Internet Infrastructure: Challenges in Developing a		 
Public/Private Recovery Plan (13-SEP-06, GAO-06-1100T). 	 
                                                                 
Since the early 1990s, growth in the use of the Internet has	 
revolutionized the way that our nation communicates and conducts 
business. While the Internet originated as a U.S.		 
government-sponsored research project, the vast majority of its  
infrastructure is currently owned and operated by the private	 
sector. Federal policy recognizes the need to prepare for	 
debilitating Internet disruptions and tasks the Department of	 
Homeland Security (DHS) with developing an integrated		 
public/private plan for Internet recovery. GAO was asked to	 
summarize its report--Internet Infrastructure: DHS Faces	 
Challenges in Developing a Joint Public/Private Recovery Plan,	 
GAO-06-672 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006). This report (1)	 
identifies examples of major disruptions to the Internet, (2)	 
identifies the primary laws and regulations governing recovery of
the Internet in the event of a major disruption, (3) evaluates	 
DHS plans for facilitating recovery from Internet disruptions,	 
and (4) assesses challenges to such efforts.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-1100T					        
    ACCNO:   A60830						        
  TITLE:     Internet Infrastructure: Challenges in Developing a      
Public/Private Recovery Plan					 
     DATE:   09/13/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Continuity of operations plan			 
	     Critical infrastructure				 
	     Critical infrastructure protection 		 
	     Disaster planning					 
	     Disaster recovery					 
	     Disaster recovery plans				 
	     E-government					 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Federal law					 
	     Federal legislation				 
	     Internet						 
	     IT contingency plans				 
	     IT legislation					 
	     Public/private partnerships			 
	     National Communications System			 

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GAO-06-1100T

     

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                 United States Government Accountability Office

Testimony before the Subcommittee on

GAO

  Telecommunications and the Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce

For Release on Delivery                                                    
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT     
Wednesday, September 13, 2006  INTERNET
                                  INFRASTRUCTURE                              
                                  Challenges in Developing a Public/Private   
                                  Recovery Plan                               
                                  Statement of David A. Powner Director,      
                                  Information Technology Management Issues    
                                  Keith A. Rhodes Chief Technologist          
                                  Director, Center for Technology and         
                                  Engineering                                 

GAO-06-1100T

INTERNET INFRASTRUCTURE

            Challenges in Developing a Public/Private Recovery Plan

What GAO Found

A major disruption to the Internet could be caused by a physical incident
(such as a natural disaster or an attack that affects key facilities), a
cyber incident (such as a software malfunction or a malicious virus), or a
combination of both physical and cyber incidents. Recent physical and
cyber incidents, such as Hurricane Katrina, have caused localized or
regional disruptions but have not caused a catastrophic Internet failure.

Federal laws and regulations that address critical infrastructure
protection, disaster recovery, and the telecommunications infrastructure
provide broad guidance that applies to the Internet, but it is not clear
how useful these authorities would be in helping to recover from a major
Internet disruption. Specifically, key legislation on critical
infrastructure protection does not address roles and responsibilities in
the event of an Internet disruption. Other laws and regulations governing
disaster response and emergency communications have never been used for
Internet recovery.

DHS has begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility for
developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery, but
these efforts are not complete or comprehensive. Specifically, DHS has
developed high-level plans for infrastructure protection and incident
response, but the components of these plans that address the Internet
infrastructure are not complete. In addition, the department has started a
variety of initiatives to improve the nation's ability to recover from
Internet disruptions, including working groups to facilitate coordination
and exercises in which government and private industry practice responding
to cyber events. However, progress to date on these initiatives has been
limited, and other initiatives lack time frames for completion. Also, the
relationships among these initiatives are not evident. As a result, the
government is not yet adequately prepared to effectively coordinate
public/private plans for recovering from a major Internet disruption.

Key challenges to establishing a plan for recovering from Internet
disruptions include (1) innate characteristics of the Internet that make
planning for and responding to disruptions difficult, (2) lack of
consensus on DHS's role and when the department should get involved in
responding to a disruption, (3) legal issues affecting DHS's ability to
provide assistance to restore Internet service, (4) reluctance of many in
the private sector to share information on Internet disruptions with DHS,
and (5) leadership and organizational uncertainties within DHS. Until
these challenges are addressed, DHS will have difficulty achieving results
in its role as a focal point for helping the Internet to recover from a
major disruption.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to summarize our previously issued report on
public/private recovery plans for Internet infrastructure. Since the early
1990s, increasing computer interconnectivity-most notably growth in the
use of the Internet-has revolutionized the way that our government, our
nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct business. Our
country has come to rely on the Internet as a critical infrastructure
supporting commerce, education, and communication. While the benefits of
this technology have been enormous, this widespread interconnectivity
poses significant risks to the government's and our nation's computer
systems and, more importantly, to the critical operations and
infrastructures they support.

