Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face  
Challenges (20-SEP-06, GAO-06-1091T).				 
                                                                 
The U.S. commercial aviation industry has had an extraordinary	 
safety record in recent years. However, expected increases in	 
air-traffic--including the introduction of new vehicles into the 
national airspace, such as unmanned vehicles and very light	 
jets--and human resource issues, present challenges that have the
potential to strain the existing safety oversight system. GAO's  
testimony focuses on these questions: (1) How is the Federal	 
Aviation Administration (FAA) ensuring that the areas of highest 
safety risk are addressed? (2) How is FAA ensuring that its staff
maintain the skills and knowledge to consistently carry out the  
agency's oversight programs? and (3) What are the key safety	 
challenges facing FAA? This statement is based on our recent	 
reports on FAA's inspection oversight programs, industry	 
partnership programs, and enforcement and training programs. It  
is also based on interviews with FAA and relevant industry	 
officials.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-1091T					        
    ACCNO:   A61201						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong   
but Face Challenges						 
     DATE:   09/20/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Aircraft accidents 				 
	     Aircraft industry					 
	     Airlines						 
	     Commercial aviation				 
	     Employee training					 
	     Employees						 
	     Inspection 					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Risk assessment					 
	     Safety standards					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Transportation safety				 
	     FAA Air Transportation Oversight System		 
	     FAA Surveillance and Evaluation Program		 

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GAO-06-1091T

     

     * Background
     * FAA's Safety Oversight System Includes Programs That Focus o
          * FAA's Oversight Focuses on Leveraging Inspector Resources, W
          * Enforcement Is an Important Element of FAA's Safety Oversigh
          * Data Limitations and Lack of Evaluations Limit FAA's Ability
     * Training Is an Integral Part of FAA's Safety Oversight Syste
     * FAA Faces a Number of Challenges in Overseeing Aviation Safe
          * FAA Faces Challenges in Human Resources
          * FAA Faces Challenges in Implementing Advanced Technology to
          * FAA Faces Challenges in Having Controllers Prepared for the
          * FAA's Inspector and Controller Workload Will Be Challenged b
          * FAA Needs to Retain Its Leadership Role in International Saf
     * GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
     * Appendix I: Extent to Which FAA Follows Effective Management
     * Appendix II: Deployment of Surface Detection Equipment at Ai
     * Related GAO Products
          * Order by Mail or Phone

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Wednesday, September 20, 2006

AVIATION SAFETY

FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face Challenges

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. Director, Physical Infrastructure
Issues

GAO-06-1091T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on issues related to
aviation safety. The U.S. commercial aviation industry has had an
extraordinary safety record in recent years. In order to maintain a high
level of safety, it is important for the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to have a safety oversight system that is comprehensive, efficient,
and effective and can provide an early warning of hazards that can lead to
accidents. It is equally important to have a skilled, well-trained
workforce to implement and monitor this safety oversight system. However,
expected increases in air traffic-including the introduction of new
vehicles into the national air space, such as unmanned vehicles and very
light jets-and human resource issues present challenges that have the
potential to strain the existing safety oversight system. My testimony
today focuses on these questions: (1) How is FAA ensuring that the areas
of highest safety risk are addressed? (2) How is FAA ensuring that its
staff maintain the skills and knowledge to consistently carry out the
agency's oversight programs? and (3) What are the key safety challenges
facing FAA? We will also discuss our related recommendations that FAA has
not fully addressed. This statement is based on our recent reports on
FAA's inspection oversight programs, industry partnership programs, and
enforcement and training programs. Additionally, we met with FAA officials
and relevant industry groups and reviewed their documentation to obtain
information on challenges facing FAA. We conducted this work in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Following is a summary of our findings:

           o  FAA's safety oversight system has programs that focus on
           identifying and mitigating risk through a system safety approach,
           leveraging resources, and enforcing safety regulations, but
           concerns exist with each aspect of the system. FAA's system safety
           approach for overseeing airlines-through the Air Transportation
           Oversight System (ATOS) and Surveillance and Evaluation Program
           (SEP)-has many strengths. Both programs, for example, use
           inspection staff efficiently by prioritizing workload based on
           areas of highest risk and ensuring that corrective actions have
           been taken. However, the full potential of SEP is not being
           realized because the inspection workload for the 81 airlines
           included in SEP is heavily oriented to nonrisk based activities.
           Of additional concern is that recent and planned changes to
           transfer about 100 airlines from SEP to ATOS will affect inspector
           workload that may affect FAA's capability to oversee the aviation
           industry. FAA leverages resources and saves money through its
           "designee" programs, in which individuals and organizations have
           been delegated to act on FAA's behalf to perform about 90 percent
           of certification-related activities. The designee program allows
           FAA to better concentrate its limited staff resources on the most
           safety-critical functions. However, planned changes to some
           designee programs that would create a new "organizational
           designation authorization" will result in FAA focusing on the
           performance of organizations rather than the individuals within
           the organization who carry out the delegated functions. As FAA
           moves from direct oversight of the individuals performing
           delegated activities, it will be important for the agency to have
           valid and reliable data and strong evaluative processes to monitor
           any program changes that have implications for safety. FAA's
           enforcement program, which is an outgrowth of its inspection
           process, is intended to ensure industry compliance with safety
           regulations and is another important element of its safety
           oversight system. A key objective of FAA's policy of assessing
           legal sanctions against entities or individuals that do not comply
           with aviation safety regulations is to deter future violations.
           However, we found that recommendations for sanctions are sometimes
           reduced on the basis of factors that are not associated with the
           merits of the case, and the economic literature on deterrence
           suggests that the goal of preventing future violations is weakened
           when the penalties for violations are lowered for reasons not
           related to the merits of the case. For fiscal years 1993 through
           2003, we found that civil monetary penalties were reduced by 52
           percent from a total of $334 million to $162 million. It is
           important for FAA to have effective evaluative processes and
           relevant data on its numerous safety programs so that the agency
           has assurance the programs are having their intended effect,
           especially as FAA's oversight becomes more indirect and as
           significant program changes are made. Our most recent work has
           shown the lack of evaluative processes and limitations with data
           for FAA's SEP program, designee programs, industry partnership
           programs, and enforcement program.

           o  FAA has made training an integral part of its safety oversight
           system and has established mandatory training requirements for its
           workforce as well as designees, but several actions could improve
           the results of its training efforts. We have reported that FAA has
           generally followed effective management practices for planning,
           developing, delivering, and assessing the impact of its technical
           training for safety inspectors, although some practices are still
           early in the implementation phase. For example, in developing its
           training curriculum for inspectors, FAA followed effective
           management practices, such as developing courses that support
           changes in inspection procedures resulting from regulatory changes
           or agency initiatives. On the other hand, FAA develops technical
           courses on an ad hoc basis rather than as part of an overall
           curriculum for each type of inspector, such as inspectors of
           operations or cabin safety, because the agency has not
           systematically identified the technical skills and competencies
           each type of inspector needs to effectively perform inspections.
           FAA has recognized the need for improvements to its training
           program in this and other areas and has begun taking some action
           to address these and other training issues.

           o  FAA faces a number of key safety challenges, including meeting
           its performance target for commercial air carrier safety, which it
           will not meet in fiscal year 2006 because of recent fatal
           accidents. The challenge of meeting its performance target will be
           exacerbated by other challenges in human capital management, the
           acquisition and operation of new safety enhancing technologies,
           and new types of vehicles, such as very light jets (VLJ), that may
           place additional workload strains on FAA inspectors and air
           traffic controllers. FAA's ability to oversee aviation safety will
           be affected by recent and anticipated trends in inspector and air
           traffic controller attrition. For example, FAA estimates it will
           lose 10,291, or about 70 percent of the controller workforce, over
           the next 10 years, primarily due to retirements. FAA intends to
           enhance runway safety by relying on new advanced technologies that
           are expected to reduce runway accidents. However, schedule delays
           and cost increases have affected FAA's ability to deploy this
           technology. Finally, if predictions about new types of aviation
           vehicles are borne out, it will change the aviation landscape and
           will require new areas of expertise for FAA's inspectors and
           controllers. For example, the industry predicts there may be as
           many as 5,000 to 10,000 VLJs operating in the national airspace by
           2020, which would further congest the national airspace system
           especially at and near smaller airports, where VLJs are expected
           to be prevalent because of their smaller size.

