    Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation
    (11-SEP-06, GAO-06-1094T).

    From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, U.S. government agencies
    have reported significant costs for U.S. stabilization and
    reconstruction efforts in Iraq. In addition, the United States
    currently has committed about 138,000 military personnel to the
    U.S.-led Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I). Over the past 3
    years, worsening security conditions have made it difficult for
    the United States to achieve its goals in Iraq. In this
    statement, we discuss (1) the trends in the security environment
    in Iraq, and (2) progress in developing Iraqi security forces, as
    reported by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State. We also
    present key questions for congressional oversight, including what
    political, economic, and security conditions must be achieved
    before the United States can draw down and withdraw? Why have
    security conditions continued to deteriorate even as Iraq has met
    political milestones, increased the number of trained and
    equipped forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for security?
    If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are
    not reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any,
    will the administration propose for stemming the violence?
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-1094T
        ACCNO:   A60624
      TITLE:     Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation
         DATE:   09/11/2006
      SUBJECT:   Armed forces abroad
    	     Congressional oversight
    	     Counterinsurgency
    	     Economic development
    	     Economic stabilization
    	     Foreign governments
    	     Foreign military training
    	     Insurgency
    	     Security assessments
    	     Iraq

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    GAO-06-1094T

         * Summary
         * Background
         * Trends in Security Conditions
              * Deteriorating Security Threatens U.S. and International Efforts
                to Assist Iraqi Political and Economic Development
              * Sunni Insurgency and Shi'a Militias Contribute to Increased
                Sectarian Violence
                   * Sunni Insurgency Remains Strong and Resilient
                   * Presence and Influence of Shi'a Militias Have Grown
                   * Growing Sectarian Violence Has Led to Increased Civilian
                     Deaths and Displacement
                   * Shi'a Militia Demobilization Depends on Reduction in Sunni
                     Insurgency
         * DOD and State Progress Reports Provide Limited Information on the
           Development of Iraqi Security Forces
              * Increases in Training and Equipping Iraqi Security Forces and
                Transferring Security Responsibilities to Them and the Iraqi
                Government
              * Unit-level TRA Reports Provide More Insight into Iraqi
                Capabilities and Development Needs Than Do Aggregate Data on
                Overall TRA Ratings
         * Questions for Congressional Oversight
         * Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
         * Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Report

    September 11, 2006

    Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

    We appreciate the opportunity to assist the Subcommittee in its oversight
    of U.S. efforts to improve the security situation in Iraq. The November
    2005 U.S. strategy for Iraq states that victory in Iraq is a vital U.S.
    interest. Since May 2003, the United States has employed political,
    economic, and military measures to stabilize Iraq and help the country
    achieve the desired end-state: a constitutional, representative Iraqi
    government that respects civil rights and has security forces sufficient
    to maintain domestic order and keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven for
    terrorists. To support these goals, the United States initially led, and
    later assisted, Iraq's political transition from a dictatorship to a
    democratically elected government. The United States currently has
    committed about 138,000 military personnel to the U.S.-led Multinational
    Force in Iraq (MNF-I). The Department of Defense (DOD) has reported
    obligations of about $227 billion for U.S. military operations in Iraq for
    fiscal years 2003 through June 2006. U.S. assistance appropriated for
    Iraqi security forces and law enforcement has grown from $3.24 billion in
    January 2004 to about $13.7 billion in June 2006.1 Over the past 3 years,
    worsening security conditions have made it difficult for the United States
    to achieve its goals in Iraq.

    In this statement, we discuss (1) the trends in the security environment
    in Iraq, and (2) progress in developing Iraqi security forces, as reported
    by DOD and the State Department. We also present questions for
    congressional oversight. To examine trends in Iraq's security situation,
    we reviewed reports by DOD, State, the United Nations (UN), and
    nongovernmental organizations, as well as transcripts of MNF-I and U.S.
    embassy Baghdad press conferences and interviews. Although we reviewed
    classified documents during our completed and ongoing Iraq-related
    engagements, the information in this statement is based on unclassified
    documents only. We also obtained and assessed MNF-I data on
    enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners from
    the Defense Intelligence Agency. We determined that the data were
    sufficiently reliable for establishing general trends in the number of
    attacks. To assess progress in developing Iraqi security forces, we
    reviewed DOD and State reports, as well as MNF-I guidance on Iraqi
    readiness assessments. Because of the broad congressional interest in this
    issue, we performed this work under my authority as the Comptroller
    General of the United States to conduct reviews on my initiative. The work
    was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
    standards.

