Terrorism Insurance: Measuring and Predicting Losses from	 
Unconventional Weapons Is Difficult, but Some Industry Exposure  
Exists (25-SEP-06, GAO-06-1081).				 
                                                                 
Terrorists using unconventional weapons, also known as nuclear,  
biological, chemical, or radiological (NBCR) weapons, could cause
devastating losses. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) of	 
2002, as well as the extension passed in 2005, will cover losses 
from a certified act of terrorism, irrespective of the weapon	 
used, if those types of losses are included in the coverage.	 
Because of a lack of information about the willingness of	 
insurers to cover NBCR risks and uncertainties about the extent  
to which these risks can be and are being insured by private	 
insurers across various lines of insurance, GAO was asked to	 
study these issues. This report discusses (1) commonly accepted  
principles of insurability and whether NBCR risks are measurable 
and predictable, and (2) whether private insurers currently are  
exposed to NBCR risks and the challenges they face in pricing	 
such risks. GAO collected information from and met with some of  
the largest insurers in each line of insurance, associations	 
representing a broader cross section of the industry and state	 
insurance regulators. GAO makes no recommendations in this	 
report. 							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-1081					        
    ACCNO:   A61444						        
  TITLE:     Terrorism Insurance: Measuring and Predicting Losses from
Unconventional Weapons Is Difficult, but Some Industry Exposure  
Exists								 
     DATE:   09/25/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Biological weapons 				 
	     Chemical weapons					 
	     Insurance						 
	     Insurance companies				 
	     Insurance losses					 
	     Insurance regulation				 
	     Nuclear weapons					 
	     Prices and pricing 				 
	     Property losses					 
	     Risk management					 
	     Terrorism						 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-06-1081

     

     * Results in Brief
     * Background
          * State Regulation of Insurance Companies
          * NBCR Weapons Represent Many Methods of Attack
          * The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act Program
     * Applying Common Principles for Assessing Insurability Presen
     * Insurers' Exposure to NBCR Risks Varies Widely by Line of In
          * Relatively Little NBCR Coverage Available in Property/Casual
               * Although Property/Casualty Insurers Remove Coverage for NBCR
               * Demand for NBCR Coverage in Property/Casualty Market Is Diff
          * Insurers in Workers' Compensation, Life, and Health Generall
               * Workers' Compensation Insurance Generally Covers All Perils,
               * According to Life Insurers, They Generally Cannot Exclude Te
               * According to Health Insurers, They Face Unique Challenges in
          * Principles of Insurability and Assessing Whether NBCR Risks
          * Assessing Exposure to NBCR Risks
     * GAO Contact
     * Staff Acknowledgments
     * GAO's Mission
     * Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
          * Order by Mail or Phone
     * To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * Congressional Relations
     * Public Affairs

Report to the Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, House of
Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

September 2006

TERRORISM INSURANCE

Measuring and Predicting Losses from Unconventional Weapons Is Difficult,
but Some Industry Exposure Exists

GAO-06-1081

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 4
Applying Common Principles for Assessing Insurability Presents Challenges
in Measuring and Predicting NBCR Risks 8
Insurers' Exposure to NBCR Risks Varies Widely by Line of Insurance and
Insurers Offering Coverage Face Challenges in Pricing 15
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 30
Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 36
Related GAO Products 37

Table

Table 1: Description of NBCR Weapons 6

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

September 25, 2006

The Honorable Michael G. Oxley Chairman Committee on Financial Services
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

When considering possible terrorist events, among the most potentially
devastating would be those caused by terrorists using unconventional
weapons, also known as nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological
(NBCR) weapons. Because of the potential for catastrophic losses from an
NBCR attack, representatives of the insurance industry have voiced doubts
about its ability to pay for such losses, and members of Congress have
raised concerns about costs to the federal government and citizens from
losses not covered by insurance. In response to the insurance industry's
reluctance to cover terrorism risks generally, Congress enacted the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) of 2002 for the commercial
property/casualty industry, which requires insurers to provide coverage
for terrorism and provides a defined level of reimbursement for certain
losses.1 However, limited information suggests that even with this federal
financial backstop, the insurance industry continues to be reluctant to
provide insurance to cover NBCR risks.

In light of the continuing debate about TRIA, which is set to expire in
2007, the lack of information about the willingness of insurers to cover
NBCR risks, and uncertainties about the extent to which these risks can be
and are being insured by private insurers across various lines of
insurance, you asked that we study the extent to which NBCR risks are
measurable and insurable. This report discusses (1) commonly accepted
principles of insurability and whether NBCR risks are measurable and
predictable and (2) whether private insurers currently are exposed to NBCR
risks and the challenges they face in pricing such risks.

To identify commonly accepted principles of insurability and whether NBCR
risks are measurable and predictable, we reviewed standard insurance
references to identify principles that insurers consider when evaluating
the insurability of risks. We relied primarily on Fundamentals of Risk and
Insurance.2 To determine the insurability of NBCR risks, we compared
information we collected about the market for and nature of NBCR terrorism
risk to the principles. Moreover, we obtained information from a limited
number of insurance industry representatives, as well as firms that
specialize in modeling terrorism and other catastrophic events for
insurers (modeling firms), to identify the amount and types of data
available to predict future losses from NBCR terrorist attacks.3 For
comparison, we also obtained descriptions of data typically available to
calculate losses for other catastrophic risks such as hurricanes. To
assess whether private insurers were exposed to NBCR events and how they
price for NBCR risks, we identified state requirements for coverage of
NBCR events, lines of insurance where insurers cover NBCR damage of their
own accord, and circumstances where coverage of NBCR events could be less
clear. Specifically, we obtained documentation on state requirements from
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and visited two
states and the District of Columbia, which contain localities that are
considered to be at higher risk than others for a terrorist attack. To
assess whether lines of insurance could be exposed to NBCR attacks, we
reviewed government and industry studies to obtain broad estimates of the
amount of NBCR coverage for commercial property/casualty insurance
available on the market, but these studies had certain methodological
limitations. We also interviewed at least two of the larger insurers in
each of the major lines of insurance (commercial and personal
property/casualty, workers' compensation, and individual and group life
and health); commercial property/casualty and group life reinsurers
(companies that provide insurance for insurers); and selected trade
associations. Although we obtained information from a limited number of
insurers, we selected the insurers based on their market share for each
line of insurance nationwide and in states with localities considered to
be at higher risk for terrorist attacks. The insurers we selected
represented between 13 and 38 percent of the national market for each line
of insurance. To determine circumstances under which coverage of NBCR
events might be less clear, we interviewed insurers and identified
examples of language relating to coverage in insurance contracts that
could be contested. Finally, to determine if and why insurers would be
willing to offer more coverage for NBCR events in the future, we
interviewed representatives of insurers, insurance trade groups,
policyholders, and academic experts.

1Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (Nov. 26, 2002), codified at 15
U.S.C. S: 6701 note.

2Emmett J. Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, Fundamentals of Risk and
Insurance, 9th ed. (Hoboken, N. J.: John Wiley & Sons: 2003).

3From an insurance company perspective, a catastrophe is one that has the
potential to cause severe losses to an insurance company relative to its
available financial resources.

We conducted our work in California, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts,
and Washington, D.C., from February 2006 through September 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

                                Results in Brief

Insuring NBCR risks is distinctly different from insuring other risks
because of the potential for catastrophic losses, a lack of understanding
or knowledge about the long-term consequences, and a lack of historical
experience with NBCR attacks in the United States. Measuring and
predicting NBCR risks present distinct challenges to insurers because the
characteristics of the risks largely diverge from commonly accepted
principles used in determining insurability. According to these common
principles, when assessing insurability, the risk generally must (1) have
past occurrences sufficient in number and homogeneous enough (invoking the
"law of large numbers") to enable insurers to accurately predict future
losses, (2) be definite and measurable in terms of dollar value, (3) occur
by chance, and (4) not result in catastrophic losses for the insurer.
Although these principles of insurability generally underlie insurers'
decisions about what risks to insure and at what price, experience with
NBCR and other more common risks illustrate that insurability occurs along
a continuum. That is, at one end are risks that satisfy all the principles
and are most likely to be insured and at the other end are risks that
satisfy none of the principles and are least likely to be insured. In
general, NBCR risks largely fail to meet most or all of the principles of
an insurable risk. Indeed, insurance experts we interviewed said that the
potential severity of NBCR risks alone could diminish the willingness of
some insurers to insure NBCR risks.

Although NBCR risks may not fully satisfy the principles of insurability,
there are enough variations across lines of insurance that some insurers
or some lines of insurance may have no willingness to offer coverage for
NBCR, while others may choose to offer coverage for some or all of the
risks. For example, even with TRIA, property/casualty insurers generally
have attempted to limit their exposure to NBCR risks by excluding nearly
all NBCR events from coverage, both for commercial property/casualty and
homeowners. According to industry representatives, property/casualty
insurers believe they have excluded NBCR coverage by interpreting existing
exclusions in their policies to apply to NBCR risks, but some of the
exclusions could be challenged in courts. However, unlike
property/casualty insurers, workers' compensation, life, and health
insurers are exposed to NBCR risks and generally have not excluded them
from coverage for a variety of reasons. Specifically, workers'
compensation insurers generally offer NBCR coverage because many states
limit the exclusion of any peril for workers' compensation. Conversely,
while life and health insurers may not always be required to insure NBCR
risks, they generally face other challenges in segregating and excluding
NBCR risks. Another reason that life and health insurers may be more
willing to insure NBCR risks is that while the loss of life and health
effects from an NBCR event may be damaging to some companies, large life
and health insurers might be able to diversify their risks geographically
and spread their losses over time. However, representatives of workers'
compensation, life, and health insurers expressed concerns that the prices
they currently charge may not cover their potential exposures to NBCR
risks, sometimes because of regulatory limitations, and generally because
of difficulties in measuring and pricing for NBCR losses. Given the
challenges faced by insurers in providing coverage for, and pricing, NBCR
risks, any purely market-driven expansion of coverage is highly unlikely
in the foreseeable future.

                                   Background

The insurance industry offers many types of coverages intended to protect
businesses as well as individuals. While the extent of regulation varies
by state and by line of insurance, state insurance regulators oversee the
provision of insurance; for example, states may approve the rates (prices)
insurers may charge and require insurers to cover certain events. In order
to ensure the availability of terrorism coverage after September 11,
Congress enacted TRIA to temporarily provide some property/casualty
insurers some reimbursement for insured losses, including workers'
compensation losses, resulting from specific acts of terrorism.

