Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness	 
for 21st Century Challenges (21-SEP-06, GAO-06-1109T).		 
                                                                 
Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the	 
deployment of large numbers of Army National Guard and Army	 
Reserve personnel. The Department of Defense (DOD) faces the	 
unprecedented challenge of sustaining large-scale, long-duration 
operations with an all-volunteer military force. In addition,	 
DOD's homeland defense missions have taken on higher priority,	 
and National Guard forces have state responsibilities for	 
homeland security activities as well as their traditional roles  
in responding to natural disasters. Over the past few years, GAO 
has examined the effects of ongoing military operations and	 
domestic missions on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.	 
This statement, which draws on prior GAO work, focuses on (1)	 
challenges in sustaining Army reserve component equipment and	 
personnel readiness while supporting ongoing operations and (2)  
the extent to which the Army's planned transformation initiatives
will alleviate equipment and personnel shortages and enhance	 
readiness.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-1109T					        
    ACCNO:   A61266						        
  TITLE:     Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve     
Readiness for 21st Century Challenges				 
     DATE:   09/21/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Armed forces reserves				 
	     Army modularity					 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Equipment management				 
	     Equipment upgrades 				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military personnel deployment			 
	     Military reserve personnel 			 
	     Military training					 
	     Mobilization					 
	     National Guard					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom			 

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GAO-06-1109T

     

     * Summary
     * Background
     * Army Reserve Components Have Significant Equipment Shortages
          * Reserve Components' Transfers of Equipment to Deploying Unit
               * Transferring Equipment to Ready Deploying Units Has Degraded
               * Requirement to Leave Significant Quantities of Equipment in
               * Equipment Shortages Could Adversely Affect Reserve Units' Ab
          * Army National Guard and Army Reserve Face Significant Person
               * Personnel Transfers among Units to Support Deployments Have
               * Requirements for Full-time Personnel to Provide Support Have
               * Identifying Trained Personnel Available to Deploy for Future
     * Two Major Army Transformation Initiatives Are Under Way, But
          * Army's Plans to Transform Its Forces into Modular Brigades F
          * Equipping and Personnel Levels Associated with Army's Force
     * Concluding Observations
     * Contact and Acknowledgments
     * Related GAO Products
          * Order by Mail or Phone

Testimony

Before the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 11:30 a.m. EDT

Thursday, September 21, 2006

RESERVE FORCES

Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st Century Challenges

Statement of Janet A. St. Laurent, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management

GAO-06-1109T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the work GAO has undertaken
regarding the changing roles and readiness of the Army National Guard and
Army Reserve. The Congress has given the Commission on the National Guard
and Reserves (Commission) a very significant charge, and I hope that our
work will be useful to the Commission in its deliberations on how reserve
forces should be structured and equipped for the 21st century given new
threats to our national security, both overseas and at home. Ongoing
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the involvement of large
numbers of reservists, particularly ground forces, and the Department of
Defense (DOD) now faces the unprecedented challenge of sustaining
large-scale, long-duration operations with an all-volunteer military
force. Since 2001, over 500,000 reservists have been mobilized in support
of ongoing operations, the largest mobilization of reserve forces since
World War II. The high pace of operations has led to personnel and
equipment shortages among Army reserve component units. Further, in
addition to its traditional homeland missions, such as responding to
storms and fighting forest fires, the National Guard's homeland missions
have expanded to include guarding against terrorist threats.

Over the last few years, we have examined the effects of expanded mission
requirements on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, including their
new operational roles in supporting both large-scale, long-duration
overseas operations and emerging domestic requirements. My testimony today
focuses on (1) the Army reserve components' challenges in sustaining
equipment and personnel readiness while supporting ongoing military
operations and (2) the extent to which Army's planned transformation
initiatives will alleviate the Army reserve components' equipment and
personnel shortages and enhance their readiness for overseas and domestic
operations.

My testimony draws upon several GAO reports related to reserve component
personnel and equipment issues, including requirements for personnel with
high-demand skills to support ongoing overseas operations. A list of these
reports appears at the end of this statement.

In preparing these reports, we performed extensive analysis of DOD's
documentation on the status of Army National Guard and Army Reserve
equipment and personnel, focusing primarily on the status of nondeployed
units. We also reviewed and assessed DOD's and the Army's strategies and
plans for the future including the Army Campaign Plan, key plans related
to the Army's transition to a modular force, rotational force management
data, equipping and funding plans, and unit readiness reports. We also
discussed these issues with officials from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense; the Departments of the Army and the Air Force; the National Guard
Bureau; the Army Reserve; the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff; and the U.S. Joint Forces Command. In addition, we visited selected
Army National Guard units that had been deployed or were preparing to
deploy as well as Army Reserve units performing homeland defense missions.
This work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

We are continuing to conduct work relating to reserve component issues,
which will enable us to provide more information in the coming months on
issues of interest to the Commission. For example, we have begun work
examining reserve pay and compensation issues. We also have ongoing
engagements examining employer support for reservists; emergency
management assistance compacts among states; reserve deployment reporting;
and the status of the National Guard's equipment for its domestic homeland
defense missions and support to civilian authorities.