           Background
			  
			  The U.S. commercial aviation industry, with less than one fatal
           accident per 5 million flights from 2002 through 2005 has an
           extraordinary safety record. However, when passenger airlines have
           accidents or serious incidents, regardless of their rarity, the
           consequences can be tragic. In addition, according to Bureau of
           Transportation Statistics data, flight arrival delays have
           increased from 15 percent in 2003 to 22 percent in 2006. Increases
           in flight delays can be viewed as evidence of strain in the
           aviation system, as a loss of efficiency in the air system is a
           symptom of increased strain. Losses of efficiency and the
           corresponding strain on the system could potentially result in
           hazards that decrease safety. In order to maintain a high level of
           aviation safety, it is critical to have well-established,
           efficient, and effective systems in place to provide an early
           warning of hazards that can lead to accidents.

           FAA has established a number of systems and processes to inspect
           and oversee various aspects of passenger airline safety, such as
           aircraft maintenance and flight operations. In 1998, the agency
           implemented the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), which
           currently oversees 35 commercial airlines and cargo carriers; the
           goal is for ATOS to oversee all commercial passenger and cargo
           airlines. ATOS emphasizes a system safety approach that extends
           beyond periodically checking airlines for compliance with
           regulations to using technical and managerial skills to identify,
           analyze, and control hazards and risks. For example, under ATOS,
           inspectors develop surveillance plans for each airline, based on
           data analysis and risk assessment, and adjust the plans
           periodically based on inspection results. Our review of ATOS's
           early implementation found weaknesses, which FAA addressed by
           improving guidance to inspectors and increasing data usefulness.

           FAA's inspection process for the 81 commercial airlines not
           covered by ATOS has two components. The National Work Program
           Guidelines (NPG) is the original oversight program for these
           airlines. Under NPG, an FAA-wide committee of managers identifies
           an annual minimum set of required inspections to ensure that
           airlines comply with their operating certificates; this process is
           not risk-based. In 2002, FAA added another component, the
           Surveillance and Evaluation Program (SEP), to the inspection
           process to incorporate principles of ATOS into its oversight of
           commercial airlines. The two components are used together to
           establish the number and types of annual inspections for airlines.
           Inspections can encompass many different activities, such as
           visually spot-checking an airplane at a gate, monitoring
           procedures on a scheduled flight, or observing maintenance
           performed on an aircraft. Each year, FAA headquarters establishes
           a baseline number and type of inspections for each airline through
           NPG. Through SEP, teams of FAA inspectors analyze the results of
           an airline's prior inspections at periodic meetings and, based on
           their assessment of specific risks, establish other inspections
           that may be needed.

           Since 1990, FAA has emphasized industry partnership programs that
           allow participants, such as airlines and pilots, to self-report
           violations of safety regulations and help identify safety
           deficiencies and potentially mitigate or avoid fines or other
           legal action. For example, the Voluntary Disclosure Program
           encourages the self-reporting of manufacturing problems and safety
           incidents by participants that can include air carriers and repair
           stations.1

           When violations of statutory and regulatory requirements are
           identified through inspections, partnership programs, or other
           methods, FAA has a variety of enforcement tools that it may use to
           respond to the violations, including administrative actions (such
           as issuing a warning notice or a letter of correction that
           includes the corrective actions the violator is to take) and legal
           sanctions (such as levying a fine or suspending or revoking a
           pilot's certificate or other FAA-issued certificate).

           The achievement of FAA's mission is dependent in large part on the
           skills and expertise of its workforce, whose aviation safety
           activities include air traffic control, maintenance of air traffic
           control equipment, and certification and inspection of various
           industry participants. As of 2006, 714 of FAA's approximately
           3,400 inspectors were dedicated to overseeing the 35 airlines in
           ATOS. Approximately 1,100 inspectors2 oversee other entities and
           individuals, including the remaining 81 commercial airlines that
           are included in the SEP inspection program, about 5,200 aircraft
           repair stations, and approximately 625,000 pilots. FAA's safety
           oversight programs for other aspects of the aviation
           industry-including manufacturers of aircraft and aircraft parts,
           repair stations, flight schools, aviation maintenance technician
           schools, pilots, and mechanics-involve certification,
           surveillance, and inspection by FAA's safety inspectors,
           engineers, flight surgeons, and designated representatives. FAA
           authorizes about 13,400 private individuals and 218 organizations
           (called "designees") to act as its representatives to conduct many
           safety certification activities that FAA considers to be nonsafety
           critical, such as administering flight tests to pilots, inspecting
           repair work by maintenance facilities, conducting medical
           examinations of pilots, and approving designs for aircraft parts.
           These designees are grouped into 18 different programs and are
           overseen by three FAA offices-Flight Standards Service, Aerospace
           Medicine, and Aircraft Certification Service-all of which are
           under the Office of Aviation Safety. In addition, FAA's Air
           Traffic Organization (ATO) includes the approximately 16,700 air
           traffic controller workforce3 and nearly 7,200 field maintenance
           technicians responsible for maintaining ATO's equipment and
           facilities, which include 21 air traffic control centers, 518
           airport control towers, and 76 flight service facilities.

           While overall commercial aviation safety trends have been
           generally positive over the last several years, recent safety
           trends may warrant scrutiny. On the positive side, the number of
           serious runway incursions4 has decreased since fiscal year 2002.
           Specifically, in fiscal year 2002, there were 37 serious runway
           incursions, compared with 29 in fiscal year 2005. Recent fiscal
           year 2006 data also continue the downward trend, with 25 serious
           runway incursions as of August 1, 2006-fewer than at the same time
           in the previous fiscal year. However, with four fatal accidents in
           fiscal year 2006,5 FAA will not meet its performance target for
           fiscal year 2006 for commercial air carrier safety.6 Although
           general aviation accidents have decreased from 1,715 in 2002 to
           1,669 in 2005, general aviation safety continues to be a concern
           because it represents a significant number of fatal accidents
           every year. (See fig. 1.) For example, 321 of the 1,669 general
           aviation accidents in 2005 were fatal. Additionally, the poorer
           safety records of cargo and air ambulances services, compared with
           the commercial passenger airline accident rate, point out the
           safety vulnerabilities in this area. According to FAA, from 1998
           through 2005, the accident rate for scheduled air cargo operators
           declined significantly, but was still about 2.5 times higher than
           the accident rate for scheduled passenger operators. Further, in
           instances where there was not an isolated injury to a single
           individual, the accident rate for cargo was about 6.3 times higher
           than for commercial passenger aviation.7 In addition, from January
           2002 to January 2005, there were 55 emergency medical services or
           air ambulance accidents, with 54 fatalities, the highest number of
           accidents since the 1980s.8 In addition, FAA did not meet its
           performance target with regard to operational errors9 for fiscal
           years 2003 through 2005. While operational errors continued an
           upward trend in 2006, FAA was below the fiscal year 2006 target of
           4.27 operational errors per million activities as of June 2006.

