    Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to
    Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency
    Response Capabilities Could Be Strengthened (21-SEP-06,
    GAO-06-1015).

    The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains an emergency response
    capability to quickly respond to potential nuclear and
    radiological threats in the United States. This capability has
    taken on increased significance after the attacks of September
    11, 2001, because there is heightened concern that terrorists may
    try to detonate a nuclear or radiological device in a major U.S.
    city. This report discusses (1) the capabilities and assets DOE
    has to prevent and respond to potential nuclear and radiological
    attacks in the United States, (2) the physical security measures
    in place at DOE's two key emergency response facilities and
    whether they are consistent with DOE guidance, and (3) the
    benefits of using DOE's aerial background radiation surveys to
    enhance emergency response capabilities.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-06-1015
        ACCNO:   A61247
      TITLE:     Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond
    to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency
    Response Capabilities Could Be Strengthened
         DATE:   09/21/2006
      SUBJECT:   Contamination
    	     Counterterrorism
    	     Emergency preparedness
    	     Emergency response
    	     Facility security
    	     Homeland security
    	     Physical security
    	     Policy evaluation
    	     Radiation monitoring
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Terrorism

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    GAO-06-1015

         * Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
           Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
           House of Representatives
              * September 2006
         * COMBATING NUCLEAR TERRORISM
              * Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats
                and to Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could Be
                Strengthened
         * Contents
              * Results in Brief
              * Background
              * DOE Has Unique Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to
                a Nuclear or Radiological Attack in the United States
                   * DOE Has Specialized Teams That Use a Variety of Methods and
                     Equipment to Prevent a Nuclear or Radiological Attack
                   * DOE Has a Critical Role to Play in Minimizing the
                     Consequences of a Nuclear or Radiological Attack
              * DOE's Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to
                Protect Its Key Emergency Response Facilities
                   * DOE Is Protecting Its Key Emergency Response Facilities with
                     the Lowest Level of Physical Security Measures Allowed under
                     DOE Guidance Because Some Capabilities and Assets Have Been
                     Dispersed
                   * DOE Has Not Fully Dispersed the Capabilities and Assets at
                     These Facilities, and Their Loss Would Significantly Hamper
                     DOE's Ability to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats
                   * Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to
                     Protect the Facilities against Terrorist Attack
              * Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiation
                Surveys, They Remain Underutilized Because Neither DOE Nor DHS
                Has Mission Responsibility for Funding and Conducting Them
                   * Completing Baseline Aerial Surveys Can Later Help to Detect
                     Radiological Threats in U.S. Cities and Measure Radiation
                     Levels in the Event of a Radiological Attack
                   * DOE Has Conducted a Survey of Only One Major City
                   * Despite the Benefits, Neither DOE Nor DHS Has Mission
                     Responsibility for Aerial Background Radiation Surveys,
                     Which Has Discouraged Both Agencies from Informing Cities
                     about the Surveys
              * Conclusions
              * Recommendations for Executive Action
              * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * Comments from the Department of Energy
         * GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
    Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House
    of Representatives

    September 2006

    COMBATING NUCLEAR TERRORISM

    Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to
    Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could Be Strengthened

    Contents

    Table

    Figure

    September 21, 2006Letter

    The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman Subcommittee on National
    Security, Emerging Threats     and International Relations Committee on
    Government Reform House of Representatives

    Dear Mr. Chairman:

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has maintained an emergency response
    capability to quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological
    threats in the United States. This capability has taken on increased
    significance after the attacks of September 11, 2001, because there is
    heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or
    radiological materials into the United States and detonate a nuclear or a
    radiological dispersal device, otherwise known as a dirty bomb, in a major
    U.S. city. Detonating either type of device would have serious
    consequences for our national and economic interests, including
    potentially causing numerous deaths and undermining citizens' confidence
    in the government's ability to protect the homeland.

    To respond to such threats, DOE has developed the technical expertise to
    search for and locate potential nuclear and radiological threats in U.S.
    cities and also to help minimize the consequences of a radiological
    incident by, among other things, measuring the extent of contamination.
    After September 11, 2001, DOE began dispersing its emergency response
    capabilities across the country. However, a number of critical
    capabilities and assets are primarily concentrated at two key facilities,
    known as Remote Sensing Laboratories, located at Nellis Air Force Base,
    Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. These two facilities house,
    among other things, specialized search teams that locate and identify
    nuclear and radiological devices; planes and helicopters used to measure
    contamination; and research and development laboratories that design
    specialized equipment. DOE requires that these facilities be adequately

    protected with security measures to defend against potential terrorist
    attacks.1

    One of DOE's unique capabilities is the ability to conduct aerial
    background radiation surveys. These surveys are conducted by using
    helicopters or planes equipped with radiation detectors to fly over an
    area and collect information on existing background radiation sources,
    such as granite statues in a city or medical isotopes located at
    hospitals. This can help DOE establish baseline radiation levels against
    which future radiation levels can be compared in order to more easily
    detect new radiation sources that may pose a security or public health
    threat.

    DOE is not the only federal agency responsible for detecting nuclear and
    radiological materials. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a
    Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) that is responsible for
    developing, testing, and deploying radiation detection equipment to detect
    and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials at U.S.
    points of entry, such as seaports and border crossings. DNDO is also
    responsible for helping state and local governments improve their
    capability to detect and identify illicit nuclear and radiological
    materials. If DHS cannot prevent the smuggling of nuclear or radiological
    materials into the United States, it relies on DOE's emergency response
    capabilities to search for and locate the materials.

    In this context, this report discusses (1) the capabilities and assets DOE
    has to prevent and respond to potential nuclear and radiological attacks
    in the United States, (2) the physical security measures in place at DOE's
    two key emergency response facilities and whether they are consistent with
    DOE guidance, and (3) the benefits of using DOE's aerial background
    radiation surveys to enhance emergency response capabilities.

    To address these objectives, we collected and analyzed documentation
    related to DOE's emergency response capabilities and assets and the
    physical security guidelines and plans for its two key emergency response
    facilities. We interviewed officials from DOE's Office of Emergency
    Response and the Office of Independent Oversight. We also interviewed
    program managers and security officials from the Remote Sensing
    Laboratories at Nellis and Andrews Air Force Bases, and we received a tour
    of these facilities to view the physical security measures and obtain a
    demonstration of their radiation detection equipment. In addition, we
    analyzed documents and interviewed officials from DOE's national
    laboratories at Brookhaven (in New York), Sandia (in New Mexico), and
    Savannah River (in South Carolina), where emergency response assets have
    been dispersed. To obtain information on aerial surveys, we analyzed
    documents and interviewed officials from the Counter Terrorism Bureau of
    the New York City Police Department who requested an aerial background
    radiation survey of New York City. We also collected documentation and
    interviewed officials from DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and
    Office of Grants and Training to obtain information on DHS's role in
    conducting and funding aerial background radiation surveys. We conducted
    our work from January to August 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
    government auditing standards.

    Results in Brief

    DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear
    or radiological attack in the United States. These include specialized
    teams to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or radiological
    devices and to help minimize the consequences of a nuclear or radiological
    attack. These capabilities are primarily found at DOE's two key emergency
    response facilities-the Remote Sensing Laboratories at Nellis Air Force
    Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. DOE also draws upon
    the technical expertise of scientists, engineers, and technicians from the
    national laboratories, including Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence
    Livermore. To prevent an attack, search teams use a variety of clandestine
    and discreet methods, including the use of radiation sensors carried in
    backpacks and mounted on vehicles and helicopters, to detect and locate
    radiological sources. In fiscal year 2005, DOE conducted about 30 search
    missions to address potential radiological threats or to assist local and
    state officials in monitoring large public events such as the Super Bowl
    and the State of the Union address. DOE officials cautioned, however, that
    it may be difficult to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded
    radiological materials. In order to deploy teams more quickly, since the
    attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE has expanded its search capability
    beyond the Remote Sensing Laboratories to include eight other emergency
    response sites across the country. In the event of a nuclear or
    radiological attack, DOE also maintains capabilities to minimize the
    consequences. DOE can deploy teams that use radiation-monitoring
    equipment, including sensors mounted on aircraft and vehicles, to detect
    and measure radiation contamination levels and provide information to
    state and local officials on what areas need to be evacuated. DOE can also
    coordinate federal activities related to monitoring contamination levels
    and mobilize medical personnel to treat injuries resulting from radiation
    exposure.

    DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of
    physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE,
    emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed across the
    country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. Under DOE policy
    guidance for safeguarding and securing facilities issued in November 2005,
    DOE facilities can be protected at the lowest level of physical security
    if their capabilities and assets exist at other locations and can be
    easily and quickly reconstituted. However, we found that there are a
    number of critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote
    Sensing Laboratories and their loss would significantly hamper DOE's
    ability to quickly prevent or respond to a nuclear or radiological
    emergency. Specifically, the capabilities and assets that are located only
    at the laboratories include, among other things, the most highly trained
    teams that help manage and minimize the consequences of a nuclear or
    radiological attack and the only helicopters and planes that can readily
    help locate nuclear or radiological devices and measure contamination
    levels after a radiological attack. Since these capabilities and assets
    have not been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not
    be sufficient to protect the facilities against a terrorist attack. Under
    DOE's physical security guidance, a facility in the lowest level of
    physical security can meet the requirements by having walls and doors but
    no other physical security measures. For example, the Remote Sensing
    Laboratory at Andrews Air Force Base does not have a fence, vehicle
    barriers, or any other protective measures around the building, but DOE
    has determined that it meets physical security requirements. Furthermore,
    while the laboratories' location on Air Force bases may appear to provide
    an additional level of security, access onto Nellis and Andrews Air Force
    Bases is not strictly limited, and anyone with federal government
    identification may gain entry. In fact, GAO staff gained access to the
    bases multiple times with little or no scrutiny of their identification.
    Security officials told us that the laboratories are not designed to
    withstand certain types of terrorist attacks. However, officials have not
    taken any steps to strengthen security because of DOE's assumption that
    their capabilities and assets are fully dispersed. Furthermore, DOE has
    not developed contingency plans that would identify capabilities and
    assets that would be used in the event that one or both Remote Sensing
    Laboratories were attacked.

    There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation
    surveys of U.S. cities. Specifically, the surveys can be used to compare
    changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in
    U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination levels after a
    radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts.
    Despite the benefits, there has been only one survey of a major U.S. city
    because neither DOE nor DHS has mission responsibility for conducting the
    surveys. In the event of a dirty-bomb threat, if a city had a completed
    survey, DOE could then conduct a new survey and compare baseline radiation
    data from the previous survey to identify locations with new sources of
    radiation. Focusing their attention on these new locations, law
    enforcement officials may be able to locate a nuclear or radiological
    device more quickly. In addition, using baseline information from a prior
    survey, DOE could assess contamination levels after a radiological attack
    to assist cleanup efforts. DOE officials estimated that information from
    the surveys could save millions of dollars in cleanup costs because
    cleanup efforts could be targeted to decontaminating buildings and other
    areas up to pre-existing levels of radiation rather than fully removing
    all traces of radiation. Without baseline information from the surveys,
    law enforcement officials may lose valuable time investigating
    pre-existing sources of radiation that do not pose a threat, and the time
    and cost of cleanup after an attack may increase significantly. DOE
    officials explained that surveys do have some limitations, noting that it
    is difficult to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded radiological
    materials. Weather conditions and the type of building being surveyed may
    also limit the ability to detect nuclear and radiological devices.

    Nevertheless, in 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked
    DOE to conduct a survey of the New York City metro area. The cost of the
    survey-about $800,000-was funded through DHS grants. NYPD officials
    indicated that the survey was tremendously valuable because it identified
    more than 80 locations with radiological sources that required further
    investigation to determine their risk. In addition to identifying
    potential terrorist threats, NYPD officials told us that a secondary
    benefit of the survey was identifying threats to public health. While
    investigating the 80 locations, they found an old industrial site
    contaminated with radium-a radiological material linked to diseases such
    as bone cancer-and used this information to close the area and protect the
    public. Despite these benefits, neither DOE nor DHS have embraced mission
    responsibility for funding and conducting surveys or notifying city
    officials that such a capability exists. DOE officials told us they are
    reluctant to conduct additional surveys because they have a limited number
    of helicopters that are needed for emergency response functions, and told
    us that it is DHS's mission to protect cities from potential terrorist
    attacks. DHS officials disagreed with DOE, stating they do not have the
    expertise or capability to conduct surveys. However, DHS does have a
    program to help state and local governments detect illicit nuclear and
    radiological materials, and in fiscal year 2006, approximately $2.5
    billion was available in grant funding to state and local governments for
    terrorism preparedness. In the absence of clear mission responsibility,
    there are no plans to conduct additional surveys, in part, because DOE and
    DHS are not informing cities about the benefits of these surveys.

    We provided a draft of this report to DOE and DHS for comment. DHS agreed
    with our recommendations and provided technical comments, which we
    incorporated, as appropriate. DOE neither agreed nor disagreed with the
    report's recommendations, but raised concerns about one of our findings.
    In its written comments, DOE disagreed with our finding that physical
    security at the Remote Sensing Laboratories may not be sufficient to
    protect them against terrorist attacks. While we recognize that DOE is
    complying with physical security requirements, the Remote Sensing
    Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of physical security, even
    though the laboratories have unique capabilities and assets that exist at
    no other location and cannot be easily and quickly reconstituted. DOE also
    provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

    Background

    DOE's predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), established a
    program to prevent and respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies in
    1974 after an extortionist threatened to detonate a nuclear device in
    Boston unless he received $200,000.2 Even though the threat turned out to
    be a hoax, AEC recognized that it lacked the capability to quickly respond
    to a nuclear or radiological incident. To address this deficiency, AEC
    established the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) to provide technical
    assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department
    of State, which is the lead federal agency for terrorism response outside
    the United States. Under the Atomic Energy Act, the FBI is responsible for
    investigating illegal activities involving the use of nuclear materials
    within the United States, including terrorist threats. The NEST program
    was designed to assist the FBI in searching, identifying, and deactivating
    nuclear and radiological devices. However, the deployments of search teams
    were large scale and often slow because they were designed to respond to
    threats, such as extortion, when there was time to find the device.

    With the threat of nuclear terrorism and the events of September 11, 2001,
    DOE's capabilities have evolved to more rapidly respond to nuclear and
    radiological threats. While NEST activities to prevent terrorists from
    detonating a nuclear or radiological device remain the core mission, DOE's
    emergency response activities have expanded to include actions to minimize
    the consequences of a nuclear or radiological incident. For example, DOE
    maintains an aerial capability to detect, measure, and track radioactive
    material to determine contamination levels at the site of an emergency.
    DOE has used this capability to conduct background radiation surveys of
    most nuclear power plants in the country for the Environmental Protection
    Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In the event of an accident
    at a nuclear power plant, a new radiation survey could be performed to
    help determine the location and amount of contamination.

    There are currently about 950 scientists, engineers, and technicians from
    the national laboratories and the Remote Sensing Laboratories dedicated to
    preventing and responding to a nuclear or radiological threat. In fiscal
    year 2005, DOE had a budget of about $90 million for emergency response
    activities. Under the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the
    Office of Emergency Response manages DOE's efforts to prevent and respond
    to nuclear or radiological emergencies.

