    Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing
    Voter Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote
    (27-SEP-05, GAO-05-997).

    GAO's past work and the work of others has shown that challenges
    processing voter registration applications and maintaining voter
    registration lists can result in individuals arriving at polls on
    Election Day to find they were not listed as registered. GAO
    surveyed local election officials in 14 jurisdictions in 7 states
    (AZ, CA, MI, NY, TX, VA, and WI) to obtain their views on
    managing voter registration for the 2004 election. GAO selected
    the 7 states considering characteristics relevant to voter
    registration, such as whether a statewide voter registration list
    existed prior to the enactment of the Help America Vote Act
    (HAVA) of 2002. Locations were selected within each state to
    represent one small and one large election jurisdiction. This
    report discusses election officials' characterization of (1)
    challenges receiving voter registration applications, including
    checking them for completeness; (2) removing voters' names from
    voter registration lists and ensuring that names were not
    inadvertently removed; and (3) implementing HAVA's provisional
    voting and identification requirements. HAVA, in part, requires
    that states offer provisional ballots to voters not listed as
    registered who declare eligibility and first-time voters who
    registered by mail after January 1, 2003, and could not provide
    identification. GAO offered election officials the opportunity to
    verify the accuracy of their responses used to prepare this
    report.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-997
        ACCNO:   A38337
      TITLE:     Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on
    Managing Voter Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can
    Vote
         DATE:   09/27/2005
      SUBJECT:   Data integrity
    	     Elections
    	     Voting records
    	     Identity verification
    	     Policy evaluation
    	     Surveys
    	     Voting systems

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    GAO-05-997

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

                           Report to Congressional Requesters

    September 2005

    ELECTIONS

     Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing Voter Registration and
                          Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote

    GAO-05-997

    [IMG]

    September 2005

    ELECTIONS

    Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing Voter Registration and
    Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote

    What GAO Found

    Local election officials representing all but 1 of the 14 jurisdictions
    GAO surveyed after the November 2004 election reported facing some
    challenges processing voter registration applications and took steps to
    address them. Processing applications received from voter registration
    drives sponsored by non-governmental organizations posed a challenge to
    election officials in 12 of the 14 jurisdictions, while half of the
    officials reported challenges receiving applications from other external
    sources, such as motor vehicle agencies. Challenges occurred in processing
    these applications for reasons such as incomplete or inaccurate
    information on voter registration applications. Half of the officials
    reported that their offices faced challenges checking applications for
    completeness, accuracy, or duplicates, citing, among other things,
    insufficient staffing to check the applications. Steps taken by election
    officials to address these and other challenges included hiring additional
    staff to handle the volume of applications received and contacting
    applicants to get correct information.

    All but 1 of the 14 election officials reported that, using various
    sources of information, they removed names from voter registration lists
    during 2004 if, for example, voters had moved, were deceased, or were
    ineligible due to a felony conviction. To help ensure names of eligible
    voters were not inadvertently removed from voter registration lists,
    officials reported contacting voters to confirm removal, matched voters'
    identifying information (such as name and address) with address changes
    provided by the U.S. Postal Service, and matched voter registration
    records with felony or death records. GAO reported in June 2005 about
    problems officials in these same jurisdictions experienced verifying voter
    information with death or felony information from existing data sources.

    GAO's survey showed that all 14 election jurisdictions permitted citizens
    to cast provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. HAVA gives
    states discretion to implement provisional voting based on state voter
    eligibility requirements. According to the election officials surveyed,
    about 423,000 provisional ballots were cast in 13 of the 14 jurisdictions,
    and 70 percent of those votes were counted. Also, 8 of the 14
    jurisdictions reported challenges implementing provisional voting, in
    part, because some poll workers were not familiar with provisional voting
    or staff did not have sufficient time to process provisional ballots. To
    address these challenges, election officials in these jurisdictions said
    they hired extra staff or provided training to poll workers.

