Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard	 
Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force	 
Transformation Initiatives (04-OCT-05, GAO-06-111).		 
                                                                 
Recent military operations have required that the Army rely	 
extensively on Army National Guard forces, which currently	 
comprise over 30 percent of the ground forces in Iraq. Heavy	 
deployments of Army National Guard forces and their equipment,	 
much of which has been left overseas for follow-on forces, have  
raised questions about whether the Army National Guard has the	 
types and quantities of equipment it will need to continue	 
supporting ongoing operations and future missions. GAO was asked 
to assess the extent to which (1) the Army National Guard has the
equipment needed to support ongoing operations and (2) the Army  
can account for Army National Guard equipment left overseas. GAO 
also assessed the Army's plans, cost estimates, and funding	 
strategy for equipping Guard units under its modular and	 
rotational force initiatives.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-111 					        
    ACCNO:   A39017						        
  TITLE:     Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National    
Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army	 
Force Transformation Initiatives				 
     DATE:   10/04/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Armed forces abroad				 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Equipment inventories				 
	     Inventory control					 
	     Military inventories				 
	     Military operations				 
	     National Guard					 

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GAO-06-111

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO	Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, and Chairman,

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations, House of Representatives

October 2005

RESERVE FORCES

Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better
           Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives

                                       a

GAO-06-111

[IMG]

October 2005

RESERVE FORCES

Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better
Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives

What GAO Found

While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting
the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the
equipment inventory of the Guard's nondeployed units and threatens the
Guard's ability to prepare forces for future missions at home and
overseas. Nondeployed Guard units now face significant equipment
shortfalls because (1) they have been equipped at less than war-time
levels with the assumption that they could obtain additional resources
prior to deployment and (2) current operations have created an
unanticipated high demand for certain items, such as armored vehicles. To
fully equip its deploying units, as of July 2005, the Army National Guard
had transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from its nondeployed
units. As of May 2005, such transfers had exhausted the Guard's inventory
of more than 220 high demand equipment items, such as night vision
equipment, trucks, and radios. Further, as equipment requirements for
overseas operations continue to evolve, the Army has been unable to
identify and communicate what items deploying units need until close to
their scheduled deployments, which challenges the Guard to transfer needed
equipment quickly.

To meet the demand for certain types of equipment for continuing
operations, the Army has required Army National Guard units to leave
behind many items for use by follow-on forces, but the Army can account
for only about 45 percent of these items and has not developed a plan to
replace them, as DOD policy requires. DOD has directed the Army to track
equipment Guard units left overseas and develop replacement plans, but
they have not yet been completed. The Army Guard estimates that since 2003
it has left more than 64,000 items, valued at more than $1.2 billion,
overseas to support operations. Without a completed and implemented plan
to replace all Guard equipment left overseas, Army Guard units will likely
face growing equipment shortages and challenges in regaining readiness for
future missions. Thus, DOD and Congress will not have assurance that the
Army has an effective strategy for addressing the Guard's equipping needs.

Although Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new designs
within the Army's modular force by 2008, they are not expected to be
equipped for these designs until at least 2011. The Army has not developed
detailed equipping plans that specify the Guard's equipment requirements
to transform to a modular force while supporting ongoing operations. As of
June 2005, the Army estimated that it would cost about $15.6 billion to
convert most of the Guard's units, but this estimate did not include all
expected costs and the Army was unable to provide detailed information to
support the estimate. In the short term, units nearing deployment will
continue to receive priority for equipment, which may affect the
availability of equipment needed for modular conversions. Until the Army
fully identifies the Guard's equipment requirements and costs for both the
near and long term, DOD and Congress will not be in a sound position to
weigh the affordability and effectiveness of the Army's plans.

United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

Letter

Results in Brief
Background
Critical Equipment Shortages Have Degraded the Overall

Equipment Readiness of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units

Army's Lack of Accountability and Plans to Replace All Army National Guard
Equipment Retained in Theater Hinder the Guard's Ability to Prepare and
Train Units

Army National Guard Units Are Changing to New Designs, but Will

Continue to Lack Equipment Comparable to Active Forces Conclusions
Recommendations Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

                                       1

                                      3 6

                                       9

17

19 25 26 26

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Table

Table 1: Examples of Current Mobilization Equipment Shortages among Nondeployed
                           Army National Guard Units

Figures

Figure 1: Post-September 11, 2001 Army National Guard Activity under
Federal Command and Control 8 Figure 2: Percentage of Nondeployed Army
National Guard Units Meeting Minimum Equipment Criteria to Deploy 12

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United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

October 4, 2005

The Honorable Tom Davis

Chairman

Committee on Government Reform

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives

In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the
subsequent launch of the Global War on Terrorism, the Army National Guard
has been called upon to play a significant role in supporting active Army
forces overseas while, at the same time, taking on new homeland defense
missions, such as protecting critical infrastructure-all of which require
that the Army National Guard have sufficient quantities and types of
equipment items. In addition, the Army National Guard must use its
allotted equipment to perform other domestic responsibilities, including
responding to natural emergencies or incidents of civil unrest.
Historically, the Army National Guard has been structured as a follow-on
force that supports the active Army in overseas conflicts, and as such,
Guard units have not been resourced with all of the equipment and
personnel they require for their missions. Instead, it was assumed that
there would be sufficient time for units to obtain the remainder of their
resources prior to deployment. However, Army National Guard members now
comprise 31 percent of the ground forces in Iraq. While Army officials
anticipate Guard involvement to decline somewhat in 2006, the tempo of
operations over the long term remains uncertain. The post-September 11
increase in the Army National Guard's responsibilities, particularly its
increased involvement in overseas operations, raises concerns about
whether the Army National Guard has the equipment it needs to continue to
support operations in the future.

The Army recognizes that it needs to transform its forces, including the
National Guard, to better meet the emerging threats of the 21st century
and is undertaking two initiatives designed to enhance the capability of
active and reserve forces. One of the Army's key initiatives-called the
modular force initiative-is a multibillion dollar effort to restructure
the entire Army. It involves increasing the flexibility and responsiveness
of the

force by converting from a division-based structure to smaller brigade
combat teams and increasing the pool of units available for deployment. In
addition, the Army is in the process of developing a rotational force
model in which active and reserve forces would progress through a cycle of
increasing readiness, culminating in the availability of a specified
number of units for deployment if needed. The Army also hopes the model
will increase deployment predictability for Army National Guard soldiers,
who have been heavily involved in recent operations and must balance their
military duties with civilian careers.

The challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in managing its
reserve forces and allocating its resources across services and programs
are some of the many issues that we have highlighted to Congress as the
nation entered the 21st century.1 We have previously reported on how the
Army National Guard and Army Reserve have been used in recent operations.2
In 2004, we reported on the effect of the continuing high use of National
Guard forces and challenges to prepare the Guard for future overseas and
domestic missions.3 In addition, we recently testified on the Army's plans
to convert to a modular force.4 And, in August 2003 and September 2004, we
reported on several reserve mobilization issues, including the limited use
of the individual ready reserve and long-term availability issues.5

In response to your request that we examine Army National Guard equipment
issues, the objectives of this report are to assess the extent to which
(1) the Army National Guard has the types and quantities of equipment
needed to support the Global War on Terrorism and (2) the

1 GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005).

2 GAO, Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army
Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages, GAO-05-660 (Washington, D.C.:
July 12, 2005).

