Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse	 
Effects on the Public (29-SEP-06, GAO-06-1031). 		 
                                                                 
A consolidated watch list managed by the FBI's Terrorist	 
Screening Center (TSC) contains the names of known or suspected  
terrorists, both international and domestic. Various agencies	 
whose missions require screening for links to terrorism use watch
list records. For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection	 
(CBP) screens travelers at ports of entry. Because screening is  
based on names, it can result in misidentifications when persons 
not on the list have a name that resembles one on the list. Also,
some names may be mistakenly included on the watch list. In	 
either case, individuals can be negatively affected and may	 
express concerns or seek agency action, or redress, to prevent	 
future occurrences. This report addresses: (1) the extent to	 
which the numbers of misidentified persons are known and how they
could be affected, (2) the major reasons misidentifications occur
and the actions agencies are taking to reduce them or minimize	 
their effects, and (3) the opportunities for redress available to
individuals with watch list-related concerns. In conducting work 
at TSC and the principal federal agencies that use watch list	 
data, GAO reviewed standard operating procedures and other	 
relevant documentation and interviewed responsible officials. GAO
makes no recommendations at this time because the agencies have  
ongoing initiatives to improve data quality, reduce the number of
misidentifications or mitigate their effects, and enhance redress
efforts.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-1031					        
    ACCNO:   A61608						        
  TITLE:     Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce   
Adverse Effects on the Public					 
     DATE:   09/29/2006 
  SUBJECT:   Antiterrorism					 
	     Border security					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Identity verification				 
	     Inspection 					 
	     Passenger screening				 
	     Security policies					 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Terrorists 					 
	     Transportation security				 
	     Customs Service/INS Interagency Border		 
	     Inspection System					 
                                                                 
	     Department of State Consular Lookout and		 
	     Support System					 
                                                                 
	     FBI Integrated Automated Fingerprint		 
	     Identification System				 
                                                                 

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GAO-06-1031

     

     * Results in Brief
     * Background
     * Although Likely a Small Percentage of All People Screened, t
          * Although a Substantial Number, Misidentified Persons Likely
          * Misidentified Individuals Can Experience Delays and Other Ef
     * Most Misidentifications Occur Because of Similarities to Nam
          * Misidentifications Result Because a Traveler's Name Is Simil
          * Some Misidentifications Can Result from Inaccurate or Incomp
          * Agencies Are Taking a Number of Actions to Expedite Frequent
               * Transportation Security Administration Maintains a Cleared L
               * U.S. Customs and Border Protection Is Annotating Its Databas
               * The Department of State Is Annotating Its Database to Avoid
          * As a Future Enhancement, the Terrorist Screening Center Plan
     * The Terrorist Screening Center and Frontline-Screening Agenc
          * The Terrorist Screening Center and the Federal Frontline-Scr
          * The Terrorist Screening Center's Handling of Redress Referra
          * Most Redress Queries Involve Misidentified Persons and Are H
          * Transportation Security Administration: For Individuals Who
               * U.S. Customs and Border Protection Is Considering Realigning
               * Department of State: Applicants Who Are Denied a Visa Have N
          * The Department of Justice Is Leading an Effort to Finalize a
     * Concluding Observations
     * Agency Comments
     * Objectives
     * Scope and Methodology
          * Extent That the Numbers of Terrorist Watch List Misidentific
          * Major Reasons That Misidentifications Occur, and Actions the
               * Major Reasons That Misidentifications Occur
               * Actions to Reduce the Number of Misidentified Persons or Exp
          * Redress Opportunities Established by the Terrorist Screening
     * Data Reliability
     * Exhibit A: "Our Traveler Identity Verification Program"
     * Exhibit B: Traveler Identity Verification (TSA Form 2301, Ma
     * Background and Preliminary Observation
     * Interagency Border Inspection System Fact Sheet
          * "What Is IBIS?"
          * "Who Uses IBIS?"
          * "What Does IBIS Provide?"
          * "Where Is IBIS?"
          * "What Information Is in IBIS?"
          * "Additional Questions?"
     * GAO's Mission
     * Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
          * Order by Mail or Phone
     * To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * Congressional Relations
     * Public Affairs

Report to Congressional Requesters

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

September 2006

TERRORISTWATCH LIST SCREENING

Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects on the Public

GAO-06-1031

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4
Background 6
Although Likely a Small Percentage of All People Screened, the Thousands
of Persons Misidentified to the Terrorist Watch List Can Experience
Additional Questioning, Delays, and Other Effects 12
Most Misidentifications Occur Because of Similarities to Names on the
Terrorist Watch List; Agencies Are Attempting to Reduce the Incidence of
Misidentifications or Otherwise Facilitate Individuals through the
Screening Process 19
The Terrorist Screening Center and Frontline-Screening Agencies Are
Addressing Concerns Related to Watch List Screening, and an Interagency
Agreement Is Being Developed to Further Ensure an Effective Means for
Seeking Redress 27
Concluding Observations 42
Agency Comments 44
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 47
Objectives 47
Scope and Methodology 47
Data Reliability 54
Appendix II Terrorist Screening Center Terrorist-Watch-List Redress
Process 55
Appendix III Transportation Security Administration Traveler Identity
Verification Program 61
Exhibit A: "Our Traveler Identity Verification Program" 61
Exhibit B: Traveler Identity Verification (TSA Form 2301, May 2006) 64
Appendix IV U.S. Customs and Border Protection Online Information 66
Background and Preliminary Observation 66
Interagency Border Inspection System Fact Sheet 66
Appendix V Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 68
Appendix VI Comments from the State Department 71

Tables

Table 1: Number and Disposition of Redress Queries Referred to the
Terrorist Screening Center, Calendar Year 2005 32
Table 2: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Ports of Entry Visited by GAO
48

Figures

Figure 1: General Overview of the Name-Matching Process Used to Screen
Individuals against the Terrorist Watch List 11
Figure 2: General Overview of the Terrorist Screening Center's Process for
Handling Concerns Involving Watch-List-Related Screening 30
Abbreviations

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
IAFIS Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System IDENT
Automated Biometrics Identification System IBIS Interagency Border
Inspection System RFID radio frequency identification SENTRI Secure
Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection TSA Transportation
Security Administration TSC Terrorist Screening Center US-VISIT U.S.
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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separately.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

September 29, 2006

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Chairman Committee on the
Judiciary House of Representatives

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson Ranking Member Committee on Homeland
Security House of Representatives

To identify individuals with known or potential links to terrorism, since
the tragedies of September 11, 2001, agencies such as the departments of
State, Justice, and Homeland Security have implemented enhanced procedures
to screen international travelers, airline passengers, and visa
applicants. One important homeland security tool used by these federal
frontline-screening agencies is the terrorist-screening database,
otherwise known as the consolidated watch list, containing the names of
individuals with known and suspected links to terrorism. The database,
which contains names of foreign and U.S. citizens, is maintained by the
Terrorist Screening Center, an entity that has been operational since
December 2003 under the administration of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). Based upon agency-specific policies and criteria,
relevant portions of the Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated watch
list can be used in a wide range of security-related screening procedures.
For instance, the Transportation Security Administration's No Fly and
Selectee lists-used by airlines to screen passengers prior to boarding-are
portions of the Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated watch list.1
Also, to help ensure that known or suspected terrorists do not enter the
United States, applicable portions of the watch list are to be checked by
Department of State consular officers before issuing U.S. visas and by
U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers before admitting persons at
air, land, and sea ports of entry.

1According to the Transportation Security Administration, persons on the
No Fly list should be precluded from boarding an aircraft bound for, or
departing from, the United States. In contrast, being on the Selectee list
does not mean that the individual will be precluded from boarding a plane
or entering the United States. Instead, any person on the Selectee list is
to receive additional screening, which may involve a physical inspection
of the person and a hand-search of luggage.

Because terrorist watch list screening involves comparisons based on
personal-identifying information such as names and dates of birth, there
is potential to generate misidentifications-given that two or more
persons, for example, may have the same or similar names.2 As such, the
screening inevitably can raise concerns from individuals who assert that
they are being misidentified because of a name similarity to some other
person whose name is on the watch list. Misidentifications can result in
travel delays and other inconveniences for the respective individuals.
Specific instances have been widely reported in newspapers and other
media, including cases involving members of Congress and other
high-profile individuals. Misidentifications highlight the importance of
having a process-often referred to as redress-for affected persons to
express their concerns, seek correction of any inaccurate data, and
request other actions to reduce or eliminate future inconveniences.3
Similarly, such a process would apply to other persons affected by the
maintenance of watch list data, including persons whose names are actually
on the watch list but should not be ("mistakenly listed persons") as well
as persons who are properly listed.4 Accordingly, in reference to
terrorist watch list screening, this report addresses the following
questions:

           o  To what extent are the numbers of terrorist watch list
           misidentifications known, and generally, how could misidentified
           persons be affected?

           o  What are the major reasons that misidentifications occur, and
           what actions are the Terrorist Screening Center and
           frontline-screening agencies taking to reduce the number of
           misidentified persons or expedite them through the screening
           process?

           o  To address concerns from misidentified and mistakenly listed
           persons, what opportunities for redress have the Terrorist
           Screening Center and frontline-screening agencies established?

           In answering these questions, we reviewed the Terrorist Screening
           Center's standard operating procedures, statistics on
           watch-list-related screening encounters that resulted in referrals
           to the center, and other relevant documentation; and we
           interviewed Terrorist Screening Center officials, including the
           director, principal deputy director, chief information officer,
           and privacy officer. Similarly, we interviewed officials at and
           reviewed documentation obtained from the principal
           frontline-screening agencies-Transportation Security
           Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the
           Department of State-whose missions most frequently and directly
           involve interactions with travelers.5 Regarding the screening of
           air passengers, in addition to contacting the Transportation
           Security Administration to broadly discuss the procedures of air
           carriers, we interviewed security officials at five major,
           domestic air carriers. Also, we visited various land and air ports
           of entry in four states-California, Michigan, New York, and Texas.
           Collectively, these states have ports of entry on both the
           northern and southern borders of the United States. Regarding
           statistical data we obtained from the Terrorist Screening
           Center-such as the number of misidentifications and the results of
           the redress process, particularly the number of mistakenly listed
           persons whose names have been removed from the watch list-we
           discussed the sources of the data with center officials, including
           the chief information officer, and we reviewed documentation
           regarding the compilation of the statistics. We determined that
           the statistics were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
           presenting overall patterns and trends. We performed our work from
           April 2005 through August 2006 in accordance with generally
           accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I presents more
           details about our objectives, scope, and methodology.

           Results in Brief
			  
			  Although the total number of misidentifications that have occurred
           as a result of watch-list-related screening conducted by all
           frontline-screening agencies and airlines is unknown, Terrorist
           Screening Center data indicate that about half of the tens of
           thousands of potential matches sent to the center between December
           2003 and January 2006 for further research turned out to be
           misidentifications.6 The frontline-screening agencies and, in the
           case of air travel, airlines are able use other identifying
           information to resolve some possible matches without Terrorist
           Screening Center involvement, but when the agencies are unable to
           do so, they are to refer the information to the center for
           clarification and resolution. Frontline- screening agencies and
           airlines generally do not have readily available statistics
           quantifying the number of potential matches they have been able to
           resolve without consulting the Terrorist Screening Center.
           Although the total number of misidentified persons may be
           substantial in absolute terms, it likely represents a small
           fraction of the hundreds of millions of individuals screened each
           year. For example, in fiscal year 2005, U.S. Customs and Border
           Protection alone reported that its officers managed about 431
           million border crossings into the United States at land, air, and
           sea ports of entry. Nonetheless, misidentifications resulting from
           terrorist watch list screening can affect the respective
           individuals by, for example, delaying their travel, subjecting
           them to more intensive questioning and searches, and denying them
           conveniences such as self-serve check-in at airports. Also, in
           some cases, travelers have missed flights.

           Misidentifications most commonly occur because the names of some
           persons being screened are similar to those on the terrorist watch
           list. The federal screening agencies we studied and most airlines
           use computer-driven algorithms to rapidly compare the names of
           individuals against the terrorist watch list.7 Generally, these
           name-recognition technologies may be designed to balance
           minimizing the possibility of false negatives-that is, failing to
           identify an individual whose name is on the terrorist watch
           list-while not generating an unacceptable number of false
           positives (misidentifications). Thus, the computerized algorithms
           may be configured to return a broad set of possible matches based
           on the name input in order to account, for example, for
           differences in names due to misspellings or transcription errors.
           The Terrorist Screening Center has formed an interagency working
           group to improve the effectiveness of identity matching across
           agencies, and the group's efforts were ongoing the time of our
           review. The center also has ongoing quality-assurance initiatives
           to identify and correct incomplete or inaccurate records that
           contribute to misidentifications. Further, agencies are taking
           actions to expedite frequently misidentified persons through the
           screening process. For example, in February 2006, U.S. Customs and
           Border Protection began annotating its database to help ensure
           that travelers who have been inadvertently stopped in the
           past-because they have the same or similar name as a watch list
           record-are no longer subjected to intensive screening, unless
           warranted by new data. As a future enhancement, the Terrorist
           Screening Center is planning to have links to other agencies'
           biometric data, such as fingerprints. According to center
           officials, the capability to link biometric data to supplement
           name-based screening may be more relevant for confirming the
           identities of known terrorists than minimizing misidentifications
           or false positives.

           The Terrorist Screening Center, the Transportation Security
           Administration, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have
           processes in place to help resolve concerns or complaints
           submitted by persons adversely affected by terrorist watch list
           screening.8 The processes are interdependent in that the
           frontline-screening agencies are to receive all redress queries,
           resolve those that, based on other identifying information,
           clearly involve misidentified persons, and refer the other queries
           to the Terrorist Screening Center-particularly queries submitted
           by persons whose names are actually contained on the watch list.
           For calendar year 2005, the center reported that it processed to
           completion 112 redress referrals and removed the names of
           31mistakenly listed individuals from the watch list. In contrast,
           the frontline-screening agencies processed thousands of redress
           queries. Most redress queries are submitted by misidentified
           persons, and their names cannot be removed from the watch list
           because they are not the persons on the list. Instead, some
           frontline-screening agencies have undertaken initiatives to
           expedite the future processing of persons who are frequently
           misidentified. For example, under the Transportation Security
           Administration's process, affected individuals can voluntarily
           provide additional personal-identifying information as a basis for
           the agency to determine whether their names can be put on a
           cleared list. Airlines are to use the cleared list to more quickly
           distinguish these individuals from persons who are on the No Fly
           and the Selectee lists. This procedure is intended to reduce
           delays in obtaining airline-boarding passes. The Terrorist
           Screening Center, from its unique position as administrator of the
           consolidated terrorist watch list, has noted significant
           differences among agencies in providing watch-list-related
           redress. For instance, whereas the Transportation Security
           Administration has designated an official accountable specifically
           for redress, U.S. Customs and Border Protection does not and also
           has not followed consistent procedures in referring appropriate
           redress queries to the Terrorist Screening Center. Thus, at the
           Terrorist Screening Center's request, the Department of Justice is
           leading an effort to develop an interagency memorandum of
           understanding to ensure that opportunities for redress are
           formally documented and that agency responsibilities are clear,
           with designated officials specifically accountable for supporting
           the continued success of watch-list-related redress. This effort,
           according to the Terrorist Screening Center, has been ongoing
           since fall 2005, and a final draft of the memorandum of
           understanding is expected to be ready for interagency clearances
           by fall 2006. The Department of Justice and the Terrorist
           Screening Center have acknowledged that, upon finalization of an
           interagency agreement that documents the redress opportunities and
           designates agencies' responsibilities, it is important that
           appropriately updated information on redress and points of contact
           be made available to the public, including updates of Web-based
           guidance.

