Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing
Voter Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote
(27-SEP-05, GAO-05-997).
GAO's past work and the work of others has shown that challenges
processing voter registration applications and maintaining voter
registration lists can result in individuals arriving at polls on
Election Day to find they were not listed as registered. GAO
surveyed local election officials in 14 jurisdictions in 7 states
(AZ, CA, MI, NY, TX, VA, and WI) to obtain their views on
managing voter registration for the 2004 election. GAO selected
the 7 states considering characteristics relevant to voter
registration, such as whether a statewide voter registration list
existed prior to the enactment of the Help America Vote Act
(HAVA) of 2002. Locations were selected within each state to
represent one small and one large election jurisdiction. This
report discusses election officials' characterization of (1)
challenges receiving voter registration applications, including
checking them for completeness; (2) removing voters' names from
voter registration lists and ensuring that names were not
inadvertently removed; and (3) implementing HAVA's provisional
voting and identification requirements. HAVA, in part, requires
that states offer provisional ballots to voters not listed as
registered who declare eligibility and first-time voters who
registered by mail after January 1, 2003, and could not provide
identification. GAO offered election officials the opportunity to
verify the accuracy of their responses used to prepare this
report.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-997
ACCNO: A38337
TITLE: Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on
Managing Voter Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can
Vote
DATE: 09/27/2005
SUBJECT: Data integrity
Elections
Voting records
Identity verification
Policy evaluation
Surveys
Voting systems
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-05-997
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
Report to Congressional Requesters
September 2005
ELECTIONS
Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing Voter Registration and
Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote
GAO-05-997
[IMG]
September 2005
ELECTIONS
Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing Voter Registration and
Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote
What GAO Found
Local election officials representing all but 1 of the 14 jurisdictions
GAO surveyed after the November 2004 election reported facing some
challenges processing voter registration applications and took steps to
address them. Processing applications received from voter registration
drives sponsored by non-governmental organizations posed a challenge to
election officials in 12 of the 14 jurisdictions, while half of the
officials reported challenges receiving applications from other external
sources, such as motor vehicle agencies. Challenges occurred in processing
these applications for reasons such as incomplete or inaccurate
information on voter registration applications. Half of the officials
reported that their offices faced challenges checking applications for
completeness, accuracy, or duplicates, citing, among other things,
insufficient staffing to check the applications. Steps taken by election
officials to address these and other challenges included hiring additional
staff to handle the volume of applications received and contacting
applicants to get correct information.
All but 1 of the 14 election officials reported that, using various
sources of information, they removed names from voter registration lists
during 2004 if, for example, voters had moved, were deceased, or were
ineligible due to a felony conviction. To help ensure names of eligible
voters were not inadvertently removed from voter registration lists,
officials reported contacting voters to confirm removal, matched voters'
identifying information (such as name and address) with address changes
provided by the U.S. Postal Service, and matched voter registration
records with felony or death records. GAO reported in June 2005 about
problems officials in these same jurisdictions experienced verifying voter
information with death or felony information from existing data sources.
GAO's survey showed that all 14 election jurisdictions permitted citizens
to cast provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. HAVA gives
states discretion to implement provisional voting based on state voter
eligibility requirements. According to the election officials surveyed,
about 423,000 provisional ballots were cast in 13 of the 14 jurisdictions,
and 70 percent of those votes were counted. Also, 8 of the 14
jurisdictions reported challenges implementing provisional voting, in
part, because some poll workers were not familiar with provisional voting
or staff did not have sufficient time to process provisional ballots. To
address these challenges, election officials in these jurisdictions said
they hired extra staff or provided training to poll workers.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
Selected Jurisdictions Reported Challenges Processing Voter
Registration Applications and Various Steps They Took to Address Them
Jurisdictions Reported They Removed Voter Names from Registration Lists
for Various Reasons, but Took Steps to Ensure That Eligible Voters' Names
Were Not Inadvertently Removed
All Jurisdictions Reported Enabling Provisional Votes to Be Cast but Not
All Provisional Ballots Met States' Criteria for Whether These Votes
Should Count
1
6 9
16
26
32
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
Appendix II Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix III Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Receiving Voter Registration Applications
Appendix IV Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Checking Voter Registration Applications
Appendix V Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Entering Information into Voter Registration Lists 74
Appendix VI Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Removing Names from Voter Registration Lists 77
Page i GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VII Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Implementing Provisional Voting 84
Appendix VIII Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle
Agency Offices with Voter Registration Applications 98
Experiences of Selected State MVA Offices 99 Experiences of Selected Local
MVA Offices 103
Appendix IX Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency Officials
Appendix X GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Tables
Table 1: Election Officials' Responses to Questions about Reasons Why
Voters' Names Were Removed from Voter Registration Lists in 14
Jurisdictions during 2004
Table 2: Number and Percentage of Provisional Ballots Election Officials
Reported Cast and Counted in the November 2004 Election in 14
Jurisdictions
Table 3: Number of Provisional Ballots Cast as a Percentage of Total
Ballots Cast for President in the November 2004 Election in 14
Jurisdictions
Table 4: State Selection Factors
28
33
35 40
Figures
Figure 1: Examples of Opportunities Citizens Have to Apply to
Register to Vote 13 Figure 2: Sample of Michigan's Voter Registration
Application 14 Figure 3: Sample of Texas' Voter Registration Application
15 Figure 4: Extent of Challenges Reported by 14 Election
Jurisdictions Receiving Applications from Organizations External to
Election Offices: MVAs, Other NVRA Agencies, and Voter Registration Drives
Sponsored by Non-Governmental Organizations 17
Page ii GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Figure 5: Extent of Challenges Election Officials Reported Experiencing
When Checking Applications for Completeness, Accuracy, or Duplicates 19
Figure 6: Extent of Challenges Reported by Election Officials Entering
Voter Information into Voter Registration Lists and Scanning Signatures of
New Voters into Voter Registration Systems 21
Figure 7: Reasons That Provisional Ballots Were Not Counted for the
November 2004 Election in Selected Jurisdictions 36
Figure 8: MVA Officials' Characterization of How Difficult or Easy It Was
for MVA Staff to Assist Clients with Completing Voter Registration
Applications, Accept Applications from Clients, and Forward Applications
to Election Offices 99
Abbreviations
FEC Federal Election Commission
HAVA Help America Vote Act of 2002
MVA motor vehicle agency
NVRA National Voter Registration Act of 1993
USPS U.S. Postal Service
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
Page iii GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548
September 27, 2005
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Government Affairs and Homeland Security
United States Senate
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives
After the November 2000 election, reports in the media and elsewhere
have questioned the mechanics and effectiveness of voter registration and
voter registration list maintenance by highlighting accounts of
individuals
who thought they were registered being turned away from polling places
on Election Day. In managing the voter registration process and
maintaining voter registration lists, state and local election officials
must
balance two goals-(1) minimizing the burden on eligible people of
registering to vote and (2) ensuring that voter lists are accurate
(limited to
those eligible to vote), which includes ensuring that appropriately
registered voters are not inadvertently removed from the voter
registration
lists. All the while, state and local election officials must try to
ensure that
eligible citizens have the opportunity to cast their votes and have them
counted accurately in federal, state, and local elections.
Over the last several years, federal legislation has been enacted to
expand
the opportunities for citizens to become registered to vote, improve the
accuracy of voter registration lists, and ensure that eligible voters have
the
opportunity to cast their ballots. In 1993, the National Voter
Registration
Act (NVRA), commonly called the Motor Voter Act, was enacted.1 Among
other things, NVRA expanded the opportunity of citizens to register to
1Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993).
Page 1 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
vote in federal elections at state motor vehicle agencies and other public
organizations, such as public assistance agencies and armed forces
recruiting centers. NVRA also limited the circumstances under which states
could remove the names of eligible voters from registration lists for
federal elections and required states to take certain steps to accurately
maintain such voter registration lists by removing the names of certain
types of ineligible persons. In 2002, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was
enacted and, among other things, it requires states to implement
provisional voting for elections for federal office. HAVA, in general,
requires that individuals not listed as registered or whose eligibility is
questioned by an election official must be notified about and permitted to
cast a provisional ballot that is set aside for review by election
officials at a later time so that they can determine whether the person is
eligible to vote under state law.2 HAVA also requires that provisional
ballots be provided to first-time voters who had registered to vote by
mail on or after January 1, 2003, but were unable to show photo
identification or another qualifying identification document when voting
in person or by mail in a federal election.3 In addition, HAVA requires
that election officials must provide access to information that permits
voters to learn if their provisional ballot was counted, and, if not, why
not.
Our work, which began in January 2004, focuses on the efforts of local
election officials in 14 jurisdictions within 7 states to manage the
registration process, maintain accurate voter registration lists, and
ensure that eligible citizens in those jurisdictions had the opportunity
to cast ballots during the 2004 election. Specifically, for the 2004
election, we are reporting on election officials' characterization of
their experiences with regard to (1) managing the voter registration
process and any challenges related to receiving voter registration
applications; checking them for completeness, accuracy, and duplication;
and entering information into voter registration lists; (2) removing
voters' names from voter registration lists and ensuring that the names of
eligible voters were not inadvertently
2Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002). With respect to provisional
voting, under HAVA, states that had either (1) no voter registration
requirements for voters with respect of federal elections (North Dakota)
or (2) polling place registration on Election Day with respect to federal
elections (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) in
effect on and after August 1, 1994, are not subject to HAVA's provisional
voting requirements.
3Under HAVA, such individuals who desire to vote in person may cast a
provisional ballot, whereas an individual desiring to vote by mail may
cast a ballot that is to be treated as a provisional ballot.
Page 2 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
removed; and (3) implementing HAVA provisional voting and identification
requirements and addressing any challenges encountered related to these
requirements. We are also providing information on motor vehicle agency
(MVA)4 officials' characterization of their experiences assisting citizens
who apply to register to vote at MVA offices and forwarding voter
registration applications to election offices. This information is
contained in appendix VIII.
In addition to this report, we have also issued, or plan to issue this
year, reports on other specific election issues. In June 2005, we issued a
report on the efforts of state and local election officials in seven
states-the same seven states and local jurisdictions covered in this
report-to ensure that voter registration lists are accurate.5 Later this
year we plan to issue reports on (1) actions by nine states without HAVA
waivers6 to create and maintain computerized, statewide voter registration
lists as of January 1, 2004; (2) significant security and reliability
concerns that have been identified for electronic voting systems; and (3)
the Department of Defense's implementation of the Federal Voting
Assistance Program to facilitate absentee voting by military personnel
during the November 2004 election. These reports respond to congressional
requests made prior to the November 2004 election. In addition, given
concerns about the November 2004 election process, we are undertaking a
broader, more comprehensive study of election administration and processes
related to the November 2004 general election. This more comprehensive
study, which we plan to issue in 2006, will address activities and
challenges- people, processes, and technology-associated with each major
stage of election administration to include registration, absentee and
early voting; Election Day preparation and activities; and vote counting
and
4States may refer to their motor vehicle agencies by different names. For
purposes of this report, we will generally refer to them as "motor vehicle
agencies."
5GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Election
Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478
(Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).
6With respect to HAVA's statewide voter registration list requirements,
while HAVA established a deadline of January 1, 2004, for states to have a
statewide voter registration list and verification procedures, it also
provided that states could request a waiver to extend the deadline to
January 1, 2006. Eight states did not request a waiver, 42 states and the
District of Columbia did request and received waivers, and 1 state (North
Dakota) is not subject to HAVA's statewide voter registration list
requirements. North Dakota is exempt from these requirements because it
qualifies for a HAVA exemption applicable to any "State in which, under a
State law in effect continuously on and after the date of
enactment...there is no voter registration requirement for individuals in
the State with respect to elections for Federal office." Pub. L. No.
107-252, 116 Stat. 1666, 1709 (2002).
Page 3 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
certification. In October 2001, we issued a similar report that focused on
how elections were conducted in the United States, and the people,
processes and technology that were generally associated with the
preparation for and administration of elections. Among other things, the
report discussed the activities and challenges associated with each stage
of election administration, including voter registration.7
To address our objectives for this report, we analyzed information
collected from elections and motor vehicle agency offices in seven
states-Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, Texas, Virginia, and
Wisconsin.8 Our selection of the seven states is geographically diverse,
and took into consideration a range of voter registration-related factors
and unique characteristics of the states that might affect the
implementation of HAVA. Specifically, we selected states that took various
approaches for administering elections-for example, Wisconsin has same-day
registration, which exempts the state from the HAVA provisional voting
requirement; Arizona has on-line registration; Michigan has a reputation
as a model for registration practices; and some local jurisdictions
administer elections at the county level and others at the city or
township level. Within each of the seven states, using population data
from the 2000 U.S. Census, we then selected two jurisdictions: a local
jurisdiction with a large population and a local jurisdiction with a small
population.9 Other criteria we applied to select these jurisdictions
included the proximity of the locations to our site visits with state
election and motor vehicle officials, suggestions by state election
officials, and proximity to a local motor vehicle office. The 14
jurisdictions we selected were Gila and Maricopa Counties, Arizona; Los
Angeles and Yolo Counties, California; City of Detroit and Delta Township,
Michigan; New York City and Rensselaer County, New York; Bexar and Webb
Counties, Texas; Albemarle and Arlington Counties, Virginia; and the
cities of Franklin and Madison,
7GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across the
Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).
8We selected these states using a nonprobability sample-a sample in which
some items in the population have no chance, or an unknown chance, of
being selected. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population. Thus, the information we obtained cannot be
generalized to state and local election jurisdictions or MVA offices
either nationwide or at the state level.
9We defined a local jurisdiction with a large population as one having
150,000 or more people of voting age and a local jurisdiction with a small
population as one having less than 150,000 people of voting age. The
population figures are based on the 2000 U.S. Census.
Page 4 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Wisconsin. The selected states and jurisdictions are the same states and
jurisdictions we discussed in our June 2005 report.
We gathered information from state and local officials using a
multipronged approach. First, we reviewed relevant laws, state reports,
and documents related to the voter registration process in the seven
states. Second, we interviewed state and local election officials in the
seven states and 14 jurisdictions to obtain information on their
registration processes and implementation of the HAVA requirements for
provisional voting and voter identification. Third, we sent a survey to
election officials in the 14 jurisdictions to gather information about
their experiences with the November 2004 election. We developed our survey
questions on the basis of our review of laws, reports, and documents and
our interviews with state and local election officials in the seven states
and 14 jurisdictions. Our survey primarily asked questions on (1)
challenges, if any, in processing voter registration
applications-specifically, challenges receiving voter registration
applications from MVAs, other NVRA agencies, and voter registration drives
sponsored by non-governmental organizations; checking voter registration
applications for completeness, accuracy, and duplicates; and entering
voter information into registration lists or systems; (2) whether names of
registrants were removed from voter registration lists, reasons why names
were removed, and steps taken to ensure that names of eligible registrants
were not inadvertently removed; and (3) HAVA's provisional voting and
first-time voter identification requirements-specifically, the number of
provisional ballots cast and counted, including reasons why jurisdictions
did not count provisional ballots if this did occur; how voters were
informed about provisional voting and its outcome; and whether first-time
voters who registered by mail were allowed to cast provisional ballots if
they did not provide required identification. Appendix II provides a copy
of the survey we sent to each jurisdiction.
Finally, to provide information on MVA officials' characterization of
their experiences with voter registration applications received before the
November 2004 election, we sent a survey to state and local MVA officials
Page 5 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
in six of the seven states and 12 of the 14 jurisdictions.10 The survey
primarily asked questions about the MVA offices' experiences with (1)
assisting citizens with completing voter registration applications, (2)
forwarding the applications to election offices, and (3) responding to
individuals and state or local election officials who contacted their
offices about individuals who declared they had applied to register to
vote at MVA offices but their names were not on voter registration lists
when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. Appendix IX provides
a copy of the survey we sent to the MVA officials.
We did not independently verify the accuracy or completeness of responses
provided from our surveys of election officials and MVA officials.
However, local election officials and state and local MVA officials we
surveyed were provided the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their
responses for this report and, on the basis of the comments we received,
we made technical changes, where appropriate. The results of our work
cannot be generalized to state and local election jurisdictions and MVA
offices at the state level or nationwide.
We conducted our work from January 2004 through September 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix
I discusses our scope and methodology in greater detail.
Election officials representing all but one of the jurisdictions we
surveyed following the November 2004 election said they faced some
challenges managing the voter registration process, including (1)
receiving voter registration applications; (2) checking them for
completeness, accuracy, and duplication; and (3) entering information into
voter registration lists; when challenges occurred, election officials
reported they took various steps to address them. For example, when asked
whether their staff faced challenges receiving voter registration
applications from MVAs, other NVRA agencies, or voter registration drives
sponsored by nongovernmental organizations, election officials
representing 12 of the 14 jurisdictions responded that staff faced
challenges receiving voter
Results in Brief
10We did not survey MVA officials in Wisconsin regarding voter
registration under NVRA; MVA offices in Wisconsin do not participate in
voter registration because the state is exempt from NVRA. Wisconsin's
exemption from NVRA, in general, is based upon the fact that it did not,
and still does not, have voter registration requirements for federal
elections under state laws that were in effect on the NVRA-specified
exemption date of August 1, 1994.