Insurance can be grouped into three main types: property/casualty, life,
and health. Property/casualty insurance includes several types of
insurance. Commercial property/casualty insurers cover physical losses to
property, business interruptions or loss of use of buildings due to
property damage, and also legal liability related to the maintenance of
the property and business operations. Workers' compensation insurance is
considered a separate category of commercial property/casualty insurance,
and the insurers provide employers protection against work-related
disability and death. In addition, with certain exceptions, almost all
employers are required to provide some form of workers' compensation
insurance to cover employer liability for workers who are killed, injured,
or disabled on the job from any cause.4 Personal lines of
property/casualty insurance include policies for homeowners and automobile
coverage. Homeowners insurance provides coverage for physical losses to
the home, its contents, and additional living expenses for the owner while
the home is uninhabitable.

Life insurers sell either individual or group policies that provide
benefits to designated survivors after the death of an insured. Health
insurers cover medical expenses resulting from sickness and injury.

State Regulation of Insurance Companies

States have primary responsibility for regulating the insurance industry
in the United States, and state insurance regulators coordinate their
activities in part through NAIC. The degree of oversight of insurance
varies by state and insurance type. In some lines of insurance, such as
workers' compensation, insurers may file insurance policy forms with state
regulators, who help determine the extent of coverage provided by a policy
by approving the wording of policies, including the explicit exclusions of
some perils. According to an NAIC representative, while practices vary by
state, state regulators generally regulate prices for personal lines of
insurance and workers' compensation policies but not for group life or
commercial property/casualty policies. In most cases, state insurance
regulators perform neither rate nor form review for commercial
property/casualty insurance contracts because it is presumed that
businesses have a better understanding of insurance contracts than the
average personal lines consumer. However, reinsurers-companies that
provide insurance to insurers-generally are not required to get state
regulatory approval for the terms of coverage or the prices they charge.

NBCR Weapons Represent Many Methods of Attack

Terrorism attacks, particularly including those using NBCR weapons, could
result in catastrophic losses. Each type of weapon-nuclear, biological,
chemical, and radiological-represents different methods of attack.
Further, many different agents can be used to carry out a biological,
chemical, or radiological attack. See table 1 for general descriptions of
each type of weapon and examples of available agents.

4Employers may cover employees for work-related injuries, illness, and
death by purchasing an insurance policy from a company licensed by the
state, or employers may self-insure.

Table 1: Description of NBCR Weapons

                Weapon description                Examples of agents          
Nuclear      A nuclear explosion would have    The explosion of the        
                immediate blast effects that      weapon, a bomb or missile,  
                would destroy buildings. The      would be generated through  
                explosion also would produce      nuclear fission of uranium  
                high-energy radiation and extreme or plutonium atoms, or      
                heat, and form a cloud from which nuclear fusion of hydrogen  
                highly lethal radioactive         isotopes.                   
                material would fall. The overall  
                effect of the weapon would depend 
                on the size of the weapon and how 
                high above the ground the         
                detonation occurred.              
Biological   Biological attacks can involve    Many different agents such  
                two basic types of biological     as smallpox or anthrax,     
                agents: contagious and            each with its own           
                noncontagious. With most          characteristics, could be   
                biological agents, an attack may  used for biological         
                not be recognized immediately     attacks.                    
                because the symptoms may be       
                attributable to several causes or 
                because the disease the agent     
                causes has an incubation period.  
Chemical     Chemical attacks entail the       Many different agents such  
                dispersal of chemical vapors,     as sarin and hydrogen       
                aerosols, liquids, or solids and  cyanide, each with its own  
                affect individuals through        characteristics, could be   
                inhalation or exposure to eyes    used for chemical attacks.  
                and skin. Chemical weapons act    
                very quickly to kill or harm      
                humans, often within a few        
                seconds.                          
Radiological A "dirty bomb" uses conventional  Different radioactive       
                explosives to disperse            agents, including           
                radioactive material across the   americium, cesium, and      
                immediate area, which could vary  plutonium, could be used to 
                in size depending on the size of  create a dirty bomb.        
                the explosive. The primary        
                short-term exposure hazard to     
                humans would be inhalation of     
                radioactive material suspended in 
                the dust and smoke from the       
                explosion.                        

Sources: RAND, GAO.

Notes: For weapon descriptions, see Rand Public Safety and Justice,
Individual Preparedness and Response to Chemical, Radiological, Nuclear,
and Biological Terrorist Attacks (Santa Monica, California: 2003). For
examples of biological and chemical agents, see GAO, Combating Terrorism:
Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and
Biological Attacks, GAO/NSIAD-99-163 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 1999).
For examples of radiological agents that can be used in dirty bombs, see
GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs Better Information to Guide Its Expanded
Recovery of Sealed Radiological Sources, GAO-05-967 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 22, 2005).

The agents used to undertake NBCR attacks have differing characteristics
and properties and would affect people and property in myriad ways. Of the
four types of NBCR attacks, a nuclear bomb would be the most likely to
result in fires of any consequence. The intense heat produced by the
nuclear explosion and subsequent reactions could produce extensive fires
located throughout the area of detonation. While the detonation of a dirty
bomb (conventional explosives used to disperse radioactive material) could
result in blast damage, the resulting fire damage likely would be confined
to the immediate area. However, the detonation of both nuclear and dirty
bombs would release radioactive materials, resulting in the need to
decontaminate buildings and provide immediate healthcare. The distance
these radioactive agents disperse from the original detonation site would
depend on many factors, including the strength of the explosive and
meteorological conditions. While the release of chemical and biological
agents is significantly less likely to result in fires of any consequence,
the agents also have the potential to contaminate buildings and make them
unusable for long periods. These agents could be released within buildings
or outdoors, with chemical agents more likely than biological agents to
result in immediate harm to humans. All NBCR attacks, depending on size of
the explosion or the quantity of the agent, have the potential to result
in fatalities, injuries, or illness.

The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act Program

After the events of September 11, when certain coverage for terrorism
events disappeared, Congress passed TRIA.5 This law created a temporary
program that effectively functions as reinsurance-for the commercial
property/casualty and workers' compensation insurance industries only.6
Under TRIA, the federal government would reimburse insurers in these lines
for 90 percent of their losses, up to a specified level, after the
insurers paid a deductible. The program also would cover losses caused by
NBCR attacks, if insurers had included this coverage in an insurance
policy. However, coverage of NBCR attacks, as with other terrorist
attacks, would have to meet the program's criteria to trigger
reimbursements.

TRIA requires certain insurers to "make available" coverage for terrorist
events that the Secretary of the Treasury has certified as committed by
individuals acting on behalf of a foreign person or interest.7 Commercial
property/casualty insurers must offer terrorism coverage to their
policyholders, although they could impose an additional charge.
Policyholders have the option of not purchasing the coverage and adding a
terrorism exclusion to their policies. If policyholders chose to purchase
the terrorism coverage for their property/casualty policies, insurers then
could not add any additional exclusions or conditional language to the
policies.

5For more information on TRIA, see GAO, Terrorism Insurance:
Implementation of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, GAO-04-307
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004).

6For purposes of TRIA, "property and casualty insurance" includes
commercial lines of property/casualty insurance, including workers'
compensation and directors and officers' liability insurance. It does not
include other types of insurance such as federal crop insurance, medical
malpractice insurance, health or life insurance, commercial automobile
insurance, burglary and theft insurance, professional liability insurance
or farm owners multiple peril insurance. 15 U.S.C. S: 6701 note (Pub. L.
No. 107-297, S: 102(12)).

7TRIA defines "make available" to mean that insurers subject to TRIA must
offer coverage for insured losses arising from certified terrorist events
and that the coverage not differ materially from the terms, amounts, and
limitations applicable to other types of coverage.

In December 2005, Congress extended many of the same provisions of the
original statute in the Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005,
but increased the required amount insurers would have to pay in the
aftermath of a terrorist attack.8 While deliberating the extension of
TRIA, Congress considered whether to cover additional lines of coverage,
such as group life insurance, and set a lower deductible that applied only
to NBCR terrorist events. However, Congress did not enact these changes.
The TRIA extension, which continues to apply only to the commercial
property/casualty industry, is set to expire on December 31, 2007.

  Applying Common Principles for Assessing Insurability Presents Challenges in
                      Measuring and Predicting NBCR Risks

Several commonly accepted principles underlie insurers' ability to
determine whether to offer coverage for a particular risk and at what
price. Ultimately, the decision becomes a question of whether sufficient
information exists for insurers to accurately estimate potential losses.
According to standard insurance theory, four major principles contribute
to the ability of insurers to estimate and cover future losses: the law of
large numbers, measurability, fortuity, and the size of the potential
losses.9 However, measuring and predicting losses associated with NBCR
risks can be particularly challenging for a number of reasons, including
lack of experience with similar attacks, difficulty in predicting
terrorists' intentions, and the potentially catastrophic losses that could
result. Nevertheless, models have been developed that attempt to assist
insurers in evaluating terrorist and NBCR risks. However, many insurers
and other insurance experts continue to believe that there is an
insufficient basis for estimating the probable frequency of terrorist
attacks, including NBCR attacks.

Four principles generally underlie an insurance company's willingness to
provide insurance for a particular risk or type of risk. Each contributes
to the insurer's ability to measure and predict, with a reasonable degree
of accuracy, the likely frequency of occurrence and the probable severity
of losses that will result from each occurrence. In the ideal situation,
when all these factors are satisfied, the insurer can add other expenses
and profits to the expected losses and determine a price that is
appropriate to the risk. Insurers may still decide to offer insurance for
risks that deviate from the "ideal." However, as one or more of the
factors vary from the ideal, the ability of the insurer to estimate future
losses decreases, the risk increases, and the insurer's capital is more
exposed to inadequate prices for the coverage that the insurer offers.
These principles are

8Pub. L. No. 109-144, 119 Stat. 2660 (Dec. 22, 2005).