           We are not making recommendations at this time because the
           agencies have ongoing efforts to improve data quality and
           otherwise either reduce the number of misidentifications or
           mitigate their effects and to provide more effective redress.

           Background
			  
			  In April 2003, we reported that watch lists were maintained by
           numerous federal agencies and that the agencies did not have a
           consistent and uniform approach to sharing information on
           individuals with possible links to terrorism.9 Our report
           recommended that the Department of Homeland Security's Secretary,
           in collaboration with the heads of the departments and agencies
           that have and use watch lists, lead an effort to consolidate and
           standardize the federal government's watch list structures and
           policies. Subsequently, pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential
           Directive 6, dated September 16, 2003, the Terrorist Screening
           Center was established to consolidate the government's approach to
           terrorism screening and provide for the appropriate and lawful use
           of terrorist information in screening processes. The center began
           "24/7" operations on December 1, 2003, and, about 3 months later,
           on March 12, 2004, announced that watch list consolidation was
           completed with establishment of the terrorist-screening database.
           This consolidated database is the U.S. government's master
           repository for all known and suspected international and domestic
           terrorist records used for watch-list-related screening. Records
           for inclusion in the consolidated database are submitted to the
           Terrorist Screening Center from the following two sources:

           o  Identifying information on individuals with possible
           international terrorism ties is provided through the National
           Counterterrorism Center, which is managed by the Office of the
           Director of National Intelligence.

           o  Identifying information on individuals with ties to purely
           domestic terrorism, such as Ted Kaczynski (the "Unabomber"), is
           provided by the FBI.

           In their terrorist-screening processes, the three federal
           frontline-screening agencies that we reviewed use records exported
           by the Terrorist Screening Center. That is, the applicable
           exported records are incorporated, respectively, into the
           Transportation Security Administration's No Fly and Selectee
           lists, U.S. Customs and Border Inspection's Interagency Border
           Inspection System, and the State Department's Consular Lookout and
           Support System. The following listing discusses the
           frontline-screening agencies' use of watch list records more
           specifically:

           o  Transportation Security Administration's No Fly and Selectee
           Lists: As needed, the Transportation Security Administration
           provides updated No Fly and Selectee lists to airlines for use in
           prescreening passengers. Through the issuance of security
           directives, the agency requires that airlines use these lists to
           screen passengers prior to boarding. The agency's Office of
           Intelligence (formerly called the Transportation Security
           Intelligence Service) provides assistance to airlines in
           determining whether passengers are a match with persons on the
           lists.10

           o  U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Interagency Border
           Inspection System: U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers use
           the Interagency Border Inspection System to screen travelers
           entering the United States at ports of entry, which include land
           border crossings along the Canadian and Mexican borders, sea
           ports, and U.S. airports for international flight arrivals. This
           system includes not only the applicable records exported by the
           Terrorist Screening Center, but also additional information on
           people with prior criminal histories, immigration violations, or
           other activities of concern that U.S. Customs and Border
           Protection wants to identify and screen at ports of entry.

           o  State Department's Consular Lookout and Support System: This
           system is the primary sensitive but unclassified database used by
           consular officers abroad to screen the names of visa applicants to
           identify terrorists and other aliens who are potentially
           ineligible for visas based on criminal histories or other reasons
           specified by federal statute. According to the State Department,
           all visa-issuing posts have direct access to the system and must
           use it to check each applicant's name before issuing a visa.

           Also, the Terrorist Screening Center makes applicable records in
           the consolidated database available to support the
           terrorist-screening activities of other federal agencies-such as
           U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which is the largest
           investigative component of the Department of Homeland Security-as
           well as state and local law enforcement agencies. For example, the
           FBI's National Crime Information Center has a file-the Violent
           Gang and Terrorist Organization File-which is accessible by
           federal, state, and local law enforcement officers for screening
           in conjunction with arrests, detentions, or other criminal justice
           purposes.11 A subset of this file consists of the Terrorist
           Screening Center's records to be used to screen for possible
           terrorist links.

           Figure 1 presents a general overview of the name-matching process
           typically used by frontline-screening agencies and airlines to
           screen individuals against applicable records exported by the
           Terrorist Screening Center, which has an important role in
           verifying identities. When the computerized name-matching system
           of a frontline-screening agency or, in the case of air travel, an
           airline generates a "hit" (a potential name match) against a
           terrorist database record, the agency or airline is to review each
           potential name-match. Any obvious mismatches (misidentifications)
           are to be resolved by the frontline agency or airline.

           Conversely, clearly positive or exact matches generally are to be
           referred to the applicable screening agency's intelligence center
           and to the Terrorist Screening Center to provide law enforcement
           an opportunity for a counterterrorism response.12 Similarly, hits
           involving inconclusive matches-that is, uncertain and other
           hard-to-verify potential matches-typically are to be referred to
           the applicable screening agency's intelligence center. In turn, if
           the intelligence center cannot conclusively determine whether a
           hit is an exact match, the Terrorist Screening Center is to be
           contacted.13 Referring inconclusive matches to the Terrorist
           Screening Center for resolution or confirmation is important
           because the possible consequences of not identifying a known or
           suspected terrorist could be worse than the inconveniences
           associated with misidentifications. In conducting its research,
           the Terrorist Screening Center has access to classified data
           systems that may contain additional information not available to
           the referring agency. Once the Terrorist Screening Center has
           confirmed the individual as either a positive match or a
           misidentification, the frontline-screening agency is to be
           informed.

2The term "misidentification" refers to a person initially matched by a
screening agency to a name on the watch list, but upon closer examination,
the person is found to not match any watch list record.

3As used in this report, the term "redress" generally refers to an
agency's complaint-resolution process, whereby individuals may seek
resolution of their concerns about an agency action. In the report, we
describe elements of the opportunities for redress offered by several
agencies, and we generally analyze their respective policies and
procedures. However, we do not address the relation between agency redress
and other possible remedies, such as judicial review.

4For purposes of this report, the term "mistakenly listed persons"
includes two categories of individuals-(1) persons who never should have
been included on the watch list but were due to some type of error and (2)
persons who were appropriately included on the watch list at one time but
no longer warrant inclusion on the terrorist watch list due to subsequent
events.

5Although the terrorist watch list is used for a variety of screening
purposes, such as conducting background checks of workers who have access
to secure areas of the national transportation system, our work generally
focused on the screening of travelers. At the Transportation Security
Administration, we examined the screening of air passengers prior to their
boarding a flight; at U.S. Customs and Border Protection, we examined the
screening of travelers entering the United States through ports of entry;
and at the Department of State, we examined the screening of nonimmigrant
visa applicants.

6According to the FBI, the specific number of potential matches sent to
the Terrorist Screening Center that turned out to be misidentifications is
sensitive information; however, the total is substantially less than
100,000.

7An algorithm is a prescribed set of well-defined, unambiguous rules or
processes for the solution of a problem in a finite number of steps.
Pursuant to Transportation Security Administration security directives and
implementing guidance, airlines are to prescreen passengers by matching
their names against the No Fly and Selectee lists.

8Any such concern or complaint raised formally by an affected individual
is what the Terrorist Screening Center calls a redress query.
Specifically, the Terrorist Screening Center defines a "redress query" as
communication from individuals or their representatives inquiring or
complaining about an adverse experience during a terrorist
watch-list-related-screening process conducted or sponsored by a federal
agency, including congressional inquiries to federal agencies on behalf of
their constituents.

9GAO, Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated
to Promote Better Integration and Sharing, GAO-03-322 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 15, 2003).

10The Transportation Security Administration is developing a new passenger
prescreening program, known as Secure Flight. Under the Secure Flight
program, the agency plans to take over, from commercial airlines, the
responsibility to compare identifying information on airline passengers
against information on known or suspected terrorists. The agency expects
that Secure Flight will improve passenger prescreening as compared with
the current airline-operated process. In June 2006, we reported that the
Transportation Security Administration still faces significant challenges
in developing and implementing the Secure Flight program. See, GAO,
Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation
Security Administration's Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-864T (Washington,
D.C.: June 14, 2006).

11Also, the FBI and designated state and local criminal justice agencies
access the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File in conducting
background checks on individuals seeking to purchase firearms or obtain
permits to possess, acquire, or carry firearms. See GAO, Gun Control and
Terrorism: FBI Could Better Manage Firearm-Related Background Checks
Involving Terrorist Watch List Records, GAO-05-127 (Washington, D.C.: Jan.
19, 2005).

12Airlines are to contact the Transportation Security Administration,
which may then contact the Terrorist Screening Center, as necessary.

13In commenting on a draft of this report, the State Department noted that
the general overview presented in figure 1 is not fully reflective of the
process for screening nonimmigrant visa applicants against the terrorist
watch list. Specifically, the department emphasized that for any hit that
clearly is not a mismatch, consular officers are required to obtain a
security advisory opinion. That is, the consular post must ask Department
of State headquarters to initiate a process of requesting that the
Terrorist Screening Center and other relevant agencies check their
respective databases or systems for the existence of any investigative or
intelligence information regarding the individual and pass the results
back to the department for use in recommending a course of action to the
post.

Figure 1: General Overview of the Name-Matching Process Used to Screen
Individuals against the Terrorist Watch List

Homeland security-related screening processes entail some level of
inconvenience for all travelers. Also, in an operational context, people
can be and frequently are screened for reasons not related to the
terrorist watch list but rather for reasons related to an agency's
mission. For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection screens travelers
for any conditions that may make them inadmissible to the country,
including past violations of immigration, drug, customs, or other laws.
The agency also randomly selects certain individuals for more thorough
screening. Similarly, prospective airline passengers may be randomly
selected for additional screening, and others may be selected if they
exhibit unusual behavior.14 Generally, screening agencies and airlines are
not to disclose the reason they select an individual for more thorough
screening measures, so persons may mistakenly assume it is because they
are on a terrorist watch list.

  Although Likely a Small Percentage of All People Screened, the Thousands of
  Persons Misidentified to the Terrorist Watch List Can Experience Additional
                     Questioning, Delays, and Other Effects

Annually, hundreds of millions of individuals-international travelers,
airline passengers, and visa applicants-are screened against relevant
portions of the Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated watch list. The
number of persons misidentified during terrorist watch list screening may
be substantial in absolute terms but likely represents a small fraction of
the total screenings. Nonetheless, misidentifications resulting from
terrorist watch list screening can affect the respective individuals in
various ways, with perhaps the most common situation involving delays and
related inconveniences experienced by travelers.

14Since the late 1990s, airline passenger prescreening has been conducted
using the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS I)-in
which data related to a passenger's reservation and travel itinerary are
compared against characteristics (known as CAPPS I rules) used to select
passengers who require additional scrutiny-and through the matching of
passenger names to terrorist watch lists. See, GAO, Aviation Security:
Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but Risks Should Be
Managed as System Is Further Developed, GAO-05-356 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
28, 2005), which reported that approximately 99 percent of all passengers
on domestic flights are screened under the air carrier-operated, automated
CAPPS I system, and the remaining 1 percent of passengers are screened by
air carriers who do not have an automated system.

Although a Substantial Number, Misidentified Persons Likely Constitute a Small
Percentage of All People Screened

Although the full universe of persons misidentified by terrorist watch
list screening may be substantial in absolute terms, the total number
likely represents a small fraction of all persons who are screened. During
the 26-month period we studied-from December 2003 (when the Terrorist
Screening Center began operations) to January 2006-the center received
tens of thousands of screening-encounter referrals from
frontline-screening agencies and determined that approximately half
involved misidentified persons with names the same as or similar to
someone whose name was contained on the terrorist watch list. The number
of referrals to the Terrorist Screening Center does not constitute the
universe of all persons initially misidentified by terrorist watch list
screening because the names of many persons initially misidentified are
not forwarded to the Terrorist Screening Center. Rather, by comparing
birth dates or other data, the frontline- screening agencies (e.g., U.S.
Customs and Border Protection) are able to resolve many initial
misidentifications without contacting the Terrorist Screening Center.
Additionally, for air passengers, the airlines often are able to resolve
initial misidentifications without contacting the Transportation Security
Administration.15 The screening agencies and airlines generally do not
maintain readily available statistics on these resolutions.

Nonetheless, although the full universe of such misidentifications may be
substantial in absolute terms, the total number likely represents a small
fraction of all persons who are subject to terrorist watch list screening
procedures, as in the following examples:

           o  U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported that its officers
           managed a total of 431 million border crossings into the United
           States at land, air, and sea ports of entry in fiscal year 2005.

           o  Domestic airline flights-flights within the United
           States-carried 658 million passengers during the 12 months ending
           January 2006, according to Department of Transportation
           statistics.16

           o  The State Department reported that it processed about 7.4
           million nonimmigrant visa applications in fiscal year 2005.17

           In addition to these international travelers, domestic flight
           passengers, and visa applicants, any other person can be subject
           to terrorist watch list screening in conjunction with routine law
           enforcement activities. For instance, in stopping a motorist for a
           traffic violation, a state or local law enforcement officer can
           check the motorist's name against the National Crime Information
           Center's various files, which include terrorist watch list records
           exported by the Terrorist Screening Center. The National Crime
           Information Center, according to the FBI, is available to
           virtually every law enforcement agency nationwide, 24 hours a day,
           365 days a year.

           Misidentified Individuals Can Experience Delays and Other Effects
			  
			  People who are misidentified to the terrorist watch list can be
           affected in various ways, most commonly experiencing delays and
           related inconveniences, including being subjected to more
           intensive questioning and searches. Generally, the extent of the
           effects of terrorist watch-list-related misidentification can vary
           by individual circumstances and the operational nature of the
           screening agency's mission. For example, an individual with a name
           similar to someone who is on the Transportation Security
           Administration's No Fly list likely will be unable to utilize the
           convenience of Internet, curbside, and airport kiosk check-in
           options. This effect of misidentifications is reflected in a
           sample of 24 complaint letters to the Transportation Security
           Administration that we reviewed.18 Many of the complainants
           described their frustrations with not being able to use
           alternative check-in options such as the Internet or airport
           kiosks. Similarly, in a survey conducted in June 2006 by the
           National Business Travel Association, many companies' travel
           managers responded that their employees have expressed frustration
           about repeatedly having to go to the airline ticket counter to
           obtain a boarding pass.19

           Also, misidentifications can cause other effects, such as missed
           airline flights by either leisure travelers or business travelers,
           which could have economic and other consequences, although we
           found no readily available data on how frequently these effects
           occurred. However, according to Transportation Security
           Administration data, two international flights-one in December
           2004 and another in May 2005-were diverted from landing at their
           scheduled destinations in the United States due to potential
           matches to the No Fly list. In each instance, following the
           diversions of the flights and further investigation after the
           airplanes landed, federal authorities determined that the
           respective passengers were misidentified and not true matches to
           the No Fly list. Nonetheless, the diversions resulted in delays
           and related inconveniences for all passengers on these flights.

