Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation	 
(11-SEP-06, GAO-06-1094T).					 
                                                                 
From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, U.S. government agencies	 
have reported significant costs for U.S. stabilization and	 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq. In addition, the United States	 
currently has committed about 138,000 military personnel to the  
U.S.-led Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I). Over the past 3	 
years, worsening security conditions have made it difficult for  
the United States to achieve its goals in Iraq. In this 	 
statement, we discuss (1) the trends in the security environment 
in Iraq, and (2) progress in developing Iraqi security forces, as
reported by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State. We also  
present key questions for congressional oversight, including what
political, economic, and security conditions must be achieved	 
before the United States can draw down and withdraw? Why have	 
security conditions continued to deteriorate even as Iraq has met
political milestones, increased the number of trained and	 
equipped forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for security? 
If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are  
not reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, 
will the administration propose for stemming the violence?	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-1094T					        
    ACCNO:   A60624						        
  TITLE:     Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation
     DATE:   09/11/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Armed forces abroad				 
	     Congressional oversight				 
	     Counterinsurgency					 
	     Economic development				 
	     Economic stabilization				 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Foreign military training				 
	     Insurgency 					 
	     Security assessments				 
	     Iraq						 

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GAO-06-1094T

     

     * Summary
     * Background
     * Trends in Security Conditions
          * Deteriorating Security Threatens U.S. and International Efforts
            to Assist Iraqi Political and Economic Development
          * Sunni Insurgency and Shi'a Militias Contribute to Increased
            Sectarian Violence
               * Sunni Insurgency Remains Strong and Resilient
               * Presence and Influence of Shi'a Militias Have Grown
               * Growing Sectarian Violence Has Led to Increased Civilian
                 Deaths and Displacement
               * Shi'a Militia Demobilization Depends on Reduction in Sunni
                 Insurgency
     * DOD and State Progress Reports Provide Limited Information on the
       Development of Iraqi Security Forces
          * Increases in Training and Equipping Iraqi Security Forces and
            Transferring Security Responsibilities to Them and the Iraqi
            Government
          * Unit-level TRA Reports Provide More Insight into Iraqi
            Capabilities and Development Needs Than Do Aggregate Data on
            Overall TRA Ratings
     * Questions for Congressional Oversight
     * Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
     * Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Report

September 11, 2006

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We appreciate the opportunity to assist the Subcommittee in its oversight
of U.S. efforts to improve the security situation in Iraq. The November
2005 U.S. strategy for Iraq states that victory in Iraq is a vital U.S.
interest. Since May 2003, the United States has employed political,
economic, and military measures to stabilize Iraq and help the country
achieve the desired end-state: a constitutional, representative Iraqi
government that respects civil rights and has security forces sufficient
to maintain domestic order and keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven for
terrorists. To support these goals, the United States initially led, and
later assisted, Iraq's political transition from a dictatorship to a
democratically elected government. The United States currently has
committed about 138,000 military personnel to the U.S.-led Multinational
Force in Iraq (MNF-I). The Department of Defense (DOD) has reported
obligations of about $227 billion for U.S. military operations in Iraq for
fiscal years 2003 through June 2006. U.S. assistance appropriated for
Iraqi security forces and law enforcement has grown from $3.24 billion in
January 2004 to about $13.7 billion in June 2006.1 Over the past 3 years,
worsening security conditions have made it difficult for the United States
to achieve its goals in Iraq.

In this statement, we discuss (1) the trends in the security environment
in Iraq, and (2) progress in developing Iraqi security forces, as reported
by DOD and the State Department. We also present questions for
congressional oversight. To examine trends in Iraq's security situation,
we reviewed reports by DOD, State, the United Nations (UN), and
nongovernmental organizations, as well as transcripts of MNF-I and U.S.
embassy Baghdad press conferences and interviews. Although we reviewed
classified documents during our completed and ongoing Iraq-related
engagements, the information in this statement is based on unclassified
documents only. We also obtained and assessed MNF-I data on
enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners from
the Defense Intelligence Agency. We determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for establishing general trends in the number of
attacks. To assess progress in developing Iraqi security forces, we
reviewed DOD and State reports, as well as MNF-I guidance on Iraqi
readiness assessments. Because of the broad congressional interest in this
issue, we performed this work under my authority as the Comptroller
General of the United States to conduct reviews on my initiative. The work
was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.