9For our description of the elements of an insurable risk, we primarily
relied on Fundamentals of Risk and Insurance. In addition, we consulted
other insurance references.

           o  The law of large numbers must apply. There must be a
           sufficiently large number of homogeneous units exposed to random
           losses, both historically and prospectively, to make the future
           losses reasonably predictable. This principle works best when
           there are large numbers of losses with similar characteristics
           spread across a large group. For example, an automobile insurer
           could analyze annual data on the frequency and severity (cost) of
           accidents and the characteristics of drivers (gender or age)
           involved in the accidents to predict expected losses for certain
           types of drivers, and thus set premiums adequate to cover these
           losses. The greater the experience with losses, the better the
           insurer would be able to estimate both the frequency and the
           severity of future losses, based on what happened in the past.
           o  The loss must be definite and measurable. The insurer must be
           capable of determining whether a loss has taken place, and setting
           a dollar value on the amount of the loss.
           o  The loss must be fortuitous or accidental. That is, the loss
           must result from chance and not be something that is certain to
           happen. To the extent that a future loss approaches certainty, an
           insurer would have to charge the full value of the loss plus an
           additional amount for the expenses incurred.
           o  The loss must not be catastrophic. That is, the losses should
           not affect a very large percentage of an insurance company's
           policyholders at the same time, for example, in a limited
           geographic area. Alternatively, a catastrophic loss is one that is
           extraordinarily large relative to the amount of exposure in an
           insurance pool.

           When applied to NBCR terrorist risks, these principles can help
           explain why NBCR risks are so challenging for insurers. Most
           importantly, because so few NBCR attacks have occurred, the pool
           of experience in the United States is very limited, and the law of
           large numbers does not help insurers to measure and predict the
           frequency and severity of future losses.10 One of the reasons many
           insurers we interviewed had concerns about insuring NBCR risks was
           the small number of historical events that could be used as a
           basis for predicting the future frequency and severity of these
           risks. However, several of the academic experts we interviewed
           also noted that a limited number of historical events did not
           automatically make a risk uninsurable.11 For example, insurers
           have covered risks related to commercial satellites for which
           there has been a very limited record of losses; however, several
           of the experts noted that for commercial satellites the
           prospective loss is measurable and documentation is available to
           assess their safeguards.

           In addition to the inapplicability of the law of large numbers,
           insurers also told us that they are not able to fully measure the
           costs of NBCR terrorist risks (that is, the potential severity).
           Because certain types of NBCR attacks could have long-term or
           uncertain consequences, insurers may not be able to measure, or
           even clearly identify, their prospective losses. Almost all of the
           insurers we interviewed indicated uncertainties about the scope of
           potential losses as a factor contributing to difficulties in
           insuring NBCR risks. For example, according to America's Health
           Insurance Plans (AHIP), a national trade association for health
           insurers, some NBCR attacks could produce latent illnesses such as
           cancer.12 The costs to health insurers would not be immediate but
           would occur in the years to come. In addition, representatives of
           insurers and an insurance broker with knowledge of the
           property/casualty market told us that they believed the costs of
           some NBCR events would be uncertain because of difficulties in
           estimating how much time would pass before buildings were
           successfully decontaminated (for example, after an anthrax attack)
           or before anyone would even be willing to enter contaminated
           locations (for example, after a nuclear attack) to assess the
           damage, making the areas unusable for a long time.

           Moreover, losses must be fortuitous or accidental. By definition
           terrorist events, including NBCR, are deliberate and do not occur
           by chance. As we previously reported, unlike storms and accidents,
           terrorism involves an adversary with deliberate intent to destroy,
           and the probabilities and consequences of a terrorist act are
           poorly understood and difficult to predict.13 In other words, even
           if an extensive history of NBCR terrorism experiences existed,
           without the element of randomness, it would not necessarily be
           indicative of the future frequency and severity of terrorist
           events. Likewise, according to the American Academy of Actuaries
           and the Insurance Information Institute, predicting terrorist
           risks is particularly difficult because the attacks are not
           random; they are intentional, and the attack characteristics are
           not likely to be constant, as terrorists adjust their
           strategies.14

           Finally, insurance experts told us that NBCR risks could represent
           the potential for catastrophic (severe) losses because of the
           concentration of risks that could face either a particular insurer
           or the industry. Most of the academic experts we interviewed
           stressed that the potential for catastrophic losses, rather than
           the lack of reliable data on the frequency and severity of NBCR
           risks, made insurers reluctant to insure them. Several of these
           experts observed that in Florida, where the risk of hurricanes is
           both greater and more predictable than NBCR terrorism risks,
           insurers were leaving the state because of their exposure to
           catastrophic losses, perhaps more so than the unpredictability of
           the risk. An NBCR event, like a natural catastrophe, could result
           in catastrophic losses if it created significant losses to a high
           proportion of insureds in a particular geographic area. Should
           these events take place in urban areas that serve as major places
           of employment, they could result in tremendous exposure for lines
           of insurance providing coverage for workers, such as health or
           workers' compensation.15 In addition, as explained by
           representatives of the New York Department of Insurance, because
           NBCR risks have the ability to cut across many lines of insurance
           in a concentrated geographic area, large insurance companies that
           typically cover several lines of insurance could find it very
           difficult to diversify their risk portfolios. According to the
           American Academy of Actuaries, the prospect of catastrophic losses
           from an NBCR event could be far larger than insurers could sustain
           without impairing their ability to continue providing all other
           insurance coverages.16

           The prospect of catastrophic risk poses additional problems
           because insurers, like most businesses, generally have two major
           objectives. First, they expect to make a profit for their owners.
           Second, they plan to survive so as to operate in the future.
           Several of the academic experts we interviewed questioned the
           incentive insurers would have to insure risks, such as
           catastrophic NBCR attacks, that might jeopardize their financial
           soundness and profitability. If an insurer were faced with the
           potential for a catastrophic loss-that is, one that threatened its
           solvency or its survival-the insurer would be less likely to be
           willing to provide insurance, or at a minimum, the insurer would
           limit its exposure to the extent that it could. The larger and
           more uncertain the estimates of projected losses, the less likely
           an insurer would be willing to voluntarily insure the risk.
           Moreover, insurers could have another disincentive to insuring
           catastrophic risks for which they might not be adequately
           capitalized-the prospect of receiving a low rating from a rating
           agency. We interviewed representatives from three rating agencies,
           two of whom said they generally viewed NBCR risks as not insurable
           because of their potential for catastrophic losses.17 For example,
           a representative from one credit rating agency said that if his
           company considered existing potential exposure to NBCR risks when
           analyzing commercial property/casualty insurers, they might have
           to downgrade ratings due to the magnitude of potential losses.

           Because the frequency and severity of NBCR risks are difficult to
           measure, insurers have turned to techniques and processes that
           they have applied to other catastrophic risks. As we previously
           reported, insurers have come to rely on computer models and
           modeling firms to assist them in estimating the frequency and
           severity of catastrophic events and the probable losses that they
           might face.18 Since Hurricane Andrew in 1992, insurers have
           recognized the challenges associated with insuring low-frequency,
           high-cost risks such as natural disasters and increasingly have
           turned to the use of computer models to better estimate the
           expected frequency and severity of the risks. After September 11,
           the owners of these models developed them to estimate the effects
           of man-made, or terrorist, events as well. However, as noted by
           the Insurance Information Institute and other insurance experts,
           estimating the incidence of terrorism is fundamentally different
           and vastly more difficult than forecasting natural catastrophes,
           where insurers can learn much about the frequency and severity of
           events through historical claim data, meteorological and
           geological records, and increases in scientific knowledge.19

           In view of the limited history of NBCR attacks in the United
           States, representatives of the modeling firms reported to us that
           they generally have relied on panels of terrorism experts to
           assess threats posed by terrorists. While these experts do not
           have access to current classified data, they use their judgment
           and expertise to assess the probability (that is, the future
           occurrence or frequency) of future terrorist attacks. For example,
           the experts assess the likelihood of terrorists targeting urban
           areas, based on population density and perceived importance, as
           well as well-known buildings within those areas. Moreover, the
           experts also consider the level of difficulty of using weapons of
           different sizes and capacities as a way of estimating the
           potential severity of terrorist attacks. The modeling firm
           representatives reported that they use a number of statistical
           techniques to convert the subjective opinions of their experts and
           the characteristics of NBCR weapons into quantified estimates of
           the frequency and severity of potential losses. While we did not
           assess the capabilities of these models, we have noted in a
           previous report that some federal agencies, even with access to
           classified data, have difficulty including in their risk
           assessments the relative probability of various terrorist threat
           scenarios.20 Representatives of insurers and insurance brokers
           also said that they generally had little confidence in the ability
           of models to estimate the frequency of future terrorist attacks,
           and the American Academy of Actuaries noted that while there has
           been some development of terrorism models since September 11,
           quantification of terrorism exposure still was extremely
           difficult.21 The Academy also noted that the probabilities
           associated with the occurrence of a terrorist attack have remained
           somewhat judgmental and a key source of uncertainty.

           Representatives of insurers told us that the models can be useful
           in simulating scenarios for particular NBCR attacks in specified
           locations, allowing them to estimate the potential severity of
           possible losses for specific events. Using available engineering,
           scientific, and demographic research, the models can estimate
           insured potential losses for the portfolios of individual
           insurers. Several insurers and brokers said that they found
           models, including those that they may have created themselves,
           useful in managing insurers' exposure to terrorism risks.

           Finally, insurance experts and representatives of insurers and
           reinsurers we interviewed agreed that difficulties in predicting
           NBCR events, as well as the prospect for catastrophic losses, make
           these risks difficult to insure.22 However, as noted by several of
           the experts from academia, even though a risk may not satisfy all
           the principles of insurability, insureds may be able to find some
           amount of coverage. Several experts noted that insurability is not
           simply an issue of extremes-that is, either insurable or
           uninsurable. Rather, as specifically noted by one, the
           insurability of events should be viewed as a continuum, with some
           events such as NBCR being on the extreme end of the continuum.

           Insurersï¿½ Exposure to NBCR Risks Varies Widely by Line of Insurance,
			  and Insurers Offering Coverage Face Challenges in Pricing
			  
			  Insurers' exposure to NBCR risks varies widely by line of
           insurance, and insurers offering coverage face challenges in
           pricing. In view of the underlying difficulties in insuring NBCR
           risks, property/casualty insurers generally have tried to exclude
           such events from their coverage. However, for reasons that vary
           somewhat by line of insurance, workers' compensation, life, and
           health insurers generally offer coverage for NBCR events.
           Insurance industry representatives told us that most
           property/casualty insurers have used long-standing policy
           exclusions to limit coverage of NBCR events, although experience
           with these types of exclusions suggests that they could be
           challenged in court. Representatives of property/casualty insurers
           said that these risks continue to be unattractive to insure
           because of difficulties in predicting the frequency and severity
           of these risks, the potential for large and uncertain losses, and
           the limited amount of private reinsurance. Despite similar
           concerns and subsequent difficulties in setting prices due to lack
           of reliable historical data, coverage for workers' compensation,
           life, and health insurance generally is available on the market.
           In large part, insurers provide this coverage, particularly
           workers' compensation, because they are required to by states, or
           because the coverage (for example, life insurance) does not
           readily lend itself to excluding one type of risk. Nevertheless,
           insurance and state regulatory officials expressed particular
           concerns about whether the prices set for workers' compensation
           insurance would cover potential losses, should a major NBCR event
           occur. Representatives of life and health insurers told us that
           generally their prices did not reflect their potential exposure to
           NBCR risks.

