Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Leadership Needed to	 
Enhance Cybersecurity (13-SEP-06, GAO-06-1087T).		 
                                                                 
Increasing computer interconnectivity has revolutionized the way 
that our nation and much of the world communicate and conduct	 
business. While the benefits have been enormous, this widespread 
interconnectivity also poses significant risks to our nation's	 
computer systems and, more importantly, to the critical 	 
operations and infrastructures they support. The Homeland	 
Security Act of 2002 and federal policy establish DHS as the	 
focal point for coordinating activities to protect the computer  
systems that support our nation's critical infrastructures. GAO  
was asked to summarize recent reports on (1) DHS's		 
responsibilities for cybersecurity-related critical		 
infrastructure protection and for recovering the Internet in case
of a major disruption (2) challenges facing DHS in addressing its
cybersecurity responsibilities, including leadership challenges, 
and (3) recommendations to improve the cybersecurity of national 
critical infrastructures, including the Internet.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-1087T					        
    ACCNO:   A60828						        
  TITLE:     Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Leadership Needed
to Enhance Cybersecurity					 
     DATE:   09/13/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Computer security					 
	     Critical infrastructure				 
	     Critical infrastructure protection 		 
	     Cyber security					 
	     Internet						 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Systems analysis					 

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GAO-06-1087T

     

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                 United States Government Accountability Office

Testimony

GAO

Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Economic
             Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity

For Release on Delivery        CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE                     
Expected at 3 p.m. EDT         
Wednesday, September 13, 2006  
                                  PROTECTION                                  
                                  DHS Leadership Needed to Enhance            
                                  Cybersecurity                               
                                  Statement of David A. Powner Director,      
                                  Information Technology Management Issues    

GAO-06-1087T

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

DHS Leadership Needed To Enhance Cybersecurity

  What GAO Found

In 2005 and 2006, GAO reported that DHS had initiated efforts to address
its responsibilities for enhancing the cybersecurity of critical
infrastructures, but that more remained to be done. Specifically, in 2005,
GAO reported that DHS had initiated efforts to fulfill 13 key
cybersecurity responsibilities, but it had not fully addressed any of
them. For example, DHS established forums to foster information sharing
among federal officials with information security responsibilities and
among various law enforcement entities, but had not developed national
threat and vulnerability assessments for cybersecurity. Since that time,
DHS has made progress on its 13 key responsibilities-including the release
of its National Infrastructure Protection Plan-but none have been
completely addressed. Moreover, in 2006, GAO reported that DHS had begun a
variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility to develop an
integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery, but these efforts
were not complete or comprehensive. For example, DHS established working
groups to facilitate coordination among government and industry
infrastructure officials and fostered exercises in which government and
private industry could practice responding to cyber events, but many of
its efforts lacked timeframes for completion and the relationships among
its various initiatives were not evident.

DHS faces a number of challenges that have impeded its ability to fulfill
its cybersecurity responsibilities, including establishing effective
partnerships with stakeholders, demonstrating the value it can provide to
private sector infrastructure owners, and reaching consensus on DHS's role
in Internet recovery and on when the department should get involved in
responding to an Internet disruption. DHS faces a particular challenge in
attaining the organizational stability and leadership it needs to gain the
trust of other stakeholders in the cybersecurity world-including other
government agencies as well as the private sector. In May 2005, we
reported that multiple senior DHS cybersecurity officials had recently
left the department. In July 2005, DHS undertook a reorganization which
established the position of the Assistant Secretary of Cyber Security and
Telecommunications-in part to raise the visibility of cybersecurity issues
in the department. However, over a year later, this position remains
vacant.

To strengthen DHS's ability to implement its cybersecurity
responsibilities and to resolve underlying challenges, GAO has made about
25 recommendations over the last several years. These recommendations
focus on the need to (1) conduct threat and vulnerability assessments, (2)
develop a strategic analysis and warning capability for identifying
potential cyber attacks, (3) protect infrastructure control systems, (4)
enhance public/private information sharing, and (5) facilitate recovery
planning, including recovery of the Internet in case of a major
disruption. These recommendations provide a high-level road map for DHS to
use to help improve our nation's cybersecurity posture. Until they are
addressed, DHS will have difficulty achieving results as the federal
cybersecurity focal point.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to join in today's hearing on the need for
leadership in protecting our nation's critical infrastructures from
cybersecurity threats. Increasing computer interconnectivity-most notably
growth in the use of the Internet-has revolutionized the way that our
government, our nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct
business. While the benefits have been enormous, this widespread
interconnectivity also poses significant risks to the government's and our
nation's computer systems and, more importantly, to the critical
operations and infrastructures they support.