           The Transportation Security Administration has acknowledged that
           misidentifications can be embarrassing and time consuming for
           individuals and also potentially can erode the public's confidence
           in the agency's security efforts. Similarly, a recent Department
           of Homeland Security report recognized that "individuals who are
           mistakenly put on watch lists or who are misidentified as being on
           these lists can potentially face consequences ranging from
           inconvenience and delay to loss of liberty."20

           Also, an individual can experience an immediate delay at a port of
           entry when U.S. Customs and Border Protection's automated search
           of the Interagency Border Inspection System database returns a
           potential match to a terrorist watch list record. For such
           potential matches, U.S. Customs and Border Protection's operating
           protocol is to escort the person to another screening area for
           further questioning and inspection (a process referred to as
           secondary screening). The length of time the person spends in
           secondary screening can be several hours, depending partly on the
           difficulty or ease of verifying whether the person is or is not
           the individual on the watch list. In the four states we
           visited-California, Michigan, New York, and Texas-U.S. Customs and
           Border Protection officers told us that given the importance of
           the homeland security mission, their practice is to err on the
           side of caution by conducting very thorough screenings.21

           The effects of such misidentifications and the related secondary
           screenings can be emotional as well as physical, as reflected in
           complaint letters to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. A sample
           of 28 complaint letters to U.S. Customs and Border Protection that
           we reviewed alleged a range of effects, such as experiencing
           travel delays, which resulted in missing airline flights and
           incurring additional travel costs; being subjected to extensive
           questioning and searches, while not being allowed to contact
           family members, friends, or business associates to inform them
           about the delays; and feeling embarrassed and frustrated.22

           The State Department's screening of nonimmigrant visa applicants
           against the terrorist watch list may not affect individuals in the
           same way as does screening by the Transportation Security
           Administration and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Generally,
           the State Department's screening differs from other screening
           agencies because there is more time to search records and make
           decisions. According to State Department officials, the average
           time for processing a nonimmigrant visa application is about 2
           days. However, additional processing time may be needed if initial
           screening of the applicant shows a possible link to terrorism-that
           is, the applicant's name possibly matches that of a person whose
           name is on the terrorist watch list. The officials explained that
           this additional processing time is needed because a decision on
           the visa applicant cannot be made until a security advisory
           opinion is obtained. That is, the consular post must ask the
           Department of State headquarters in Washington, D.C., to initiate
           a process of requesting that various agencies check their
           respective databases or systems for the existence of any
           investigative or intelligence information regarding the individual
           and pass the results back to a central point. This interagency
           review process includes the FBI, the Drug Enforcement
           Administration, the Central Intelligence Agency, and others.
           According to State Department officials, visa applicants are
           routinely told not to buy tickets or incur other travel-related
           expenses until the clearance process has been completed and the
           application approved.

           In acknowledging that the interagency review process may extend
           the processing time for a visa decision, the State Department
           provided us (in June 2006) the following contextual perspectives:

           o  In the last 2 years, the department and its interagency
           partners have worked to decrease the processing time in order to
           reduce the impact on the traveling public.

           o  Nevertheless, the department's position is that the time it
           takes to screen a visa applicant is a necessary part of the
           application procedure and, therefore, is not an adverse
           governmental action. At times, additional processing must be done
           in order to determine whether a visa applicant is eligible for a
           visa under the law, including for national security reasons. The
           additional processing is the inconvenient consequence of the
           proper functioning of the visa screening system.

           o  Moreover, the extended processing time generally is a one-time
           occurrence. Once an alien is cleared through the process, the
           clearance is noted in the department's consular visa database.
           Thus, this person may not be subject to the same processing delay
           when applying for another visa in the future, unless additional
           investigative or intelligence information arises after issuance of
           the first visa.23

           Screening by state and local law enforcement also differs from
           screening by the Transportation Security Administration, U.S.
           Customs and Border Protection, and the State Department.
           Essentially, federal agencies (or air carriers, as applicable)
           initiate screening when individuals make an airline reservation,
           arrive at a port of entry, or apply for a visa. In contrast, a
           state or local law enforcement agency may initiate screening by,
           for example, pulling over a motorist for speeding. Generally, a
           routine procedure for the law enforcement officer is to query the
           motorist's name against records in the National Crime Information
           Center, which contains criminal history records as well as
           terrorist watch list records. According to congressional testimony
           presented in March 2004 by the Director of Public Security for the
           State of New York, it takes about 12 to 15 minutes, on average,
           for a New York patrol officer to contact the Terrorist Screening
           Center and resolve a potential name match.24 More recently, in
           July 2006, the Director of the Terrorist Screening Center told us
           that the average time nationally is now down to about 5
           minutes-that is, the time period beginning with the center's
           receipt of the call from a state or local law enforcement officer
           and ending with the response to the officer regarding the
           potential name match.25

           Most Misidentifications Occur Because of Similarities to Names on
			  the Terrorist Watch List; Agencies Are Attempting to Reduce the
			  Incidence of Misidentifications or Otherwise Facilitate Individuals
			  through the Screening Process
			  
			  The most common cause of misidentifications is similarity of the
           names of persons being checked to names on the Terrorist Screening
           Center's consolidated watch list, for which there is no complete
           remedy, but agencies are taking actions to minimize the effect on
           frequently misidentified persons. The Terrorist Screening Center
           has formed an interagency group to improve the effectiveness of
           identity matching across agencies and also has ongoing initiatives
           regarding data quality. As a future enhancement, the Terrorist
           Screening Center's strategy is to develop the capability to link
           name-based watch list searches to relevant biometric systems
           maintained by other agencies, although this capability may be more
           useful for confirming positive matches than for reducing the
           incidence of misidentifications.

           Misidentifications Result Because a Travelerï¿½s Name Is Similar
			  to Someone with a Terrorist Watch List Record			  
			  
			  Misidentifications occur most often because the names of some
           persons being screened are the same or similar to those in the
           consolidated terrorist watch list. To handle the large volumes of
           travelers and others who must be screened, federal agencies and
           most airlines use computer-driven algorithms to rapidly compare
           the names of individuals against the applicable terrorist watch
           list records. A primary factor in designing a computerized
           name-matching process is the need to minimize the possibility of
           generating false negatives-that is, failing to identify an
           individual whose name is on the terrorist watch list-without
           generating an unacceptable number of false positives
           (misidentifications). To help ensure that name-based screening
           does not miss detecting someone who is on the watch list, agencies
           and airlines may configure their algorithms in such a way that
           they return a broad set of possible matches for any given name
           input. For instance, the computerized algorithms may account for
           differences in names due to misspellings or transcription errors.

           Operationally, for each name that is screened against the watch
           list, the computerized algorithm may return a list of possible
           matches. If applicable, screening agency or airline security
           personnel then review these results of possible matching records
           arrayed by probability scores to determine which, if any, is a
           positive match with the person being screened. To help ensure
           awareness of best practices among agencies, the Terrorist
           Screening Center has formed and chairs a working group-the Federal
           Identity Match Search Engine Performance Standards Working
           Group-which met initially in December 2005.26 An objective of the
           working group is to provide voluntary guidance for federal
           agencies that use identity-matching search engine technology.
           Essentially, the prospective guidance is intended to improve the
           effectiveness of identity matching across agencies by, among other
           means, assessing which algorithms or search engines are the most
           effective for screening specific types or categories of names. At
           the time of our review, a target date for completing the
           initiative to develop and provide voluntary guidance to screening
           agencies had not been set.

           Some Misidentifications Can Result from Inaccurate or Incomplete Data
			  
			  Some misidentifications can result from inaccurate or incomplete
           data in the consolidated terrorist watch list. Generally, the FBI
           and intelligence agencies are the original collectors of the
           information used to determine whether a given individual should be
           added to the terrorist watch list. The Terrorist Screening Center,
           in turn, is responsible for ensuring that information received
           from the intelligence community is accurately maintained in the
           consolidated watch list. One of the Terrorist Screening Center's
           primary goals is to maintain accurate and complete information.

           In June 2005, the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector
           General reported that its review of the Terrorist Screening
           Center's consolidated watch list found several problems-such as
           inconsistent record counts and duplicate records, lack of data
           fields for some records, and unclear sources for some records.27
           Among other things, the Inspector General recommended that the
           Terrorist Screening Center develop procedures to regularly review
           and test the information contained in the consolidated terrorist
           watch list to ensure that the data are complete, accurate, and
           non-duplicative. The Terrorist Screening Center agreed and noted
           that it was taking steps to implement the recommendation. Also,
           the Terrorist Screening Center has quality-assurance initiatives
           ongoing to identify and correct troublesome records related to
           misidentifications.

           Moreover, the Terrorist Screening Center's director and principal
           deputy director stressed to us that quality of data is a high
           priority for the center and also is a continuing challenge,
           particularly given that the database is dynamic, changing
           frequently with additions, deletions, and modifications. The
           officials noted the equal importance of ensuring that (1) the
           names of known and appropriately suspected terrorists are included
           in the watch list and (2) the names of any mistakenly listed
           individuals are removed. In this regard, the officials explained
           that the center's standard operating practices include at least
           two opportunities to review records. First, Terrorist Screening
           Center staff-including subject matter experts detailed to the
           center from other agencies-review each incoming record submitted
           (nominated) to the center for inclusion in the consolidated watch
           list. Also, every time there is a screening encounter-for example,
           a port-of-entry screening of an individual that generates an
           actual or a potential match with a watch list record-that record
           is reviewed again.

           In addition to the Terrorist Screening Center's quality-assurance
           initiatives, screening agencies also have been looking at ways to
           reduce misidentifications. One way that holds promise, where
           applicable, is to use additional personal-identifying information
           to enhance name-based searching. For example, as part of its
           efforts to develop the Secure Flight program, the Transportation
           Security Administration conducted tests between November 2004 and
           April 2005 to determine what combinations of names and associated
           personal-identifying attributes were most effective in matching
           airline passenger data against terrorist watch list records.
           According to the Transportation Security Administration, the
           testing indicated that searches using additional
           personal-identifying attributes could potentially result in
           decreasing the number of misidentifications. However, the
           Transportation Security Administration concluded that more testing
           was needed to determine, among other things, the point of
           diminishing returns in using combinations of personal-identifying
           information to enhance name-based watch list searches.

           Agencies Are Taking a Number of Actions to Expedite Frequently
			  Misidentified Persons through the Screening Process
			  
			  In addition to initiatives aimed at reducing the number of
           misidentifications, screening agencies also are taking actions to
           expedite the screening of frequently misidentified persons.

           Transportation Security Administration Maintains a Cleared List
			  of Individuals to Expedite Screening and Mitigate Negative Effects
			  
			  The Transportation Security Administration has instituted a
           process designed to help frequently misidentified air passengers
           obtain boarding passes more quickly and avoid prolonged delays.
           Under this process, an individual can voluntarily provide the
           Transportation Security Administration with additional
           personal-identifying information. Then, the Transportation
           Security Administration will use this information to decide
           whether the person's name should be put on a cleared list-that is,
           a list that contains the names and other personal-identifying
           information of individuals who have been checked and cleared as
           being persons not on the No Fly and Selectee lists. Airlines are
           to use the cleared list to more quickly determine that these
           passengers are not the persons whose names are on the No Fly and
           Selectee lists. As needed, the Transportation Security
           Administration provides the airlines with updates of the No Fly
           and Selectee lists and the cleared list. As discussed later in
           this report, the cleared list is integral to the Transportation
           Security Administration's redress process for watch-list-related
           complaints.

           U.S. Customs and Border Protection Is Annotating Its Database to
			  Help Frequently Misidentified Travelers Avoid Additional Screening
			  and Delays
			  
			  According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials, the
           agency has implemented procedures designed to help frequently
           misidentified travelers avoid additional screening and delays.
           Specifically, in February 2006, the agency began annotating its
           database regarding travelers who were inadvertently stopped
           because they have the same or similar name as a watch list record
           but are not the actual subject of the record. The officials
           explained that the agency uses the data routinely collected on a
           traveler during the initial inspection process, and no further
           action is necessary by the traveler. The officials noted that
           these travelers should no longer be stopped on subsequent visits
           because of the records in question. As of September 2006,
           according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials, the
           agency had annotated more than 10,300 such instances and had
           prevented more than 7,200 unnecessary inspections from occurring.
           28

           The Department of State Is Annotating Its Database to Avoid Future
			  Delays for Visa Applicants
			  
			  As mentioned previously, the State Department's processing of a
           visa application takes additional time if initial screening shows
           a possible link to terrorism, because a decision on the visa
           applicant cannot be made until a security advisory opinion request
           is forwarded to Washington, D.C., and a response is received.
           However, the State Department has taken steps to help minimize
           visa-processing delays for any subsequent application filed by a
           previously screened person. Specifically, according to State
           Department officials, when a visa applicant is screened through
           the security advisory opinion process and is found to be a person
           who is not on the terrorist watch list, the State Department
           enters clarifying comments in its database or even on the visa
           itself. This information is available for review by consular
           officers in processing any subsequent visa applications filed by
           the individual. Thus, according to State Department officials, the
           individual's future applications should not incur any additional
           processing times, unless new information has been acquired in the
           interim period that would cast doubt on the applicant's
           eligibility for a visa.

           As a Future Enhancement, the Terrorist Screening Center Plans to
			  Have Links to Biometric Data; Various Traveler-Screening Programs
			  Already Use Biometric Data
			  
			  Within the law enforcement community, fingerprint identification
           has been used and accepted for decades and is the de facto
           international standard for positively identifying individuals.
           Thus, as is widely recognized throughout government, the use of
           biometric technologies based on fingerprint recognition, facial
           recognition, or other physiological characteristics offer
           opportunities for enhancing the key homeland security objective of
           preventing known or suspected terrorists from entering the
           country.29

           Conceptually, biometrics can be used to screen a traveler against
           a consolidated database, such as the terrorist watch list-a
           screening of one record against many records. However, the
           Terrorist Screening Center presently does not have this
           capability, although use of biometric information to supplement
           name-based screening is planned as a future enhancement.
           Specifically, the Terrorist Screening Center's strategy is not to
           replicate existing biometric data systems. Rather, the center's
           strategy, according to the director and principal deputy director,
           is to develop a "pointer" capability to facilitate the online
           linking of name-based searches to relevant biometric systems, such
           as the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
           System (IAFIS)-a computerized system for storing, comparing, and
           exchanging fingerprint data in a digital format, which contains
           the largest criminal biometric database in the world. Center
           officials recognize that even biometric systems have screening
           limitations, such as relevant federal agencies may have no
           fingerprints or other biometrics to correlate with many of the
           biographical records in the center's consolidated database. For
           instance, watch list records may be based on intelligence gathered
           by electronic wire taps or other methods that involve no
           opportunity to obtain biometric data. Also, the availability of
           interoperable technology to facilitate online linking among
           agencies is a long-standing issue that presents challenges.
           Nonetheless, center officials anticipate that biometric
           information, if available, can be especially useful for confirming
           matches to watch list records when individuals use false
           identities or aliases.

           On the other hand, the Terrorist Screening Center has no plans for
           trying to reduce the incidence of misidentifications by collecting
           or maintaining biometric information on persons who are not on the
           watch list. Center officials noted that collecting and using
           biometric information on innocent persons would raise significant
           privacy concerns, which would have to be thoroughly considered in
           interagency discussions and weighed against the possible benefits.