Page 6 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
registration applications from voter registration drives; 4 faced
challenges receiving applications from MVAs; and 4 faced challenges
receiving applications from other NVRA agencies. Officials responded that
the reasons these challenges occurred included applications that were
incomplete or inaccurate, and applications that were received too close
to, or after, their state's registration deadline. Election officials
reported that, to address these challenges, their jurisdictions took
steps, including contacting applicants to resolve issues with incomplete
or inaccurate applications or hiring staff to handle the volume of
applications received near registration deadlines. In addition, officials
in 7 of the 14 jurisdictions reported that their staff faced challenges
checking voter registration applications for completeness, accuracy, or
duplicates. According to these officials, these challenges occurred for a
variety of reasons, including problems contacting individuals to obtain
complete and accurate information and insufficient staffing to check the
applications. They reported that, among other things, their staff
addressed these challenges by sending letters or calling applicants to
obtain correct information. Finally, 6 of the 14 election officials
reported that their staff faced challenges entering or scanning voter
information into registration lists for reasons such as the volume of
applications received close to Election Day and problems with the scanning
equipment. To address these challenges, they reported that more staff were
hired and staff worked overtime. Challenges like those experienced by the
election officials we surveyed are not new. Over the last few years, we
and others have found that challenges managing the voter registration
process can result in eligible citizens not being registered to vote on
Election Day. For example, in our October 2001 report, we found that about
46 percent of jurisdictions nationwide had problems with NVRA
registrations during the November 2000 election. We cited local election
officials who told us that problems processing late, incomplete, or
illegible voter registration applications could result in individuals
showing up at the polls and discovering they were never registered.
Our survey of election officials representing the 14 jurisdictions showed
that all but 1 of the jurisdictions reported removing names from
registration lists during 2004 for various reasons, including that voters
requested that their names be removed from the voter registration list;
information from the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) showing that voters had
moved outside the jurisdiction; felony records received from federal,
state, or local governments identifying voters as ineligible due to felony
convictions; and death records received from state or local vital
statistics offices. NVRA prohibits removing a voter's name from a
registration list for a federal election solely for not voting, but
permits removal for certain
Page 7 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
specified reasons, including at the request of the voter, a move outside
the voting jurisdiction, or due to ineligibility by reason of death or a
felony conviction as provided by state law. When removing names from
registration lists, election officials reported that they took various
steps to ensure that the names of eligible voters were not inadvertently
removed from voter registration lists. These steps included sending
letters or postcards to registrants to verify that voters wanted their
names removed; matching voters' identifying information with USPS data and
sending voters identified by USPS as having moved outside the jurisdiction
notices of removal; and matching voter registration records with felony
records or death records to confirm it was the same person. Our June 2005
report showed that these same jurisdictions faced challenges verifying the
accuracy of registration lists because of problems matching voter
information with various records maintained by other organizations, such
as records maintained by state and federal entities on felony convictions
and deaths.11 The report echoed some of the issues highlighted in our 2001
report, wherein, on the basis of a national survey of local election
officials, we reported on challenges that election officials identified
with voter registration, such as obtaining accurate and timely information
to update voter registration lists.12
Our survey of officials in the 14 election jurisdictions showed that all
of the jurisdictions reported that they permitted citizens to cast
provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. In addition, 12 of
the 14 jurisdictions to which this was applicable reported that they
offered certain first-time voters who registered by mail the opportunity
to cast provisional ballots. HAVA, in general, requires that states
provide an individual the opportunity to cast a provisional ballot if, for
example, the individual's name does not appear on the voter registration
list. HAVA also gives states discretion to determine if an individual is
eligible to vote and whether the provisional ballot should be counted as a
vote in accordance with state law. For example, in one state, at least a
portion of a provisional ballot-e.g., votes for statewide offices-may be
counted when an individual casting the ballot was eligible to vote but not
at the election district where the ballot was cast. In another state, a
provisional ballot is
11GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Election
Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478
(Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).
12GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges Across the
Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).
Page 8 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
not counted if the ballot is cast in a precinct other than the
individual's assigned precinct. Election officials in 13 of the 14
jurisdictions reported that 423,149 provisional ballots were cast, and 70
percent (297,662) were counted. Not all provisional votes were counted
because, as election officials reported, not all provisional ballots met
states' criteria for determining which ballots should be counted. Reasons
that provisional ballots cast during the 2004 election were not counted,
as reported by election officials, included, among others, that
individuals did not meet the residency eligibility requirements, had not
registered or tried to register to vote with the election office, had not
submitted the voter registration applications at motor vehicle agency
offices, or election officials did not have time to enter information from
applicants into their voter registration lists because applications were
received at the election offices very close to or after the state
registration deadline. HAVA requires that states establish means of
communicating how voters who cast provisional ballots can learn-free of
charge-whether their votes counted. Local election officials in 12 of the
13 jurisdictions13 we surveyed reported that they set up mechanisms to
inform voters-without cost-about the outcome of their provisional votes
during the November 2004 election. These mechanisms included toll-free
telephone numbers, Web sites, and letters sent to the voters who cast
provisional ballots. Election officials also reported that provisional
voters in their jurisdictions received written information at their
polling places about how to find out the outcome of their provisional
ballots, and provisional voters in 8 of the 13 jurisdictions had the
opportunity to access information about the outcome of their ballots
within 10 days after the election. Finally, election officials
representing 8 of the 14 jurisdictions reported facing challenges
implementing provisional voting for various reasons, including some poll
workers not being familiar with provisional voting or, in one jurisdiction
representing a large number of precincts, staff not having sufficient time
to process provisional ballots. To address these challenges, the officials
reported that they provided additional training to poll workers and hired
additional staff to count provisional ballots.
Background The constitutional framework for elections contemplates both
state and federal roles. States are responsible for the administration of
both their
13While New York State had not passed legislation to implement provisional
voting requirements in HAVA by the time of the November 2004 election, New
York had a form of provisional voting in place referred to as affidavit
ballots. The New York City election office said that letters were sent to
voters whose affidavit ballots did not count.
Page 9 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
own elections and federal elections. They also regulate various aspects of
the elections process, including, for example, ballot access, registration
procedures, absentee voting requirements, establishment of polling places,
provision of Election Day workers, and counting and certifying the vote.
Although the states are responsible for running elections, Congress has
authority to affect the administration of elections. Congress' authority
to regulate elections depends upon the type of election. With regard to
federal elections, Congress has constitutional authority over both
congressional and presidential elections. In addition, with respect to
federal, state, and local elections, a number of constitutional amendments
authorize Congress to enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory
acts.
Federal Laws Affecting Voter Registration and Provisional Balloting
Under its various constitutional authorities, Congress has passed
legislation regarding the administration of elections, including voter
registration, voter registration list maintenance, and provisional voting.
In 1993 Congress passed the National Voter Registration Act of 1993,14
also known as the "motor voter" law, to establish registration procedures
designed, in part, to "increase the number of eligible citizens who
register to vote in elections for Federal office. . . . protect the
integrity of the electoral process. . . . [and] ensure that accurate and
current voter registration lists are maintained." NVRA expanded the number
of locations and opportunities for eligible citizens to apply to register
to vote.15 Under NVRA, an eligible citizen conducting certain transactions
at a motor vehicle agency-such as applying for, renewing, or changing the
address on a driver's license-can simultaneously apply to register to vote
in elections for federal office or, if applicable, change the voter's
address. Also, various agencies, such as those involved in providing
public assistance, U.S. armed forces recruitment offices, and offices in a
state providing state-funded services to people with disabilities, must be
designated as voter registration agencies. Each state may also designate
other offices as voter registration agencies, such as public libraries,
schools, offices of city and county governments, and unemployment
compensation offices. In addition, NVRA requires states to accept and use
14Pub. L. No. 103-31, 101 Stat. 77 (1993).
15States that had either (1) no voter registration requirement for voters
with respect to federal elections (North Dakota) or (2) polling place
registration on Election Day with respect to federal elections (Idaho,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) in effect on and after
August 1, 1994, are not subject to NVRA.
Page 10 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
a mail-in registration application developed by the Federal Election
Commission.
NVRA also outlined various requirements for the processing of registration
forms and maintenance of voter registration lists for elections for
federal office. Under NVRA, agencies designated as voter registration
agencies, such as motor vehicle agencies, are to transmit completed voter
registration forms to the appropriate state election officials not later
than 10 days after the date of acceptance or, if accepted within 5 days
before the end of the registration deadline for an election, the forms are
to be transmitted not later than 5 days after acceptance. Also, under
NVRA, the names of people who are registered to vote may not be removed
from voter registration lists for federal elections except for the
following reasons: upon written confirmation of a change of address
outside the election jurisdiction; on the grounds that the voter has
changed address to a location outside the election jurisdiction on the
basis of change of address information from USPS, but only if there is
also a failure to respond to confirmation mailings and a failure to vote
in any election within two subsequent general federal elections; the
request of the voter; the death of the voter; a criminal conviction, as
provided by state law; and mental incapacity, as provided by state law.
HAVA was enacted in October 2002 and, in addition to establishing
requirements for provisional ballots for federal elections effective 2004,
the law requires, in general, that individuals who registered by mail on
or after January 1, 2003, and have not voted in a federal election
beginning in 2004 in the state since registering to vote to show photo
identification or another qualifying identification document when voting
in person or by mail in a federal election. Under HAVA, the other
qualifying documents that can be provided to show proof of identity and
residency are a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government
check, pay check, or other government document that shows the voter's name
and address.
Voter Registration in States and Local Jurisdictions
Voter registration is a prerequisite in nearly all voting jurisdictions
and is based on state designated voter eligibility requirements. Ensuring
that eligible persons are registered to vote is an ongoing challenge for
election officials and is complicated by factors such as jurisdiction
size, mobility of voters, and community diversity. Communities with large
student or military populations must manage voters constantly moving in or
out of a jurisdiction, and communities with diverse populations must
handle substantial numbers of new citizens and face language challenges in
communicating voter registration requirements. U.S. citizens who meet
Page 11 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
state voter eligibility requirements have numerous opportunities to
register to vote and can do so by filling out and submitting applications
by certain deadlines. States establish voting eligibility requirements
that generally include that the voter is at least 18 years of age on the
day of the election, a citizen of the United States, mentally competent,
and meets state eligibility qualifications regarding felon status. In
general, to register to vote, eligible citizens may apply at local
election offices or at motor vehicle agencies and other agencies, such as
public assistance agencies, covered by NVRA; by submitting applications to
local election officials; or through registration drives sponsored by
various groups, including political parties. Figure 1 illustrates some of
the opportunities citizens have to apply to register to vote.
Page 12 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Figure 2: Sample of Michigan's Voter Registration Application
Page 14 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Figure 3: Sample of Texas' Voter Registration Application
Once an application is received and accepted, state and local
jurisdictions compile registration applications into lists of registered
voters. A citizen's access to voting is based primarily on the appearance
of his or her name on such a list. For votes cast absentee by mail
(absentee voting), for votes cast in person prior to Election Day (early
voting), and for votes cast at the polls on Election Day, election
officials typically verify an individual's eligibility using a list of
registered voters or a poll book before allowing him or her to vote.
Election officials also update and delete information from voter
registration lists. However, NVRA's provisions specifically prohibit
removing a name from the voter registration list for a federal election
solely for failure to vote or for a change of address to another location
within the same election jurisdiction.
Page 15 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Selected Jurisdictions Reported Challenges Processing Voter Registration
Applications and Various Steps They Took to Address Them
In our survey of election officials, all but one of the jurisdictions
reported that they faced challenges receiving and processing voter
registration applications and that they took various steps to address
them. Most of these challenges occurred with applications received from
voter registration drives sponsored by non-governmental organizations.
Election officials in half the jurisdictions also reported challenges
checking voter registration applications for completeness, or for
accuracy, or for duplicates. And when asked to what extent elections staff
experienced challenges entering voter information into voter registration
lists, 4 of 14 jurisdictions reported this as being a challenge, to some
extent. Election officials reported taking steps to address these
challenges by hiring extra staff, among other things. Over the past few
years, our work and the work of others have found that challenges
processing voter registration applications can result in eligible citizens
not being registered to vote on Election Day.
Jurisdictions Reported Challenges Receiving Voter Registration
Applications from Various Organizations External to Election Offices
Our survey of election officials representing the 14 jurisdictions showed
that staff in most of these offices reported challenges receiving voter
registration applications from various organizations external to election
offices and most of these challenges occurred with applications received
from voter registration drives sponsored by non-governmental
organizations. Citizens in the states and jurisdictions covered by our
survey can register to vote with various organizations external to
election offices. In all of the jurisdictions-except those in Wisconsin,
which is exempt from NVRA because it permits voters to register at the
polling place on Election Day-citizens can apply to register to vote at
MVAs and other NVRA agencies. Also, as mentioned earlier, citizens can
register to vote during registration drives sponsored by political
parties. Applications from these organizations are then sent
electronically, or by mail, or are hand-delivered to election offices.
Figure 4 shows the extent of challenges encountered in the 14
jurisdictions as reported by the election officials representing those
jurisdictions when receiving voter registration applications from voter
registration drives sponsored by nongovernmental organizations, MVAs, and
other NVRA agencies.
Page 16 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Figure 4: Extent of Challenges Reported by 14 Election Jurisdictions
Receiving Applications from Organizations External to Election Offices:
MVAs, Other NVRA Agencies, and Voter Registration Drives Sponsored by
Non-Governmental Organizations
Great extent Some extent Little or no extent
Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected
jurisdictions.
aWhile Wisconsin is not subject to NVRA, one local jurisdiction responding
to our survey-the City of Madison-received applications from other
municipal agencies, such as public libraries or fire stations.
Election officials representing the 13 jurisdictions that reported
experiencing challenges to some extent or to a great extent receiving
applications responded that these challenges occurred for various reasons,
such as incomplete or inaccurate information on voter registration
applications or applications that were received close to or after the
registration deadline. In the states and 14 jurisdictions we selected for
our
Page 17 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
review, deadlines for submitting applications to vote varied by state, as
specified by state statute. In five of the seven states-Arizona, Michigan,
New York, Texas, and Virginia-registration applications were to be
received at the election office about 1 month before the election. In one
state, California, citizens could register 15 days before the election. In
Wisconsin, which allows "same-day registration," eligible citizens with
required identification can register to vote at the polling place on the
day of the election.
Election officials also reported that they took a variety of steps to try
to address the challenges they encountered, including contacting
individual voters to resolve issues with incomplete or inaccurate
information, adding staff to handle the volume of applications received
near registration deadlines, and offering training to organizations
sponsoring voter registration drives. (App. III discusses in greater
detail responses to our survey with regard to receiving applications from
external organizations.)
Election Officials in Half of the 14 Jurisdictions Reported Challenges
Checking Voter Registration Applications for Completeness, Accuracy, or
Duplicates
Election officials representing 7 of the 14 jurisdictions also reported
that their staff experienced challenges, to some extent or a great extent,
checking voter registration applications for completeness, accuracy, or
duplicates. During interviews we conducted prior to the November 2004
election, state and local election officials told us that they take
specific steps to check voter registration applications before entering
voter information into voter registration lists. All of the officials told
us that they check applications for completeness before entering voter
information into voter registration lists, and with regard to accuracy,
took steps to verify eligibility when an applicant applies to register.
For example, officials in Arizona, Texas, Virginia, and New York said that
their voter registration computer systems are programmed to calculate the
age of the applicant, on the basis of the date of birth the registrant
provides, and reject applications of individuals who will be younger than
18 years of age on the day of the next election. At the same time, Arizona
and Michigan match their voter registration applications against state
motor vehicle agency records to verify information. Also, officials we
spoke with in the seven states said that they initially verify that an
applicant resides in the jurisdiction. Finally, to identify duplicate
registrations, election officials said that they check existing voter
lists before adding new voters to the registration lists.
Our survey asked election officials in the 14 jurisdictions the extent to
which their offices experienced challenges checking voter registration
applications for completeness, accuracy, or duplicates and officials
Page 18 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
representing 7 of the 14 jurisdictions responded that their staff
experienced, to some or a great extent, challenges in at least one of
these three areas. Figure 5 shows how election officials in the 14
jurisdictions responded to our survey regarding checking applications for
completeness, or accuracy, or duplicates.
Figure 5: Extent of Challenges Election Officials Reported Experiencing
When Checking Applications for Completeness, Accuracy, or Duplicates
Great extent Some extent Little or no extent
Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected
jurisdictions.