                     United States Government Accountability Office

    Contents

    Letter

    Results in Brief
    Background
    Selected Jurisdictions Reported Challenges Processing Voter

    Registration Applications and Various Steps They Took to Address Them

    Jurisdictions Reported They Removed Voter Names from Registration Lists
    for Various Reasons, but Took Steps to Ensure That Eligible Voters' Names
    Were Not Inadvertently Removed

    All Jurisdictions Reported Enabling Provisional Votes to Be Cast but Not
    All Provisional Ballots Met States' Criteria for Whether These Votes
    Should Count

                                           1

                                          6 9

                                           16

                                           26

                                           32

    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

    Appendix II Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix III	Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Receiving Voter Registration Applications

    Appendix IV	Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Checking Voter Registration Applications

    Appendix V	Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Entering Information into Voter Registration Lists 74

    Appendix VI	Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Removing Names from Voter Registration Lists 77

                     Page i GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix VII	Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Implementing Provisional Voting 84

    Appendix VIII Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle

    Agency Offices with Voter Registration Applications 98

    Experiences of Selected State MVA Offices 99 Experiences of Selected Local
    MVA Offices 103

    Appendix IX Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency Officials

    Appendix X GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    Tables

    Table 1: Election Officials' Responses to Questions about Reasons Why
    Voters' Names Were Removed from Voter Registration Lists in 14
    Jurisdictions during 2004

    Table 2: Number and Percentage of Provisional Ballots Election Officials
    Reported Cast and Counted in the November 2004 Election in 14
    Jurisdictions

    Table 3: Number of Provisional Ballots Cast as a Percentage of Total
    Ballots Cast for President in the November 2004 Election in 14
    Jurisdictions

    Table 4: State Selection Factors

                                           28

                                           33

                                         35 40

    Figures

    Figure 1: Examples of Opportunities Citizens Have to Apply to

    Register to Vote 13 Figure 2: Sample of Michigan's Voter Registration
    Application 14 Figure 3: Sample of Texas' Voter Registration Application
    15 Figure 4: Extent of Challenges Reported by 14 Election

    Jurisdictions Receiving Applications from Organizations External to
    Election Offices: MVAs, Other NVRA Agencies, and Voter Registration Drives
    Sponsored by Non-Governmental Organizations 17

                     Page ii GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Figure 5: Extent of Challenges Election Officials Reported Experiencing
    When Checking Applications for Completeness, Accuracy, or Duplicates 19

    Figure 6: Extent of Challenges Reported by Election Officials Entering
    Voter Information into Voter Registration Lists and Scanning Signatures of
    New Voters into Voter Registration Systems 21

    Figure 7: Reasons That Provisional Ballots Were Not Counted for the
    November 2004 Election in Selected Jurisdictions 36

    Figure 8: MVA Officials' Characterization of How Difficult or Easy It Was
    for MVA Staff to Assist Clients with Completing Voter Registration
    Applications, Accept Applications from Clients, and Forward Applications
    to Election Offices 99

    Abbreviations

    FEC Federal Election Commission
    HAVA Help America Vote Act of 2002
    MVA motor vehicle agency
    NVRA National Voter Registration Act of 1993
    USPS U.S. Postal Service

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

                    Page iii GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

    September 27, 2005

    The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Government Affairs and Homeland Security
    United States Senate

    The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Government Reform
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
    Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on the Judiciary
    House of Representatives

    After the November 2000 election, reports in the media and elsewhere
    have questioned the mechanics and effectiveness of voter registration and
    voter registration list maintenance by highlighting accounts of
    individuals
    who thought they were registered being turned away from polling places
    on Election Day. In managing the voter registration process and
    maintaining voter registration lists, state and local election officials
    must
    balance two goals-(1) minimizing the burden on eligible people of
    registering to vote and (2) ensuring that voter lists are accurate
    (limited to
    those eligible to vote), which includes ensuring that appropriately
    registered voters are not inadvertently removed from the voter
    registration
    lists. All the while, state and local election officials must try to
    ensure that
    eligible citizens have the opportunity to cast their votes and have them
    counted accurately in federal, state, and local elections.

    Over the last several years, federal legislation has been enacted to
    expand
    the opportunities for citizens to become registered to vote, improve the
    accuracy of voter registration lists, and ensure that eligible voters have
    the
    opportunity to cast their ballots. In 1993, the National Voter
    Registration
    Act (NVRA), commonly called the Motor Voter Act, was enacted.1 Among
    other things, NVRA expanded the opportunity of citizens to register to

    1Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993).