Summary

Since June 2003, the overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated
and grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and,
more recently, the growing Sunni/Shi'a sectarian strife, which has grown
since the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra.
Enemy-initiated attacks generally have increased around major religious or
political events, including Ramadan and elections. Attack levels also
follow a seasonal pattern, increasing through the spring and summer and
decreasing in the winter months. According to MNF-I data, attack levels in
July 2006 were the highest to date. Despite coalition efforts and the
efforts of the newly formed Iraqi government, insurgents continue to
demonstrate the ability to recruit new fighters, supply themselves, and
attack coalition and Iraqi security forces. The deteriorating conditions
threaten continued progress in U.S. and other international efforts to
assist Iraq in the political and economic areas. In July 2006, the State
Department reported to Congress that the recent upturn in violence had
hindered efforts to engage fully with Iraqi partners. State noted that a
baseline of security was a prerequisite for moving forward on the
political and economic tasks essential to achieving the conditions for
withdrawing U.S. forces. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi'a militias
have contributed to an increase in sectarian strife that has resulted in
large numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals.

DOD uses three key factors to measure progress in developing capable Iraqi
security forces and transferring security responsibilities to them and the
Iraqi government: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) the
number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed
responsibility for security of specific geographic areas, and (3) the
assessed capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and
aggregate Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) reports. From July 2005 to
August 2006, the State Department reported that the number of trained and
equipped Iraqi security forces had increased from about 174,000 to
294,000. However, these numbers do not provide a complete picture of the
units' capabilities because they do not give detailed information on the
status of their equipment, personnel, training, and leadership. They may
also overstate the number of forces on duty. As of August 2006, 115 Iraqi
army units had assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations in
specific areas, and one province, Muthanna, had assumed control for
security responsibilities. Information on the readiness levels for Iraqi
security forces is classified. Unit-level readiness reports provide
important insight into the status of Iraqi army units' personnel,
training, equipment, leadership, and sustainment/logistical capabilities.
DOD has provided GAO with classified, aggregate information on overall
readiness levels and more detailed information on Iraqi units in the lead.
GAO has been working with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. Such
information would inform both GAO and the Congress on the capabilities and
needs of Iraq's security forces.

We present key questions for congressional oversight, including:

o What political, economic and security conditions must be achieved before
the United States can draw down and withdraw military forces from Iraq?

o Why have security conditions continued to worsen even as Iraq has met
political milestones, increased the number of trained and equipped forces,
and increasingly assumed the lead for security?

o If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not
reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the
administration propose for stemming the violence?

Background

In May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)2 dissolved the
military organizations of the former regime and began the process of
reestablishing or creating new Iraqi security forces, including the police
and a new Iraqi army. Over time, multinational force commanders assumed
responsibility in their areas for recruiting and training some Iraqi
defense and police forces. In October 2003, the multinational force
outlined a multistep plan for transferring security missions to Iraqi
security forces. The plan had the objective of gradually decreasing the
number of coalition forces in conjunction with neutralizing Iraq's
insurgency and developing Iraqi forces capable of securing their country.

Citing the growing capability of Iraqi security forces, coalition forces
in Iraq began to shift responsibilities to Iraqi security forces in
February 2004, earlier than planned. According to the President, senior
DOD officials, and multinational force commanders, Iraqi forces were
unprepared to assume security responsibilities and responded poorly to a
series of anti-coalition attacks in April 2004. In western and central
Iraq, insurgents attacked the multinational force in Fallujah, Baghdad, Ar
Ramadi, Samarra, and Tikrit, while a radical Shi'a militia, the Mahdi
Army, launched operations to dislodge multinational forces and occupy
cities from Baghdad to Basra in the south. Although some Iraqi forces
fought alongside coalition forces, other units abandoned their posts and
responsibilities and, in some cases, assisted the insurgency. MNF-I
identified a number of problems that contributed to the collapse of Iraqi
security forces, including problems in training and equipping them.

In May 2004, the President issued a National Security Presidential
Directive, which stated that, after the transition of power to the Iraqi
government, DOD would be responsible for U.S. activities relating to
security and military operations. The Presidential directive established
that the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) would direct all U.S. government
efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi security forces. In the summer
of 2004, MNF-I developed and began implementing a comprehensive campaign
plan, which elaborated and refined the original strategy for transferring
security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. In April 2006, MNF-I revised
the campaign plan and, in conjunction with the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad,
issued a new Joint Campaign Plan that contains the goal of transitioning
security responsibility from MNF-I to the Iraqi security forces and
government. Further details on the campaign plan are classified.3 In late
August 2006, the MNF-I Commanding General said that the United States is
helping Iraq build a force to deal with its current security threats of
international terrorism and insurgency. He noted, however, that the Iraqi
government is developing a long-term security plan to shape the type of
armed forces that the country will need 5 to 10 years from now.