Federal regulation establishes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
as the focal point for the security of cyberspace-including analysis and
warning, information sharing, vulnerability reduction, and recovery
efforts for public and private critical infrastructure information
systems.1 Additionally, federal policy recognizes the need to be prepared
for the possibility of debilitating Internet disruptions and-because the
vast majority of the Internet's infrastructure is owned and operated by
the private sector-tasks DHS with developing an integrated public/private
plan for Internet recovery.2

As requested, our testimony will summarize our recent work on

(1)
           DHS's responsibilities for cybersecurity-related critical
           infrastructure protection and, more specifically, its
           responsibilities for recovering the Internet in case of a major
           disruption,

(2)
           challenges facing DHS in addressing its cybersecurity
           responsibilities, including leadership challenges, and

(3)
           recommendations to improve the cybersecurity of national critical
           infrastructures, including the Internet. In preparing for this
           testimony, we relied on our previous reports on the challenges
           faced by DHS in fulfilling its cybersecurity responsibilities and
           in

1

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (Dec. 17, 2003).

2

The White House, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Washington, D.C.:
February 2003).

    Page 1

facilitating the recovery of the Internet in case of a major disruption.3
These reports contain detailed overviews of the scope and methodology we
used. All of the work on which this testimony is based was performed in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

                                Results in Brief
										  
As the focal point for critical infrastructure protection, DHS has many
cybersecurity-related responsibilities that are called for in law and
policy. In 2005 and 2006, we reported that DHS had initiated efforts to
address these responsibilities, but that more remained to be done.4
Specifically, in 2005, we reported that DHS had initiated efforts to
fulfill 13 key cybersecurity responsibilities, but it had not fully
addressed any of them. For example, DHS established forums to foster
information sharing among federal officials with information security
responsibilities and among various law enforcement entities, but had not
developed national threat and vulnerability assessments for cybersecurity.
Since that time, DHS has made progress on its responsibilities-including
the release of its National Infrastructure Protection Plan-but none has
been completely addressed. Moreover, in 2006, we reported that DHS had
begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility to develop an
integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery, but that these
efforts were not complete or comprehensive. For example, DHS had
established working groups to facilitate coordination among government and
industry infrastructure officials and fostered exercises in which
government and private industry could practice responding to cyber events,
but many of its efforts lacked

3GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security
Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities, GAO-05-434
(Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005); Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Challenges in Addressing Cybersecurity, GAO-05-827T (Washington, D.C.:
July 19, 2005); Internet Infrastructure: DHS Faces Challenges in
Developing a Joint Public/Private Recovery Plan, GAO-06-672 (Washington,
D.C.: June 16, 2006); Internet Infrastructure: Challenges in Developing a
Public/Private Recovery Plan, GAO-06-863T (Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2006).

4 GAO-05-434 and GAO-06-672 .

timeframes for completion and the relationships among its various
initiatives are not evident.

DHS faces a number of challenges that have impeded its ability to fulfill
its cybersecurity responsibilities, including establishing effective
partnerships with stakeholders, achieving two-way information sharing with
stakeholders, demonstrating the value it can provide to private sector
infrastructure owners, and reaching consensus on DHS's role in Internet
recovery and on when the department should get involved in responding to
an Internet disruption. DHS faces a particular challenge in attaining the
organizational stability and leadership it needs to gain the trust of
other stakeholders in the cybersecurity world-including other government
agencies as well as the private sector. In May 2005, we reported that
multiple senior DHS cybersecurity officials had recently left the
department. In July 2005, DHS undertook a reorganization which established
the position of the Assistant Secretary of Cyber Security and
Telecommunications-in part to raise the visibility of cybersecurity issues
in the department. However, over a year later, this position remains
vacant. While DHS stated that the lack of a permanent assistant secretary
has not hampered its efforts related to protecting critical
infrastructures, several private-sector representatives stated that DHS's
lack of leadership in this area has limited its progress.

To strengthen DHS's ability to implement its cybersecurity
responsibilities and to resolve underlying challenges, GAO has made about
25 recommendations over the last several years. These recommendations
focus on the need to (1) conduct important threat and vulnerability
assessments, (2) develop a strategic analysis and warning capability for
identifying potential cyber attacks, (3) protect infrastructure control
systems, (4) enhance public/private information sharing, and (5)
facilitate recovery planning, including recovery of the Internet in case
of a major disruption. Together, the recommendations provide a high-level
road map for DHS to use in working to improve our nation's cybersecurity
posture. Until it addresses these recommendations, DHS will have
difficulty achieving results in its role as the federal focal point for
the cybersecurity of critical infrastructures-including the Internet.

  Background

The same speed and accessibility that create the enormous benefits of the
computer age can, if not properly controlled, allow individuals and
organizations to inexpensively eavesdrop on or interfere with computer
operations from remote locations for mischievous or malicious purposes,
including fraud or sabotage. In recent years, the sophistication and
effectiveness of cyberattacks have steadily advanced. These attacks often
take advantage of flaws in software code, circumvent signature-based
tools5 that commonly identify and prevent known threats, and use social
engineering techniques designed to trick the unsuspecting user into
divulging sensitive information or propagating attacks.