In those instances where officials responded that checking applications
for completeness, accuracy, and duplication was a challenge to some or a
great extent, they also identified what caused the challenges to occur and
what actions they took to try to address them. According to officials in 7
of the 14 jurisdictions, challenges occurred for various reasons-including
Page 19 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
difficulties determining what information on the application was
inaccurate, problems contacting individuals to obtain complete and
accurate information, insufficient time between receiving the applications
and the state's registration deadline, and lack of sufficient resources or
staff to check the applications.
Officials from these jurisdictions reported that they tried to address
these challenges by, among other things, sending letters or calling
applicants to get the correct information, asking individuals to provide
information at the polls, and hiring additional staff or having staff work
additional hours. (App. IV discusses responses to our survey regarding
checking voter registration applications in greater detail.)
Few of the 14 Jurisdictions Reported That They Experienced Challenges
Entering Voter Information into Voter Registration Lists
Our survey also showed that few of the jurisdictions experienced
challenges entering voter information into voter registration lists and
scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration system. Once
election officials receive and address any issues associated with voter
registration applications, they enter voter registration information into
voter registration lists. In some jurisdictions with computerized
registration lists, signatures of new voters are scanned into the voter
registration system.
When asked to what extent their staff experienced challenges entering
voter information into voter registration lists, election officials
representing 4 of the 14 jurisdictions responded that entering voter
information into voter registration lists was, to some extent, a challenge
and the remainder responded little or no challenge. When asked whether
election office staff experienced challenges scanning signatures of new
voters into their voter registration system, three of eight officials
responded that scanning signatures was, to some extent a challenge. The
remaining six officials responded that this question was not applicable to
their jurisdictions. Figure 6 shows the election officials' responses to
questions about entering voter information into lists, and scanning
signatures of new voters into registration systems.
Page 20 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Figure 6: Extent of Challenges Reported by Election Officials Entering
Voter Information into Voter Registration Lists and Scanning Signatures of
New Voters into Voter Registration Systems
Great extent Some extent Little or no extent
Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected
jurisdictions.
In those instances where entering voter information into the list was, to
some extent, reported as a challenge, two of the four officials responded
that the challenge occurred because of the high volume of registration
applications received close to Election Day-a response consistent with
these officials' responses to our questions about receiving applications
from organizations, like voter registration drives, external to the
election office. One of these officials responded that this challenge was
addressed by hiring additional staff or having staff work overtime. In
those instances where scanning signatures was a challenge to some extent,
one official responded that the challenge occurred because of the high
volume of applications, and three officials responded that the challenge
occurred because of problems with scanning equipment. Officials also
responded
Page 21 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
that they tried to address this challenge by hiring additional staff or,
when problems with equipment occurred, having the equipment fixed.
For example, an election official in one county reported that staff faced
some challenges entering voter information into the registration list and
scanning new voters' signatures into the voter registration system because
the election office (1) needed to hire additional staff to ensure
information from voter registration applications was in the voter
registration list by Election Day and (2) had problems with the scanning
equipment. To address challenges associated with entering and scanning
voter information, the county official reported that additional staff were
hired, staff worked additional shifts, and budget requests were submitted
to upgrade the scanning equipment. This official also reported that their
office was challenged with having to add registration information for more
than 400,000 prospective new voters to the voter registration list in the
15day period immediately prior to the November 2004 presidential election
while also having to process more than 800,000 absentee ballot
applications during this same 15-day period. (App. V discusses responses
to our survey regarding entering information onto voter registration lists
and systems in greater detail.)
Past Reports Show That Challenges Processing Voter Registration
Applications Can Result in Individuals Discovering That They Were Never
Registered to Vote
Our past work and the work of others has shown that challenges processing
voter registration applications-including challenges receiving timely and
accurate applications, checking them for completeness, and entering
information into voter registration lists or systems-can have an effect on
whether a citizen is registered to vote. In October 2001, we issued a
report that described the operations and challenges associated with each
stage of the election process, including voter registration.16 We reported
that, on the basis of a telephone survey, an estimated 46 percent of
jurisdictions nationwide had problems, in general, with NVRA registrations
during the November 2000 election. Officials most frequently noted
challenges with processing incomplete or illegible applications,
applications that arrived late at the local election office, and
applications that never arrived. We stated that, according to local
officials, each of these three situations could result in individuals who
show up at the polls to vote and discover that they were never registered.
16GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across the
Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).
Page 22 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Other organizations have also reported that challenges processing voter
registration applications can result in applicants finding that they were
never registered to vote. In a 2001 report to the Congress, the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) reported on the results of a survey of election
officials in the 44 states and the District of Columbia subject to NVRA
for the period covering 1999 through 2000 on the impact of NVRA on the
administration of elections for federal office.17 Among other things,
FEC's survey showed that some election officials expressed concerns about
problems identifying multiple registrations by the same individual or
applicants that provided incomplete names. Also, according to FEC, several
states reported problems with election officials receiving applications
from MVA offices in a timely manner. Regarding the latter, FEC stated
that:
"Several States reported that motor vehicle offices in some areas failed
to transmit voter registration applications or changes of address to the
appropriate election authorities in a timely manner. The result,
unfortunately, was the effective disenfranchisement of those citizens who
had duly applied but whose registrations were not processed by election
day."
Two years later, in another report to the Congress, FEC reported similar
findings and said that some states also noted similar problems with other
agencies charged with offering voter registration.18 FEC reiterated its
conclusion about the disenfranchisement of those who had applied but whose
registrations were not processed by election day and recommended, as in
the earlier report, that states develop an ongoing training program for
personnel in agencies covered by NVRA, such as MVAs, regarding their
duties and responsibilities under NVRA.
In 2001, the National Commission on Federal Election Reform, which was
organized by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of
17Federal Election Commission, The Impact of the National Voter
Registration Act on Federal Elections 1999 - 2000.
18Federal Election Commission, The Impact of the National Voter
Registration Act on Federal Elections 2001 - 2002.
Page 23 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Virginia and The Century Foundation,19 expressed concerns through a task
force on voter registration that delegating voter registration
responsibilities to agencies and organizations outside of election
offices, such as organizations that conduct voter registration drives, can
result in citizens who thought they had registered being turned away from
the polls on Election Day. 20 The Commission's final report stated that
voters can be turned away from the polls because of administrative errors
by election offices or NVRA agencies that accept voter registration
applications and noted that, although NVRA does not require it,
"most states allow practically anyone to go out and register voters by
taking and transmitting their mail-in applications. These people thus act
in effect as deputy registrars. Election administrators we have
encountered in every part of the country tell us of numerous cases where
these unofficial registrars, often meaning well, mishandle or lose such
applications. The applicants, of course, rightly believe they have
registered. Then they show up on Election Day and find out that they are
not on the list."
The task force on voter registration went on to say that "third party
registrars-political parties, advocacy groups and citizens groups that
conduct voter registration drives-delay to send applications or fail to
send them at all, sometimes inadvertently, sometimes deliberately."
According to the task force, agencies other than election offices and
third party registrars take applications that are incomplete or
inadmissible, such as applications with postal boxes rather than street
addresses, and applications that are unsigned.21
19The National Commission on Federal Election Reform was organized by the
Miller Center and The Century Foundation in early 2001 to formulate
concrete proposals for election reform to "help ensure a more effective
and fair democratic process in elections to come," as stated in the
Commission's report, To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral
Process, August 2001.
20The National Commission on Federal Election Reform's Task Force on the
Federal Election System, July 2001. This task force report accompanied the
report of the National Commission on Election Reform.
21The National Commission on Federal Election Reform, To Assure Pride and
Confidence in the Electoral Process, August 2001.
Page 24 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
More recently, in May 2005, the National Task Force on Election Reform,
sponsored by the non-profit Election Center,22 also known as the National
Association of Election Officials, issued a report on various issues
surrounding the 2004 general election, including voter registration. The
Task Force stated that voter registration groups operated vigorously
during the 2004 election and were recognized and welcomed by election
officials. However, the Task Force expressed the concern that "when voter
registration forms are delivered to registration authorities after the
close of registration or not at all, usually at no fault of the applicant,
voters find themselves not registered and not eligible to vote on Election
Day."23 The Task Force also pointed out that NVRA agencies, which have
voter registration as a secondary responsibility, are challenged to
provide voter registration opportunities to their clients in a consistent
manner and, although processes for transferring registrations accurately
and efficiently to voter registration offices have improved, breakdowns
can still occur.
We did not analyze the extent to which registration applications
transferred from an external organization, like a voter registration drive
or MVA office, to an election office resulted in voters' names not
appearing on registration lists on Election Day. However, as part of our
survey of MVA officials in six states and 12 jurisdictions, we asked if
any state or local election offices contacted MVA offices because
individuals' names were not on the list of registered voters for the
November 2004 election.24 Representatives of 5 of the 18 MVA offices
responded that their offices were contacted by state or local election
officials about individuals whose names did not appear on the registration
list, but only 2 of the 5 reported data on the number of individuals
affected. For example, one of representatives who reported data on the
number of individuals affected said that the state election board-which
has access to MVA customer data-analyzed the MVA records for 1,288
individuals whose names did not appear on voter registration rolls, but
who said they had registered at MVA locations within the state. The
representative reported that the board of elections found that 295 (23
percent) individuals had in fact applied to
22The Election Center is also known as the National Association of
Election Officials and is composed almost exclusively of officials who
serve in voter registration and administration of elections.
23National Task Force on Election Reform, Election 2004: Review and
Recommendations by the Nation's Election Administrators, May 2005.
24Wisconsin and the two jurisdictions in Wisconsin were not included in
our survey because, as noted in footnote 10, the state is exempt from
NVRA.
Page 25 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
register to vote and their applications were sent to the state board of
elections office. The representative also reported that, of the remaining
993 individuals, 591 (46 percent) had indicated that they did not wish to
apply to register to vote and did not complete applications; 245 (19
percent) had no record of conducting MVA business or submitting voter
registration applications at MVA offices; 128 (10 percent) conducted
Internet, mail, or phone transactions with the MVA but did not request
that paper voter registration applications be mailed to them; and 29 (2
percent) submitted their voter registration applications after the
registration deadline. (App. VII discusses responses to our survey of MVA
officials in 6 state and 12 local MVA offices in greater detail.)
Election officials representing all but 1 of the 14 jurisdictions we
surveyed reported that their offices removed voters' names from voter
registration lists during 2004 for various reasons, including at the
request of the voter and upon identification of the voter as ineligible
due to a felony conviction. However, before removing names, election
officials reported that their offices took steps to ensure that names of
eligible voters were not inadvertently removed from lists. Our June 2005
report identified list maintenance challenges faced by election officials
in the 14 jurisdictions because of problems using felony, death, and other
information from existing data sources to verify the accuracy of voter
registration data.
Jurisdictions Reported They Removed Voter Names from Registration Lists for
Various Reasons, but Took Steps to Ensure That Eligible Voters' Names Were Not
Inadvertently Removed
Jurisdictions Reported They Took Various Steps to Ensure that Eligible
Voters Were Not Inadvertently Removed from Voter Registration Lists
As discussed earlier, NVRA prohibits removing a name from a registration
list for a federal election solely for non-voting but permits removal for
certain specified reasons, including at the request of the voter, by
reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity under state law, the
death of the voter, or upon written confirmation by the voter regarding a
move out of the jurisdiction. Our survey of officials in the 14
jurisdictions showed that all but 1 of the jurisdictions said they removed
names from voter registration lists during 2004 for a variety of reasons,
including when the voter requested that his or her name be removed, the
jurisdiction received a change of address notice from USPS, or data from
other federal, state, or local organizations showed that the voter was
ineligible due to a felony conviction or had died. In addition, before
removing names, jurisdictions reported they took various steps to ensure
that the names of eligible voters
Page 26 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
were not inadvertently removed from voter registration lists, including
sending letters or postcards to voters to confirm that the voters wanted
their names removed; sending follow-up notices to voters or phoning voters
to notify them of removal; or matching voters' identifying information
contained in voter registration records with felony records or death
records maintained by other government organizations.
When asked if their offices removed names of any voters from voter
registration lists during 2004, 13 of 14 officials responded that, in
their jurisdictions, names were removed for a variety of reasons,
including when the voter requested that the name be removed from the list,
felony records received from federal/state/local courts or correction
facilities identified the voter as ineligible due to a felony conviction,
information received from state/county vital statistics offices identified
the voter as deceased, and change of address information received from
USPS showed that the voter had moved outside of the jurisdiction where
registered. Table 1 shows the election officials' responses to questions
about reasons for removing names of voters from voter registration lists.
Page 27 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Table 1: Election Officials' Responses to Questions about Reasons Why
Voters' Names Were Removed from Voter Registration Lists in 14
Jurisdictions during 2004
Voter requested that name be removed Felony records from
federal, state, or local courts or correction facilities
identified the voter as a felon Information from state or
county vital statistics offices identified the voter as
deceased Change of address information from the U.S.
Postal Service showed that the voter had moved outside
the jurisdiction Newspaper obituaries identified the
voter as deceased Information from federal, state, or
local courts showed that the voter had been judged to be
mentally incompetent Voter failed to respond to a notice
from voter registrar and had not voted or had not
appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections
Jurisdictiona Voter names were removed from voter registration lists
Gila County, AZ during 2004 because: x x x x x x x
Maricopa County, x x x x x x x
AZ
Los Angeles x x x x x
County, CA
Yolo County, CA x x x x x
City of Detroit,
MI x x x x x
New York City, x x x x x
NY
Rensselaer
County, NY x x x x x
Bexar County, TX x x x x x
Webb County, TX x x x x x
Albermarle x x x x x
County, VA
Arlington x x x x x
County, VA
City of x x x
Franklin, WI
City of Madison, x x
WI
Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected
jurisdictions.
Note: X = Names removed from voter registration list.
aDelta Township, MI did not respond to this question because, as the
election official reported, no names were removed from the voter
registration list during 2004.
Election officials also reported that, before removing names from voter
registration lists during 2004, their offices took a variety of steps to
ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently removed from
the voter registration list. For example, election officials representing
12 of the
Page 28 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
13 jurisdictions reported that their offices removed voters' names from
voter registration lists at the request of the voter. However, before
doing so, officials representing 4 of the 12 jurisdictions reported that
their offices sent a letter or postcard to confirm that the voter wanted
his or her name removed from the voter registration list. Representatives
of 4 of the 12 jurisdictions reported that their offices took other steps
including matching the voter's identifying information-e.g., name,
address, date of birth, and driver's license number-with voter records to
confirm it was the same person and requiring voters to file a document to
indicate that they were either moving out of state or, if moving to
another jurisdiction in the state, a request to transfer to another
jurisdiction so that a letter can be sent to confirm the new address.
Election officials representing 3 of the 12 jurisdictions reported that
their offices did not take any additional steps before removing the names
of eligible voters from registration lists.
Election officials from 11 of the 13 jurisdictions also reported that
their offices removed voters' names from registration lists because felony
records received from federal, state, or local courts or correction
facilities identified them as ineligible due to felony convictions. Of the
11 jurisdictions, officials representing 10 reported that, before removing
names because of felony convictions, their offices matched the voter
identifying information (e.g., name, date of birth, social security
number, and address) contained in voter registration records with felony
records to confirm it was the same person. Eight of these 11 jurisdictions
also sent letters to the voters notifying them of removal on the basis of
felony convictions, and 1 of the 11 also attempted to reach the voters by
phone to notify them of removal. One of the 11 election officials reported
that the jurisdiction did not take any additional steps before removing
the names of these voters from registration lists.
Regarding deceased voters, election officials in 11 of the 13
jurisdictions reported that they removed names from voter registration
lists because information received from state/county vital statistics
offices showed the voters as deceased. Before removing these names, all 11
of the election officials reported that they matched the voters'
identifying information contained in voter registration records with death
records to confirm it was the same person. According to an election
official with one jurisdiction, the jurisdiction also sent a letter to the
deceased voter's next of kin notifying them of removal and another
election official reported that the office also asked for confirmation,
and one other jurisdiction attempted to reach the voter's next of kin by
phone. Election officials representing 8 of the 13 jurisdictions used
obituaries as a source of information for removing voters' names from
lists and 3 of the 8 reported
Page 29 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
that, before removing names of voters, they also matched voter records
with state or county vital statistics information. Election officials
representing 2 of the 13 jurisdictions reported that their offices relied
exclusively on obituaries as a reason for removing names from voter
registration lists.
In addition, election officials in 10 of 13 jurisdictions reported that
their offices removed names from registration lists because information
provided by USPS showed that the voters had moved outside the jurisdiction
where they were registered. Of the 10 jurisdictions, 9 election officials
reported that their offices matched the voter's identifying information,
such as name and address, contained in voter registration records with the
data provided by USPS to confirm it was the same person; 8 reported that
they sent a notice to the voter of the removal; and 1 reported that, in
addition to matching, the office sent notices and attempted to reach
voters by phone. One election official responded that the jurisdiction
sends a letter to voters and voters' names are removed only after they
sign and return the letter, indicating they no longer wish to be
registered, and another official representing one other jurisdiction
reported that, after receiving notices from voters, the office sends the
voters letters asking them to confirm their current residence. Regarding
the latter, the official reported that, if the address is outside of the
state, voters' names are removed from the list; if it is in the same
state, the information is forwarded to the receiving jurisdiction. (App.