    Page 1 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    vote in federal elections at state motor vehicle agencies and other public
    organizations, such as public assistance agencies and armed forces
    recruiting centers. NVRA also limited the circumstances under which states
    could remove the names of eligible voters from registration lists for
    federal elections and required states to take certain steps to accurately
    maintain such voter registration lists by removing the names of certain
    types of ineligible persons. In 2002, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was
    enacted and, among other things, it requires states to implement
    provisional voting for elections for federal office. HAVA, in general,
    requires that individuals not listed as registered or whose eligibility is
    questioned by an election official must be notified about and permitted to
    cast a provisional ballot that is set aside for review by election
    officials at a later time so that they can determine whether the person is
    eligible to vote under state law.2 HAVA also requires that provisional
    ballots be provided to first-time voters who had registered to vote by
    mail on or after January 1, 2003, but were unable to show photo
    identification or another qualifying identification document when voting
    in person or by mail in a federal election.3 In addition, HAVA requires
    that election officials must provide access to information that permits
    voters to learn if their provisional ballot was counted, and, if not, why
    not.

    Our work, which began in January 2004, focuses on the efforts of local
    election officials in 14 jurisdictions within 7 states to manage the
    registration process, maintain accurate voter registration lists, and
    ensure that eligible citizens in those jurisdictions had the opportunity
    to cast ballots during the 2004 election. Specifically, for the 2004
    election, we are reporting on election officials' characterization of
    their experiences with regard to (1) managing the voter registration
    process and any challenges related to receiving voter registration
    applications; checking them for completeness, accuracy, and duplication;
    and entering information into voter registration lists; (2) removing
    voters' names from voter registration lists and ensuring that the names of
    eligible voters were not inadvertently

    2Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002). With respect to provisional
    voting, under HAVA, states that had either (1) no voter registration
    requirements for voters with respect of federal elections (North Dakota)
    or (2) polling place registration on Election Day with respect to federal
    elections (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) in
    effect on and after August 1, 1994, are not subject to HAVA's provisional
    voting requirements.

    3Under HAVA, such individuals who desire to vote in person may cast a
    provisional ballot, whereas an individual desiring to vote by mail may
    cast a ballot that is to be treated as a provisional ballot.

                     Page 2 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    removed; and (3) implementing HAVA provisional voting and identification
    requirements and addressing any challenges encountered related to these
    requirements. We are also providing information on motor vehicle agency
    (MVA)4 officials' characterization of their experiences assisting citizens
    who apply to register to vote at MVA offices and forwarding voter
    registration applications to election offices. This information is
    contained in appendix VIII.

    In addition to this report, we have also issued, or plan to issue this
    year, reports on other specific election issues. In June 2005, we issued a
    report on the efforts of state and local election officials in seven
    states-the same seven states and local jurisdictions covered in this
    report-to ensure that voter registration lists are accurate.5 Later this
    year we plan to issue reports on (1) actions by nine states without HAVA
    waivers6 to create and maintain computerized, statewide voter registration
    lists as of January 1, 2004; (2) significant security and reliability
    concerns that have been identified for electronic voting systems; and (3)
    the Department of Defense's implementation of the Federal Voting
    Assistance Program to facilitate absentee voting by military personnel
    during the November 2004 election. These reports respond to congressional
    requests made prior to the November 2004 election. In addition, given
    concerns about the November 2004 election process, we are undertaking a
    broader, more comprehensive study of election administration and processes
    related to the November 2004 general election. This more comprehensive
    study, which we plan to issue in 2006, will address activities and
    challenges- people, processes, and technology-associated with each major
    stage of election administration to include registration, absentee and
    early voting; Election Day preparation and activities; and vote counting
    and

    4States may refer to their motor vehicle agencies by different names. For
    purposes of this report, we will generally refer to them as "motor vehicle
    agencies."

    5GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Election
    Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478
    (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).

    6With respect to HAVA's statewide voter registration list requirements,
    while HAVA established a deadline of January 1, 2004, for states to have a
    statewide voter registration list and verification procedures, it also
    provided that states could request a waiver to extend the deadline to
    January 1, 2006. Eight states did not request a waiver, 42 states and the
    District of Columbia did request and received waivers, and 1 state (North
    Dakota) is not subject to HAVA's statewide voter registration list
    requirements. North Dakota is exempt from these requirements because it
    qualifies for a HAVA exemption applicable to any "State in which, under a
    State law in effect continuously on and after the date of
    enactment...there is no voter registration requirement for individuals in
    the State with respect to elections for Federal office." Pub. L. No.
    107-252, 116 Stat. 1666, 1709 (2002).