    Summary

    Since June 2003, the overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated
    and grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and,
    more recently, the growing Sunni/Shi'a sectarian strife, which has grown
    since the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra.
    Enemy-initiated attacks generally have increased around major religious or
    political events, including Ramadan and elections. Attack levels also
    follow a seasonal pattern, increasing through the spring and summer and
    decreasing in the winter months. According to MNF-I data, attack levels in
    July 2006 were the highest to date. Despite coalition efforts and the
    efforts of the newly formed Iraqi government, insurgents continue to
    demonstrate the ability to recruit new fighters, supply themselves, and
    attack coalition and Iraqi security forces. The deteriorating conditions
    threaten continued progress in U.S. and other international efforts to
    assist Iraq in the political and economic areas. In July 2006, the State
    Department reported to Congress that the recent upturn in violence had
    hindered efforts to engage fully with Iraqi partners. State noted that a
    baseline of security was a prerequisite for moving forward on the
    political and economic tasks essential to achieving the conditions for
    withdrawing U.S. forces. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi'a militias
    have contributed to an increase in sectarian strife that has resulted in
    large numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals.

    DOD uses three key factors to measure progress in developing capable Iraqi
    security forces and transferring security responsibilities to them and the
    Iraqi government: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) the
    number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed
    responsibility for security of specific geographic areas, and (3) the
    assessed capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and
    aggregate Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) reports. From July 2005 to
    August 2006, the State Department reported that the number of trained and
    equipped Iraqi security forces had increased from about 174,000 to
    294,000. However, these numbers do not provide a complete picture of the
    units' capabilities because they do not give detailed information on the
    status of their equipment, personnel, training, and leadership. They may
    also overstate the number of forces on duty. As of August 2006, 115 Iraqi
    army units had assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations in
    specific areas, and one province, Muthanna, had assumed control for
    security responsibilities. Information on the readiness levels for Iraqi
    security forces is classified. Unit-level readiness reports provide
    important insight into the status of Iraqi army units' personnel,
    training, equipment, leadership, and sustainment/logistical capabilities.
    DOD has provided GAO with classified, aggregate information on overall
    readiness levels and more detailed information on Iraqi units in the lead.
    GAO has been working with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. Such
    information would inform both GAO and the Congress on the capabilities and
    needs of Iraq's security forces.

    We present key questions for congressional oversight, including:

    o What political, economic and security conditions must be achieved before
    the United States can draw down and withdraw military forces from Iraq?

    o Why have security conditions continued to worsen even as Iraq has met
    political milestones, increased the number of trained and equipped forces,
    and increasingly assumed the lead for security?

    o If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not
    reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the
    administration propose for stemming the violence?

    Background

    In May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)2 dissolved the
    military organizations of the former regime and began the process of
    reestablishing or creating new Iraqi security forces, including the police
    and a new Iraqi army. Over time, multinational force commanders assumed
    responsibility in their areas for recruiting and training some Iraqi
    defense and police forces. In October 2003, the multinational force
    outlined a multistep plan for transferring security missions to Iraqi
    security forces. The plan had the objective of gradually decreasing the
    number of coalition forces in conjunction with neutralizing Iraq's
    insurgency and developing Iraqi forces capable of securing their country.

    Citing the growing capability of Iraqi security forces, coalition forces
    in Iraq began to shift responsibilities to Iraqi security forces in
    February 2004, earlier than planned. According to the President, senior
    DOD officials, and multinational force commanders, Iraqi forces were
    unprepared to assume security responsibilities and responded poorly to a
    series of anti-coalition attacks in April 2004. In western and central
    Iraq, insurgents attacked the multinational force in Fallujah, Baghdad, Ar
    Ramadi, Samarra, and Tikrit, while a radical Shi'a militia, the Mahdi
    Army, launched operations to dislodge multinational forces and occupy
    cities from Baghdad to Basra in the south. Although some Iraqi forces
    fought alongside coalition forces, other units abandoned their posts and
    responsibilities and, in some cases, assisted the insurgency. MNF-I
    identified a number of problems that contributed to the collapse of Iraqi
    security forces, including problems in training and equipping them.

    In May 2004, the President issued a National Security Presidential
    Directive, which stated that, after the transition of power to the Iraqi
    government, DOD would be responsible for U.S. activities relating to
    security and military operations. The Presidential directive established
    that the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) would direct all U.S. government
    efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi security forces. In the summer
    of 2004, MNF-I developed and began implementing a comprehensive campaign
    plan, which elaborated and refined the original strategy for transferring
    security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. In April 2006, MNF-I revised
    the campaign plan and, in conjunction with the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad,
    issued a new Joint Campaign Plan that contains the goal of transitioning
    security responsibility from MNF-I to the Iraqi security forces and
    government. Further details on the campaign plan are classified.3 In late
    August 2006, the MNF-I Commanding General said that the United States is
    helping Iraq build a force to deal with its current security threats of
    international terrorism and insurgency. He noted, however, that the Iraqi
    government is developing a long-term security plan to shape the type of
    armed forces that the country will need 5 to 10 years from now.