    In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that
    terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials into the
    United States. These materials could be used to produce either an
    improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device, known as a
    dirty bomb. An improvised nuclear device is a crude nuclear bomb made with
    highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Nonproliferation experts estimate
    that a successful improvised nuclear device could have yields in the 10 to
    20 kiloton range (the equivalent to 10,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT). A
    20-kiloton yield would be the equivalent of the yield of the bomb that
    destroyed Nagasaki and could devastate the heart of a medium-size U.S.
    city and result in thousands of casualties and radiation contamination
    over a wider area.

    A dirty bomb combines conventional explosives, such as dynamite, with
    radioactive material,3 using explosive force to disperse the radioactive
    material over a large area, such as multiple city blocks. The extent of
    contamination would depend on a number of factors, including the size of
    the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive material used, and
    weather conditions. While much less destructive than an improvised nuclear
    device, the dispersed radioactive material could cause radiation sickness
    for people nearby and produce serious economic costs and psychological and
    social disruption associated with the evacuation and subsequent cleanup of
    the contaminated areas. While no terrorists have detonated a dirty bomb in
    a city, Chechen separatists placed a canister containing cesium-137 in a
    Moscow park in the mid-1990s. Although the device was not detonated and no
    radioactive material was dispersed, the incident demonstrated that
    terrorists have the capability and willingness to use radiological
    materials as weapons of terror.

    DOE Has Unique Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a Nuclear
    or Radiological Attack in the United States

    DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear
    or radiological attack in the United States. These include specialized
    teams and equipment to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or
    radiological devices and to help manage the consequences of a nuclear or
    radiological attack. To prevent an attack, search teams use a variety of
    clandestine and discreet methods, including the use of radiation sensors
    carried in backpacks and mounted on vehicles and helicopters, to detect
    and locate radiological sources. In the event of a nuclear or radiological
    attack, DOE would, among other things, use radiation-monitoring equipment,
    including sensors mounted on aircraft and vehicles, to detect and measure
    radiation contamination levels and provide information to state and local
    officials on what areas need to be evacuated. Table 1 summarizes DOE's
    capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear or
    radiological attack.

    Table 1: DOE Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a Nuclear
    or Radiological Attack

                                                       Purpose
    Capabilities     Mission                       Prevent a   Respond to and
                                                      nuclear or    manage the
                                                     radiological consequences of
                                                      attack or      an attack
                                                      detonation
    Search           Search for and identify           X
                        nuclear or radiological
                        devices with radiation
                        detectors mounted in
                        backpacks, vehicles, and
                        helicopters
    Deactivation     Deactivate and dispose of         X
                        nuclear or radiological
                        devices by viewing the
                        components of a bomb with
                        specialized equipment,
                        deactivating booby traps,
                        and packaging the devices
                        for safe transport
    Recovery of U.S. In the event of an accident       X
    nuclear weapons  involving a U.S. nuclear
                        weapon, assess the damage,
                        stabilize internal
                        components, and package the
                        weapon for safe transport
    Radiological     First responders to search        X              X
    Assistance       for devices with radiation
    Program          detectors mounted in
                        backpacks and on vehicles or
                        to measure contamination
                        levels after an attack or
                        accident with environmental
                        sampling and specialized
                        devices
    Aerial detection Planes and helicopters with       X              X
                        radiation detection
                        equipment and sophisticated
                        onboard computers to search
                        for devices, conduct
                        background radiation
                        surveys, or measure
                        contamination after a
                        nuclear or radiological
                        incident
    Computer         Prediction of the extent of                      X
    modeling of      contamination with advanced
    radiation        computer modeling of wind,
    release          topography, and atmospheric
                        conditions
    Consequence      Monitor and assess                               X
    management       contamination from a
                        large-scale nuclear or
                        radiological attack and set
                        up an operations center to
                        coordinate response
                        activities in the field
    Medical support  Quickly mobilize medical                         X
                        personnel to provide advice
                        and assistance for treating
                        injuries resulting from
                        radiation exposure

    Source: GAO analysis of DOE information.

    DOE Has Specialized Teams That Use a Variety of Methods and Equipment to
    Prevent a Nuclear or Radiological Attack

    To prevent a nuclear or radiological attack, DOE has specialized teams to
    search for and deactivate nuclear or radiological devices. These teams are
    manned by full-time professionals and are ready to deploy on either
    civilian or military aircraft from the Remote Sensing Laboratories within
    4 hours of notification from the FBI. To detect and locate nuclear or
    radiological devices, the teams use a variety of clandestine and discreet
    methods, including the use of radiation detectors carried in backpacks
    that silently transmit information to the searcher's earphone and
    radiation detectors mounted in vehicles and helicopters.

    While backpacks and other hand-held equipment can detect and identify
    devices with greater accuracy, vehicle and helicopter-mounted radiation
    detectors allow DOE to cover a greater area in a shorter amount of
    time-which is particularly important when the exact location of a device
    is unknown and the teams need to search a large area. Once deployed, the
    searchers can also send information they are collecting from radiation
    detectors via a secure Internet line to scientists and technicians at the
    national laboratories to help them identify nuclear or radiological
    material and determine whether the material poses a threat. If the search
    teams need additional support to cover a large area, they can train and
    equip local responders, such as law enforcement and firefighters, to
    conduct search missions. Up to 16 people can become proficient in basic
    search techniques in less than an hour.

    Should a device be located, a team composed of nuclear weapons scientists,
    technicians, and engineers from the national laboratories as well as the
    FBI and military ordnance disposal experts would be deployed to deactivate
    the device and prepare it for safe transport away from populated areas to
    the Nevada Test Site.4 This would involve, among other things, clearing
    booby traps and separating the high explosives from the nuclear material.
    It also would involve the use of specialized equipment, such as a portable
    X-ray machine, to peer under a bomb's outer shell and view the bomb's
    components, identify the device, and determine the best way of
    deactivating it. This team maintains a comprehensive computer database of
    nuclear and radiological weapon design information for identifying and
    properly deactivating devices. Once a device is ready to be safely
    transported, scientists in an underground tunnel at the Nevada Test Site
    would disassemble and dispose of the device. Under certain circumstances,
    the team may not be able to safely transport the device and it may be
    necessary to destroy the bomb in place and mitigate the potential spread
    of radioactive material by, among other things, constructing a nylon tent
    around the device and filling it with thick foam.

    Since September 11, 2001, DOE has expanded its search capability beyond
    the Remote Sensing Laboratories to include teams at eight other emergency
    response sites, allowing for more rapid deployment across the country.5
    These Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) teams traditionally have
    assisted state and local governments with responding to facility or
    transportation accidents involving radioactive material that may cause
    contamination and affect public health. Since these teams have experience
    and expertise in responding to nuclear emergencies-and are located in
    different regions across the country-their mission was expanded to include
    searching for nuclear or radiological devices. The RAP teams can drive to
    most cities in their geographic area and do not have to rely on air
    transport. In addition, since the two Remote Sensing Laboratories are
    located on the East and West coasts, the RAP teams can provide faster
    response to cities located in the center of the country.

    In fiscal year 2005, the specialized search teams from the Remote Sensing
    Laboratories and the RAP teams conducted about 30 search missions. Most of
    these missions involved assisting local and state officials in monitoring
    large public events, such as the Super Bowl and the State of the Union
    address, to provide assurance that no devices were hidden in the stands or
    inside the building before the event. A number of these missions also
    involved intelligence-driven searches to address potential radiological
    threats in U.S. cities. Despite the teams' expertise and specialized
    equipment, DOE officials cautioned that it may still be difficult to
    detect nuclear or radiological devices. Radiation detection equipment may
    not detect nuclear materials with relatively low levels of radioactivity
    or radiological materials that are well-shielded. In addition, without
    good intelligence on the location of the device, search teams may not have
    time to find the device.