Government officials are increasingly concerned about attacks from
individuals and groups with malicious intent, such as crime, terrorism,
foreign intelligence-gathering, and acts of war. As greater amounts of
money are transferred through computer systems, as more sensitive economic
and commercial information is exchanged electronically, and as the
nation's defense and intelligence communities increasingly rely on
commercially available information technology, the likelihood increases
that information attacks will threaten vital national interests.

Recent attacks and threats have further underscored the need to bolster
the cybersecurity of our government's and our nation's computer systems
and, more importantly, of the critical operations and infrastructures they
support. Recent examples of attacks include the following:

o  In March 2005, security consultants within the electric industry
reported that hackers were targeting the U.S. electric power grid and had
gained access to U.S. utilities' electronic control systems. Computer
security specialists reported that, in a few cases, these intrusions had
"caused an impact." While officials

5

Signature-based tools compare files or packets to a list of
"signatures"-patterns of specific files or packets that have been
identified as threats.

Page 4

stated that hackers had not caused serious damage to the systems that feed
the nation's power grid, the constant threat of intrusion has heightened
concerns that electric companies may not have adequately fortified their
defenses against a potential catastrophic strike.

     o In January 2005, a major university reported that a hacker had broken
       into a database containing 32,000 student and employee social security
       numbers, potentially compromising their identities and finances. In
       similar incidents during 2003 and 2004, it was reported that hackers
       had attacked the systems of other universities, exposing the personal
       information of over 1.8 million people.
     o In June 2003, the U.S. government issued a warning concerning a virus
       that specifically targeted financial institutions. Experts said the
       BugBear.b virus was programmed to determine whether a victim had used
       an e-mail address for any of the roughly 1,300 financial institutions
       listed in the virus's code. If a match were found, the software
       attempted to collect and document user input by logging keystrokes and
       then provided this information to a hacker, who could use it in
       attempts to break into the banks' networks.
     o In January 2003, the Slammer worm infected more than 90 percent of
       vulnerable computers worldwide within 10 minutes of its release on the
       Internet by exploiting a known vulnerability for which a patch had
       been available for 6 months.6 Slammer caused network outages, canceled
       airline flights, and automated teller machine failures. In addition,
       the Nuclear Regulatory Commission confirmed that the Slammer worm had
       infected a private computer network at a nuclear power plant,
       disabling a safety monitoring system for nearly 5 hours and causing
       the plant's process computer to fail. The worm reportedly also
       affected communication on the control networks of at least five
       utilities by propagating so quickly that control system traffic was

6 GAO-06-672 .

blocked. Cost estimates on the impact of the work range from

$1.05 billion to $1.25 billion.

In May 2005, we reported that federal agencies were facing a set of
emerging cybersecurity threats as a result of increasingly sophisticated
methods of attack and the blending of once distinct types of attack into
more complex and damaging forms.7 Examples of these threats include spam
(unsolicited commercial e-mail), phishing (fraudulent messages used to
obtain personal or sensitive data), and spyware (software that monitors
user activity without the user's knowledge or consent). Spam consumes
significant resources and is used as a delivery mechanism for other types
of cyberattacks; phishing can lead to identity theft, loss of sensitive
information, and reduced trust and use of electronic government services;
and spyware can capture and release sensitive data, make unauthorized
changes, and decrease system performance. These attacks are also becoming
increasingly automated with the use of botnets- compromised computers that
can be remotely controlled by attackers to automatically launch attacks.
Bots (short for robots) have become a key automation tool that is used to
speed the infection of vulnerable systems.

Federal law and regulation call for critical infrastructure protection
activities that are intended to enhance the cyber and physical security of
both the public and private infrastructures that are essential to national
security, national economic security, and national public health and
safety.8 Federal regulation also establishes DHS as the focal point for
the security of cyberspace- including analysis, warning, information
sharing, vulnerability reduction, mitigation, and recovery efforts for
public and private critical infrastructure information systems. To
accomplish this mission, DHS is to work with other federal agencies, state
and local governments, and the private sector. Federal policy further
recognizes the need to prepare for debilitating Internet disruptions
and-because the vast majority of the Internet infrastructure is

7

GAO, Information Security: Emerging Cybersecurity Issues Threaten Federal
Information Systems, GAO-05-231 (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2005).

8

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7.