           Relatively Little NBCR Coverage Available in Property/Casualty Market
			  Because Most Insurers Remain Unwilling to Cover Risks
			  
			  Unlike workers' compensation, life, and health insurers, insurers
           selling property/casualty insurance largely have excluded NBCR
           risks from their policies. Since Congress passed TRIA, the supply
           of commercial property/casualty insurance for conventional
           terrorism appears to have increased, yet insurance policies
           covering NBCR risks have remained in short supply. In its most
           recent survey of terrorism insurance in the commercial
           property/casualty industry, Treasury found that the percentage of
           insurers that reported that they wrote some coverage for terrorism
           using conventional weapons (that is, not NBCR) increased from 73
           percent in 2002 to 91 percent in 2003 and 2004.23 In contrast, the
           percentage of insurers that reported covering NBCR risks in some
           of their policies remained about the same during that general
           period and was significantly smaller-about 35 percent.24 Moreover,
           as explained by Treasury officials, the 35 percent represented
           insurers that offered any kind of coverage for NBCR risks, meaning
           that an insurer would be counted as offering NBCR coverage even if
           it offered only one policy for one type of NBCR risk.

           Representatives of insurance and insurance brokerage companies
           also told us there was a very limited supply of NBCR coverage in
           the commercial property/casualty marketplace. Representatives of
           the three largest brokerage firms that find property/casualty
           insurance coverage for large commercial businesses told us that
           insurers offering terrorism coverage exclude NBCR risks. According
           to representatives of insurers, exclusions for NBCR risks are
           contained in policies offered by commercial property/casualty
           insurers underwriting in regulated insurance markets and also are
           contained in stand-alone terrorism insurance policies offered by
           specialty insurers in the nonregulated market.25 A representative
           of one of the specialty insurers with whom we spoke said the
           company offered very limited amounts of NBCR coverage, typically
           for one or two of the risks. For example, this company would offer
           $10 million of biological and chemical coverage for certain
           commercial properties, but the insurer would not provide coverage
           above that threshold.

           Representatives of insurance and insurance brokerage companies we
           interviewed said that even though TRIA would cover NBCR losses
           incurred by an insurer the same as it would any other covered
           terrorist losses, little coverage for NBCR risks was available
           because commercial property/casualty carriers largely viewed NBCR
           risks as uninsurable. According to representatives of two large
           commercial property/casualty insurers, both of whom underwrote
           insurance in states with localities considered at higher risk for
           a terrorist attack, the current structure of TRIA offered little
           incentive to cover NBCR losses, even though TRIA would provide
           coverage for some insured NBCR events. For example, they said that
           because their companies offered workers' compensation insurance in
           areas at higher risk for terrorism, the companies were less likely
           to increase their level of exposure to NBCR events by also
           offering NBCR coverage in their commercial property and general
           liability policies.26 Under TRIA, the more business an insurer
           writes, the larger its deductible; and the more lines of insurance
           an insurer writes, the more it is exposed to losses from a
           catastrophic event.27 In addition, because of uncertainties
           surrounding the frequency and severity of NBCR events as well as
           the enormity of potential losses, representatives of insurers we
           interviewed said that they would have difficulty setting prices to
           cover such losses, even using information from the modeling firms.
           These representatives also expressed concerns about the potential
           insured losses of an NBCR event being largely undeterminable for
           many years after the event occurred. Such an event could have many
           long-term consequences-for example, the extent and duration of
           remediation for a contaminated building, the resulting business
           interruption to the policyholder, and any related litigation
           involved.28 Finally, as confirmed by representatives of the
           Reinsurance Association of America, private reinsurance-the
           risk-spreading mechanism that insurers typically use to reduce
           their potential losses-provided very limited amounts of coverage
           for NBCR risks in the property/casualty market.

           Although Property/Casualty Insurers Remove Coverage for NBCR
			  Events through Exclusions, They Could Be Challenged
			  
			  Property/casualty insurers long have sought to limit their
           exposure to certain perils, such as flood, that they consider
           uninsurable. Property/casualty insurers have written exclusions
           related to nuclear hazard risk into their standard policies for
           decades, generally to protect themselves from losses related to
           nuclear power plant accidents. Representatives of insurance
           companies and brokerage firms agreed that existing nuclear hazard
           exclusions were broad enough to likely exclude any losses
           resulting from nuclear and radiological events, including a
           terrorist attack.29

           According to these same insurance industry representatives,
           property/casualty insurance contracts issued prior to September 11
           did not specifically include references to losses from the
           terrorist release of biological and chemical agents.30 Rather,
           Insurance Services Office (ISO) officials told us that the
           standard contracts they provided for industry use contained
           language that excluded coverage for losses caused by pollution and
           contamination. For instance, the pollution exclusion was developed
           to exclude coverage for the release of many different types of
           substances-from asbestos to pesticides-that could cause harm to
           people and the environment. Representatives of some of the
           insurers we interviewed believed that their pollution and
           contamination exclusions also might allow property/casualty
           insurers to exclude losses caused by biological and chemical
           agents released by a terrorist. However, representatives of one
           insurance broker we interviewed suggested that pollution and
           contamination exclusions could be challenged in the courts if a
           biological or chemical event were to occur. Courts determine
           whether a particular substance is or is not a pollutant based
           upon, among other things, the language in the policy, the facts
           and circumstances of the case, and the law of the jurisdiction. As
           a result, the language of the standard pollution exclusion might
           be susceptible to broad interpretation by the courts. In other
           words, some uncertainty exists, even in the insurance industry,
           about how effectively the pollution and contamination exclusions
           would protect insurers against losses from a NBCR terrorist
           attack.

           In addition to disputes over the exclusion of NBCR risks in
           policies, there are other situations where the extent of
           property/casualty insurers' coverage of such events could depend
           on judicial or other determinations.

           o  Cause of loss. According to standard nuclear exclusions,
           commercial policies would not cover damage caused by a nuclear
           blast. However, regardless of any exclusions, according to
           information provided by NAIC, approximately 16 states (including
           New York) require property/casualty insurers to cover losses from
           a "fire following" an event, irrespective of the cause of fire.31
           A national security expert told us that in the case of a nuclear
           bomb detonation, once the property was destroyed, insurers could
           dispute the extent to which fire (covered in fire following
           states) or the blast (excluded by the nuclear exclusion) caused
           the damage. In other contexts, disputes over the cause of loss
           often have been litigated. For example, many homeowners who
           suffered losses in Hurricane Katrina have filed lawsuits
           challenging property/casualty insurers' determinations about the
           cause of their losses.32 
           o  Certified as a terrorist act. The Congressional Budget Office
           (CBO) has suggested that some NBCR events might not be readily
           identified as terrorist acts, as defined by TRIA, and therefore
           coverage-both for insurers and for their policyholders-would be
           unclear.33 For example, the persons or person who in 2001 mailed
           letters contaminated with anthrax that killed several people and
           sickened many more remain(s) unknown.34 However, should TRIA not
           be renewed in 2007, this particular determination would not apply.

           In addition, homeowners' insurers, part of the personal
           property/casualty market, have long-standing exclusions in their
           policies, similar to the exclusions contained in commercial
           property/casualty policies. According to representatives of two
           large homeowners' insurers, the exclusions limited their exposure
           to NBCR risks. While these representatives also told us they have
           not excluded conventional terrorist events from their policies,
           they said their companies generally manage their exposure to any
           terrorism risks by diversifying their portfolios.

           Demand for NBCR Coverage in Property/Casualty Market Is Difficult
			  to Determine
			  
			  The 2005 Treasury study reported that less than 3 percent of
           policyholders from a range of industries reported purchasing NBCR
           coverage in their commercial property/casualty insurance
           policies.35 Further, although purchase rates for NBCR insurance do
           not necessarily reflect overall demand, a major reason for not
           purchasing NBCR insurance given by the survey respondents was that
           they did not believe they were at risk for an NBCR event. While
           the Treasury study did not break down purchase rates for NBCR
           insurance by industry sector, another study of the market for
           terrorism insurance conducted by insurance brokers found that
           companies in the real estate, financial, and health care sectors
           had the highest rates for purchasing terrorism insurance.36
           Although the brokerage firm study does not specifically address
           the demand for NBCR insurance, we consider demand for terrorism
           insurance generally to be a reasonable approximation of where
           demand for NBCR insurance might exist. For instance, demand for
           terrorism insurance may be strong in the real estate sector
           because terrorism coverage typically is required as part of a
           commercial business loan transaction, according to the Mortgage
           Bankers Association. However, representatives of the Mortgage
           Bankers Association also said lenders generally do not require
           NBCR coverage, because little or no coverage is available. In
           addition, a few of the academic experts we interviewed suggested
           that some individuals and businesses might not purchase NBCR
           coverage under the assumption that the federal government would
           cover losses from an NBCR attack, as the government agreed to do
           for some personal and commercial property losses resulting from
           Hurricane Katrina.

           However, several risk managers we interviewed from the hospitality
           and transportation industries, as well as commercial property
           owners, all reported a willingness to buy NBCR coverage in the
           private market. These managers expressed frustration at not being
           able to purchase insurance for NBCR risks, which they said they
           could do little to prevent or mitigate, particularly because an
           NBCR attack would be an intentional act. One of the risk managers
           that we interviewed noted that his company could not find enough
           NBCR coverage for even one building, so the company used a captive
           to self-insure against NBCR risks.37

           Insurers in Workersï¿½ Compensation, Life, and Health Generally Cover
			  NBCR Risks, but Prices May Not Take Account of Potential Losses
			  
			  Should an NBCR event occur, workers' compensation, life, and
           health insurers would be responsible for covering loss of life and
           medical treatment for injuries because they generally provide
           coverage for these events. Following September 11, NAIC issued
           guidance stating its member state regulators believed terrorism
           exclusions were "not necessary" or were "inappropriate" for
           workers' compensation, life, and health insurance policies, with
           exceptions limited to cases where insurers could demonstrate they
           would become insolvent from offering the coverage.38 According to
           an NAIC representative, regulators did not perceive exclusions as
           necessary because they presumed these insurers were diversifying
           their risks in these lines by insuring individuals across the
           country.