    In addition to preventing a nuclear or radiological attack, DOE is also
    responsible for responding to an accident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon.
    A DOE team made up of scientists, engineers, technicians, health
    physicists, and safety professionals from the national laboratories and
    nuclear weapons production facilities are ready to respond within 4 hours
    of notification of an accident, such as the crash of a military airplane
    transporting a nuclear weapon. In such a scenario, the team would assess
    the damage, if any, to the weapon by using, among other things,
    radiography to examine the weapon's internal structure, and how best to
    recover it safely. Since nuclear weapons contain chemically reactive
    materials and radioactive elements, great care must be taken in gaining
    access to them. For damaged weapons, the team has special techniques to
    stabilize the internal components. After weapons are safe to move, they
    can be packaged and prepared for transport.

    DOE Has a Critical Role to Play in Minimizing the Consequences of a
    Nuclear or Radiological Attack

    DOE maintains capabilities to minimize the impact of a nuclear or
    radiological attack. An RAP team likely would be the first DOE team to
    respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency, whether resulting from a
    terrorist attack or an accident. The RAP teams, located in nine different
    parts of the country, would be responsible for assessing the situation and
    determining what additional resources would be necessary to manage the
    emergency. These teams are expected to arrive at the site of an emergency
    within 4 to 6 hours and conduct an initial radiological assessment of the
    area. RAP team members are trained to provide initial assistance to
    minimize immediate radiation risks to people, property, and the
    environment. In responding to an emergency, they would use radiation
    detectors and air-sampling equipment to measure contamination and help
    state and local officials reduce the spread of contamination.

    Large-scale contamination from a dirty bomb or nuclear device would
    require the deployment of consequence management teams from the Remote
    Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base. These teams are responsible
    for setting up an operations center near the site of the emergency to
    coordinate environmental monitoring and assessment activities, conduct
    monitoring and assessment activities with specialized equipment, and
    collect and analyze data from the field on the type, amount, and extent of
    radiological release. This information would be used by state and local
    governments to determine what areas should be evacuated and how to
    properly respond to the emergency and by other federal agencies involved
    in decontamination and other cleanup activities. These teams would monitor
    the area where radioactivity was released until the area was fully
    evaluated and the effects known.

    In addition to the RAP and consequence management teams, DOE would collect
    information on the extent of contamination, using not only planes and
    helicopters fitted with radiation detectors but also sophisticated
    computer models. DOE has a limited number of planes and helicopters at the
    Remote Sensing Laboratories that detect, measure, and track radioactive
    materials to determine contamination levels. The aircraft can provide
    real-time measurement of low levels of ground contamination. They can also
    provide detailed imagery analysis of an accident site. The planes are
    deployed first to determine the location and extent of ground
    contamination. The helicopters are then used to perform detailed surveys
    of any ground contamination.6 This information is used to decide where to
    send ground monitoring teams. Based on information from the aircraft,
    scientists are able to develop maps of the ground hazards. In addition to
    their ability to track radiation from a dirty bomb or nuclear device, the
    aircraft have also been used to search for lost or stolen nuclear material
    and to locate medical isotopes left behind after natural disasters, as
    occurred in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, to ensure they do not
    endanger the public.

    Emergency response teams can also use computer models developed by the
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to predict the consequences of a
    radiological release by modeling the movement of hazardous plumes. Based
    on the time, location, type of accident, and weather conditions, the model
    can predict the extent to which the material can spread and estimate the
    amount of the release. As technicians receive information from field
    teams, they can update the model.

    Lastly, DOE can mobilize medical personnel to treat injuries resulting
    from radiation exposure. Medical radiation experts are on call 24 hours a
    day and can provide medical and radiological advice to state and local
    governments or deploy directly to an accident site. These experts also
    track the treatment of radiation accident patients and conduct medical
    follow-ups.

    DOE's Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to Protect
    Its Key Emergency Response Facilities

    DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of
    physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, their
    emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed across the
    country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a
    number of critical emergency response capabilities and assets that exist
    only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and whose loss would significantly
    hamper DOE's ability to quickly respond to a nuclear or radiological
    threat. Because these capabilities and assets have not been fully
    dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient for
    protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack.

    DOE Is Protecting Its Key Emergency Response Facilities with the Lowest
    Level of Physical Security Measures Allowed under DOE Guidance Because
    Some Capabilities and Assets Have Been Dispersed

    DOE is protecting its two Remote Sensing Laboratories at the lowest level
    of physical security allowed under DOE guidance. According to DOE
    officials, the lowest level of security is adequate because emergency
    response assets and capabilities have been dispersed across the country
    and are no longer concentrated at these facilities. DOE policy guidance
    for safeguarding and securing facilities issued in November 2005 required
    a review of facilities protected at the lowest level of physical security
    to determine whether they were "mission critical." Mission critical
    facilities have capabilities and assets that are not available at any
    other location and cannot be easily and quickly reconstituted. Under DOE
    guidance, facilities designated as mission critical must be protected at a
    higher level of physical security. For example, DOE Headquarters was
    designated as mission critical because the loss of decision makers during
    an emergency would impair the deployment and coordination of DOE
    resources. As a result, DOE strengthened the physical security measures
    around DOE Headquarters by, among other things, adding vehicle barriers
    around the facility.

    In April 2006, the Office of Emergency Response reviewed the capabilities
    and assets at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and found that they were not
    mission critical because if either one or both laboratories were attacked
    and destroyed, DOE would be able to easily reconstitute their capabilities
    and assets to meet mission requirements. Since September 11, 2001, DOE has
    dispersed some of the assets and capabilities once found exclusively at
    the Remote Sensing Laboratories. Specifically, DOE has expanded its search
    mission to include the RAP teams that are located at eight sites across
    the country. These teams receive training and equipment similar to the
    search teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as radiation
    detectors mounted in backpacks and vehicles. They have also participated
    in a number of search missions, including addressing potential threats at
    sporting events and national political conventions, or assisting customs
    officials with investigating cargo entering ports and border crossings.

    DOE Has Not Fully Dispersed the Capabilities and Assets at These
    Facilities, and Their Loss Would Significantly Hamper DOE's Ability to
    Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats

    Contrary to DOE's assessment that the Remote Sensing Laboratories'
    capabilities and assets have been fully dispersed to other parts of the
    country, we found that the laboratories housed a number of unique
    emergency response capabilities and assets whose loss would significantly
    undermine DOE's ability to respond to a nuclear or radiological threat.
    The critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the laboratories
    include (1) the teams that help minimize the consequences of a nuclear or
    radiological attack, (2) the planes and helicopters designed to measure
    contamination levels and assist search teams in locating nuclear or
    radiological devices, and (3) a sophisticated mapping system that tracks
    contamination and the location of radiological sources in U.S. cities.
    Furthermore, while the RAP teams have assumed a greater role in searching
    for nuclear or radiological devices, the teams at the Remote Sensing
    Laboratories remain the most highly trained and experienced search teams.

    The consequence management teams that would respond within the first 24
    hours of a nuclear or radiological attack are located at the Remote
    Sensing Lab at Nellis Air Force Base. These teams have specialized
    equipment for monitoring and assessing the type, amount, and extent of
    contamination. They are responsible for establishing an operations center
    near the site of contamination to coordinate all of DOE's radiological
    monitoring and assessment activities and to analyze information coming
    from the field, including aerial survey data provided by helicopters,
    planes, and ground teams monitoring radiation levels. Without this
    capability, state and local governments would not receive information
    quickly about the extent of contamination to assess the impact on public
    health and private property and how best to reduce further contamination.