    Trends in Security Conditions

    Since June 2003, overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and
    grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and more
    recent Sunni/Shi'a sectarian strife after the February 2006 bombing of the
    Golden Mosque in Samarra.4 The deteriorating conditions threaten continued
    progress in U.S. and other international efforts to assist Iraq in the
    political and economic areas. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi'a
    militias have contributed to an increase in sectarian strife and large
    numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals.

    Deteriorating Security Threatens U.S. and International Efforts to Assist
    Iraqi Political and Economic Development

    Enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners have
    continued to increase through July 2006 (see fig. 1). Since 2003,
    enemy-initiated attacks have increased around major religious or political
    events, including Ramadan5 and elections. Attack levels also follow a
    seasonal pattern, increasing through the spring and summer and decreasing
    in the fall and winter months. Overall, attacks increased by 23 percent
    from 2004 to 2005. After declining in the fall of 2005, the number of
    attacks rose to the highest level ever in July 2006. Total attacks
    reported from January 2006 through July 2006 were about 57 percent higher
    than the total reported during the same period in 2005. These data show
    significant increases in attacks against coalition forces, who remain the
    primary targets, as well as civilians and Iraqi security forces. According
    to a June 2006 UN report,6 an increasingly complex armed opposition
    continues to be capable of maintaining a consistently high level of
    violent activity across Iraq. Baghdad, Ninewa, Salahuddin, Anbar, and
    Diyala have been experiencing the worst of the violence. Other areas,
    particularly Basra and Kirkuk, have witnessed increased tension and a
    growing number of violent

    incidents. In August 2006,7 DOD reported that breaking the cycle of
    violence is the most pressing immediate goal of coalition and Iraqi
    operations.

    Figure 1: Enemy-initiated Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi
    Partners, May 2003 through July 2006

    The security situation has deteriorated even as Iraq has made progress in
    meeting key political milestones and in developing its security forces.
    Since the CPA transferred power to the Iraqi interim government in June
    2004, Iraq has held an election for a transitional government in January
    2005, a referendum on the constitution in October 2005, and an election
    for a Council of Representatives in December 2005 that led to the
    formation of a new government in May 2006 (see fig. 2). However, according
    to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the December
    2005 elections appeared to heighten sectarian tensions and polarize
    sectarian divides. According to a U.S. Institute of Peace report,8 the
    focus on ethnic and sectarian identity has sharpened as a result of Iraq's
    political process, while nationalism and a sense of Iraqi identity have
    weakened.

    Figure 2: Political Milestones in Iraq Compared with Enemy-initiated
    Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi Partners, May 2003 through
    July 2006

    Moreover, according to the Director of National Intelligence's February
    2006 report, Iraqi security forces are experiencing difficulty in managing
    ethnic and sectarian divisions among their units and personnel. In
    addition, the DIA Director reported that many elements of the Iraqi
    security forces are loyal to sectarian and party interests. According to
    DOD's August 2006 report, sectarian lines among Iraqi security forces are
    drawn along geographic lines, with Sunni, Shi'a, or Kurdish soldiers
    mostly serving in units located in geographic areas familiar to their
    group. Moreover, according to the report, commanders at the battalion
    level tend to command only soldiers of their own sectarian or regional
    background.

    On August 7, 2006, MNF-I and Iraqi security forces began phase II of
    Operation Together Forward. The operation is an effort to reduce the level
    of murders, kidnappings, assassinations, terrorism, and sectarian violence
    in Baghdad and to reinforce the Iraqi government's control of the city. On
    August 30, 2006, the MNF-I Commanding General said that he was pleased
    with the operation's progress, but that there was a long way to go in
    bringing security to the neighborhoods of Baghdad. U.S. intelligence
    assessments of this operation's impact are classified.

    The State Department reported in July 2006 that the recent upturn in
    violence has hindered the U.S. government's efforts to engage fully with
    its Iraqi partners and to move forward on political and economic fronts.
    State noted that a baseline of security was a prerequisite for moving
    forward on these fronts, which are essential to achieving the right
    conditions for withdrawing U.S. forces. For example, Iraqi government
    efforts to foster reconciliation have become more difficult with the
    increase in sectarian divisions and violence during the spring and summer
    of 2006. According to DOD's August 2006 report, security issues-such as
    the attempted kidnapping of a deputy minister and threats to personnel who
    work with embassy teams-have made some ministers reluctant to have U.S.
    personnel visit them. The report also noted that the security situation in
    some provinces has hampered interaction between U.S.-led Provincial
    Reconstruction Teams9 and provincial leaders. Moreover, the UN reported
    that the lack of security has hampered reconstruction efforts. The UN
    reported that the diplomatic community remains under serious threat as
    embassy staff have been abducted and killed and facilities attacked. The
    UN noted that improved security is central to the normal ability of
    international agencies to provide assistance to the government and people
    of Iraq.