Page 6

owned and operated by the private sector-tasks the DHS with developing an
integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery.9

  Prior Reports Identified DHS's Efforts to Fulfill Cybersecurity
  Responsibilities

As the focal point for critical infrastructure protection, the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) has many cybersecurityrelated roles and
responsibilities that are called for in law and policy. These
responsibilities include developing plans, building partnerships, and
improving information sharing, as well as implementing activities related
to the five priorities in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.
These priorities are (1) developing and enhancing national cyber analysis
and warning, (2) reducing cyberspace threats and vulnerabilities, (3)
promoting awareness of and training in security issues, (4) securing
governments' cyberspace, and (5) strengthening national security and
international cyberspace security cooperation. See table 1 for a list of
DHS's 13 key cybersecurity responsibilities. These responsibilities are
described in more detail in appendix I. To fulfill its cybersecurity role,
in June 2003, DHS established the National Cyber Security Division to take
the lead in addressing the cybersecurity of critical infrastructures.

9

The White House, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Washington, D.C.:
February 2003).

Page 7

    Table 1: DHS's Key Cybersecurity Responsibilities

o

o  Develop a comprehensive national plan for critical infrastructure
protection, including cybersecurity.

o

o  Develop partnerships and coordinate with other federal agencies, state
and local governments, and the private sector.

o

o  Improve and enhance public/private information sharing involving cyber
attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities.

o

     o Develop and enhance national cyber analysis and warning capabilities. 
       o 
     o Provide and coordinate incident response and recovery planning
       efforts.  o

o  Identify and assess cyber threats and vulnerabilities.  o

Support efforts to reduce cyber threats and

vulnerabilities. Promote and support research and development efforts to
strengthen cyberspace security.

Promote awareness and outreach. Foster training and certification. Enhance
federal, state, and local government

cybersecurity. Strengthen international cyberspace security. Integrate
cybersecurity with national security.

Source: GAO analysis of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-7, and the National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace.

In our 2005 report and testimony, we noted that while DHS initiated
multiple efforts to fulfill its responsibilities, it had not fully
addressed any of the 13 responsibilities, and much work remained to
fulfill them.10 For example, the department established the United States
Computer Emergency Readiness Team as a public/private partnership to make
cybersecurity a coordinated national effort, and it established forums to
build greater trust and information sharing among federal officials with
information security responsibilities and law enforcement entities.
However, DHS had not yet developed national cyber threat and vulnerability
assessments or government/industry contingency recovery plans for
cybersecurity. Since that report was issued, DHS has made progress on its
responsibilities, but none have been completely addressed. For example, in
June 2006, the agency released the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan; however, supplemental sectorspecific plans have not yet been
finalized. Further, DHS reported that it has expanded the use of a
situational awareness tool that supports cyber analysis and warning from
one to seven federal

10 GAO-05-434 and GAO-05-827T.

agencies. However, this does not yet comprise a national analysis and
warning capability.

In our 2006 report and testimony, we focused particularly on one of DHS's
key cybersecurity responsibilities-facilitating Internet recovery.11 We
reported that DHS had begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its
responsibility for developing an integrated public/private plan for
Internet recovery, but that these efforts were not comprehensive or
complete. For example, DHS had developed highlevel plans for
infrastructure protection and incident response; however, the components
of these plans that address the Internet infrastructure were not complete.
Further, several representatives of private-sector firms supporting the
Internet infrastructure expressed concerns about the plans, noting that
the plans would be difficult to execute in times of crisis. The department
had also started a variety of initiatives to improve the nation's ability
to recover from Internet disruptions, including establishing working
groups to facilitate coordination and exercises in which government and
private industry practice responding to cyber events. However, progress to
date on these initiatives had been limited, and other initiatives lacked
time frames for completion. Also, the relationships among these
initiatives were not evident. As a result, we reported that the government
was not yet adequately prepared to effectively coordinate public/private
plans for recovering from a major Internet disruption. A private-sector
organization subsequently reported that our nation was unprepared to
reconstitute the Internet after a massive disruption, noting that there
were significant gaps in government response plans and that the
responsibilities of the multiple organizations that would plan a role in
recovery were unclear.12

11 GAO-06-672 and GAO-06-863T.

Business Roundtable, Essential Steps to Strengthen America's Cyber
Terrorism Preparedness (Washington, D.C.: June 2006).

Page 9

  DHS Faces Many Challenges; Organizational Stability and Leadership Are Keys to
  Success

DHS faces numerous challenges in fulfilling its cybersecurity-related CIP
responsibilities. Key challenges in fulfilling DHS's broad
responsibilities include increasing awareness about cybersecurity roles
and capabilities, establishing effective partnerships with stakeholders,
achieving two-way information sharing with these stakeholders, and
demonstrating the value it can provide to private sector infrastructure
owners. Key challenges to establishing a plan for recovering from Internet
disruptions include addressing innate characteristics of the Internet that
make planning for and responding to disruptions difficult, achieving
consensus on DHS's role13 and on when the department should get involved
in responding to a disruption, addressing legal issues affecting DHS's
ability to provide assistance to restore Internet service, and overcoming
reluctance of many in the private sector to share information on Internet
disruptions with DHS. Further, the department faces a particular challenge
in attaining the organizational stability and leadership it needs to gain
the trust of other stakeholders in the cybersecurity world-including other
government agencies as well as the private sector.