                     Page 3 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    certification. In October 2001, we issued a similar report that focused on
    how elections were conducted in the United States, and the people,
    processes and technology that were generally associated with the
    preparation for and administration of elections. Among other things, the
    report discussed the activities and challenges associated with each stage
    of election administration, including voter registration.7

    To address our objectives for this report, we analyzed information
    collected from elections and motor vehicle agency offices in seven
    states-Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, Texas, Virginia, and
    Wisconsin.8 Our selection of the seven states is geographically diverse,
    and took into consideration a range of voter registration-related factors
    and unique characteristics of the states that might affect the
    implementation of HAVA. Specifically, we selected states that took various
    approaches for administering elections-for example, Wisconsin has same-day
    registration, which exempts the state from the HAVA provisional voting
    requirement; Arizona has on-line registration; Michigan has a reputation
    as a model for registration practices; and some local jurisdictions
    administer elections at the county level and others at the city or
    township level. Within each of the seven states, using population data
    from the 2000 U.S. Census, we then selected two jurisdictions: a local
    jurisdiction with a large population and a local jurisdiction with a small
    population.9 Other criteria we applied to select these jurisdictions
    included the proximity of the locations to our site visits with state
    election and motor vehicle officials, suggestions by state election
    officials, and proximity to a local motor vehicle office. The 14
    jurisdictions we selected were Gila and Maricopa Counties, Arizona; Los
    Angeles and Yolo Counties, California; City of Detroit and Delta Township,
    Michigan; New York City and Rensselaer County, New York; Bexar and Webb
    Counties, Texas; Albemarle and Arlington Counties, Virginia; and the
    cities of Franklin and Madison,

    7GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across the
    Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

    8We selected these states using a nonprobability sample-a sample in which
    some items in the population have no chance, or an unknown chance, of
    being selected. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
    inferences about a population. Thus, the information we obtained cannot be
    generalized to state and local election jurisdictions or MVA offices
    either nationwide or at the state level.

    9We defined a local jurisdiction with a large population as one having
    150,000 or more people of voting age and a local jurisdiction with a small
    population as one having less than 150,000 people of voting age. The
    population figures are based on the 2000 U.S. Census.

                     Page 4 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Wisconsin. The selected states and jurisdictions are the same states and
    jurisdictions we discussed in our June 2005 report.

    We gathered information from state and local officials using a
    multipronged approach. First, we reviewed relevant laws, state reports,
    and documents related to the voter registration process in the seven
    states. Second, we interviewed state and local election officials in the
    seven states and 14 jurisdictions to obtain information on their
    registration processes and implementation of the HAVA requirements for
    provisional voting and voter identification. Third, we sent a survey to
    election officials in the 14 jurisdictions to gather information about
    their experiences with the November 2004 election. We developed our survey
    questions on the basis of our review of laws, reports, and documents and
    our interviews with state and local election officials in the seven states
    and 14 jurisdictions. Our survey primarily asked questions on (1)
    challenges, if any, in processing voter registration
    applications-specifically, challenges receiving voter registration
    applications from MVAs, other NVRA agencies, and voter registration drives
    sponsored by non-governmental organizations; checking voter registration
    applications for completeness, accuracy, and duplicates; and entering
    voter information into registration lists or systems; (2) whether names of
    registrants were removed from voter registration lists, reasons why names
    were removed, and steps taken to ensure that names of eligible registrants
    were not inadvertently removed; and (3) HAVA's provisional voting and
    first-time voter identification requirements-specifically, the number of
    provisional ballots cast and counted, including reasons why jurisdictions
    did not count provisional ballots if this did occur; how voters were
    informed about provisional voting and its outcome; and whether first-time
    voters who registered by mail were allowed to cast provisional ballots if
    they did not provide required identification. Appendix II provides a copy
    of the survey we sent to each jurisdiction.

    Finally, to provide information on MVA officials' characterization of
    their experiences with voter registration applications received before the
    November 2004 election, we sent a survey to state and local MVA officials

                     Page 5 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    in six of the seven states and 12 of the 14 jurisdictions.10 The survey
    primarily asked questions about the MVA offices' experiences with (1)
    assisting citizens with completing voter registration applications, (2)
    forwarding the applications to election offices, and (3) responding to
    individuals and state or local election officials who contacted their
    offices about individuals who declared they had applied to register to
    vote at MVA offices but their names were not on voter registration lists
    when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. Appendix IX provides
    a copy of the survey we sent to the MVA officials.