3 GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard
for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions, GAO-05-21 (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 10, 2004).

4 GAO, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to
Implement and Fund Modular Forces, GAO-05-443T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16,
2005).

5 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of
Mobilizations for Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 21,
2003) and Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force
Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues,
GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004).

Army can account for Army National Guard equipment that has been
transferred to the active component in theater and its plans for replacing
this equipment. We also examined the Army's plans for converting the Army
National Guard to a modular force and implementing a rotational force
model to determine how Army National Guard units will be equipped for
future missions and the estimated costs of the conversion.

To address these objectives, we analyzed data on the types and quantities
of Army National Guard equipment that have been used in support of the
Global War on Terrorism and the equipment status of nondeployed units; the
extent to which Army National Guard equipment has been retained overseas
in the theater of operations; and the Army's plans to create a modular
force and its new rotational force model. We interviewed officials in the
DOD, the Department of the Army, and the National Guard Bureau to obtain
information on how equipment needs have evolved, the extent to which
equipment has been transferred to the active component and the Army's
plans for replacing it, and the Army's plans to include the Army National
Guard in the modular force initiative and the rotational force model. We
supplemented this information with visits to Army commands and conducted a
case study of unit equipment experiences by visiting two units, the 30th
Brigade Combat Team in North Carolina, which deployed in February 2004,
and the 48th Brigade Combat Team in Georgia, which deployed in May 2005.
We selected these units because they allowed us to evaluate how the
process used to prepare units has changed with subsequent rotations to
Operation Iraqi Freedom. We conducted our review in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards between December 2004 and
August 2005 and determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable
for our objectives. The scope and methodology used in our review are
described in further detail in appendix

I.

While Army National Guard units have deployed overseas with most of the
equipment they have needed to support current operations, the Guard is
experiencing growing equipment shortages which are decreasing the ability
of its nondeployed forces to be ready for future operations at home and
overseas. Equipment shortages have developed for two primary reasons.
First, the Army National Guard has been equipped at less than war-time
readiness levels under the assumption that there would be sufficient time
for its forces to obtain additional equipment prior to deployment; in
peacetime, units generally had only about 65 to 75 percent of the
equipment they needed for their wartime missions. For recent operations,
theater commanders have generally required Army National

Results in Brief

Guard units to deploy with 90 to 100 percent of the equipment that is
needed for their missions and, in some cases, to obtain different
equipment, such as more modern communications systems, than Army National
Guard units are authorized in peacetime. Thus, to fully equip its
deploying units, as of July 2005 the Army National Guard had transferred
more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from nondeployed units to prepare
deploying units; an increase of 189 percent from the 35,000 equipment
items that were transferred as of June 2004.6 Providing this equipment has
depleted its inventories of more than 220 critical items and reduced
inventories of other mission-essential items7 to only 61 percent of
requirements by May 2005. Second, demand for some types of equipment, such
as armored humvees and night vision equipment, has increased across the
Army, and equipment requirements continue to evolve. This has made it very
difficult for the Army to communicate to deploying units what equipment is
needed in theater and further challenges the Army National Guard to
identify and transfer the right equipment. The continuing strategy of
transferring equipment to deploying forces hampers the ability of
nondeployed forces to train for future missions. The Army has developed
processes to ensure that deploying active and reserve forces are provided
the equipment they need for their deployments through transferring
equipment between units and concentrating high-demand equipment in
theater. However, growing equipment shortages resulting from these
processes among the Army National Guard nondeployed force make it unclear
whether the Guard will be able to maintain acceptable levels of equipment
readiness for missions overseas or at home.

Compounding the problem of equipment transfers within the Guard, Army
National Guard units that have returned from overseas deployments have
left behind many equipment items for use by follow-on forces by
transferring equipment to active Army units. However, the Army does not
have a complete accounting of these items or a plan to replace the
equipment, as DOD policy requires. DOD Directive 1225.6, which implements
this policy, requires the services to develop a replacement plan for
equipment transferred from the reserve component to the active component
for more than 90 days. The Army National Guard estimates that since 2003,
it has transferred more than 64,000 pieces of equipment,

6GAO-05-21.

7Mission-essential items are those items that are critical for
accomplishing missions, including principal weapon/mission systems and
equipment and critical mission support items.

valued at more than $1.2 billion, to the Army to support Operation Iraqi
Freedom. However, the Army is only centrally tracking the portion of the
Guard's equipment that it expects will remain in the theater for the
duration of current operations such as those items purchased specifically
for units deploying to the theater or certain high-demand items in short
supply. Items that units transfer to other units may also remain in
theater for up to 3 years, but the Army does not have a complete
accounting of these items because they are not tracked centrally. The Army
expects that the items transferred from unit to unit will eventually be
returned to the Guard, although the Guard does not know whether or when
the items will be returned. Army officials told us they did not track and
develop plans to replace Guard equipment because there were many other
priorities in the early phases of the war, and the strategy of having
units leave some equipment was expected to be a short-term measure. Yet,
as operations continue, the amount of Guard equipment overseas has
increased and, without a centralized process to account for all items that
have been retained in theater, it is not clear how the Army will be able
to develop the replacement plans required by the DOD directive. In May
2005, DOD expressed its concerns about the magnitude of equipment Guard
units have left overseas and directed the Army to submit replacement plans
for Guard equipment. Until these plans are completed and replacement
equipment provided, Army National Guard units will face continuing
equipment shortages while challenged to train and prepare for future
missions.

Although Army National Guard units are converting to new designs within
the Army's modular force by 2008 and entering the Army's new rotational
cycle, some units are not expected to be equipped for the new designs
until 2011. Further, the Army has not developed detailed equipping plans
that specify the Guard's equipment requirements for each phase of the
rotational cycle. One of the Army's chief goals of its modular force
initiative is to create standardized unit designs in the active and
reserve forces with similar structures and equipment that are as effective
as current brigades. Under this initiative, the Army National Guard's new
units will need different types and quantities of equipment for wartime
missions and training. However, the Army is modifying the preferred
designs to include the equipment it can reasonably expect to have based on
current funding plans. As a result, Army National Guard units will
continue to lack equipment items and have to use less modern equipment to
fill gaps until at least 2011, and not be comparably equipped with their
active duty counterparts. Our analysis of other DOD initiatives has shown
that detailed plans which outline the major implementation tasks and
identify realistic funding requirements are needed to facilitate success
and

avoid unintended consequences, such as differing assumptions among key
leaders in DOD and Congress about priorities or program performance. The
Army has not completed detailed plans or cost estimates for these
initiatives because it is moving quickly to implement them to better
support continuing operations. Until the Army fully identifies the
requirements and associated costs of these two initiatives and makes key
implementation decisions, DOD and Congress will not be in a sound position
to weigh their affordability and effectiveness, and the Army National
Guard will face uncertainty as it prepares to implement the restructuring
efforts.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy
that addresses the equipment needs of the Army National Guard and a plan
for the effective integration of the Army National Guard into its
rotational force model and modular force initiatives. DOD agreed with our
recommendations and cited actions the Army is taking to posture the Army
National Guard for prolonged operations by building a rotational force and
developing a resource priority plan for all Army units. DOD stated that
the details raised in our recommendations need to be addressed in the
Army's strategy for equipping Army National Guard units to prepare for
future state emergency response, homeland defense, and federal missions.
DOD also stated that the Army is taking steps to implement stricter
accountability over Guard equipment currently left in theater and is
working to develop replacement plans for these items.

The Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of
the United States are two components of the armed forces Selected
Reserve.8 The National Guard Bureau is the federal entity responsible for
the administration of both the Army National Guard and the Air National
Guard. The Army National Guard, which is authorized 350,000 soldiers,
makes up more than one-half of the Army's ground combat forces and
onethird of its support forces (e.g., military police, transportation
units). Army National Guard units are located at more than 3,000 armories
and bases in

8The reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces are the Army National
Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the
Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air
Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. The Selected Reserve consists
of military members assigned to organized reserve units and reservists who
participate in at least 48 scheduled drills or training periods each year
and serve on active duty for training of not less than 14 days during each
year.

Background

all 50 states and 4 U.S. territories. Traditionally, the majority of Guard
members are employed on a part-time basis, typically training 1 weekend
per month and 2 weeks per year. However, after September 11, 2001, the
President authorized reservists to be activated for up to 2 years. As of
July 2005, more than 70,000 Army National Guard personnel were activated
under this authority to support ongoing operations. The Guard also employs
some full-time personnel who assist unit commanders in administrative,
training, and maintenance tasks.

Army National Guard personnel may be ordered to perform duty under three
general statutory frameworks: Title 10 or 32 of the United States Code or
pursuant to state law in a state active duty status. In a Title 10 status,
Army National Guard personnel are federally funded and under federal
command and control. Personnel may enter Title 10 status by being ordered
to active duty, either voluntarily or under appropriate circumstances
involuntarily (i.e., mobilization). Personnel in Title 32 status are
federally funded but under state control. Title 32 is the status in which
National Guard personnel typically perform training for their federal
mission. Personnel performing state active duty are state-funded and under
state command and control. Under state law, the governor may order
National Guard personnel to perform state active duty to respond to
emergencies, civil disturbances, and for other reasons authorized by state
law.

While the Army National Guard performs both federal and state missions,
the Guard is organized, trained, and equipped for its federal missions,
and these take priority over state missions. The Global War on Terrorism,
a federal mission, is a comprehensive effort to defeat terrorism and
protect and defend the homeland and includes military operations such as
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. As
we reported in our November 2004 report on the National Guard, the Army
National Guard's involvement in federal operations has increased
substantially since the September 11 terrorist attacks, and Army National
Guard members have participated in overseas warfighting operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and
homeland missions, such as guarding Air Force bases. Figure 1 shows that
while the number of activated Army National Guard personnel has declined
since its peak in December 2004 and January 2005, it continues to provide
a substantial number of personnel to support current operations. As of
July 2005, about 35,500 of the 113,000 soldiers, or nearly one-third of
the soldiers serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom, were Army National Guard
members. In a June 30, 2005, testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee the Army's Chief of Staff said that the Army National

Guard's participation in overseas operations is expected to decrease
somewhat in the near future. Although the Army National Guard is expected
to continue its participation in ongoing operations, decisions as to the
level of participation have not been made.

Figure 1: Post-September 11, 2001 Army National Guard Activity under
Federal Command and Control

Number of activated guardsmen 120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000 4,291 0

ar.Apr.MSept.Oct.Nov.Dec.Jan.Feb.M

      ayJuneJulyAug.Sept.Oct.Nov.Dec.Jan.Feb.Mar.Apr.MayJuneJulyAug.Sept.
                               Nov.Dec.Jan.Feb.M

ct.O ar.Apr.M

                ayJuneJulyAug.Sept.Oct.Nov.Dec.Jan.Feb.Mar.Apr.M

ayJune

yJul2001

                       2002 2003 2004 2005 Month and year

Source: Army National Guard data.

The Department of the Army is responsible for equipping the Army National
Guard. DOD policy requires that equipment be provided to units according
to their planned wartime mission, regardless of their component. However,
based on the Army's funding priorities, the most modern equipment is
usually provided to units that would deploy first. Later deploying units,
such as most Army National Guard units, are equipped with older items from
the Army's inventory as active forces receive newer and more modern
equipment. Army National Guard units are responsible for conducting some
maintenance of their equipment.

Critical Equipment While deploying Army National Guard units have had
priority for getting

the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the
Shortages Have equipment inventory of the Guard's nondeployed units and
equipment Degraded the Overall shortages threaten the Guard's ability to
prepare forces for future

deployments. Among nondeployed National Guard units, the amount of
Equipment Readiness essential warfighting equipment on hand has continued
to decrease since of Nondeployed Army we last reported on the Army
National Guard in 2004. Equipment

shortages have developed because most Army National Guard units are

National Guard Units 	still structured with lesser amounts of equipment
than they need to deploy. To ready deploying units for overseas missions,
the Guard has had to transfer large numbers of equipment items from
nondeployed units-a practice that has left nondeployed units with
increasing shortages of equipment and made it difficult to prepare units
for future missions and maintain readiness for any unplanned
contingencies. Moreover, the equipment requirements for deploying Army
National Guard units have evolved as the nature of current operations has
changed. This has meant that in some cases, the Army National Guard has
had little time to identify sources of equipment and transfer needed items
to deploying units. The Army is adapting some of its processes to help
units address the evolving equipment requirements.

The Army National Guard's Most Army National Guard units mobilized9 for
recent overseas operations Initial Equipment had equipment shortages that
had to be filled so that the unit could meet Shortages and the the
combatant commander's equipment requirements for their mission.

These shortages exist because the Army, following DOD planningContinuing
Need for Fully guidance, has historically equipped all Army units,
including the ArmyEquipped Forces for National Guard, according to a
tiered resourcing strategy. Under tiered Current Operations Have
resourcing, those units expected to deploy overseas early in a conflict
Resulted in Critical receive first priority for equipment, and most Army
National Guard units Equipment Shortages were expected to deploy after the
active component units to serve as

follow-on forces. The Army therefore accepted some operational risks by
providing lower priority Army National Guard units with less equipment
than they would need for their mission under the assumption that there
would be time to provide additional equipment to these units before they
would be deployed. For example, Army National Guard enhanced separate

9Mobilization involves assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and
materiel for active military service. Deployment is defined as the
relocation of forces, personnel or equipment from home station to meet
operational requirements.

brigades10 are generally supplied with about 75 percent of the equipment
they require for their warfighting missions and divisional units, which
comprise the majority of the Guard's combat forces, are supplied with
about 65 percent. In addition to being given less equipment, most Army
National Guard units did not have priority for the newest, most modern
equipment, so much of the Guard's equipment is older and less modern than
that of the active Army and is not always compatible with more modern
items.