    DOE's emergency response planes and helicopters are designed to detect,
    measure, and track radioactive material at the site of a nuclear or
    radiological release to determine contamination levels. DOE has a limited
    number of planes and helicopters designed for this mission at the Remote
    Sensing Laboratories. These planes and helicopters use a sophisticated
    radiation detection system to gather radiological information and produce
    maps of radiation exposure and concentrations. It is anticipated that the
    planes would arrive at an emergency scene first and be used to determine
    the location and extent of ground contamination. The helicopters would
    then be used to perform more detailed surveys of any contamination.
    According to DOE officials, the planes and helicopters can gather
    information on a wide area without placing ground teams at risk. Without
    this capability, DOE would not be able to quickly obtain comprehensive
    information about the extent of contamination. The helicopters can also be
    used by search teams to locate nuclear or radiological devices in U.S.
    cities. The helicopters can cover a larger area in a shorter amount of
    time than teams on foot or in vehicles. The ground search teams can
    conduct secondary inspections of locations with unusual radiation levels
    identified by the helicopter.

    The Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base also maintains a
    sophisticated mapping system that can be used by consequence management
    teams to track contamination in U.S. cities after a nuclear or
    radiological attack. DOE collects information from its planes and
    helicopters, ground monitoring teams, and computer modeling and uses this
    system to provide detailed maps of the extent and level of contamination
    in a city. Without this system, DOE would not be able to quickly analyze
    the information collected by various emergency response capabilities and
    determine how to respond most effectively to a nuclear or radiological
    attack. This mapping system can also be used to help find nuclear or
    radiological devices more quickly before they are detonated.

    DOE officials told us the loss of these capabilities and assets that are
    unique to the Remote Sensing Laboratories would devastate DOE's ability to
    respond to a nuclear or radiological attack. State and local governments
    would not receive information-such as the location and extent of
    contamination-that they need in a timely manner in order to manage the
    consequences of an attack and reduce the harm to public health and
    property. Despite the importance of these capabilities and assets, DOE has
    not developed contingency plans identifying capabilities and assets at
    other locations that could be used in the event that one or both Remote
    Sensing Laboratories were attacked. Specifically, DOE has not identified
    which RAP team would assume responsibility for coordinating contamination
    monitoring and assessment activities in the place of the consequence
    management teams from Nellis. During an emergency, the lack of clearly
    defined roles may hamper emergency response efforts.

    DOE officials told us that in the event that the capabilities and assets
    of both Remote Sensing Laboratories were destroyed, they could mobilize
    and deploy personnel and equipment from the RAP teams or national
    laboratories. The RAP teams and some national laboratories, such as
    Sandia, have similar equipment that could be used to measure contamination
    in a limited area. However, if both Remote Sensing Laboratories were
    destroyed, the RAP teams and the national laboratories would not have
    planes and helicopters to conduct large-scale contamination monitoring and
    assessment. The RAP teams also do not have the equipment or expertise to
    set up an operations center and analyze data that field teams would
    collect on contamination levels. In April 2006, DOE's Office of
    Independent Oversight, which is responsible for independently evaluating,
    among other things, the effectiveness of DOE's programs, reported that the
    RAP teams, during performance tests, could not quickly provide state and
    local governments with recommendations on what actions to take to avoid or
    reduce the public's exposure to radiation and whether to evacuate
    contaminated areas.7 In addition, DOE officials told us that, based on
    training exercises, the demands of responding to two simultaneous nuclear
    or radiological events strained all of DOE's capabilities to manage the
    consequences. According to DOE officials, if the consequence management
    teams at Nellis could not respond and there were multiple, simultaneous
    attacks, DOE's capabilities to minimize the impact of a nuclear or
    radiological attack would be significantly hampered.

    DOE officials also told us that if Nellis Air Force Base were attacked,
    their aerial contamination measuring assets would not be lost unless the
    aircraft at Andrews Air Force Base were also destroyed. However, DOE
    policy generally requires that some of its aerial assets stationed at
    Andrews remain in the Washington, D.C., area to protect top government
    decision makers and other key government assets. During a nuclear or
    radiological emergency, DOE would need to rely on a limited airborne
    capability to measure contamination levels. In addition, if there were
    multiple simultaneous events, there would be considerable delay in
    providing information to state and local governments about the extent of
    contamination because DOE could assist only one city at a time.

    Some DOE officials suggested that if DOE helicopters were not available to
    provide assistance, DOE could request another helicopter and fit it with
    radiation detectors. However, during an emergency, we found that DOE would
    face a number of challenges in equipping a helicopter not designed for
    measuring contamination. DOE officials told us that DOE has a memorandum
    of understanding with the Department of Defense and other federal and
    state agencies to use their helicopters and planes for transport and other
    mission requirements, but that it is unlikely that DOD or any other agency
    would provide them with aircraft during an emergency because those
    agencies' priority would be to carry out their own missions, not to assist
    DOE. Even if DOE were provided with helicopters, DOE does not have spare
    radiation detectors like those found on its own helicopters, and even if
    it did have spares, it would not have time to mount radiation detectors on
    the exterior of the aircraft. DOE officials told us that radiation
    detectors, like those found on their vehicles, could be placed inside an
    airplane or helicopter, but the ability to measure contamination would be
    significantly reduced compared with an exterior-mounted detector.

    Furthermore, DOE does not conduct training exercises to simulate the
    actions necessary to reconstitute the capabilities and assets unique to
    the Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as placing radiation detectors on
    helicopters or testing the ability of RAP teams to conduct large-scale
    contamination monitoring and assessment without the assistance of the
    consequence management teams from Nellis. DOE officials told us that all
    of their training scenarios and exercises involve the use of consequence
    management teams and the planes and helicopters from the Remote Sensing
    Laboratories. As a result, DOE does not know whether it would be able to
    accomplish mission objectives without the capabilities and assets of the
    Remote Sensing Laboratories.

    Lastly, while the RAP teams have assumed a greater role in searching for
    nuclear or radiological devices, Remote Sensing Laboratories have the most
    highly trained and experienced search teams. For example, the search teams
    at the Remote Sensing Laboratories are the only teams trained to conduct
    physically demanding maritime searches to locate potential nuclear or
    radiological devices at sea before they arrive at a U.S. port. The search
    teams can also repair radiation equipment for search missions in the
    field. Furthermore, these search teams are more prepared than the RAP
    teams to enter environments where there is a threat of hazards other than
    those associated with radiological materials, such as explosives. If there
    is a threat of explosives in an area where a search mission would be
    conducted, these teams have specialized equipment to detect explosives and
    can more quickly request FBI ordnance disposal assistance in order to
    complete their search mission. In April 2006, the Office of Independent
    Oversight reported that the RAP teams did not always complete their search
    missions when there was a high level of risk to the lives of the RAP team
    members from explosives. The report found that some RAP teams refused to
    perform the mission unless all risk from explosives around a device was
    removed and others completed the mission only after certain safety
    criteria were met. According to this study, leaders of the RAP teams had
    to make on-the-spot judgments weighing the safety of RAP team members
    against their ability to complete the search mission because there was a
    lack of guidance on how to respond.

    Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to Protect the
    Facilities against Terrorist Attack

    Under DOE guidance, the physical security measures for facilities in the
    lowest level of security may include barriers such as fences, walls, and
    doors.8 According to DOE officials, a facility can have, at a minimum,
    walls and doors and be in compliance with the guidance. Adding additional
    measures, such as fences and vehicle barriers, are under the discretion of
    the security officer in charge of the facilities. According to DOE
    security officials, the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base
    exceeds current physical security requirements because DOE placed a fence
    around the facility and a vehicle barrier at the front entrance. These
    additional measures were taken because, at the time the Remote Sensing
    Laboratory was built, these measures were required.

    In contrast, the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Andrews Air Force Base does
    not have a fence or any vehicle barriers because it is located along the
    executive route used by the President and foreign dignitaries when they
    land at Andrews and exit the base. The buildings along this route must
    meet specific aesthetic standards, which prohibit the use of certain
    physical security measures, such as fences. Despite these limitations, DOE
    security officials told us that the laboratory still meets the minimum
    security requirements. According to these officials, the Office of
    Emergency Response, which is responsible for managing DOE's emergency
    response capabilities, would have to classify the facilities as mission
    critical before more stringent measures would be required.