Federal regulation establishes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
as the focal point for the security of cyberspace-including recovery
efforts for public and private critical infrastructure systems.1
Additionally, federal policy recognizes the need to be prepared for the
possibility of debilitating Internet disruptions and tasks DHS with
developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery.2 Last
year, we testified before the Senate on DHS's responsibilities for
cybersecurity-related critical infrastructure protection.3 In that
testimony, we discussed the status of DHS's efforts and challenges faced
by DHS in fulfilling its responsibilities. We reported that DHS had much
work ahead of it. In a related report, we recommended that DHS prioritize
cybersecurity-related responsibilities-including establishing recovery
plans for key Internet functions.4

1

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (Dec. 17, 2003).

2The White House, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Washington D.C.:
February 2003).

3

GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Addressing
Cybersecurity, GAO- 05-827T (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2005).

4GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security
Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities, GAO-05-434
(Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005).

                                Results in Brief

In June 2006, we issued a report that (1) identifies examples of major
disruptions to the Internet, (2) identifies the primary laws and
regulations governing recovery of the Internet in the event of a major
disruption, (3) evaluates DHS's plans for facilitating recovery from
Internet disruptions, and (4) assesses challenges to such efforts.5 The
report includes matters for congressional consideration and
recommendations to DHS for improving Internet recovery efforts.

As requested, this testimony summarizes our June 2006 report. That report
contains a detailed overview of our scope and methodology. As we stated in
our report, all supporting work was performed in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief

A major disruption to the Internet could be caused by a physical incident
(such as a natural disaster or an attack that affects facilities and other
assets), by a cyber incident (such as a software malfunction or a
malicious virus), or by a combination of both physical and cyber
incidents. Recent physical and cyber incidents have caused localized or
regional disruptions, highlighting the importance of recovery planning.
For example, a 2002 root server attack highlighted the need to plan for
increased server capacity at Internet exchange points in order to manage
the high volumes of data traffic during an attack. However, recent
incidents have also shown the Internet as a whole to be flexible and
resilient. Even in severe circumstances, the Internet did not suffer a
catastrophic failure. Nevertheless, it is possible that a complex attack
or set of attacks could cause the Internet to fail. It is also possible
that a series of attacks against the Internet could undermine users' trust
and thereby reduce the Internet's utility.

Several federal laws and regulations provide broad guidance that applies
to the Internet, but it is not clear how useful these

5

GAO, Internet Infrastructure: DHS Faces Challenges in Developing a Joint
Public/Private Recovery Plan, GAO-06-672 (Washington, D.C.: June 16,
2006).

Page 2

authorities would be in helping to recover from a major Internet
disruption. Specifically, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 7 provide guidance on protecting our
nation's critical infrastructures. However, they do not specifically
address roles and responsibilities in the event of an Internet disruption.
The Defense Production Act and the Stafford Act provide authority to
federal agencies to plan for and respond to incidents of national
significance like disasters and terrorist attacks. However, the Defense
Production Act has never been used for Internet recovery. In addition, the
Stafford Act does not authorize the provision of resources to for-profit
companies such as those that own and operate core Internet components. The
Communications Act of 1934 and National Communication System authorities
govern the telecommunications infrastructure and help ensure
communications during national emergencies, but they have never been used
for Internet recovery either. Thus, it is not clear how effective these
laws and regulations would be in assisting Internet recovery.

DHS has begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility to
develop an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery, but these
efforts are not yet comprehensive or complete. Specifically, DHS has
developed high-level plans for infrastructure protection and incident
response, but the components of these plans that address the Internet
infrastructure are not complete. In addition, DHS has started a variety of
initiatives to improve the nation's ability to recover from Internet
disruptions, including working groups to facilitate coordination and
exercises in which government and private industry practice responding to
cyber events. However, progress to date on these initiatives has been
limited, and other initiatives lack timeframes for completion. Also, the
relationships among these initiatives are not evident. As a result, the
risk remains that the government is not yet adequately prepared to
effectively coordinate public/private plans for recovering from a major
Internet disruption.

Key challenges to establishing a plan for recovering from Internet
disruption include (1) innate characteristics of the Internet (such as the
diffuse control of the many networks that make up the Internet and the
private-sector ownership of core components) that make

                                   Background

planning for and responding to disruptions difficult, (2) lack of
consensus on DHS's role and when the department should get involved in
responding to a disruption, (3) legal issues affecting DHS's ability to
provide assistance to entities working to restore Internet service, (4)
reluctance of many in the private sector to share information on Internet
disruptions with DHS, and (5) leadership and organizational uncertainties
within DHS. Until these challenges are addressed, DHS will have difficulty
achieving results in its role as a focal point for helping to recover the
Internet from a major disruption.