    We did not independently verify the accuracy or completeness of responses
    provided from our surveys of election officials and MVA officials.
    However, local election officials and state and local MVA officials we
    surveyed were provided the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their
    responses for this report and, on the basis of the comments we received,
    we made technical changes, where appropriate. The results of our work
    cannot be generalized to state and local election jurisdictions and MVA
    offices at the state level or nationwide.

    We conducted our work from January 2004 through September 2005 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix
    I discusses our scope and methodology in greater detail.

    Election officials representing all but one of the jurisdictions we
    surveyed following the November 2004 election said they faced some
    challenges managing the voter registration process, including (1)
    receiving voter registration applications; (2) checking them for
    completeness, accuracy, and duplication; and (3) entering information into
    voter registration lists; when challenges occurred, election officials
    reported they took various steps to address them. For example, when asked
    whether their staff faced challenges receiving voter registration
    applications from MVAs, other NVRA agencies, or voter registration drives
    sponsored by nongovernmental organizations, election officials
    representing 12 of the 14 jurisdictions responded that staff faced
    challenges receiving voter

      Results in Brief

    10We did not survey MVA officials in Wisconsin regarding voter
    registration under NVRA; MVA offices in Wisconsin do not participate in
    voter registration because the state is exempt from NVRA. Wisconsin's
    exemption from NVRA, in general, is based upon the fact that it did not,
    and still does not, have voter registration requirements for federal
    elections under state laws that were in effect on the NVRA-specified
    exemption date of August 1, 1994.

    Page 6 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    registration applications from voter registration drives; 4 faced
    challenges receiving applications from MVAs; and 4 faced challenges
    receiving applications from other NVRA agencies. Officials responded that
    the reasons these challenges occurred included applications that were
    incomplete or inaccurate, and applications that were received too close
    to, or after, their state's registration deadline. Election officials
    reported that, to address these challenges, their jurisdictions took
    steps, including contacting applicants to resolve issues with incomplete
    or inaccurate applications or hiring staff to handle the volume of
    applications received near registration deadlines. In addition, officials
    in 7 of the 14 jurisdictions reported that their staff faced challenges
    checking voter registration applications for completeness, accuracy, or
    duplicates. According to these officials, these challenges occurred for a
    variety of reasons, including problems contacting individuals to obtain
    complete and accurate information and insufficient staffing to check the
    applications. They reported that, among other things, their staff
    addressed these challenges by sending letters or calling applicants to
    obtain correct information. Finally, 6 of the 14 election officials
    reported that their staff faced challenges entering or scanning voter
    information into registration lists for reasons such as the volume of
    applications received close to Election Day and problems with the scanning
    equipment. To address these challenges, they reported that more staff were
    hired and staff worked overtime. Challenges like those experienced by the
    election officials we surveyed are not new. Over the last few years, we
    and others have found that challenges managing the voter registration
    process can result in eligible citizens not being registered to vote on
    Election Day. For example, in our October 2001 report, we found that about
    46 percent of jurisdictions nationwide had problems with NVRA
    registrations during the November 2000 election. We cited local election
    officials who told us that problems processing late, incomplete, or
    illegible voter registration applications could result in individuals
    showing up at the polls and discovering they were never registered.

    Our survey of election officials representing the 14 jurisdictions showed
    that all but 1 of the jurisdictions reported removing names from
    registration lists during 2004 for various reasons, including that voters
    requested that their names be removed from the voter registration list;
    information from the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) showing that voters had
    moved outside the jurisdiction; felony records received from federal,
    state, or local governments identifying voters as ineligible due to felony
    convictions; and death records received from state or local vital
    statistics offices. NVRA prohibits removing a voter's name from a
    registration list for a federal election solely for not voting, but
    permits removal for certain