           Figure 1: Number of General Aviation Accidents and Fatalities,
           2000 through 2005

           FAA's Safety Oversight System Includes Programs That Focus on Risk
			  Management and Leveraging Resources, but System Is Hindered by Data 
		     Limitations and Lack of Evaluations

           FAA's safety oversight system has programs that focus on
           identifying and mitigating risk through a system safety approach,
           leveraging resources, and enforcing safety regulations, but the
           programs lack fully developed evaluative processes. As mentioned
           previously, FAA oversees commercial airlines by one of two
           programs-ATOS, which includes 35 airlines, and SEP, which includes
           the remaining 81 airlines. Both programs emphasize a system safety
           approach of using risk analysis techniques, which allow for the
           efficient use of inspection staff and resources by prioritizing
           workload based on areas of highest risk and require that
           inspectors verify that corrective actions are taken. For example,
           FAA has developed risk assessment worksheets for both programs
           that guide inspectors through identifying and prioritizing risks
           associated with key airline areas, such as flight operations and
           personnel training. Information from the worksheets is then used
           to target resources to mitigating those risks.

           In recent work we found that the benefits of FAA's system safety
           approach for the inspection of airlines covered under SEP could be
           enhanced if FAA more completely implemented the program and
           addressed other challenges.10 Most of FAA's inspections of those
           airlines were not risk-based. For example, as shown in figure 2
           from fiscal years 2002 through 2004, SEP-a risk-based
           approach-guided only 23 percent of the inspection activities for
           the top 25 SEP airlines in terms of the number of enplanements.
           The remaining 77 percent of inspection activities were identified
           through NPG, a process that is not risk-based or system safety
           oriented. Although inspectors can replace NPG-identified
           activities with SEP-identified activities that they deem address a
           greater safety risk, we found that FAA inspectors interpret agency
           emphasis on NPG as discouraging this practice. To address this
           issue, we recommended that FAA improve communication with and
           training of inspectors in areas of system safety and risk
           management. In response to our recommendations, FAA revised its
           guidelines to require inspectors and managers to ensure that risk
           information is used and updated its SEP training course to reflect
           that change. Since FAA's focus on system safety represents a
           cultural shift in the way the agency oversees the aviation
           industry, it will be important for FAA to monitor the
           implementation of system safety and risk management principles. We
           recommended that FAA establish a continuous evaluative process for
           its activities under SEP, but the agency does not intend to set up
           a process since it expects to eliminate the SEP program after
           December 2007, which is its deadline for moving all commercial
           airlines to the ATOS program. If the deadline slips, we believe
           our recommendation remains valid.

           Figure 2: SEP- and NPG-Initiated Required Inspections for the Top
           Airlines Covered by the Programs, Fiscal Years 2002-2004

           Note: Top airlines ranked in terms of number of enplanements.

           Furthermore, FAA's plans to dissolve the SEP program after moving
           all commercial airlines to ATOS will shift the inspectors
           workloads and present a challenge to FAA's inspection oversight
           process. As FAA shifts airlines to ATOS, it will also move
           inspectors to the program. Unlike SEP inspectors, ATOS inspectors
           are dedicated to an airline and generally cannot be used to
           inspect other entities. SEP inspectors, on the other hand, have
           other duties in addition to overseeing airlines-such as certifying
           and approving aircraft types; overseeing repair stations,
           designees, and aviation schools; and investigating accidents. For
           example, our analysis of FAA data indicated that, for fiscal years
           2002 through 2004, about 75 percent of SEP inspectors had
           responsibility for more than 3 entities, and about half had
           responsibility for more than 15. As inspectors are transitioned to
           ATOS, the remaining SEP inspector workforce will have to add those
           other entities to their workload. Furthermore, ATOS requires more
           inspectors per airline than SEP. For example, when FAA recently
           transitioned four airlines to ATOS,11 the total size of the four
           inspection teams increased 30 percent, from 73 to 95 inspectors.
           With the expansion of the ATOS program, it will be important to
           monitor the magnitude of the shift in resources and the effect it
           may have on FAA's overall capability to oversee the industry as
           well as any changes to the current ATOS program that may be
           required by the expansion.12

           FAA's Oversight Focuses on Leveraging Inspector Resources, Which
			  Results in Less Direct Oversight of the Industry

           An important part of FAA's safety oversight system are designee
           programs, through which FAA authorizes about 13,400 private
           individuals and 218 organizations to act on its behalf to conduct
           safety certification activities that FAA considers to be
           non-safety critical. We reported that designees perform about 90
           percent of certification-related activities, thus greatly
           leveraging the agency's resources and enabling inspectors to
           concentrate on what FAA considers the most safety-critical
           activities.13 However, concerns about the consistency and adequacy
           of designee oversight by FAA have been raised by experts and other
           individuals we interviewed. For example, designees and industry
           officials that we spoke with indicated that FAA's level of
           oversight and interpretation of rules differ among regions and
           among offices within a region, which limits FAA's assurance that
           designees' work is performed uniformly in accordance with FAA's
           standards and policy, the primary goal of which is the safety of
           U.S. aviation. To improve management control of the designee
           programs, and thus increase assurance that designees meet FAA's
           performance standards, we recommended that FAA develop mechanisms
           to improve the compliance of FAA program and field offices with
           existing policies. In response to our recommendations, FAA has,
           among other things, established a designee quality assurance
           office to address inconsistent and nonstandard oversight issues
           among offices. FAA has also developed a survey that will collect
           information from individuals who recently worked with designees,
           such as pilots who recently received their license through a
           designee, to gather information that can be used to continually
           improve designee programs.

           To increase FAA's assurance that its designees are meeting FAA's
           safety standards, it will be important for FAA to continue these
           activities, which are in the early stages of development or
           implementation, especially as the agency moves to replace certain
           designee programs with an organizational designation authorization
           (ODA). ODA would expand the number and types of organizational
           designees and further transform FAA's role to that of monitoring
           the performance of others. In October 2005, FAA issued a final
           rule that established the ODA program and provides for the phasing
           out of organizational designees by November 2009. By that time,
           the current 218 organizational designees will have to apply for
           and be granted status as an ODA.14 In August 2006, FAA issued an
           order that establishes procedures for the ODA program, including
           the capability to expand the activities that may be delegated out.
           Under the program, FAA will focus on the performance of
           organizations rather than the individuals within the organization
           who carry out the delegated functions. As FAA makes these changes
           to its designee programs that remove FAA from direct oversight of
           the individuals performing the delegated activities, it will be
           important for the agency to adhere to its policy of using
           designees only for less safety-critical work. It will also be
           important for FAA to have the data and evaluative processes, which
           we discuss later in this testimony, to effectively monitor the new
           program.

           FAA is also becoming increasingly removed from overseeing airline
           maintenance. In recent years, in an attempt to reduce costs,
           airlines have increasingly contracted out maintenance. For example
           in 2000, 44 percent of major air carriers' maintenance expenses
           were attributable to outsourcing; in 2004, it had increased to 54
           percent. However, FAA's inspection activities have remained
           focused on air carriers' in-house maintenance, according to DOT's
           Inspector General.15

           Enforcement Is an Important Element of FAA's Safety Oversight
			  System, but Deterrent Effect of Sanctions Is Unclear

           FAA's enforcement process, which is intended to ensure industry
           compliance with safety regulations, is another important element
           of its safety oversight system. FAA assesses legal sanctions
           against entities or individuals that do not comply with aviation
           safety regulations. Such sanctions are intended to deter future
           violations. However, we found that the effect of FAA's legal
           sanctions on deterrence is unclear, and that recommendations for
           sanctions are sometimes changed on the basis of factors not
           associated with the merits of the case.16 For fiscal years 1993
           through 2003, attorneys in FAA's Office of the Chief Counsel
           authorized a 52 percent reduction in the civil monetary penalties
           assessed (from a total of $334 million to $162 million). FAA
           officials told us the agency sometimes negotiate lower fines,
           thereby reducing sanctions to close cases more quickly and reduce
           FAA attorneys' caseloads. Economic literature on deterrence
           suggests that although negative sanctions (such as fines and
           certificate suspensions) can deter violations, if violators expect
           sanctions to be reduced, they may have less incentive to comply
           with regulations. In effect, it becomes more difficult to achieve
           the goal of preventing future violations when the penalties for
           present violations are lowered for reasons not related to the
           merits of the case.