           Presently, the Department of Homeland Security uses biometric data
           for operating various programs to screen travelers, one of which
           is a required-enrollment program for selected foreign nationals
           who travel to the United States and others are
           voluntary-enrollment or trusted-traveler programs. However,
           enrollment in these programs, whether required or voluntary, does
           not exempt individuals from being screened against the terrorist
           watch list. As mentioned previously, for instance, the watch list
           is dynamic, changing frequently with additions, deletions, and
           modifications.

           The required-enrollment program that uses biometric data is the
           U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)
           program, which is an entry/exit tracking system designed to
           collect, maintain, and share information on selected foreign
           nationals who travel to the United States. The program uses a
           related system-the Automated Biometrics Identification System
           (IDENT), developed by the former Immigration and Naturalization
           Service-to collect two fingerprints (right and left index fingers)
           and a digital photograph to provide for the biometric
           identification of visitors.30 Required enrollment in the US-VISIT
           program is conducted by the Department of State at visa-issuing
           consulates before the visitors depart or by U.S. Customs and
           Border Protection at ports of entry when the visitors arrive.
           American citizens, permanent legal residents, Canadian nationals,
           and Mexican nationals with border-crossing cards are not required
           to submit to US-VISIT screening at ports of entry. In July 2006,
           the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General
           provided an update on progress toward achieving biometric
           interoperability between IDENT and IAFIS.31 The Inspector
           General's progress report noted that the FBI and the Department of
           Homeland Security have formed a working group to make US-VISIT,
           IDENT, and IAFIS interoperable by December 2009.

           Under the US-VISIT program, at each subsequent reentry into the
           United States, applicable individuals are biometrically screened
           against the fingerprints collected during the initial enrollment.
           Such biometric screening is for identity verification
           purposes-screening that involves a one-to-one matching of
           fingerprints to determine if the traveler is the person enrolled
           in the program. Enrollment in the U.S.-VISIT program does not
           exempt individuals from being screened against the terrorist watch
           list and generally may not reduce the possibility of the
           individuals being misidentified based on name similarities. As
           such, when there are potential matches to a name on the watch
           list, the individuals may still be subject to more extensive
           screening at ports of entry.

           Another biometrics-based program-Registered Traveler-is being
           pilot tested by the Transportation Security Administration.32 The
           program, commonly categorized as a trusted-traveler program,
           collects biographical information and biometric data from airline
           passengers who volunteer to undergo a security threat assessment.
           The pilot program is being tested in partnership with selected
           airlines and airports across the country. Under the program, prior
           to boarding at airports, participants are to be screened using the
           biometric data.

           In addition, U.S. Customs and Border Protection operates various
           trusted-traveler programs, which are intended to provide expedited
           processing for pre-approved, low risk travelers who frequently
           cross U.S. borders. For instance, a commuter program on the
           southern border is known as Secure Electronic Network for
           Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) and on the northern border as
           "NEXUS." For these voluntary programs, the biometric component
           generally involves only the enrollment process, such as conducting
           fingerprint-based background checks using IDENT or IAFIS to ensure
           that applicants are eligible for expedited processing before
           allowing their participation.33 Thereafter, cross-border commuting
           is facilitated by use of radio frequency identification (RFID)
           technology, whereby an embedded chip in each membership card
           transmits the person's arrival to a reader-antenna at the port of
           entry.34

           While trusted-traveler programs are most commonly applicable to
           cross-border commuters, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
           officials told us that all persons who believe they are frequently
           misidentified with similar names on the terrorist watch list can
           apply and will be accepted if they are found to meet program
           requirements. Also, a benefit of these programs from a watch list
           perspective is that U.S. Customs and Border Protection has greater
           assurance of the identity of the enrollees and that these
           individuals are not persons on the watch list. Enrollment in a
           trusted-traveler program does not exempt individuals from being
           screened against the terrorist watch list; although, according to
           U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials, enrollment does
           mitigate the possibility of the individuals being misidentified
           and selected for more extensive screening at ports of entry. The
           officials also noted that the trusted-trusted traveler programs
           are not widely applicable to all ports of entry. Rather, the
           programs are helpful only to individuals eligible to use
           trusted-traveler lanes at the border, not at airports or seaports.

           The Terrorist Screening Center and Frontline-Screening Agencies
			  Are Addressing Concerns Related to Watch List Screening, and an
			  Interagency Agreement Is Being Developed to Further Ensure an
			  Effective Means for Seeking Redress
			  
			  It is important that individuals who are inadvertently and
           adversely affected by watch list screening be provided an
           opportunity to seek redress. The Terrorist Screening Center, the
           Transportation Security Administration, and U.S. Customs and
           Border Protection have processes in place to address individuals'
           concerns involving watch-list-related screening and have reported
           some successes, such as removing from the watch list the names of
           several mistakenly listed persons. Most watch-list-related redress
           concerns usually involve misidentified persons-individuals who are
           not on the watch list but have name similarities with known or
           suspected terrorists. To help ensure that opportunities for
           redress are formally documented and that agency responsibilities
           are clear, the Department of Justice is leading an effort to
           develop an interagency memorandum of understanding. A final draft
           of the memorandum of understanding is expected to be ready for
           interagency clearances by fall 2006, according to Terrorist
           Screening Center officials.

           The Terrorist Screening Center and the Federal Frontline-Screening
			  Agencies Have a Role in Addressing the Concerns of Individuals Who
			  are Adversely Affected by Watch List Screening
			  
			  The Terrorist Screening Center, the Transportation Security
           Administration, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have
           important responsibilities in providing individuals who are
           inadvertently and adversely affected by watch list screening with
           opportunities to seek redress. As mentioned previously, all
           aggrieved individuals may seek redress, including persons who
           express concerns or complaints that they are being misidentified
           and adversely affected because they have a name similar to someone
           whose name is on the terrorist watch list and persons who actually
           are on the terrorist watch list. Any such concern or complaint
           raised formally by an affected individual is what the Terrorist
           Screening Center calls a redress query. Specifically, the
           Terrorist Screening Center defines a "redress query" as
           communication from individuals or their representatives inquiring
           or complaining about an adverse experience during a terrorist
           watch-list-related-screening process conducted or sponsored by a
           federal agency, including congressional inquiries to federal
           agencies on behalf of constituents.

           According to the Terrorist Screening Center's standard operating
           procedures for redress matters, frontline-screening agencies, such
           as the Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Customs and
           Border Protection, have a key role in handling redress queries.
           Significantly, for example, the frontline-screening agencies-and
           not the Terrorist Screening Center-are to receive and initially
           handle redress queries from the public. The operating procedure of
           having frontline agencies receive redress queries serves at least
           two purposes, according to the Terrorist Screening Center. First,
           the applicable frontline-screening agency is better positioned to
           know the details of the screening encounters and to respond
           appropriately. Second, many screening encounters may be based on
           factors other than terrorism-factors such as narcotics trafficking
           or incomplete currency or customs declarations-which are not
           within the mission of the Terrorist Screening Center and must be
           resolved by the frontline agencies. Also, as a practical matter,
           the frontline agencies are the entities visible to complainants or
           inconvenienced persons.

           Further, after a frontline-screening agency receives a complaint
           or concern from an individual, the agency is to begin its internal
           complaint-resolution or redress process. As part of this process,
           the agency is to determine whether the person's complaint is
           related to a potential match to a terrorist watch list record. If
           the determination is "no"-that is, the person is not actually on
           the watch list but was misidentified because of a name similarity
           to someone who is on the terrorist watch list-the
           frontline-screening agency is responsible for resolving the
           complaint and responding to the misidentified individual.

           If the frontline-screening agency's determination is "yes"-which
           includes not only definite matches but also any potential or
           "maybe" matches that require additional research to confirm-the
           frontline agency is to refer the redress query to the Terrorist
           Screening Center. Then, the center is to check its database to
           determine whether the individual is indeed on the terrorist watch
           list or whether the person is misidentified with someone on the
           watch list. If the person is actually on the terrorist watch list,
           the Terrorist Screening Center is to consult with applicable
           intelligence community and law enforcement agencies to assess
           whether the person is appropriately listed and should remain on
           the watch list or is mistakenly listed and should be removed from
           the list. In either instance, the center is to inform the
           applicable frontline-screening agency, which is responsible for
           responding to the individual. If the complainant is a
           misidentified person, the Terrorist Screening Center is to send
           the redress query back to the applicable frontline-screening
           agency for that agency to resolve. Also, as part of its
           quality-assurance efforts, the center is to review the underlying
           watch list record that caused the person's adverse experience to
           determine, for example, the record's validity or whether a
           modification is needed, including possible removal of the record.
           Finally, any referrals received by the Terrorist Screening Center
           not related to its mission-that is, "other issues" with no nexus
           to terrorism such as complaints involving employee misconduct or
           random screening-are to be sent back to the applicable
           frontline-screening agency, which is to provide a response to the
           individual.

           In January 2005, the Terrorist Screening Center established its
           formal redress process. An overview of the redress process,
           including interaction between the center and the
           frontline-screening agencies, is illustrated in figure 2.

15The Transportation Security Administration provides security directives
and implementing guidance to foreign and domestic aircraft operators for
use in ensuring that individuals who pose a threat to civil aviation are
denied boarding passes or are subjected to additional screening, as
appropriate.

16Also, terrorist-watch-list-screening procedures are applicable to
international flights-of foreign and domestic air carriers-into or from
the United States.

17A nonimmigrant is a person, not a citizen or national of the United
States, seeking to enter the United States temporarily for a specific
purpose, such as business or pleasure.

18As discussed in appendix I, the Transportation Security Administration
provided us a selection of 24 terrorist watch-list-related complaint
letters that the agency received from December 1, 2003 (when the Terrorist
Screening Center became operational) to April 20, 2006. The agency
attempted to select letters from different weeks throughout this time
period; however, because a statistically projectable methodology was not
used for the selections, the 24 letters are not representative of all
complaints or inquiries (an unspecified total) that the Transportation
Security Administration received during this time period.

19According to its Web site ( www.nbta.org ), the National Business Travel
Association represents over 2,500 corporate travel managers and travel
service providers who collectively manage and direct more than $170
billion of expenditures within the business travel industry, primarily for
Fortune 1,000 companies. In June 2006, the association conducted a survey
of 1,316 corporate travel managers, and 444 responded to the survey. Of
the responding travel managers, 107 reported that they have employees who
repeatedly have had to go to the airline ticket counter to obtain a
boarding pass. (Accessed August 2006.)

20Department of Homeland Security, Report on Effects on Privacy & Civil
Liberties-DHS Privacy Office Report Assessing the Impact of the Automatic
Selectee and No Fly Lists on Privacy and Civil Liberties as Required under
Section 4012(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2006).

21As discussed in appendix I, besides conducting work at U.S. Customs and
Border Protection headquarters in Washington, D.C., we visited various
land and air ports of entry in four states-California, Michigan, New York,
and Texas. We judgmentally selected these four states because each has
major land and air ports of entry, and the states collectively have ports
of entry on both the northern and southern borders of the United States.

22As discussed in appendix I, U.S. Customs and Border Protection provided
us a selection of complaint letters submitted by 28 individuals. The dates
of the 28 complaint letters encompassed an 11-month period, ranging from
June 2005 to April 2006. The 28 letters were not selected based on a
statistically projectable methodology. Thus, the 28 letters are not
representative of the approximately 220 complaints or inquiries-regarding
watch-list-related secondary screening at ports of entry-that U.S. Customs
and Border Protection's Customer Satisfaction Unit received during the
11-month time period and forwarded for research to the agency's National
Targeting Center.

23The extended or additional processing time is not always a one-time
occurrence. In processing visa applications, consular posts may request
security advisory opinions for a variety of reasons. Thus, even though an
individual previously has been the subject of a security advisory opinion,
a new visa application may present facts and circumstances that lead the
consular post to request another security advisory opinion.

24Testimony of Mr. James W. McMahon, Director, Office of Public Security,
State of New York, at a hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary, and the
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism of the Select Committee
on Homeland Security, House of Representatives (Mar. 25, 2004).

25The response to the state or local law enforcement officer may be
provided by the Terrorist Screening Center or by the FBI's
Counterterrorism Division (Terrorist Screening Operations Unit), as
applicable.

26The working group's membership includes representatives from the
departments of Homeland Security (including Transportation Security
Administration and U.S. Customs and Border Protection), State, and
Defense; FBI; and the intelligence community (including the National
Counterterrorism Center, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security
Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency). Also, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology acts as a special advisor to the working group.

27Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the
Terrorist Screening Center, Audit Report 05-27 (June 2005).

28Although a purpose is to expedite frequently misidentified persons
through the screening process, the database-annotation initiative is not a
"redress" process as defined in this report. Under the initiative, the
agency is taking action proactively rather than responding to specific
complaints or redress queries submitted by individuals.

29In an earlier report, we assessed various biometric technologies. See,
GAO, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security,
GAO-03-174 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002).

30In July 2005, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced that US-VISIT
would be enhanced to collect 10-finger scans.

31U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation
and Inspection Division, Follow-up Review of the FBI's Progress Toward
Biometric Interoperability between IAFIS and IDENT (Washington, D.C.: July
2006).

32The Transportation Security Administration is authorized to "establish
requirements to implement trusted passenger programs and use available
technologies to expedite security screening of passengers who participate
in such programs, thereby allowing security screening personnel to focus
on those passengers who should be subject to more extensive screening."
See Pub. L. No. 107-71, S: 109(a)(3), 115 Stat. 597, 613 (2001).

33In the SENTRI program, for example, applicants must volunteer for (1) a
biographical background check against criminal, law enforcement, customs,
immigration, and terrorist databases; (2) a 10-fingerprint law enforcement
check; and (3) a personal interview with a U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officer.

34RFID is a wireless technology that stores and retrieves data remotely
from devices. For instance, the technology allows information to be
written to tags, which can be scanned or read from a distance. See, GAO,
Information Security: Radio Frequency Identification Technology in the
Federal Government, GAO-05-551 (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2005).

Figure 2: General Overview of the Terrorist Screening Center's Process for
Handling Concerns Involving Watch-List-Related Screening

Note: As a general overview, the figure does not reflect all ways that
complaints or concerns can be resolved. For instance, regarding clearance
difficulties experienced by an individual at a port of entry, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection may determine that the person was selected for
intensive screening based on information provided by another federal law
enforcement agency. If so, U.S. Customs and Border Protection may refer
the complainant's query to the applicable agency-which, in turn, would
reply directly to the individual.

The Terrorist Screening Center does not directly provide final disposition
letters to individuals who have submitted redress queries. Rather, the
center works with the frontline-screening agencies-and, as applicable, any
relevant intelligence or law enforcement agencies-to develop a written
response. In providing a final response to an individual who submits a
redress query, the frontline-screening agencies use a response letter that
neither confirms nor denies the existence of any terrorist watch list
records relating to the individual. For example, one of the Transportation
Security Administration's standardized response letters states, in part,
"Where it has been determined that a correction to records is warranted,
these records have been modified to address any delay or denial of
boarding that you may have experienced as a result of the watch list
screening process."

Generally, this type of language reflects the Terrorist Screening Center's
policy of neither confirming nor denying whether an individual is on the
consolidated terrorist watch list because this information is derived from
classified and sensitive law enforcement and intelligence sources. The
policy of nondisclosure to the public is intended to protect the
operational counterterrorism and intelligence collection objectives of the
government and the personal safety of those involved in counterterrorism
investigations.