In May 2005, we reported that multiple senior DHS cybersecurity officials
had recently left the department.14 These officials included the NCSD
Director, the Deputy Director responsible for Outreach and Awareness, the
Director of the US-CERT Control Systems Security Center, the Under
Secretary for the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate and the Assistant Secretary responsible for the Information
Protection Office.

13

While some private sector officials we spoke to stated that the government
did not have a direct recovery role, others identified a variety of
potential roles including providing information on specific threats,
providing security and disaster relief during a crisis, funding backup
communication infrastructures, driving improved Internet security through
requirements for the government's own procurements, and providing
logistical assistance, such as fuel, power, and security to Internet
infrastructure operators during a crisis.

                                 14 GAO-05-434.

Infrastructure sector officials stated that the lack of stable leadership
has diminished NCSD's ability to maintain trusted relationships with its
infrastructure partners and has hindered its ability to adequately plan
and execute activities. According to one private-sector representative,
the importance of organizational stability in fostering strong
partnerships cannot be over emphasized.

In July 2005, DHS underwent a reorganization which elevated responsibility
for cybersecurity to an assistant secretary position. NCSD and the
National Communication System were placed in the Preparedness Directorate
under a new position, called the Assistant Secretary of Cyber Security and
Telecommunications-in part to raise the visibility of cybersecurity issues
in the department. However, over a year later, this position remains
vacant. While DHS stated that the lack of a permanent assistant secretary
has not hampered its efforts related to protecting critical
infrastructure, several private-sector representatives stated that DHS's
lack of leadership in this area has limited progress. Specifically, these
representatives stated that filling key leadership positions would enhance
DHS's visibility to the Internet industry and would potentially improve
its reputation.

  Implementation of GAO's Recommendations Should Enhance DHS's Ability to
  Fulfill Cybersecurity Responsibilities and Address Challenges

To strengthen DHS's ability to implement its cybersecurity
responsibilities and to resolve underlying challenges, GAO has made about
25 recommendations over the last several years. These recommendations
focus on the need to (1) conduct threat and vulnerability assessments, (2)
develop a strategic analysis and warning capability for identifying
potential cyber attacks, (3) protect infrastructure control systems, (4)
enhance public/private information sharing, and (5) facilitate recovery
planning, including recovery of the Internet in case of a major
disruption. These recommendations are summarized below and key
recommendations that have not yet been fully implemented are listed in
appendix 2. Together, the recommendations provide a high-level roadmap for
DHS to use to improve our nation's cybersecurity posture. Until it
addresses these recommendations, DHS will have difficulty achieving
results in its role as a federal focal point for cybersecurity of critical
infrastructures.

Threat and Vulnerability Assessments: In May 2005, we reported that while
DHS had made progress in planning and coordinating efforts to enhance
cybersecurity, much more work remained to be done for the department to
fulfill its basic responsibilities- including conducting important threat
and vulnerability assessments.15 Specifically, we noted that DHS had
participated in national efforts to identify and assess cyber threats and
had begun to take steps to facilitate sector-specific vulnerability
assessments, but that it had not completed a national cyber threat
assessment, sector-specific vulnerability assessments, or the
identification of cross-sector interdependencies that are called for in
the cyberspace strategy. We made recommendations to strengthen the
department's ability to implement key cybersecurity responsibilities by
prioritizing and completing critical activities and resolving underlying
challenges. DHS concurred with our recommendation to engage stakeholders
in prioritizing its key cybersecurity responsibilities, including
performing a national cyber threat assessment and facilitating sector
cyber vulnerability assessments. However, these efforts are not yet
complete.

Strategic Analysis and Warnings: In 2001, we reported on the analysis and
warnings efforts within DHS's predecessor, the National Infrastructure
Protection Center, and we identified several challenges that were impeding
the development of an effective strategic analysis and warning
capability.16 We reported that a generally accepted methodology for
analyzing strategic cyber-based threats did not exist. Specifically, there
was no standard terminology, no standard set of factors to consider, and
no established thresholds for determining the sophistication of attack
techniques. We also reported that the Center did not have the
industry-specific data on factors such as critical systems components,
known vulnerabilities, and interdependencies.

15 GAO-05-434.

16GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in
Developing National Capabilities, GAO-01-323 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25,
2001).

Page 12

We therefore recommended that the responsible executive-branch officials
and agencies establish a capability for strategic analysis of
computer-based threats, including developing a methodology, acquiring
expertise, and obtaining infrastructure data.

More recently, in 2005, we reported that DHS had established various
initiatives to enhance its analytical capabilities, including
intelligence-sharing through the US CERT and situational awareness tools
through the US CERT Einstein program at selected federal agencies.
However, we noted that DHS was still facing the same challenges in
developing strategic analysis and warning capabilities and that our
original recommendations had not been fully implemented.