    As we reported in July 2006, the poor security conditions have also
    hindered U.S. and Iraqi government efforts to revitalize Iraq's economy
    and restore essential services in the oil and electricity sectors.
    According to a State Department report,10 during the week of August 16-22,
    2006, Iraq was producing 2.17 million barrels of oil per day. This figure
    is below the Iraqi Oil Ministry's goal of 2.5 million barrels of oil per
    day and the pre-war level of 2.6 million barrels per day. Over the same
    time period, electricity availability averaged 5.9 hours per day in
    Baghdad and 10.7 hours nationwide. Electricity output for the week was
    about 9 percent above the same period in 2005. U.S. officials report that
    major oil pipelines continue to be sabotaged, shutting down oil exports
    and resulting in lost revenues. Current U.S. assistance is focused on
    strengthening the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, which are Ministry
    of Defense forces that protect oil fields and pipelines. Major electrical
    transmission lines have also been repeatedly sabotaged, cutting power to
    parts of the country. Security conditions in Iraq have, in part, led to
    project delays and increased costs for security services. Although it is
    difficult to quantify the costs and delays resulting from poor security
    conditions, both agency and contractor officials acknowledged that
    security costs have diverted a considerable amount of reconstruction
    resources and have led to canceling or reducing the scope of some
    reconstruction projects.

    Sunni Insurgency and Shi'a Militias Contribute to Increased Sectarian
    Violence

    Although the Sunni insurgency has remained strong and resilient, the
    presence and influence of Shi'a militias have grown and led to increased
    sectarian violence. According to a July 2006 State Department report, the
    Sunni insurgency remains a pressing problem in Iraq. However, in recent
    months, Shi'a militia groups have grown more prominent and threaten Iraq's
    stability.11 The increase in sectarian violence has led to an increasing
    number of Iraqis fleeing their homes. According to the U.S. Ambassador to
    Iraq, the demobilization of Shi'a militias requires a corresponding
    reduction in the Sunni insurgency.12

    Sunni Insurgency Remains Strong and Resilient

    Despite coalition efforts and the efforts of the newly formed Iraqi
    government, insurgents continue to demonstrate the ability to recruit new
    fighters, supply themselves, and attack coalition and Iraqi security
    forces. According to a July 2006 State Department report, the Sunni
    insurgency remains a pressing problem in Iraq, even after the death of Abu
    Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, in early June 2006. As
    DOD recently reported, al-Qaeda in Iraq remains able to conduct operations
    due to its resilient, semi-autonomous cellular structure of command and
    control. The Sunni insurgency consists of former Baathists, whose goal is
    to return to power; terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, its
    affiliates in the Mujahadeen Shura Council, and Ansar al Sunna; and
    various other groups that rely on violence to achieve their objectives.

    Sunni insurgents have no distinct leader but share the goal of
    destabilizing the Iraqi government to pursue their individual and, at
    times, conflicting goals. Although these groups have divergent goals, some
    collaborate at the tactical and operational levels. DOD has reported that
    the relationships among insurgents, terrorists, and criminal opportunists
    are blurred at times but that the ideological rifts between terrorists and
    other resistance groups remain. DOD also reports that many insurgent
    groups employ a dual-track political and military strategy to subvert
    emerging institutions and to infiltrate and co-opt security and political
    organizations. These groups attempt to leverage the political process to
    address their core concerns and demands while attacking coalition and
    Iraqi security forces.

    Presence and Influence of Shi'a Militias Have Grown

    The presence and influence of Shi'a militia groups have grown in recent
    months, as they have become more prominent and acted in ways that threaten
    Iraq's stability. According to the CENTCOM Commander, as of early August
    2006, these militias are the largest contributors to sectarian violence in
    Iraq. As DOD reported in August 2006, the threat posed by Shi'a militias
    is growing and represents a significant challenge for the Iraqi
    government. The Shi'a militias that are affecting the security situation
    the most are the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organization.

    o Mahdi Army: Led by radical Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, this group was
    responsible for attacks against the coalition and two uprisings in April
    2004 and August 2004. The militia committed abuses against Sunni
    civilians, which have exacerbated sectarian tensions, and were implicated
    in unrest following the February bombing in Samarra. Evidence exists that
    the Mahdi Army are supplied by sources outside Iraq, most notably Iran. As
    of June 2006, Sadr followers headed four of Iraq's 40 ministries-the
    ministries of health, transportation, agriculture, and tourism and
    antiquities. As DOD recently reported, this militia has popular support in
    Baghdad and Iraq's southern provinces and is tolerated by elements in the
    Iraqi government.

    o Badr Organization: This Shi'a militia group is the paramilitary wing of
    the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a prominent
    political party in the new government. The party was founded in Iran
    during the Iran-Iraq war and retains strong ties to Iran. According to
    DOD, the Badr Organization received financial and material support from
    Iran, and individuals from Badr have been implicated in death squads. The
    Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq is one of the two
    largest Shi'a parties in parliament. One of Iraq's two deputy presidents
    and the Minister of Finance are party members.