           Recent changes that FAA has made to its enforcement program may
           lead to more uniformly set fines and, thus, potentially less need
           to revise fines. Prior to September 2005, the initial
           recommendation to use administrative actions (such as warning
           notices and letter of correction) or legal sanctions (such as
           fines or suspension of operating certificates) was based on the
           judgment of the inspectors. If inspectors recommended a legal
           sanction, they then consulted FAA's sanction guidance policy to
           determine the amount of the proposed penalty. In September 2005,
           FAA adopted changes to its enforcement program that incorporated
           system safety risk management principles and established explicit
           criteria for inspectors to use in making an initial enforcement
           recommendation. As soon as FAA investigators have gathered
           sufficient information to categorize the safety risk and the
           conduct (i.e., whether it was intentional, reckless, or systemic),
           they prepare a risk statement that describes the hazard created by
           the act and the potential consequence of that hazard. An example
           of a risk statement is "an aircraft that operates in Class B
           airspace without a clearance providing separation from other
           aircraft could cause a mid-air collision." The investigators then
           review the risk statement to determine the severity of the hazard
           (using a scale of catastrophic, critical, marginal, or negligible)
           and the likelihood of the worst credible outcome (using a scale of
           frequent, occasional, or remote). Based on these assessments,
           investigators apply a decision tool that determines the type of
           action (legal or administrative) to take against an individual or
           business. Inspectors no longer have the responsibility of
           recommending a specific fine level. It is too early to determine
           if these changes to the enforcement program have resulted in a
           more uniform application of penalties and fewer penalty
           reductions.

           Data Limitations and Lack of Evaluations Limit FAA's Ability to
			  Manage Risk and Are Particularly Critical as FAA's Oversight
			  Becomes More Indirect
			  
           Effective processes for evaluating FAA's safety oversight
           programs, along with accurate nationwide data on those programs
           would provide FAA's program managers and other officials with
           assurance that the programs are having their intended effect,
           especially as FAA's oversight becomes more indirect. Such
           processes and data are also important because FAA's workforce is
           dispersed worldwide-with thousands of staff working out of more
           than 100 local offices-and because FAA's use of a risk-based
           system safety approach represents a cultural shift from its
           traditional inspection program. The experiences of successful
           transformations and change management initiatives in large public
           and private organizations suggest that it can take 5 to 7 years or
           more until such initiatives are fully implemented and cultures are
           transformed in a sustainable manner. As a result, evaluation is
           important to understanding if the cultural shift has effectively
           occurred. Our most recent work has shown that FAA had not
           evaluated its safety programs, and we recommended that the agency
           establish continuous evaluative processes for the SEP program,
           designee programs, industry partnership programs, and enforcement
           program. FAA has made recent progress in implementing some of
           these recommendations. For example, FAA has scheduled audits of
           all its designee programs, to be completed by the end of fiscal
           year 2009, and established a delegation steering group that first
           met in August 2006 and will be responsible for agencywide
           monitoring of the designee programs for compliance with program
           policies and evaluating the effectiveness of the designee
           programs. Additionally, as FAA implements its new enforcement
           policy, it has established procedures to monitor the new policy on
           a quarterly basis and to recommend process improvements based on
           the information collected. However, FAA does not plan to evaluate
           the SEP program because it intends to discontinue the program
           after December 2007.

           Yet, FAA's ability to evaluate its programs is hindered by its
           lack of useful nationwide data. For example, we found that FAA's
           oversight of designees was hampered, in part, by the limited
           information of designee's performance contained in the various
           designee databases.17 These databases contain descriptive
           information on designees, such as their types of designations and
           status (i.e., active or terminated). More complete information
           would allow the agency to gain a comprehensive picture of whether
           staff are carrying out their responsibilities to oversee
           designees. To improve management control of the designee programs,
           and thus increase assurance that designees meet the agency's
           performance standards, we recommended that FAA improve the
           consistency and completeness of information in the designee
           databases. To address this recommendation, FAA has established the
           Designee Integration User Group, which expects to begin work in
           September 2006 on an automated information tool that will track
           data on all designees. We also found problems with the accuracy or
           completeness of data in the SEP and enforcement programs, which
           FAA has recently taken steps to begin addressing.

           Training Is an Integral Part of FAA's Safety Oversight System, but Several
                         Actions Could Improve Results
			  
			  FAA's use of a risk-based system safety approach to inspections
           requires inspectors to apply data analysis and auditing skills to
           identify, analyze, assess, and control potential hazards and
           risks. To effectively identify safety risks, inspectors must be
           well-trained in the system-safety approach and have sufficient
           knowledge of increasingly complex aircraft, aircraft parts, and
           systems. It is also important that FAA's large cadre of designees
           is well-trained in federal aviation regulations and FAA policies.
           FAA has made training an integral part of its safety inspection
           system by establishing mandatory training requirements for its
           workforce as well as designees. Although FAA provides inspectors
           with extensive training in federal aviation regulations;
           inspection and investigative techniques; and technical skills,
           such as flight training for operations inspectors, we have
           identified weaknesses with the training program. The agency
           provides designees with an initial indoctrination that covers
           federal regulations and agency policies, and refresher training
           every 2 to 3 years.

           We have reported that FAA has generally followed effective
           management practices for planning, developing, delivering, and
           assessing the impact of its technical training18 for safety
           inspectors, although some practices have yet to be fully
           implemented.19 Appendix I describes the extent to which FAA
           follows effective management practices in each of these four
           areas. Some examples follow:

           o  In developing its training curriculum for inspectors, FAA has
           developed courses that support changes in inspection procedures
           resulting from regulatory change or agency initiatives. On the
           other hand, FAA develops technical courses on an ad hoc basis
           rather than as part of an overall curriculum for each inspector
           specialty-such as air carrier operations, maintenance, and cabin
           safety-because the agency has not systematically identified the
           technical skills and competencies each type of inspector needs to
           effectively perform inspections.

           o  In delivering training, FAA has established clear
           accountability for ensuring that inspectors have access to
           technical training, has developed a way for inspectors to choose
           courses that meet job needs and further professional development,
           and offers a wide array of technical and other courses. However,
           both FAA and its inspectors recognize the need for more timely
           selection of inspectors for technical training.

           To address some of these issues, we recommended, among other
           things, that FAA ensure that inspector technical training needs
           are identified and met in a timely manner by systematically
           assessing inspectors' technical training needs and better aligning
           the timeliness of training to when inspectors need the training to
           do their jobs. In addition, we have identified gaps in the
           training provided to SEP inspectors, and have recommended that FAA
           improve inspectors' training in areas such as system safety and
           risk management to ensure that these inspectors have a complete
           and timely understanding of FAA's policies in these areas. We
           identified similar competency gaps related to designee oversight.
           For example, FAA does not require refresher training on how to
           oversee designees, which increases the risk that inspectors do not
           retain the information, skills, and competencies required to
           perform their oversight responsibilities. We recommended that FAA
           provide additional training for staff who directly oversee
           designees.

           FAA has begun to address these recommendations. For example, FAA
           plans to release five Web-based courses by the end of 2006, which
           will allow the agency to provide training closer to the time that
           employees need it. Also, FAA has instituted an electronic learning
           management system that provides for employee input to their own
           learning plans. FAA has also updated the SEP training course to
           reflect recent policy changes that emphasize the importance of
           risk management. Finally, FAA has begun developing a new designee
           oversight training course that is planned to be ready by the
           summer of 2007.