However, for recent operations, combatant commanders have required Army
National Guard units to deploy with 90 to 100 percent of the equipment
they are expected to need and with equipment that is compatible with
active Army units. As an increasing number of Army National Guard forces
have been needed to support current operations, the Army National Guard
has supplied the equipment its deploying units need to meet combatant
commander requirements by transferring equipment from within the Army
National Guard. The Army National Guard first tries to identify the needed
equipment within the same state as the deploying unit. If the equipment
cannot be found within the state, the National Guard Bureau requests the
equipment from Army National Guard units across the United States. If the
equipment is not available in the Army National Guard, the Army National
Guard notifies the Army that the equipment is not available, and the Army
takes over the task of providing the equipment to the mobilized unit.

For example, although the 30th Brigade Combat Team needed about 8,810
night vision goggles to deploy, it only had about 40 percent of its
requirement on hand when it was alerted to prepare to deploy, so the Army
National Guard had to identify and transfer about 5,272 pairs of goggles
to fully equip the unit. In another case, the Army tasked the National
Guard to convert 40 nonmilitary police units, including field artillery
companies, to security units capable of performing selected military
police missions in Iraq during 2004 and 2005. While a military police
company typically has 47 humvees in its inventory, field artillery
companies have only about 3 humvees that are suitable for this new

10Enhanced separate brigades have between 3,000 and 5,000 soldiers and are
the Army National Guard's highest priority combat units. These 15 brigades
received specialized training and higher priority than other National
Guard units for personnel and resources during peacetime. Once called to
active duty, they are expected to be ready to deploy overseas within 90
days. In October 2004, the Army stopped using the enhanced separate
brigade designation and now refers to these units as brigade combat teams.

mission. Therefore, the converted units had to obtain armored humvees from
other units already in Iraq because the Army National Guard had depleted
its inventory of armored humvees.

As current operations have continued, the pool of equipment from which the
Army National Guard can draw has been reduced because so many items have
been transferred to deploying units or left overseas. Shortages of some
equipment items have forced the Army National Guard to take measures that
have further exacerbated existing shortages in nondeployed units to
provide training equipment for deploying units. For example, because the
Army National Guard's supply of armored humvees was depleted, the Army
directed the Army National Guard to transfer more than 500 humvees from
nondeployed Guard units to create training sets for units to use when
preparing for deployment.

Significant numbers of equipment transfers have persisted as operations
overseas have continued. We previously reported that as of June 2004 the
Army National Guard had transferred more than 35,000 pieces of equipment
to ready units for recent operations.11 By July 2005, the number of
equipment items transferred among Army National Guard units had grown to
more than 101,000. As a result of these transfers, the equipment readiness
of nondeployed Army National Guard units has declined. As figure 2 shows,
the percentage of nondeployed units that reported having the minimum
amount of equipment they would need to deploy12 dropped from 87 percent in
October 2002 to 59 percent in May 2005. However, this estimate includes
units that have older, less modern equipment referred to as substitute
equipment. While these substitute items are useful for training purposes,
commanders may not allow these items in the theater of operations because
they may not be compatible with the equipment other units are using and
cannot be sustained logistically in theater. In addition, this estimate
includes units that have equipment that is undergoing maintenance after
returning from deployment or was left overseas, so these items are not
readily available for deployment. The National Guard Bureau estimates that
when substitute items, equipment undergoing maintenance, and equipment
left overseas for follow-on forces are subtracted, its nondeployed units
had available only about 34 percent of essential warfighting equipment as
of July 2005.

11GAO-05-21.

12 To meet minimum deployment criteria, a unit must generally have at
least 80 percent of its mission-essential equipment items on hand.

Figure 2: Percentage of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units Meeting
Minimum Equipment Criteria to Deploy

Percent of units meeting minimum equipment criteria to deploy Oct Jan.

Apr. July Oct. Jan. Apr. July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May

2002 2003

                                   2004 2005

Month and year

Source: Army National Guard data.

Note: Units must have at least 80 percent of their mission-essential
equipment to meet minimum deployment criteria. Because data were not
available for all months between October 2002 and July 2004, some chart
points in this period were estimated based on trends.

With respect to some equipment items, transfers of equipment to deploying
units have depleted the inventories of many key items in nondeployed
units. Table 1 shows selected items needed for current mobilization for
which inventory levels in nondeployed Guard units have fallen below 20
percent of authorized levels.

Table 1: Examples of Current Mobilization Equipment Shortages among
Nondeployed Army National Guard Units

    Number Percentage of of items Number of authorized in authorized items on
                                                               hand inventory

               Equipment for handling truck containers      25          4     
                                          Machine guns    1,088           150 
                    Chemical decontamination equipment     514         73     
                              Armament carrier humvees    2,240           220 
                            Truck flatbed semitrailers    2,287           180 
                                    Lightweight rifles    16,839          788 
                       Individual night vision goggles   127,000        1,000 
                            Weapon night vision sights    11,400        0     
                              Up-armored scout humvees    3,922         0     
                   Chemical agent monitoring equipment    7,200         0     

Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data as of May 2005.

As of July 2005, the Army National Guard reported that equipment transfers
had reduced its inventory of more than 220 items to less than 5 percent of
the required amount or a quantity of fewer than 5 items. Among these 220
high-demand items are generators, trucks, and radios.

While the Army can supply deploying forces with additional equipment after
they are mobilized, nondeployed units will be challenged to maintain
readiness for future missions because they do not have the equipment to
train with or to use for other contingencies. The effect of equipment
shortages on nondeployed units' ability to perform homeland defense
missions is not known because, as we reported in 2004, DOD has not
developed requirements or preparedness standards and measures for the
homeland missions in which the Army National Guard is expected to
participate. However, as previously reported, some of these items such as
humvees, night vision goggles, and chemical protective suits are useful
for the Guard's domestic missions, such as responding to potential
terrorist threats.

Evolving Equipment Requirements Challenge Efforts to Equip Units for the
Global War on Terrorism

As current military operations have evolved, equipment requirements for
the Global War on Terrorism have continued to change. This has challenged
Guard units preparing to deploy because equipment requirements are not
defined and communicated to them until close to their deployment dates.
Equipment that was not considered essential for some units' expected
missions has become important for ongoing operations, and units have been
required to have equipment that is newer than or different from that on
which they have been trained. For example, the 30th Brigade Combat Team
from North Carolina, which deployed in the spring of 2004, and the 48th
Brigade Combat Team from Georgia, which deployed in 2005, were directed to
deploy as motorized brigade combat teams with humvees instead of the
heavy-tracked equipment, such as Bradley fighting vehicles and tanks, with
which they had trained for their expected missions. Overall, the combatant
commander required that the 30th Brigade deploy to Operation Iraqi Freedom
with more than 35 types of items that were previously not authorized for
the unit, including different radios and weapons.