Given the importance of the Internet infrastructure to our nation's
communications and commerce, we suggested in our report, that Congress
consider clarifying the legal framework guiding Internet recovery.6 We
also made recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security to
strengthen the department's ability to serve effectively as a focal point
for helping to recover from Internet disruptions by establishing clear
milestones for completing key plans, coordinating various Internet
recovery-related activities, and addressing key challenges to Internet
recovery planning. In written comments, DHS agreed with our
recommendations and provided information on initial activities it was
taking to implement them.

Background

The Internet is a vast network of interconnected networks that is used by
governments, businesses, research institutions, and individuals around the
world to communicate, engage in commerce, do research, educate, and
entertain. From its origins in the 1960s as a research project sponsored
by the U.S. government, the Internet has grown increasingly important to
both American and foreign businesses and consumers, serving as the medium
for hundreds of billions of dollars of commerce each year. The Internet
has also become an extended information and communications infrastructure,
supporting vital services such as power distribution, health care, law
enforcement, and national defense. Today, private

6 GAO-06-672.

industry-including telecommunications companies, cable companies, and
Internet service providers-owns and operates the vast majority of the
Internet's infrastructure. In recent years, cyber attacks involving
malicious software or hacking have been increasing in frequency and
complexity. These attacks can come from a variety of actors, including
criminal groups, hackers, and terrorists.

Federal regulation recognizes the need to protect critical infrastructures
such as the Internet. It directs federal departments and agencies to
identify and prioritize critical infrastructure sectors and key resources
and to protect them from terrorist attack. Furthermore, it recognizes that
since a large portion of these critical infrastructures is owned and
operated by the private sector, a public/private partnership is crucial
for the successful protection of these critical infrastructures. Federal
policy also recognizes the need to be prepared for the possibility of
debilitating disruptions in cyberspace and, because the vast majority of
the Internet infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector,
tasks DHS with developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet
recovery. In its plan for protecting critical infrastructures, DHS
recognizes that the Internet is a key resource composed of assets within
both the information technology and the telecommunications sectors.7 It
notes that the Internet is used by all critical infrastructure sectors to
varying degrees and provides information and communications to meet the
needs of businesses and government.

In the event of a major Internet disruption, multiple organizations could
help recover Internet service. These organizations include private
industry, collaborative groups, and government organizations. Private
industry is central to Internet recovery because private companies own the
vast majority of the Internet's infrastructure and often have response
plans. Collaborative groups-including working groups and industry
councils-provide information-sharing mechanisms to allow private
organizations to

DHS, The National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

restore services. In addition, government initiatives could facilitate
response to major Internet disruptions.

Federal policies and plans8 assign DHS lead responsibility for
facilitating a public/private response to and recovery from major Internet
disruptions. Within DHS, responsibilities reside in two divisions within
the Preparedness Directorate: the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD)
and the National Communications System (NCS). NCSD operates the U.S.
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), which coordinates defense
against and response to cyber attacks. The other division, NCS, provides
programs and services that assure the resilience of the telecommunications
infrastructure in times of crisis. Additionally, the Federal
Communications Commission can support Internet recovery by coordinating
resources for restoring the basic communications infrastructures over
which Internet services run. For example, after Hurricane Katrina, the
commission granted temporary authority for private companies to set up
wireless Internet communications supporting various relief groups;
federal, state, and local government agencies; businesses; and victims in
the disaster areas.

Prior evaluations of DHS's cybersecurity responsibilities have highlighted
issues and challenges facing the department. In May 2005, we issued a
report on DHS's efforts to fulfill its cybersecurity responsibilities.9 We
noted that while DHS had initiated multiple efforts to fulfill its
responsibilities, it had not fully addressed any of the 13 key
cybersecurity responsibilities noted in federal law and policy. We also
reported that DHS faced a number of challenges that have impeded its
ability to fulfill its cyber responsibilities. These challenges included
achieving organizational stability, gaining organizational authority,
overcoming hiring and contracting issues, increasing awareness of
cybersecurity roles and capabilities, establishing effective partnerships
with stakeholders, achieving twoway information sharing with stakeholders,
and demonstrating the

8These include the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, the interim
National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the Cyber Incident Annex to the
National Response Plan, and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7.

9 GAO-05-434.

Page 6

value that DHS can provide. In this report, we also made recommendations
to improve DHS's ability to fulfill its mission as an effective focal
point for cybersecurity, including recovery plans for key Internet
functions. DHS agreed that strengthening cybersecurity is central to
protecting the nation's critical infrastructures and that much remained to
be done, but it has not yet addressed our recommendations.