                     Page 7 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    specified reasons, including at the request of the voter, a move outside
    the voting jurisdiction, or due to ineligibility by reason of death or a
    felony conviction as provided by state law. When removing names from
    registration lists, election officials reported that they took various
    steps to ensure that the names of eligible voters were not inadvertently
    removed from voter registration lists. These steps included sending
    letters or postcards to registrants to verify that voters wanted their
    names removed; matching voters' identifying information with USPS data and
    sending voters identified by USPS as having moved outside the jurisdiction
    notices of removal; and matching voter registration records with felony
    records or death records to confirm it was the same person. Our June 2005
    report showed that these same jurisdictions faced challenges verifying the
    accuracy of registration lists because of problems matching voter
    information with various records maintained by other organizations, such
    as records maintained by state and federal entities on felony convictions
    and deaths.11 The report echoed some of the issues highlighted in our 2001
    report, wherein, on the basis of a national survey of local election
    officials, we reported on challenges that election officials identified
    with voter registration, such as obtaining accurate and timely information
    to update voter registration lists.12

    Our survey of officials in the 14 election jurisdictions showed that all
    of the jurisdictions reported that they permitted citizens to cast
    provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. In addition, 12 of
    the 14 jurisdictions to which this was applicable reported that they
    offered certain first-time voters who registered by mail the opportunity
    to cast provisional ballots. HAVA, in general, requires that states
    provide an individual the opportunity to cast a provisional ballot if, for
    example, the individual's name does not appear on the voter registration
    list. HAVA also gives states discretion to determine if an individual is
    eligible to vote and whether the provisional ballot should be counted as a
    vote in accordance with state law. For example, in one state, at least a
    portion of a provisional ballot-e.g., votes for statewide offices-may be
    counted when an individual casting the ballot was eligible to vote but not
    at the election district where the ballot was cast. In another state, a
    provisional ballot is

    11GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Election
    Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478
    (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).

    12GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges Across the
    Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

                     Page 8 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    not counted if the ballot is cast in a precinct other than the
    individual's assigned precinct. Election officials in 13 of the 14
    jurisdictions reported that 423,149 provisional ballots were cast, and 70
    percent (297,662) were counted. Not all provisional votes were counted
    because, as election officials reported, not all provisional ballots met
    states' criteria for determining which ballots should be counted. Reasons
    that provisional ballots cast during the 2004 election were not counted,
    as reported by election officials, included, among others, that
    individuals did not meet the residency eligibility requirements, had not
    registered or tried to register to vote with the election office, had not
    submitted the voter registration applications at motor vehicle agency
    offices, or election officials did not have time to enter information from
    applicants into their voter registration lists because applications were
    received at the election offices very close to or after the state
    registration deadline. HAVA requires that states establish means of
    communicating how voters who cast provisional ballots can learn-free of
    charge-whether their votes counted. Local election officials in 12 of the
    13 jurisdictions13 we surveyed reported that they set up mechanisms to
    inform voters-without cost-about the outcome of their provisional votes
    during the November 2004 election. These mechanisms included toll-free
    telephone numbers, Web sites, and letters sent to the voters who cast
    provisional ballots. Election officials also reported that provisional
    voters in their jurisdictions received written information at their
    polling places about how to find out the outcome of their provisional
    ballots, and provisional voters in 8 of the 13 jurisdictions had the
    opportunity to access information about the outcome of their ballots
    within 10 days after the election. Finally, election officials
    representing 8 of the 14 jurisdictions reported facing challenges
    implementing provisional voting for various reasons, including some poll
    workers not being familiar with provisional voting or, in one jurisdiction
    representing a large number of precincts, staff not having sufficient time
    to process provisional ballots. To address these challenges, the officials
    reported that they provided additional training to poll workers and hired
    additional staff to count provisional ballots.

    Background 	The constitutional framework for elections contemplates both
    state and federal roles. States are responsible for the administration of
    both their

    13While New York State had not passed legislation to implement provisional
    voting requirements in HAVA by the time of the November 2004 election, New
    York had a form of provisional voting in place referred to as affidavit
    ballots. The New York City election office said that letters were sent to
    voters whose affidavit ballots did not count.

    Page 9 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    own elections and federal elections. They also regulate various aspects of
    the elections process, including, for example, ballot access, registration
    procedures, absentee voting requirements, establishment of polling places,
    provision of Election Day workers, and counting and certifying the vote.
    Although the states are responsible for running elections, Congress has
    authority to affect the administration of elections. Congress' authority
    to regulate elections depends upon the type of election. With regard to
    federal elections, Congress has constitutional authority over both
    congressional and presidential elections. In addition, with respect to
    federal, state, and local elections, a number of constitutional amendments
    authorize Congress to enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory
    acts.