Trends in Security Conditions

Since June 2003, overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and
grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and more
recent Sunni/Shi'a sectarian strife after the February 2006 bombing of the
Golden Mosque in Samarra.4 The deteriorating conditions threaten continued
progress in U.S. and other international efforts to assist Iraq in the
political and economic areas. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi'a
militias have contributed to an increase in sectarian strife and large
numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals.

Deteriorating Security Threatens U.S. and International Efforts to Assist
Iraqi Political and Economic Development

Enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners have
continued to increase through July 2006 (see fig. 1). Since 2003,
enemy-initiated attacks have increased around major religious or political
events, including Ramadan5 and elections. Attack levels also follow a
seasonal pattern, increasing through the spring and summer and decreasing
in the fall and winter months. Overall, attacks increased by 23 percent
from 2004 to 2005. After declining in the fall of 2005, the number of
attacks rose to the highest level ever in July 2006. Total attacks
reported from January 2006 through July 2006 were about 57 percent higher
than the total reported during the same period in 2005. These data show
significant increases in attacks against coalition forces, who remain the
primary targets, as well as civilians and Iraqi security forces. According
to a June 2006 UN report,6 an increasingly complex armed opposition
continues to be capable of maintaining a consistently high level of
violent activity across Iraq. Baghdad, Ninewa, Salahuddin, Anbar, and
Diyala have been experiencing the worst of the violence. Other areas,
particularly Basra and Kirkuk, have witnessed increased tension and a
growing number of violent

incidents. In August 2006,7 DOD reported that breaking the cycle of
violence is the most pressing immediate goal of coalition and Iraqi
operations.

Figure 1: Enemy-initiated Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi
Partners, May 2003 through July 2006

The security situation has deteriorated even as Iraq has made progress in
meeting key political milestones and in developing its security forces.
Since the CPA transferred power to the Iraqi interim government in June
2004, Iraq has held an election for a transitional government in January
2005, a referendum on the constitution in October 2005, and an election
for a Council of Representatives in December 2005 that led to the
formation of a new government in May 2006 (see fig. 2). However, according
to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the December
2005 elections appeared to heighten sectarian tensions and polarize
sectarian divides. According to a U.S. Institute of Peace report,8 the
focus on ethnic and sectarian identity has sharpened as a result of Iraq's
political process, while nationalism and a sense of Iraqi identity have
weakened.

Figure 2: Political Milestones in Iraq Compared with Enemy-initiated
Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi Partners, May 2003 through
July 2006

Moreover, according to the Director of National Intelligence's February
2006 report, Iraqi security forces are experiencing difficulty in managing
ethnic and sectarian divisions among their units and personnel. In
addition, the DIA Director reported that many elements of the Iraqi
security forces are loyal to sectarian and party interests. According to
DOD's August 2006 report, sectarian lines among Iraqi security forces are
drawn along geographic lines, with Sunni, Shi'a, or Kurdish soldiers
mostly serving in units located in geographic areas familiar to their
group. Moreover, according to the report, commanders at the battalion
level tend to command only soldiers of their own sectarian or regional
background.

On August 7, 2006, MNF-I and Iraqi security forces began phase II of
Operation Together Forward. The operation is an effort to reduce the level
of murders, kidnappings, assassinations, terrorism, and sectarian violence
in Baghdad and to reinforce the Iraqi government's control of the city. On
August 30, 2006, the MNF-I Commanding General said that he was pleased
with the operation's progress, but that there was a long way to go in
bringing security to the neighborhoods of Baghdad. U.S. intelligence
assessments of this operation's impact are classified.

The State Department reported in July 2006 that the recent upturn in
violence has hindered the U.S. government's efforts to engage fully with
its Iraqi partners and to move forward on political and economic fronts.
State noted that a baseline of security was a prerequisite for moving
forward on these fronts, which are essential to achieving the right
conditions for withdrawing U.S. forces. For example, Iraqi government
efforts to foster reconciliation have become more difficult with the
increase in sectarian divisions and violence during the spring and summer
of 2006. According to DOD's August 2006 report, security issues-such as
the attempted kidnapping of a deputy minister and threats to personnel who
work with embassy teams-have made some ministers reluctant to have U.S.
personnel visit them. The report also noted that the security situation in
some provinces has hampered interaction between U.S.-led Provincial
Reconstruction Teams9 and provincial leaders. Moreover, the UN reported
that the lack of security has hampered reconstruction efforts. The UN
reported that the diplomatic community remains under serious threat as
embassy staff have been abducted and killed and facilities attacked. The
UN noted that improved security is central to the normal ability of
international agencies to provide assistance to the government and people
of Iraq.