VI discusses responses to our survey on removing names from voter
registration list in greater detail.)
Jurisdictions Face Challenges Maintaining the Accuracy of Voter
Registration Lists
Although officials reported that they took steps to ensure that names of
eligible voters are not removed from registration lists, election
officials still face challenges maintaining the accuracy of these lists.
In June 2005, we issued a report on the efforts of state and local
officials in the same seven states and 14 local jurisdictions to maintain
accurate voter registration lists.25 We pointed out that officials faced
challenges maintaining the accuracy of voter registration lists because of
problems using existing data sources to verify the accuracy of voter
registration data. For example:
25GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Election
Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478
(Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).
Page 30 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
o Some state and local officials were concerned about the timeliness of
death data-with the names of some deceased voters possibly remaining on
registration lists after the election. Also, one state official and local
officials in two states said that problems can arise in getting timely
records on residents who pass away out of state. In one jurisdiction, an
official expressed the concern that the election office could not identify
which of several voters with the same name had died because of the lack of
a birth date on some state death records.
o State and local officials stated that criminal information was often
incomplete, not timely, or difficult to decipher. Information on felony
convictions, particularly from federal sources, was not useful because the
information was old, had limited matching criteria, or was in different
formats.
o State and local officials were challenged ensuring voters resided
within an election jurisdiction because of missing information, no street
numbers in rural areas, new streets, redistricting or untimely forwarding
of new addresses.
We stated that some of these challenges might be addressed as state and
local jurisdictions implement specific HAVA provisions that require states
to (1) develop interactive computerized statewide voter registration lists
for federal elections and (2) perform regular list maintenance by
comparing the voter registration list against state records on felons and
death.26 However, we also pointed out that other challenges, such as
identifying duplicate registrations or deceased individuals out of state,
may continue to be issues. Our June 2005 report echoed some of the issues
highlighted in our 2001 report, wherein, on the basis of a national survey
of local election officials, we reported on challenges that election
officials identified with voter registration, such as obtaining accurate
and timely information to update voter registration lists.27
26HAVA, in general, requires states to, among other things, (a) implement
an interactive statewide voter registration list for federal elections;
(b) perform regular list maintenance by comparing the voter list against
state records on felons and death; (c) match applicant information on
voter registration lists with information in state motor vehicle agency's
records; and (d) match voter registration application information on voter
registration lists with Social Security Administration records, as
appropriate.
27GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges Across the
Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).
Page 31 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
All Jurisdictions Reported Enabling Provisional Votes to Be Cast but Not All
Provisional Ballots Met States' Criteria for Whether These Votes Should Count
HAVA, in general, requires states to implement provisional voting for
elections for federal office whereby individuals not listed as registered
or whose eligibility is questioned by an election official must be
notified about and permitted to cast a provisional ballot. Election
officials representing all 14 jurisdictions reported offering provisional
voting to voters, and 9 of the 14 jurisdictions informed voters that
provisional ballots were available by, for example, posting signs at
polling places and generating media announcements. In addition, election
officials in 12 of the 14 jurisdictions reported that their jurisdictions
offered certain firsttime voters-those who had registered by mail after
January 1, 2003, but did not provide a copy of required identification
when they applied to register to vote28-the opportunity to cast
provisional ballots even if they were unable to provide identification at
the polling place.29 Election officials we surveyed reported to us that,
during the November 2004 election, provisional ballots were cast in 13 of
the 14 jurisdictions and in 11 of the 13, the percentage of ballots
counted ranged from none to nearly 90 percent. Overall, on the basis of
the data reported by election officials, the 11 jurisdictions counted 70
percent of all of the provisional ballots cast. Table 2 shows the number
of provisional ballots cast and counted, by jurisdiction, during the
November 2004 election, as reported by election officials.
28HAVA, in general, requires that provisional ballots be provided to
first-time voters who registered to vote by mail on or after January 1,
2003, but were unable to show required identification when either voting
in person or by mail in a federal election.
29Local election officials in the two jurisdictions in Arizona said this
was not applicable. In an April 2005 letter from the U.S. Department of
Justice to the Arizona Secretary of State, Justice's Civil Rights Division
concluded that it was permissible for a state to mandate that potential
voters show identification at the polls prior to receiving provisional
ballots. Local election officials in 2 of 14 jurisdictions surveyed
reported that 12,815 first-time voters cast provisional ballots during the
November 2004 election. The election officials representing the remaining
jurisdictions said no first-time voters cast provisional ballots.
Page 32 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Table 2: Number and Percentage of Provisional Ballots Election Officials
Reported Cast and Counted in the November 2004 Election in 14
Jurisdictions
Number of provisional ballots
Percent of provisional Jurisdiction Cast Counted ballots counted
Gila County, AZ 575 505
Maricopa County, AZ 68,642 50,719
Los Angeles County, CA 204,578 166,894
Yolo County, CA 2,050 a a
City of Detroit, MI 1,350 123
Delta Township, MI 4 1
New York City, NY 140,779 77,804
Rensselaer County, NY 1,914 972
Bexar County, TX 2,996 602
Webb County, TX 60 23
Albemarle County, VA 49 a a
Arlington County, VA 147 19
City of Franklin, WI 0 0 b
City of Madison, WI 5 0
Total 423,149 297,662 70c
Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected
jurisdictions.
aRespondents said they did not know how many provisional ballots were
counted. Thus, the percentage of provisional votes counted could not be
computed.
bNot applicable since no provisional ballots were cast.
cExcludes Yolo County, Calif., Albemarle County, Va., and City of
Franklin, Wis. because respondents from Yolo County, Calif., and Albemarle
County, Va., said they did not know how many provisional ballots were
counted and no provisional ballots were cast in the City of Franklin, Wis.
To better understand what proportion of total ballots cast constituted
provisional ballots cast, we compared the number of provisional ballots
cast, as reported in our survey, with Web-based state and local data on
Page 33 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
total ballots cast for president for the 2004 election.30 Our comparison
showed that the percent of provisional ballots cast, relative to total
ballots cast in the 13 jurisdictions, ranged from less than 1 percent in 6
of the 13 jurisdictions to as much as 7 percent in one of the 13
jurisdictions. Table 3 shows the number of provisional ballots cast as a
percent of total ballots cast, by jurisdiction, for the November 2004
election.
30Total ballots cast does not necessarily represent the total number of
votes cast and officially counted in any jurisdiction. In some
jurisdictions, total ballots cast may include ballots where votes cast may
or may not have been counted for a variety of reasons, including
improperly marked ballots, ballots submitted without a mark for any
particular candidate, ballots that included a mark for two candidates in
the same election, or provisional ballots cast that were not counted. For
purposes of this analysis, total ballots cast can include votes cast but
not counted. For example, in Maricopa County, Arizona, the total number of
ballots cast for president during the 2004 election was 1,211,963-which
included 19,212 votes cast but not counted for a variety reasons-and the
total number of votes cast and counted was 1,192,751.
Page 34 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Table 3: Number of Provisional Ballots Cast as a Percentage of Total
Ballots Cast for President in the November 2004 Election in 14
Jurisdictions
Provisional ballots
cast
Total ballots Provisional as a percentage of
total
Jurisdiction casta ballots cast ballots cast
Gila County, AZ 21,158 575
Maricopa County, AZ 1,211,963 68,642
Los Angeles County, 3,023,280 204,578
CA
Yolo County, CA 72,269 2,050
City of Detroit, MI 326,098 1,350 <1
Delta Township, MI 18,060 4 <1
New York City, NY 2,459,653 140,779
Rensselaer County, 72,983 1,914
NY
Bexar County, TX 475,314 2,996
Webb County, TX 42,030 60 <1
Albemarle County, VA 43,726 49 <1
Arlington County, VA 94,650 147 <1
City of Franklin, WI 18,418 0
City of Madison, WI 138,078 5 <1
Source: GAO survey of local election officials and Web sites of respective
Secretaries of State, counties, or cities.
aTotal ballots cast does not necessarily represent the total number of
votes cast and officially counted in any jurisdiction. In some
jurisdictions, total ballots cast may include ballots where votes cast may
or may not have been counted for a variety of reasons, including
improperly marked ballots, ballots submitted without a mark for any
particular candidate, ballots that included a mark for two candidates in
the same election, or provisional ballots cast that were not counted. For
purposes of this analysis, total ballots cast can include votes cast but
not counted. For example, in Maricopa County, Arizona, the total number of
ballots cast for president during the 2004 election was 1,211,963-which
included 19,212 votes cast but not counted for a variety reasons-and the
total number of votes cast and counted was 1,192,751.
Under HAVA, states have discretion to determine if an individual is
eligible to vote and to determine whether the provisional ballot should be
counted as a vote in accordance with state law. When asked to report the
most frequent reasons why provisional ballots were not counted after the
November 2004 election, election officials reported that the most frequent
reasons were that individuals did not meet the residency eligibility
requirements for the precincts where the provisional votes were cast,
election officials did not have evidence that the individuals had
registered or tried to register to vote before the election, and local
election officials did not have evidence that the individuals casting
provisional ballots had applied to register to vote at motor vehicle
agency offices. Figure 7 shows the main reasons that provisional ballots
were not counted after the
Page 35 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
November 2004 election in the 13 jurisdictions we surveyed where
provisional ballots were cast in November 2004.
Figure 7: Reasons That Provisional Ballots Were Not Counted for the November
2004 Election in Selected Jurisdictions
Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected
jurisdictions.
aJurisdictions could select more than one reason.
bOther reasons included voter did not provide acceptable identification or
proof of residence; voter did not sign voter registration form; persons
casting ballots were too young; voter was a convicted felon whose voting
rights had not been restored; voters did not provide complete information
on the voter registration applications or on the provisional ballots.
To enable voters who cast provisional ballots in the November 2004
election to learn whether their votes counted, HAVA requires that state or
local election officials establish free means of receiving the
information. Local election officials in 12 of the 13 jurisdictions where
provisional ballots were cast for the November 2004 election said that
they set up freeaccess mechanisms to inform provisional voters about the
outcome of their provisional votes during the November 2004 election,
including tollfree telephone numbers, Web sites, and letters sent to the
provisional voters who cast provisional ballots.31 They also said that
provisional voters were provided written information at their polling
places about how to
31While New York State had not passed legislation to implement provisional
voting requirements in HAVA by the time of the November 2004 election, New
York had a form of provisional voting in place referred to as affidavit
ballots. The New York City election office said that letters were sent to
voters whose affidavit ballots did not count.
Page 36 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
find out about the outcome of their provisional ballots. Eight of the 13
jurisdictions said that provisional voters had access to information about
the outcome of their ballots within 10 days after the election.
Local election officials in 8 of the 14 jurisdictions said that they
experienced challenges implementing provisional voting for the November
2004 election. In these jurisdictions, the election officials said that
they viewed provisional voting as a challenge for various reasons,
including some poll workers were not familiar with provisional voting or,
in one jurisdiction representing a large number of precincts, staff
reported not having sufficient time to process provisional ballots. To
address these challenges, the officials reported that they provided
additional training to poll workers and hired additional staff to count
provisional ballots within the time frames allowed.
In addition, local election officials in 3 of the 14 jurisdictions said
that they experienced challenges verifying the identification of
first-time voters who applied to register to vote after January 1, 2003,
and who did not provide identification with their applications.
Specifically, these officials said that this requirement was very
time-consuming due to the high number of voters, they needed additional
staff to send notices to these voters to notify them that they needed to
provide the necessary identification, and the state did not have a
statewide voter registration database to verify the voters'
identification. (App. VII discusses responses to our survey on HAVA
provisional voting and identification requirements in greater detail.)
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after
the report date. At that time we will make copies available to others on
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's
Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points for
Page 37 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix X.
William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Page 38 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to describe election officials' characterization of
their experiences in 14 jurisdictions within 7 states with regard to the
November 2004 election: (1) managing the voter registration process and
any challenges related to receiving voter registration applications,
checking them for completeness, accuracy, and duplication; and entering
information into voter registration lists; (2) removing voter names from
voter registration lists and ensuring that the names of eligible voters
were not inadvertently removed; and (3) implementing provisional voting
and identification requirements in accordance with HAVA and addressing any
challenges encountered. In addition, we describe the experiences of
selected motor vehicle agency (MVA) offices during 2004 in carrying out
voter registration application procedures-specifically, assisting MVA
clients with completing voter registration applications, accepting
applications from these clients, and forwarding application to state or
local elections offices.
We first selected states and, subsequently, local jurisdictions within
those states consistent with our earlier report on maintaining accurate
voter registration lists.1 We selected the following states using a
non-probability sample: Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, Texas,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Our selection of the seven states took into
consideration several voter registration-related factors and unique
characteristics of the states that might affect the implementation of
HAVA. For example, Wisconsin has same day registration, which exempts the
state from the HAVA provisional voting requirement; Arizona has on-line
voter registration; and Michigan has a reputation as a model for
registration practices. Also, we selected New York State because, when
receiving voter registration applications or checking applications with
voter registration lists, New York State may have to rely on social
security number verification procedures more than other states because it
has a large population who live in New York City and may not have driver's
licenses. We also selected states to provide geographic diversity and
variation in election administration-some administer elections at the
county level and others at lower levels such as city or townships. Our
goal was not to target a particular state, but rather to identify a range
of issues facing states in managing the voter registration process,
including updating voter registration lists, and implementing HAVA
provisional voting and identification requirements. Information from these
seven states cannot be
1GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Election
Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478
(Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005)
Page 39 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
generalized to all states. Table 4 describes the voter
registration-related characteristics of each state.
Table 4: State Selection Factors State Voter registration-related
characteristics
Arizona o No statewide database prior to HAVA.
o Did not request a waiver from HAVA database and verification
requirements deadline of January 1, 2004.
o Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 12.8.
o Voter registration administered at county level.
o Has implemented an on-line voter registration process.
California o Statewide database prior to HAVA that is compiled from
local election lists. Local jurisdictions can access entire list.
o Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004.
o Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 26.2.
o Voter registration administered at county level.
Michigan o Unified statewide database.
o Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004.
o Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 5.3.
o Voter registration administered at township, city, and village level.
o Secretary of State responsible for election and motor vehicle licensing
functions.
New York o No statewide database prior to HAVA.
o Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004.
o Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 20.4.
o Voter registration administered at county level.
o Expected higher use of social security records for registrant
verification due to fewer drivers in New York City.
Texas o Statewide database prior to HAVA that is compiled from local
election lists. Local jurisdictions do not have access to entire list.
o Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004.
o Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 13.9.
o Voter registration administered at county level.
Virginia o Unified statewide database.
o Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004.
o Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 8.1.
o Voter registration administered at county level.
o May use 9-digit social security number for voter registration
verification (rather than 4 digits outlined by HAVA).
Wisconsin o No statewide database prior to HAVA. Some jurisdictions
currently do not maintain voter registration rolls.
o Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004.
o Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 3.6.
o Voter registration administered at municipal level.
o Allows Election Day voter registration.
Source: GAO.
Page 40 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Within each state, we selected the two jurisdictions using a
nonprobability sample. Our selection criteria for the 14 jurisdictions (2
jurisdictions in each of the 7 states) included population size, the
proximity of the locations to our site visits with state election and
motor vehicle officials, suggestions by state election and motor vehicle
officials, and proximity to an MVA office. The local jurisdictions we
selected were:
o Maricopa County, Arizona;
o Gila County, Arizona;
o Los Angeles County, California;
o Yolo County, California;
o City of Detroit, Michigan;
o Delta Township, Michigan;
o New York City, New York;
o Rensselaer County, New York;
o Bexar County, Texas;
o Webb County, Texas;
o Arlington County, Virginia;
o Albemarle County, Virginia;
o City of Franklin City, Wisconsin; and
o City of Madison, Wisconsin.
To address our objectives, we used a multi-pronged approach. First, we
reviewed HAVA and other relevant laws, state reports, and documents
related to the voter registration process in the seven states. Second, we
interviewed state and local election officials in the 7 states and 14
jurisdictions to obtain information on their registration processes and
implementation of the HAVA requirements for provisional voting and voter
identification. Third, because so many voter registrations originate with
applications from motor vehicle agencies, we also interviewed officials
from these agencies in 10 jurisdictions to discuss their procedures for
processing voter registration applications.2 In Michigan, where we spoke
only with Secretary of State officials, the Secretary of State's office is
responsible for elections and motor vehicle functions, such as issuing
driver's licenses.