           Workersï¿½ Compensation Insurance Generally Covers All Perils,
			  Including NBCR Risks, but Pricing Challenges Exist
			  
			  Workers' compensation insurers must cover losses from NBCR events
           that occur at the workplace, including related illnesses and
           injuries. According to multiple sources, applicable state laws
           generally require workers' compensation insurers to cover nearly
           all perils, including those from NBCR risks.39 In addition,
           according to representatives of the National Council on
           Compensation Insurance (NCCI), an organization that prepares
           insurance rate (price) recommendations for workers' compensation,
           under state workers' compensation laws, employers are responsible
           for covering unlimited medical costs and a portion of lost
           earnings for injuries or illnesses that occur during the course of
           employment, regardless of the cause.40

           While workers' compensation insurers generally are not permitted
           to exclude any perils from coverage, insurer representatives
           advised us that any surcharges they may be permitted to charge for
           NBCR exposure likely would not cover potential losses. According
           to NCCI representatives, recognizing that workers' compensation
           insurers have exposure to terrorism losses, at least 36 states,
           including the District of Columbia, have allowed workers'
           compensation insurers to file rates that include an additional
           surcharge (an average of 2 cents per $100 of employee payroll) for
           terrorism risk.41 NCCI developed this statewide surcharge based on
           the results of a model, as a way for insurers that underwrite in
           states that belong to NCCI to cover potential losses from
           terrorism, including those from NBCR weapons. While
           representatives of NCCI were reasonably satisfied that the
           surcharges were actuarially sound, in the District of
           Columbia-where insurers may file the NCCI-developed terrorism
           surcharge-regulators did not believe that the surcharge was
           actuarially sound because of assumptions made in the model about
           localities designated to be at higher risk for terrorist events.
           Moreover, the willingness of state regulators that do not
           participate in NCCI to approve terrorism surcharges in workers'
           compensation may vary. For example, we obtained information from
           two large states that do not participate in NCCI and have
           geographic areas considered at higher risk for terrorism-New York
           and California. In New York, regulators have allowed workers'
           compensation insurers to file an additional surcharge for
           terrorism. However, representatives of the New York Compensation
           Insurance Rating Board (Rating Board) told us that the terrorism
           surcharge the Rating Board developed does not distinguish between
           conventional and NBCR risks.42 They did not believe that the
           Rating Board could justify a higher surcharge to cover NBCR risks
           because of the limited historical data on NBCR attacks and
           further, if the Rating Board did, the cost would be so high that
           businesses would probably find it unaffordable. In contrast,
           California regulators have not permitted insurers to file rates
           with additional surcharges specifically for terrorism, including
           NBCR risks. California regulatory officials told us that they
           would reject any terrorist or NBCR risk surcharges because they
           thought such rate justifications were not based on recognized
           actuarial methods.43

           Representatives of workers' compensation insurers we interviewed
           said that factors unique to workers' compensation also made it
           difficult for them to cover NBCR risks. First, as they explained,
           unlike some other lines of insurance, workers' compensation
           insurance covers losses beyond the expiration date of the policy.
           The representatives told us their most expensive claims typically
           came from workers who were disabled from illness or injury because
           they were entitled to lost wages as well as medical expenses. For
           NBCR events, quantifying medical expenses could be especially
           challenging because some illnesses or disabilities might not
           manifest until much later or could be difficult to trace to a
           workplace occurrence.44 For example, representatives of workers'
           compensation insurers told us that in the case of smallpox, it
           might be difficult to determine whether the worker contracted the
           illness at work or elsewhere.45 In addition, these representatives
           told us that they may be further constrained in their ability to
           adjust their price for specific geographic risks. Representatives
           of NCCI told us that terrorism surcharges must be applied equally
           throughout a state, thus the terrorism surcharge did not reflect
           that employers in certain areas, such as urban areas where
           employees might be more concentrated, had a greater exposure to
           terrorist events.46

           Despite the exposure of workers' compensation insurers to NBCR
           risks, representatives of private market insurers and two public
           insurance funds told us that the availability of private
           reinsurance for these risks was limited.47 Therefore, they
           explained that they largely would rely on TRIA to cover NBCR
           risks. As representatives of the private insurers explained, many
           of their private-market reinsurance policies specifically excluded
           NBCR risks, or to the extent coverage was available, reinsurers
           offered it at prices they could not afford. Representatives of the
           New York State Insurance Fund told us that they had not purchased
           reinsurance because they viewed the high costs of reinsurance for
           their market as unaffordable. As a result, should a large NBCR
           attack occur, these representatives said that their fund might
           have to turn to the state to help pay claims. In contrast,
           representatives of the California State Compensation Insurance
           Fund said that they were willing to pay higher prices based on
           available capacity for reinsurance for NBCR risks.

           According to Life Insurers, They Generally Cannot Exclude Terrorism
			  Coverage Including NBCR Risks
			  
			  The American Council of Life Insurers officials, as well as
           representatives of life insurers we interviewed, told us they
           believed that most states do not allow for terrorism or NBCR
           exclusions in life insurance policies.48 In two of the states
           specifically included in our review-New York and California-state
           insurance law and implementing regulatory policy prohibited both
           individual and group life insurance policies from excluding NBCR
           or other terrorism events.49 On the other hand, regulatory
           officials from the third jurisdiction we included in our review,
           the District of Columbia, told us that they did not have any legal
           requirements that life insurers cover NBCR events and that several
           group life insurers recently filed policies with exclusions for
           NBCR risks.

           While group life insurers have exposure to NBCR risks,
           representatives of group life insurers that provide coverage
           nationwide told us that charging higher rates to insureds at
           potentially greater risk for an NBCR event would be difficult.
           This is because of the way the insurers typically price coverage
           and their inability to determine which employers would be at
           greater risk for an NBCR event. Life insurers price their products
           based on mortality tables derived from experience with prior
           insurance contracts and calibrated for the effects of certain
           individual characteristics such as a smoking habit, or group
           characteristics such as occupation type. However, representatives
           of life insurers said that these tables do not take into account a
           greater number of deaths that could occur as a result of a
           terrorist or NBCR act.50 Furthermore, these representatives told
           us that they have difficulty determining whether a particular
           employer or group would be more or less at risk for death from an
           NBCR event because they traditionally have not tracked the
           geographic locations of individuals covered by their policies.

           However, whether losses from a large NBCR attack would be
           catastrophic for life insurers was unclear and could depend on the
           extent to which their portfolios were diversified. Representatives
           of national life insurers told us that they have a broad portfolio
           of exposure nationwide, which helps them diversify their risks. In
           the event of a large NBCR attack in which up to one million
           insured people died, representatives of the American Council of
           Life Insurers told us that most large life insurers probably would
           be able to pay the death claims. However, these representatives
           also said that small or medium-size group life insurers that
           received a significantly high number of death claims following an
           NBCR attack might be unable to pay claims and become insolvent,
           and that state guarantee funds would have to levy an assessment on
           the remaining insurers in the states to pay the claims.51
           Notwithstanding their belief that they could survive an NBCR
           attack, representatives of the two national insurers we
           interviewed were concerned about the companies' exposure to
           catastrophic NBCR losses. These representatives particularly were
           concerned because their companies generally insure all the
           employees of a given company. These employees could be
           concentrated in one geographic location, and the insurance
           companies could be liable for huge losses if an NBCR event led to
           widespread casualties in one area.52

           In addition, life insurers do not have access to TRIA.
           Representatives of two group life insurers we interviewed said
           that their companies either had not found reinsurance for NBCR
           risks or the costs were very high relative to the amount of
           insurance that could be purchased. We also spoke with
           representatives of a large group life reinsurer who said their
           company provided some coverage for NBCR events, although the
           company limited this exposure to $100 million per event.

           According to Health Insurers, They Face Unique Challenges in
			  Determining Exposure to NBCR Risks
			  
			  Although many health insurers cover groups of individuals
           concentrated geographically, representatives of AHIP and two
           national group health insurers told us that determining overall
           exposure to NBCR risks was challenging. Further, they explained
           that state regulation of NBCR coverage was not the primary reason
           they covered terrorism risks, and AHIP could not provide us
           documentation of regulatory requirements for NBCR coverage.
           Nevertheless, insurance regulatory officials from two states with
           localities at higher exposure to terrorism risks-California and
           New York-told us they have not allowed health insurance policies
           to exclude medical expenses related to illness or injury sustained
           from an NBCR event.53 In contrast, regulatory officials in the
           District of Columbia told us that they did not have any
           requirements that health insurers cover NBCR events.

           Representatives of two national group health insurers we
           interviewed described the difficulties they would have in
           attempting to set actuarially sound prices for health risks from
           NBCR terrorist events. First, representatives of health insurers
           said that they typically price health coverage based on experience
           with their insured populations and without knowing the likely
           impact of NBCR risks, they could not develop actuarially sound
           prices for such a risk. Further, the representatives explained
           they tend to limit policy coverage by procedure or by individual,
           rather than by the source of the illness. For example, a
           representative of one health insurer told us that while the
           company did develop prices for other low-frequency, high-cost
           claims such as liver transplants, they could only do so because of
           prior experiences. Second, uncertainties over the long-term health
           effects of NBCR attacks, such as the need for psychological
           counseling or cancer treatment, make it difficult for insurers
           either to exclude NBCR attacks from their coverage or charge
           additional prices for their coverage. A report from the American
           Academy of Actuaries, as well as representatives from AHIP, noted
           that harm from NBCR events could be widespread and persist for
           years, and in the years subsequent to the attack, it would be
           difficult to identify the source of the illness.54 According to
           representatives of one insurer, this also would make direct
           attribution of an expense to an NBCR attack difficult.55 Further,
           these representatives said that the ultimate costs of medical
           treatment would be unknown, as some factors such as whether
           hospitals would remain open and sufficient vaccines would be
           available, were controlled by local public health responders.56
           Finally, similar to life insurance, representatives of one health
           insurer told us they often lack information about the specific
           geographic locations of their insured populations, further
           limiting their ability to conduct risk-based pricing for events
           such as NBCR attacks.