Although Cyber and Physical Incidents Have Caused Disruptions, the Internet Has
                    Not Yet Suffered a Catastrophic Failure

The Internet's infrastructure is vulnerable to disruptions in service due
to terrorist and other malicious attacks, natural disasters, accidents,
technological problems, or a combination of the above. Disruptions to
Internet service can be caused by cyber and physical incidents-both
intentional and unintentional. Recent physical and cyber incidents have
caused localized or regional disruptions, highlighting the importance of
recovery planning. However, these incidents have also shown the Internet
as a whole to be flexible and resilient. Even in severe circumstances, the
Internet has not yet suffered a catastrophic failure.

To date, cyber attacks have caused various degrees of damage. For example,
in 2001, the Code Red worm used a denial-of-service attack to affect
millions of computer users by shutting down Web sites, slowing Internet
service, and disrupting business and government operations. In 2003, the
Slammer worm caused network outages, canceled airline flights, and
automated teller machine failures. Slammer resulted in temporary loss of
Internet access to some users, and cost estimates on the impact of the
worm range from $1.05 billion to $1.25 billion. The federal government
coordinated with security companies and Internet service providers and
released an advisory recommending that federal departments and agencies
patch and block access to the affected channel. However, because the worm
had propagated so quickly, most of these activities occurred after it had
stopped spreading.

In 2002, a coordinated denial-of-service attack was launched against all
of the root servers in the Domain Name System. At least nine of the
thirteen root servers experienced degradation of service. However, average
end users hardly noticed the attack. The attack became visible only as a
result of various Internet health-monitoring projects. The response to the
attacks was handled by the server operators and their service providers.
The attack pointed to a need for increased capacity for servers at
Internet exchange points to enable them to manage the high volumes of data
traffic during an attack. If a massive disruptive attack on the domain
name server system were successful, it could take several days to recover
from. According to experts familiar with the attack, the government did
not have a role in recovering from it.

Like cyber incidents, physical incidents could affect various aspects of
the Internet infrastructure, including underground or undersea cables and
facilities that house telecommunications equipment, Internet exchange
points, or Internet service providers. For example, on July 18, 2001, a
60-car freight train derailed in a Baltimore tunnel, causing a fire that
interrupted Internet and data services between Washington and New York.
The tunnel housed fiber-optic cables serving seven of the biggest U.S.
Internet service providers. The fire burned and severed fiber optic
cables, causing backbone slowdowns for at least three major Internet
service providers. Efforts to recover Internet service were handled by the
affected Internet service providers; however, local and federal officials
responded to the immediate physical issues of extinguishing the fire and
maintaining safety in the surrounding area, and they worked with
telecommunications companies to reroute affected cables.

In addition, Hurricane Katrina caused substantial destruction of the
communications infrastructure in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, but
it had minimal affect on the overall functioning of the Internet outside
of the immediate area. According to an Internet monitoring service
provider, while there was a loss of routing around the affected area,
there was no significant impact on global Internet routing. According to
the Federal Communications Commission, the storm caused outages for over 3
million telephone customers, 38 emergency 9-1-1 call centers, hundreds of
thousands of cable customers, and over 1,000 cellular sites. However, a
substantial number of the networks that experienced service disruptions
recovered relatively quickly.

Federal officials stated that the government took steps to respond to the
hurricane, such as increasing analysis and watch services in the affected
area, coordinating with communications companies to move personnel to
safety, working with fuel and equipment providers, and rerouting
communications traffic away from affected areas. However, private-sector
representatives stated that requests for assistance, such as food, water,
fuel, and secure access to facilities were denied for legal reasons; the
government made timeconsuming and duplicative requests for information;
and certain government actions impeded recovery efforts.

Since its inception, the Internet has experienced disruptions of varying
scale-including fast-spreading worms, denial-of-service attacks, and
physical destruction of key infrastructure components-but the Internet has
yet to experience a catastrophic failure. However, it is possible that a
complex attack or set of attacks could cause the Internet to fail. It is
also possible that a series of attacks against the Internet could
undermine users' trust and thereby reduce the Internet's utility.

Existing Laws and Regulations Apply to the Internet, but Numerous Uncertainties
                   Exist in Using Them for Internet Recovery

Several federal laws and regulations provide broad guidance that applies
to the Internet infrastructure, but it is not clear how useful these
authorities would be in helping to recover from a major Internet
disruption because some do not specifically address Internet recovery and
others have seldom been used. Pertinent laws and regulations address
critical infrastructure protection, federal disaster response, and the
telecommunications infrastructure.

Specifically, the Homeland Security Act of 200210 and Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 711 establish critical infrastructure

10

     The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.107-296 (Nov. 25, 2002).

protection as a national goal and describe a strategy for cooperative
efforts by the government and the private sector to protect the physical
and cyber-based systems that are essential to the operations of the
economy and the government. These authorities apply to the Internet
because it is a core communications infrastructure supporting the
information technology and telecommunications sectors. However, this law
and regulation do not specifically address roles and responsibilities in
the event of an Internet disruption.