Control Systems: In March 2004, we reported that several factors-including
the adoption of standardized technologies with known vulnerabilities and
the increased connectivity of control systems to other systems-had
contributed to an escalation of the risk of cyber-attacks against control
systems.17 We recommended that DHS develop and implement a strategy for
coordinating with the private sector and with other government agencies to
improve control system security, including an approach for coordinating
the various ongoing efforts to secure control systems. DHS concurred with
our recommendation and, in December 2004, issued a highlevel national
strategy for control systems security. This strategy includes, among other
things, goals to create a capability to respond to attacks on control
systems and to mitigate vulnerabilities, bridge industry and government
efforts, and develop control systems security awareness. However, the
strategy does not yet include underlying details and milestones for
completing activities. In 2007, we plan to evaluate federal efforts to
enhance the protection of critical control systems.

Information Sharing: Over the years, we have issued a series of reports,
summarized below, on efforts to improve information sharing in support of
critical infrastructure protection. Further,

GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges and Efforts to Secure
Control Systems, GAO-04-354 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2004).

Page 13

because of the importance of this topic, in January 2005, we designated
establishing appropriate and effective informationsharing mechanisms to
improve homeland security as a new highrisk area in our report on federal
programs and operations at risk.18 We reported that the ability to share
security-related information can unify the efforts of federal, state, and
local government agencies and the private sector in preventing or
minimizing terrorist attacks.

In July 2004, we recommended actions to improve the effectiveness of DHS's
information-sharing efforts.19 We recommended that officials within the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (1) proceed
with and establish milestones for developing an information-sharing plan
and (2) develop appropriate DHS policies and procedures for interacting
with ISACs, sector coordinators (groups or individuals designated to
represent their respective infrastructure sectors' CIP activities), and
sector-specific agencies and for coordination and information sharing
within the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
and other DHS components. DHS stated that the report generally provided an
accurate analysis and planned actions to address these recommendations.
However, as of today, the recommendations have not yet been implemented.

More recently, in March 2006, we reported that more than 4 years after
September 11, the nation still lacked governmentwide policies and
processes to help agencies integrate a myriad of ongoing efforts to
improve the sharing of terrorism-related information that is critical to
protecting our homeland. 20 Responsibility for creating these policies and
processes now lies with the Director of National Intelligence-and should
include a cybersecurity focus. We made several recommendations to the
Director of National Intelligence to strengthen information sharing
efforts.

18

 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005).

19GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Improving Information Sharing
with Infrastructure Sectors, GAO-04-780 (Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2004).

20

GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish
Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but
Unclassified Information, GAO-06-385 (Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2006).

Page 14

Most recently, in April 2006, we reported on DHS's efforts to implement
the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002, which was enacted to
encourage nonfederal entities to voluntarily share critical infrastructure
information and established protections for it.21 DHS has initiated
several actions, including issuing interim operating procedures22 and
creating a program office to administer the critical infrastructure
protection program called for by the Critical Infrastructure Information
Act. The program office has also begun to accept and safeguard critical
infrastructure information submitted voluntarily by infrastructure owners
and is sharing it with other DHS entities and, on a limited basis, with
other government entities. For example, as of January 2006, the program
office had received about 290 submissions of critical infrastructure
information from various sectors. However, DHS faces challenges that
impede the private sector's willingness to share sensitive information,
including defining specific government needs for critical infrastructure
information, determining how the information will be used, assuring the
private sector that the information will be protected and who will be
authorized to have access to the information, and demonstrating to
critical infrastructure owners the benefits of sharing the information. We
recommended that DHS better define its own and other federal agencies'
critical infrastructure information needs and explain how it and the other
agencies will use the information they receive from the private sector. We
also recommended that DHS establish a specific deadline for issuing its
final operating procedures. DHS concurred with our findings and
recommendations and has made progress in selected areas. Specifically, on
September 1, 2006, DHS released its final operating procedures.23

21GAO, Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More
Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical Infrastructure
Information, GAO-06-383 (Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2006).

22

On February 20, 2004, DHS issued Procedures for Handling Critical
Infrastructure Information: Interim Rule (69 FR 8074) that, among other
things, included mechanisms specified in law, established authorities
regarding the sharing of information, and stated that DHS would consider
issuing supplemental regulations.

23

Department of Homeland Security, Procedures for Handling Critical
Infrastructure Information; Final Rule (71 FR 52262) (Sept. 1, 2006).

Recovery Planning: In May 2005, we reported that while DHS had made
progress in planning and coordinating efforts to enhance cybersecurity,
much more work remained to be done to fulfill its
responsibilities-including facilitating government and government/industry
cybersecurity recovery plans.24 More recently, in June 2006, we reported
that DHS had begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility
for developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery,
but that these efforts were not complete or comprehensive. 25 Further, we
reported that DHS faced key challenges in establishing a plan for
recovering from Internet disruptions, including obtaining consensus on its
role and on when the department should get involved in responding to a
disruption, overcoming the reluctance of many in the private sector to
share information on Internet disruptions, addressing leadership
uncertainties within the department. We made recommendations to strengthen
the department's ability to help recover from Internet disruptions. DHS
concurred with our recommendations and identified plans to begin
addressing them.