As we reported in July 2006, the poor security conditions have also
hindered U.S. and Iraqi government efforts to revitalize Iraq's economy
and restore essential services in the oil and electricity sectors.
According to a State Department report,10 during the week of August 16-22,
2006, Iraq was producing 2.17 million barrels of oil per day. This figure
is below the Iraqi Oil Ministry's goal of 2.5 million barrels of oil per
day and the pre-war level of 2.6 million barrels per day. Over the same
time period, electricity availability averaged 5.9 hours per day in
Baghdad and 10.7 hours nationwide. Electricity output for the week was
about 9 percent above the same period in 2005. U.S. officials report that
major oil pipelines continue to be sabotaged, shutting down oil exports
and resulting in lost revenues. Current U.S. assistance is focused on
strengthening the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, which are Ministry
of Defense forces that protect oil fields and pipelines. Major electrical
transmission lines have also been repeatedly sabotaged, cutting power to
parts of the country. Security conditions in Iraq have, in part, led to
project delays and increased costs for security services. Although it is
difficult to quantify the costs and delays resulting from poor security
conditions, both agency and contractor officials acknowledged that
security costs have diverted a considerable amount of reconstruction
resources and have led to canceling or reducing the scope of some
reconstruction projects.

Sunni Insurgency and Shi'a Militias Contribute to Increased Sectarian
Violence

Although the Sunni insurgency has remained strong and resilient, the
presence and influence of Shi'a militias have grown and led to increased
sectarian violence. According to a July 2006 State Department report, the
Sunni insurgency remains a pressing problem in Iraq. However, in recent
months, Shi'a militia groups have grown more prominent and threaten Iraq's
stability.11 The increase in sectarian violence has led to an increasing
number of Iraqis fleeing their homes. According to the U.S. Ambassador to
Iraq, the demobilization of Shi'a militias requires a corresponding
reduction in the Sunni insurgency.12

Sunni Insurgency Remains Strong and Resilient

Despite coalition efforts and the efforts of the newly formed Iraqi
government, insurgents continue to demonstrate the ability to recruit new
fighters, supply themselves, and attack coalition and Iraqi security
forces. According to a July 2006 State Department report, the Sunni
insurgency remains a pressing problem in Iraq, even after the death of Abu
Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, in early June 2006. As
DOD recently reported, al-Qaeda in Iraq remains able to conduct operations
due to its resilient, semi-autonomous cellular structure of command and
control. The Sunni insurgency consists of former Baathists, whose goal is
to return to power; terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, its
affiliates in the Mujahadeen Shura Council, and Ansar al Sunna; and
various other groups that rely on violence to achieve their objectives.

Sunni insurgents have no distinct leader but share the goal of
destabilizing the Iraqi government to pursue their individual and, at
times, conflicting goals. Although these groups have divergent goals, some
collaborate at the tactical and operational levels. DOD has reported that
the relationships among insurgents, terrorists, and criminal opportunists
are blurred at times but that the ideological rifts between terrorists and
other resistance groups remain. DOD also reports that many insurgent
groups employ a dual-track political and military strategy to subvert
emerging institutions and to infiltrate and co-opt security and political
organizations. These groups attempt to leverage the political process to
address their core concerns and demands while attacking coalition and
Iraqi security forces.

Presence and Influence of Shi'a Militias Have Grown

The presence and influence of Shi'a militia groups have grown in recent
months, as they have become more prominent and acted in ways that threaten
Iraq's stability. According to the CENTCOM Commander, as of early August
2006, these militias are the largest contributors to sectarian violence in
Iraq. As DOD reported in August 2006, the threat posed by Shi'a militias
is growing and represents a significant challenge for the Iraqi
government. The Shi'a militias that are affecting the security situation
the most are the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organization.

o Mahdi Army: Led by radical Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, this group was
responsible for attacks against the coalition and two uprisings in April
2004 and August 2004. The militia committed abuses against Sunni
civilians, which have exacerbated sectarian tensions, and were implicated
in unrest following the February bombing in Samarra. Evidence exists that
the Mahdi Army are supplied by sources outside Iraq, most notably Iran. As
of June 2006, Sadr followers headed four of Iraq's 40 ministries-the
ministries of health, transportation, agriculture, and tourism and
antiquities. As DOD recently reported, this militia has popular support in
Baghdad and Iraq's southern provinces and is tolerated by elements in the
Iraqi government.

o Badr Organization: This Shi'a militia group is the paramilitary wing of
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a prominent
political party in the new government. The party was founded in Iran
during the Iran-Iraq war and retains strong ties to Iran. According to
DOD, the Badr Organization received financial and material support from
Iran, and individuals from Badr have been implicated in death squads. The
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq is one of the two
largest Shi'a parties in parliament. One of Iraq's two deputy presidents
and the Minister of Finance are party members.