    While current physical security measures are consistent with DOE guidance
    and may protect the facilities against trespass and theft of classified
    government documents, these measures may not be sufficient to protect the
    facilities against a terrorist attack. Security officials told us that
    current physical security measures at the Remote Sensing Laboratories have
    not been hardened or designed to withstand certain types of terrorist
    attacks. Security officials told us that the physical security measures
    protecting these facilities have not been strengthened because, if there
    were credible intelligence that the facilities faced the risk of terrorist
    attack, DOE could take additional measures to protect the facility, such
    as deploying protective forces around the laboratories and limiting access
    to the parking areas near the facilities. However, security officials
    would have to rely on good intelligence to prevent such an attack. In
    addition, under DOE guidance, facilities that house nuclear weapons or
    substantial quantities of special nuclear material that could be used in
    nuclear weapons are required to have vehicle barriers and other protective
    measures. Since the Remote Sensing Laboratories do not have nuclear
    weapons or special nuclear material, additional security measures are not
    required unless the facilities are classified as mission critical.

    While the laboratories' location on Air Force bases may appear to provide
    an additional level of security, access onto Nellis and Andrews Air Force
    Bases is not strictly limited, and any person with a federal government
    identification may gain entry. In addition, Air Force guards do not
    inspect every vehicle. Vehicles are randomly inspected, and Air Force
    security guards can use their judgment as to whether a car should be
    searched. In fact, GAO staff gained access to the bases multiple times
    with little or no scrutiny of their identification, and their vehicles
    were never searched.

    Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiation Surveys,
    They Remain Underutilized Because Neither DOE Nor DHS Has Mission
    Responsibility for Funding and Conducting Them

    There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation
    surveys of U.S. cities. Once surveys are complete, they can later be used
    to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological
    threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure radiation levels after
    a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup
    efforts. Despite the benefits, there has been a survey of only one major
    U.S. city. Since neither DOE nor DHS has mission responsibility for
    funding and conducting surveys, there are no plans to conduct additional
    surveys or to inform cities about their benefits.

    Completing Baseline Aerial Surveys Can Later Help to Detect Radiological
    Threats in U.S. Cities and Measure Radiation Levels in the Event of a
    Radiological Attack

    DOE can conduct aerial background radiation surveys to record the location
    of radiation sources and produce maps showing existing radiation levels
    within U.S. cities. Background radiation can come from a variety of
    sources, such as rock quarries; granite found in buildings, statues, or
    cemeteries; medical isotopes used at hospitals; and areas treated with
    high amounts of fertilizer, such as golf courses. DOE uses helicopters
    mounted with external radiation detectors and equipped with a global
    position system to fly over an area and gather data in a systematic grid
    pattern. Figure 1 illustrates a helicopter conducting an aerial survey and
    collecting information on radiation sources in a city.

    Figure 1: Illustration of a Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background
    Radiation Survey

    Onboard computers record radiation levels and the position of the
    helicopter. This initial, or baseline, survey allows DOE technicians and
    scientists to produce maps of a city showing the locations of high
    radiation concentrations, also known as "hot spots." DOE uses helicopters
    rather than airplanes because their lower altitude and lower speed permits
    a more precise reading. While conducting the baseline survey, DOE ground
    teams and law enforcement officials can investigate these hot spots to
    determine whether the source of radiation is used for industrial, medical,
    or other routine purposes. DOE officials told us that this baseline
    information would be beneficial for all major cities because law
    enforcement officials could immediately investigate any potentially
    dangerous nuclear or radiological source and DOE could later use the data
    in the event of an emergency to find a device more quickly or assist in
    cleanup efforts. For example, in 2002, DOE conducted a survey of the
    National Mall in Washington, D.C., just prior to July Fourth celebrations.
    Law enforcement officials used the survey to investigate unusual radiation
    sources and ensure the Mall area was safe for the public.

    Data from the baseline survey would help DOE and law enforcement detect
    new radiological threats more quickly. In the event of a dirty-bomb
    threat, DOE could conduct a new, or follow-up, survey and compare that
    radiation data to the baseline survey data to identify locations with new
    sources of radiation. Law enforcement officials looking for a nuclear or
    radiological device would focus their attention on these new locations and
    might be able to distinguish between pre-existing sources and potential
    threats in order to locate a dirty bomb or nuclear device more quickly.
    Conducting baseline surveys also provides a training opportunity for DOE
    personnel. DOE officials told us that regular deployments helped to keep
    job performance standards high for pilots, field detection specialists,
    and the technicians who analyze the data.

    DOE can also use a baseline radiation survey to assess changes in
    radiation levels after a radiological attack to assist with cleanup
    efforts. A follow-up survey could be taken afterward to compare changes
    against the baseline radiation levels. This information can be used to
    determine which areas need to be cleaned and to what levels. In 2004, DOD
    funded a survey of the area around the Pentagon in Northern Virginia in
    order to assist with cleanup efforts in case of nuclear or radiological
    attack. While no study has reliably determined the cleanup costs of a
    dirty-bomb explosion in an urban area, DOE estimates that cleaning up
    after the detonation of a small to medium-size radiological device may
    cost tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars. DOE officials estimated
    that information from background radiation surveys could save several
    million dollars in cleanup costs because cleanup efforts could be focused
    on decontaminating buildings and other areas to pre-existing levels of
    radiation. Without a baseline radiation survey, cleanup crews would not
    know the extent to which they would have to decontaminate the area.
    Efforts to completely clean areas with levels of pre-existing radiation,
    such as granite buildings or hospitals, would be wasteful and expensive.

    DOE officials cautioned that background radiation surveys have limitations
    and cannot be relied upon to detect all nuclear or radiological devices.
    Aerial surveys may not be able to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded
    radiological materials. Weather conditions and the type of building being
    surveyed may also reduce the effectiveness of detection systems.
    Furthermore, DOE may have to rely on good intelligence to find a device.
    Law enforcement officials would need intelligence information to narrow
    the search to a specific part of a city. Lastly, according to DOE
    officials, baseline background radiation surveys may need to be conducted
    on a periodic basis because radiation sources may change over time,
    especially in urban areas. For example, new construction using granite,
    the installation of medical equipment, or the heavy use of fertilizer all
    could change a city's radiation background. Despite these limitations,
    without baseline survey information, law enforcement officials may lose
    valuable time when searching for nuclear or radiological threats by
    investigating pre-existing sources of radiation that are not harmful. In
    addition, if there were a nuclear or radiological attack, a lack of
    baseline radiological data would likely make the cleanup more costly and
    time consuming.

    DOE Has Conducted a Survey of Only One Major City

    In 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked DOE to conduct a
    survey of the New York City metro area. NYPD officials were aware that DOE
    had the capability to measure background radiation and locate hot spots by
    helicopter because DOE used this capability at the World Trade Center site
    in the days following September 11, 2001. DHS provided the city with about
    $30 million in grant money to develop a regional radiological detection
    and monitoring system. NYPD decided to spend part of this money on a
    complete aerial survey of all five boroughs. DOE conducted the survey in
    about 4 weeks in the summer of 2005, requiring over 100 flight hours to
    complete at a cost of about $800,000.

    According to NYPD officials, the aerial background radiation survey
    exceeded their expectations, and they cited a number of significant
    benefits that may help them better respond to a radiological incident.
    First, NYPD officials said that in the course of conducting the survey,
    they identified over 80 locations with unexplained radiological sources.
    Teams of NYPD officers accompanied by DOE scientists and technicians
    investigated each of these hot spots and determined whether they posed a
    danger to the public. While most of these were medical isotopes located at
    medical facilities and hospitals, according to NYPD officials, awareness
    of these locations will allow them to distinguish false alarms from real
    radiological threats and locate a radiological device more quickly.
    Second, NYPD officers are now trained in investigating hot spots and they
    have real-life experience in locating radiological sources. Third, NYPD
    officials now have a baseline radiological survey of the city to assist
    with cleanup efforts in the event of a radiological release.