2We did not survey MVA officials in Wisconsin regarding voter registration
under NVRA; MVA offices in Wisconsin do not participate in voter
registration because the state is exempt from NVRA. Wisconsin's exemption
from NVRA, in general, is based upon the fact that it did not, and still
does not, have voter registration requirements for federal elections under
state laws that were in effect on the NVRA-specified exemption date of
August 1, 1994.
Page 41 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Following our site visits, we sent a questionnaire to the same officials
in the 14 local elections offices in the seven states to gather
information about their experiences with the November 2004 election. We
did not survey state election officials because voter registration and
operations are carried out at the local level (e.g., county, city, or
township). Consistent with our objectives, our survey focused primarily on
(1) challenges, if any, processing voter registration applications,
specifically, challenges receiving voter registration applications from
MVAs, other NVRA agencies, and voter registration drives sponsored by
nongovernmental organizations; checking voter registration applications
for completeness, accuracy, and duplicates; and entering voter information
into registration lists or systems; (2) whether voters names were removed
from voter registration lists, reasons why names were removed, and steps
taken to ensure that voters names were not inadvertently removed; and (3)
HAVA's provisional voting and first-time voter identification
requirements, specifically, the number of provisional ballots cast and
counted, including reasons, if any, why jurisdictions did not count
provisional ballots; how voters were informed about provisional voting and
its outcome; and whether first-time voters who registered by mail were
allowed to cast provisional ballots if they did not provide
identification. We also sent a survey to the state and local motor vehicle
agency officials in six of the seven states3 to gather information about
(1) their experiences assisting citizens in filling out voter registration
applications and forwarding applications to election offices and (2) their
experiences with the November 2004 election related to voter registration
applications.
Because our surveys were not sample surveys, there are no sampling errors.
However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce
errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example,
difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, in the sources
of information that are available to respondents, or in how the responses
we received are entered into a database or were analyzed, can introduce
unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps in the
development of the surveys, the data collection, and the data analysis to
minimize these nonsampling errors and help ensure the accuracy of the
answers that were obtained. For example, a social science survey
specialist designed the surveys in collaboration with our staff with
subject matter expertise. When the data were analyzed, a second,
independent
3We did not send a survey to motor vehicle agency officials in Wisconsin
because of its exemption from NVRA.
Page 42 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
analyst checked all computer programs. With regard to numbers received as
part of our surveys, such as the number of provisional ballots cast and
counted, we determined that the data reported via the surveys were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report by asking the survey
respondents to identify any limitations associated with using the numbers
provided and actions taken to check the accuracy of the numbers. We did
not independently verify the accuracy or completeness of responses
provided from our surveys of election officials and MVA officials. Local
election officials and state and local MVA officials we surveyed were
provided the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their responses for
this report and, on the basis of the comments we received, we made
technical changes, where appropriate. The results of our work cannot be
generalized to state and local election jurisdictions or MVA offices
either nationwide or at the state level. Appendix II contains the survey
we sent to local election officials, and appendix IX contains the survey
we sent to state and local officials representing MVAs.
We also reviewed state and local Internet sites, such as sites maintained
by Secretaries of State and County and City Clerks Offices to obtain data
on total ballots cast for president for the 2004 elections in the seven
states and 14 jurisdictions covered by our review. We used these data to
show the relative proportion of provisional ballots cast to total ballots
cast for each of the jurisdictions. These data were used for limited
comparison purposes; we asked election officials to verify the accuracy of
these data but we did not independently asses their reliability. In
addition, we reviewed relevant federal and state statutes pertinent to the
state and local jurisdictions covered by our review. To obtain information
on the challenges facing state and local election officials during the
registration process, we reviewed our past reports on various aspects of
the election process as well as reports by the Federal Election
Commission, the National Commission on Federal Reform, and a Task Force
Report to Accompany the Commission's Report-both organized by the Miller
Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and the Century
Foundation-and a May 2005 report by the National Task Force on Election
Reform, sponsored by the Election Center, which is also called the
National Association of Election Officials. We also reviewed various
reports developed by the Election Reform Information Project, a
clearinghouse for election reform information and an online forum for
learning about, discussing, and analyzing election reform issues and
providing research on questions of interest to the election reform
community. After the November 2000 election, the Election Reform
Information Project received a 3-year grant from the Pew Charitable Trusts
via the University of Richmond.
Page 43 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our work was performed from January 2004 through September 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 44 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials
Appendix III: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Receiving
Voter Registration Applications
This appendix summarizes the responses of local election office
representatives to questions in our survey related to challenges they
encountered during the November 2004 election in receiving voter
registration applications from organizations external to the election
office-motor vehicle agencies (MVA), other National Voter Registration Act
(NVRA) agencies, and non-governmental organizations that sponsor voter
registration drives; why these challenges occurred; and steps that
election officials took to try to address these challenges. The statements
in this appendix reflect the responses to our survey by the applicable
local election officials and were not independently verified by us.
Gila County, Arizona
Staff in the Gila County election office experienced little or no
challenges receiving registration applications from MVA offices. However,
staff faced some challenges receiving applications from NVRA agencies
other than MVA offices and voter registration drives held by
non-governmental organizations. These challenges occurred because
applications from these sources were received after the voter registration
deadline. A representative from the county election office reported that
political candidates and parties that sponsored voter registration drives
did not send all voter registration applications to the election office
after receiving them from people who completed them. The election office
tried to address these challenges by talking to the candidates and
political parties about turning in applications on a timely basis.
Maricopa County, Arizona
Staff in the Maricopa County election office experienced little or no
challenges receiving registration applications from NVRA agencies other
than MVA offices. However, staff faced some challenges receiving
applications from MVA offices and faced challenges to great extent
receiving applications from voter registration drives held by
nongovernmental organizations. Receiving applications from MVA offices and
voter registration drives was challenging because the county election
office received applications from these sources too close to the
registration deadline. A representative from the county election office
reported encountering numerous occasions when individuals who indicated
that they wanted to apply to register to vote at MVA offices were not
given voter registration forms to complete, and consequently these
individuals were not registered to vote. Staff in the county election
office tried to address these challenges by (1) adding additional staff
and resources to update the voter registration list in time for the
election and (2) allowing the aforementioned MVA clients who showed copies
of their applications for driver's licenses indicating that they had
requested to
Page 66 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix III: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Receiving Voter Registration Applications
register to vote to complete voter registration forms so that they could
be added to the voter registration list.
Los Angeles County, California
Staff in the Los Angeles County election office experienced little or no
challenges receiving registration applications from MVA and NVRA agencies.
However, staff faced some challenges receiving applications from voter
registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. These
challenges occurred because the county election office received these
applications close to or after the voter registration deadline. To address
these challenges, staff from the county election office contacted these
organizations and will be developing a training program focused on legal
requirements for registering voters.
Yolo County, California Staff in the Yolo County election office faced
little or no challenges receiving registration applications from MVA and
NVRA agencies. However, staff faced some challenges receiving applications
from voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations.
These challenges occurred because the county election office received the
applications after the voter registration deadline, but a representative
from the county election office said that the applications were still
processed.
City of Detroit, Michigan Staff in the Detroit election office faced
challenges to a great extent receiving applications from MVA offices, NVRA
agencies, and voter registration drives held by non-governmental
organizations. These challenges occurred because the applications were
received either too close to or after the voter registration deadline. The
representative who responded to our survey said that the election office
did not try to address this challenge.
Delta Township, Michigan
Staff in the Delta Township election office faced little or no challenge
receiving voter registration applications from MVA and NVRA agencies.
However, staff faced challenges to a great extent receiving applications
from voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations.
These challenges occurred because applications were received either too
close to or after the voter registration deadline and were incomplete. To
address this challenge, the office added these applications to the voter
registration list and sent verification letters to applicants whose
applications were incomplete. If staff in the election office was not able
to verify incomplete information on applicants before the election, the
Page 67 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix III: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Receiving Voter Registration Applications
affected applicants' names were coded on the voter registration lists so that
poll workers could ask them to identify themselves before voting.
New York City, New York
Staff in the New York City election office faced little or no challenges
receiving registration applications from MVA and NVRA agencies. However,
staff faced some challenges receiving applications from voter registration
drives held by non-governmental organizations. These challenges occurred
because the applications were received too close to the voter registration
deadline. To address these challenges, the city election office requested
that non-governmental organizations submit all voter registration forms as
soon as possible and not wait until the last minute. A representative from
the city election office said that most of these groups complied with this
request, but some did not. Staff in the city election office also
addressed these challenges by hiring additional data entry staff to handle
the large volume of registrations and by working extended hours to process
the applications received before the deadline.
Rensselaer County, Staff in the county election office faced little or no
challenges receiving
New York registration applications from MVA offices, other NVRA agencies,
and voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations.
Bexar County, Texas
Staff in the county election office experienced little or no challenges
receiving applications from MVA and other NVRA agencies. However, staff
faced some challenges receiving applications from voter registration
drives held by non-governmental organizations. These challenges occurred
because these applications were not properly completed, had missing
information, had invalid addresses, or were turned in on a Friday even
though the county election office had asked the organizations sponsoring
voter registration drives not to do so. According to the official, the
latter resulted in staff having to work overtime and weekends to process
registrations. To address these challenges, staff from the county election
office discussed these issues with leaders of the non-governmental
organizations, state election officials, and political parties, among
others.
Webb County, Texas Staff in the county election office faced some
challenges receiving voter registration applications from MVA offices and
faced little or no challenges receiving applications from other NVRA
agencies. In addition, staff did not know or had no basis to judge whether
the office faced challenges receiving applications from voter registration
drives sponsored by non-
Page 68 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix III: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Receiving Voter Registration Applications
governmental organizations. The challenges in receiving applications from
MVA offices occurred because some applications got lost in the mail and
were not received at the county election office. To address this
challenge, staff reviewed information received from the Secretary of State
and MVA offices, and mailed new applications to persons who had completed
their applications at MVA offices. Staff also installed a lock box at the
local MVA office so that MVA staff could keep completed voter registration
applications in the lock box and staff from the county election office
could pick up the applications at the MVA office 3 times a week.
Albemarle County, Virginia
Staff in the county election office faced little or no challenges
receiving voter registration applications from MVA offices. However, staff
faced some challenges receiving applications from other NVRA agencies and
voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. An
official from the county election office said that these challenges
occurred because (1) some NVRA agencies may not have been in compliance
with NVRA and (2) the county election office may not have received
applications from individuals who completed voter registration
applications at a voter registration drive. To address these challenges,
staff from the county election office contacted staff in NVRA agencies to
encourage compliance with NVRA and offered training to all private groups
who contacted the office about voter registration drives.
Arlington County, Virginia
Staff in the county election office faced some challenges receiving
applications from MVA offices and faced little or no challenges receiving
applications from other NVRA agencies. In addition, staff faced challenges
to a great extent receiving applications from voter registration drives
held by non-governmental organizations. The challenges in receiving
applications from MVA offices and voter registration drives occurred
because the county election office received applications too close to the
voter registration deadline and the county election office did not have
enough staff to handle the applications that were received. To address
these challenges, staff worked extra hours and the office extended the
hours of temporary staff to process applications and meet deadlines.
City of Franklin, Wisconsin In response to questions about receiving
applications from MVAs and NVRA agencies other than MVAs, a representative
from the city election office said that this was not applicable. However,
staff faced challenges to a great extent receiving applications from voter
registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. These
challenges occurred because
Page 69 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix III: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Receiving Voter Registration Applications
(1) the city election office received these applications too close to or
after the registration deadline, (2) the city election office did not have
enough resources or staff to handle the applications, and (3) the
applications contained inaccurate information, which required staff in the
election office to do extensive follow-up work. To address these
challenges, staff in the city election office attempted to make direct
contact with the voters.
City of Madison, Wisconsin
Staff in the city election office faced some challenges receiving voter
registration applications from NVRA agencies other than MVA offices and
from voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations.
These challenges occurred due to incomplete applications. In response to a
question about receiving applications from MVAs, a representative from the
city election office said this was not applicable. Staff in the city
election office tried to address these challenges by sending letters to
the applicants, if time allowed, and returning incomplete applications to
staff in the NVRA agencies and non-governmental organizations sponsoring
the voter registration drives.
Page 70 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Checking
Voter Registration Applications
This appendix summarizes the responses of local election office
representatives to questions in our survey related to challenges their
offices encountered during the November 2004 election with regard to
checking voter registration applications for completeness, accuracy, or
duplicates, and if challenges occurred, why they occurred and any actions
taken to overcome them. The statements in this appendix reflect the
responses to our survey by the applicable local election officials and
were not independently verified by us.
Gila County, Arizona Checking voter registration applications to ensure
information on the applications was complete and accurate and to identify
duplicate applications posed little or no challenges to staff in the
election office.
Maricopa County, Arizona Election office staff experienced some
challenges checking voter registration applications to ensure the
information in the applications was complete and accurate and to identify
duplicate applications. These challenges occurred because local election
office encountered problems contacting the individuals to obtain complete
or accurate information. Staff in the local election office tried to
address these challenges by putting the applications in a suspense file
and sending letters to the applicants requesting the missing information.
Los Angeles County, While election staff experienced little or no
challenges checking individual
California applications for completeness and duplicates, they experienced
challenges, to some extent, checking the accuracy of voter registration
applications because the elections office did not have sufficient time,
resources, and staff to check them. To address this challenge, additional
staff were hired, multiple work shifts were added, and a great deal of
overtime was worked.
Yolo County, California Election office staff experienced little or no
challenges checking voter registration applications for accuracy,
completeness, or duplicates.
City of Detroit, Michigan Election office staff experienced challenges,
to a great extent, checking voter registration applications for
completeness, accuracy, and duplicates. The challenges they faced checking
voter registration applications were due to problems with (1) determining
what information was inaccurate, (2) contacting individuals to obtain
complete or accurate information, and
Page 71 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Checking Voter Registration Applications
(3) checking the accuracy of information in the applications against
various databases, such as motor vehicle or Social Security Administration
databases, or against state records. To overcome this challenge, election
office staff attempted to reach the applicants by telephone and mailed
response cards to them to verify the information contained in their
applications.
Delta Township, Michigan
Although checking applications for accuracy or duplicates posed little or
no challenge to election office staff, they experienced challenges, to
some extent, checking the completeness of voter registration applications.
These challenges occurred because hundreds of registration forms were
received too close to the registration deadline and staff encountered
difficulties determining what information was not accurate. To address
these challenges, election staff added the names of the applicants to the
voter registration lists and sent the applicants letters asking them to
verify the information contained in their registration applications. If
the applicants did not respond to the letters, their names were placed on
the registration list and if they appeared at the polls to vote, they were
asked to provide identification.
New York City, New York Election office staff faced little or no
challenges checking voter registration applications to ensure information
on the applications was complete and accurate and to identify duplicate
applications.
Rensselaer County, Election office staff faced little or no challenges
checking voter
New York registration applications to ensure information on the
applications was complete and accurate and to identify duplicate
applications.
Bexar County, Texas Election office staff faced little or no challenges
checking voter registration applications to ensure information on the
applications was complete and accurate and to identify duplicate
applications.
Webb County, Texas Election staff experienced little or no challenges
checking voter registration applications to ensure information on the
applications was complete and to identify duplicate applications. The
official who responded to our survey did not know the extent of
challenges, if any, that staff may have experienced checking voter
registration applications for accuracy.
Page 72 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Checking Voter Registration Applications
Albemarle County, Virginia Election office staff faced little or no
challenges checking voter registration applications to ensure information
on the applications was complete and accurate and to identify duplicate
applications.
Arlington County, Virginia Election office staff experienced some
challenges checking voter registration applications for completeness,
accuracy, and duplicates. These challenges occurred because the election
office did not have enough resources and staff to check the applications,
and staff did not have enough time to check the applications between the
registration deadline and when voting began. To address these challenges,
staff worked extra hours.
City of Franklin, Wisconsin
To a great extent, election office staff experienced challenges checking
applications for completeness, accuracy, and duplicates. Staff experienced
these challenges because of (1) difficulties determining what information
was inaccurate, (2) problems contacting individuals to obtain complete or
accurate information, and (3) insufficient time between the state's
registration deadline and when voting began to check whether applications
were complete, accurate, or duplicates. To overcome these challenges,
staff from the election office attempted to make direct contact with the
voters.
City of Madison, Wisconsin To some extent, election office staff faced
challenges checking applications for completeness and accuracy but had
little or no problems checking applications for duplicates. The challenges
of checking the completeness and accuracy of applications occurred because
of problems with contacting individuals to obtain complete and accurate
information. To overcome these challenges, additional staff were hired.
Page 73 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix V: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Entering
Information into Voter Registration Lists
This appendix summarizes the responses of local election office
representatives to questions in our survey related to challenges they
encountered during the November 2004 election entering information on
eligible voters into voter registration lists, and when challenges
occurred, why they occurred and actions taken to overcome them. The
statements in this appendix reflect the responses to our survey by the
applicable local election officials and were not independently verified by
us.