According to the CENTCOM Commander, Shi'a militias must be controlled
because they are nonstate actors that have the attributes of the state,
yet bear no responsibility for their actions. In many cases, according to
DOD, militias provide protection for people and religious sites, sometimes
operating in conjunction with the Iraqi police in areas where the Iraqi
police are perceived to provide inadequate support. According to a May
2006 DOD report,13 Shi'a militias seek to place members into army and
police units as a way to serve their interests. This is particularly
evident in the Shi'a dominated south where militia members have hindered
the implementation of law enforcement. Militia leaders also influence the
political process through intimidation and hope to gain influence with the
Iraqi people through politically based social welfare programs. In areas
where they provide social services and contribute to local security, they
operate openly and with popular support.

According to the Director of National Intelligence, Iran provides guidance
and training to select Iraqi Shi'a political groups and provides weapons
and training to Shi'a militant groups to enable anticoalition attacks.
Iran also has contributed to the increasing lethality and effectiveness of
anticoalition attacks by enabling Shi'a militants to build improvised
explosive devices with explosively formed projectiles, similar to those
developed by Lebanese Hezbollah. Iranian support for Shi'a militias
reinforces Sunni fears of Iranian domination, further elevating sectarian
violence.

According to the August 2006 DOD report, Sunni Arabs do not have formally
organized militias. Instead, they rely on neighborhood watches, Sunni
insurgents, and increasingly, al-Qaeda in Iraq. The rise of sectarian
attacks is driving some Sunni and Shi'a civilians in Baghdad and in
ethnically mixed provinces to support militias. Such support is likely to
continue, according to DOD's report, in areas where the population
perceives Iraqi institutions and forces as unable to provide essential
services or meet security requirements.

Growing Sectarian Violence Has Led to Increased Civilian Deaths and
Displacement

According to DOD's August 2006 report, rising sectarian strife defines the
emerging nature of violence in mid-2006, with the core conflict in Iraq
now a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key
areas in Baghdad, create or protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic
resources, and impose their own respective political and religious
agendas. The UN reported in March 2006 that the deteriorating security
situation is evidenced by increased levels of sectarian strife and the
sectarian nature of the violence, particularly in ethnically mixed areas.
Figure 3 shows the ethnic distribution of the population in Iraq. Baghdad,
Kirkuk, Mosul, and southwest of Basra are key ethnically mixed areas.

Figure 3: Ethnic Distribution in Iraq

In June 2006, the UN reported that much of the sectarian violence has been
committed by both sides of the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian divide and has
resulted in increased civilian deaths. The UN reported that the number of
Iraqi civilian casualties continues to increase, with a total of about
14,300 civilians killed in Iraq from January to June 2006. The
overwhelming majority of casualties were reported in Baghdad, according to
the report. Specifically targeted groups included prominent Sunni and
Shi'a Iraqis, government workers and their  families, members of the
middle class (such as merchants and academics), people working for or
associated with MNF-I, and Christians. According to the UN, daily reports
of intercommunal intimidation and murder include regular incidents of
bodies of Sunni and Shi'a men found to be tortured and summarily executed
in Baghdad and its surrounding areas. Violence against Kurds and Arabs has
also been reported in Kirkuk, while the abduction and intimidation of
ordinary Iraqis is a growing problem. According to the report, repeated
bombings against civilians, mosques, and more recently against churches
are creating fear, animosity, and feelings of revenge within Iraq's
sectarian communities.

Moreover, according to a July 2006 UN report,14 the increase in sectarian
violence has resulted in a growing number of Iraqis fleeing their homes.
The UN estimated that about 150,000 individuals had been displaced as of
June 30, 2006. The UN reported that people left their community of origin
primarily because of direct or indirect threats against them or attacks on
family members and their community. According to the report, displaced
persons are vulnerable, lack many basic rights, and compete for limited
services. This in turn can increase intercommunal animosities and can
generate further displacement.

Shi'a Militia Demobilization Depends on Reduction in Sunni Insurgency

Although U.S. and UN officials recognize the importance of demobilizing
the militias, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq has stated that the
demobilization of the Shi'a militias depends on a reduction in the Sunni
insurgency. According to the Ambassador, a comprehensive plan for
demobilizing all the militias and reintegrating them into Iraqi society is
needed to ensure Iraq's stability and success. However, the Sunni
insurgent groups now see themselves as protectors of the Sunni community,
and the Shi'a militias see themselves as protectors of the Shi'a
community. As DOD reported in August 2006, Sunni and Shi'a extremists are
locked in mutually reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife, with each
portraying themselves as the defenders of their respective sectarian
groups.