    According to the CENTCOM Commander, Shi'a militias must be controlled
    because they are nonstate actors that have the attributes of the state,
    yet bear no responsibility for their actions. In many cases, according to
    DOD, militias provide protection for people and religious sites, sometimes
    operating in conjunction with the Iraqi police in areas where the Iraqi
    police are perceived to provide inadequate support. According to a May
    2006 DOD report,13 Shi'a militias seek to place members into army and
    police units as a way to serve their interests. This is particularly
    evident in the Shi'a dominated south where militia members have hindered
    the implementation of law enforcement. Militia leaders also influence the
    political process through intimidation and hope to gain influence with the
    Iraqi people through politically based social welfare programs. In areas
    where they provide social services and contribute to local security, they
    operate openly and with popular support.

    According to the Director of National Intelligence, Iran provides guidance
    and training to select Iraqi Shi'a political groups and provides weapons
    and training to Shi'a militant groups to enable anticoalition attacks.
    Iran also has contributed to the increasing lethality and effectiveness of
    anticoalition attacks by enabling Shi'a militants to build improvised
    explosive devices with explosively formed projectiles, similar to those
    developed by Lebanese Hezbollah. Iranian support for Shi'a militias
    reinforces Sunni fears of Iranian domination, further elevating sectarian
    violence.

    According to the August 2006 DOD report, Sunni Arabs do not have formally
    organized militias. Instead, they rely on neighborhood watches, Sunni
    insurgents, and increasingly, al-Qaeda in Iraq. The rise of sectarian
    attacks is driving some Sunni and Shi'a civilians in Baghdad and in
    ethnically mixed provinces to support militias. Such support is likely to
    continue, according to DOD's report, in areas where the population
    perceives Iraqi institutions and forces as unable to provide essential
    services or meet security requirements.

    Growing Sectarian Violence Has Led to Increased Civilian Deaths and
    Displacement

    According to DOD's August 2006 report, rising sectarian strife defines the
    emerging nature of violence in mid-2006, with the core conflict in Iraq
    now a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to control key
    areas in Baghdad, create or protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic
    resources, and impose their own respective political and religious
    agendas. The UN reported in March 2006 that the deteriorating security
    situation is evidenced by increased levels of sectarian strife and the
    sectarian nature of the violence, particularly in ethnically mixed areas.
    Figure 3 shows the ethnic distribution of the population in Iraq. Baghdad,
    Kirkuk, Mosul, and southwest of Basra are key ethnically mixed areas.

    Figure 3: Ethnic Distribution in Iraq

    In June 2006, the UN reported that much of the sectarian violence has been
    committed by both sides of the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian divide and has
    resulted in increased civilian deaths. The UN reported that the number of
    Iraqi civilian casualties continues to increase, with a total of about
    14,300 civilians killed in Iraq from January to June 2006. The
    overwhelming majority of casualties were reported in Baghdad, according to
    the report. Specifically targeted groups included prominent Sunni and
    Shi'a Iraqis, government workers and their  families, members of the
    middle class (such as merchants and academics), people working for or
    associated with MNF-I, and Christians. According to the UN, daily reports
    of intercommunal intimidation and murder include regular incidents of
    bodies of Sunni and Shi'a men found to be tortured and summarily executed
    in Baghdad and its surrounding areas. Violence against Kurds and Arabs has
    also been reported in Kirkuk, while the abduction and intimidation of
    ordinary Iraqis is a growing problem. According to the report, repeated
    bombings against civilians, mosques, and more recently against churches
    are creating fear, animosity, and feelings of revenge within Iraq's
    sectarian communities.

    Moreover, according to a July 2006 UN report,14 the increase in sectarian
    violence has resulted in a growing number of Iraqis fleeing their homes.
    The UN estimated that about 150,000 individuals had been displaced as of
    June 30, 2006. The UN reported that people left their community of origin
    primarily because of direct or indirect threats against them or attacks on
    family members and their community. According to the report, displaced
    persons are vulnerable, lack many basic rights, and compete for limited
    services. This in turn can increase intercommunal animosities and can
    generate further displacement.

    Shi'a Militia Demobilization Depends on Reduction in Sunni Insurgency

    Although U.S. and UN officials recognize the importance of demobilizing
    the militias, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq has stated that the
    demobilization of the Shi'a militias depends on a reduction in the Sunni
    insurgency. According to the Ambassador, a comprehensive plan for
    demobilizing all the militias and reintegrating them into Iraqi society is
    needed to ensure Iraq's stability and success. However, the Sunni
    insurgent groups now see themselves as protectors of the Sunni community,
    and the Shi'a militias see themselves as protectors of the Shi'a
    community. As DOD reported in August 2006, Sunni and Shi'a extremists are
    locked in mutually reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife, with each
    portraying themselves as the defenders of their respective sectarian
    groups.