The Terrorist Screening Center's Handling of Redress Referrals Has Resulted in
Removing the Names of Several Mistakenly Listed Persons from the Terrorist Watch
List

During calendar year 2005, the Terrorist Screening Center processed to
completion 112 redress queries referred by frontline-screening agencies.
Of this total, according to the Terrorist Screening Center, 31 were
determined to be mistakenly listed individuals and their names were
removed from the watch list (see table 1). The center reported that for
another 54 queries the individuals were on the terrorist watch list and
the center either did not change the watch list records (48) or made some
updates (6).

Table 1: Number and Disposition of Redress Queries Referred to the
Terrorist Screening Center, Calendar Year 2005

Disposition of redress query                                        Number 
Positive match: The name of the mistakenly listed person was               
removed from the watch list                                            31a
Positive match: No change to the watch list record was needed           48 
Positive match: The record was changed or updated but not removed          
from the watch list                                                      6
Misidentification: The redress query was referred back to the              
frontline- screening agency to process and provide a response to    
the individual                                                          19
Other: These queries involved issues not relevant to the terrorist         
watch list and should not have been referred to the Terrorist       
Screening Center                                                         8
Total                                                                  112 

Source: Terrorist Screening Center data.

aAccording to Terrorist Screening Center officials, the center was already
in the process of removing a few of these names before the center received
the respective redress queries. The officials explained that although the
names were properly included on the watch list initially, subsequent
events warranted removing the names.

Also, as table 1 indicates, 19 of the 112 referrals in calendar year 2005
involved misidentified persons-that is, the Terrorist Screening Center
determined that these individuals were not on the terrorist watch list but
have names similar to someone who is a known or suspected terrorist. The
center referred each of these queries back to the applicable frontline-
screening agency for processing under the respective agency's redress
procedures. These 19 misidentifications do not constitute the annual
universe of all redress queries involving misidentifications. Rather,
thousands of such queries from misidentified persons are handled by the
frontline-screening agencies and are not referred to the Terrorist
Screening Center.

To enhance public awareness of redress availability, the Web site of the
FBI-the Terrorist Screening Center's administering agency-presents an
overview of applicable policy and procedures, provides answers to
frequently asked questions, and gives contact information for three
frontline-screening agencies-the Transportation Security Administration,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the State Department. This
information is also presented in appendix II of this report.

Most Redress Queries Involve Misidentified Persons and Are Handled by
Frontline-Screening Agencies

Most redress queries involve misidentified rather than mistakenly listed
individuals. Therefore, inherently the disposition or resolution of a
redress query involving a misidentification cannot be removal of the
individual's name from a watch list because the individual is not the
person on the list. Instead, an objective of the frontline-screening
agencies is to address complaints of misidentified individuals by
providing alternative relief-that is, by developing procedures and having
sufficient information in screening databases to expedite the processing
of frequently misidentified persons.

Transportation Security Administration: For Individuals Who Are Frequently
Misidentified Due to Name Similarities with Known or Suspected Terrorists, the
Agency Has Compiled a Cleared List

The Transportation Security Administration has a contact center that
centrally receives nonmedia public inquiries and complaints. According to
the agency, the contact center's customer service representatives and
contact security specialists are trained to handle and analyze incoming
calls, e-mails, correspondence, and facsimiles from the public, the
Congress, and private industry. The functions of these representatives and
specialists, as specified in the contact center's operating procedures,
are to analyze letters and electronic messages, sort them by subject
matter, and confer with appropriate offices throughout the agency
(including field staff) to provide responses.

Generally, any inquiries and complaints regarding watch-list-related
screening-that is, screening against the No Fly and Selectee lists-are to
be handled by the agency's Office of Transportation Security Redress,
which was established in November 2004.35 As part of the redress process,
an individual can voluntarily provide additional personal-identifying
information to the Office of Transportation Security Redress.
Specifically, the individual can submit a completed Traveler Identity
Verification Form (reproduced in app. III), along with a copy of a U.S.
passport or copies of three types of other identification documents, such
as birth certificate, driver's license, military identification card,
military discharge paper, voter registration card, and naturalization
certificate or certificate of citizenship.36 Then, the agency will use
this information in deciding whether the person's name should be put on a
cleared list-which airlines are to use for distinguishing the individual
from persons who are in fact on the No Fly or Selectee lists.37 Along with
as-needed updates of the No Fly and Selectee lists, the Transportation
Security Administration transmits updated cleared list information to the
airlines for the purpose of enabling the airlines to more quickly
determine that these passengers are not the persons who are on the No Fly
and Selectee lists. The purpose of the cleared list is to mitigate or
minimize delays or other inconveniences by facilitating the check-in
process for passengers who have names similar to known or suspected
terrorists. An individual on the cleared list may still have to obtain a
boarding pass at the ticket counter rather than using Internet, curbside,
or airport kiosk check-in options. Nonetheless, the intent of the cleared
list is to reduce the delay or wait time for applicable air passengers in
obtaining a boarding pass at the ticket counter.

35Previously, the agency's Office of the Ombudsman handled all inquiries
and complaints, including those regarding watch-list-related screening.

36The Traveler Identity Verification Form (May 2006) replaced an earlier
form, the Passenger Identity Verification Form. Regarding the latter, the
Transportation Security Administration's instructions required the
submission of notarized copies of three identification documents.
Instructions for the new form do not require that the submitted documents
be notarized.

According to the Director of the Office of Transportation Security
Redress, over 30,000 individuals had submitted identify verification forms
and supporting documentation to the agency, as of December 2005, and the
names of the overwhelming majority of these individuals were added to the
cleared list. The director explained that although the agency requires air
carriers to use the cleared list, responsibility for utilizing the list
rests with the air carriers, and all carriers do not operate in the same
way or have equal capabilities. Further, according to the director, some
customers (air passengers) call and complain about having problems even
though they have taken the necessary steps to be placed on the cleared
list. The director said that his office forwards information regarding
these complaints to another component of the agency-the Office of
Transportation Sector Network Management-which is responsible for
contacting the respective air carriers to address relevant issues.

According to Transportation Security Administration officials, the Secure
Flight program is a prospective solution to current issues regarding
inconsistent use of the cleared list by air carriers-as well as any
inconsistent use of the No Fly and Selectee lists. Under the Secure Flight
program, the Transportation Security Administration plans to take over,
from commercial airlines, the responsibility for comparing identifying
information of airline passengers against information on known or
suspected terrorists.38 We note, however, that the Transportation Security
Administration has been in the process of developing a passenger
prescreening system, presently known as the Secure Flight program, for
more than 3 years. We have reported and the Transportation Security
Administration has acknowledged significant challenges in developing and
implementing the Secure Flight program.39 Earlier this year, the
Transportation Security Administration suspended Secure Flight's
development to reassess, or rebaseline, the program. The rebaselining
effort includes reassessing the program goals to be achieved, the expected
benefits and capabilities, and the estimated schedules and costs. As of
July 2006, the Transportation Security Administration had not publicly
announced any decisions regarding the future of the Secure Flight program,
although the agency anticipates that the rebaselining effort will be
completed by the end of September 2006.

37The cleared list procedure began in May 2003 under the agency's Office
of the Ombudsman.

  U.S. Customs and Border Protection Is Considering Realigning Its
  Watch-List-Related Redress Responsibilities and Is Updating Its Procedures

U.S. Customs and Border Protection headquarters has a Customer
Satisfaction Unit that functions as a centralized source for recording,
tracking, and reviewing all complaint information related to U.S. Customs
and Border Protection interactions with travelers, the general public,
industry, and government entities. This unit is responsible for responding
to customer complaints, irrespective of the subject matter-that is, the
unit focuses on all complaint topics, not just complaints involving
terrorist watch-list-related screening. For instance, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection routinely uses a comment card that allows travelers to
express any complaint regarding the port-of-entry processing experience.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection policy is to provide a comment card to
(1) all air and sea travelers who are subjected to a secondary examination
and (2) all air, land, and sea travelers who undergo a personal search.

38In March 2003, the Transportation Security Administration began
developing CAPPS II, a second-generation computer-assisted passenger
prescreening program, to provide improvements over CAPPS I and to screen
all passengers flying into, out of, and within the United States. CAPPS II
was to perform different analyses and access more diverse data, including
data from government and commercial databases, to classify passengers
according to their level of risk (i.e., acceptable risk, unknown risk, or
unacceptable risk), which would in turn be used to determine the level of
security screening each passenger would receive. Because of a variety of
challenges, the Department of Homeland Security cancelled the development
of CAPPS II in August 2004 and announced that a new prescreening program,
called Secure Flight, would be developed.

39GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the
Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight Program,
GAO-06-864T (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006).

In June 2006, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials explained that
the agency was actively considering ways to enhance the capability of the
Customer Satisfaction Unit to support redress efforts regarding terrorist
watch-list-related concerns or complaints. For instance, a realignment
being considered is to move the responsibility for handling certain
categories of complaints-those not involving terrorist watch list
screening-from the Customer Satisfaction Unit to the Office of Public
Affairs. Also, the officials further noted that the agency's Office of
Regulations and Rulings was updating the Customer Satisfaction Unit's
standard operating procedures, including redress procedures regarding
terrorist watch-list-related concerns or complaints.

Further, in commenting on a draft of this report in September 2006, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection officials said that the agency is working
with the Terrorist Screening Center to ensure that its process aligns with
the center's process. Also, another Department of Homeland Security
component-U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement-commented that its
Office of Intelligence serves as a point of contact and works closely with
the Terrorist Screening Center's redress team to ensure the removal or
modification of records, as appropriate, from the terrorist-screening
database and the Treasury Enforcement Communications System/Interagency
Border Inspection System. For instance, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement noted that if the Terrorist Screening Center determines that
an individual should no longer be listed in the terrorist-screening
database, the Office of Intelligence coordinates with U.S. Customs and
Border Protection to have the record expunged from the Treasury
Enforcement Communications System/Interagency Border Inspection System.

As part of our study, we reviewed the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Web site for the Terrorist Screening Center to determine what overview
information regarding watch-list-related redress was publicly available
(see app. II). In turn, from the FBI's overview Web site, we followed up
on any references or online links to the redress processes of key
frontline-screening agencies-the Transportation Security Administration
and U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

In contrast to the online link to the Transportation Security
Administration's redress guidance (see app. III), we found limited
usefulness in the online link to U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
redress guidance. The FBI's overview Web site lists the Customer
Satisfaction Unit as the redress-related contact point for U.S. Customs
and Border Protection. Also, the overview Web site provides an online link
to a fact sheet describing the Interagency Border Inspection System-a
system that provides U.S. Customs and Border Protection and other law
enforcement entities with access to computer-based information. However,
the fact sheet (reproduced in app. IV) has no specific guidance regarding
terrorist-watch-list-related redress. Rather, the fact sheet answers basic
questions regarding the Interagency Border Inspection System, such as who
uses the system and what information is in the system. Moreover, the
overview Web site provides no references or online links to U.S. Customs
and Border Protection's trusted-traveler programs-such as SENTRI and
NEXUS. As mentioned previously, agency officials told us that persons who
believe they are frequently misidentified with the terrorist watch list or
who continuously experience delays and other inconveniences during
screening could apply to one of these programs and, if accepted, receive
expedited processing at applicable ports of entry.

Based on our observations regarding the limited usefulness of the online
links from the FBI's overview Web site, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
officials acknowledged a need to coordinate with the FBI and the Terrorist
Screening Center to provide more appropriate online links regarding
redress guidance. The officials noted, for example, that U.S. Customs and
Border Protection's Web site does provide information regarding the
Customer Satisfaction Unit and how complaints are handled as well as
information on trusted-traveler programs.

  Department of State: Applicants Who Are Denied a Visa Have No Legal Basis to
  Appeal, but an Agency-Initiated Process Is Used to Remove Erroneous or
  Outdated Entries from the Consular Lookout and Support System

The term "redress," according to the State Department, is not applicable
to complaints about visa denials, which are final decisions not subject to
appeal or judicial review. However, the State Department has an
agency-initiated process for removing erroneous or outdated entries from
the Consular Lookout and Support System, which contains applicable
terrorist watch list records. As mentioned previously, the system is used
by consular officers abroad to screen the names of visa applicants to
identify terrorists and other aliens who are potentially ineligible for
visas based on criminal histories or other reasons specified by federal
statute. All visa-issuing posts have direct access to the system and are
required to use it to check each applicant's name before issuing a visa,
according to the State Department.

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, gives Department
of State consular officers at overseas posts exclusive authority for
adjudicating applications submitted by foreign citizens for visas to enter
the United States.40 The process for determining who will be issued or
refused a visa consists of several steps-including checking or
cross-referencing each applicant's name against the Consular Lookout and
Support System, which contains applicable names and biographical data
exported from the Terrorist Screening Center's database. According to the
State Department, no applicant is denied a visa simply because the
person's name appears in the Consular Lookout and Support System, which is
only a flag or tool to help the consular officer know if further screening
may be required. Rather, visa denials are by law based either on statutory
grounds of ineligibility, which are specifically set out in the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended,41 or on the applicant's
failure to present evidence to establish eligibility for the type of visa
requested. In addition to security and terrorism concerns, statutory
grounds of ineligibility include, for example, criminal history reasons,
previous violations of immigration law, and health-related grounds.

According to State Department instructions provided to consular offices
worldwide, visa denials are to be reviewed by the consular officer's
supervisor. If an error has been made or a question exists about
interpreting immigration law in reference to the facts surrounding the
applicant, the consular officer can request a legal advisory opinion.
Also, if there are misunderstandings about the application process,
individuals can correspond with the overseas consular section and the
Public Inquiries Division of the Visa Office in Washington, D.C.

However, federal courts have consistently held that a consular officer's
final decision to issue or deny a visa is not subject to a formal appeal
or to judicial review.42 That is, there is no way to directly appeal the
visa denial, nor is there a way to directly overturn the consular
officer's denial decision because it is not subject to judicial review.
Thus, in explaining why it would be incorrect and legally misleading to
use the term "redress" in reference to any complaint about a visa denial,
officials in the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs commented
that a visa refusal (denial) is a final decision in which the consular
officer makes a legal determination that the applicant is not eligible for
a visa based on a statutory ground. The State Department officials
reiterated that the consular officer's decision is a final governmental
adjudication, for which there is no appeal or judicial review, and the
only recourse for the person is to submit a new application with
sufficient information to "overcome" the grounds for ineligibility.

40Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 182 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. S:
1101, et seq.). However, obtaining a visa from an American consul does not
guarantee an alien's entry into the United States. Rather, a visa
authorizes the alien to arrive at a port of entry, at which point a U.S.
Customs and Border Protection officer will independently examine the
alien's eligibility for admission.

41See 8 U.S.C. S: 1182(a).

42Courts have long held that a consular officer's decision to grant or
deny a visa is not subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Saavedra Bruno
v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Centeno v. Schultz, 817 F.2d
1212 (5th Cir. 1987); Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800 F.2d 970
(9th Cir. 1986); Ventura-Escamilla v. I.N.S., 647 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1981);
Rivera de Gomez v. Kissinger, 534 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1976); U.S. ex rel.
Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929). See also, Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 752 (1972) (holding that courts may not look behind the
exercise of an official's discretionary authority to deny admission to an
alien).

Consular officers are required to provide each applicant an explanation of
the legal basis for denying the visa.43 However, if the basis for
ineligibility is terrorism-under section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, as amended44-the consular officer normally would not
be able to explain the reasons behind the denial because of national
security grounds.