DOD and State Progress Reports Provide Limited Information on the
Development of Iraqi Security Forces

DOD and State report progress in developing capable Iraqi security forces
and transferring security responsibilities to them and the Iraqi
government in three key areas: (1) the number of trained and equipped
forces, (2) the number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that
have assumed responsibility for security of specific geographic areas, and
(3) the assessed capabilities of operational units, as reported in
aggregate Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) reports. While all three
provide some information on the development of Iraqi security forces, they
do not provide detailed information on specific capabilities that affect
individual units' readiness levels. Unit-level TRA reports provide that
information. We are currently working with DOD to obtain these reports
because they would more fully inform both GAO and the Congress on the
capabilities and needs of Iraq's security forces.

Increases in Training and Equipping Iraqi Security Forces and Transferring
Security Responsibilities to Them and the Iraqi Government

DOD and State have reported progress toward the current goal of training
and equipping about 325,000 Iraqi security forces by December 2006. As
shown in table 1, the State Department reports that the number of trained
army and police forces has increased from about 174,000 in July 2005 to
about 294,000 as of August 2006. According to State, the Ministries of
Defense and Interior are on track to complete the initial training and
equipping of all their authorized end-strength forces by the end of 2006.
The authorized end-strength is 137,000 military personnel in the Ministry
of Defense and about 188,000 in Ministry of Interior police and other
forces. However, as we previously reported,15 the number of trained and
equipped security forces does not provide a complete picture of their
capabilities and may overstate the number of forces on duty. For example,
Ministry of Interior data include police who are absent without leave.
Ministry of Defense data exclude absent military personnel.

Table 1: Reported Number of Trained and Equipped Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Interior Forces, July 2005, January 2006, and August 2006

                                        

     Ministry and Component       July 2005 January 2006 August 2006 
Ministry of Defense Forces  Army               78,200     105,600 127,200a 
                               Air Force             200         500      700 
                               Navy                  700         800    1,100 
                               Subtotalb          79,100     106,900  129,000 
Ministry of Interior Forces Police             64,100      82,400  115,500 
                               Other forces       30,700      38,000   49,600 
                               Subtotalc          94,800     120,400  165,100 
                               Total             173,900     227,300  294,100 

Source: State Department Iraq Weekly Status Reports

Note: Ministry of Defense forces are defined as operational. Ministry of
Interior Forces are defined as trained and equipped.

aArmy number includes Special Operations Forces and Support Forces.

bUnauthorized absence personnel are not included in these numbers.

cUnauthorized absence personnel are included in these numbers.

In spring 2005, MNF-I recognized that the number of trained and equipped
forces did not reflect their capability to assume responsibility for
security. MNF-I began to develop and refine the TRA system as a means of
assessing the capabilities of Iraqi security forces.16 It also started a
program to place transition teams with Iraqi army and special police
units.

DOD also assesses progress in the number of Iraqi army units and
provincial governments that have assumed responsibility for the security
of specific geographic areas in Iraq. The joint MNF-I/U.S. Embassy
Campaign Plan calls for the Iraqi army to assume the lead for
counterinsurgency operations in specific geographic areas and Iraqi civil
authorities to assume security responsibility for their provinces. The
transition of security responsibilities concludes when the Iraq government
assumes responsibility for security throughout Iraq.17

As shown in table 2, DOD reports that an increasing number of Iraqi army
units are capable of leading counterinsurgency operations in specific
geographic areas. DOD reports more detailed information on this transition
in a classified format. However, when an Iraqi army unit assumes the lead,
it does not mean that the unit is capable of conducting independent
operations since it may need to develop additional capabilities and may
require the support of coalition forces. According to DOD's May 2006
report, it will take time before a substantial number of Iraqi units are
assessed as fully independent and requiring no assistance considering the
need for further development of Iraqi logistical elements, ministry
capacity and capability, intelligence structures, and command and control.

Table 2: Reported Progress in Transferring Security Responsibilities to
Iraqi Army Combat Units and Provincial Governments, January 2006 and
August 2006

                                        

         Type of Security Transition       January 2006 August 2006 Goal 
Iraqi army units leading                Divisions              2    5   10 
counterinsurgency operations in         Brigades               8   25   36 
specific areas                          Battalions            37   85 114a 
Number of provinces that have assumed              0           1   18 
security responsibilities                                             

Sources: DOD and State Department reports.

aIncludes Iraqi army and special operations battalions.