    In addition to identifying potential terrorist threats, a secondary
    benefit of the survey was identifying threats to public health. One of the
    over 80 locations with a radiological signature was a local park that was
    once the site of an industrial plant. According to NYPD officials, the
    survey disclosed that the soil there was contaminated by large quantities
    of radium.9 Brush fires in the area posed an imminent threat to public
    health because traditional fire mitigation tactics of pushing flammable
    debris into the middle of the park could release radiological
    contamination into the air. Investigating locations with unexplained
    radiological sources identified by the aerial background radiation survey
    alerted NYPD officials to this threat, and they were able to prevent
    public exposure to the material.

    Because the extent to which the background radiation of a city changes
    over time is not clear, NYPD officials have requested that DHS provide
    money to fund a survey every year. With periodic surveys, NYPD hope to get
    a better understanding of how and to what extent background radiation
    changes over time. NYPD officials also want to continue identifying
    radiological sources in the city and to provide relevant training to their
    officers.

    Despite the Benefits, Neither DOE Nor DHS Has Mission Responsibility for
    Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, Which Has Discouraged Both Agencies
    from Informing Cities about the Surveys

    Despite the benefits of aerial background radiation surveys, neither DOE
    nor DHS has embraced mission responsibility for funding and conducting
    surveys. In addition, neither agency is notifying city officials of the
    potential benefits of aerial surveys or that such a capability exists.
    According to DOE and DHS officials, New York City is the only city where a
    background radiation survey has been completed.

    DOE officials told us that DOE is reluctant to conduct large numbers of
    additional surveys because they have a limited number of helicopters that
    are needed to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies.
    Furthermore, they assert that DOE does not have sufficient funding to
    conduct aerial background radiation surveys. In fiscal year 2006, the
    emergency response budget for aerial radiation detection was approximately
    $11 million to cover costs for items such as aircraft maintenance,
    personnel, fuel, and detection equipment. DOE relies on federal agencies
    and cities to reimburse them for the costs of surveys. However, even if
    DHS funded cities to pay for surveys, as it did in New York's case, DOE
    officials stated that payment would need to include costs associated with
    the wear and tear on the helicopters. Furthermore, the extra costs could
    not be completely recovered by increasing the charges to the city because,
    according to DOE officials, DOE cannot accumulate money from year to year
    to pay for future lump-sum repairs. In addition, DOE officials view
    background radiation surveys as part of the homeland security mission to
    prepare state and local officials against terrorist attacks, not as part
    of their emergency response mission. However, DOE officials told us that
    because they possess the assets and expertise, they would be willing to
    conduct additional surveys if DHS funded the full cost of the surveys and
    covered the wear and tear on DOE's equipment.

    DHS officials told us that it is not DHS's responsibility to conduct
    aerial background radiation surveys or to develop such a capability. DHS's
    Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) told us it does not have the
    expertise or capability to conduct surveys and that surveys are DOE's
    responsibility. However, DNDO is responsible for assisting state and local
    governments' efforts to detect and identify illicit nuclear and
    radiological materials and to develop mobile detection systems. DNDO has
    not evaluated the benefits and limitations of background surveys and does
    not plan to conduct background surveys as part of this effort. DHS
    officials also told us that it is DHS's responsibility to advise cities
    about different radiation detection technology and to help state and local
    officials decide which technologies would be most beneficial. However,
    DNDO does not currently advise cities and states on the potential benefits
    of background surveys.

    DHS also has a grant program to improve the capacity of state and local
    governments to prevent and respond to terrorist and catastrophic events,
    including nuclear and radiological attacks. In fiscal year 2006, there was
    about $2.5 billion available in grant funding for state and local
    governments. DHS officials told us that this grant funding could be used
    for radiation surveys if cities requested them. However, according to DHS
    officials, the agency has not received any requests for funding other than
    the 2005 request by New York City. While it is DHS's responsibility to
    inform state and local governments about radiation detection technology,
    it has neither an outreach effort nor does it maintain a central database
    for informing cities and states about background radiation surveys. DHS
    maintains a lessons-learned information-sharing database, which is a
    national online network of best practices and lessons learned to help plan
    and prepare for a terrorist attack. However, it is the responsibility of
    state and local governments to enter information into this database, and
    DHS officials told us they were not aware if New York City officials had
    added any information to the database about the surveys. According to DHS
    officials, it is DOE's responsibility to inform cities and states about
    the surveys, since DOE maintains the capability for conducting them.

    In the absence of clear mission responsibility, there are no plans to
    conduct additional surveys, and no other city has requested one, in part,
    because DOE and DHS are not informing cities about the benefits of these
    surveys.

    Conclusions

    Preventing a nuclear or radiological explosion that could kill or injure
    many people and severely disrupt the nation's economy depends, in part, on
    DOE's ability to search for and deactivate a device with little or no
    warning. Reducing the loss of life from radiation exposure and the spread
    of contamination in the event of a nuclear or radiological explosion also
    depends, in part, on DOE's capability to determine what parts of a U.S.
    city have been contaminated and provide this information to local and
    state governments to help evacuate citizens that are at risk of exposure
    and to administer medical aid. A number of critical capabilities and
    assets for preventing and responding to nuclear and radiological attacks
    reside at DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories. Despite efforts to
    disperse emergency response capabilities and assets to other regions, the
    Remote Sensing Laboratories still play a prominent role in DOE's ability
    to search for and locate nuclear or radiological devices and to minimize
    the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack. The capabilities and
    assets that are unique to the laboratories include consequence management
    teams that provide information to state and local governments about the
    extent of contamination; the planes and helicopters used to locate lost or
    stolen nuclear or radiological materials and measure contamination levels;
    and a sophisticated mapping system that contains information on the
    locations of radiological sources in U.S. cities. In addition, the Remote
    Sensing Laboratories house specialized teams that are highly trained in
    clandestine search techniques and can conduct physically demanding search
    missions, such as maritime boarding. Despite the importance of the assets
    and capabilities located at these facilities, the Remote Sensing
    Laboratories are protected at DOE's lowest level of physical security. If
    DOE's emergency response capabilities were fully dispersed, then providing
    only minimal security may be sufficient. However, since several DOE
    emergency response capabilities remain unique to the Remote Sensing
    Laboratories, we believe that the physical security measures around those
    facilities may not be sufficient to protect their capabilities. We
    recognize that physical protection measures may be costly and that DOE
    security officials must prioritize where to spend limited resources in a
    fiscally constrained environment. However, in our view, a modest
    improvement in security at the Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as
    installing vehicle barriers, would significantly enhance the protection of
    highly valuable assets against a terrorist attack.

    In responding to a nuclear or radiological emergency, DOE must rely on all
    of the capabilities and assets at its disposal. One capability that
    remains underutilized is aerial background radiation surveys. These
    surveys establish baseline radiological data that can later be used to
    more quickly detect radiological threats in U.S. cities and to measure
    changes in contamination levels after a radiological attack in order to
    better focus and reduce cleanup costs. Despite their benefits and
    relatively low cost, there has been a survey of only one major
    metropolitan area. Since neither DOE nor DHS has embraced mission
    responsibility for performing the surveys, they have not evaluated the
    costs, benefits, and limitations of conducting the surveys for
    metropolitan areas that may be most at risk from a terrorist attack. While
    DOE has the expertise to conduct the surveys, the department is reluctant
    to encourage cities to request the surveys because it has a limited number
    of helicopters at its disposal, and they are generally reserved for
    emergency response missions. DHS, which is responsible for assisting state
    and local governments in preparing for a nuclear or radiological attack
    and has a $2.5 billion grant program to improve state and local
    governments' capacity to do so, has not considered aerial surveys to be
    part of its efforts to protect cities against such an attack. With no
    agency assuming responsibility for informing cities about the benefits of
    these surveys, U.S. cities are missing an opportunity to be better
    prepared for a terrorist attack.