                                    Summary

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have made significant
contributions to ongoing military operations since September 11, 2001;
however, equipment shortages and personnel challenges have increased over
time and could hamper the Army's reserve components' preparedness for
future overseas and domestic missions if left unattended. These readiness
challenges have occurred for two primary reasons. First, the Army has
provided resources to reserve units based primarily on the assumption that
they would deploy overseas only in the latter stages of major combat
operations and would receive additional resources during a mobilization
phase. However, the Army National Guard's and Army Reserve's shift to more
of an operational role in response to the new security environment has led
to a situation in which the Army's traditional resourcing strategies for
managing personnel and equipment may no longer be in balance with how the
reserves are being used. Second, mobilization authorities, DOD's policies,
and Army deployment practices limit the number and duration of reservists'
deployments for ongoing operations so that the Army's reserve components
will be challenged to involuntarily mobilize and deploy large numbers of
personnel with needed skills. To provide deployable units for Iraq and
Afghanistan, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve have transferred
large numbers of uniformed personnel and equipment from nondeployed units
to deploying units. This approach has resulted in growing shortages among
nondeployed units. Equipment shortages have been further compounded
because DOD has required reserve units to leave large amounts of equipment
overseas for use by other forces, and much of this equipment has not been
replaced. As a result, the Army National Guard reports that units have
less than one-third of their required equipment, and the Army Reserve
currently reports that its units have about half of the modern equipment
they would need to deploy. In addition to creating potential risk to the
nation's ability to respond to unforeseen events overseas, Army National
Guard and Army Reserve equipment shortages could also adversely affect
reserve units' ability to perform homeland defense missions and provide
support to civil authorities in the event of natural disasters or
terrorist events. Moreover, under current policies, the Army is challenged
to identify and mobilize reserve personnel in some high-demand skills. We
have made recommendations to DOD intended to bring about a comprehensive
reassessment of equipment, personnel, training, and funding requirements
given the Army reserve components' shift to a more operational role.
However, DOD's progress in implementing these recommendations has been
limited. Unless such a comprehensive reassessment and rethinking of the
equipment and personnel policies is completed-in other words, unless DOD
reaches consensus on a new model for the reserves that matches policies
and resources with the Army reserve components' expected missions-DOD may
find itself ill prepared to deal with future events at home or abroad.

The Army has recently begun two major transformational initiatives that
are intended to improve the ability of Army Reserve and Army National
Guard units to respond to 21st century threats; however, the extent to
which these initiatives will help to alleviate personnel and equipment
challenges and enhance readiness is unclear. These initiatives include the
creation of modular units in the active and reserve components and the
creation of a new model to manage readiness and provide reservists with
more predictable deployment schedules. Although both these initiatives
have some merit from a conceptual standpoint, the Army faces significant
challenges in managing their costs, risks, and performance. Specifically,
the Army is making progress in transforming its division-based structure
to more easily deployable modular units, but it has not provided detailed
plans showing the extent to which DOD will be able to fund new equipment
required by modular units in the reserve components. The Army has budgeted
$21 billion to improve the Army National Guard's equipment and $3.8
billion for the Army Reserve over the next 5 years; however, it has not
yet provided detailed information about the types and amounts of equipment
it will buy or described the extent to which this funding will provide
equipment compatibility with the active component. Further, the Army has
not provided sufficient information with which DOD and congressional
decision makers can assess the capabilities, costs, affordability, and
risks of the Army's modular force implementation plans. Because the need
to equip units deploying overseas is likely to continue to take priority
over nondeployed units for equipment funds, reserve units are likely to
have shortfalls of some key equipment items well into the future. The
Army's second major initiative is the development of a force generation
model in which units' readiness for deployment would move through phases
of increasing readiness as they move closer to deployment eligibility-once
every 5 to 6 years for reserve forces. However, the Army has not yet
developed a transparent plan for national-level decision makers that
identifies the equipment, personnel, and training that will be required at
each phase of the model nor has it fully identified the resources it will
need to implement its plans. We reported in 2005 that the Army needs to
fully define how the reserve components will be integrated into its
modular force and rotational cycle, and although DOD agreed with our
recommendations, many questions remain about the risks inherent in the
Army's plans.1 Until the Army completes such plans and identifies funding
for its transformational initiatives, the reserve components' preparedness
for future overseas and domestic missions is not likely to increase and
may continue to erode. Moreover, unless the Army completes more detailed
implementation plans, decision makers will not have sufficient information
to assess both DOD's progress and performance in transforming the Army's
reserve components and whether investment decisions are being targeted to
the highest priority areas.

                                   Background

The Army has two reserve components, the Army National Guard and the Army
Reserve. Both reserve components are composed primarily of citizen
soldiers who balance the demands of civilian careers with military service
on a part-time basis. During the Cold War, it was expected that the
reserve forces would be a strategic reserve to supplement active forces in
the event of extended conflict. However, since the mid-1990s, the reserves
have been continuously mobilized to support operations worldwide,
including those in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq. In today's strategic environment, the Army's reserve components
have taken on a variety of different overseas missions as well as
traditional and emerging domestic missions.

1 GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard
Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force
Transformation Initiatives, GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2005)
and Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve
Personnel and Equipment Shortages, GAO-05-660 (Washington, D.C.: July 12,
2005).

The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are part of the total Army,
which also includes the active component. The Army organizes, trains, and
equips its reserve components to perform assigned missions. The Army
Reserve is a federal force that is organized and trained primarily to
supply specialized combat support and combat service support skills to
combat forces. The Army National Guard is composed of both combat forces
and units that supply support skills. The Army National Guard, when
mobilized for a federal mission, is under the command and control of the
President. When not mobilized for a federal mission, Army National Guard
units act under the control of the governors for state missions, typically
responding to natural disasters and more recently protecting state assets
from terrorist attacks. Using DOD planning guidance, the Army provides
reserve units varying levels of resources according to the priority
assigned to their federal warfighting missions.

Reserve forces may be involuntarily called to active duty under three
mobilization authorities. As shown in table 1, two authorities authorize
the President to involuntarily mobilize forces, but with size and time
limitations. Full mobilization, which would authorize the mobilization of
forces for as long as they are needed, requires a declaration by the
Congress. The Office of the Secretary of Defense implements the activation
of reservists.