           Representatives of the health insurance industry told us private
           reinsurance for their coverage of catastrophic events generally
           was very limited. AHIP representatives told us that catastrophic
           reinsurance for health insurers was in short supply, expensive,
           and generally focused on covering large costs incurred by
           individuals, rather than large costs incurred by groups of
           individuals potentially exposed to the same risks. Representatives
           from health insurers also said that reinsurance was costly, but
           they had not specifically sought out coverage for NBCR risks. As
           is the case for life insurers, health insurers do not have access
           to TRIA.

           As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
           contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution
           until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send
           copies to the Ranking Minority Member of the House Financial
           Services Committee, other interested members of Congress, and
           NAIC. We also will make copies available to others upon request.
           In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO's
           Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

           If you or your staff have any questions on this report, please
           contact me at 202-512-8678 or [email protected]. Contact points
           for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
           be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
           contributions to this report are listed in appendix II.

           Sincerely yours,

           Orice M. Williams Director, Financial Markets and Community
           Investment

           Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
			  
			  Our objectives were to discuss (1) commonly accepted principles of
           insurability and whether nuclear, biological, chemical, and
           radiological (NBCR) risks are measurable and predictable and (2)
           whether private insurers currently are exposed to NBCR risks and
           the challenges they face in pricing such risks. As part of our
           review, we conducted interviews in California, New Jersey, New
           York, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C. We conducted our review
           from February 2006 through September 2006 in accordance with
           generally accepted government auditing standards.

           Principles of Insurability and Assessing Whether NBCR Risks Are
			  Measurable and Predictable
			  
			  To identify commonly accepted principles of insurability and
           whether NBCR risks are measurable and predictable, we reviewed
           standard insurance references to identify principles that underlie
           insurers' evaluations of the insurability of risks. We primarily
           relied upon Fundamentals of Risk and Insurance, but consulted
           additional references for consistency of explanation.1 To
           determine the insurability of NBCR risks, we applied these
           principles based on information we collected about the market for,
           and nature of, NBCR terrorism risks. To enhance our understanding
           of the market for NBCR insurance, and factors that insurers might
           consider when deciding whether to offer this insurance, we
           consulted insurance experts, including the American Academy of
           Actuaries, the Insurance Information Institute, and insurance
           experts from academia, and a crosssection of insurers representing
           different lines of insurance.

           Moreover, we obtained information about how NBCR terrorist risks
           are measured and predicted from three firms that specialize in
           modeling terrorism and other catastrophic events for insurers
           (modeling firms).2 We chose these three firms because they are
           among the best known in the insurance industry. Representatives of
           these firms provided us with and identified the types of
           information they incorporate into their computer models, the
           methods that they use to estimate the potential frequency and
           severity of terrorist attacks with NBCR weapons, and the reasons
           they believe their products are of assistance to the insurance
           industry. We did not evaluate the ability of the models to predict
           the frequency and severity of NBCR or other catastrophic risks.
           For additional perspective, we also obtained descriptions of the
           types of data available to model insured losses from natural
           disasters, such as hurricanes, from a modeling firm and
           presentations made at a catastrophe modeling conference.3

           Finally, to obtain a broad understanding of the characteristics of
           NBCR weapons and the types of damage they could cause, we
           consulted several sources of information. We interviewed
           representatives from RAND, a nonprofit research organization with
           a focus on national security issues, and reviewed RAND
           publications. In addition, we interviewed representatives of the
           U.S. Department of Homeland Security and reviewed reports. In
           addition, to identify the characteristics of biological, chemical,
           and radiological weapons, we used information from our own
           reports.

           Assessing Exposure to NBCR Risks
			  
			  To assess whether insurers are exposed to NBCR events, we
           identified lines of insurance that could be affected in the event
           of an NBCR terrorist attack: life, health, workers' compensation,
           commercial property/casualty, and homeowners insurance. Our
           information about insurer exposure in each of these lines came
           from multiple sources.

           For an overview of the market nationwide, we interviewed
           representatives of three of the largest commercial insurance
           brokers and national insurance trade organizations-the American
           Council of Life Insurers, representing life insurers; America's
           Health Insurance Plans, representing health insurers; the Property
           Casualty Insurance Association of America, representing
           property/casualty insurers; the Reinsurance Association of
           America, representing reinsurance companies; and the Association
           of Bermuda Insurers and Reinsurers, representing off-shore
           specialty insurers and reinsurers. In addition, we interviewed
           representatives from Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of
           America, an association of independent insurance agents and
           insurance brokers nationwide. Information from these trade
           associations helped provide a broader context for information we
           obtained from individual insurers and reinsurers and gave us some
           perspective on exposure for small and medium-sized insurers,
           insurers that we did not interview.

           To obtain information on specific insurers' exposure to NBCR
           risks, we interviewed knowledgeable representatives of a total of
           12 insurers, writing either one or several lines of insurance
           addressed by our study. Although the time frames of our report
           only permitted us to obtain information from selected insurers, we
           believe that these insurers were knowledgeable based on their
           broad exposure for their respective lines of insurance nationwide
           and their knowledge of markets at higher risk for terrorism. To
           select insurers to interview, we obtained 2004 market share data
           based on direct written premiums from the Insurance Information
           Institute and Moody's, the most recent available data at the time
           of our review.4

           Seven of the insurers we interviewed that provide coverage in the
           property/casualty, workers' compensation, life, and health
           insurance lines held a significant portion of the insurance
           industry's market share nationwide. In addition, we interviewed
           the state workers' compensation insurance funds for New York and
           California, which serve as insurers of last resort for employers
           that cannot find workers' compensation coverage in the private
           market. Collectively, the private insurers and state funds held
           the following shares of the markets, by line of insurance:

           o  16 percent of the commercial property/casualty insurance
           market,
           o  34 percent of the homeowners insurance market,
           o  38 percent of the workers' compensation insurance market,
           o  18 percent of the life insurance market, and
           o  13 percent of the health insurance market.5

           In addition, market shares for the private market insurers were
           among the highest in six states with localities considered by the
           Insurance Services Office (ISO)-a national organization that
           prepares insurance rate (price) recommendations and related
           policies for property/casualty insurers-to be at higher risk for
           terrorist events (including NBCR events). These insurers usually
           numbered among the top five insurance providers for their
           respective lines of insurance in these six states. Depending on
           the competitiveness of the state market for each insurance line,
           this market share generally represented anywhere from 2 to 30
           percent of the local market. For commercial property/casualty
           insurance, we also interviewed three specialty insurers,
           recommended to us by insurance brokers. Specialty insurers are not
           regulated by state insurance departments but provide stand-alone
           terrorism insurance coverage that may or may not include NBCR
           risks.

           Finally, to learn more about the availability of NBCR reinsurance
           coverage, we interviewed representatives of three reinsurers that
           provide insurance for insurers in the commercial property/casualty
           market and the group life market, including one reinsurer that
           focuses its coverage on specific risks such as NBCR events. Two of
           the reinsurers, as measured by revenue, are among the top three
           reinsurers in the United States.

           To identify state requirements regarding NBCR coverage, we met
           with and received documentation from the National Association of
           Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for a national regulatory
           perspective as well as insurance regulators in California, New
           York, and the District of Columbia for individual states'
           regulations. We selected these states and the District of Columbia
           because they were among the jurisdictions that have localities
           considered at high risk for terrorist attacks. Representatives of
           NAIC were able to provide us with all of the states' legal
           requirements for property/casualty insurers' coverage of fire
           following events; however, NAIC did not collect information that
           would allow us to determine a state's requirements for coverage of
           NBCR events in workers' compensation, life, and health insurance.
           State regulators in California, New York, and the District of
           Columbia provided us with information about their requirements for
           NBCR coverage for life and health policies issued in their
           respective states. We gathered information on state workers'
           compensation requirements for providing NBCR coverage and for
           pricing this coverage from the National Council on Compensation
           Insurance-representing 34 states including the District of
           Columbia-and from workers' compensation rating boards and
           researchers in New York and California. In the time frames of our
           study, we could not review all of the state requirements for each
           of the lines of insurance included in our study. Therefore, for
           circumstances in which NAIC could not provide us specific state
           requirements, we relied on national trade associations or
           information provided by national insurance carriers, particularly
           for requirements for life and health insurance.

           To learn about permissible policy exclusions, we met with ISO and
           reviewed their standard policies (forms) for commercial property,
           general liability, and homeowners insurance, including terrorism
           endorsements. While individual insurer's use of these forms may
           vary, ISO's forms contain standard policy language. We identified
           language in these policies that could address issues related to
           NBCR events, including the nuclear hazard exclusion and the
           pollution exclusion. We also obtained information about factors
           that could affect the interpretation of ISO forms from insurers
           and insurance brokers. In addition, we identified examples of
           court cases involving disputes over language pertaining to the
           pollution exclusion in insurance contracts.

           Interviews with insurance experts and representatives of three
           major rating agencies provided additional perspective on insurer
           willingness to offer NBCR coverage. We selected insurance experts
           from academia based on their knowledge of insuring for
           catastrophes, including terrorist acts. We met with
           representatives of three rating agencies that provide ratings on
           insurers' financial strength and abilities to meet ongoing
           obligations to policyholders.

           To learn more about supply and demand for NBCR insurance in the
           commercial property/casualty industry, we reviewed the U.S.
           Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) 2005 "Report to Congress,
           Assessment: The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002" and
           discussed the findings with Treasury staff responsible for its
           contents. In this report, Treasury reports on results from a
           series of surveys of commercial property/casualty insurers and
           policyholders. One survey asked insurers whether they wrote
           coverage for terrorism risks and whether they wrote any policies
           that included coverage for any one of the NCBR risks. Another
           survey asked policyholders from a range of industries whether they
           purchased NBCR terrorism risk coverage and if not, asked them to
           identify the reasons. We were limited in our ability to use
           policyholders' reported purchase rates for NBCR coverage as a
           signal for approximating overall demand because of the low
           response rates to these questions. Because a number of surveyed
           policyholders did not provide this information, there is a risk
           that those who did not respond differed from those who did, which
           could lead to bias in the survey results.