According to Bureau of Consular Affairs officials, the State Department
does have an agency-initiated process for removing erroneous or outdated
information from the Consular Lookout and Support System. In explaining
why the correction-of-records process is initiated by the agency and not
the visa applicant, the officials commented substantially as follows:

           o  Visa applicants usually would not even know whether their names
           are on the terrorist watch list. If a visa application results in
           the overseas post's requesting a security advisory opinion and
           additional screening, the applicant might think that any
           processing delay is due to a record entry in the Consular Lookout
           and Support System. However, the additional screening could be due
           to reasons other than terrorism, such as a criminal record, a
           contagious disease, or simply an overstay on a previous visa.

           o  Thus, any deletion of entries from the Consular Lookout and
           Support System normally would be initiated by the consular officer
           in the field. That is, if the consular officer determines-based on
           evidence presented during the course of a visa application-that an
           entry in the Consular Lookout and Support System is incorrect or
           has been overtaken by events, the officer is to initiate action to
           have the entry deleted from the system.

           Also, the Bureau of Consular Affairs officials noted that there
           has been an occasional complaint that despite the issuance of a
           visa, the alien experienced difficulties at a U.S. port of entry
           because, for example, screening by U.S. Customs and Border
           Protection showed a potential match with a terrorist watch list
           record. Regarding these instances, the officials said that based
           on an interest in data integrity and customer service, the
           department works with the Terrorist Screening Center to review
           relevant records and determine an appropriate course of action,
           which could consist of a watch list message or annotation
           specifying that the alien is not a person on the watch list. In
           addition, as discussed previously, the State Department is taking
           steps to annotate its database when it screens individuals and
           finds that they are not on the watch list. Such annotations are
           intended to expedite visa processing in the future and limit the
           incidence of misidentifications.

           The Department of Justice Is Leading an Effort to Finalize an
			  Interagency Agreement to Help Ensure That Effective Redress Is
			  Available
			  
			  The Terrorist Screening Center and the frontline-screening
           agencies have interdependent responsibilities in providing redress
           for individuals who are inadvertently and adversely affected by
           watch list screening. The availability of redress is important for
           all affected persons, including persons who are misidentified
           because of name similarities and to persons who contend that they
           are mistakenly included on the terrorist watch list. For any given
           watch-list-related complaint or redress query, providing relief
           can necessitate interaction among several governmental agencies.
           For instance, if the query involves a person who is mistakenly
           listed, relevant redress participants could include the Terrorist
           Screening Center and a frontline-screening agency as well as the
           agency that originally submitted or nominated the person's name
           for inclusion in the consolidated terrorist watch list. Nominating
           agencies include the FBI and various agencies within the
           intelligence community, such as the Central Intelligence Agency,
           the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

           To help ensure that opportunities for terrorist-watch-list-related
           redress are implemented effectively, the Department of Justice is
           leading an effort-which has been ongoing since fall 2005-to
           develop and finalize an interagency memorandum of understanding.
           Key purposes of the final memorandum of understanding include
           ensuring that opportunities for redress are formally documented
           and that agency responsibilities are clear, with designated
           officials accountable for supporting the continued success of the
           processes. The Department of Justice has a lead role in developing
           the memorandum of understanding because the Terrorist Screening
           Center has primary responsibility for the consolidated
           terrorist-screening database. Interagency partners in the effort
           to develop the memorandum of understanding include the Department
           of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and the National
           Counterterrorism Center.

           Also, another entity involved in developing the memorandum of
           understanding is the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
           which is part of the Executive Office of the President and
           consists of five members appointed by the president.45 According
           to the board's executive director, the terrorist watch list
           redress process is a top priority for the board. The executive
           director noted that since June 2006 board staff have attended all
           meetings of the interagency partners engaged in developing the
           memorandum of understanding. This official opined that the board's
           participation has helped reprioritize this matter among the
           constituent agencies and that the board is committed to continuing
           its involvement.

           According to Department of Justice officials, a final draft of the
           memorandum of understanding is expected to be ready for
           interagency clearances by fall 2006. Terrorist Screening Center
           officials emphasized that the interagency memorandum of
           understanding was definitely needed, particularly as a mechanism
           for ensuring the accuracy of the watch list. The center officials
           noted, for instance, that there have been disagreements at times
           between agencies over nominations to the watch list. Thus, in
           handling watch-list-related complaints, the center officials
           explained that the interagency memorandum of understanding could
           help by clearly outlining a process for coordinating with the
           National Counterterrorism Center and nominating agencies to
           validate the accuracy and appropriateness of watch list records.

           Moreover, the Terrorist Screening Center officials explained that
           the interagency memorandum of understanding could help resolve
           significant watch-list-related redress differences among the
           frontline-screening agencies. Examples regarding Department of
           Homeland Security components are as follows:

           o  The Transportation Security Administration has an office
           specifically designated for redress issues, with an accountable
           official-the Director, Office of Transportation Security Redress.
           Also, the office has followed consistent procedures in referring
           appropriate watch-list-related complaints to the Terrorist
           Screening Center.

           o  In contrast, U.S. Customs and Border Protection does not have a
           clearly designated official accountable for redress, and the
           agency has not always followed consistent procedures in referring
           appropriate watch-list-related complaints to the Terrorist
           Screening Center.

           Additionally, regarding the State Department, the Terrorist
           Screening Center officials stressed the importance of having
           clearly established procedures and responsibilities. The center
           officials noted that even though the State Department's
           operational context is somewhat different than that of other
           frontline-screening agencies, the department nonetheless has a
           substantial volume of interactions with the Terrorist Screening
           Center. State Department Bureau of Consular Affairs officials
           acknowledged to us the value of having an interagency memorandum
           of understanding that specifies standard operating procedures for
           redress and designates points of contact. In this regard, the
           State Department officials commented that they have been
           participating in meetings with the Terrorist Screening Center and
           other interagency partners to discuss the proposed memorandum of
           understanding. According to the officials, a benefit to the State
           Department expected from the interagency agreement would be
           clearly established and coordinated procedures for removing-from
           the department's Consular Lookout and Support System and the
           Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated watch list-any name that
           is mistakenly listed or has been overtaken by subsequent events.

           Concluding Observations
			  
			  Homeland security measures affect all travelers to some extent.
           Thus, it may be argued that travel delays and other
           inconveniencies resulting from terrorist watch-list-related
           screening can be viewed as regrettable but inevitable consequences
           of enhanced security. However, name-based screening and its
           inherent limitations-even full names, in most cases, are hardly
           unique identifiers-may result in disproportionate impact on
           individuals who repeatedly are singled out for additional
           screening for no other reason than the similarity of their names
           to someone on the watch list.

           The Terrorist Screening Center and its interagency partners are
           undertaking a number of efforts, including data-quality
           initiatives, to reduce the occurrence and/or impact of watch list
           screening on U.S. citizens and visitors who do not necessarily
           merit additional scrutiny and the associated inconveniences. A
           continuing challenge for the center will be ensuring that the
           consolidated watch list contains accurate data, particularly given
           that the database is dynamic, changing frequently with additions,
           deletions, and modifications. The efforts of an interagency
           working group to improve the effectiveness of name-matching
           computer algorithms may offer some promise for reducing the number
           of people who experience unintended, adverse effects. However, any
           policy trade-off considerations regarding use of algorithms likely
           will favor ensuring homeland security over minimizing
           inconveniences to travelers. Regarding future operations, the
           Terrorist Screening Center is actively considering approaches for
           using biometric data to supplement name-based searches, although
           the availability of appropriate technology is an issue that has
           long confronted the interagency screening community.

           In any event, despite the best efforts of the interagency
           community to maintain a fully accurate watch list and to conduct
           screening efficiently, there likely will be continuing unintended
           consequences. Thus, it is appropriate for the Terrorist Screening
           Center and its interagency partners to continue their efforts to
           provide effective redress for both mistakenly listed persons and
           misidentified persons. Indeed, redress queries have already
           resulted in the removal of several mistakenly listed names from
           the watch list. Comparatively, however, the issue of redress
           arises more commonly regarding the thousands of persons who are
           not on the watch list but are misidentified and adversely affected
           because of a name similarity. Whether appropriate relief is being
           afforded these individuals is still an open question, for several
           reasons. For example, although a core element of the redress
           provided by the Transportation Security Administration is the
           maintenance of a cleared list, there are some indications that the
           cleared list is not working as intended to reduce delays for air
           passengers in obtaining boarding passes. Prospectively, the
           Transportation Security Administration expects that development
           and implementation of the Secure Flight program will help ensure
           consistent and effective use of the cleared list among air
           carriers, although the agency has not publicly disclosed its
           future plans for the program.

           Another frontline-screening agency's initiative, U.S. Customs and
           Border Protection's database-annotation initiative, may prove to
           be an even more efficient approach for assisting frequently
           misidentified individuals. Unlike the Transportation Security
           Administration's cleared list procedures, the U.S. Customs and
           Border Protection's initiative is based on records in the agency's
           database and does not necessitate any filing of forms and other
           documentation by travelers. At the time of our review, U.S.
           Customs and Border Protection was planning to develop a capability
           to monitor the effectiveness of the initiative. This planning
           effort is particularly important, given that the initiative may
           eventually prove to be a model for a proactive solution if it
           functions as intended.

           Finally, an overarching factor regarding whether appropriate
           relief is being afforded to persons inadvertently and adversely
           affected by terrorist watch-list-related screening is the absence
           of an interagency agreement to help ensure that, among other
           matters, redress procedures and responsibilities are clearly
           documented and implemented effectively. The Terrorist Screening
           Center and its interagency partners are working to address this
           fundamental deficiency and have indicated their intent to provide
           the public with updated information on the availability of
           redress, after finalization of an agreement.

           We are not making recommendations at this time because the
           agencies have ongoing efforts to improve data quality and
           otherwise either reduce the number of misidentifications or
           mitigate their effects and to provide more effective redress.

           Agency Comments
			  
			  We provided a draft of this report for comments to the departments
           of Homeland Security, State, and Justice. We received written
           responses from each agency.

           In its response, the Department of Homeland Security acknowledged
           that it currently is undertaking actions to enhance
           terrorist-screening and redress efforts. Also, the response noted
           that in January 2006, the departments of State and Homeland
           Security announced an initiative on "Secure Borders and Open Doors
           in the Information Age," otherwise known as the Rice-Chertoff
           Initiative. One purpose of the initiative is to establish a
           governmentwide redress process to address perceived problems in
           international and domestic traveler prescreening. According to the
           Department of Homeland Security, a goal is to establish a one-stop
           redress process for travelers by the end of calendar year 2006.
           The department explained that this initiative, which will
           supplement terrorist watch-list-related redress, focuses on a
           larger set of travel-screening redress issues. The full text of
           the Department of Homeland Security's written comments is
           reprinted in appendix V. The department also provided technical
           comments, which we incorporated in this report where appropriate.

           The Department of State commented that the report accurately
           describes the visa process and the department's position that the
           administrative processing time required to screen a visa
           applicant-including, if required, the processing of a security
           advisory opinion review-is a necessary part of the visa
           application procedure rather than an adverse governmental action.
           Also, the department noted that-in its use of the terrorist watch
           list as a screening tool for visa adjudication-a
           "misidentification" is not an adverse result for the visa
           applicant. Rather, according to the department, this type of
           response helps to determine that the visa applicant is not
           associated with terrorism. In its written response, the department
           also provided a technical comment regarding the security advisory
           opinion process, which we incorporated in this report where
           appropriate. The full text of the Department of State's written
           comments is reprinted in appendix VI.

           The Department of Justice provided technical comments only, which
           we incorporated in this report where appropriate.

           As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
           contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution
           until 30 days after the date of this report. At that time, we will
           send copies of this report to interested congressional committees
           and subcommittees. We will also make copies available to others on
           request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge
           on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov .

           If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish
           to discuss the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777
           or [email protected] . Contact points for our Offices of
           Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
           last page of this report. Other key contributors to this report
           were Ronald J. Salo, Eric W. Clemons, R. Eric Erdman, Susan L.
           Conlon, Michele C. Fejfar, Kathryn E. Godfrey, Richard B. Hung,
           Thomas F. Lombardi, Jan B. Montgomery, and Danny R. Burton.

           Eileen Larence Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

           Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
			  
			  Objectives
			  
			  In response to a request from the Chairman of the House Judiciary
           Committee and the Ranking Member of the House Committee on
           Homeland Security, we addressed the following questions:

           o  To what extent are the numbers of terrorist watch list
           misidentifications known, and generally, how could misidentified
           persons be affected?1

           o  What are the major reasons that misidentifications occur, and
           what actions are the Terrorist Screening Center and
           frontline-screening agencies taking to reduce the number of
           misidentified persons or expedite them through the screening
           process?

           o  To address concerns from misidentified and mistakenly listed
           persons, what opportunities for redress have the Terrorist
           Screening Center and frontline-screening agencies established?2

           Scope and Methodology
			  
			  Our work generally focused on the screening of travelers, although
           the terrorist watch list is used for a variety of other screening
           purposes, such as conducting background checks of workers who have
           access to secure areas of the national transportation system. In
           performing our work, we focused on the Terrorist Screening Center
           and three frontline-screening agencies-the Transportation Security
           Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the
           Department of State-whose missions most frequently and directly
           involve interactions with travelers. At the Terrorist Screening
           Center, we interviewed key officials-including the director,
           principal deputy director, chief information officer, and privacy
           officer-and reviewed standard operating procedures and other
           relevant documentation.

           Regarding the screening of air passengers against the No Fly and
           Selectee lists prior to boarding, in addition to contacting the
           Transportation Security Administration to broadly discuss the
           procedures of air carriers, we interviewed security officials at
           five major, domestic air carriers. At their request, the air
           carriers are not identified in this report. Regarding U.S. Customs
           and Border Protection's screening of travelers entering the United
           States, besides conducting work at the agency's headquarters in
           Washington, D.C., we visited various land and air ports of entry
           in four states-California, Michigan, New York, and Texas (see
           table 2). We judgmentally selected these four states because each
           has major land and air ports of entry. Also, the four states are
           geographically dispersed and collectively have ports of entry on
           both the northern and southern borders of the United States.

           Table 2: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Ports of Entry Visited
           by GAO
			  
			  State      Land ports of entry Air ports of entry                      
California San Ysidro          Los Angeles International Airport       
Michigan   Detroit Port Huron  Detroit Metropolitan Airport            
New York   Niagara Falls       John F. Kennedy International Airport   
Texas      Laredo              Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport 

           Source: GAO.

           Regarding the State Department, we focused on screening of
           applicants for nonimmigrant visas.3 We performed our work at State
           Department headquarters in Washington, D.C, and did not visit
           consular offices abroad.

           More details about the scope and methodology of our work regarding
           each of the objectives are presented in the following sections,
           respectively.