We also reported that the federal laws and regulations that address
critical infrastructure protection, disaster recovery, and the
telecommunications infrastructure provide broad guidance that applies to
the Internet, but it is not clear how useful these authorities would be in
helping to recover from a major Internet disruption. Specifically, key
legislation on critical infrastructure protection does not address roles
and responsibilities in the event of an Internet disruption. Other laws
and regulations governing disaster response and emergency communications
have never been used for Internet recovery. We suggested that Congress
consider clarifying the legal framework guiding Internet recovery.

In summary, while DHS has initiatives underway to fulfill its many
cybersecurity responsibilities, major tasks remain to be done. These
include assessing and reducing cyber threats and vulnerabilities and

                         24 GAO-05-434 . 25 GAO-06-672.

coordinating incident response and recovery planning efforts. In
fulfilling its cybersecurity responsibilities, DHS has many challenges to
overcome, several of which will be difficult without effective leadership.
Effective leadership is essential in order to fulfill key government
responsibilities and to partner and build credibility with the private
sector. Addressing this leadership void starts with DHS naming its
Assistant Secretary of Cyber Security and Telecommunications. Once that
position is filled, our recommendations in the areas of threat and
vulnerability analysis, analysis and warning, control systems protection,
information sharing, and recovery planning can help prioritize efforts to
secure our nation's public and private infrastructures.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any
questions at this time.

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, please
contact us at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at [email protected]. Other key
contributors to this report include Colleen Phillips (Assistant Director),
Vijay D'Souza, Michael Gilmore, Barbarol James, and Teresa Neven.

            Appendix I: Thirteen DHS Cybersecurity Responsibilities

Critical infrastructure protection Description responsibilities with a
cyber element

Develop a national plan for critical Developing a comprehensive national
plan for securing the key resources and critical infrastructure protection
that includes infrastructure of the United States, including information
technology and cybersecurity. telecommunications systems (including
satellites) and the physical and technological

assets that support such systems. This plan is to outline national
strategies, activities, and

milestones for protecting critical infrastructures.

Develop partnerships and coordinate with Fostering and developing
public/private partnerships with and among other federal other federal
agencies, state and local agencies, state and local governments, the
private sector, and others. DHS is to serve as governments, and the
private sector. the "focal point for the security of cyberspace."

Improve and enhance public/private Improving and enhancing information
sharing with and among other federal agencies, information sharing
involving cyber state and local governments, the private sector, and
others through improved partnerships attacks, threats, and
vulnerabilities. and collaboration, including encouraging information
sharing and analysis mechanisms.

DHS is to improve sharing of information on cyber attacks, threats, and
vulnerabilities.

Responsibilities related to the cyberspace strategy's five priorities

Develop and enhance national cyber Providing cyber analysis and warnings,
enhancing analytical capabilities, and developing analysis and warning
capabilities. a national indications and warnings architecture to identify
precursors to attacks.

Provide and coordinate incident response Providing crisis management in
response to threats to or attacks on critical information

and recovery planning efforts. systems. This entails coordinating efforts
for incident response, recovery planning, exercising cybersecurity
continuity plans for federal systems, planning for recovery of Internet
functions, and assisting infrastructure stakeholders with cyber-related
emergency recovery plans.

Identify and assess cyber threats and Leading efforts by the public and
private sector to conduct a national cyber threat vulnerabilities.
assessment, to conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of sectors,
and to identify cross-sector interdependencies.

Support efforts to reduce cyber threats Leading and supporting efforts by
the public and private sector to reduce threats and

and vulnerabilities. vulnerabilities. Threat reduction involves working
with law enforcement community to investigate and prosecute cyberspace
threats. Vulnerability reduction involves identifying and remediating
vulnerabilities in existing software and systems.

Promote and support research and Collaborating and coordinating with
members of academia, industry, and government to development efforts to
strengthen optimize cybersecurity related research and development efforts
to reduce vulnerabilities cyberspace security. through the adoption of
more secure technologies.

Promote awareness and outreach. Establishing a comprehensive national
awareness program to promote efforts to strengthen cybersecurity
throughout government and the private sector, including the home user.

 Foster training and certification. Improving cybersecurity-related education,
                   training, and certification opportunities.

Enhance federal, state, and local Partnering with federal, state, and
local governments in efforts to strengthen the government cybersecurity.
cybersecurity of the nation's critical information infrastructure to
assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, and response to
terrorist attacks against the United States.