Table 1: Mobilization Authorities for Reserve Forces

Statute                Provisions                                          
10 U.S.C. 12301(a)     Declared by Congress:                               
                                                                              
"Full Mobilization"    In time of war or national emergency                
                                                                              
                          No limit on numbers of soldiers called to active    
                          duty                                                
                                                                              
                          For duration of war plus 6 months                   
10 U.S.C. 12302        Declared by the President:                          
                                                                              
"Partial Mobilization" In time of national emergency                       
                                                                              
                          No more than 1,000,000 reservists can be on active  
                          duty                                                
                                                                              
                          No more than 24 consecutive months                  
10 U.S.C. 12304        Determined by the President:                        
                                                                              
"Presidential          To augment the active duty force for operational    
                          missions                                            
Reserve Call-up"                                                           
                          No more than 200,000 reservists can be on active    
                          duty                                                
                                                                              
                          No more than 270 days                               

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Code provisions.

On September 14, 2001, President Bush declared that a national emergency
existed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. On
September 20, 2001, DOD issued mobilization guidance that among other
things allowed the services to mobilize reservists for up to 24 cumulative
months under the President's partial mobilization authority. The Army's
current guidance is that soldiers should serve 12 months with their "boots
on the ground" in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and
Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, not including the time spent in
mobilization and demobilization activities, which could add several more
months to the time a reserve member spends on active duty.

Army Reserve Components Have Significant Equipment Shortages and Personnel
              Challenges That Hinder Readiness for Future Missions

The Army's reserve components have provided ready forces for ongoing
military operations since September 11, 2001, but personnel and equipment
challenges have led to declining readiness and hamper their ability to
prepare for future overseas and domestic missions. A resourcing structure
that is inconsistent with the reserve components' new operational role as
well as limiting mobilization policies and practices have led to equipment
and personnel shortages. These shortages have required nondeployed reserve
units to transfer equipment and personnel to deploying units, further
degrading readiness. In the absence of a major effort to reassess
equipment, personnel, and training requirements and policies, it will
become increasingly difficult for the Army reserve components to prepare
for future missions.

Reserve Components' Transfers of Equipment to Deploying Units and Equipment Left
Overseas Exacerbate Existing Shortages

Two major issues that have degraded the readiness of Army reserve forces
are (1) the transfers of equipment among units to deploy ready forces and
(2) the significant amounts of equipment reserve units have left overseas.
The resulting equipment shortages could adversely affect reserve units'
ability to contribute to overseas and homeland missions.

  Transferring Equipment to Ready Deploying Units Has Degraded Nondeployed
  Units' Equipment Inventories

The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve currently have shortages in
the equipment they need to train and deploy and, in the case of the Army
National Guard, to respond to domestic emergencies. As noted earlier,
equipment shortages exist because the Army, following DOD planning
guidance, has historically equipped Army units, including the Army reserve
components, according to a strategy known as tiered resourcing. Under the
tiered resourcing strategy, units expected to deploy overseas first in a
conflict, generally active combat units, receive first priority for
equipment. Following this approach, the Army accepted some operational
risk by providing lower-priority reserve units with less equipment than
they would need for their missions, under the assumption that there would
be time to provide additional equipment to them before they would be
deployed. For example, the Army National Guard's divisions, which
constitute the majority of its combat forces, have been maintained with
about 65 percent of the equipment they would need to perform their
missions. In addition, much Army reserve component equipment is older and
less modern than that of the active Army and is not always compatible with
active force logistics. The Army National Guard reports that units have
less than one-third of their required equipment, and the Army Reserve
currently reports that its units have about half of the modern equipment
they would need to deploy.

Despite this tiered resourcing structure, for recent operations, combatant
commanders have required Army National Guard and Army Reserve units to
deploy with 90 to 100 percent of the equipment they are expected to need
and with equipment that is compatible with that of active Army units. To
meet the combatant commander requirements for fully manned and equipped
units, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve have transferred
equipment to deploying units. For example, when Army National Guard's 30th
Brigade Combat Team from North Carolina was alerted to prepare to deploy
to Iraq in 2004, it had only about 40 percent of its deployment
requirement of about 8,810 night vision goggles. The Army National Guard
had to transfer about 5,272 pairs of goggles to fully equip the unit,
leaving other units with even fewer goggles available for training and
future missions. In another case, to support requirements for high-demand
military police skills during 2004 and 2005, the Army tasked the Army
National Guard to convert 40 non-military police units, including field
artillery companies, to security units capable of performing selected
military police missions in Iraq. While a military police company
typically has 47 humvees in its inventory, field artillery companies have
only about 3 humvees that are suitable for this new mission. The Army
National Guard had already depleted its inventory of armored humvees to
prepare units that had deployed previously, so the converted units had to
obtain armored humvees from other units already in Iraq.

While transferring equipment has enabled the Army National Guard and Army
Reserve to meet immediate needs, transfers have decreased the equipment
available to nondeployed units for training and other purposes. Early
transfers of equipment to deploying units created a cycle of additional ad
hoc transfers as reserve units that had provided equipment to deploying
forces were themselves alerted for mobilizations.

In 2004, we reported that as of May of that year, the Army National Guard
had transferred more than 35,000 pieces of equipment to ready units for
recent operations.2 We subsequently reported that by July 2005, the number
of equipment items transferred among Army National Guard units had grown
to more than 101,000.3 With respect to some equipment items, transfers of
equipment to deploying units have completely or almost completely
exhausted the inventories of many nondeployed Army National Guard units.
As of July 2005, the Army National Guard reported that equipment transfers
had largely exhausted its inventory of more than 220 critical items,
including some items useful to nondeployed units for training and domestic
missions. Among the items for which the Army National Guard had shortages
of over 80 percent of the authorized inventory were chemical warfare
monitoring and decontamination equipment and night vision goggles.