Table 2 also shows that one provincial government-Muthanna-had assumed
responsibility for security operations, as of August 2006. According to a
July 2006 State Department report, when a provincial government can assume
security responsibilities depends on the (1) threat level in the province,
(2) capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, (3) capabilities of the
provincial government, and (4) posture of MNF-I forces, that is, MNF-I's
ability to respond to major threats, if needed. Once the provincial
government assumes security responsibilities, the provincial governor and
police are in charge of domestic security. According to an MNF-I official,
MNF-I forces will then move out of all urban areas and assume a supporting
role. In August 2006, DOD reported that security responsibility for as
many as nine of Iraq's provinces could transition to Iraqi government
authority by the end of 2006.

Unit-level TRA Reports Provide More Insight into Iraqi Capabilities and
Development Needs Than Do Aggregate Data on Overall TRA Ratings

DOD has provided GAO with aggregate information on the overall TRA levels
for Iraqi security forces and the number of Iraqi units in the lead for
counterinsurgency operations. DOD's aggregate data on the capabilities and
readiness of Iraqi security forces do not provide information on
shortfalls in personnel, command and control, equipment, and leadership.
Unit-level TRA reports provide more insight into Iraqi army capabilities
and development needs in personnel, leadership, and logistics than do the
overall TRA levels that DOD reports in classified format.18 The TRA rating
for individual Iraqi army units is a key factor in determining the ability
of the unit to conduct and assume the lead for counterinsurgency
operations.

According to Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) guidance,19 the TRA is
intended to provide commanders with a method to consistently evaluate
Iraqi units, as well as to identify factors hindering progress, determine
resource issues, make resource allocation decisions, and determine when
Iraqi army units are prepared to assume the lead for security
responsibilities. The TRA is prepared jointly on a monthly basis by the
unit's military transition team chief and Iraqi security forces commander.

In completing TRA reports, commanders assess the unit's capabilities in
six subcategories-personnel, command and control, training,
sustainment/logistics, equipment, and leadership (see app. 1). After
considering the unit's subcategory ratings, commanders then give each
Iraqi army unit an overall TRA rating that describes the unit's overall
readiness to assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations. The overall
ratings go from TRA level 1 through TRA level 4. To be able to assume the
lead for counterinsurgency operations, Iraqi army units are required to
obtain an overall rating of TRA level 2 as assessed by their commanders.
Commanders also provide a narrative assessment that describes key
shortfalls and impediments to the unit's ability to assume the lead for
counterinsurgency operations and estimate the number of months needed for
the unit to assume the lead. The purpose of the narrative is to clarify
and provide additional support for the overall TRA rating. The aggregate
data on overall TRA ratings for Iraqi security forces are classified.

DOD has provided us with classified data on the aggregate number of Iraqi
units at each TRA level and more detailed information on which Iraqi army
units have assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations. We are
currently working with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. These
unit-level reports would provide GAO and Congress with more complete
information on the status of developing effective Iraqi security forces.
Specifically, unit-level TRA reports would allow us to (1) determine if
the TRA reports are useful and if changes are needed; (2) verify if
aggregate data on overall TRA ratings reflect unit-level TRA reports; and
(3) determine if shortfalls exist in key areas, such as personnel,
equipment, logistics, training, and leadership.

Questions for Congressional Oversight

1.What are the key political, economic, and security conditions that must
be achieved before U.S. forces can draw down and ultimately withdraw from
Iraq? What target dates, if any, has the administration established for
drawing down U.S. forces?

2.The continued deterioration of security conditions in Iraq has hindered
U.S. political and economic efforts in Iraq. According to the State
Department, a baseline of security is a prerequisite for moving forward on
the political and economic tasks essential to achieving the right
conditions for withdrawing U.S. forces.

o Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate in Iraq even as
the country has met political milestones, increased the number of trained
and equipped security forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for
security?

o What is the baseline of security that is required for moving forward on
political and economic tasks? What progress, if any, can be made in the
political and economic areas without a significant improvement in current
security conditions?

o If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not
reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the
administration propose for stemming the violence?

3.In February 2006, the Director of National Intelligence reported that
Iraqi security forces were experiencing difficulty in managing ethnic and
sectarian divisions among their units and personnel. The DIA Director
reported that many elements of the Iraqi security forces are loyal to
sectarian and party interests.

o How does the U.S. government assess the extent to which personnel in the
Iraqi security forces are loyal to groups other than the Iraqi government
or are operating along sectarian lines, rather than as unified national
forces? What do these assessments show?

o How would DOD modify its program to train and equip Iraqi security
forces if evidence emerges that Iraqi military and police are supporting
sectarian rather than national interests?