           To supplement Treasury's data on demand for NBCR coverage in the
           commercial property/casualty insurance market, we reviewed surveys
           of the terrorism insurance market conducted by Marsh-a large
           insurance broker-in 2005 and 2006 as well as by Moody's, a rating
           agency, in 2005.6 We also interviewed three risk managers from
           large companies who purchase commercial property/casualty
           insurance policies in the real estate, hospitality, and
           transportation industries, and interviewed representatives of two
           national associations representing a range of consumers and
           commercial businesses. The information from both the surveys and
           the interviews about the availability of NBCR coverage is limited
           to the specific brokerage clients and individual companies, and
           cannot be generalized to all policyholders in the United States.
           Nonresponse rates and other sources of potential error also may
           limit the use of data from these two surveys.

           Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
			  
			  GAO Contact
			  
			  Orice M. Williams, (202) 512-8678 or [email protected]

           Staff Acknowledgments
			  
			  Lawrence D. Cluff was the Assistant Director. In addition, Joseph
           A. Applebaum, Sonja J. Bensen, Katherine C. Bittinger, Carl
           Ramirez, Linda Rego, Barbara M. Roesmann, and Elizabeth Walat made
           key contributions to this report.

           Related GAO Products
			  
			  Insurance Sector Preparedness: Insurers Appear Prepared to Recover
           Critical Operations Following Potential Terrorist Attacks, but
           Some Issues Warrant Further Review. GAO-06-85 . Washington, D.C.:
           November 18, 2005.

           Catastrophe Risk: U.S. and European Approaches to Insure Natural
           Catastrophe and Terrorism Risks. GAO-05-199 . Washington, D.C.:
           February 28, 2005.

           Terrorism Insurance: Effects of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
           of 2002. GAO-04-806T . Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2004.

           Terrorism Insurance: Effects of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
           of 2002. GAO-04-720T . Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2004.

           Terrorism Insurance: Implementation of the Terrorism Risk
           Insurance Act of 2002. GAO-04-307 . Washington, D.C.: April 23,
           2004.

           Catastrophe Insurance Risks: Status of Efforts to Securitize
           Natural Catastrophe and Terrorism Risk. GAO-03-1033 . Washington,
           D.C.: September 24, 2003.

           Catastrophe Insurance Risks: The Role of Risk-Linked Securities
           and Factors Affecting Their Use. GAO-02-941 . Washington, D.C.:
           September 24, 2002.

           Terrorism Insurance: Rising Uninsured Exposure to Attacks
           Heightens Potential Economic Vulnerabilities. GAO-02-472T .
           Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.

           Terrorism Insurance: Alternative Programs for Protecting Insurance
           Consumers. GAO-02-199T . Washington, D.C.: October 24, 2001.

           Terrorism Insurance: Alternative Programs for Protecting Insurance
           Consumers. GAO-02-175T . Washington, D.C.: October 24, 2001.

           GAOï¿½s Mission
			  
			  The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
           investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in
           meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve
           the performance and accountability of the federal government for
           the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds;
           evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,
           recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
           informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
           commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
           accountability, integrity, and reliability.

           Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
			  
			  The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at
           no cost is through GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ). Each weekday,
           GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on
           its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted
           products every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe
           to Updates."

           Order by Mail or Phone
			  
			  The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies
           are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the
           Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
           Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are
           discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:

           U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM
           Washington, D.C. 20548

           To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax:
           (202) 512-6061

           To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
			  
			  Contact:

           Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail:
           [email protected] Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or
           (202) 512-7470

           Congressional Relations
			  
			  Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202) 512-4400
           U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
           Washington, D.C. 20548

           Public Affairs
			  
			  Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
           512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW,
           Room 7149 Washington, D.C. 20548

10As described in GAO, U.S. Postal Service: Better Guidance Is Needed to
Ensure an Appropriate Response to Anthrax Contamination, GAO-04-239
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2004), the first cases of bioterrorism anthrax
in the United States occurred in September and October 2001, when at least
four letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to news media personnel
and two U.S. Senators. In addition, as indicated in Combating Terrorism:
Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and
Biological Attacks, GAO/NSIAD-99-163 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 1999), a
limited number of incidents involving biological agents, including the
contamination of salad bars in local restaurants with salmonella poisoning
by the Rajneeshee religious cult, have occurred in the United States.

11We contacted insurance experts from academia, including the University
of California (Berkeley), Drake University, University of Pennsylvania,
Santa Clara University, Georgia State University, as well as the American
Academy of Actuaries, and RAND (with expertise in both insurance and
national security).

12AHIP, July 3, 2003, letter to Office of Microeconomic Analysis, U.S.
Department of the Treasury (Treasury).

13GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and
Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure
GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).

14American Academy of Actuaries, April 21, 2006, letter to the President's
Working Group on Financial Markets; public comment record, U.S. Department
of the Treasury; and Insurance Information Institute, Terrorism Insurance
and the United States Government (New York, New York: September 2004). In
addition, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) also noted that terrorism
models are hampered not only by a lack of data but also by the absence of
an established "theory" of terrorist attacks. CBO, Federal Terrorism
Reinsurance: An Update (Washington, D.C.: January 2005).

15Congressional Research Service, Terrorism: The New Occupational Hazard,
Order Code RL31387 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 23, 2002). As noted in this
report, most of the direct victims of terrorism in the United States in
recent years have been people at work, whether those in the World Trade
Center or the Pentagon, or victims of anthrax transmitted through the
mail.

16Statement by American Academy of Actuaries' TRIA Subgroup on Extending
or Replacing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, December 1, 2005.
The Academy presented this conclusion-that the insurance industry would be
impaired by an NBCR attack-based on the assumption that TRIA would be
allowed to expire.

17While rating agency representatives reported that their agencies have
considered the exposure of commercial property/casualty insurers to
terrorism generally, none reported that their agencies specifically
analyzed exposure to NBCR risks.

18See GAO, Catastrophic Risks: U.S. and European Approaches to Insure
Natural Catastrophe and Terrorism Risks, GAO-05-199 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 28, 2005) for a description of how insurers use modeling firms to
estimate the financial consequences of various natural catastrophe
scenarios.

19Insurance Information Institute, Terrorism Insurance and the United
States Government (New York, N.Y.: September 2004).

20See GAO-06-91 . We concluded that the assessments of selected federal
agencies were limited in terms of including information on the relative
probability of various threat scenarios. The assessments were limited in
their reliability and completeness in part because coordination was needed
with the intelligence community.

21American Academy of Actuaries, August 2, 2005, letter to the Honorable
Richard Baker, Chairman, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and
Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services, U.S.
House of Representatives.

22See appendix I for a description of the insurance experts, insurers, and
reinsurers we selected to interview.

23From U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Report to Congress: Assessment:
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002," (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 30,
2005). Treasury reported on the market for terrorism insurance in 2005,
using data collected in 2003 and 2004.

24According to Treasury, the overall amount of coverage for any of the
NBCR events was the same for 2003 and 2004, with an increase in the number
of large insurers reporting coverage for NBCR events. The nonresponse rate
for this part of the study was 16 percent in 2003 and 9 percent in 2004.
Percentages given do not include workers' compensation coverage.

25Specialty insurers, also called surplus lines insurers, are not licensed
or admitted to generally conduct business in a state but nevertheless are
allowed to write insurance in a state under certain circumstances, such as
providing insurance for special risks or with terms and conditions having
special flexibility.

26According to the American Academy of Actuaries, losses for a large NBCR
event in both commercial property/casualty and workers' compensation could
be substantial. Loss estimates obtained by the Academy indicate that a
large NBCR event in a densely populated area could cause total insured
losses of $158.3 billion for commercial property, $14.4 billion for
general liability, and $483.7 billion for workers' compensation. American
Academy of Actuaries, April 21, 2006, letter to the President's Working
Group on Financial Markets; public comment record, U.S. Department of the
Treasury.

27Representatives of the insurers we interviewed said that although TRIA
would cover a portion of their losses, the percentage mandated by law for
insurer payments represented a sizeable portion of their capital. Under
TRIA, insurers affected by a certified terrorist event would currently pay
a deductible of 17.5 percent of earned premium in addition to paying 10
percent of the insured losses exceeding the deductible. This is an
increase from the deductible amounts in previous years (7 percent in 2003,
10 percent in 2004, and 15 percent in 2005), and less than the 20 percent
deductible that they would be responsible for paying in 2007. Treasury
also noted the impact of company-specific deductibles in its 2005 report,
stating that the deductible may confer an advantage to smaller insurers
and insurers writing in single TRIA-eligible lines. Moreover, insurers
will be responsible for covering 15 percent of the insured losses
exceeding the deductible in 2007. See 15 U.S.C. S: 6701 note (Pub. L. No.
107-297, S:S: 102(7) and 103(e)(1)(A)). As a business strategy, insurers
we interviewed had decided to limit their exposure by limiting the amount
of business they wrote for NBCR risks.

28Litigation remains a concern to representatives of a property/casualty
insurer and reinsurer we interviewed because of what has occurred with
other terrorist acts. To illustrate, property/casualty insurers were
involved in lawsuits related to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center
as late as November 2005.

29Standard Insurance Services Office (ISO) policy contracts state that
insurers will not pay for any loss or damage from "nuclear reaction or
radiation, or radioactive contamination, however caused." ISO is a
national rating organization for the property/casualty insurance industry
that develops standardized policy language designed to be in compliance
with regulatory requirements. According to an NAIC representative,
regulators have allowed commercial property/casualty insurers to exclude
nuclear risks because insurance coverage for nuclear events falls under
the Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (Sept. 2, 1957),
codified at 42 U.S.C. S:S: 2039, 2210.

30After September 11 and prior to the passage of TRIA, ISO created
terrorism exclusions with specific references to the dispersal of nuclear
or radioactive material and the release of biological or chemical
materials. Under TRIA, commercial property/casualty insurers are required
to "make available" the same coverage as they did prior to September 11.
Because of this, insurance industry representatives told us that insurers
have relied on other long-standing exclusions written into standard
contracts to limit their exposure to NBCR events.

31As of June 28, 2006, according to NAIC, these states were California,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. According to NAIC, since September 11, insurers
have tried to limit fire following exposure by lobbying state legislatures
to amend standard fire laws so that insurers would not be responsible for
fire losses resulting from terrorism. Based upon the information NAIC
provided, the number of states that have made such amendments has
increased from the last time we reported on terrorism insurance, from
seven states in 2004 to 12 in 2006. (See GAO-04-307.) The remaining 22
states and the District of Columbia, according to NAIC, did not have
standard fire policies.