These continuing transfers have resulted in significant declines in the
amount of equipment available to nondeployed Army National Guard units
since the beginning of current overseas operations. As we previously
reported, the percentage of nondeployed units that reported having the
minimum amount of equipment they would need to deploy4 dropped from 87
percent in October 2002 to about 59 percent in May 2005. (See fig. 1.)
However, this estimate includes units that have older, less modern
equipment, referred to as substitute equipment. While these substitute
items may be useful for training purposes, commanders may not allow these
older items in the theater of operations because they may not be
compatible with the equipment other units are using and cannot be
sustained logistically overseas. In addition, this estimate includes units
that have equipment that is undergoing maintenance after returning from
deployment or was left overseas, so these items are not readily available
for use.

2 GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard
for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions, GAO-05-21 (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 10, 2004).

3 GAO-06-111 .

4 To meet minimum deployment criteria, a unit must generally have at least
80 percent of its mission-essential equipment on hand.

Figure 1: Percentage of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units Meeting
Minimum Equipment Criteria to Deploy

National Guard officials stated that the number of Army National Guard
units meeting the minimum criteria to deploy has continued to decline
since our last report. The National Guard Bureau estimates that when
substitute equipment items, equipment undergoing maintenance, and
equipment left overseas for follow-on forces are subtracted, its
nondeployed units had available only about 34 percent of essential
warfighting equipment as of July 2005. Senior National Guard officials now
estimate that the Army National Guard has less than 30 percent of its
essential warfighting equipment.

Like the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve is also facing problems
resulting from equipment transfers to deploying units. According to our
analysis, from September 2001 through April 2005, the Army Reserve
transferred about 236,000 pieces of equipment worth about $765 million to
fill equipment shortages among deploying units. The items most transferred
were (1) individual equipment, such as clothing and boots; (2) unit
equipment, such as tents, generators, and communications equipment; and
(3) weapons.

In the fiscal year 2007 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, the
Army Reserve reported that it had about 78 percent of the equipment it
requires, but about one-third of the equipment is obsolete and not
interoperable with the active Army. Therefore, the percentage of equipment
Army Reserve units have that is acceptable for deployment is lower than
the overall figure indicates. In addition, the Army Reserve has reported
that its equipment is aging more quickly than planned because of high use
and a harsh operational environment. Accordingly, the Army Reserve has
estimated that as much as 44 percent of its equipment needs servicing,
including equipment that has been returned from overseas. These shortfalls
in equipment that could be used to equip deploying forces or in training
for future missions challenge the Army Reserve's ability to train and
prepare units for future deployments.

  Requirement to Leave Significant Quantities of Equipment in Theater Has
  Further Decreased Equipment Available to Nondeployed Units

Compounding the degrading effect of equipment transfers on the equipment
available to nondeployed reserve component units has been the requirement
that units leave significant amounts of equipment in Afghanistan and Iraq
for follow-on forces. In July 2005, we reported that Army Reserve units
had been required to leave some equipment items, such as vehicles that
have had armor added to them, which exacerbated shortages in equipment
available for training.5 Moreover, in October 2005, we reported that the
Army National Guard estimated it had left more than 64,000 equipment items
valued at over $1.2 billion overseas since 2003 to be used to support
ongoing operations.6 For example, when the North Carolina 30th Brigade
Combat Team returned from its deployment to Iraq in 2005, it left 229
humvees, about 73 percent of its predeployment inventory of those
vehicles, for other units to use. Similarly, according to Army National
Guard officials, three Illinois National Guard units were required to
leave almost all of their humvees, about 130, in Iraq when they rotated
back from deployment. Moreover, we reported that the Army had not fully
accounted for this equipment and had not prepared plans to replace it as
required under DOD policy. DOD Directive 1225.6, Equipping the Reserve
Forces, issued April 7, 2005, requires a replacement plan for reserve
component equipment transferred to the active component for more than 90
days.7 However, according to Army officials, the Army did not initially
track the Army National Guard's equipment or prepare replacement plans in
the early phases of the war because the practice was intended to be a
short-term measure and there were other priorities. In addition, the Army
did not have a centralized process to track equipment and develop
replacement plans. Instead, transfers of equipment between units were only
documented at the unit level in unit property records. According to Army
and National Guard officials, the Army only planned to track certain
high-demand equipment items, such as armored humvees, that were designated
to remain in theater for the duration of the conflict. The National Guard
estimates untracked items, such as cargo trucks, rough terrain forklifts,
and palletized load trucks, to be about 45 percent of all the items its
units left overseas.

5 GAO-05-660 .

6 GAO-06-111 .

7 Replacement plans for removed equipment and supplies are not required
for transfers in support of force restructuring adopted as a result of
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process decisions approved
by the Secretary of Defense.

In May 2005, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs noted
that while the exact amount of equipment transferred between the reserve
and active components was unknown, overall the magnitude of these
transfers has been significant and was an area of concern. He requested
that the Army submit a replacement plan for all Army National Guard
equipment retained in theater by June 17, 2005. In October 2005, we
recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Army to prepare the
replacement plans required by DOD Directive 1225.6.8 The department agreed
with that recommendation, but the Army still has not completed plans for
replacing the majority of the equipment. As of June 2006, the Army had
developed some plans for replacement of Army National Guard equipment, but
only three plans, which only covered a portion of the equipment the Army
National Guard units left behind, had been approved.