           It is important that FAA's inspection workforce, designees, and
           FAA-certified aviation mechanics are knowledgeable about the
           latest technology changes. While we did not attempt to assess the
           technical proficiency that FAA's workforce requires and will
           require in the near future, FAA officials said that inspectors do
           not need a substantial amount of technical training courses
           because inspectors are hired with a high degree of technical
           knowledge of aircraft and aircraft systems. They further indicated
           that inspectors can sufficiently keep abreast of many of the
           changes in aviation technology through FAA and industry training
           courses and on-the-job training. Similarly, we did not identify
           any specific gaps in the competencies of designees. However, in
           its certification program for aviation mechanics, we found that
           FAA standards for minimum requirements for aviation courses at
           FAA-approved aviation maintenance technician schools and its
           requirements for FAA-issued mechanics certificates do not keep
           abreast with the latest technologies. In 2003, we reported that
           those standards had not been updated in more than 50 years.20 We
           recommended that FAA review the curriculum and certification
           requirements and update both. In response to this recommendation,
           Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, which was
           passed December 12, 2003, required FAA to update the standards 1
           year after enactment of the law and to conduct reviews and updates
           every 3 years after the initial update. FAA issued an Advisory
           Circular in January 2005 that described suggested curriculum
           changes; however, the agency has not updated the certification
           requirements for mechanics.

           FAA Faces a Number of Challenges in Overseeing Aviation Safety
						  
			  FAA faces a number of key safety challenges, including meeting its
           performance target for commercial air carrier safety, which it
           will not meet in fiscal year 2006 because of recent fatal
           accidents. With four fatal commercial air carrier accidents in
           fiscal year 2006, the agency will not meet its target of 0.018
           fatal accidents per 100,000 departures.21 Moreover, for the past 3
           years, FAA did not meet its performance target for severe
           operational errors, which occur when aircraft do not maintain safe
           distances in the air; as of June 2006, the agency was slightly
           below its target level of 4.27 severe operational errors per
           million activities. In addition, although general aviation
           accidents have, on the whole, decreased in recent years, general
           aviation safety is also a concern because of the large number of
           fatal accidents every year-an average of 334 fatal accidents have
           occurred annually since 2000. Furthermore, other industry sectors,
           such as cargo operations22 and on-demand air ambulances,23 have
           poor safety records, as mentioned earlier. It will be important
           for FAA to develop the appropriate strategies to deal with the
           challenges posed by these safety records and to continuously
           monitor safety information to identify trends and early warnings
           of other safety problems.

           Also as described earlier, FAA also faces a number of challenges
           to several of its oversight programs. Specifically, FAA's rapid
           expansion of ATOS, by transferring about 100 airlines and
           additional inspectors to the program over about 2 years, will
           cause shifts in inspector workload that may affect the agency's
           ability to oversee other parts of the industry. Furthermore, some
           activities, such as FAA's creation of ODAs and the trend for
           airlines to outsource maintenance, will remove FAA from direct
           oversight. It will be important for FAA to have robust data and
           continuous evaluative processes to monitor such activities and
           program changes in order to ensure they are not having a negative
           effect on safety.

           Meeting the challenges posed by recent safety trends and program
           changes will be exacerbated by other challenges in human capital
           management; the acquisition and operation of new safety enhancing
           technologies; and new types of vehicles, such as very light jets
           (VLJ), that may place additional workload strains on FAA
           inspectors and air traffic controllers.

           FAA Faces Challenges in Human Resources
			  
			  FAA's ability to oversee aviation safety will be affected by
           recent and anticipated trends in attrition of its inspectors
           compounded, in some cases, by delays in hiring and increased
           workload. For example, for fiscal years 2005 through 2010, FAA
           estimated that over 1,100 safety inspectors who oversee commercial
           airlines and general aviation will leave the agency, with an
           average loss due to attrition of about 195 inspectors per year.
           However, FAA's efforts to hire more inspectors have been hindered
           by a budget situation in 2005 that resulted in a hiring freeze
           during part of that year. During the hiring freeze, FAA filled
           safety-critical positions, such as principal inspectors, through
           internal appointments. As other safety inspectors left, they were
           not replaced and their workload was divided among the remaining
           inspectors.

           Concerned about the need for additional safety inspectors, for
           fiscal year 2006, Congress provided additional funding over the
           budget request to FAA with the expectation that the funding would
           increase the safety staff by 248. This increase in funding would
           allow for hiring an additional 182 safety inspectors in Aviation
           Flight Standards (AFS) and an additional 66 inspectors and
           engineers in Aircraft Certification Service (AIR). However, as a
           result of a rescission and unfunded pay raises for fiscal year
           2006, FAA lacks the funds to hire 67 staff of the expected 248 new
           staff. As a result, FAA's revised hiring target is 139 AFS staff
           and 42 AIR staff. As of August 2006, FAA has hired an additional
           25 AFS and 28 AIR staff. (See fig. 3.) According to FAA, it has a
           pipeline of applicants and expects to reach its goal of filling
           the 181 slots by the end of the fiscal year. However, the actual
           number of aviation safety inspector slots needed is unknown,
           because FAA lacks staffing standards for safety inspectors. The
           National Academy of Sciences, under a congressional mandate, has
           just completed a study for FAA to estimate staffing standards for
           inspectors to ensure proper oversight over the aviation industry.

           Figure 3: Number of Additional Staff for AFS and AIR, Fiscal Year
           2006

           During the coming decade, FAA will need to hire and train
           thousands of air traffic controllers to replace those who will
           retire and leave for other reasons. FAA estimates it will lose
           10,291 controllers, or about 70 percent of the controller
           workforce, for fiscal years 2006 through 2015, primarily due to
           retirements.24 To replace these controllers and to accommodate
           forecasted increases in air traffic and expected productivity
           increases, FAA plans to hire a total of 11,800 new controllers
           over the next 10 years, or 1,180 per year, on average.25 By the
           end of fiscal year 2006, FAA expects to hire 930 controllers. As
           of August 2006, FAA had hired 920. Figure 4 shows the estimated
           losses each year as well as the number of planned hires.

           Figure 4: Estimated Controller Losses and Planned Hires, Fiscal
           Years 2006-2015

           Recent events may exacerbate the staffing situation. New data
           indicate that controllers are retiring at a faster rate than FAA
           anticipated. In its 2004 workforce report, FAA projected 341
           retirements for fiscal year 2005; 465 controllers actually
           retired-36 percent more than FAA's estimate. In addition, a new
           contract with the air traffic controllers union was recently
           implemented by FAA after lengthy negotiations. Under this new
           contract, most current air traffic controllers would continue to
           receive their existing base salaries and benefits, which may
           remove a financial incentive to continue working past their
           retirement eligibility date, while newly hired controllers would
           be hired at lower wage rates, which may affect FAA's ability to
           hire new controllers. FAA has maintained that this contract will
           result in significant cost savings, freeing up resources for other
           critical agency needs. It is too soon to know what effect, if any,
           the new contract may have on retirement decisions.

           In addition to the challenge of hiring large numbers of
           controllers, FAA will face a challenge in training its new hires
           expeditiously so that it can plan to have the right number of
           controllers in the right facilities when they are needed.
           According to FAA, its ability to train the new controllers depends
           upon several factors, including hiring a relatively even number of
           controllers each year, reducing the time it takes to hire a
           controller, and reducing the duration of training. FAA estimates
           that because of the long training time, it must hire enroute
           controllers26 an average of 3 to 5 years in advance of when they
           are needed. FAA is taking actions to address these issues. For
           example, in line with our recommendation, a recent change to the
           training program allows individuals who complete collegiate
           requirements under the Air Traffic Collegiate Training
           Initiative27 to bypass the first 5 weeks of initial FAA Academy
           training required for controllers.

           FAA also faces the challenge of ensuring that control facilities
           have adequate staffing based on their unique traffic demands and
           the accuracy of FAA's retirement forecast. Historically, FAA has
           computed staffing standards, which are the number of controllers
           needed on a systemwide basis, but distribution of these totals to
           the facility level was a negotiated process. The staffing
           standards did not take into account the significant differences in
           complexity and workload among FAA's 300 terminal and enroute
           control facilities, which can lead to staffing imbalances. FAA has
           begun developing and implementing new staffing standards that use
           an algorithm that incorporates traffic levels and complexity of
           traffic at the facility level to determine the number of
           controllers needed, according to an FAA official. As FAA further
           refines its process for determining controller staffing needs, the
           ultimate objective is to assess the traffic level and complexity
           on a sector-by-sector basis to develop more accurate controller
           staffing requirements.