    Recommendations for Executive Action

    To better ensure that all capabilities and assets are available and used
    to prevent or minimize the consequence of a nuclear or radiological
    attack, we are making the following three recommendations:

    o The Administrator of NNSA, who implements the emergency response program
    within DOE, should review the physical security measures at the Remote
    Sensing Laboratories and determine whether additional measures should be
    taken to protect the facilities against a loss of critical emergency
    response capabilities or whether it is more cost-effective to fully
    disperse its capabilities and assets to multiple areas of the country.

    o The Administrator of NNSA and the Secretary of Homeland Security should
    evaluate the costs, benefits, and limitations of conducting aerial
    background radiation surveys of metropolitan areas, especially those that
    are considered to be most at risk of a terrorist attack; determine whether
    they would help prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological attack;
    and report the results to the Congress.

    o If the Administrator of NNSA and the Secretary of Homeland Security
    determine that the surveys would help prevent and respond to a nuclear or
    radiological attack, the Secretaries should work together to develop a
    strategy for making greater use of the aerial surveys. In developing this
    strategy, the Secretary of Homeland Security should consider (1) the costs
    and benefits of funding these surveys through its existing grant program
    for state and local governments or through other means and (2) ways to
    inform state and local government officials about the benefits and
    limitations of aerial background radiation surveys so that these
    government officials can make their own decision about whether they would
    benefit from the surveys.

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    We provided DOE and DHS with draft copies of this report for their review
    and comment. DHS agreed with our recommendations. DOE neither agreed nor
    disagreed with our recommendations, but raised concerns about one of our
    findings. In its written comments, DOE disagreed with our finding that the
    physical security of the Remote Sensing Laboratories may not be sufficient
    to protect them against terrorist attacks. According to DOE, physical
    security measures at these two facilities are sufficient because (1) two
    senior-level managers diligently reviewed the physical security measures
    around the facilities and believe that they are sufficient and (2) the
    laboratories are located on Air Force bases. We disagree with these
    rationales and stand behind our finding. First, while we acknowledge that
    current physical security measures for the two Remote Sensing Laboratories
    are consistent with DOE guidance, the laboratories are protected at the
    lowest level of physical security. This means that a facility can meet the
    requirements by having walls and doors but no other physical security
    measures. For example, the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Andrews Air Force
    Base does not have a fence or any vehicle barriers, but security officials
    told us that it still meets the minimum security requirements. Further,
    DOE's justification for protecting the laboratories at the lowest level of
    physical security is that their emergency response capabilities and assets
    have been dispersed across the country and are not concentrated at the
    laboratories. However, although we found that DOE had dispersed some of
    its emergency response capabilities and assets, a number of critical
    emergency response capabilities and assets still exist only at the
    laboratories. Because these capabilities and assets have not been fully
    dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient for
    protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack.

    Second, the security officials responsible for developing security plans
    for the laboratories told us that they do not rely on Air Force personnel
    to protect the facility against a terrorist attack. As we reported, while
    the laboratories' location on Air Force bases may appear to provide an
    additional level of security, access onto Nellis and Andrews Air Force
    Bases is not strictly limited, and any person with a federal government
    identification may gain entry. Furthermore, guards at these installations
    do not inspect every vehicle. In fact, as discussed in our report, GAO
    staff gained access to the bases multiple times with little or no scrutiny
    of their identification, and their vehicles were never searched.

    In its written comments, DOE agreed that there may be value in performing
    additional aerial background radiation surveys. However, DOE was concerned
    that existing mission requirements may limit DOE's ability to conduct
    aerial surveys. While we recognize that DOE has limited resources to
    conduct aerial surveys, we note that the agency does have the expertise
    and that there is funding potentially available under DHS's grant program
    for state and local governments. If neither DOE nor DHS assume mission
    responsibility for conducting the aerial surveys and do not inform cities
    about the benefits of these surveys, U.S. cities will miss an important
    opportunity to be better prepared for a terrorist attack.

    DOE also noted that aerial background radiation surveys have limitations.
    For example, aerial surveys may not be able to detect well-shielded
    radiological materials. We acknowledged these limitations in our report.
    However, despite the limitations, without baseline survey information from
    an aerial survey, law enforcement officials may lose valuable time when
    searching for nuclear or radiological threats by investigating
    pre-existing sources of radiation that are not harmful. In addition, if
    there were a nuclear or radiological attack, the lack of baseline
    radiological data would likely make the cleanup more costly and time
    consuming.

    DHS provided comments via e-mail. Comments from DOE's NNSA are reprinted
    in appendix I. DOE and DHS also provided technical comments, which we
    incorporated, as appropriate.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy, the
    Administrator of NNSA, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and interested
    congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others
    upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
    the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
    me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov . Contact points for our Offices
    of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
    page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report
    are listed in appendix II.

    Sincerely yours,

    Gene Aloise Director, Natural Resources and Environment

    Appendix I

    Comments from the Department of Energy

    Appendix II

    GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    GAO Contact

    Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov

    Staff Acknowledgments

    In addition to the contact named above, Leland Cogliani, John Delicath,
    Mattias Fenton, Glen Levis, Greg Marchand, Keith Rhodes, Rebecca Shea, and
    Ned Woodward made significant contributions to this report.

    (360657)

    www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-1015 .

    To view the full product, including the scope
    and methodology, click on the link above.

    For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or
    aloisee@gao.gov.

    Highlights of GAO-06-1015 , a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
    National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Committee
    on Government Reform, House of Representatives

    September 2006

    COMBATING NUCLEAR TERRORISM

    Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to
    Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could Be Strengthened

    The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains an emergency response capability
    to quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological threats in the
    United States. This capability has taken on increased significance after
    the attacks of September 11, 2001, because there is heightened concern
    that terrorists may try to detonate a nuclear or radiological device in a
    major U.S. city. This report discusses (1) the capabilities and assets DOE
    has to prevent and respond to potential nuclear and radiological attacks
    in the United States, (2) the physical security measures in place at DOE's
    two key emergency response facilities and whether they are consistent with
    DOE guidance, and (3) the benefits of using DOE's aerial background
    radiation surveys to enhance emergency response capabilities.

    What GAO Recommends

    GAO recommends, among other things, that (1) DOE review the physical
    security measures at its two key emergency response facilities to
    determine whether additional measures should be taken to protect the
    facilities and (2) DOE and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
    evaluate the costs, benefits, and limitations of making greater use of
    aerial background radiation surveys of U.S. cities. DHS agreed and DOE
    neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations. DOE raised concerns
    about our finding on security measures.

    DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear
    or radiological attack in the United States. These include specialized
    teams to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or radiological
    devices and to help manage the consequences of a nuclear or radiological
    attack. These capabilities are primarily found at DOE's two key emergency
    response facilities-the Remote Sensing Laboratories at Nellis Air Force
    Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.

    DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of
    physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE,
    capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological
    emergencies have been dispersed across the country and are not
    concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a number of critical
    capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories
    and whose loss would significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly prevent
    and respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency. These capabilities
    include the most highly trained teams for minimizing the consequences of a
    nuclear or radiological attack and the only helicopters and planes that
    can readily help locate nuclear or radiological devices or measure
    contamination levels after a radiological attack. Because these
    capabilities and assets have not been fully dispersed, current physical
    security measures may not be sufficient for protecting the facilities
    against a terrorist attack.

    There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation
    surveys of U.S. cities. Specifically, the surveys can be used to compare
    changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in
    U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination levels after a
    radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts.
    Despite the benefits, only one major city has been surveyed. Neither DOE
    nor DHS has mission responsibility for conducting these surveys, and there
    are no plans to conduct additional surveys.

    DOE Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background Radiation Survey
    *** End of document. ***