  Equipment Shortages Could Adversely Affect Reserve Units' Ability to
  Contribute to Homeland Security Missions as Well as Overseas Missions

In addition to creating potential risk to the nation's ability to respond
to unforeseen events overseas, Army National Guard and Army Reserve
equipment shortages could also adversely affect reserve units' ability to
perform homeland defense missions and provide support to civil authorities
in the event of natural disasters or terrorist attacks. Until recently, it
has been assumed that the National Guard could perform its typical state
missions, such as storm relief and firefighting, with the equipment it had
on hand for its federal missions. However, with the heavy use of the Army
National Guard in the new security environment, this assumption may not be
a sound one, especially in the event of non-traditional threats, such as
chemical or biological attacks, or pandemic disease. Moreover, while DOD's
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the
U.S. Northern Command, which are charged with leading DOD's efforts in
homeland defense, have taken some actions to plan DOD's response to
potential threats, they have not completed developing requirements or
preparedness standards and measures for homeland missions in which the
National Guard may be likely to participate. We have previously reported
that some items, such as humvees, night vision goggles, and chemical
protective suits, which are in short supply among the Army National
Guard's nondeployed forces, may also be extremely useful for responding to
domestic events, including terrorism.9 Although planning for large-scale
events, whether natural or man-made, is not complete and requirements are
not fully known, it is likely that at a minimum, National Guard
forces-under control of the states or the President-will be involved in
responding to any large-scale threat or catastrophe. Hurricane Katrina,
which hit the Gulf Coast in August 2005, highlighted the Army National
Guard's and DOD's key roles in responding to catastrophic events as over
50,000 National Guard forces, as well as 20,000 additional active duty
military forces, participated in responding to the devastation the
hurricane left behind.10 We reported in May 2006 that many challenges that
the military faced during Katrina pointed to the need for better plans and
more robust exercises for disaster response and noted that without actions
to help address planning and exercise inadequacies, a lack of
understanding will continue to exist within the military and among
federal, state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and
capabilities that DOD might provide in response to a catastrophe; the
timing of this assistance; and the respective contributions of the active,
reserve, and National Guard forces.

8 GAO-06-111 .

Given the National Guard's role in responding to domestic emergencies, in
November 2004, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense (1) establish
the full range of the National Guard's homeland missions, including those
led by DOD and those conducted in support of civilian authorities; (2)
identify the National Guard's capabilities to perform these missions and
any shortfalls in personnel, equipment, and training that need to be
addressed to perform these missions successfully; (3) develop a plan to
address any shortfalls including identifying funding; and (4) establish
readiness standards and measures for the National Guard's homeland
security missions so that the readiness for these missions can be
systematically measured and accurately reported.11 DOD agreed with our
recommendations and is now taking a more active role in working with its
federal and state partners to improve its ability to respond to
catastrophic incidents. In addition, this year the Army has taken some
steps to provide equipment to National Guard units in hurricane-prone
states to temporarily improve their ability to respond to hurricanes.
Specifically, the Army transferred equipment, such as trucks, floodlights,
and night vision devices, from its active component units to National
Guard units. Further, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness has directed that the department begin tracking its readiness
for some domestic missions in the new Defense Readiness Reporting System.

9 GAO-06-111 .

10 GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).

Army National Guard and Army Reserve Face Significant Personnel Challenges,
Especially in Some Critical Skills

In addition to equipment shortages, other factors have negatively affected
Army's reserve components' personnel readiness: (1) the transfer of
personnel among units to deploy ready forces, (2) fewer full-time support
staff than authorized, and (3) the increasing difficulty of identifying
trained personnel available to deploy for future rotations.

  Personnel Transfers among Units to Support Deployments Have Led to Shortages
  in Nondeployed Units

Under tiered resourcing, Army National Guard and Army Reserve units have
generally been assigned fewer personnel than they require to perform their
assigned missions, under the assumption that the shortages could be filled
before the units would deploy. For example, the Army Reserve has been
assigned about 80 to 85 percent of its required personnel. Additionally,
some personnel assigned to units may not be deployable because of
unfulfilled training requirements or for personal reasons, such as family
situations or health reasons. However, for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the
combatant commander has required that Army National Guard and Army Reserve
units be deployed with 100 percent of the personnel they need for their
missions. Therefore, to fill shortages in deploying units to support the
first rotations of troops to Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, the
Army National Guard and the Army Reserve had to transfer personnel from
units that were not yet alerted to deploy. Initial transfers worsened
existing personnel shortages in non-mobilized units and increased the
numbers of personnel that had to be transferred when additional units were
subsequently mobilized. Moreover, transfers are continuing as reserve
personnel continue to be deployed to support ongoing rotations to Iraq.
Shortages of available personnel in non-mobilized units now limit their
ability to conduct training for future missions and will require them to
receive significant infusions of personnel from other units if they are
alerted for mobilization. Without a comprehensive reassessment of its
reserve staffing policies, the reserve components will have difficulty
improving readiness.

11 GAO-05-21 .

  Requirements for Full-time Personnel to Provide Support Have Not Been Fully
  Reassessed in Light of the Army's Reserve Components' Changing Role

Another significant challenge the Army National Guard and Army Reserve
face in continuing to provide support for ongoing operations is that they
have not been authorized all of the full-time support staff units need to
perform critical readiness duties at home. These personnel play a key role
in maintaining reserve component unit readiness and participating in
mobilization/deployment planning and preparation by performing the
day-to-day equipment maintenance, administrative, recruiting and
retention, and training tasks for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve
forces. However, in accordance with the Army's tiered resourcing strategy,
the Army's reserve components have not been authorized all the full-time
personnel they need to be fully manned. For example, based on a
pre-September 11, 2001, analysis, the Army Reserve identified a
requirement for about 38,000 full-time support personnel, which equates to
about 18.5 percent of the 205,000 members it is authorized by law.
However, the Army Reserve is only authorized about 26,350 full-time
support personnel, or about 68 percent of its requirement. The Army
National Guard was authorized full-time support equal to only 59 percent
of its full-time requirement, in contrast with the Air National Guard,
which is staffed at 100 percent of its required full-time support
personnel. In 2005, we recommended that the Army should reassess the Army
Reserve's requirement for full-time staffing support given its new
operational role, but such a reassessment has not yet been completed.12
Without sufficient full-time personnel, critical administrative,
maintenance, and training tasks may not be completed in a timely manner
and unit readiness may suffer.