Strengthen international cyberspace Working in conjunction with other
federal agencies, international organizations, and security. industry in
efforts to promote strengthened cybersecurity on a global basis.

Integrate cybersecurity with national Coordinating and integrating
applicable national preparedness goals with its National security.
Infrastructure Protection Plan.

Source: GAO analysis of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-7, and the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.

  Appendix II: Key Recommendations To Improve Cybersecurity of Critical
  Infrastructures

    Functional Area Recommendations That Have Not Yet Been Fully Implemented

      Threat and vulnerability Perform a national cyber threat assessment.

assessments Facilitate sector cyber vulnerability assessments-to include
identification of cross-sector interdependencies.

Strategic analysis and Establish a capability for strategic analysis of
computer-based threats, including developing a related warning
methodology, acquiring staff expertise, and obtaining infrastructure data.

Develop a comprehensive governmentwide data-collection and analysis
framework and ensure that national watch and warning operations for
computer-based attacks are supported by sufficient staff and resources

Develop a comprehensive written plan for establishing analysis and warning
capabilities that integrates existing planning elements and includes
milestones and performance measures; approaches (or strategies) and the
various resources needed to achieve the goals and objectives; a
description of the relationship between the long-term goals and objectives
and the annual performance goals; and a description of how program
evaluations could be used to establish or revise strategic goals, along
with a schedule for future program evaluations.

Infrastructure control Develop and implement a strategy for coordinating
with the private sector and other government agencies systems protection
to improve control system security, including an approach for coordinating
the various ongoing efforts to secure control systems.

Public/private To ensure effective implementation of the Intelligence
Reform Act, assess progress toward the milestones

information sharing set in the Interim Implementation Plan; identify any
barriers to achieving these milestones,such as insufficient resources and
determine ways to resolve them; and recommend to the oversight committees
with jurisdiction any necessary changes to the organizational structure or
approach to creating the Information Sharing Environment.26

Consistent with other infrastructure planning efforts such as the NIPP,
define and communicate to the private sector what critical infrastructure
information DHS and federal entities need to fulfill their critical
infrastructure responsibilities and how federal, state, and local entities
are expected to use the information submitted under the program.

Determine whether creating mechanisms, such as providing originator
control and direct submissions to federal agencies other than DHS, would
increase submissions of critical infrastructure information.

Expand efforts to use incentives to encourage more users of critical
infrastructure information, such as mechanisms for state-to-state sharing.

Proceed with and establish milestones for the development of an
information-sharing plan that includes (1) a clear description of the
roles and responsibilities of DHS, the ISACs, the sector coordinators, and
the sector-specific agencies and (2) actions designed to address
information-sharing challenges. Efforts to develop this plan should
include soliciting feedback from the ISACs, sector coordinators, and
sectorspecific agencies to help ensure that challenges identified by the
ISACs and the ISAC Council are appropriately considered in the final plan.

Considering the roles, responsibilities, and actions established in the
information-sharing plan, develop appropriate DHS policies and procedures
for interacting with the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs),
sector coordinators, and sector-specific agencies and for coordination and
information sharing within the IAIP Directorate (such as the National
Cyber Security Division and Infrastructure Coordination Division) and
other DHS components that may interact with the ISACs, including TSA.

26

     We made this recommendation to the Office of the Director of National
                                 Intelligence.

    Functional Area Recommendations That Have Not Yet Been Fully Implemented

Recovery planning Establish contingency plans for cybersecurity, including
                   recovery plans for key internet functions.

Establish dates for revising the National Response Plan and finalizing the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (to include components related to
Internet recovery).

Draft public/private plans for Internet recovery and obtain input from key
Internet infrastructure companies. Review the organizational structures
and roles of DHS's National Communication System (NCS) and National Cyber
Security Division (NCSD) in light of the convergence of voice and data
communications.

Identify the relationships and interdependencies among the various
Internet recovery-related activities currently underway in NCS and NCSD.

 Establish timelines and priorities for key efforts identified by the Internet
                           Disruption Working Group.

Identify ways to incorporate lessons learned from actual incidents and
during cyber exercises into recovery plans and procedures.

Work with private-sector stakeholders representing the Internet
infrastructure to address challenges to effective Internet recovery by (1)
further defining needed government functions, (2) defining a trigger for
government involvement in responding to a disruption, and (3) documenting
assumptions and developing approaches to deal with key challenges that are
not within the government's control.

Crosscutting topics Engage appropriate stakeholders to prioritize key
cybersecurity responsibilities so that the most important activities are
addressed first.

Prioritize a list of activities for addressing underlying challenges that
are impeding execution of DHS responsibilities

Identify performance measures and milestones for fulfilling prioritized
responsibilities and activities to address underlying challenges, and
track progress against these measures and milestones

Source: GAO-06-383, GAO-06-385, GAO-06-672, GAO-05-434, GAO-04-780, GAO-04-354,
                                  GAO-01-323.

      (310825)

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