           Extent That the Numbers of Terrorist Watch List Misidentifications
			  Are Known, and Generally, How Misidentified Persons Could Be Affected
			  
			  From the Terrorist Screening Center, we obtained statistical
           information on misidentifications covering a 26-month time
           period-December 2003 (when the center began operations) to January
           2006. These statistics are based on screening encounters that were
           referred for identity verification to the center by the
           frontline-screening agencies, particularly U.S. Customs and Border
           Protection, which conducts screening at ports of entry, and the
           Transportation Security Administration, which provides guidance to
           air carriers, receives encounter inquiries from them, and makes
           applicable referrals to the center. Frontline-screening agencies
           are able to resolve some misidentifications on their own without
           having to refer them to the center. Similarly, in following
           federal guidance, airlines may also resolve some
           misidentifications without involving the Transportation Security
           Administration or necessitating subsequent referrals to the
           Terrorist Screening Center. However, the agencies and airlines
           generally do not maintain readily available statistics on how
           often they do so. Thus, we were unable to quantify the universe of
           terrorist watch-list-related misidentifications. However, to
           provide a contextual perspective, we obtained national statistics
           on the numbers of persons who were subject to terrorist watch list
           screening procedures conducted, for example, in fiscal year 2005
           at ports of entry.

           To determine how misidentified persons could be affected, we
           interviewed officials at the principal frontline-screening
           agencies-the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs
           and Border Protection, and the Department of State-whose missions
           most frequently and directly involve interactions with travelers.
           Also, as indicated in table 2, we made on-site observations of
           U.S. Customs and Border Protection screening operations at various
           ports of entry in California, Michigan, New York, and Texas. Our
           observations at these locations helped us better understand how
           the name-match screening process can affect misidentified persons,
           but these observations are not projectable to other locations.

           To obtain additional information on ways that misidentified
           individuals could be affected by terrorist-watch-list-related
           screening, we asked the Transportation Security Administration and
           U.S. Customs and Border Protection to provide us examples of
           actual complaint letters to review:

           o  The Transportation Security Administration provided us a
           selection of 24 terrorist watch-list-related complaint letters
           that the agency received during December 1, 2003 (when the
           Terrorist Screening Center became operational) to April 20, 2006.
           The agency attempted to select letters from different weeks
           throughout this time period; however, because a statistically
           projectable methodology was not used for the selections, the 24
           letters are not representative of all complaints or inquiries (an
           unspecified total) that the Transportation Security Administration
           received during this time period.

           o  U.S. Customs and Border Protection's National Targeting Center
           provided us a selection of complaint letters submitted by 28
           individuals. The dates of the 28 complaint letters encompassed an
           11-month period, ranging from June 2005 to April 2006. The 28
           letters were not selected based on a statistically projectable
           methodology. Thus, the 28 letters are not representative of all
           complaints or inquiries-regarding watch-list-related secondary
           screening at ports of entry-that U.S. Customs and Border
           Protection's Customer Satisfaction Unit received during the
           11-month time period and forwarded for research to the agency's
           National Targeting Center.4

           The scope of our work did not include contacting or interviewing
           any of the individuals who submitted complaint letters to the
           Transportation Security Administration or U.S. Customs and Border
           Protection.

           To further identify ways that misidentified persons could be
           affected by watch-list-related screening, we contacted various
           associations that represent air carriers, travel agencies, and
           business travelers. Specifically, we contacted (1) the Air
           Transport Association, a trade organization of the principal U.S.
           airlines; (2) the American Society of Travel Agents; and (3) the
           National Business Travel Association, which represents corporate
           travel management professionals and the travel industry.

           Also, we reviewed the results of a survey that the National
           Business Travel Association conducted in June 2006. According to
           its Web site ( www.nbta.org ), the association represents over
           2,500 corporate travel managers and travel service providers who
           collectively manage and direct more than $170 billion of
           expenditures within the business travel industry, primarily for
           Fortune 1,000 companies. In June 2006, the association conducted a
           survey of 1,316 corporate travel managers; the survey posed a
           range of questions that addressed how terrorist watch list
           screening by the Transportation Security Administration and air
           carriers affected travelers. A total of 444 corporate travel
           managers responded to the survey. The responses may not be
           representative of all of the association's corporate travel
           managers.

           Major Reasons That Misidentifications Occur, and Actions the
			  Terrorist Screening Center and Frontline-Screening Agencies Are
			  Taking to Reduce the Number of Misidentified Persons or Expedite
			  Them through the Screening Process
			  
			  Major Reasons That Misidentifications Occur
			  
			  Regarding why misidentifications occur, our work focused on
           interviewing officials at and reviewing documentation obtained
           from the Terrorist Screening Center and three frontline-screening
           agencies-the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs
           and Border Protection, and the Department of State. We also
           interviewed security officers at five major domestic air carriers
           about their role in name-match screening against the No Fly and
           Selectee lists and obtained their views on the causes of
           misidentifications. Further, we reviewed the work of two groups
           regarding factors they have identified that contribute to
           misidentifications-the Terrorist Screening Center's Search Engine
           Standardization Working Group5 and the Department of Homeland
           Security's Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee.6

           Actions to Reduce the Number of Misidentified Persons or Expedite
			  Them through the Screening Process
			  
			  At the Terrorist Screening Center, we interviewed the director,
           principal deputy director, chief information officer, and other
           senior managers and staff regarding data-quality initiatives,
           including efforts to identify and correct troublesome records
           related to misidentifications. Additionally, we inquired about the
           status of the center's efforts to implement recommendations made
           by the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General in
           its June 2005 report.7 Among other things, the Inspector General
           recommended that the Terrorist Screening Center develop procedures
           to regularly review and test the information contained in the
           consolidated terrorist watch list to ensure that the data are
           complete, accurate, and nonduplicative.

           At the three frontline-screening agencies, we interviewed
           applicable program managers regarding initiatives being taken to
           expedite frequently misidentified persons through the screening
           process. We inquired particularly about any computer-based
           initiatives that use applicable databases to help ensure that
           travelers who have been frequently misidentified in the past are
           no longer subjected to intensive screening, unless warranted by
           new data.

           In further reference to potential initiatives for minimizing
           misidentifications as well as better confirming the identities of
           terrorists, we reviewed the Terrorist Screening Center's strategic
           plan and discussed with center officials the outlook for using
           biometric data-such as fingerprints-to supplement name-based
           screening. Similarly, in our interviews with officials of the
           frontline-screening agencies, we discussed programs that currently
           use biometric data, such as the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status
           Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program, which is an entry-exit
           tracking system designed to collect, maintain, and share
           information on selected foreign nationals who travel to the United
           States.

           Redress Opportunities Established by the Terrorist Screening Center
			  and Frontline-Screening Agencies to Address Concerns from
			  Misidentified and Mistakenly Listed Persons
			  
			  As used in this report, the term "redress" generally refers to an
           agency's complaint-resolution process, whereby individuals may
           seek resolution of their concerns about an agency action. We
           identified elements of the opportunities for redress offered by
           the Terrorist Screening Center and the three frontline-screening
           agencies, and we generally analyzed their respective policies and
           procedures. However, we did not address the relation between
           agency redress and other possible remedies, such as judicial
           review, which involves invoking the legal system through a civil
           action. Rather, the scope of our work focused on means for redress
           made available by agencies for inconvenienced persons.

           We reviewed the Terrorist Screening Center's standard operating
           procedures for redress and interviewed the center official
           (privacy officer) principally responsible for watch-list-related
           redress. Also, we obtained and reviewed statistics and general
           disposition or outcome information regarding redress queries that
           the center received and processed to completion in calendar year
           2005.8

           Further, at the three frontline-screening agencies, we reviewed
           redress-related documentation, including standard operating
           procedures and training materials, and we interviewed the
           officials responsible for redress. Specifically, we interviewed
           the Director of the Transportation Security Administration's
           Office of Transportation Security Redress, the head of U.S.
           Customs and Border Protection's Customer Satisfaction Unit, and
           program managers at the State Department's Bureau of Consular
           Affairs responsible for processing nonimmigrant visa applications.

           Also, to generally determine what watch-list-related redress
           information was publicly available, we reviewed the Federal Bureau
           of Investigation's Web site for the Terrorist Screening Center. In
           turn, from that overview Web site (see app. II), we followed up on
           any online links or references to the redress processes of the
           Transportation Security Administration (see app. III), U.S.
           Customs and Border Protection (see app. IV), and the State
           Department.

           In addition, we contacted the Department of Justice's Office of
           Legal Policy, which has a lead role in ongoing efforts to develop
           an interagency memorandum of understanding to help ensure that
           redress processes are formally documented, with clearly
           established responsibilities for the Terrorist Screening Center
           and all interagency partners. Also, we contacted the executive
           director of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to
           discuss its role in facilitating development of the interagency
           memorandum of understanding.9 However, because the memorandum of
           understanding was in draft form at the time of our study, we have
           not had an opportunity to review it.

           Data Reliability
			  
			  In addressing our objectives, we obtained the following statistics
           from the Terrorist Screening Center:

                        o  The number of watch-list-related screening
                        encounters referred to the center by
                        frontline-screening agencies during the period
                        December 2003 to January 2006.

                        o  The number and general dispositions of redress
                        queries that the center received and processed to
                        completion in calendar year 2005.

           We discussed the sources of the data with Terrorist Screening
           Center officials, including the chief information officer, and we
           reviewed documentation regarding the compilation of the
           statistics. We determined that the statistics were sufficiently
           reliable for the purposes of presenting overall patterns and
           trends.

           Appendix II: Terrorist Screening Center: Terrorist-Watch-List
			  Redress Process
			  
			  This appendix, which consists of two sections, presents publicly
           available information that we copied from the Web site of the
           Federal Bureau of Investigation:

           o  The first section of the appendix is an overview of the
           Terrorist Screening Center's watch-list-related redress process
           and also presents contact information for three
           frontline-screening agencies-the Transportation Security
           Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the
           Department of State.

           o  The second section covers frequently asked questions.

           Overview and Contact Information [Copied from the FBI's Web site,
           www.fbi.gov . Accessed August 2006.]

           "The Terrorist Screening Center cannot confirm or deny whether an
           individual is on the consolidated terrorist watch list, because
           this information is derived from classified and sensitive law
           enforcement and intelligence. The nondisclosure of the contents of
           the watch list protects the operational counterterrorism and
           intelligence collection objectives of the government, as well as
           the personal safety of those involved in counterterrorism
           investigations. The watch list remains an effective tool in the
           government's counterterrorism efforts because its contents are not
           disclosed.

           "The Terrorist Screening Center works with other agencies on a
           daily basis to resolve complaints from individuals who are
           experiencing repeated delays or difficulties during a screening
           process that may be related to the terrorist watch list. Because
           individuals may experience problems during screening for any
           number of reasons, and not just because of the terrorist watch
           list, individuals should contact the agency that is conducting the
           screening process in question. The screening agency is in the best
           position to resolve issues.

           "Contact information:

           "The Terrorist Screening Center does not accept redress inquiries
           directly from the public. Members of the public should contact the
           relevant screening agency with complaints about a negative
           screening experience.

           "Please direct the public to contact the following screening
           agencies to submit a complaint about a negative screening
           experience.

           For air passenger screening:

           Transportation Security Administration Ombudsman Phone: (866)
           289-9673 Email: [email protected] Online: TSA Traveler
           Identity Verification Program1

           For U.S. borders and ports of entry:

           Customs and Border Protection Customer Satisfaction Unit2 1300
           Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Room 5.5C Washington, DC 20229 Phone: (202)
           344-1968 Fax: (202) 344-2791 Online: Interagency Border Inspection
           System Fact Sheet 3

           For visas:

           Director, Information Management Liaison (CA/VO/I) Bureau of
           Consular Affairs, SA-1 U.S. Department of State Washington, D.C.
           20520 FAX: (202) 663-3535 Online: Bureau of Consular Affairs"

           "Frequently Asked Questions" [Copied from the FBI's Web site,
           www.fbi.gov . Accessed August 2006.]

           "Why was the Terrorist Screening Database created?

           Prior to the creation of the terrorist-screening database,
           information about known or suspected terrorists was dispersed
           throughout the U.S. government and no one agency was charged with
           consolidating it and making it available for use in terrorist
           screening. Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6, the
           Terrorist Screening Center now provides "one-stop shopping" so
           that every government screener is using the same terrorist watch
           list-whether it is an airport screener, an embassy official
           issuing visas overseas, or a state or local law enforcement
           officer on the street. The Terrorist Screening Center allows
           government agencies to run name checks against the same
           comprehensive list with the most accurate, up-to-date information
           about known and suspected terrorists.

           Who gets included in the terrorist-screening database?

           Per Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6, only individuals
           who are known or appropriately suspected to be or have been
           engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or
           related to terrorism are included in the terrorist-screening
           database.

           Does the terrorist screening database contain information on
           domestic terrorists, like Timothy McVeigh?

           Yes. The terrorist-screening database contains information on both
           international and domestic terrorists.

           Does the terrorist-screening database contain information on
           people who have been convicted of a crime?

           The purpose of the terrorist-screening database is not to hold
           information on individuals who have been convicted of a crime;
           however, an individual appropriately included in the
           terrorist-screening database may also have a criminal history.
           None of the information pertaining to the criminal history is
           contained or referenced in the terrorist-screening database.

           Are there U.S. citizens in the terrorist-screening database?

           Yes, U.S. citizens are included in terrorist-screening database if
           they meet the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 terrorism
           nexus criteria.

           Can I find out if I am in the terrorism screening database?

           The Terrorist Screening Center cannot reveal whether a particular
           person is in the terrorist-screening database. The
           terrorist-screening database remains an effective tool in the
           government's counterterrorism efforts because its contents are not
           disclosed. If the Terrorist Screening Center revealed who was in
           the terrorist-screening database, terrorist organizations would be
           able to circumvent the purpose of the terrorist watch list by
           determining in advance which of their members are likely to be
           questioned or detained.

           I am having trouble when I try to fly or cross the border into the
           United States. Does this mean I am in the terrorist-screening
           database?

           No. At security checkpoints like our nation's borders, there are
           many law enforcement or security reasons that an individual may be
           singled out for additional screening. Most agencies have redress
           offices (e.g., Ombudsman) where individuals who are experiencing
           repeated problems can seek help. If an individual is experiencing
           these kinds of difficulties, he/she should cooperate with the
           agency screeners and explain the recurring problems. The screeners
           can supply instructions on how to raise concerns to the
           appropriate agency redress office.

           I have been told that I am on a terrorist watch list by an airline
           employee and I frequently have difficulty when I fly. Does this
           mean I am in the terrorist-screening database?

           No; however, an individual may be a "misidentified person." A
           misidentified person is someone who is experiencing a delay during
           screening because they have a similar name to a person in the
           terrorist-screening database. Misidentified persons are sometimes
           delayed while the government works to distinguish them from the
           terrorist in the terrorist-screening database. Because these
           delays are frustrating and inconvenient, there are several
           initiatives in progress to help streamline the clearance process
           for misidentified persons. If an individual believes he/she is
           having a misidentification problem, he/she should contact the
           screening agency's redress office for assistance.

           Are individuals removed from the terrorist-screening database?

           Yes. The Terrorist Screening Center works with partner agencies
           through a formal process to remove individuals who no longer meet
           the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 terrorism criteria.

           How does the Terrorist Screening Center ensure that the terrorist-
           screening database is accurate?

           The Terrorist Screening Center has a staff dedicated to redress
           and quality assurance that conducts comprehensive as well as
           case-specific reviews of terrorist-screening database records to
           ensure they are current, accurate, and thorough. The Terrorist
           Screening Center conducts research and coordinates with other
           federal agencies to ensure the terrorist record is as complete,
           accurate, and thorough as possible. The Terrorist Screening
           Center's redress and quality assurance process has resulted in the
           correction or removal of hundreds of records in the
           terrorist-screening database.

           What are the Terrorist Screening Center's redress procedures?