  Identifying Trained Personnel Available to Deploy for Future Rotations Is
  Increasingly Difficult

As current operations have continued, under DOD's current policies, the
Army National Guard and Army Reserve will be challenged to involuntarily
mobilize and deploy large numbers of personnel with needed skills.
Reservists serving in Afghanistan and Iraq have been activated under a
partial mobilization authority that enables the secretary of a military
department to involuntarily mobilize reservists for up to 24 consecutive
months. Limitations imposed by DOD policies implementing the mobilization
authority have contributed to increasing difficulties in identifying
reserve personnel, especially personnel trained in some high-demand
skills, to fill ongoing requirements.

12 GAO-05-660 .

Some of the skills in highest demand for current operations are the combat
support and combat service support skills that reside heavily or primarily
in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve-sometimes in small numbers of
critical personnel. Skills that are in high demand include military
police, engineering, and civil affairs. Because so many of the Army
reservists in these skills areas have already been deployed and are not
eligible for future deployment under current policies, DOD has developed
strategies, such as reassigning and retraining personnel from within the
Army and the other services according to Army doctrine, to fill combatant
commander requirements. While new recruits are constantly entering the
Army Reserve and National Guard, training them with specialized skills,
such as intelligence analysis, takes time.

As we reported earlier this month, there are various options that DOD can
consider to make more reserve personnel available for future rotations
overseas, such as reconsidering its policy of involuntarily activating
reservists only once for current operations, changing deployment
durations, and transferring more positions to high-demand areas.13 Each of
these options has both advantages and disadvantages. However, DOD has not
conducted a comprehensive, data-driven analysis of its options. Without
such an analysis, DOD will be challenged to plan effectively for future
requirements. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress will not
have complete information on which to base decisions about the size and
composition of the force, mobilization and deployment policies, and other
issues.

13 GAO, Force Structure: DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force
Identification Process and Examine Options to Meet Requirements for
High-Demand Support Forces, GAO-06-962 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 2006).

 Two Major Army Transformation Initiatives Are Under Way, But Effect On Reserve
                         Component Readiness Is Unclear

The Army has two major initiatives-the creation of modular units and
development of a force generation model to provide more predictability to
unit rotations-that are intended to enhance the ability of both active and
reserve units to conduct 21st century operations; however, implementation
plans for these initiatives are still evolving, funding plans lack
sufficient details and could change, and the risks associated with the
initiatives have not been clearly identified. As a result, the potential
impact of these initiatives on the reserve components' sustainability as
part of a 21st century operational force is very uncertain. Further
details about how both these initiatives will work are critical so that
national decision makers can make accurate assessments, manage risk, and
ensure that the initiatives will result in a sustainable model for the
reserves that will provide adequate levels of readiness commensurate with
expected roles and missions of the Army National Guard and Reserves.

Army's Plans to Transform Its Forces into Modular Brigades Face Significant
Personnel and Equipment Challenges

The Army considers its modular force transformation the most extensive
restructuring it has undertaken since World War II. Restructuring the Army
from a division-based force to a force of modular brigades that are
intended to be more rapidly deployable and better able to conduct joint
operations will require extensive investments in equipment and retraining
of personnel. The Army currently estimates this initiative will cost $52.5
billion, including $41 billion for new equipment. These funds are intended
to cover the costs for equipping, training, and procuring new facilities
for active, reserve, and National Guard units-including those designed for
combat, support, and headquarters functions. The Army estimated in June
2005 that it would cost about $15.6 billion to convert the Army National
Guard's units.

We have given testimony that although the Army is making progress in
creating modular units, it faces significant challenges in managing costs
and meeting equipment and personnel requirements associated with modular
restructuring in both the active and reserve components.14 Specifically,
we have noted that it is not clear to what extent the Army can achieve the
expected capabilities of the new modular units within its cost estimate
and planned time frames for completing unit conversions. As of April 2006,
the Army had not met its near-term equipping goals for its active modular
combat brigades, which have traditionally been equipped at a higher level
than most reserve component units. In both the active component and Army
National Guard, combat brigades will initially lack some of the key
equipment that Army force design analyses determined were essential for
achieving their planned capabilities. This will occur because the Army's
plans to fund new equipment for its modular force do not match the
schedule for converting units to new modular organizational designs.

14 GAO, Force Structure: Capabilities and Cost of Army Modular Force
Remain Uncertain, GAO-06-548T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006).

In addition, we have also reported that the Army will face greater
challenges in meeting its modular equipping requirements for its 28
planned National Guard combat brigades.15 Army National Guard and Army
Reserve units will start their modular conversions with less and much
older equipment than most active units. This will add to the challenge the
Army faces in achieving its plans and timelines for equipping Army
National Guard units at comparable levels to active units. The Army plans
to spend a total of $21 billion cumulatively over the next few years on
Army National Guard equipment and $3.8 billion on Army Reserve equipment.
However, Army National Guard officials believe that even after the Army's
planned investment, the Army National Guard will have to accept risk in
certain equipment, such as tactical wheeled vehicles, aircraft, and force
protection equipment.