    DOD and State Progress Reports Provide Limited Information on the
    Development of Iraqi Security Forces

    DOD and State report progress in developing capable Iraqi security forces
    and transferring security responsibilities to them and the Iraqi
    government in three key areas: (1) the number of trained and equipped
    forces, (2) the number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that
    have assumed responsibility for security of specific geographic areas, and
    (3) the assessed capabilities of operational units, as reported in
    aggregate Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) reports. While all three
    provide some information on the development of Iraqi security forces, they
    do not provide detailed information on specific capabilities that affect
    individual units' readiness levels. Unit-level TRA reports provide that
    information. We are currently working with DOD to obtain these reports
    because they would more fully inform both GAO and the Congress on the
    capabilities and needs of Iraq's security forces.

    Increases in Training and Equipping Iraqi Security Forces and Transferring
    Security Responsibilities to Them and the Iraqi Government

    DOD and State have reported progress toward the current goal of training
    and equipping about 325,000 Iraqi security forces by December 2006. As
    shown in table 1, the State Department reports that the number of trained
    army and police forces has increased from about 174,000 in July 2005 to
    about 294,000 as of August 2006. According to State, the Ministries of
    Defense and Interior are on track to complete the initial training and
    equipping of all their authorized end-strength forces by the end of 2006.
    The authorized end-strength is 137,000 military personnel in the Ministry
    of Defense and about 188,000 in Ministry of Interior police and other
    forces. However, as we previously reported,15 the number of trained and
    equipped security forces does not provide a complete picture of their
    capabilities and may overstate the number of forces on duty. For example,
    Ministry of Interior data include police who are absent without leave.
    Ministry of Defense data exclude absent military personnel.

    Table 1: Reported Number of Trained and Equipped Ministry of Defense and
    Ministry of Interior Forces, July 2005, January 2006, and August 2006

         Ministry and Component       July 2005 January 2006 August 2006
    Ministry of Defense Forces  Army               78,200     105,600 127,200a
                                   Air Force             200         500      700
                                   Navy                  700         800    1,100
                                   Subtotalb          79,100     106,900  129,000
    Ministry of Interior Forces Police             64,100      82,400  115,500
                                   Other forces       30,700      38,000   49,600
                                   Subtotalc          94,800     120,400  165,100
                                   Total             173,900     227,300  294,100

    Source: State Department Iraq Weekly Status Reports

    Note: Ministry of Defense forces are defined as operational. Ministry of
    Interior Forces are defined as trained and equipped.

    aArmy number includes Special Operations Forces and Support Forces.

    bUnauthorized absence personnel are not included in these numbers.

    cUnauthorized absence personnel are included in these numbers.

    In spring 2005, MNF-I recognized that the number of trained and equipped
    forces did not reflect their capability to assume responsibility for
    security. MNF-I began to develop and refine the TRA system as a means of
    assessing the capabilities of Iraqi security forces.16 It also started a
    program to place transition teams with Iraqi army and special police
    units.

    DOD also assesses progress in the number of Iraqi army units and
    provincial governments that have assumed responsibility for the security
    of specific geographic areas in Iraq. The joint MNF-I/U.S. Embassy
    Campaign Plan calls for the Iraqi army to assume the lead for
    counterinsurgency operations in specific geographic areas and Iraqi civil
    authorities to assume security responsibility for their provinces. The
    transition of security responsibilities concludes when the Iraq government
    assumes responsibility for security throughout Iraq.17

    As shown in table 2, DOD reports that an increasing number of Iraqi army
    units are capable of leading counterinsurgency operations in specific
    geographic areas. DOD reports more detailed information on this transition
    in a classified format. However, when an Iraqi army unit assumes the lead,
    it does not mean that the unit is capable of conducting independent
    operations since it may need to develop additional capabilities and may
    require the support of coalition forces. According to DOD's May 2006
    report, it will take time before a substantial number of Iraqi units are
    assessed as fully independent and requiring no assistance considering the
    need for further development of Iraqi logistical elements, ministry
    capacity and capability, intelligence structures, and command and control.

    Table 2: Reported Progress in Transferring Security Responsibilities to
    Iraqi Army Combat Units and Provincial Governments, January 2006 and
    August 2006

             Type of Security Transition       January 2006 August 2006 Goal
    Iraqi army units leading                Divisions              2    5   10
    counterinsurgency operations in         Brigades               8   25   36
    specific areas                          Battalions            37   85 114a
    Number of provinces that have assumed              0           1   18
    security responsibilities

    Sources: DOD and State Department reports.

    aIncludes Iraqi army and special operations battalions.