           FAA Faces Challenges in Implementing Advanced Technology to
			  Increase Air Traffic Safety
			  
			  To enhance runway safety, FAA intends to rely on new
           technologies-beginning with the Airport Movement Area Safety
           System (AMASS) and Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X
           (ASDE-X)-that are expected to reduce runway accidents.28 AMASS and
           ASDE-X are instrumental in mitigating runway incursions and
           operational errors. However, FAA faces challenges-such as a
           reduced number of airports scheduled to receive the equipment,
           schedule delays, and cost increases-that affect its reliance on
           the technologies.

           FAA's original plans called for 34 airports to receive AMASS29 and
           35 airports to receive ASDE-X (see app. II).30 In total, 59
           airports were to receive one or both technologies, but this number
           was reduced to 44 in August 2006 after FAA canceled plans to
           deploy ASDE-X at 15 of the originally scheduled airports. FAA
           plans to take these 15 systems and upgrade certain airports that
           already have AMASS based on the rationale that maximum benefit is
           achieved by deploying ASDE-X to airports with larger traffic
           counts or more complex operations. This decision leaves 15
           airports (see fig. 5) that were supposed to receive ASDE-X without
           either advanced technology system. Since the anticipated future
           increase in air traffic from commuter airlines and very light jets
           are likely to be at smaller airports that lack the advanced
           technologies, it will be important for FAA to periodically
           re-evaluate its deployment strategy.

           Figure 5: Airports Scheduled to Receive ASDE-X before Deployment
           Was Canceled by FAA

           In addition to reducing the number of facilities selected to
           receive the newer technology, FAA has amended the cost and
           extended the implementation dates for the ASDE-X program (see fig.
           6). The 35 ASDE-X systems were originally scheduled to be
           implemented by 2007. As of August 2006, FAA had moved that date to
           2011. FAA estimates the total facilities and equipment cost of the
           ASDE-X program at about $550 million, which is approximately $40
           million more than we reported in 2005.31 The costs of these new
           technologies mean that they may never be deployed at all airports;
           therefore, it will be important for FAA to continue prioritizing
           and maximizing its resources.

           Figure 6: Changes in Cost and Schedule Targets for ASDE-X

           FAA Faces Challenges in Having Controllers Prepared for the Next
			  Generation Air Transportation System
			  
			  To ensure a national airspace system that is safe, efficient, and
           capable of meeting a growing demand of air transportation that is
           expected to triple by 2025, the Joint Planning and Development
           Office (JPDO) was created within FAA to plan for and coordinate
           the longer-term transformation to the "next generation air
           transportation system" (NGATS). JPDO was created in 2003 to
           develop an integrated plan for NGATS and to include in the plan,
           among other things, a description of the demand and required
           performance characteristics of the future system, as well as a
           high-level, multiagency road map and concept of operations for the
           future system.

           FAA and JPDO face the challenge of adequately involving
           stakeholders in the development of NGATS to ensure that the system
           meets users' needs, especially air traffic controllers who will be
           end users of the new technology and responsible for using it to
           maximize safety and efficiency. In the past, air traffic
           controllers were permanently assigned to FAA's major system
           acquisition program offices and provided input into air traffic
           control modernization projects. In June 2005, FAA terminated this
           arrangement because of budget constraints. According to FAA, it
           now plans to obtain the subject-matter expertise of air traffic
           controllers or other stakeholders as needed in major system
           acquisitions. It remains to be seen whether this approach will be
           sufficient to avoid problems such as FAA experienced when
           inadequate stakeholder involvement in the development of new air
           traffic controller workstations (known as the Standard Terminal
           Automation Replacement System (STARS)) contributed to unplanned
           work, significant cost growth, and schedule delays.32

           FAAï¿½s Inspector and Controller Workload Will Be Challenged by
			  Emerging Industries and Established Sectors That May Need More
			  Safety Oversight
			  
			  The changing aviation landscape poses further challenges for FAA.
           It is expected that within the next few years several hundred
           VLJs33 will be in operation. FAA estimates that if 2 percent of
           airline passengers switch to VLJs, air traffic controllers will
           have to handle three times more take-offs and landings than
           currently. Additionally, the industry predicts there may be as
           many as 5,000 to 10,000 VLJs operating in the national airspace
           system by 2020. VLJ manufacturers are reporting advance sales of
           thousands of these new jets, their customers include air taxis,
           charter operators, and private owners. In July 2006, FAA granted
           the first provisional certificate for a VLJ to Eclipse Aviation
           Corporation. The provisional certificate allows existing planes to
           be flown, but new ones cannot be delivered to customers until the
           FAA grants a type certificate. According to Eclipse Aviation, it
           has orders for over 2,350 aircrafts. DayJet, which provides
           on-demand jet service, expects to be operating 50 Eclipse VLJs by
           the end of 2007. In September 2006, FAA granted the first type
           certificate to Cessna Aircraft Company. (See fig. 7.) Five other
           companies are in the process of being issued certificates by FAA.
           If this sector expands as quickly as expected, FAA inspectors
           could face workload challenges to expeditiously issue and monitor
           certificates. In addition, air traffic controllers could face the
           challenge of further congested air space, especially at and near
           smaller airports, where VLJs are expected to be prevalent because
           of their smaller size and shorter runway requirements.

           Figure 7: Cessna's Citation Mustang VLJ

           Unmanned aerial vehicles34 (UAV) are another emerging sector that
           will add to FAA's workload and may require additional FAA
           expertise. While historically UAVs have been used primarily by the
           Department of Defense in military settings outside the United
           States, there is growing demand to operate UAVs domestically in
           the national airspace system. (See fig. 8.) Federal agencies such
           as the Customs and Border Protection Service and the Federal
           Emergency Management Agency and state and local law enforcement
           agencies are interested in UAVs for purposes such as border
           security, search and rescue, firefighting, and other law
           enforcement and homeland security initiatives. Some of these
           activities are taking place today. For example, Customs conducts
           surveillance along the border with Mexico. UAVs are also an
           emerging sector of the commercial aviation industry, and possible
           commercial uses include fire detection and firefighting
           management, digital mapping, communications and broadcast
           services, and environmental research and air quality management
           control. Currently, few regulations or guidelines exist for UAVs
           or UAV-related technology. FAA issues a certificate of
           authorization for the operation of a UAV and the airspace is
           restricted during the period of operation.35 In 2006, FAA has
           issue 62 certificates of authorization for UAVs and another 35
           applications are pending review. FAA is receiving numerous
           inquiries from federal agencies, and from local, county, and state
           governments about how to operate UAVs in the national airspace
           system. FAA has established an Unmanned Aircraft Program Office,
           responsible for developing the regulatory framework and plan for
           the safe integration of UAVs into the national airspace system.
           FAA faces the challenge of working with industry to develop
           consensus standards for command and control redundancies in case
           there is a disruption in communication with the UAV, and detect
           and avoid capabilities so that UAVs can sense and avoid other
           aircraft. Such standards will be necessary before UAVs can be
           routinely integrated into the national airspace system. Until UAVs
           are completely integrated into the national airspace system, FAA
           will continue to evaluate each flight on a case-by-case basis,
           adding to the agency's workload.