In the near term, modular conversions will likely exacerbate current
equipment shortfalls in the Army National Guard. First, according to
current Army plans, the units are expected to convert to their new designs
with the equipment they have on hand. However, because of existing
shortages and the large number of equipment items that deployed units left
in Iraq or that need repair or replacement because of heavy use, units
will not have equipment needed for the Army's modular unit designs. For
example, converted Army National Guard units initially expect to be
without some equipment items that provide the basis for the improved
capability of the new brigades, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, single
channel ground and airborne radio systems, and Javelin antitank missiles.
Second, although most Army National Guard units are scheduled to be
reorganized by 2008, the Army has not planned funding to provide equipment
to the units until 2011 at the earliest, and equipment for ongoing
operations may continue to take priority away from replacing equipment of
nondeployed units. The lack of detailed plans for equipping Army National
Guard units makes it difficult to determine how the Army intends to
transition these units from the old to the new organizational structure
effectively.

15 GAO-06-548T .

Moreover, our work highlighted several limitations to the Army's cost
estimate for Army National Guard modular force conversions.16 First, the
estimate was based on a unit design that is less modern than one the Army
plans to use in the near term. Second, the estimate does not include costs
for 10 of the Army National Guard's support units or military construction
costs associated with its 40 support units. Furthermore, the cost
estimates assume that Army National Guard equipment inventories will be at
prewar levels and available for modular conversions, which may not be a
reasonable assumption given the large amounts of equipment that units have
left overseas for which replacement plans have not yet been developed.
Supplemental funds for repairing and replacing equipment worn out overseas
could help improve reserve equipment levels; however, the amount and
duration of the funding that might be allocated to the reserve components
is uncertain.

Equipping and Personnel Levels Associated with Army's Force Generation Model Are
Unclear

The Army has adopted a new force generation model that is intended to
improve units' readiness over time as they move through phased training to
prepare for a potential deployment window that would occur once every 5 to
6 years for reserve component units. The early phases of the cycle would
entail formation and staffing of the unit and beginning individual and
collective training. Figure 2 illustrates the movement of units through
reset and train, ready, and available phases.

16 GAO-06-548T .

Figure 2: Army Proposed Force Generation Model

*The Army's force rotation model proposes that active component units in
the Available phase will be available for deployment 1 year in every 3
years, and reserve component units will be available for deployment 1 year
in every 6 years.

According to Army officials, providing units increasing amounts of
equipment as they move through the phases of the model will enable the
Army to better allocate available equipment and help manage risks
associated with specific equipment shortages. Under this model, three
types of equipment sets-a baseline set, a training set, and a deployment
set-would be provided to units as they progress through the cycle. The
baseline set would vary by unit type and assigned mission and the
equipment it includes could be significantly reduced from the amount
called for in the modular brigade design. Training sets would include more
of the equipment units need to be ready for deployment, but the equipment
would be located at training sites throughout the country and units would
not have immediate access to the equipment. The deployment set would
include all equipment needed for deployment, including theater-specific
equipment. With this cyclical equipping approach, the Army believes it can
have up to 14 active combat brigades and up to 5 Army National Guard
combat brigades equipped and mission ready at any time.

The Army has developed a general proposal to equip both active and reserve
units according to the readiness requirements of each phase of the force
generation model, but it has not yet fully determined equipping
requirements for units as they progress through the rotational cycles.
Specifically, plans do not yet detail the types and quantities of items
required in each phase, and the levels of equipment the deploying and
non-deploying units would receive are currently not clear. Therefore, it
is difficult to assess the risks or the ability of units in the earlier
stages of the cycle to respond to unforeseen crises overseas or
domestically, if required. Such unforeseen crises could include both
events overseas requiring a U.S. military response or domestic events,
such as large-scale natural disasters or terrorist attacks. In either
case, reserve units may be expected to contribute units to conduct
homeland defense missions or to support civilian authorities. Although the
Army has recently worked with the Army National Guard to assess equipment
needs for some homeland security scenarios, it is not clear whether Army
National Guard units will have sufficient quantities of such equipment
during the early phases of the Army's force generation model to respond
effectively under each scenario. Further, because the requirements for the
military to support civilian authorities in a national crisis have not
been determined, there is no yardstick for measuring how ready nondeployed
forces are to respond to these potential emergencies.

In 2005 we recommended that the Army define the end state of the units,
personnel, skills, and equipment the Army reserve components would need to
fit into the Army's modular force and rotational cycle.17 Although DOD
agreed with our recommendations, many questions remain about the risks
inherent in the Army's plans. The Army has developed, and continues to
refine, a plan that will guide the implementation of its modular unit
designs and force generation model. However, to date, the plan has not
contained the level of detail needed to define the types and numbers of
units that will be required, the process for coordinating the
implementation steps of these two initiatives, or the funding streams
needed to fully implement them. Until this information is developed, it
will not be possible to assess the implementation risks and determine
whether the proposed changes will provide the desired objectives of a more
capable, flexible, and expeditionary force with reserve components fully
ready for deployments no more than once in 5 or 6 years.

                            Concluding Observations

While strategies such as transferring large numbers of Army reserve
component equipment and personnel from non-deploying units to deploying
units and leaving reserve component equipment overseas have met DOD's
immediate needs to support overseas operations, these strategies are not
sustainable over the long term. Growing equipment and personnel shortages
in nondeployed units are symptoms of an outdated model for balancing
reserve unit capabilities, costs, and risks. While DOD's strategies for
supporting Army reserve component units during the Cold War may have been
appropriate to that era, significant changes in the national security
environment have led to greater use of the Army reserve components on an
ongoing basis and spurred the need for a comprehensive reassessment of
reserve component equipping, personnel, and training policies. In the
absence of a comprehensive reassessment and development of a new model
that matches requirements and resources with expected roles and missions,
trends toward declining equipment and personnel readiness could persist
well into the future and Army reserve component units may not be as well
prepared for future overseas and homeland security missions as expected.
For example, at a time when threats to the nation from terrorist attacks
have increased, the Army National Guard has less equipment than it did in
2002 with which to respond to natural or man-made events that could
potentially be catastrophic. Although DOD and the Army have some
initiatives under way to enhance Army reserve component readiness, they
have not yet fully developed a comprehensive model for managing personnel,
equipment, and training in light of the Army reserve components' new
operational role.