Gila County, Arizona Entering information on eligible voters into voter
registration lists posed little or no challenges to staff in the election
office. However, scanning signatures of new voters into the voter
registration system posed challenges to some extent because staff in the
election office encountered problems with the scanning equipment. To
address the challenges of scanning new voters' signatures into the voter
registration system, the equipment was repaired.
Maricopa County, Arizona Election office staff experienced challenges, to
little or no extent, entering voter information into voter registration
lists and scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration
system.
Los Angeles County, To some extent, election office staff experienced
challenges entering voter
California information into voter registration lists and scanning
signatures of new voters into the voter registration system. These
challenges occurred because the election office lacked sufficient
resources and staff and had problems with the scanning equipment. To
address these challenges, additional staff were hired, and staff worked
additional shifts and a great deal of overtime. In addition, budget
requests were submitted to upgrade the scanning equipment.
Yolo County, California Election office staff experienced challenges, to
little or no extent, entering voter information into voter registration
lists and scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration
system.
City of Detroit, Michigan To some extent, election office staff
experienced challenges scanning signatures of new voters into the voter
registration system but experience little or no challenges entering
information on eligible voters into the voter registration lists. Scanning
signatures of new voters into the voter registration system was a
challenge because there were too many
Page 74 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix V: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Entering Information into Voter Registration Lists
applications to enter into the system by the registration deadline or
Election Day and because of problems with the scanning equipment. To
address this challenge, election office staff scanned as many signatures
as possible and waited until the equipment malfunctioning could be
corrected.
Delta Township, Michigan Election office staff experienced challenges, to
little or no extent, entering voter information into voter registration
lists and scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration
system.
New York City, New York Election office staff experienced challenges, to
little or no extent, entering voter information into voter registration
lists and scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration
system.
Rensselaer County, Election office staff experienced challenges, to little
or no extent, entering
New York voter information into voter registration lists and scanning
signatures of new voters into the voter registration system.
Bexar County, Texas Election office staff experienced challenges, to
little or no extent, entering voter information into voter registration
lists. Scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration
system was not applicable to this election office.
Webb County, Texas Election office staff experienced challenges, to
little or no extent, entering voter information into voter registration
lists. Scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration
system was not applicable to this election office.
Albemarle County, Virginia Election office staff experienced challenges,
to little or no extent, entering voter information into voter registration
lists. Scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration
system was not applicable to this election office.
Arlington County, Virginia Election office staff experienced challenges,
to some extent, entering information on eligible voters into voter
registration lists because the election office lacked sufficient resources
and staff to enter the
Page 75 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration Appendix V: Reported
Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Entering Information into
Voter Registration Lists
registration application information into these lists by registration
deadline or Election Day. To address these challenges, election office
staff worked extra hours to meet deadlines for entering information on
eligible voters into the voter registration lists. Scanning signatures of
new voters into the voter registration system was not applicable to this
election office.
City of Franklin, Wisconsin To some extent, election office staff
experienced challenges entering information on eligible voters into voter
registration lists because of the volume of registration applications that
had to be entered by the state's registration deadline or Election Day. To
address these challenges, staff worked extended hours and additional staff
was hired to process registration applications that were required to be
entered into voter registration lists by Election Day. Scanning signatures
of new voters into the voter registration system was not applicable to
this election office.
City of Madison, Wisconsin To some extent, election office staff
experienced challenges entering information on eligible voters into voter
registration lists because of the volume of registration applications that
had to be entered by the state's registration deadline or Election Day. To
address these challenges, staffing was increased and the office operated
with extended hours. Scanning signatures of new voters into the voter
registration system was not applicable to this election office.
Page 76 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Removing
Names from Voter Registration Lists
This appendix describes the responses of local election officials,
representing 14 jurisdictions on their reported experiences removing the
names of voters from voter registration lists during 2004. All but 1 of
the 14 local election officials responding to our survey reported that
voters' names were removed from registration lists during 2004 for various
reasons, such as voter requested name be removed or records identified
voter as deceased or as ineligible due to a felony conviction. For
information on the reasons that election officials in each jurisdiction
removed names of voters from registration lists, see table 1. The local
election officials also reported steps that they took before removing
voters' names from the voter registration lists in order to ensure that
names of eligible voters were not inadvertently removed. The statements in
this appendix reflect the responses to our survey by the applicable local
election officials and were not independently verified by us.
Gila County, Arizona
Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
inadvertently removed:
o sent the voter a follow-up notice about removal, because the voter
failed to respond to a notice from the voter registrar and had not voted
or had not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections, but
received no response to the follow-up notice;
o sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address
information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had moved
to another jurisdiction or felony records identified the voter as
ineligible due to a felony conviction;
o sent a letter or postcard to the voter to confirm that the voter
wanted his/her name removed from the voter registration list as requested;
o sent a letter to the voter notifying of removal because court records
identified the voter as ineligible due to mental incompetence;
o sent a letter to the deceased voter's next of kin notifying of removal
and asking for confirmation of the voter's death;
o contacted the funeral home to obtain the deceased voter's identifying
information (such as name, date of birth, and address);
o matched information from a newspaper obituary with information from
the state/county vital statistics offices; and
o matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
registration list with information received from various sources on
changes of address (i.e., the U.S. Postal Service National Change of
Address list), felony convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths.
Page 77 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Removing Names from Voter Registration Lists
Maricopa County, Arizona
Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
inadvertently removed:
o mailed two notices to the voter-one to the mailing address on file and
one to the residence address, if different from the mailing address-when
the office received information indicating that the voter had moved from
the address on file; if both notices were returned undeliverable, moved
the voter to an inactive registration list and if no voter activity
occurred through two federal elections, the voter's registration was
canceled;
o canceled the voter's registration when the voter requested in writing
that his/her name be removed from the registration list;
o matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
registration list with information received from various sources on
changes of address (i.e., the U.S. Postal Service National Change of
Address list), felony convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths;
o sent a letter to the voter asking if he/she wanted to remain
registered in the county when information from the U.S. Postal Service
indicated that the voter had moved to another jurisdiction, and if the
voter signed and returned the letter indicating that he/she no longer
wanted to be registered in the county, the registration was canceled;
o sent a letter to the voter notifying of removal because court records
identified the voter as ineligible due to a felony conviction and gave the
voter an opportunity to inform the election office that the information
provided from the courts was incorrect or that the felony was overturned;
and
o sent a letter to the deceased voter's family asking to confirm the
voter's death when information provided by the state/county vital
statistics offices or newspaper obituaries was insufficient to positively
identify the voter as deceased.
Los Angeles County, California
Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
inadvertently removed:
o matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
registration list with information received from various sources on
changes of address (e.g., the U.S. Postal Service National Change of
Address list), felony convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths;
o sent the voter a letter and attempted to reach the voter by phone to
notify of removal on the basis of a felony conviction; and
Page 78 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Removing Names from Voter Registration Lists
o sent the voter a letter notifying of removal because court records
identified the voter as ineligible due to mental incompetence.
Yolo County, California
Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
inadvertently removed:
o matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
registration list with information received from various sources on
changes of address (i.e., the U.S. Postal Service National Change of
Address list), felony convictions, and deaths;
o sent the voter a letter or notice of removal to confirm that the voter
wanted his/her name removed from the voter registration list as requested
or to notify the voter of removal on the basis of change-ofaddress
information from the U.S. Postal Service; and
o matched information from newspaper obituaries with information from
state/county vital statistics offices.
City of Detroit, Michigan
Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
inadvertently removed:
o matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
registration list with information received from various sources on
changes of address and deaths;
o sent the voter a follow-up notice about removal because the voter
failed to respond to a notice from the voter registrar and had not voted
or had not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections, but
received no response to the follow-up notice;
o sent the voter a notice of removal because the voter no longer resided
in the jurisdiction; and
o canceled the voter's registration as requested by the voter and
annotated the registration card with the reason the registration was
canceled.
No steps were taken before removing a voter's name from the voter
registration list when felony records identified the voter as ineligible
due to a felony conviction.
Page 79 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Removing Names from Voter Registration Lists
New York City, New York
Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
inadvertently removed:
o matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
registration list with information received from various sources on
changes of address, felony convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths;
o sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address
information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had moved
to another jurisdiction, or felony records identified the voter as
ineligible due to a felony conviction, or court records identified the
voter as ineligible due to mental incompetence; and
o sent the voter a letter or postcard to confirm that the voter wanted
his/her name removed from the voter registration list as requested.
Rensselaer County, New York
Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
inadvertently removed:
o sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address
information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had moved
to another jurisdiction and
o matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
date of birth, and social security number) contained in thevoter
registration list with information received from various sources on
changes of address, felony convictions, or deaths.
No steps were taken before removing voters' names from the voter
registration list when voters requested that names be removed or newspaper
obituaries identified voters as deceased.
Bexar County, Texas Before removing names from the voter registration
list, the following steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible
voters were not inadvertently removed:
o sent the voter a follow-up notice about removal because the voter
failed to respond to a notice from the voter registrar and had not voted
or had not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections, but
received no response to the follow-up notice;
Page 80 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Removing Names from Voter Registration Lists
o sent a letter or postcard to the voter to confirm that the voter
wanted his/her name removed from the voter registration list as requested;
o sent the voter a letter notifying of removal on the basis of a felony
conviction or mental incompetence; and
o matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
registration list with information received from various sources on felony
convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths.
Webb County, Texas
Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
inadvertently removed:
o sent the voter a follow-up notice about removal because voter failed
to respond to a notice from the voter registrar and had not voted or had
not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections, but
received no response to the follow-up notice;
o sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address
information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had moved
to another jurisdiction;
o sent the voter a letter notifying of removal on the basis of a felony
conviction;
o matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
registration list with information received from various sources on felony
convictions and deaths;
o attempted to reach the deceased voter's next of kin by phone to notify
of removal and to ask for confirmation of voter's death; and
o matched information from a newspaper obituary with information from
state/county vital statistics offices.
Albemarle County, Virginia
Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
inadvertently removed:
o required the voter to file a document with the election office before
any action was taken to remove the name from registration list as the
voter requested;
o matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
registration list with information received from various sources on
Page 81 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Removing Names from Voter Registration Lists
felony convictions, mental incompetence, deaths, or change of
registration notice from another state; and o sent the voter a letter
notifying of removal on the basis of a felony conviction.
No steps were taken before removing voters' names from the voter
registration lists when newspaper obituaries identified voters as
deceased.
Arlington County, Virginia
Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
inadvertently removed:
o matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
registration list with information received from various sources on
changes of address, felony convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths;
o sent a letter asking the voter to confirm current residence because
change-of-address information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the
voter had moved to another jurisdiction;
o sent the voter a postcard to confirm a request to remove his/her name
from the voter registration list; and
o sent the voter a letter notifying of removal on the basis of a felony
conviction or on the basis of court records that identified the voter as
ineligible due to mental incompetence.
City of Franklin, Wisconsin
Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
inadvertently removed:
o matched voter's identifying information (such as name, address, date
of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter registration
list with information received from the U.S. Postal Service National
Change of Address list;
o sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address
information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had moved
to another jurisdiction; and
o attempted to reach the voter by phone to confirm that he/she had moved
outside the jurisdiction.
No steps were taken before removing voters' names from the voter
registration list when voters requested that names be removed or newspaper
obituaries identified voters as deceased.
Page 82 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Removing
Names from Voter Registration Lists
City of Madison, Wisconsin When the office received voter cancellation
cards from other municipalities, staff checked the voters' dates of birth
before removing their names from the voter registration list to ensure
that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently removed from the
list. No steps were taken before removing voters' names from the voter
registration lists when voters requested that their names be removed or
newspaper obituaries identified voters as deceased.
Page 83 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Implementing Provisional Voting
This appendix summarizes the responses of local election office
representatives to questions in our survey and interviews about their
experiences during the November 2004 election in implementing the
requirements in HAVA for provisional voting and identification
requirements for certain first-time voters who applied to register to vote
after January 1, 2003. Unless otherwise noted, the statements in this
appendix reflect the responses to our survey by the applicable local
election officials and were not independently verified by us.
Gila County, Arizona
In Gila County, 575 provisional ballots were cast and 505 of these
ballots- 88 percent-were counted. For a provisional vote to count, the
voter had to be a qualified voter in the precinct. The main reasons for
not counting the other 70 provisional ballots were that (1) the voters did
not meet the residency eligibility requirements, (2) the election office
received voter registration applications very close to or after the
registration deadline, and (3) the provisional ballots or the envelopes
containing those ballots were incomplete or illegible. The county election
office did not experience challenges implementing the provisional voting
requirements during the November 2004 election.
The county election office used various means to inform voters of the
availability of provisional ballots and the outcome of provisional votes.
Representatives we spoke with at the county election office told us that
they notified voters of the availability of provisional ballots by posting
signs at polling places. Voters were also provided with written
information at their polling places informing them that they could find
out whether or not their provisional votes were counted and, if the votes
were not counted, the reason they were not counted. Voters who cast
provisional ballots could find out the outcome of their votes by calling a
toll-free telephone number, calling the local election office, calling the
state election office, and via a letter from the local election office
informing voters of the outcome of their provisional votes. Information on
the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters
between 6 and 10 days after the election.
In response to a question in our survey asking if the county allowed
firsttime voters who registered by mail as of January 2003 but did not
provide a copy of identification with their applications to cast
provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at the
polling place, the
Page 84 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Implementing Provisional Voting
representative who responded to the survey said this was not applicable.
Arizona passed a ballot initiative in 2004 requiring voters to show
identification prior to receiving ballots.1 The county election office did
not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these
firsttime voters.
Maricopa County, Arizona
In Maricopa County, 68,642 provisional ballots were cast and 50,719 of
these ballots-74 percent-were counted. For a provisional vote to count,
the voter had to be a qualified voter in the precinct. The main reasons
for not counting the other 17,923 provisional ballots were that (1) no
evidence existed that the individuals who cast these ballots had
registered or tried to register to vote directly with the elections
office, (2) the voters did not meet the residency eligibility requirement,
and (3) other reasons including election officials not receiving voter
registration applications until after the state's deadline to register to
vote. In describing challenges that the county election office faced in
implementing provisional voting for the November 2004 election, officials
from the county election office said they had to modify the form and
envelope used for provisional voting to provide a statement for the voter
to sign to indicate U.S. citizenship.
Voters were informed of the availability of provisional ballots and
outcome of provisional votes using various means. Representatives we spoke
with at the county election office told us that they notified voters of
the availability of provisional ballots by posting signs at polling
places. Voters were also provided with written information at their
polling places informing them that they could find out whether or not
their provisional votes were counted and, if the votes were not counted,
the reason they were not counted. Voters who cast provisional ballots
could find out the outcome of their votes by calling a toll-free telephone
number, checking a Web site, calling the local election office, calling
the state election office, visiting the local election office, and via a
letter from the local election office informing voters of the outcome of
their provisional votes. Information on the outcome of the provisional
votes was made available to the voters between 6 and 10 days after the
election.
1Local election officials in the two jurisdictions in Arizona said that
the HAVA requirement to provide a provisional ballot in such instance was
not applicable. In a letter from the U.S. Department of Justice to the
Arizona Secretary of State, Justice's Civil Rights Division concluded that
it was permissible for a state to mandate that potential voters show
identification at the polls prior to receiving provisional ballots.
Page 85 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Implementing Provisional Voting
In response to a question in our survey asking if the county allowed
firsttime voters who registered by mail as of January 2003 but did not
provide a copy of identification with their applications to cast
provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at the
polling place, the representative who responded to the survey said this
was not applicable. Arizona passed a ballot initiative in 2004 requiring
voters to show identification prior to receiving ballots. The county
election office did not report experiencing challenges verifying the
identification of these firsttime voters.
Los Angeles County, California
In Los Angeles County, 204,578 provisional ballots were cast during the
November 2004 election and 166,894 of these ballots-82 percent-were
counted. Provisional votes are counted when they are cast by qualified
voters in any precinct within the county. The main reasons for not
counting the other 37,684 ballots were that (1) no evidence existed that
the voters had registered or tried to register to vote, (2) the voters did
not sign the voter registration forms, and (3) the voters did not provide
dates or places of birth on the voter registration forms or the
provisional ballot envelopes. The county election office experienced
challenges implementing the HAVA provisional voting requirements during
the November 2004 election and took steps to address these challenges.
Provisional voting was a challenge because staff had to prepare duplicate
ballots to remove ineligible or invalid contests when voters cast their
provisional ballots at the wrong precinct. To overcome this challenge,
staffing was increased to prepare the duplicate ballots.
Voters were informed of the availability of provisional ballots and how to
find out the outcome of provisional votes using various means.