Due to changing conditions in theater and a desire to tailor a unit's
equipment as closely as possible to its expected mission, the Army has
continued to modify equipment requirements after units are alerted. These
changes have resulted in requirements not being communicated to some Army
National Guard units in a timely manner so that the units could be
equipped as efficiently as possible for current operations or be provided
ample time for training. In some instances, Army National Guard units have
not known exactly what equipment they would require to deploy and what
they could expect to receive in theater until close to their deployment
dates, which has made it more difficult for Army National Guard officials
to gather the equipment deploying units need to fill equipment shortages.
For example, the 48th Brigade Combat Team, which was preparing for
deployment in May 2005, had still not received a complete list of all of
the equipment it would need at the time of our visit in April 2005.
Because officials did not know exactly what they would need to take with
them overseas, the brigade packed and transported 180 different vehicles
to be shipped to theater. When officials learned that this equipment was
already available in theater, these vehicles had to be shipped back to the
brigade's mobilization station at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

In some cases, delays caused by the changing equipment requirements
reduced the amount of time units had to train with their new equipment.
For example, the 30th Brigade did not have a chemical agent identification
set to train with until its final exercise before deploying, and it did
not

have access to a Blue Force Tracker, a digital communications system that
allows commanders to track friendly forces across the battlefield in real
time, for training until the unit was in theater. In some cases, the 30th
Brigade did not receive some items until they could be transferred from
nondeployed units or they were provided in theater. For example, the unit
received the 4,000 ceramic body armor inserts needed to protect soldiers
from small arms fire upon arrival in Kuwait. According to Army officials,
in such instances units may undergo training upon arrival in the theater
of operations to acquaint them with new equipment. However, we did not
evaluate the adequacy of the training units received in the theater of
operations.

Army Has Adapted Its Equipping Process to Better Address Critical
Equipment Shortages and Evolving Equipment Requirements for Ongoing
Operations

To address critical equipment shortages and the evolving equipment
requirements for current operations, the Army has adapted its equipping
process in two ways. First, rather than having units bring all their
equipment to the theater of operations and take it back to their home
stations when they return home, the Army now requires units, in both the
active and reserve components, to leave certain essential equipment that
is in short supply in theater for follow-on units to use.13 This is
intended to reduce the amount of equipment that has to be transported from
the United States to theater, to better enable units to meet their
deployment dates, and to maintain stocks of essential equipment in theater
where it is most needed. While this equipping approach has helped meet
current operational needs, it has continued the cycle of reducing the pool
of equipment available to nondeployed forces for unplanned contingencies
and for training.

Second, the Army has instituted a process, known as a predeployment site
survey, to allow large14 units preparing to deploy to send a team to the
mission area to determine equipment needs. The team generates a list of
equipment, known as an operational needs statement, which the unit will
need in theater but was not previously authorized and will need to obtain
before deployment. Once the Army has approved the items, the unit can

13 The Army has directed that equipment purchased specifically for
Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, or other key items
currently in short supply such as armored vehicles, improvised explosive
device jammers, long-range surveillance systems, and generator sets,
remain in theater for the duration of operations.

14 Units that are smaller than a brigade complete a virtual pre-deployment
site survey by communicating with units already in theater to determine
the equipment they need to request.

obtain them through transfers from other units or procurement. Over the
course of current operations, the Army has improved the operational needs
statement process by pre-approving packages of equipment that are in
high-demand for current operations so that deploying units do not have to
request these items separately. For example, more than 160 items, such as
interceptor body armor; Javelin, a medium antitank weapon system; kits to
add armor to humvees; and night vision goggles, among other items, are
pre-approved. For example, in 2003, the 30th Brigade Combat Team prepared
about 35 lists of additional equipment it would need to deploy in January
2004. By the time the 48th Brigade was preparing for deployment in 2005,
changes to the process resulted in the unit preparing only one operational
needs statement.

In addition, an existing Army program, the Rapid Fielding Initiative, has
provided individual equipment to soldiers, including those in the Army
National Guard, more quickly than the standard acquisition process by
fielding commercial-off-the-shelf technology. The Army provides 49 items
such as body armor, helmets, hydration systems, goggles, kneepads, and
elbow pads through this initiative to units preparing to deploy at their
home stations and in theater.

Filling shortages in deploying units has left nondeployed forces with
worsening equipment shortages and hampers their ability to train for
future missions. Growing shortages make it unclear whether the Guard will
be able to maintain acceptable levels of equipment readiness for missions
overseas or at home.

Army's Lack of Accountability and Plans to Replace All Army National Guard
Equipment Retained in Theater Hinder the Guard's Ability to Prepare and
Train Units

The Army National Guard estimates that, since 2003, it has left more than
64,000 equipment items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas to support
continuing operations. But, the Army lacks a full accounting of this
equipment and has not prepared plans to replace it as required under DOD
policy. As a result, the Guard is challenged in its ability to prepare and
train for future missions. The policy reflected in DOD Directive 1225.6,
Equipping the Reserve Forces, April 7, 2005, requires a replacement plan
for reserve component equipment transferred to the active component for
more than 90 days.15 According to Army officials, the Army did not
initially track the Guard's equipment or prepare replacement plans in the
early phases of the war because the practice was intended to be a
short-term measure and there were other priorities. In addition, the Army
did not have a centralized process to develop plans to replace the
equipment Army National Guard units left overseas and transfers of
equipment between units were only documented at the unit level in unit
property records.

However, as operations have continued, the amount of Guard equipment
retained in theater has increased, which has further exacerbated the
shortages in nondeployed Army National Guard units. For example, when the
North Carolina 30th Brigade Combat Team returned from its deployment to
Iraq in 2005, it left 229 humvees, about 73 percent of its predeployment
inventory of those vehicles, for other units to use. Similarly, according
to Army National Guard officials, three Illinois Army National Guard units
were required to leave almost all of their humvees, about 130, in Iraq
when they returned from deployment. As a result, the units could not
conduct training to maintain the proficiency they acquired while overseas
or train new recruits. In all, the National Guard reports that 14 military
police companies left over 600 humvees and other armored trucks which are
expected to remain in theater for the duration of operations. While the
Army has now instituted processes to account for certain highdemand
equipment items that are being left in theater for the duration of the
conflict and expects replacement plans for this equipment to be developed
by August 2005, it does not appear that these replacement plans will
account for all items transferred to the active component because the Army
has not been tracking all Guard equipment left in theater in a centralized
manner.

15Replacement plans for removed equipment and supplies are not required
for transfers in support of force restructuring adopted as result of the
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process decisions approved
by the Secretary of Defense.

In June 2004, six months after the first Army National Guard units left
equipment overseas when they returned from deployment, the Army tasked the
Army Materiel Command with overseeing equipment retained in theater.
However, according to Army and National Guard officials, the Army Materiel
Command developed plans to track only certain highdemand equipment items
that are in short supply, such as armored humvees and other items
designated to remain in theater for the duration of the conflict. However,
Guard units have also left behind equipment that was not designated to
stay for the duration of the conflict, but which may remain in theater for
up to three years, such as cargo trucks, rough terrain fork lifts, and
palletized load trucks, which the Army Materiel Command does not plan to
track. Of the over 64,000 equipment items the Army National Guard
estimates Guard units have left behind, the National Guard Bureau
estimates that as of July 2005, the Army Material Command was only
tracking about 45 percent of those items. Given the lack of tracking of
all Guard equipment left in theater, it is not clear how the Army will
develop replacement plans for these items as required by DOD policy.