17 GAO-05-660 and GAO-06-111 .

The Army's key initiatives of building a modular force and establishing a
cyclical force generation model represent important changes in how the
reserve components will be organized and will operate in the future.
However, many questions remain about how these initiatives will affect
reserve component readiness. Until the Army develops a more detailed
implementation plan that identifies equipment, personnel, and training
requirements that are consistent with the Army reserve components' new
operational roles, and until funding requirements to provide an acceptable
and affordable level of readiness are identified, the Army's reserve
components will continue to be challenged to support ongoing operations or
prepare for the future. Moreover, until the details of such a plan are
communicated to a broader audience, national-level decision makers will
not have sufficient information with which to assess DOD's progress and
performance in transforming the Army reserve components.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond
to any questions you or other members of the Commission may have.

                          Contact and Acknowledgments

For more information regarding this testimony, please contact Janet St.
Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or [email protected] . Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this testimony. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony include Margaret Morgan, Assistant Director; Alissa Czyz; Paul
Gvoth; Nicole Harms; Catherine Humphries; David Marroni; Terry Richardson;
John Van Schaik; and Suzanne Wren.

Related GAO Products

Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility
Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans. GAO-06-745
. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006.

Force Structure: DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force Identification
Process and Examine Options to Meet Requirements for High-Demand Support
Forces. GAO-06-962 . Washington, D.C.: September 5, 2006.

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643 .
Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006.

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment
Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T . Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2005.

Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment
Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation
Initiatives. GAO-06-111 . Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2005.

Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of
Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force. GAO-05-926 . Washington,
D.C.: September 29, 2005.

Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve
Personnel and Equipment Shortages. GAO-05-660 . Washington, D.C.: July 12,
2005.

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for
Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. GAO-05-21 . Washington D.C.:
November 10, 2004.

Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas and
Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T . Washington, D.C.:
April 29, 2004.

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for
Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670 . Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003.

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Highlights of GAO-06-1109T , a testimony before the Commission on the
National Guard and Reserves

September 21, 2006

RESERVE FORCES

Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st Century Challenges

Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the deployment of
large numbers of Army National Guard and Army Reserve personnel. The
Department of Defense (DOD) faces the unprecedented challenge of
sustaining large-scale, long-duration operations with an all-volunteer
military force. In addition, DOD`s homeland defense missions have taken on
higher priority, and National Guard forces have state responsibilities for
homeland security activities as well as their traditional roles in
responding to natural disasters. Over the past few years, GAO has examined
the effects of ongoing military operations and domestic missions on the
Army National Guard and Army Reserve.

This statement, which draws on prior GAO work, focuses on

(1) challenges in sustaining Army reserve component equipment and
personnel readiness while supporting ongoing operations and (2) the extent
to which the Army's planned transformation initiatives will alleviate
equipment and personnel shortages and enhance readiness.

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have made significant
contributions to ongoing military operations, but equipment shortages and
personnel challenges have increased and, if left unattended, may hamper
the reserves' preparedness for future overseas and domestic missions. To
provide deployable units, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve
have transferred large quantities of personnel and equipment to deploying
units, an approach that has resulted in growing shortages in nondeployed
units. Also, reserve units have left significant quantities of equipment
overseas and DOD has not yet developed plans to replace it. The Army
National Guard reports that its units have less than one-third of their
required equipment, and the Army Reserve reports that its units have about
half of the modern equipment they need to deploy. These shortages could
also adversely affect reserve units' ability to perform homeland defense
missions and provide support to civil authorities in the event of natural
disasters or terrorist attacks. The Army also faces shortages of personnel
trained in some high-demand skills. These readiness challenges have
occurred because the Army reserve components' role has shifted from a
strategic reserve force to an operational force that is being used on an
ongoing basis. However, DOD has not fully reassessed its equipment,
personnel, and training needs and developed a new model for the reserves
appropriate to the new strategic environment. GAO has made recommendations
that DOD conduct a comprehensive reassessment of equipment, personnel,
training, and funding requirements given the reserve components' shift to
an operational role, but DOD's progress to date in addressing them has
been limited. Without a comprehensive reassessment of equipment and
personnel policies, the Army's reserve components may not be well prepared
to deal with future events at home or abroad.

The Army has begun two transformational initiatives intended to enhance
reserve units' ability to conduct 21st century operations and plans to
spend over $24 billion for equipment over the next 5 years. These
initiatives are significant, but the extent to which they will alleviate
equipment and personnel challenges is unclear. The Army faces challenges
in managing both initiatives' costs and achieving intended capabilities.
First, although the Army is making progress in transforming its forces to
more flexible modular units, it has not provided detailed information on
the capabilities, costs, and risks of its plans, and reserve units are
likely to lack some key equipment items well into the future. Second, the
Army is implementing a force generation model through which reserve units'
readiness will be increased as units move closer to eligibility for
deployment. However, the Army has not fully determined the equipment,
personnel, and training that units will require at each stage of the cycle
or fully identified the resources to implement its plans. Without detailed
implementation plans, decision makers will not have sufficient information
with which to assess both DOD's progress and performance in transforming
the Army reserve components and whether investment decisions are being
targeted to the highest priority areas.
*** End of document. ***