    Table 2 also shows that one provincial government-Muthanna-had assumed
    responsibility for security operations, as of August 2006. According to a
    July 2006 State Department report, when a provincial government can assume
    security responsibilities depends on the (1) threat level in the province,
    (2) capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, (3) capabilities of the
    provincial government, and (4) posture of MNF-I forces, that is, MNF-I's
    ability to respond to major threats, if needed. Once the provincial
    government assumes security responsibilities, the provincial governor and
    police are in charge of domestic security. According to an MNF-I official,
    MNF-I forces will then move out of all urban areas and assume a supporting
    role. In August 2006, DOD reported that security responsibility for as
    many as nine of Iraq's provinces could transition to Iraqi government
    authority by the end of 2006.

    Unit-level TRA Reports Provide More Insight into Iraqi Capabilities and
    Development Needs Than Do Aggregate Data on Overall TRA Ratings

    DOD has provided GAO with aggregate information on the overall TRA levels
    for Iraqi security forces and the number of Iraqi units in the lead for
    counterinsurgency operations. DOD's aggregate data on the capabilities and
    readiness of Iraqi security forces do not provide information on
    shortfalls in personnel, command and control, equipment, and leadership.
    Unit-level TRA reports provide more insight into Iraqi army capabilities
    and development needs in personnel, leadership, and logistics than do the
    overall TRA levels that DOD reports in classified format.18 The TRA rating
    for individual Iraqi army units is a key factor in determining the ability
    of the unit to conduct and assume the lead for counterinsurgency
    operations.

    According to Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) guidance,19 the TRA is
    intended to provide commanders with a method to consistently evaluate
    Iraqi units, as well as to identify factors hindering progress, determine
    resource issues, make resource allocation decisions, and determine when
    Iraqi army units are prepared to assume the lead for security
    responsibilities. The TRA is prepared jointly on a monthly basis by the
    unit's military transition team chief and Iraqi security forces commander.

    In completing TRA reports, commanders assess the unit's capabilities in
    six subcategories-personnel, command and control, training,
    sustainment/logistics, equipment, and leadership (see app. 1). After
    considering the unit's subcategory ratings, commanders then give each
    Iraqi army unit an overall TRA rating that describes the unit's overall
    readiness to assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations. The overall
    ratings go from TRA level 1 through TRA level 4. To be able to assume the
    lead for counterinsurgency operations, Iraqi army units are required to
    obtain an overall rating of TRA level 2 as assessed by their commanders.
    Commanders also provide a narrative assessment that describes key
    shortfalls and impediments to the unit's ability to assume the lead for
    counterinsurgency operations and estimate the number of months needed for
    the unit to assume the lead. The purpose of the narrative is to clarify
    and provide additional support for the overall TRA rating. The aggregate
    data on overall TRA ratings for Iraqi security forces are classified.

    DOD has provided us with classified data on the aggregate number of Iraqi
    units at each TRA level and more detailed information on which Iraqi army
    units have assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations. We are
    currently working with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. These
    unit-level reports would provide GAO and Congress with more complete
    information on the status of developing effective Iraqi security forces.
    Specifically, unit-level TRA reports would allow us to (1) determine if
    the TRA reports are useful and if changes are needed; (2) verify if
    aggregate data on overall TRA ratings reflect unit-level TRA reports; and
    (3) determine if shortfalls exist in key areas, such as personnel,
    equipment, logistics, training, and leadership.

    Questions for Congressional Oversight

    1.What are the key political, economic, and security conditions that must
    be achieved before U.S. forces can draw down and ultimately withdraw from
    Iraq? What target dates, if any, has the administration established for
    drawing down U.S. forces?

    2.The continued deterioration of security conditions in Iraq has hindered
    U.S. political and economic efforts in Iraq. According to the State
    Department, a baseline of security is a prerequisite for moving forward on
    the political and economic tasks essential to achieving the right
    conditions for withdrawing U.S. forces.

    o Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate in Iraq even as
    the country has met political milestones, increased the number of trained
    and equipped security forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for
    security?

    o What is the baseline of security that is required for moving forward on
    political and economic tasks? What progress, if any, can be made in the
    political and economic areas without a significant improvement in current
    security conditions?

    o If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not
    reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the
    administration propose for stemming the violence?

    3.In February 2006, the Director of National Intelligence reported that
    Iraqi security forces were experiencing difficulty in managing ethnic and
    sectarian divisions among their units and personnel. The DIA Director
    reported that many elements of the Iraqi security forces are loyal to
    sectarian and party interests.

    o How does the U.S. government assess the extent to which personnel in the
    Iraqi security forces are loyal to groups other than the Iraqi government
    or are operating along sectarian lines, rather than as unified national
    forces? What do these assessments show?

    o How would DOD modify its program to train and equip Iraqi security
    forces if evidence emerges that Iraqi military and police are supporting
    sectarian rather than national interests?