Regarding federal disaster response, the Defense Production Act12 and the
Stafford Act13 provide authority to federal agencies to plan for and
respond to incidents of national significance like disasters and terrorist
attacks. Specifically, the Defense Production Act authorizes the President
to ensure the timely availability of products, materials, and services
needed to meet the requirements of a national emergency. It is applicable
to critical infrastructure protection and restoration but has never been
used for Internet recovery. The Stafford Act authorizes federal assistance
to states, local governments, nonprofit entities, and individuals in the
event of a major disaster or emergency. However, the act does not
authorize assistance to for-profit companies-such as those that own and
operate core Internet components.

Other legislation and regulations, including the Communications Act of
193414 and the NCS authorities,15 govern the telecommunications
infrastructure and help to ensure communications during national
emergencies. For example, the NCS authorities establish guidance for
operationally coordinating with industry to protect and restore key
national security and emergency preparedness communications services.
These authorities grant the President certain emergency

11

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (Dec. 17, 2003).

12

Act of September 8, 1950, c. 932, 64 Stat. 798, as amended; codified at 50
U.S.C. App. Section 2061 et seq.

13

Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974).

14

Communications Act of 1934 (June 19, 1934), ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064.

15

Executive Order 12472 (Apr. 3, 1984), as amended by Executive Order 13286
(Feb. 28, 2003).

powers regarding telecommunications, including the authority to require
any carrier subject to the Communications Act of 1934 to grant preference
or priority to essential communications.16 The President may also, in the
event of war or national emergency, suspend regulations governing wire and
radio transmissions and authorize the use or control of any such facility
or station and its apparatus and equipment by any department of the
government. Although these authorities remain in force in the Code of
Federal Regulations, they have been seldom used-and never for Internet
recovery. Thus it is not clear how effective they would be if used for
this purpose.

In commenting on the statutory authority for Internet reconstitution
following a disruption, DHS agreed that this authority is lacking and
noted that the government's roles and authorities related to assisting in
Internet reconstitution following a disruption are not fully defined.

 DHS Initiatives Supporting Internet Recovery Planning Are under Way, but Much
Remains to Be Done and the Relationship Between Initiatives Is Not Evident

DHS has begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility to
develop an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery, but these
efforts are not complete or comprehensive. Specifically, DHS has developed
high-level plans for infrastructure protection and national disaster
response, but the components of these plans that address the Internet
infrastructure are not complete. In addition, DHS has started a variety of
initiatives to improve the nation's ability to recover from Internet
disruptions, including working groups to facilitate coordination and
exercises in which government and private industry practice responding to
cyber events. While these activities are promising, some initiatives are
not complete, others lack time lines and priorities, and still others lack
effective mechanisms for incorporating lessons learned. In addition, the

16

Executive Order 12472 S: 2; Communications Act of 1934, S: 706, 47 U.S.C S: 606.

relationship between these initiatives is not evident. As a result, the
nation is not prepared to effectively coordinate public/private plans for
recovering from a major Internet disruption.

High-Level Response and Protection Plans

DHS has two key documents that
guide its infrastructure protection and recovery efforts, but components
of these plans dealing with Internet recovery are not complete. The
National Response Plan is DHS's overarching framework for responding to
domestic incidents. It contains two components that address issues related
to telecommunications and the Internet, Emergency Support Function 2 and
the Cyber Incident Annex. These components, however, are not complete;
Emergency Support Function 2 does not directly address Internet recovery,
and the annex does not reflect the National Cyber Response Coordination
Group's current operating procedures. The other key document, the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, consists of both a base plan and
sector-specific plans. The base plan, which was recently released,
describes the importance of cybersecurity and networks such as the
Internet to critical infrastructure protection and includes an appendix
that provides information on cybersecurity responsibilities. The appendix
restates DHS's responsibility to develop plans to recover Internet
functions. However, the base plan is at a high level and the
sector-specific plans that would address the Internet in more detail are
not scheduled for release until December 2006.

Several representatives of private-sector firms supporting the Internet
infrastructure expressed concerns about both plans, noting that they would
be difficult to execute in times of crisis. Other representatives were
uneasy about the government developing recovery plans, because they were
not confident of the government's ability to successfully execute the
plans. DHS officials acknowledged that it will be important to obtain
input from privatesector organizations as they refine these plans and
initiate more detailed public/private planning.

Both the National Response Plan and National Infrastructure Protection
Plan are designed to be supplemented by more specific plans and
activities. DHS has numerous initiatives under way to better define its
ability to assist in responding to major Internet disruptions. While these
activities are promising, some initiatives are incomplete, others lack
time lines and priorities, and still others lack an effective mechanism
for incorporating lessons learned.

National Communications System Reorganization

DHS plans to revise the role
and mission of the National Communications System (NCS) to reflect the
convergence of voice and data communications, but this effort is not yet
complete. A presidential advisory committee on telecommunications17
established two task forces that recommended changes to NCS's role,
mission, and functions to reflect this convergence, but DHS has not yet
developed plans to address these recommendations.