           See the TSC Redress Procedures webpage for details. [GAO note: The
           procedures are copied in the first section of this appendix.]

           Does the Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight
           program have anything to do with the terrorist-screening database?

           Secure Flight is a congressionally mandated program that will
           check the names and dates of birth of passengers on domestic
           flights against the terrorist-screening database. As with all
           government programs that screen for terrorists, the Terrorist
           Screening Center provides this program support to ensure that
           terrorist identity matches are correct.

           What prevents the Terrorist Screening Center from violating the
           civil liberties of Americans?

           The Terrorist Screening Center only receives information collected
           by other government entities with pre-existing authority to do so.
           Each agency that contributes data to the Terrorist Screening
           Center must comply with legislation, as well as its own policies
           and procedures to protect privacy rights and civil liberties. The
           handling and use of information, including information about U.S.
           citizens and legal immigrants, is governed by the same statutory,
           regulatory, and constitutional requirements as if the information
           was not to be included in a Terrorist Screening Center managed
           database."

           Appendix III: Transportation Security Administration: Traveler
			  Identity Verification Program
			  
			  This appendix presents an overview of the Transportation Security
           Administration's (TSA) traveler identify verification program for
           air passengers who are affected by terrorist watch list screening.
           An individual can voluntarily provide TSA with additional
           personal-identifying information, which the agency will use to
           decide whether the person's name should be put on a cleared
           list-that is, a list that contains the names and other
           personal-identifying information of individuals who have been
           checked and cleared as being persons not on the No Fly and
           Selectee lists. Airlines are to use the cleared list to more
           quickly determine that these passengers are not the persons whose
           names are on the No Fly and Selectee lists. As needed, TSA
           provides the airlines with updates of the No Fly and Selectee
           lists and the cleared list.

           Specific information about TSA's traveler identity verification
           program is publicly available on the agency's Web site (
           www.tsa.gov ). The following sections of this appendix
           reproduce-as exhibits A and B-relevant information from TSA's Web
           site (accessed August 2006):

           o  Exhibit A: Our Traveler Identity Verification Program.
           o  Exhibit B: Traveler Identity Verification (TSA Form 2301, May
           2006).

           Generally, to participate in the program, an individual must
           complete a traveler identity verification form and return the form
           and copies of specified identity documents to TSA.

           Exhibit A: ï¿½Our Traveler Identity Verification Programï¿½
			  
			  "Told that you are on a Federal Government Watch List?

           Problems printing your boarding pass at the kiosk or from home?

           Experience other delays while checking-in for flights?

           Our Office of Transportation Security Redress is here to help with
           our new Traveler Identity Verification Program.

           Why am I having these problems?

           TSA and the airlines are required to check and confirm that you
           are properly identified prior to your flight for safety and
           security. You may experience inconveniences when you present your
           identification during check-in due to mistaken identity or
           incorrect information. Our Traveler Identity Verification Program
           works with the relevant parties (including airlines) to resolve
           any inaccuracies or inconsistencies that may have resulted in
           misidentifications.

           Am I on the No-Fly List?!

           If you receive a boarding pass, you are not on the No-Fly List.
           Most commonly, passengers who are told that they are on the No-Fly
           List have, in fact, a similar name to an individual on the Watch
           Lists.

           What do I need to do?

           You are invited to participate in the TSA Traveler Identity
           Verification Program by completing and returning the following
           information to TSA:

           o  Traveler Identity Verification Form (WORD 145 KB)
           o  A copy of your U.S. passport OR
           o  Copies of three of the following:

                        o  Driver's License
                        o  Birth Certificate
                        o  Voter Registration
                        o  Military ID Card
                        o  Visa
                        o  Naturalization Card
                        o  Government ID Card

           How does TSA review my information?

           Your submission is reviewed to determine if the delays are caused
           by mistaken identity or incorrect information. TSA will respond to
           you in writing and provide air carriers with your identifying
           information to help properly identify you at check-in and expedite
           your future travel.

           I participated in the Traveler Identity Verification Program, but
           I'm still experiencing problems.

           Airline check-in procedures must still be followed. We currently
           distribute the Watch Lists to the airlines, who compare your
           reservation information to the Watch Lists prior to your flight.
           The airlines use varying procedures and technology to conduct this
           comparison, which could inadvertently lead to continued delays.

           We are developing a program called Secure Flight to enhance the
           security of air travel in the U.S. while reducing security-related
           delays for the traveling public. It will allow the federal
           government, instead of individual airlines, to compare passenger
           data against the Watch Lists prior to check-in at the airport,
           while fully protecting privacy and civil liberties.

           Our goal going forward is to ensure travelers' security with
           minimal disruptions.

           Please note that you will be subject to screening procedures at
           the checkpoint. Every passenger will still walk through a metal
           detector, their carry-on bags will still be X-rayed, and every
           checked bag will still be screened for explosives. Additionally,
           you may be randomly selected at the airline counter or upon
           arrival at the checkpoint for secondary screening.

           Exhibit B: Traveler Identity Verification (TSA Form 2301, 
			  May 2006)
			  
			  We will continue to work with travelers to minimize any
           unnecessary delays. We will continue to look at process and
           technology improvements to ensure a safe and efficient travel
           experience."

           Appendix IV: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Online
			  Information
			  
			  Background and Preliminary Observation
			  
			  Appendix II provides an overview of the redress process used by
           the Terrorist Screening Center for addressing complaints or
           concerns resulting from the use of terrorist watch lists to screen
           individuals. As stated in appendix II, the Terrorist Screening
           Center is to work with frontline-screening agencies to resolve
           complaints from individuals who are experiencing repeated delays
           or difficulties during a screening process that may be related to
           a terrorist watch list. For instance, the Terrorist Screening
           Center's overview guidance notes that complainants experiencing
           such problems at U.S. borders and ports of entry should contact
           U.S. Customs and Border Protection. In further reference to the
           redress process for misidentifications of these individuals, the
           overview guidance provides an online link to the U.S. Customs and
           Border Protection's Interagency Border Inspection System Fact
           Sheet (reproduced below). The fact sheet does not specifically
           mention terrorist watch lists and the redress process.

           However, U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Web site (
           www.cbp.gov ), which can be directly accessed by the public, does
           provide information regarding the agency's Customer Satisfaction
           Unit and how complaints are handled as well as information on
           trusted-traveler programs.

           Interagency Border Inspection System Fact Sheet
			  
			  GAO note: The fact sheet consists solely of the following six
           questions and answers, which we copied from the Web site of U.S.
           Customs and Border Protection (accessed August 2006).

           ï¿½What Is IBIS?ï¿½
			  
			  "IBIS is the acronym for the Interagency Border Inspection
           System."

           ï¿½Who Uses IBIS?ï¿½
			  
			  "In addition to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, law
           enforcement and regulatory personnel from 20 other federal
           agencies or bureaus use IBIS. Some of these agencies are the
           Federal Bureau of Investigation; U.S. National Central Bureau of
           the International Criminal Police Organization; the Drug
           Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
           Firearms and Explosives; the Internal Revenue Service; the Coast
           Guard; the Federal Aviation Administration; the Secret Service;
           and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, just to name a
           few. Also, information from IBIS is shared with the Department of
           State for use by Consular Officers at U.S. Embassies and
           Consulates."

           ï¿½What Does IBIS Provide?ï¿½
			  
			  "IBIS assists the majority of the traveling public with the
           expeditious clearance at ports of entry while allowing the border
           enforcement agencies to focus their limited resources on those
           potential non-compliant travelers. IBIS provides the law
           enforcement community with access to computer-based enforcement
           files of common interest. It also provides access to the FBI's
           National Crime Information Center and allows its users to
           interface with all fifty states via the National Law Enforcement
           Telecommunications Systems."

           ï¿½Where Is IBIS?ï¿½
			  
			  "IBIS resides on the Treasury Enforcement Communications System at
           the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Data Center. Field level
           access is provided by an IBIS network with more than 24,000
           computer terminals. These terminals are located at air, land, and
           sea ports of entry."

           ï¿½What Information Is in IBIS?ï¿½
			  
			  "IBIS keeps track of information on suspect individuals,
           businesses, vehicles, aircraft, and vessels. IBIS terminals can
           also be used to access National Crime Information Center records
           on wanted persons, stolen vehicles, vessels or firearms, license
           information, criminal histories, and previous Federal inspections.
           The information is used to assist law enforcement and regulatory
           personnel."

           ï¿½Additional Questions?ï¿½
			  
			  "Any concerns you may have as an international traveler or
           importer about the use or application of IBIS may be addressed to:

           U.S. Customs and Border Protection Freedom of Information Act/
           Customer Satisfaction Unit Room 5.5 C 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue,
           N.W. Washington, D.C. 20229"

           Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
			  
			  Appendix VI: Comments from the State Department
			  
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43Secretary of State cable to all diplomatic and consular posts, Subject:
Reminder Regarding Visa Refusal Procedures (June 12, 2001).

44See 8 U.S.C. S: 1182(a)(3)(B).

45The board was established by section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638,
3684-88. The board advises the president and other senior executive branch
officials as to whether privacy and civil liberties protections are
appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws,
regulations, and executive branch policies related to efforts to protect
the nation against terrorism. The five board members were sworn in and had
their first meeting on March 15, 2006. Additional information about the
role of the board and its operations is available at www.privacyboard.gov
.

1For purposes of this report, the term "misidentification" refers to a
person initially matched by a screening agency to a name on the watch
list, but upon closer examination, the person is found to not match any
watch list record.

2As used in this report, the term "mistakenly listed persons" includes two
categories of individuals-(1) persons who never should have been included
on the watch list but were due to some type of error and (2) persons who
were appropriately included on the watch list at one time but no longer
warrant inclusion on the terrorist watch list due to subsequent events.

3A nonimmigrant is a person, not a citizen or national of the United
States, seeking to enter the United States temporarily for a specific
purpose, such as business or pleasure.

4According to Customer Satisfaction Unit managers, all complaints
regarding the terrorist watch list are forwarded to the agency's National
Targeting Center, which has access to classified information that may be
needed to determine if the incidents cited by complainants involved
individuals who either are on the watch list or were misidentified.
National Targeting Center managers told us that if research indicates that
the substance of the complaint does involve watch-list-related screening
conducted by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the National Targeting
Center will draft a response letter, which is to be signed by the Customer
Satisfaction Unit and mailed to the individual.

5The working group's membership includes representatives from the
departments of Homeland Security (including Transportation Security
Administration and U.S. Customs and Border Protection), State, and
Defense; FBI; and the intelligence community (e.g., the National
Counterterrorism Center, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security
Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency). Also, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology acts as a special advisor to the working group.

6The charter of the committee is to advise the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Department of Homeland Security's chief privacy officer
on programmatic, policy, operational, administrative, and technological
issues within the department's areas of responsibility that affect
individual privacy, data integrity, data interoperability, and other
privacy-related matters.

7Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the
Terrorist Screening Center, Audit Report 05-27 (June 2005).

8The Terrorist Screening Center defines a "redress query" as communication
from individuals or their representatives inquiring or complaining about
an adverse experience during a terrorist watch-list-related-screening
process conducted or sponsored by a federal agency, including
congressional inquiries to federal agencies on behalf of their
constituents.

9The five-member board, which is part of the Executive Office of the
President, was established by section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638,
3684-88. The board advises the president and other senior executive branch
officials as to whether privacy and civil liberties protections are
appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws,
regulations, and executive branch policies related to efforts to protect
the nation against terrorism. The five board members were sworn in and had
their first meeting on March 15, 2006. Additional information about the
role of the board and its operations is available at www.privacyboard.gov
.

1See appendix III.

2On September 12, 2006, in providing technical comments on a draft of this
report, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials noted that the
contact information given on the FBI's Web site should be as follows: U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Branch. Also, the comments noted that the telephone number should be
removed. We suggested to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials
that they coordinate with the FBI to ensure that appropriate contact
information is available to the public.

3See appendix IV for a copy of the fact sheet.

(440374)

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-1031 .

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 or
[email protected].

Highlights of GAO-06-1031 , a report to congressional requesters

September 2006

TERRORIST WATCH LIST SCREENING

Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects on the Public

A consolidated watch list managed by the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center
(TSC) contains the names of known or suspected terrorists, both
international and domestic. Various agencies whose missions require
screening for links to terrorism use watch list records. For example, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) screens travelers at ports of entry.
Because screening is based on names, it can result in misidentifications
when persons not on the list have a name that resembles one on the list.
Also, some names may be mistakenly included on the watch list. In either
case, individuals can be negatively affected and may express concerns or
seek agency action, or redress, to prevent future occurrences. This report
addresses: (1) the extent to which the numbers of misidentified persons
are known and how they could be affected, (2) the major reasons
misidentifications occur and the actions agencies are taking to reduce
them or minimize their effects, and (3) the opportunities for redress
available to individuals with watch list-related concerns. In conducting
work at TSC and the principal federal agencies that use watch list data,
GAO reviewed standard operating procedures and other relevant
documentation and interviewed responsible officials.

GAO makes no recommendations at this time because the agencies have
ongoing initiatives to improve data quality, reduce the number of
misidentifications or mitigate their effects, and enhance redress efforts.

Annually, millions of individuals-from international travelers to visa
applicants-are screened for terrorism links against the watch list. At
times, a person is misidentified because of name similarities, although
the exact number is unknown. In some cases, agencies can verify the person
is not a match by comparing birth dates or other data with watch list
records, but agencies do not track the number. In other cases, they ask
TSC for help. From December 2003 (when TSC began operations) to January
2006, agencies sent tens of thousands of names to TSC, and about half were
misidentifications, according to TSC. While the total number of people
misidentified may be substantial, it likely represents a fraction of all
people screened. Even so, misidentifications can lead to delays, intensive
questioning and searches, missed flights, or denied entry at the border.

Misidentifications most commonly occur with names that are identical or
similar to names on the watch list. To rapidly screen names against the
watch list, agencies use computerized programs that account for
differences due to misspellings and other variations. TSC has ongoing
initiatives to improve computerized matching programs and the quality of
watch list records. Also, CBP and the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) have established procedures designed to expedite
frequently misidentified persons through screening, after confirming they
are not on the watch list.

Because security measures regrettably may cause personal inconveniences,
TSA and CBP, with the support of TSC, provide opportunities for people who
have been misidentified or mistakenly included on the watch list to seek
redress. Most of these are misidentified persons who are not on the watch
list but have a similar name and, therefore, may be repeatedly
misidentified. Thus, TSA, for example, provides redress that relies
heavily on efforts to expedite frequently misidentified persons through
screening by allowing them to submit personal information that helps
airlines more quickly determine that they are not on the watch list. If
TSA and CBP cannot resolve questions from the public, they ask TSC for
help. For 2005, TSC reported that it processed to completion 112 redress
referrals and removed the names of 31 mistakenly listed persons from the
watch list. To ensure that opportunities for redress are formally
documented across agencies and that responsibilities are clear, the
Justice Department is leading an effort to develop an interagency
memorandum of understanding and expects a final draft to be ready for
approval by fall 2006. TSC and frontline-screening-agency officials
recognize that, after the agreement is finalized, the public needs to
clearly understand how to express concerns and seek relief if negatively
affected by screening. So, these officials have committed to making
updated information on redress publicly available.

GAO provided a draft copy of this report to the departments of Justice,
Homeland Security, and State. They provided technical clarifications that
GAO incorporated where appropriate.
*** End of document. ***