Representatives we spoke with at the county election office told us that
voters were notified of the availability of provisional ballots by posting
signs at polling places, conducting public education campaigns, and
working with community-based organizations. Also, they said that
information on provisional voting is contained in California's Voting Bill
of Rights and the state's election code. Voters were provided written
information at their polling places informing them that they could find
out the outcome of their provisional votes by calling a toll-free
telephone number or the local election office. Information on the outcome
of the provisional votes was made available to the voters more than 10
days after the election.
The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January
2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications
to
Page 86 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Implementing Provisional Voting
cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification
at the polling place; 12,264 of these first-time voters cast provisional
ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert pollworkers and
elections staff of first-time voters who were required to provide
identification at the polls because they did not provide it when they
registered by mail, notations were made to the voter file, voter roster,
and absentee identification envelope. The county election office reported
experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these first-time
voters. Specifically, this proved to be a challenge because the state did
not have a statewide voter registration database to verify the
identification of these voters. To overcome this challenge, voters were
requested to provide identification at the polls and absentee voters were
requested to enclose identification with their ballots.
Yolo County, California
In Yolo County, 2,050 provisional ballots were cast during the November
2004 election. The representative from the election office who responded
to our survey did not know how many of these provisional ballots were
counted. For a provisional vote to count, the voter had to be a qualified
voter in any precinct within the county. The most frequently cited reason
for not counting provisional ballots were (1) a lack of evidence that the
voters had submitted voter registration applications at MVA offices, (2)
voters not providing identification as required by HAVA for individuals
who registered by mail and were voting for the first time in the precinct
or jurisdiction, and (3) voters not signing a sworn statement that they
met the qualifications to be eligible to vote in the precinct or
jurisdiction. The county election office did not experience challenges
implementing the HAVA provisional voting requirement during the November
2004 election.
The county election office used various means to inform voters of the
availability of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes.
Representatives we spoke with at the county election office told us that
voters were notified of the availability of provisional ballots by posting
signs at polling places and mailing sample ballots to voters. Voters were
also provided written information at their polling places informing them
that they could find out the outcome of their provisional votes by calling
a toll-free telephone number or the local election office. Information on
the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters more
than 10 days after the election.
The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January
2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications
to cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide
identification at
Page 87 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Implementing Provisional Voting
the polling place. The representative from the county election office who
responded to our survey did not know how many first-time voters cast
provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert
pollworkers and elections staff about first-time voters who needed to
provide identification at the polls because they did not provide it when
they registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with
notes, codes, or marks next to the voters' names. The county election
office did not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification
of these first-time voters.
City of Detroit, Michigan
In Detroit, 1,350 provisional ballots were cast during the November 2004
election, and 123 of these ballots-9 percent-were counted. Provisional
votes are counted when they are cast by qualified voters in their assigned
precincts. The main reasons for not counting the other 1,227 provisional
ballots were that the voters did not (1) provide acceptable identification
or proof of residence, (2) sign sworn statements that they met the
qualifications to be eligible to vote in the precincts or jurisdictions,
or (3) meet the residency eligibility requirements for the precincts or
jurisdictions. The election office experienced challenges implementing
provisional voting during the November 2004 election. Provisional voting
was a challenge because Detroit has the largest number of voting precincts
in Michigan, and the 6-day time frame for processing provisional ballots
was very challenging and unrealistic. To overcome this challenge, the
entire department's employees were mobilized to process provisional
ballots.
The election office used various means to inform voters of the
availability of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes.
Representatives we spoke with at the election office told us that election
staff notified voters of the availability of provisional ballots by
speaking to community and church groups and through a voter education
program. Voters were provided with written information at their polling
places informing them that they could find out the outcome of their
provisional votes by contacting the local election office by phone and in
person, and by receiving a letter from the election office. Information on
the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters
within 6 to 10 days after the election.
The city allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January
2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications
to cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide
identification at the polling place. The representatives from the city
election office who
Page 88 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Implementing Provisional Voting
responded to our survey did not know how many of these first-time voters
cast provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert poll
workers and elections staff about first-time voters who needed to provide
identification at the polls because they did not provide it when they
registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with notes,
codes, or marks next to the voters' names. The city election office did
not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these
firsttime voters.
Delta Township, Michigan
In Delta Township, four provisional ballots were cast during the November
2004 election, and one of these ballots was counted. Provisional votes are
counted when they are cast by qualified voters in their assigned
precincts. The reason for not counting the other three ballots was that
the voters' registration applications were postmarked after the
registration deadline. The township election office experienced challenges
implementing the HAVA provisional voting requirement during the November
2004 election and took steps to address these challenges. Provisional
voting was a challenge because it was viewed as too complex and
time-consuming for poll workers to administer along with all the other
issues they face on Election Day. To overcome this challenge, the election
office provided the poll workers with general information on provisional
voting and instructed staff in precincts to call the election office about
each provisional envelope ballot being considered.
The election office used various means to inform voters of the
availability of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes.
Representatives we spoke with at the election office told us that voters
in the township were notified of the availability of provisional ballots
primarily through the media. Voters were also provided with written
information at their polling places informing them that they could find
out the outcome of their provisional votes by calling a toll-free
telephone number, calling the local or state election office telephone
number, or visiting the local election office in person. Information on
the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters
within 5 days after the election.
Delta Township allowed first-time voters who registered by mail to cast
provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at the
polling place. To alert pollworkers and elections staff about first-time
voters who needed to provide identification at the polls because they did
not provide it when they registered by mail, the voter registration list
was marked with notes, codes, or marks next to the voters' names. None of
these first-time voters cast provisional ballots during the November 2004
Page 89 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Implementing Provisional Voting
election. The county election office reported experiencing challenges
verifying the identification of these first-time voters. Specifically,
this was viewed as very time-consuming due to the high volume of voters,
and that other voters suffered because this resulted in delays. To
overcome these challenges, poll workers asked for identification as
needed.
New York City, New York
In New York City, 140,779 provisional ballots were cast and 77,804 of
these ballots-55 percent-were counted. Provisional votes are counted when
they are cast by qualified voters in their precincts. The main reasons for
not counting the other 62,975 provisional ballots were that (1) no
evidence existed that the individuals who cast these ballots had
registered or tried to register to vote directly with the elections
office, (2) the envelopes or ballots were incomplete or illegible, and (3)
voters did not meet the residency eligibility requirements. The city
election office did not report experiencing challenges with implementing
provisional voting.
In response to a question about how the city election office notified
voters of the availability of provisional ballots, election office
representatives said that voters were already familiar with the system.2
Voters were not provided with written information at their polling places
informing them that they could find out whether or not their provisional
votes were counted and, if the votes were not counted, the reason they
were counted. Instead, the election office sent letters to only those
provisional voters whose ballots were not counted because state election
law requires notifying only those voters whose provisional ballots were
not counted. Information on the outcome of the provisional ballots was
made available to the voters more than 10 days after the election.
The city allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January
2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications
to cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide
identification at the polling place; 551 of these first-time voters cast
provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. The names of these
voters were marked on the registration list so that poll workers knew that
these voters needed to show identification. The county election office did
not report
2While New York State had not passed legislation to implement the
provisional voting requirements in the Help America Vote Act by the time
of the November 2004 election, New York had a form of provisional voting
in place referred to as affidavit ballots.
Page 90 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration Appendix VII: Reported
Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Implementing Provisional
Voting
experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these first-time
voters.
Rensselaer County, New York
In Rensselaer County, 1,914 provisional ballots were cast and 972 of these
ballots-51 percent-were counted. For a provisional vote to count, the
voter had to be a qualified voter in the precinct. The main reasons for
not counting the other 942 provisional ballots were that (1) the county
election office received registration applications after the state's
registration deadline, (2) no evidence that individuals had registered or
tried to register directly with the election office, and (3) voters did
not meet residency eligibility requirements. The county election office
did not report experiencing challenges with implementing provisional
voting.
In response to a question about how the county election office notified
voters of the availability of provisional ballots, election office
representatives said that poll worker inspectors did so if they were not
listed in the voter rolls. Voters were not provided with written
information at their polling places informing them that they could find
out whether or not their provisional votes were counted and, if the votes
were not counted, the reason they were not counted. Voters who cast
provisional ballots could find out the outcome of their votes by calling
the election office. Information on the outcome of the provisional votes
was made available to the voters more than 10 days after the election.
The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January
2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications
to cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide
identification at the polling place. None of these first-time voters cast
provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. The names of these
voters were marked on the registration list so that poll workers knew that
these voters needed to show identification. The county election office did
not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these
first-time voters.
Bexar County, Texas In Bexar County, 2,996 provisional ballots were cast
during the November 2004 election and 602 of these ballots-20 percent-were
counted. Provisional votes are counted when they are cast by qualified
voters in their assigned precincts. The main reasons that the other 2,394
provisional ballots were not counted were that (1) voters did not meet the
residency eligibility requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction and
(2) no evidence existed that the individuals had registered or tried to
register directly with
Page 91 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Implementing Provisional Voting
the elections office or had submitted their voter registration
applications at MVA offices. The county election office reported
experiencing minor challenges implementing provisional voting during the
November 2004 election, which included missing signatures and provisional
ballots cast in incorrect precincts. To address this issue, efforts were
made to review all available records for the missing or incorrect
information, such as the voter registration database, secretary of state
records, motor vehicle agency records, and cards containing the voters'
original signatures.
The election office used various means to inform voters of the
availability of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes, such
as posting signs at polling places. This information was also made
available to voters upon request. Voters were not provided with written
information at their polling places informing them that they could find
out whether or not their provisional votes were counted and, if the votes
were not counted, the reasons they were not counted. Voters could find out
the outcome of their provisional votes by calling the local election
office or by receiving a letter from the election office. Information on
the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters
within 6 to 10 days after the election.
The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail after January
2003 and did not send a copy of identification with their applications to
cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification
at the polling place. The representative from the county election office
did not know how many first-time voters cast provisional ballots during
the November 2004 election. To alert poll workers and elections staff
about first-time voters who needed to provide identification at the polls
because they did not provide it when they registered by mail, the voter
registration list was marked with notes, codes, or marks next to the
voters' names. The county election office did not report experiencing
challenges verifying the identification of these first-time voters.
Webb County, Texas In Webb County, 60 provisional ballots were cast
during the November 2004 election and 23 of these ballots were counted.
Provisional votes are counted when they are cast by qualified voters in
their assigned precincts. The main reasons for not counting the other 37
ballots were (1) voters did not meet the residency eligibility
requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction, (2) a lack of evidence that
the individuals had submitted their voter registration applications at MVA
offices, and (3) the county election office received voter registration
applications after registration deadline.
Page 92 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Implementing Provisional Voting
The county election office did not report experiencing challenges with
implementing provisional voting.
The election office provided written information to voters who cast
provisional ballots informing them that they would receive a letter from
the election office notifying them of the outcome of their votes.
Information on the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to
the voters in 5 days or less after the election.
The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail after January
2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their registrations
to cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide
identification at the polling place. None of these first-time voters cast
provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert
pollworkers and elections staff about first-time voters who needed to
provide identification at the polls because they did not provide it when
they registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with
notes, codes, or marks next to the voters' names. The county election
office did not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification
of these first-time voters.
Albemarle County, Virginia
In Albemarle County, 49 provisional ballots were cast during the November
2004 election. The representative from the county election office who
responded to our survey did not know how many provisional ballots were
counted. For provisional votes to be counted, they must be cast by
qualified voters in their assigned precincts. The main reasons for not
counting provisional votes were that (1) voters did not meet the residency
eligibility requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction because they had
moved from one jurisdiction to another within Virginia and had not updated
their voter registration records within the required time frame and (2) no
evidence existed that the individuals had submitted their voter
registration applications at MVA offices or at other NVRA agencies. The
county election office reported experiencing challenges implementing
provisional voting. Specifically, provisional voting was viewed as a
challenge because ballots were provided to ineligible voters to placate
them, given the common misperception among some voters that they could
cast ballots anywhere. In addition, because various groups created a high
level of mistrust among voters, who at times were confrontational or
disruptive, provisional ballots were provided to placate voters and to
keep order at the polls. To address these challenges, the county election
office said it would expand outreach efforts to ensure individuals who
were moving understood the need to provide the election office with a
timely change of address.
Page 93 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Implementing Provisional Voting
The county election office used various means to inform voters of the
availability of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes.
Representatives we spoke with at the county registrar office told us that
voters were notified of the availability of provisional ballots through
the media. Voters were also provided with written information at their
polling places informing them that they could find out the outcome of
their provisional votes by calling a toll-free telephone number, calling
the local or state election office, contacting the local election office
in person, or receiving a letter from the local election office.
Information on the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to
the voters within 6 to 10 days after the election.
The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail after January
2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their registrations
to cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide
identification at the polling place. None of these first-time voters cast
provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert
pollworkers and elections staff about first-time voters who needed to
provide identification at the polls because they did not provide it when
they registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with
notes, codes, or marks next to the voters' names. The county election
office did not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification
of these first-time voters.
Arlington County, Virginia
In Arlington County, 147 provisional ballots were cast during the November
2004 election and 19 of these ballots-13 percent-were counted. Provisional
votes are counted when they are cast by qualified voters in their assigned
precincts. The main reasons for not counting the other 128 ballots were
(1) a lack of evidence that the individuals had registered or tried to
register directly with the elections office, (2) a lack of evidence that
the individuals had submitted their voter registration applications at MVA
offices, and (3) that they did not meet the residency eligibility
requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction. The county election office
reported experiencing challenges implementing provisional voting.
Specifically, provisional voting was viewed as a challenge because some
poll workers did not understand, according to the county election office,
that anyone who insisted on voting a provisional ballot was entitled to do
so and, as a result, some voters whose names were not in the registration
list might not have been offered provisional ballots. Provisional voting
was also a challenge because, according to the county election office,
lawyers stationed outside the polls sometimes erroneously told voters that
they could insist on voting a provisional ballot even though poll workers
had directed them to their correct polling places. The
Page 94 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Implementing Provisional Voting
election office plans to address some of these issues during training
sessions for poll workers.
The county registrar office used various means to inform voters of the
availability and outcome of provisional votes. Representatives we spoke
with at the county registrar office told us that voters were notified of
the availability of provisional ballots by posting signs at polling
places. Voters were also provided with written information at their
polling places informing them that they could find out the outcome of
their provisional votes by calling a toll-free telephone number, calling
the local or state election office telephone number, contacting the local
election office in person, or by receiving a letter from the local
election office. Information on the outcome of the provisional votes was
made available to the voters within 6 to 10 days after the election.
The county allowed first-time voters who applied to register to vote by
mail after January 2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with
their registrations to cast provisional ballots if they were not able to
provide identification at the polling place. None of these first-time
voters cast provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. To
alert pollworkers and elections staff about first-time voters who needed
to provide identification at the polls because they did not provide it
when they registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with
notes, codes, or marks next to the voters' names. The county election
office did not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification
of these first-time voters.
City of Franklin, Wisconsin
No provisional ballots were cast in Franklin during the November 2004
election. If provisional ballots had been cast, voters would have been
provided written information at their polling places informing them that
they could find out the outcome of their provisional votes. Provisional
votes would have been counted if the ballots were cast by qualified voters
in their assigned precincts. The election office reported experiencing
challenges implementing provisional voting and took steps to address these
challenges. Specifically, providing thorough instructions to all election
workers and voters about provisional voting during an extremely
high-turnout election was challenging. To address this issue, the city
election office provided thorough and repeated poll worker education.
Provisional ballots were made available to individuals who applied to
register to vote after January 2003 but did not send a copy of
identification with their applications. None of these first-time voters
cast provisional
Page 95 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Implementing Provisional Voting
ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert pollworkers and
elections staff about first-time voters who needed to provide
identification at the polls because they did not provide it when they
registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with notes,
codes, or marks next to the voters' names. The city election office did
not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these
first-time voters.
City of Madison, Wisconsin
In Madison, five provisional ballots were cast during the November 2004
election but none were counted. Provisional votes are counted when they
are cast by qualified voters in their assigned precincts. The main reason
these provisional votes were not counted was that the voters did not
provide identification as required by HAVA for voters who applied by mail
after January 2003 and were voting for the first time in the precinct.
These voters were instructed to bring their identification to the local
election office within 24 hours after the election but did not do so. The
city election office did not report experiencing challenges implementing
provisional voting.
Voters were provided with written information at their polling places
informing them that they could contact the local election office to find
out the outcome of their provisional votes. However, the local election
office did not provide information to voters on the outcome of provisional
votes since this information is only provided when provisional votes
count.3
The representative from the city election office did not know if
first-time voters who registered by mail after January 2003 but did not
send a copy of identification with their applications were allowed to cast
provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at the
polling place. To alert poll workers and elections staff about first-time
voters who needed to provide identification at the polls because they did
not provide it when they registered by mail, the voter registration list
was marked with notes, codes, or marks next to the voters' names. The city
election office reported experiencing challenges verifying the
identification of these firsttime voters. Specifically, the city election
office required additional staff to
3With respect to provisional voting, under HAVA, states that had either
(1) no voter registration requirements for voters with respect of federal
elections (North Dakota) or (2) polling place registration on Election Day
with respect to federal elections (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming) in effect on and after August 1, 1994, are not
subject to HAVA's provisional voting requirements.