National Cyber Response Coordination Group

As a primary entity responsible
for coordinating governmentwide responses to cyber incidents-such as major
Internet disruptions- DHS's National Cyber Response Coordination Group is
working to define its roles and responsibilities, but much remains to be
done. DHS officials acknowledge that the trigger to activate this group is
imprecise and will need to be clarified. Because key activities to define
roles, responsibilities, capabilities, and the appropriate triggers for
government involvement are still under way, the group is at risk of not
being able to act quickly and definitively during a major Internet
disruption.

Internet Disruption Working Group

Since most of the Internet is owned and
operated by the private sector, NCSD and NCS established the Internet
Disruption Working Group to work with the private sector to establish
priorities and develop action plans to prevent major disruptions of the
Internet and to identify recovery measures in the event of a major
disruption. According to DHS officials who organized the group, it held
its first forum, in November 2005, to begin to identify real versus
perceived threats to the Internet, refine the definition of an Internet
disruption,

17

The National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee advises the
President on issues and problems related to implementing national security
and emergency preparedness telecommunications policy.

Page 13

determine the scope of a planned analysis of disruptions, and identify
near-term protective measures. DHS officials stated that they had
identified a number of potential future plans; however, agency officials
have not yet finalized plans, resources, or milestones for these efforts.

North American Incident Response Group

US-CERT officials formed the North
American Incident Response Group, which includes both public and
private-sector network operators that would be the first to recognize and
respond to cyber disruptions. In September 2005, US-CERT officials
conducted regional workshops with group members to share information on
structure, programs, and incident response and to seek ways for the
government and industry to work together operationally. While the outreach
efforts of the North American Incident Response Group are promising, DHS
has only just begun developing plans and activities to address the
concerns of private-sector stakeholders.

Exercises

Over the last few years, DHS has conducted several broad
intergovernmental exercises to test regional responses to significant
incidents that could affect the critical infrastructure. More recently, in
February 2006, DHS conducted an exercise called Cyber Storm, which was
focused primarily on testing responses to a cyber-related incident of
national significance. Exercises that include Internet disruptions can
help to identify issues and interdependencies that need to be addressed.
However, DHS has not yet identified planned activities, milestones, or
which group should be responsible for incorporating lessons learned from
the regional and Cyber Storm exercises into its plans and initiatives.

While DHS has various initiatives under way, the relationships and
interdependencies between these various efforts are not evident. For
example, the National Cyber Response Coordination Group, the Internet
Disruption Working Group, and the North American Incident Response Group
are all meeting to discuss ways to address Internet recovery, but the
interdependencies between the groups have not been clearly established.
Without a thorough understanding of the interrelationships between its
various initiatives, DHS risks pursuing redundant efforts and missing
opportunities to build on related efforts.

After our report was issued, a private-sector organization released a
report that examined the nation's preparedness for a major Internet
disruption.18 The report stated that our nation is unprepared to
reconstitute the Internet after a massive disruption. The report supported
our findings that significant gaps exist in government response plans and
that the responsibilities of the multiple organizations that would play a
role in recovery are unclear. The report also made recommendations to
complete and revise response plans such as the Cyber Incident Annex of the
National Response Plan; better define recovery roles and responsibilities;
and establish more effective oversight and strategic direction for
Internet reconstitution.

  Multiple Challenges Exist to Planning for Recovery from Internet Disruptions

Although DHS has various initiatives under way to improve Internet
recovery planning, it faces key challenges in developing a public/private
plan for Internet recovery, including (1) innate characteristics of the
Internet that make planning for and responding to a disruption difficult,
(2) lack of consensus on DHS's role and on when the department should get
involved in responding to a disruption, (3) legal issues affecting DHS's
ability to provide assistance to restore Internet service, (4) reluctance
of the private sector to share information on Internet disruptions with
DHS, and

(5) leadership and organizational uncertainties within DHS. Until it
addresses these challenges, DHS will have difficulty achieving results in
its role as focal point for recovering the Internet from a major
disruption.

18

Business Roundtable, Essential Steps to Strengthen America's Cyber
Terrorism Preparedness (Washington D.C.: June 2006).

Page 15

First, the Internet's diffuse structure, vulnerabilities in its basic
protocols, and the lack of agreed-upon performance measures make planning
for and responding to a disruption more difficult. The components of the
Internet are not all governed by the same organization. In addition, the
Internet is international. According to private-sector estimates, only
about 20 percent of Internet users are in the United States. Also, there
are no well-accepted standards for measuring and monitoring the Internet
infrastructure's availability and performance. Instead, individuals and
organizations rate the Internet's performance according to their own
priorities.