In May 2005 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
requested that the Army submit a replacement plan for all Army National
Guard equipment retained in theater by June 17, 2005. The Assistant
Secretary noted that while the exact amount of equipment transferred
between the reserve and active components is unknown, overall the
magnitude of these transfers has been significant and was an area of
concern. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
subsequently extended the date replacement plans were due to August 15,
2005. According to Army officials, the equipment tracked by individual
units may eventually be returned to the Guard. However, Army and Army
National Guard officials said that even if it is eventually returned,
equipment condition is likely to be poor given its heavy use during
current operations and some of it will likely need to be replaced. The
National Guard estimates it will cost at least $1.2 billion to replace the
equipment it has left in Iraq, if it is not returned or is not useable.
Until the Army develops plans to replace the equipment, including
identifying timetables and funding sources, the National Guard will
continue to face critical equipment shortages which reduce readiness for
future missions.

Army National Guard Units Are Changing to New Designs, but Will Continue
to Lack Equipment Comparable to Active Forces

Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new designs within
the Army's modular force by 2008, but they are expected to convert with
the equipment they have on hand and will lack some equipment for these
designs until at least 2011. However, the Army is modifying the designs it
tested and found to be as effective as current brigades to include the
equipment it can reasonably expect to have based on current funding plans.
As a result, Army National Guard units will continue to lack equipment
items and have to use less modern equipment to fill gaps until at least
2011 and will not be comparably equipped with their active duty
counterparts. While the Army estimated in June 2005 that it would cost
about $15.6 billion to convert most of the Guard's units, this estimate
did not include all expected costs and the Army was unable to provide
detailed information to support the estimate. Further, it has not
developed detailed equipping plans that specify the Guard's equipment
requirements as it progresses through the new rotation cycle used to
provide ready forces for ongoing operations. The Army is quickly
implementing its initiatives to transform its forces into modular units
and a rotational cycle of deployment without detailed plans and cost
estimates because it views these initiatives as critical to sustaining
current operations. In the short term, units nearing deployment will
continue to receive priority for equipment, which may delay when units
will receive the equipment needed for modular conversions. In 2004 and
2005, the Army published and subsequently updated the Army Campaign
Plan,16 to establish the broad goals, assumptions, and time frames for
converting to the modular force and implementing the rotational force
model. However, the plan does not include detailed equipping plans, cost
estimates, or resources needed for implementing the modular and rotational
deployment initiatives. Our analysis of best practices in strategic
planning has shown that detailed plans, which describe how the objectives
will be achieved and identify resources, facilitate success and avoid
unintended consequences, such as differing assumptions among key leaders
in DOD and Congress about priorities or program performance. Until
equipping requirements for implementing the modular designs and the
rotational model are specified, costs are better defined, and funding is
identified, the Guard faces risks as it prepares to implement the Army's
restructuring while supporting the high pace of operations at home and
overseas.

16 The Army updated the plan in October 2004 and June 2005.

Army National Guard Units Will Continue to Face Equipment Shortfalls That
May Delay Transformation to Modular Designs and Hinder Comparability with
Active Forces

The Army has recognized that it needs to become more flexible and capable
of achieving a wide range of missions. To this end, in 2004, the Army
began to reorganize its forces from a structure organized around divisions
to one based on standardized, modular brigades that can be tailored to
meet the specific needs of the combatant commander. The Army is in the
process of developing and approving detailed designs,17 including
equipment requirements, for active18 and reserve combat units, support
units, and warfighting headquarters so that the first Guard units can
begin their scheduled conversions in September 2005. Among the goals of
the new structure are to maximize the flexibility and responsiveness of
the force by standardizing designs and equipment requirements for both
active and reserve units and maintaining reserve units at a higher level
of readiness than in the past. However, under current plans, Guard units
will continue to be equipped with items that may be older than their
active counterparts and less capable than the new modular unit designs
require. The Army's initial estimate for converting Guard units to modular
designs is about $15.6 billion through 2011, but this estimate is
incomplete because it does not include the costs for converting all units
to the new structure or the full costs of equipping them for the design
the Army tested and determined was as effective as current brigades.
Moreover, the Army has not developed plans to equip Guard units to the
tested modular unit design and instead plans to equip them for a less
modern design. Without a detailed equipping plan that identifies funding
priorities over time, the Army National Guard is likely to continue to
face challenges in its ability to train and maintain ready forces in the
future.

The Army expects that the new modular brigades, which will include about
3,000 to 4,000 personnel,19 will be as capable as the current brigades of
between 3,000 and 5,000 personnel through the use of enhanced military
intelligence capability, introduction of key technology enablers, such as
weapons and communications systems, and by having support capabilities

17Unit designs prescribe the unit's wartime mission, capabilities,
organizational structure, and mission-essential personnel and equipment
requirements.

18The Army plans to reorganize its 10 active divisions by the end of
fiscal year 2006, expanding from the current 33 to 43 modular,
standardized brigade combat teams and creating new types of command
headquarters.

19 The Army's plan calls for three variants of the modularized brigade
combat team. The infantry variant will have about 3,300 personnel, the
armored variant 3,700 personnel, and the Stryker variant 4,000 personnel.

contained in the brigade itself instead of at a higher echelon of command.
The Army tested the new modular brigade designs and found that they were
as effective as current brigades. However, the Army has modified the
tested designs based on the equipment it can reasonably expect to provide
to units undergoing conversion based on its current inventory of
equipment, planned procurement pipelines, and other factors, such as
expected funding. At the time of this report, the Army had not tested the
modified designs to determine whether they are as capable as the current
brigades or the tested design. The Army plans to equip modular Guard units
for the modified design by 2011. In the meantime, modular Guard units are
expected to continue the practice of using approved substitute equipment
and will initially lack some of the key enablers, such as communications
systems, which are the basis for the improved effectiveness of modular
units.

As of June 2005, the Army had approved modified designs for the 25 Army
National Guard brigade combat teams and 25 support brigades scheduled to
convert to the modular structure between 2005 and 2007, and all eight
warfighting headquarters converting between 2005 and 2008. Under current
plans, all the Army National Guard units will be converted to the modular
organizational structure by 2008 with the exception of 3 support brigades
which will be converted in 2011. The Army expects to complete modular
designs for the remaining 9 brigade combat teams and 15 support brigades
by September 2005. The Army had originally planned to convert Guard units
on a slower schedule by 2010, but at the request of the Army National
Guard, accelerated the plan so that Guard units would share the new
standardized organizational designs with the active component at least two
years earlier, avoid training soldiers for the previous skill mix, and
better facilitate recruiting and retention efforts.

However, our work indicates that accelerated modular conversions will
exacerbate near-term equipment shortfalls. There are significant
shortfalls in the Army's ability to equip Guard units for the modified
design in the short term for three key reasons. First, according to
current plans, the units are expected to convert to their new designs with
the equipment they have on hand. However, because of existing shortages
and the large number of equipment items that deployed units left in Iraq
or that need repair or replacement due to heavy use, units will not have
the equipment needed to reach even the modified design. For example,
converted Guard units expect initially to be without some equipment items,
such as unmanned aerial vehicles, single channel ground and airborne radio
systems, and Javelin antitank missiles that provide the basis for the
improved capability of the new brigades. Second, the Army has not

planned funding to provide equipment to the additional Guard units
converting to the modular structure on the accelerated schedule. Although
most Guard units are scheduled to be reorganized by 2008, they are
expected to receive equipment for their new designs on a slower schedule,
and in some cases are not expected to receive their equipment until 2 to 3
years after they reorganize. The lack of detailed plans for equipping Army
National Guard units makes it difficult to determine how the Army intends
to transition Guard units from the old to the new organizational structure
effectively.

