regulatory officials relied on systems already in place to
           investigate AMP issues or complaints and, when needed, used
           applicable licensing and consumer protection laws to respond to
           problems such as unfair and deceptive trade practices.

           Some state regulatory officials with whom we spoke said they have
           taken other actions to better understand the issues associated
           with AMP lending and expand consumer protections. For example,
           some states such as New Jersey and Nevada have gathered data on
           AMPs to better understand AMP lending and risks. Others, such as
           New York, plan to use guidance developed by regulatory
           associations to help oversee AMP lending by independent mortgage
           lenders and brokers.

           In summary, it is too soon to tell the extent to which payment
           shock will produce financial distress for some borrowers and
           induce defaults that would affect banks that hold AMPs in their
           portfolios. However, the popularity, complexity, and widespread
           marketing of AMPs highlight the importance of mortgage disclosures
           to help borrowers make informed mortgage decisions. As a result,
           while we commend the Federal Reserve's efforts to review and
           revise Regulation Z, we recommended in our report that the Board
           of Governors of the Federal Reserve System consider amending
           federal mortgage disclosure requirements to improve the clarity
           and comprehensiveness of AMP disclosures. In response to our
           recommendation, the Federal Reserve said that it will conduct
           consumer testing to determine appropriate content and formats and
           use design consultants to develop model disclosure forms intended
           to better communicate information.

           Chairmen of the subcommittees, this completes my prepared
           statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or
           other Members may have at this time.
			  
                       GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

           For additional information about this testimony, please contact
           Orice M. Williams on (202) 512-5837 or at [email protected] .
           Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
           Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement.
           Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include
           Karen Tremba, Assistant Director; Tania Calhoun; Bethany Claus
           Widick; Stefanie Jonkman; Marc Molino; Robert Pollard; Barbara
           Roesmann; and Steve Ruszczyk.

           GAO's Mission
			  
			  The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
           investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in
           meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve
           the performance and accountability of the federal government for
           the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds;
           evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,
           recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
           informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
           commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
           accountability, integrity, and reliability.

           Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
			  
			  The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at
           no cost is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each weekday,
           GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on
           its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted
           products every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe
           to Updates."
            
           Order by Mail or Phone

           The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies
           are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the
           Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
           Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are
           discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:

           U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM
           Washington, D.C. 20548

           To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax:
           (202) 512-6061

           To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
			  
			  Contact:

           Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail:
           [email protected] Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or
           (202) 512-7470

           
           Congressional Relations

           Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4400
           U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
           Washington, D.C. 20548
			  
			  Public Affairs

           Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
           512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW,
           Room 7149 Washington, D.C. 20548

1GAO, Alternative Mortgage Products: Impact on Defaults Remains Unclear,
but Disclosure of Risks to Borrowers Could Be Improved, GAO-06-1021
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2006).

2This example assumes a $400,000 payment-option ARM with a 1 percent
initial interest rate, a 7.5 percent annual payment increase cap, and a 10
percent negative amortization cap. The example reflects actual interest
rates for 2004 to 2006 and rates are assumed to remain unchanged
thereafter. With an initial interest rate of 1 percent the borrower's
minimum payment would be $1,287. However, the lender likely would have
qualified the borrower based on a fully indexed rate of 4.41 percent,
which corresponds to a first-year's fully amortizing monthly payment of
$2,039. Federal Reserve and OCC officials told us that lenders generally
qualify payment-option ARM borrowers at the fully indexed interest rate.
Although the borrower is faced with a payment shock of 128 percent in year
six as a result of making minimum payments, the increase is 44 percent
more than the monthly payment that was originally used to qualify the
borrower.

3Federally regulated financial institutions include all banks and their
subsidiaries, bank holding companies and their non bank subsidiaries,
savings associations and their subsidiaries, savings and loan holding
companies and their subsidiaries, and credit unions.

250316

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-1112T .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Orice M. Williams at (202) 512-8678 or
[email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-1112T , a testimony to the Subcommittees on Housing
and Transportation and Economic Policy, Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, U. S. Senate

September 20, 2006

ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE PRODUCTS

Impact on Defaults Remains Unclear, but Disclosure of Risks to Borrowers
Could Be Improved

Alternative mortgage products (AMPs) can make homes more affordable by
allowing borrowers to defer repayment of principal or part of the interest
for the first few years of the mortgage. Recent growth in AMP lending has
heightened the importance of borrowers' understanding and lenders'
management of AMP risks. GAO's report discusses the (1) recent trends in
the AMP market, (2) potential AMP risks for borrowers and lenders, (3)
extent to which mortgage disclosures discuss AMP risks, and (4) federal
and selected state regulatory response to AMP risks. GAO used regulatory
and industry data to analyze changes in AMP monthly payments under various
scenarios; reviewed available studies; and interviewed relevant federal
and state regulators and mortgage industry groups, and consumer groups.

What GAO Recommends

GAO's report includes a recommendation that as part of the Federal Reserve
Board's review of existing mortgage disclosure requirements, it should
consider revising those requirements to improve the clarity and
comprehensiveness of AMP disclosures. The Federal Reserve responded that
it will conduct consumer testing to determine appropriate content and
formats and use design consultants to develop model disclosure forms
intended to better communicate information.

From 2003 through 2005, AMP originations, comprising mostly interest-only
and payment-option adjustable-rate mortgages, grew from less than 10
percent of residential mortgage originations to about 30 percent. They
were highly concentrated on the East and West Coasts, especially in
California. Federally and state-regulated banks and independent mortgage
lenders and brokers market AMPs, which have been used for years as a
financial management tool by wealthy and financially sophisticated
borrowers. In recent years, however, AMPs have been marketed as an
"affordability" product to allow borrowers to purchase homes they
otherwise might not be able to afford with a conventional fixed-rate
mortgage.

Because AMP borrowers can defer repayment of principal, and sometimes part
of the interest, for several years, some may eventually face payment
increases large enough to be described as "payment shock." Mortgage
statistics show that lenders offered AMPs to less creditworthy and less
wealthy borrowers than in the past. Some of these recent borrowers may
have more difficulty refinancing or selling their homes to avoid higher
monthly payments, particularly in an interest-rate environment where
interest rates have risen or if the equity in their homes fell because
they were making only minimum monthly payments or home values did not
increase. As a result, delinquencies and defaults could rise. Federal
banking regulators stated that most banks appeared to be managing their
credit risk well by diversifying their portfolios or through loan sales or
securitizations. However, because the monthly payments for most AMPs
originated between 2003 and 2005 have not reset to cover both interest and
principal, it is too soon to tell to what extent payment shocks would
result in increased delinquencies or foreclosures for borrowers and in
losses for banks.

Regulators and others are concerned that borrowers may not be
well-informed about the risks of AMPs, due to their complexity and because
promotional materials by some lenders and brokers do not provide balanced
information on AMPs benefits and risks. Although lenders and certain
brokers are required to provide borrowers with written disclosures at loan
application and closing, federal standards on these disclosures do not
currently require specific information on AMPs that could better help
borrowers understand key terms and risks.

In December 2005, federal banking regulators issued draft interagency
guidance on AMP lending that discussed prudent underwriting, portfolio and
risk management, and consumer disclosure practices. Some lenders commented
that the recommendations were too prescriptive and could limit consumer
choices of mortgages. Consumer advocates expressed concerns about the
enforceability of these recommendations because they are presented in
guidance and not in regulation. State regulators GAO contacted generally
relied on existing regulatory structure of licensing and examining
independent mortgage lenders and brokers to oversee AMP lending.
*** End of document. ***