Second, there is no consensus about the role DHS should play in responding
to a major Internet disruption or about the appropriate trigger for its
involvement. The lack of clear legislative authority for Internet recovery
efforts complicates the definition of this role. DHS officials
acknowledged that their role in recovering from an Internet disruption
needs further clarification because private industry owns and operates the
vast majority of the Internet.

The trigger for the National Response Plan, which is DHS's overall
framework for incident response, is poorly defined and has been found by
both us and the White House to need revision.19 Since private-sector
participation in DHS planning activities for Internet disruption is
voluntary, agreement on the appropriate trigger for government involvement
and the role of government in resolving an Internet disruption is
essential to any plan's success.

Private-sector officials representing telecommunication backbone providers
and Internet service providers were also unclear about the types of
assistance DHS could provide in responding to an incident and about the
value of such assistance. There was no consensus on this issue. Many
private-sector officials stated that the government did not have a direct
recovery role, while others identified a variety of potential roles,
including

19See GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
8, 2006), and the White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:
Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C., February 2006).

Page 16

     o providing information on specific threats;
     o providing security and disaster relief support during a crisis;
     o funding backup communication infrastructures;
     o driving improved Internet security through requirements for the
       government's own procurement;
     o serving as a focal point with state and local governments to establish
       standard credentials to allow Internet and telecommunications
       companies access to areas that have been restricted or closed in a
       crisis;
     o providing logistical assistance, such as fuel, power, and security, to
       Internet infrastructure operators;
     o focusing on smaller-scale exercises targeted at specific Internet
       disruption issues;
     o limiting the initial focus for Internet recovery planning to key
       national security and emergency preparedness functions, such as public
       health and safety; and
     o establishing a system for prioritizing the recovery of Internet
       service, similar to the existing Telecommunications Service Priority
       Program.

A third challenge to planning for recovery is that there are key legal
issues affecting DHS's ability to provide assistance to help restore
Internet service. As noted earlier, key legislation and regulations
guiding critical infrastructure protection, disaster recovery, and the
telecommunications infrastructure do not provide specific authorities for
Internet recovery. As a result, there is no clear legislative guidance on
which organization would be responsible in the case of a major Internet
disruption. In addition, the Stafford Act, which authorizes the government
to provide federal assistance to states, local governments, nonprofit
entities, and individuals in the event of a major disaster or emergency,
does not authorize assistance to for-profit corporations. Several
representatives of telecommunications companies reported that they had
requested federal assistance from DHS during Hurricane Katrina.
Specifically, they requested food, water, and security for the teams they
were sending in to restore the communications infrastructure and fuel to
power their generators. DHS responded that it could not fulfill these
requests, noting that the Stafford Act did not extend to for-profit
companies.

A fourth challenge is that a large percentage of the nation's critical
infrastructure-including the Internet-is owned and operated by the private
sector, meaning that public/private partnerships are crucial for
successful critical infrastructure protection. Although certain policies
direct DHS to work with the private sector to ensure infrastructure
protection, DHS does not have the authority to direct Internet owners and
operators in their recovery efforts. Instead, it must rely on the private
sector to share information on incidents, disruptions, and recovery
efforts. Many private-sector representatives questioned the value of
providing information to DHS regarding planning for and recovery from
Internet disruption. In addition, DHS has identified provisions of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act20 as having a "chilling effect" on
cooperation with the private sector. The uncertainties regarding the value
and risks of cooperation with the government limit incentives for the
private sector to cooperate in Internet recovery-planning efforts.

Finally, DHS has lacked permanent leadership while developing its
preliminary plans for Internet recovery and reconstitution. In addition,
the organizations with roles in Internet recovery (NCS and NCSD) have
overlapping responsibilities and may be reorganized once DHS selects
permanent leadership. As a result, it is difficult for DHS to develop a
clear set of organizational priorities and to coordinate between the
various activities necessary for Internet recovery planning. In May 2005,
we reported that multiple senior DHS cybersecurity officials had recently
left the department.21 These officials included the NCSD Director, the
Deputy Director responsible for Outreach and Awareness, the Director of
the US-CERT Control Systems Security Center, the Under Secretary for the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate and the
Assistant Secretary responsible for the Information Protection Office.
Additionally, DHS officials acknowledge that the current

Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 2. 21
GAO-05-434.

Page 18

organizational structure has overlapping responsibilities for planning for
and recovering from a major Internet disruption.

In a July 2005 departmental reorganization, NCS and NCSD were placed in
the Preparedness Directorate. NCS's and NCSD's responsibilities were to be
placed under a new Assistant Secretary of Cyber Security and
Telecommunications-in part to raise the visibility of cybersecurity issues
in the department. However, almost a year later, this position remains
vacant. While DHS stated that the lack of a permanent assistant secretary
has not hampered its efforts in protecting critical infrastructure,
several private-sector representatives stated that DHS's lack of
leadership in this area has limited progress. Specifically, these
representatives stated that filling key leadership positions would enhance
DHS's visibility to the Internet industry and potentially improve its
reputation.

Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Improve DHS Internet Recovery
                                Planning Efforts

Given the importance of the Internet infrastructure to our nation's
communication and commerce, in our accompanying report we suggested
matters for congressional consideration and made recommendations to DHS
regarding improving efforts in planning for Internet recovery.22
Specifically, we suggested that Congress consider clarifying the legal
framework that guides roles and responsibilities for Internet recovery in
the event of a major disruption. This effort could include providing
specific authorities for Internet recovery as well as examining potential
roles for the federal government, such as providing access to disaster
areas, prioritizing selected entities for service recovery, and using
federal contracting mechanisms to encourage more secure technologies. This
effort also could include examining the Stafford Act to determine whether
there would be benefits in establishing specific authority for the
government to provide for-profit companies-such

22 GAO-06-672 .

as those that own or operate critical communications infrastructures-with
limited assistance during a crisis.

Additionally, to improve DHS's ability to facilitate public/private
efforts to recover the Internet in case of a major disruption, we
recommended that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
implement the following nine actions:

     o Establish dates for revising the National Response Plan-including
       efforts to update key components that are relevant to the Internet.
     o Use the planned revisions to the National Response Plan and the
       National Infrastructure Protection Plan as a basis to draft
       public/private plans for Internet recovery and obtain input from key
       Internet infrastructure companies.
     o Review the NCS and NCSD organizational structures and roles in light
       of the convergence of voice and data communications.
     o Identify the relationships and interdependencies among the various
       Internet recovery-related activities currently under way in NCS and
       NCSD, including initiatives by US-CERT, the National Cyber Response
       Coordination Group, the Internet Disruption Working Group, the North
       American Incident Response Group, and the groups responsible for
       developing and implementing cyber recovery exercises.
     o Establish time lines and priorities for key efforts identified by the
       Internet Disruption Working Group.
     o Identify ways to incorporate lessons learned from actual incidents and
       during cyber exercises into recovery plans and procedures.
          * Work with private-sector stakeholders representing the Internet
            infrastructure to address challenges to effective Internet
            recovery by
               o further defining needed government functions in responding
                 to a major Internet disruption (this effort should include a
                 careful consideration of the potential government functions
                 identified by the private sector earlier in this testimony),
               o defining a trigger for government involvement in responding
                 to such a disruption, and
               o documenting assumptions and developing approaches to deal
                 with key challenges that are not within the government's
                 control.

In written comments, DHS agreed with our recommendations and stated that
it recognizes the importance of the Internet for information
infrastructures. DHS also provided information about initial actions it is
taking to implement our recommendations.

In summary, as a critical information infrastructure supporting our
nation's commerce and communications, the Internet is subject to
disruption-from both intentional and unintentional incidents. While major
incidents to date have had regional or local impacts, the Internet has not
yet suffered a catastrophic failure. Should such a failure occur, however,
existing legislation and regulations do not specifically address roles and
responsibilities for Internet recovery.

As the focal point for ensuring the security of cyberspace, DHS has
initiated efforts to refine high-level disaster recovery plans; however,
pertinent Internet components of these plans are not complete. While DHS
has also undertaken several initiatives to improve Internet recovery
planning, much remains to be done. Specifically, some initiatives lack
clear timelines, lessons learned are not consistently being incorporated
in recovery plans, and the relationships between the various initiatives
are not clear.

DHS faces numerous challenges in developing integrated public/private
recovery plans-not the least of which is the fact that the government does
not own or operate much of the Internet. In addition, there is no
consensus among public and private stakeholders about the appropriate role
of DHS and when it should get involved; legal issues limit the actions the
government can take; the private sector is reluctant to share information
on Internet performance with the government; and DHS is undergoing
important organizational and leadership changes. As a result, the exact
role of the government in helping to recover the Internet infrastructure
following a major disruption remains unclear.

To improve DHS's ability to facilitate public/private efforts to recover
the Internet in case of a major disruption, our report suggested that
Congress consider clarifying the legal framework guiding Internet
recovery. We also made recommendations to DHS to establish clear
milestones for completing key plans, coordinate various Internet
recovery-related activities, and address key challenges to Internet
recovery planning. Effectively implementing these recommendations could
greatly enhance our nation's ability to recover from a major Internet
disruption.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any
questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have at this time.

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, please
contact us at (202) 512-9286 and at (202) 512-6412 or by email at
[email protected] and [email protected]. Other key contributors to this
testimony include Don R. Adams, Naba Barkakati, Scott Borre, Neil Doherty,
Vijay D'Souza, Joshua A. Hammerstein, Bert Japikse, Joanne Landesman,
Frank Maguire, Teresa M. Neven, and Colleen M. Phillips.

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