Page 96 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
Implementing Provisional Voting
send notices to these voters to notify them that they needed to submit the
necessary documentation or bring it to the polling place on Election Day.
Page 97 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices
with Voter Registration Applications
This appendix describes the responses of state and local motor vehicle
agency (MVA) representatives to our survey about their experiences during
2004 in carrying out various voter registration application tasks-
specifically, assisting MVA clients with completing voter registration
applications, accepting applications from these clients, and forwarding
applications to state or local elections offices. It also describes
actions MVA officials reported that they took when individuals and state
or local election officials contacted their offices about individuals who
said they submitted their applications to MVA offices but their names were
not on the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November
2004 election. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses to
our survey by the applicable state and local MVA officials and were not
independently verified by us.
In 1993, NVRA, also known as the "motor voter" law, was enacted. NVRA,
among other things, established procedures to facilitate the registration
of eligible citizens to vote in federal elections by providing them the
opportunity to apply to register to vote at various locations, such as
motor vehicle and other NVRA agencies primarily in states that have a
voter registration requirement.1 Under NVRA, an eligible citizen
conducting certain transactions at a motor vehicle agency (MVA)- such as
applying for, renewing, or changing the address on a driver's license-can
simultaneously apply to register to vote or, if applicable, change the
voter's address.
In 2001, we reported that about 46 percent of the jurisdictions responding
to our nationwide survey expressed concerns about applications received
from NVRA agencies. For example, officials most frequently noted
challenges with processing incomplete or illegible applications,
applications that arrived late at the local election office, and
applications that never arrived. Because local election officials around
the country expressed concerns about processing applications submitted at
MVAs, as noted in our 2001 report, we surveyed MVA officials in six
states2 and 12 local jurisdictions about their experiences during 2004 in
carrying out
1Under NVRA, states that had either (1) no voter registration requirements
for voters with respect to federal elections (North Dakota) or (2) polling
place registration on Election Day with respect to federal elections
(Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) in effect on and
after August 1, 1994, are not subject to NVRA.
2Wisconsin was not included in our survey because MVA offices in this
state do not participate in voter registration because, as noted in
footnote 1 in this appendix, the state is exempt from NVRA.
Page 98 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration Appendix VIII: Reported
Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with Voter Registration
Applications
voter registration application tasks and assisting voters who said they
had submitted their applications to a MVA office but their names were
missing from the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the
November 2004 election. Appendix IX provides a copy of the survey sent to
MVA officials in each of the six states and 12 local jurisdictions.
As figure 8 illustrates, state MVA representatives reported, for the most
part, that during 2004 MVA staff found that helping clients complete their
voter registration applications, accepting applications from clients, and
forwarding applications to state or local elections offices was either
very easy, somewhat easy, or neither difficult nor easy.
Experiences of
Selected State MVA Offices
Figure 8: MVA Officials' Characterization of How Difficult or Easy It Was
for MVA Staff to Assist Clients with Completing Voter Registration
Applications, Accept Applications from Clients, and Forward Applications
to Election Offices
aThe state MVA officials responded not applicable when asked how difficult
or easy it was for staff to help MVA clients complete the voter
registration application because they said MVA staff do not help clients
complete the application.
Discussed below, by state, are the reasons MVA representatives reported
that MVA staff did not experience difficulty performing the voter
registration application tasks and the assistance staff provided to
individuals who said they had submitted their applications to MVA offices,
Page 99 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency
Offices with Voter Registration Applications
but their names were not on the voter registration lists when they went to
vote in the November 2004 election.
Arizona
When asked how difficult or easy it was for staff to help MVA clients
complete the voter registration application, the state MVA representative
responded "not applicable" because staff do not help MVA clients complete
their voter registration applications. Accepting voter registration
applications was easy because the electronic form walks the clients
through each part of it. MVA clients cannot proceed through the form if
all the required boxes have not been completed. Forwarding the
applications to the state or local elections offices was more time
consuming than difficult or easy.
Twelve individuals contacted the state MVA office saying that they had
submitted a voter registration application to their MVA office or another
MVA office, but their names were missing from the voter registration lists
when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. The MVA office
referred these individuals to the local election office and checked the
MVA electronic transaction information for their voter registration
applications. State or local election officials contacted the state MVA
office about individuals who said they were told their names were not on
the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
election. However, the state or local election officials did not know
whether the individuals had said that they had submitted their voter
registration applications to the state MVA office or another MVA office.
California
When asked how difficult or easy it was for staff to help MVA clients
complete the voter registration application, the state MVA representative
responded not applicable because staff do not help MVA clients complete
their voter registration applications. Accepting applications from MVA
clients and forwarding these applications to state or local elections
offices was very easy.
The state MVA office was not contacted by individuals who said that their
names were missing from the voter registration lists when they went to
vote in the November 2004 election. But the MVA office was contacted by
state or local elections officials who indicated that the individuals said
they had submitted their voter registration applications to the state MVA
office or another MVA office, but their names were missing from the voter
registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election.
The state MVA representative, who did not know how many individuals
Page 100 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency
Offices with Voter Registration Applications
had contacted the state or local elections officials, reported that when
the elections officials provided adequate information, the MVA office
researched the driver's license database to determine if the individuals'
claims could be confirmed and informed the elections officials of the
outcome of the MVA research.
Michigan
Helping MVA clients to complete their voter registration applications and
accepting the completed applications from them were very easy because the
MVA offices process thousands of voter registrations annually following
standard procedures that have not changed substantially in many years.
Also, the voter registration applications are printed automatically with
the voter name, address, and date of birth. The clients only have to
verify the information in the application and sign it. Forwarding
applications to the state or local elections offices was somewhat easy
because clients are not always sure about their city or township. MVA
offices are provided with pre-printed mailing labels for forwarding the
applications to the various election jurisdictions, which makes the
process quite simple overall.
The state MVA representative did not know how many individuals or state or
local elections officials had contacted the state MVA office or another
MVA office about individuals who said that their names were not on the
voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
election because this information was not collected or tracked.
New York
The state MVA representative responded that helping MVA clients to
complete their voter registration applications, accepting the completed
applications from them, and forwarding the applications to state or local
elections offices were neither difficult nor easy for MVA staff during
2004. The state MVA office has not been made aware of any difficulties
that MVA staff might have encountered in carrying out these voter
registration application tasks.
Individuals and state or local elections officials had contacted the state
MVA office about 421 individuals, in total, who said that they had
submitted their voter registration applications to the state MVA office or
another MVA office, but their names were not on the voter registration
lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. The state MVA
office searched its electronic files to determine whether the 421
individuals had indicated they wanted to apply to register to vote at the
time of the MVA transaction. Also, if necessary, the state MVA office
Page 101 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency
Offices with Voter Registration Applications
pulled the original source documents to determine the individuals' intent
to apply to register to vote.
Texas
The state MVA representative responded that helping MVA clients to
complete their voter registration applications was neither difficult nor
easy for MVA staff during 2004, but this task added time to processing MVA
transactions. Accepting the completed applications from the clients also
was neither difficult nor easy and added time to processing MVA
transactions. MVA staff had to review the completed applications before
accepting them and forwarding them to the state or local elections
offices. Forwarding the completed voter registration applications to state
or local election offices was neither difficult nor easy. Applications
were either mailed or hand delivered to the state or local elections
offices.
Individuals and state or local elections officials had contacted the state
MVA office about individuals who said that they had submitted their voter
registration applications to the state MVA office or another MVA office,
but their names were not on the voter registration lists when they went to
vote in the November 2004 election. However, the state MVA office did not
know how many individuals had said that they had submitted their voter
registration applications to the state MVA office or another MVA office.
Virginia
Helping MVA clients to complete their voter registration applications and
accepting the completed applications from them were neither difficult nor
easy because MVA has been handling voter registration since 1996. MVA
staff provide the same level of service for voter registration as they do
for other MVA transactions. Forwarding applications to the state or local
elections offices is very easy because the applications are mailed daily
to the state board of elections by all of the MVA offices.
Four individuals contacted the state MVA office saying that they had
submitted a voter registration application to their MVA office or another
MVA office, but their names were missing from the voter registration list
when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. The MVA office(s)
and the state board of elections office researched various automated
systems and paper records to determine when the clients had conducted
business with the MVA and the disposition of any voter registration
applications. The MVA clients were advised by letter of the outcome of
this research. Also, the state board of elections office contacted the
state MVA office indicating that 1,288 individuals had said that they had
submitted their voter registration applications to the MVA state office or
Page 102 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration Appendix VIII: Reported
Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with Voter Registration
Applications
another MVA office, but their names were missing from the voter
registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election.
MVA assisted the state board of elections office in verifying the
individuals' claims and determining when they submitted an application to
a MVA office. The state board of elections office, which has access to MVA
records and houses all voter registration information, found that 295
individuals had applied to register to vote at a MVA office and their
applications were sent to the state board of elections office. Of the
remaining 993 individuals, 591 had indicated that they did not wish to
apply to register to vote and did not complete an application; 245 had no
record of conducting MVA business or submitting a voter registration
application at a MVA office; 128 conducted an Internet, mail, or phone
transaction with MVA but did not request that a paper voter registration
application be mailed to them; and 29 submitted their voter registration
applications after the registration deadline.
Experiences of Selected Local MVA Offices
Gila County, Arizona
The MVA representative responded not applicable when asked how difficult
or easy was it for staff to help MVA clients complete the voter
registration application because staff do not help MVA clients complete
their voter registration applications. The customer completes the
application and MVA staff glance at it to ensure all the information has
been completed. Accepting applications from clients and forwarding the
applications to the elections offices is very easy because, after the
clients complete their applications, a copy of the application is given to
them and the original applications are mailed daily to the elections
offices.
The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election
officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from
the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
election.
Maricopa County, Arizona When asked how difficult or easy it was for
staff to help MVA clients complete the voter registration application, the
MVA representative
Page 103 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration Appendix VIII: Reported
Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with Voter
Registration Applications
responded not applicable. Accepting applications from MVA clients and
forwarding the applications to election offices was very easy.
One individual contacted the MVA office saying that he/she had submitted a
voter registration application to their MVA office or another MVA office,
but his/her name was missing from the voter registration list when he/she
went to vote in the November 2004 election. The MVA office referred the
individual to the local election office. No state or local election
officials contacted the MVA office about individuals who said they were
told that their names were not on the lists of registered voters when they
went to vote in the November 2004 election.
Los Angeles County, California
The MVA representative responded not applicable when asked how difficult
or easy was it for staff to help MVA clients complete the voter
registration application because staff do not help MVA clients complete
their voter registration applications. Accepting applications from clients
and forwarding the applications to the elections offices is very easy
because the applications are collected and mailed to the elections offices
daily.
The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election
officials about individuals who said their names were missing from the
voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
election.
Yolo County, California
When asked how difficult or easy it was for staff to help MVA clients
complete the voter registration application, the MVA representative
responded not applicable because MVA staff do not assist MVA clients with
completing voter registration forms. MVA staff provide clients the forms,
accept the completed forms from the clients and note in the MVA database
that the forms were received, and forward the forms to the local voter
registrars. Accepting the forms from the clients and forwarding them to
the elections offices was very easy. Most forms are forwarded weekly to
the local registrars by mail and a special pickup is arranged for the
deadline day before an election.
The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election
officials about individuals who said their names were missing from the
voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
election.
Page 104 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency
Offices with Voter Registration Applications
City of Detroit, Michigan
Assisting clients with completing their voter registration applications
and accepting the applications from them was very easy because the
applications are completed by computer as part of other transactions. The
individuals only have to sign their applications. Forwarding applications
to the elections offices was very easy because applications are presorted
and pre-printed labels are used for mailing them to the elections offices
weekly. Around the time of elections, applications are forwarded daily to
the elections offices.
The representative from the MVA office did not know whether individuals or
state/local election officials had contacted their MVA office about
individuals who said their names were missing from the voter registration
lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election because this
information was not collected or tracked.
Delta Township, Michigan
Assisting clients with completing their voter registration applications
and accepting applications from them was very easy because thousands of
these transactions are processed yearly; the clients check the information
in their applications and sign them. Forwarding applications to the
elections offices was neither easy nor difficult, but it can be time
consuming based the volume of applications and the need to separate them
by election jurisdictions.
The representative from the MVA office did not know whether state or local
election officials contacted the MVA office about individuals who said
their names were missing from the voter registration lists when they went
to vote in the November 2004 election because this information was not
collected or tracked. Approximately 12 individuals contacted the MVA
office saying that they had submitted their voter registration
applications to their MVA office or another MVA office, but their names
were missing from the voter registration lists when they went to vote in
the November 2004 election. The MVA office referred the individuals to the
local election office and tried to look up a record of the voter
registration applications the individuals reportedly submitted.
New York City, New York Assisting MVA clients with completing the voter
registration form, accepting forms from them, and forwarding the forms to
the elections offices was very easy. When assisting clients with
completing the forms, MVA staff question information on the voter
registration forms only if the clients have not filled out any of the
information on the voter registration forms.
Page 105 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency
Offices with Voter Registration Applications
The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election
officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from
the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
election.
Rensselaer County, New York
Assisting MVA clients with completing their voter registration forms was
very easy because MVA staff do not assist clients with completing the
forms. Accepting the voter registration forms and forwarding them to the
local elections offices was also very easy. The forms are mailed to the
elections offices.
Two individuals contacted the MVA office saying that they had submitted a
voter registration application to their MVA office or another MVA office,
but their names were missing from the voter registration lists when they
went to vote in the November 2004 election. The MVA office referred the
individuals to the local election office. No state or local election
officials contacted the MVA office.
Bexar County, Texas Assisting MVA clients with completing the voter
registration application, accepting applications from them, and forwarding
the applications to the elections offices was very easy.
The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election
officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from
the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
election.
Webb County, Texas
Assisting MVA clients with completing the voter registration application,
accepting applications from them, and forwarding the applications to the
elections offices is somewhat easy. The applications are very easy for the
clients to complete, and staff forward the applications to the elections
offices daily. MVA staff review incomplete applications for accuracy.
The MVA office was contacted by individuals saying that their names were
missing from the voter registration list when they went to vote in the
November 2004 election. The representative from the MVA office did not
know how many of these individuals contacted the MVA office. The MVA
office was not contacted by state/local election officials about
individuals who said they were told that their names were not on the lists
of registered voters when they went to vote in the November 2004 election.
Page 106 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency
Offices with Voter Registration Applications
Albemarle County, Virginia
Assisting MVA clients with completing their voter registration
applications was neither difficult nor easy because MVA clerks are
responsible for quickly reviewing the applications to ensure all parts
have been completed and informing the clients of any parts of the
application that are incomplete. If clients have questions about the voter
registration application, MVA staff refer the clients to the local voter
registrar or the state election office because the MVA is responsible for
providing clients the opportunity to apply to register to vote, not
answering voter registration questions or verifying clients' responses
contained in the applications. Accepting applications from MVA clients was
somewhat easy because sometimes the clients do not complete all parts of
their applications and return incomplete applications to the MVA clerk.
Forwarding applications to elections offices was also neither difficult
nor easy because a policy and procedure are in place for carrying out this
activity.
The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election
officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from
the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
election.
Arlington County, Virginia
Assisting clients with completing their voter registration applications
was neither difficult nor easy because MVA clerks do a quick review of the
applications to make sure they are complete but do not verify any of the
clients' responses. MVA offices are tasked with providing their clients
with the opportunity to apply to register to voter. Accepting applications
from the clients and forwarding them to the elections offices was somewhat
easy. Forwarding these applications is a task that is performed daily.
The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election
officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from
the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
election.
Page 107 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency Officials
Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency Officials
Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency Officials
Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency Officials
Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency Officials
Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency Officials
Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact Acknowledgments
(440203)
William O. Jenkins, Jr. (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov
In addition to the contact named above, John Mortin and Linda Watson,
Assistant Directors; Leo Barbour; Amy Bernstein; Katherine Davis; Gina
Flacco; Evan Gilman; Mary Martin; and Maria Santos made key contributions
to this report.
Page 114 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration
GAO's Mission
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts newly
released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To have
GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out
to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25
percent. Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061
To Report Fraud, Contact:
Waste, and Abuse in Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.govFederal Programs Automated answering system: (800)
424-5454 or (202) 512-7470
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202)
512-4400Congressional U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street
NW, Room 7125 Relations Washington, D.C. 20548
Public Affairs Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202)
512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
*** End of document. ***