4.MNF-I established the TRA system to assess the capabilities and
readiness of Iraqi security forces.

o How does DOD assess the reliability of TRAs and ensure that they present
an accurate picture of Iraq security forces' capabilities and readiness?

o At what TRA rating level would Iraqi army units not require any U.S.
military support? What U.S. military support would Iraqi units still
require at TRA levels 1 and 2?

o How does DOD use unit-level TRAs to assess shortfalls in Iraqi
capabilities? What do DOD assessments show about the developmental needs
of Iraqi security forces?

5.In late August 2006, the MNF-I Commanding General said that the United
States is helping Iraq build a force to deal with its current security
threats of international terrorism and insurgency. However, he noted that
the Iraqi government is developing a long-term security plan to shape the
type of armed forces the country will need 5 to 10 years from now.

o What are the current resource requirements for developing Iraqi security
forces capable of dealing with international terrorism and insurgency?
What have been the U.S. and Iraqi financial contributions to this effort
thus far? What U.S. and Iraqi contributions will be needed over the next
several years?

o What are the projected resource requirements for the future Iraqi force?
What are the projected U.S. and Iraqi financial contributions for this
effort?

Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

For further information, please contact Joseph A. Christoff on (202)
512-8979. Key contributors to this testimony were Nanette J. Barton, Lynn
Cothern, Tracey Cross, Martin De Alteriis, Whitney Havens, Brent Helt,
Rhonda Horried, Judith McCloskey, Mary Moutsos, Jason Pogacnik, and Jena
Sinkfield.

Appendix I

Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Report

This appendix provides information on the TRA reports used to assess the
capabilities of Iraqi army units. Commanders provide ratings in each of 6
subcategories (see fig. 4). For each subcategory, a green rating
corresponds to TRA level 1, yellow to TRA level 2, orange to TRA level 3,
and red to TRA level 4. The commanders consider the subcategory ratings in
deciding the overall TRA rating for each unit.

Figure 4: Transition Readiness Assessment Form for Iraqi Army Combat Units

(320366)

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

Testimony

For the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and
International Relations; House Committee on Government Reform

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT Monday, September 11, 2006

STABILIZING IRAQ

An Assessment of the Security Situation

Statement for the Record by David M. Walker Comptroller General of the
United States

GAO-06-1094T

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-1094T .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff, (202) 512-8979,
[email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-1094T , a statement for the record to the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations; Committee on Government Reform; House of Representatives

September 11, 2006

STABILIZING IRAQ

An Assessment of the Security Situation

From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, U.S. government agencies have
reported significant costs for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction
efforts in Iraq. In addition, the United States currently has committed
about 138,000 military personnel to the U.S.-led Multinational Force in
Iraq (MNF-I). Over the past 3 years, worsening security conditions have
made it difficult for the United States to achieve its goals in Iraq.

In this statement, we discuss (1) the trends in the security environment
in Iraq, and (2) progress in developing Iraqi security forces, as reported
by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State. We also present key
questions for congressional oversight, including:

           o  What political, economic, and security conditions must be
           achieved before the United States can draw down and withdraw?

           o  Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate even as
           Iraq has met political milestones, increased the number of trained
           and equipped forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for
           security?

           o  If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are
           not reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any,
           will the administration propose for stemming the violence?

Since June 2003, the overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated
and grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and
Sunni/Shi'a sectarian strife, which has grown since the February 2006
bombing in Samarra. As shown in the figure below, attacks against the
coalition and its Iraqi partners reached an all time high during July
2006. The deteriorating conditions threaten the progress of U.S. and
international efforts to assist Iraq in the political and economic areas.
In July 2006, the State Department reported that the recent upturn in
violence has hindered efforts to engage with Iraqi partners and noted that
a certain level of security was a prerequisite to accomplishing the
political and economic conditions necessary for U.S. withdrawal. Moreover,
the Sunni insurgency and Shi'a militias have contributed to growing
sectarian strife that has resulted in increased numbers of Iraqi civilian
deaths and displaced individuals.

DOD uses three factors to measure progress in developing capable Iraqi
security forces and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi
government: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) the number
of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed
responsibility for security in specific geographic areas, and (3) the
capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and aggregate
Transition Readiness Assessments (TRA). Although the State Department
reported that the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces has
increased, these numbers do not address their capabilities. As of August
2006, 115 Iraqi army units had assumed the lead for counterinsurgency
operations in specific areas, and one province had assumed control for
security. Unit-level TRA reports provide insight into the Iraqi army
units' training, equipment, and logistical capabilities. GAO is working
with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. Such information would
inform the Congress on the capabilities and needs of Iraq's security
forces.

Enemy-initiated Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi Partners, as
of July 2006

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