Finally, the Army's cost estimates for converting Guard units to the
modular structure are incomplete and likely to grow. The Army's current
cost estimate for converting all its active and reserve units to the
modular force is $48 billion, a 71 percent increase from its initial rough
order of magnitude estimate of $28 billion made in 2004. Of the $48
billion, the Army estimated in June 2005 that Army National Guard modular
conversions would cost about $15.6 billion. This estimate included costs
to convert all eight of the Guard's warfighting headquarters and 33 of the
Guard's 34 combat units between 2005 and 2011. It also includes
procurement of some high-demand equipment such as tactical unmanned aerial
vehicles, humvees, and antitank guided-missile systems. During our work,
we obtained summary information on the types of cost and key assumptions
reflected in the Army's estimates; however, we were unable to fully
evaluate the estimate because the Army did not have detailed supporting
information.

Our work highlighted several limitations to the Army's cost estimate for
Army National Guard modular force conversions. First, the estimate was
based on a less modern design than both the modified design that the Army
plans to use in the near term and the tested design it intends to evolve
to over time. The estimate assumes that Guard units will continue to use
substitute equipment items that may be older and less capable than that of
active units and does not include costs for all the technology enablers
that are expected to provide additional capability for modular units. As a
result, the estimate does not include costs for all the equipment Guard
units would require to reach the capabilities of the tested modular
brigade design. Second, the estimate does not include costs for 10 of the
Guard's support units, nor does it include military construction costs
associated with the Guard's 40 support units. According to the Army
National Guard, military construction costs for converted support units
are expected to near the $1.4 billion in military construction costs
already included for the Guard's warfighting headquarters and combat
units. Furthermore, current cost estimates assume that Guard equipment

inventories will be at prewar levels and available for modular
conversions. However, this may not be a reasonable assumption because, as
discussed previously, Army National Guard units have left large amounts of
equipment overseas - some of which will be retained indefinitely and the
Army has not provided plans for its replacement.

Further, the Army has currently identified funding sources for only about
25 percent ($3.9 billion) of the current estimate- $3.1 billion programmed
in the fiscal year 2006-2011 future years defense program and $.8 billion
expected from fiscal year 2005 supplemental funding. Approval for funding
the remaining $11.7 billion is pending within DOD. However, equipping
priorities and the amount designated for equipment have not been decided.

In the long term, according to the Army, the intent is to equip all active
and reserve component units to the tested design over time. However, it
will take until at least 2011 under current plans for the Army National
Guard units to receive the equipment they will need for the modified
designs which are still less modern than the one the Army tested and found
as effective as current brigades, and the pace of operations may further
delay equipping Guard units. Moreover, the Army does not have detailed
plans or cost estimates that identify the funding required for equipping
Guard units for the tested design. Without detailed plans for when Guard
units will get the equipment they need for the tested design, it is
unclear when the Army National Guard will achieve the enhanced
capabilities the Army needs to support ongoing operations. Further,
without more complete equipment requirements and cost estimates, the DOD
and Congress will not have all the information they need to evaluate
funding requests for the Army National Guard's transition to the modular
force.

Army Plans for Equipping Army National Guard Units Under Its Rotational
Force Model Are Not Complete

The Army's initiative to transform into a rotational force, which is
intended to provide units with a predictable cycle of increasing readiness
for potential mobilization once every 6 years, involves a major change in
the way the Army planned to use its reserve forces and has implications
for the amount and types of equipment that Army National Guard units will
need over time. Historically, Army National Guard units have been provided
only a portion of the equipment they needed to train for their wartime
missions because they were generally expected to deploy after active
units. However, current military operations have called for the Army
National Guard to supply forces to meet a continuing demand for fully
equipped units, a demand the Army National Guard met through transfers of
equipment to deploying units and which undermined the readiness of

nondeployed units. Under the rotational force concept, the Army would
provide increasing amounts of equipment to units as they move through
training phases and near readiness for potential deployment so they would
be ready to respond quickly with fully equipped forces if needed. However,
the Army has not yet finalized equipping requirements for Army National
Guard units as they progress through the rotational cycle. In addition, it
is not clear how the equipment needed to support units in the new
rotational cycle will affect the types and quantities of items available
for modular conversions and affect the pace of the Army National Guard's
transformation. Without firm decisions as to requirements for both the new
modular structure and rotational force model and a plan that integrates
requirements, the Army and Army National Guard are not in the best
position to develop complete cost estimates or to determine whether the
modular and rotational initiatives are working together to reach the goal
of improving Army National Guard readiness.

While the Army has developed a general proposal to equip units according
to the readiness requirements of each phase of the rotational force model,
it has not yet detailed the types and quantities of items required in each
phase. Under this proposal the Army National Guard will have three types
of equipment sets: a baseline set, a training set, and a deployment set.
The baseline set would vary by unit type and assigned mission and the
equipment it includes could be significantly reduced from the amount
called for in the unit design, but plans call for it to provide at least
the equipment Guard units need for domestic missions. Training sets would
include more of the equipment units will need to be ready for deployment,
but units would share the equipment that would be located at training
sites throughout the country, so the equipment would not be readily
available for units' state or homeland missions. The deployment set would
include all equipment needed for deployment including theater specific
equipment, items provided through operational needs statements, and
equipment from Army prepositioned stock. At the time of this report, the
Army was still developing the proposals for what would be included in the
three equipment sets and planned to publish the final requirements in
December 2005.

Army resourcing policy gives higher priority to units engaged in
operations or preparing to deploy than those undergoing modular
conversions. As a result, the requirements of ongoing operations will
continue to drain the Army National Guard's equipment resources and affect
the pace at which equipment will be available for nondeployed units to
transform to their new design. At the present time, it is not clear how
the equipment requirements associated with supporting deployment under the
new

Conclusions

rotational readiness cycle will affect the types and quantities of
equipment available to convert the Army National Guard to a modular force.
Until the near-term requirements for the rotational force and long-term
requirements for a modular force are fully defined, the Army and Army
National Guard will not be in a position to prioritize funding to achieve
readiness goals in the near and long term. Further, although Army leaders
have made it a priority to ensure that Army National Guard units have the
equipment they need to continue to perform their domestic missions, it is
not possible to assess whether units will have the equipment they need
until unit designs and training set configurations are finalized and
homeland defense equipment requirements are known.

Evolving equipment requirements for the Global War on Terrorism have
challenged the Army National Guard in equipping its units for deployment
while trying to maintain the readiness of its nondeployed force for
training and future missions. While strategies such as transferring needed
equipment from nondeploying units to ready deploying units, completing
operational needs statements, and leaving equipment overseas when Guard
units return home have helped to equip deploying units, these strategies
may not be sustainable in the long term, especially as the Guard's
equipment inventories continue to diminish. In the meantime, as the Army
National Guard's equipment stocks are depleted, risks to its ability to
perform future overseas and domestic missions increase.