32GAO has ongoing work in this area.

33CBO, Federal Terrorism Reinsurance: An Update (Washington, D.C.: January
2005).

34As described in GAO, Capital Hill Anthrax Incident: EPA's Cleanup Was
Successful: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Contract Oversight, GAO-03-686
(Washington, D.C.: Jun. 4, 2003), letters containing a powdered form of
anthrax were mailed to members of the news media and congressional
leaders, resulting in five deaths and a costly decontamination process.

35Treasury reports that 20 percent or fewer policyholders responded to its
survey. In addition, Treasury only surveyed policyholders about purchasing
NBCR coverage for commercial property/casualty lines.

36The information on demand for terrorism coverage comes from the 2006
Marsh MarketWatch report, published by a large commercial insurance broker
using data from more than 2,000 companies, representing two-thirds of
their clients.

37Captives are special-purpose insurance companies set up by commercial
businesses to self-insure risks arising from the owners' business
activities. Captives may be insurers under TRIA and therefore may be
eligible for payments for losses related to certified NBCR events.

38The guidance NAIC issued, termed a "model bulletin," also stated they
did not believe terrorism exclusions were needed in personal
property/casualty insurance (including homeowners' insurance policies).
See NAIC Model Bulletin (Dec. 21, 2001) addressing exclusions related to
acts of terrorism, personal lines property/casualty coverage, life
insurance, health insurance, and workers' compensation.

39American Academy of Actuaries, Public Policy Monograph, P/C Terrorism
Insurance Coverage: Where Do We Go Post-Terrorism Risk Insurance Act?
(Washington, D.C.: May 2004). In addition, Pennsylvania is an exception to
this general rule because that state allows insurers to exclude losses
from disability or death resulting from military activities or enemy
sabotage. See 77 P.S. S: 1209 and 77 P.S. S: 431.

40NCCI helps insurers develop and file loss costs and rates in 33 states
and the District of Columbia.

41NCCI developed the terrorism surcharge using information from a modeling
firm on potential losses to workers' compensation lines. The surcharge is
applicable to 36 states-2 more than the number of states where NCCI files
loss costs or rates. However, this surcharge was not developed for
non-NCCI states, a group which includes some states with localities
considered to be at higher risk for terrorism attacks-including
California, New York, and Texas.

42The Rating Board determines workers' compensation rates in New York.

43As we previously noted, insurers use historical information from a large
number of occurrences to determine potential future losses. In addition,
workers' compensation insurers that underwrite in California told us that
even if they could charge higher prices to specifically cover NBCR risks,
they could not use these funds to establish separate reserves to cover
potential losses until after an event had occurred.

44In addition, GAO has reported on difficulties in identifying whether
chemical agents were the source of long-term illness. See GAO, Gulf War
Illnesses: DOD's Conclusions about U.S. Troops' Exposure Cannot Be
Adequately Supported, GAO-04-159 (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 1, 2004).

45Workers' compensation insurance only would cover injury or illness that
occurred or was contracted on the job or when the employee was acting
within the scope of employment.

46In other words, workers' compensation insurers charge different rates,
depending on the risk of death or injury by occupation, but they must
charge the same statewide rate for occupation regardless of geographic
location. For example, workers' compensation insurers charge higher rates
for roofers than for clerical staff. However, according to NCCI
representatives, employers pay the same rate for a roofer in an area
considered at greater risk for a terrorism attack as they pay for a roofer
in an area considered less at risk.

47The New York State Insurance Fund and the State Compensation Insurance
Fund of California are both insurers of last resort for employers that
otherwise cannot find workers' compensation insurance in their respective
states. See appendix I for information about their market share
nationwide.

48Although neither NAIC nor the American Council of Life Insurers could
tell us about requirements across all states related to exclusions for
terrorism and NBCR risks, NAIC told us that many states allow life
insurers to exclude losses from an act of war. California state regulatory
officials told us that they did not include terrorism within the
definition of an act of war.

49California regulatory officials told us that not all life products are
subject to regulatory review, and therefore some forms sold by life
insurers in California could exclude NBCR risks.

50For example, according to one insurer, a group life insurer might
anticipate three or four deaths per 1,000 people through ordinary causes
of death, but an incident that caused more than four deaths per 1,000
would require additional funds beyond what the insurer anticipated.

51In general, when insurers become insolvent and cannot pay their claims,
state insolvency guarantee funds compensate members of the public who
suffer losses, although the policyholders may bear part of the losses
themselves.

52According to a model developed for the American Academy of Actuaries, a
large NBCR event could cause widespread casualties resulting in insured
losses to life insurers of $82 billion. See footnote 26.

53NAIC also does not track state requirements regarding the coverage of
NBCR events in health insurance policies across the states. California
regulatory officials told us that some health insurance forms could
exclude NBCR coverage if such a form were not disapproved by the state
within 30 days of filing.

54American Academy of Actuaries, December 2002, Public Policy Monograph,
Group and Health Coverage in the Wake of September 11. The Academy
specifically noted that a biological, chemical, or radiological attack
could spread illness for extended periods. In addition, we have noted that
the symptoms from some biological agents easily could be confused with
other, more common illnesses. See GAO/NSIAD-99-163 .

55Unlike workers' compensation insurance, health insurers with whom we
spoke told us that their policies covered medical treatments for current
illnesses or injuries, regardless of when the person got sick or hurt.

56The capabilities and availability of public health personnel and
medicines or vaccines could affect the scope of damage and casualties, as
we have previously noted in reports on the preparedness of public health
agencies and health care organizations for biological attacks. See GAO,
Infectious Disease Outbreaks: Bioterrorism Preparedness Efforts Have
Improved Public Health Response Capacity, but Gaps Remain, GAO-03-654T ,
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 2003) and GAO, Bioterrorism: Preparedness
Varied across State and Local Jurisdictions, GAO-03-373 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 7, 2003).

1Emmett J. Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, Fundamentals of Risk and
Insurance, 9th ed. (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2003).

2From an insurance perspective, a catastrophe is one that has the
potential to cause severe losses to an insurance company relative to its
available financial resources.

Assessing Exposure to NBCR Risks

3Cat Modeling 2006: Shifting Paradigms, presented by the Reinsurance
Association of America, Tampa, Fla.: February 2006.

4The Insurance Information Institute provides information and analysis of
insurance topics and collects data on insurance premiums and market shares
for individual states as well as for the entire United States. Moody's
Investors Services, as part of its Special Comment on insurers' exposure
to terrorist risks, published information about workers' compensation
insurers' premiums and market share.

5All of the information about market share data came from the Insurance
Information Institute, with the exception of workers' compensation
insurance, which came from Moody's Special Comment on Terrorism Insurance
in 2005. While the state funds only underwrite workers' compensation in
their respective states, Moody's calculated their marketshare based on a
percentage of total premiums written nationwide.

6These studies were the Marsh MarketWatch Report: 2006 and Moody's Special
Comment Letter on Terrorism Insurance: 2005.

(250283)

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-1081 .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Orice M. Williams (202) 512-5837 or
[email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-1081 , a report to the Chairman, Committee on
Financial Services, House of Representatives

September 2006

TERRORISM INSURANCE

Measuring and Predicting Losses from Unconventional Weapons Is Difficult,
but Some Industry Exposure Exists

Terrorists using unconventional weapons, also known as nuclear,
biological, chemical, or radiological (NBCR) weapons, could cause
devastating losses. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) of 2002, as
well as the extension passed in 2005, will cover losses from a certified
act of terrorism, irrespective of the weapon used, if those types of
losses are included in the coverage. Because of a lack of information
about the willingness of insurers to cover NBCR risks and uncertainties
about the extent to which these risks can be and are being insured by
private insurers across various lines of insurance, GAO was asked to study
these issues. This report discusses (1) commonly accepted principles of
insurability and whether NBCR risks are measurable and predictable, and
(2) whether private insurers currently are exposed to NBCR risks and the
challenges they face in pricing such risks. GAO collected information from
and met with some of the largest insurers in each line of insurance,
associations representing a broader cross section of the industry and
state insurance regulators.

GAO makes no recommendations in this report.

Insuring NBCR risks is distinctly different from insuring other risks
because of the potential for catastrophic losses, a lack of understanding
or knowledge about the long-term consequences, and a lack of historical
experience with NBCR attacks in the United States. Measuring and
predicting NBCR risks present distinct challenges to insurers because the
characteristics of the risks largely diverge from commonly accepted
principles used in determining insurability. According to these common
principles, when assessing insurability, the risk generally must (1) have
past occurrences sufficient in number and homogeneous enough (invoking the
"law of large numbers") to enable insurers to accurately predict future
losses, (2) be definite and measurable in terms of dollar value, (3) occur
by chance, and (4) not result in catastrophic losses for the insurer.
While the condition of insurability or uninsurability is not an absolute,
NBCR risks generally fail to meet most or all of these principles of an
insurable risk. Indeed, insurance experts GAO interviewed said that the
potential severity of NBCR risks alone could diminish the willingness of
some insurers to insure NBCR risks.

Although NBCR risks may not fully satisfy the principles of insurability,
there are enough variations in exposure across lines of insurance that
some insurers or some lines of insurance may have no willingness to offer
coverage for NBCR, while others may choose to offer coverage for some or
all of the risks. For example, even with TRIA, property/casualty insurers
generally have attempted to limit their exposure to NBCR risks by
excluding nearly all NBCR events from coverage, both for commercial
property/casualty and homeowners. According to industry representatives,
property/casualty insurers believe they have excluded NBCR coverage by
interpreting existing exclusions in their policies to apply to NBCR risks,
but some of the exclusions could be challenged in courts. Unlike
property/casualty insurers, however, workers' compensation, life, and
health insurers are exposed to NBCR risks and generally have not excluded
them from coverage for a variety of reasons. Specifically, workers'
compensation insurers generally offer NBCR coverage because many states
limit the exclusion of perils for workers' compensation. Conversely, while
life and health insurers may not always be required to insure NBCR risks,
they generally face other challenges in segregating and excluding NBCR
risks. However, representatives of workers' compensation, life, and health
insurers expressed concerns that the prices they currently charge may not
cover their potential exposures to NBCR risks, sometimes because of
regulatory limitations, and generally because of difficulties in measuring
and pricing for NBCR losses. Given the challenges faced by insurers in
providing coverage for, and pricing, NBCR risks, any purely market-driven
expansion of coverage is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.
*** End of document. ***