           Figure 8: U.S. Air Force's Global Hawk UAV

           Space tourism is an additional emerging sector that FAA is
           beginning to respond to. Tourist launches are expected to take
           place at inland locations and may have more impact on the national
           airspace system than previous unmanned commercial space launches,
           which occurred at federal launch sites near or over oceans. While
           UAVs pose a learning curve for safety inspectors, engineers, and
           air traffic controllers, space tourism launches pose a learning
           curve for FAA's commercial space engineers who are responsible for
           licensing and monitoring commercial space launches and nonfederal
           launch sites (called spaceports). The prospect for commercial
           space tourism materialized in 2004 when SpaceShipOne, developed by
           Scaled Composites, flew to space twice, achieving a peak altitude
           of about 70 miles to win the Ansari X Prize.36 Several
           entrepreneurial launch companies are planning to start taking
           paying passengers on suborbital flights within the next few years.
           Virgin Galactic intends to enter commercial suborbital space
           flight service around 2008, launching from a spaceport in New
           Mexico, and according to the company, plans to carry 3,000
           passengers over 5 years, with 100 individuals having already paid
           the full fare of $200,000. Several other companies, including
           former Ansari X Prize competitors, continue to develop their
           vehicles for space tourism. Several spaceports are being developed
           to accommodate anticipated commercial space tourism flights and
           are expanding the nation's launch capacity. As of August 2006, the
           United States had seven federal launch sites, and seven
           spaceports, and an additional eight spaceports have been proposed
           (see fig. 9). We will be issuing a report later this year on FAA's
           oversight of commercial space launches.

1Other industry partnership programs include the Aviation Safety Action
Program, which allows for the self-reporting of safety incidents by
employees of air carriers and repair stations; the Aviation Safety
Reporting Program, which allows any participant in the national airspace
system, such as air traffic controllers, pilots, and flight attendants, to
self-report safety incidents; and the Flight Operation Quality Assurance
Program, whose participant airlines equip their aircraft to record flight
data, which the airlines analyze for safety trends that are provided to
FAA.

2The remaining approximately 1,500 inspectors oversee general aviation.

3As of June 2006. This number includes about 2,380 traffic management
coordinators and operations supervisors.

4A runway incursion is any occurrence at an airport involving an aircraft,
vehicle, person or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or
results in a loss of separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to
take off, landing, or intending to land.

5In December 2005, a Southwest Airlines airplane slid off a runway at
Chicago's Midway Airport, went through a barrier fence and onto a roadway,
killing a passenger in a passing automobile. Also in December 2005, a
Chalk's Ocean Airways aircraft experienced an in-flight breakup shortly
after takeoff in Miami, resulting in 20 fatalities. On January 16, 2006, a
Continental Airlines ground worker was fatally injured in El Paso, Texas.
In August 2006, a Comair flight crashed while attempting take-off from the
Lexington, Kentucky, airport, resulting in 49 fatalities.

6FAA's performance target for fiscal year 2006 is 0.018 fatal accidents
per 100,000 departures over the last 3 years.

7According to FAA, accidents impacting a single person, although they may
be serious, are isolated to ground workers or a single passenger who may
walk into a propeller or who may fall while boarding or deplaning.
Removing these isolated risk accidents from the data helps achieve a more
informative comparison of accident data, according to the agency.

8Comprehensive activity data regarding emergency medical services
operations (for example, exposure rates and missions flown) are limited
because the sources for these data are generally poor. Therefore, accident
rates cannot be calculated.

9An operational error is a violation of FAA separation standards that
define minimum safe distances between aircraft, between aircraft and other
physical structures, and between aircraft and otherwise restricted
airspace.

10GAO, Aviation Safety: System Safety Approach Needs Further Integration
into FAA's Oversight of Airlines, GAO-05-726 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28,
2005).

11The airlines are Champion, American Eagle, ExpressJet, and SkyWest.

12For example, we found that when Champion Airlines became part of ATOS in
January 2005, FAA has, in this one case, revised its procedures to allow
the Northwest Airlines inspection team to share its data analyst and
manager with the Champion inspection team.

13GAO, Aviation Safety: FAA Needs to Strengthen the Management of Its
Designee Programs, GAO-05-40 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 2004).

14Examples of companies that are organizational designees include Boeing,
Gulfstream, United Airlines, and Continental Airlines, as well as smaller
companies.

15DOT Inspector General, Air Carriers' Use of Aircraft Repair Stations
(Washington, D.C.; July 8, 2003).

16GAO, Aviation Safety: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Improve
FAA's Safety Enforcement and Compliance Efforts, GAO-04-646 (Washington,
D.C.: July 6, 2004).

17These databases are the Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystem,
National Vital Information Subsystem, Designee Information Network, and
Airmen Medical Certification Information Subsystem.

18We define technical training as training in aviation technologies. FAA
includes in its definition of technical training topics such as system
safety and risk analysis, inspector job skills, data analysis, and
training in software packages.

19GAO, Aviation Safety: FAA Management Practices for Technical Training
Mostly Effective; Further Actions Could Enhance Results, GAO-05-728
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005). We compared FAA's management of its
inspector technical training efforts with effective management practices
in GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and
Development Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 1, 2004).

20GAO, Aviation Safety: FAA Needs to Update the Curriculum and
Certification Requirements for Aviation Mechanics, GAO-03-317 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 6, 2003).

21After a fourth fatal accident occurred in August 2006, FAA estimated
that 0.023 fatal accidents per 100,000 departures had occurred over the
last 3 years. Since the fatal accident rate is small and could
significantly fluctuate from year to year due to a single accident, FAA's
performance measure is a 3-year average, which helps to smooth the
fluctuation that may occur in any given year.

22The risk factors that may affect the safety record of cargo carriers
include operating a large number of flights at night and the age of cargo
aircraft. FAA estimates the median age of in-service passenger jets was
6.25 years, compared with the median age of cargo jets of over 25 years.

23We have ongoing work for this subcommittee that is examining in detail
FAA's oversight of air ambulances.

24The high percentage of retirements is attributable to the 1981
controller strike, when President Ronald Reagan fired over 10,000 air
traffic controllers, and the consequent need to quickly rebuild the
controller workforce. From 1982 through 1991, FAA hired an average of
2,655 controllers per year. These controllers will become eligible for
retirement during the next decade.

25FAA, A Plan for the Future, 2006-2015 (Washington, D.C.: June 2006).

26Enroute air traffic controllers issue clearances and instructions for
airborne aircraft.

27To bypass initial Academy training, individuals must have successfully
completed an aviation-related program of study from a school under FAA's
collegiate training initiative program. FAA has agreements with 13 schools
for this program.

FAA Faces Challenges in Implementing Advanced Technology to Increase Air Traffic
Safety

28AMASS processes data from Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model 3
(ASDE-3) systems and uses visual and sound signals to warn controllers of
potential conflicts between arriving aircraft, and aircraft and vehicles
on the ground. ASDE-X is the upgraded digitally based technology that
enables air traffic controllers to detect potential runway conflicts by
providing detailed coverage of movement on runways and taxiways. Both
systems warn the controllers of potential incursions. Among the systems,
only ASDE-X works in poor weather conditions.

29By December 2003, FAA had installed AMASS at the 34 airports.

30Ten airports that were scheduled to receive ASDE-X already had AMASS.

31GAO, National Airspace System: FAA Has Made Progress but Continues to
Face Challenges in Acquiring Major Air Traffic Control Systems, GAO-05-331
(Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).

FAA Faces Challenges in Having Controllers Prepared for the Next Generation Air
Transportation System

32 GAO-05-331 .

FAA's Inspector and Controller Workload Will Be Challenged by Emerging
Industries and Established Sectors That May Need More Safety Oversight

33Very light jets are jet aircraft weighing 10,000 pounds or less maximum
certificated take-off weight and certificated for single pilot operations.
Aircraft possess at least some of the following features: (1) advanced
cockpit automation, such as moving map GPS and multifunction displays; (2)
automated engine and systems management; and (3) integrated auto-flight,
autopilot and flight-guidance systems.

34Unmanned aerial vehicles do not carry a human operator; they are either
programmed for autonomous flight (called a "drone") or are flown remotely
by a ground operator.

35A certificate of authorization allows an operator to use defined
airspace for a specified time (up to one year, in some cases) and includes
special provisions unique to each operation. For instance, a certificate
may include a requirement to operate only under visual flight rules.