The Army's lack of accountability over the Guard's equipment stocks
retained in theater has created a situation in which deploying Guard units
face considerable uncertainty about what equipment they need to bring
overseas and what equipment they will have for training when they return
from deployment. DOD Directive 1225.6 requires a plan to replace reserve
component equipment that is transferred to the active component, but the
Army has not prepared these plans. Without a replacement plan, the Army
National Guard faces depleted stocks of some key equipment items needed to
maintain readiness and is unable to plan for how it will equip the force
for future missions.

Supporting ongoing operations will continue to strain Army National Guard
equipment inventories, which will likely delay the pace of its
transformation to a modular force. Further, current modular plans for the
Guard's conversion will not provide for equipping Guard units to the less
modern modified design and there are no plans to equip the Guard for the
design the Army found as capable as current brigades. As a result, Guard
units will continue to face equipment shortages and have to use older

Recommendations

equipment than their active counterparts. If units are not comparable, the
Army National Guard will have to continue its current practice of
transferring equipment to fill the shortfalls in deploying units, thereby
undermining the readiness of nondeployed forces. With lower readiness of
Guard forces, the nation faces increased risk to future overseas
operations, unplanned contingencies, and the homeland missions the Guard
may be called upon to support.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy that
addresses the equipment needs of the Army National Guard for the Global
War on Terrorism and addresses how the Army will transition from shortterm
equipping measures to long-term equipping solutions. This plan should
address the measures the Army will take to ensure it complies with
existing DOD directives to safeguard reserve component equipment readiness
and provide a plan to replace depleted stocks resulting from equipment
transferred to the active Army, so that the Guard can plan for equipping
the force for future missions.

We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan for the effective
integration of the Army National Guard into its rotational force model and
modular force initiatives. This plan should include:

o  	the specific equipment requirements, costs, timelines, and funding
strategy for converting Army National Guard units to the modular force and
the extent to which Guard units will have comparable types of equipment
and equipment levels as the active modular units,

o  	an analysis of the equipment the Army National Guard's units will need
for their missions in each phase of the rotation cycle, and

o  	how the Army will manage implementation risks to modular forces if
full funding is not provided on the expected timeline.

Agency Comments 	The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
provided written comments on a draft of this report. The department agreed
with our

and Our Evaluation 	recommendations and cited actions it is taking to
implement them. DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix
II. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate.

DOD agreed with our recommendation to develop and submit a plan and
funding strategy to Congress that addresses the equipment needs of the

Army National Guard for the Global War on Terrorism, specifically
addressing how the Army will transition from its short-term equipping
measures to long-term equipping solutions. In its comments, DOD said that
the Army needs to determine how Army National Guard forces will be
equipped to meet state disaster response and potential homeland defense
requirements as well as federal missions and include these requirements in
its resource priorities. DOD also said that the Army is working to
implement stricter accountability over equipment currently left in theater
and to comply with DOD guidelines which require replacement plans for
these items.

DOD also agreed with our recommendation to develop and submit a plan to
Congress that details the effective integration of the Army National Guard
into the Army's rotational force model and modular force initiatives. DOD
said that the Army plans to develop resourcing alternatives to mitigate
potential risks should full funding for transformation initiatives not be
realized. DOD also agreed that readiness goals for the Army National Guard
in the 6-year rotational model need to be established and that the Army's
equipping strategy for the Army National Guard must include the resources
required to be prepared to carry out both their federal and state
missions.

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days
from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the Secretary of
Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Chief, National Guard Bureau; and
the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
available
at no charge on the GAO web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512
4402. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Janet A. St. Laurent
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, reviewed
documentation and interviewed officials from the Army National Guard, the
National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Army, and the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. We supplemented this
information with visits to the United States Army Forces Command, the
Coalition Forces Land Component Command, and the First Army of the United
States. We also developed case studies of two units: the 30th Brigade
Combat Team located in North Carolina and the 48th Brigade Combat Team in
Georgia. These states were chosen to provide representative examples of
how Army National Guard units were prepared for deployment to Operation
Iraqi Freedom in support of the Global War on Terrorism. The 30th Brigade
Combat Team was one of the first National Guard units to deploy for
Operation Iraqi Freedom and had just returned from deployment when we
visited in March 2005. The 48th Brigade Combat Team was preparing for
deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom at the time of our visit in April
2005. In both states we met with unit logistics staff who had visibility
over how the unit prepared for deployment.

To examine the extent to which Army National Guard units have the
equipment needed for the Global War on Terrorism, we obtained and analyzed
data on critical shortages and the types and quantities of equipment
transferred from nondeployed units to deploying units from the National
Guard Bureau and our two case study states. Additionally, we supplemented
these data with interviews, briefings, and documentation from officials at
the National Guard Bureau, the Department of the Army, the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the U.S. Army Forces
Command, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command, and the First Army
of the United States. We did not examine whether shortages of particular
items were the result of industrial base issues. To understand the
processes the Army adapted to equip units as equipment requirements
evolved for the Global War on Terrorism, we interviewed officials from and
analyzed data provided by the 30th Brigade Combat Team in North Carolina,
the 48th Brigade Combat Team in Georgia, the National Guard Bureau, the
Department of the Army, the U.S. Army Forces Command, the Coalition Forces
Land Component Command, and the First Army of the United States.

To assess the Army National Guard equipment retained in theater, we
analyzed Army National Guard data and the Guard's estimate of the cost to
replace the equipment if it is not returned. Additionally, we interviewed
officials and reviewed documentation and data from the Army National
Guard, Department of the Army, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Defense for Reserve Affairs, U.S. Army Forces Command, and the Coalition
Forces Land Component Command about the lack of reliable data and whether
any plans exist to replace the Guard's equipment. We supplemented data on
how much of the Army National Guard's equipment has been left in theater
with briefings and reviewed internal Army messages regarding the
accountability and visibility of this equipment.

To evaluate how the Army National Guard has been integrated into the
Army's plans for a modular structure and force generation model, we
interviewed officials at the Army National Guard, the Department of the
Army, and U.S. Army Forces Command. We reviewed documents such as the Army
Campaign Plan, the Army Transformation Roadmap, the Army's force
generation model, and numerous briefings on the Army's plans for a modular
force and the new force generation model. Additionally, we interviewed
Guard officials from both of our case study states about the units' plans
to convert to modular force given Army time frames and cost estimates.

To assess the reliability of data used during the course of this
engagement, we interviewed data sources about how they ensured the
accuracy of their data and reviewed their data collection methods,
standard operating procedures, and other internal control measures. In
addition, we reviewed available data for inconsistencies, and, when
applicable, performed computer testing to assess data reliability. We
determined that the data were sufficient to answer each of our objectives.

We conducted our review between December 2004 and August 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Agency comments were made on GAO-05-954. This report number was
subsequently changed to GAO-06-111.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact Acknowledgments

(350607)

Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402

In addition to the person named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant
Director; Frank Cristinzio; Alissa Czyz; Curtis Groves; Nicole Harms; Tina
Morgan Kirschbaum; Kim Mayo; Kenneth Patton; Jay Smale; and Suzanne Wren
also made major contributions to this report.

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