    4.MNF-I established the TRA system to assess the capabilities and
    readiness of Iraqi security forces.

    o How does DOD assess the reliability of TRAs and ensure that they present
    an accurate picture of Iraq security forces' capabilities and readiness?

    o At what TRA rating level would Iraqi army units not require any U.S.
    military support? What U.S. military support would Iraqi units still
    require at TRA levels 1 and 2?

    o How does DOD use unit-level TRAs to assess shortfalls in Iraqi
    capabilities? What do DOD assessments show about the developmental needs
    of Iraqi security forces?

    5.In late August 2006, the MNF-I Commanding General said that the United
    States is helping Iraq build a force to deal with its current security
    threats of international terrorism and insurgency. However, he noted that
    the Iraqi government is developing a long-term security plan to shape the
    type of armed forces the country will need 5 to 10 years from now.

    o What are the current resource requirements for developing Iraqi security
    forces capable of dealing with international terrorism and insurgency?
    What have been the U.S. and Iraqi financial contributions to this effort
    thus far? What U.S. and Iraqi contributions will be needed over the next
    several years?

    o What are the projected resource requirements for the future Iraqi force?
    What are the projected U.S. and Iraqi financial contributions for this
    effort?

    Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    For further information, please contact Joseph A. Christoff on (202)
    512-8979. Key contributors to this testimony were Nanette J. Barton, Lynn
    Cothern, Tracey Cross, Martin De Alteriis, Whitney Havens, Brent Helt,
    Rhonda Horried, Judith McCloskey, Mary Moutsos, Jason Pogacnik, and Jena
    Sinkfield.

    Appendix I

    Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Report

    This appendix provides information on the TRA reports used to assess the
    capabilities of Iraqi army units. Commanders provide ratings in each of 6
    subcategories (see fig. 4). For each subcategory, a green rating
    corresponds to TRA level 1, yellow to TRA level 2, orange to TRA level 3,
    and red to TRA level 4. The commanders consider the subcategory ratings in
    deciding the overall TRA rating for each unit.

    Figure 4: Transition Readiness Assessment Form for Iraqi Army Combat Units

    (320366)

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

    Testimony

    For the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and
    International Relations; House Committee on Government Reform

    For Release on Delivery

    Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT Monday, September 11, 2006

    STABILIZING IRAQ

    An Assessment of the Security Situation

    Statement for the Record by David M. Walker Comptroller General of the
    United States

    GAO-06-1094T

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-1094T .

    To view the full product, including the scope
    and methodology, click on the link above.

    For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff, (202) 512-8979,
    christoffj@gao.gov.

    Highlights of GAO-06-1094T , a statement for the record to the
    Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
    Relations; Committee on Government Reform; House of Representatives

    September 11, 2006

    STABILIZING IRAQ

    An Assessment of the Security Situation

    From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, U.S. government agencies have
    reported significant costs for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction
    efforts in Iraq. In addition, the United States currently has committed
    about 138,000 military personnel to the U.S.-led Multinational Force in
    Iraq (MNF-I). Over the past 3 years, worsening security conditions have
    made it difficult for the United States to achieve its goals in Iraq.

    In this statement, we discuss (1) the trends in the security environment
    in Iraq, and (2) progress in developing Iraqi security forces, as reported
    by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State. We also present key
    questions for congressional oversight, including:

               o  What political, economic, and security conditions must be
               achieved before the United States can draw down and withdraw?

               o  Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate even as
               Iraq has met political milestones, increased the number of trained
               and equipped forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for
               security?

               o  If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are
               not reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any,
               will the administration propose for stemming the violence?

    Since June 2003, the overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated
    and grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and
    Sunni/Shi'a sectarian strife, which has grown since the February 2006
    bombing in Samarra. As shown in the figure below, attacks against the
    coalition and its Iraqi partners reached an all time high during July
    2006. The deteriorating conditions threaten the progress of U.S. and
    international efforts to assist Iraq in the political and economic areas.
    In July 2006, the State Department reported that the recent upturn in
    violence has hindered efforts to engage with Iraqi partners and noted that
    a certain level of security was a prerequisite to accomplishing the
    political and economic conditions necessary for U.S. withdrawal. Moreover,
    the Sunni insurgency and Shi'a militias have contributed to growing
    sectarian strife that has resulted in increased numbers of Iraqi civilian
    deaths and displaced individuals.

    DOD uses three factors to measure progress in developing capable Iraqi
    security forces and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi
    government: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) the number
    of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed
    responsibility for security in specific geographic areas, and (3) the
    capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and aggregate
    Transition Readiness Assessments (TRA). Although the State Department
    reported that the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces has
    increased, these numbers do not address their capabilities. As of August
    2006, 115 Iraqi army units had assumed the lead for counterinsurgency
    operations in specific areas, and one province had assumed control for
    security. Unit-level TRA reports provide insight into the Iraqi army
    units' training, equipment, and logistical capabilities. GAO is working
    with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. Such information would
    inform the Congress on the capabilities and needs of Iraq's security
    forces.

    Enemy-initiated Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi Partners, as
    of July 2006

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