36The X Prize Foundation was established in 1995 to award $10 million to
the first team to launch a suborbital reusable launch vehicle capable of
carrying three people to an altitude of 70 miles, return safely to Earth,
and repeat the exercise within 2 weeks using the same vehicle.
Twenty-seven teams from seven countries competed.

Figure 9: Existing and Proposed Federal and Nonfederal Spaceports in the
United States, April 2006

FAA Needs to Retain Its Leadership Role in International Safety Standard Setting

Maintaining U.S. position as a global leader in aviation safety calls for
robust participation in the setting of international safety standards. The
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations
organization, develops standards and recommended practices for aviation
safety and security for 188 member states.37 In 2002, the Commission on
the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry38 reported that the
United States had not devoted enough resources to ICAO and was, therefore,
losing its position as the de facto standard setter. Furthermore, the
position of U.S. ambassador to ICAO, which was filled earlier this year,
had been vacant for more than a year, which may have affected the U.S.
impact on international aviation issues. To ensure that qualified U.S.
applicants apply for U.S. positions at ICAO, FAA has supported a number of
activities, including outreach efforts, incentive pay programs, and a
fellowship program that sends FAA employees to work at ICAO for up to 12
months. However, as of December 2005, FAA had filled only 13 of the 31
positions allocated to the United States at ICAO. FAA faces difficulty in
filling the allocated positions for reasons beyond its control. For
example, while FAA can recruit applicants, it does not make the final
hiring decisions. With unfilled positions at ICAO, it will remain
important for FAA to continue these efforts to enhance the presence of the
United States in the international aviation community.

                     GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

For further information on this testimony, please contact Dr. Gerald L.
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected] . Individuals making
key contributions to this testimony include Teresa Spisak, Jessica Evans,
Colin Fallon, David Hooper, and Rosa Leung.

Appendix I: Extent to Which FAA Follows Effective Management Practices for
Inspector Training

Figure 10: Extent That FAA Follows Effective Management Practices in
Planning Technical Training

Figure 11: Extent That FAA Follows Effective Management Practices in
Developing Technical Training

aThis management practice is not specifically identified in our assessment
guide. However, a management approach that assesses training needs
holistically rather than on a course-by-course basis can provide for a
more systematic assessment of whether and how training will help meet
organizational needs.

Figure 12: Extent That FAA Follows Effective Management Practices in
Delivering Technical Training

Figure 13: Extent That FAA Followed Effective Management Practices in
Evaluating Its Training Program

Appendix II: Deployment of Surface Detection Equipment at Airports

Figure 14: Airports with Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS)

Figure 15: Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X) Deployment
Sites

Related GAO Products

Aviation Safety: FAA's Safety Oversight System Is Effective but Could
Benefit from Better Evaluation of Its Programs' Performance. GAO-06-266T .
Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2005.

Aviation Safety: System Safety Approach Needs Further Integration into
FAA's Oversight of Airlines. GAO-05-726 . Washington, D.C.: September 28,
2005.

Aviation Safety: FAA Management Practices for Technical Training Mostly
Effective; Further Actions Could Enhance Results. GAO-05-728 . Washington,
D.C.: September 7, 2005.

Aviation Safety: Oversight of Foreign Code-Share Safety Program Should Be
Strengthened. GAO-05-930 . Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2005.

Aviation Safety: FAA Needs to Strengthen the Management of Its Designee
Programs. GAO-05-40 . Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2004.

Aviation Safety: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Improve FAA's
Safety Enforcement and Compliance Efforts. GAO-04-646 . Washington, D.C.:
July 6, 2004.

Aviation Safety: Information on FAA's Data on Operational Errors at Air
Traffic Control Towers. GAO-03-1175R . Washington, D.C.: September 23,
2003.

Aviation Safety: FAA Needs to Update the Curriculum and Certification
Requirements for Aviation Mechanics. GAO-03-317 . Washington, D.C.: March
6, 2003.

Aviation Safety: FAA and DOD Response to Similar Safety Concerns.
GAO-02-77 . Washington. D.C.: January 22, 2002.

Aviation Safety: Safer Skies Initiative Has Taken Initial Steps to Reduce
Accident Rates by 2007. GAO/RCED-00-111 . Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2000.

37ICAO also addresses issues such as air navigation, airspace capacity,
and environmental concerns such as engine noise and emissions.

38Final Report of the Commission on the Future of the United States
Aerospace Industry (Arlington, Va.; November 2002).

(540136)

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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-1091T .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., at (202)
512-2834 or [email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-1091T , a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives

September 20, 2006

AVIATION SAFETY

FAA's Safety Efforts Generally Strong but Face Challenges

The U.S. commercial aviation industry has had an extraordinary safety
record in recent years. However, expected increases in air-
traffic-including the introduction of new vehicles into the national
airspace, such as unmanned vehicles and very light jets-and human resource
issues, present challenges that have the potential to strain the existing
safety oversight system. GAO's testimony focuses on these questions: (1)
How is the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ensuring that the areas
of highest safety risk are addressed? (2) How is FAA ensuring that its
staff maintain the skills and knowledge to consistently carry out the
agency's oversight programs? and (3) What are the key safety challenges
facing FAA? This statement is based on our recent reports on FAA's
inspection oversight programs, industry partnership programs, and
enforcement and training programs. It is also based on interviews with FAA
and relevant industry officials.

What GAO Recommends

To help FAA fully realize the benefits of its safety oversight system, GAO
has made several recommendations to address the weaknesses identified in
GAO's reviews. Although FAA has begun addressing the recommendations, many
have not been fully implemented.

FAA's aviation safety oversight system includes programs that focus on
identifying and mitigating risks through a system safety approach and by
leveraging resources, but as FAA is still developing evaluations for some
of these programs, it remains unclear the extent to which they are
achieving their intended effects. FAA's system safety approach for
overseeing airlines-through the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS)
and Surveillance and Evaluation Program (SEP)-uses inspection staff
efficiently by prioritizing workload based on areas of highest risk and
ensuring that corrective actions have been taken. However, recent and
planned changes that would move inspections of about 100 airlines from SEP
to ATOS will shift inspector workload and might affect FAA's capability to
oversee the industry. FAA also concentrates its limited staff resources on
the most safety-critical functions and through its designee programs
delegates other, less critical activities to designees. Designees perform
about 90 percent of certification-related activities, and thus allow FAA
to better leverage resources. GAO's recent work found some weaknesses in
FAA's system safety approach and recommended that FAA develop effective
evaluative processes and accurate nationwide data on its safety oversight
programs to address these weaknesses so that program managers and other
officials have assurance that the programs attain their intended effect.
FAA has begun implementing those recommendations but does not plan to
evaluate SEP, which it intends to discontinue after December 2007.

Training-including mandatory training requirements for FAA's workforce as
well as designees-is an integral part of FAA's safety oversight system.
GAO has reported that FAA has generally followed effective management
practices for planning, developing, delivering, and assessing the impact
of its technical training for safety inspectors, although some practices
have yet to be fully implemented. However, several actions could improve
the results of its training efforts. For example, FAA develops technical
courses on an ad hoc basis rather than as part of an overall curriculum
for each type of inspector, such as inspectors of operations or cabin
safety, because the agency has not systematically identified the technical
skills and competencies each type of inspector needs to effectively
perform inspections. FAA has recognized the need to improve its training
program in this and other areas.

FAA faces several key safety challenges, including not meeting its
performance target for commercial air carrier safety this year because of
recent fatal accidents. Further, FAA's ability to oversee aviation safety
will be affected by recent and anticipated trends in inspector and air
traffic controller attrition. Also, FAA intends to enhance runway safety
by relying on new technologies that are expected to reduce runway
accidents. However, schedule delays and cost increases challenge FAA's
ability to deploy this technology. Finally, new types of aviation vehicles
are changing the aviation industry and will require new areas of expertise
for FAA's inspectors and controllers.
*** End of document. ***