    Federal Laws Affecting Voter Registration and Provisional Balloting

    Under its various constitutional authorities, Congress has passed
    legislation regarding the administration of elections, including voter
    registration, voter registration list maintenance, and provisional voting.
    In 1993 Congress passed the National Voter Registration Act of 1993,14
    also known as the "motor voter" law, to establish registration procedures
    designed, in part, to "increase the number of eligible citizens who
    register to vote in elections for Federal office. . . . protect the
    integrity of the electoral process. . . . [and] ensure that accurate and
    current voter registration lists are maintained." NVRA expanded the number
    of locations and opportunities for eligible citizens to apply to register
    to vote.15 Under NVRA, an eligible citizen conducting certain transactions
    at a motor vehicle agency-such as applying for, renewing, or changing the
    address on a driver's license-can simultaneously apply to register to vote
    in elections for federal office or, if applicable, change the voter's
    address. Also, various agencies, such as those involved in providing
    public assistance, U.S. armed forces recruitment offices, and offices in a
    state providing state-funded services to people with disabilities, must be
    designated as voter registration agencies. Each state may also designate
    other offices as voter registration agencies, such as public libraries,
    schools, offices of city and county governments, and unemployment
    compensation offices. In addition, NVRA requires states to accept and use

    14Pub. L. No. 103-31, 101 Stat. 77 (1993).

    15States that had either (1) no voter registration requirement for voters
    with respect to federal elections (North Dakota) or (2) polling place
    registration on Election Day with respect to federal elections (Idaho,
    Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) in effect on and after
    August 1, 1994, are not subject to NVRA.

                     Page 10 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    a mail-in registration application developed by the Federal Election
    Commission.

    NVRA also outlined various requirements for the processing of registration
    forms and maintenance of voter registration lists for elections for
    federal office. Under NVRA, agencies designated as voter registration
    agencies, such as motor vehicle agencies, are to transmit completed voter
    registration forms to the appropriate state election officials not later
    than 10 days after the date of acceptance or, if accepted within 5 days
    before the end of the registration deadline for an election, the forms are
    to be transmitted not later than 5 days after acceptance. Also, under
    NVRA, the names of people who are registered to vote may not be removed
    from voter registration lists for federal elections except for the
    following reasons: upon written confirmation of a change of address
    outside the election jurisdiction; on the grounds that the voter has
    changed address to a location outside the election jurisdiction on the
    basis of change of address information from USPS, but only if there is
    also a failure to respond to confirmation mailings and a failure to vote
    in any election within two subsequent general federal elections; the
    request of the voter; the death of the voter; a criminal conviction, as
    provided by state law; and mental incapacity, as provided by state law.

    HAVA was enacted in October 2002 and, in addition to establishing
    requirements for provisional ballots for federal elections effective 2004,
    the law requires, in general, that individuals who registered by mail on
    or after January 1, 2003, and have not voted in a federal election
    beginning in 2004 in the state since registering to vote to show photo
    identification or another qualifying identification document when voting
    in person or by mail in a federal election. Under HAVA, the other
    qualifying documents that can be provided to show proof of identity and
    residency are a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government
    check, pay check, or other government document that shows the voter's name
    and address.

    Voter Registration in States and Local Jurisdictions

    Voter registration is a prerequisite in nearly all voting jurisdictions
    and is based on state designated voter eligibility requirements. Ensuring
    that eligible persons are registered to vote is an ongoing challenge for
    election officials and is complicated by factors such as jurisdiction
    size, mobility of voters, and community diversity. Communities with large
    student or military populations must manage voters constantly moving in or
    out of a jurisdiction, and communities with diverse populations must
    handle substantial numbers of new citizens and face language challenges in
    communicating voter registration requirements. U.S. citizens who meet

                     Page 11 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    state voter eligibility requirements have numerous opportunities to
    register to vote and can do so by filling out and submitting applications
    by certain deadlines. States establish voting eligibility requirements
    that generally include that the voter is at least 18 years of age on the
    day of the election, a citizen of the United States, mentally competent,
    and meets state eligibility qualifications regarding felon status. In
    general, to register to vote, eligible citizens may apply at local
    election offices or at motor vehicle agencies and other agencies, such as
    public assistance agencies, covered by NVRA; by submitting applications to
    local election officials; or through registration drives sponsored by
    various groups, including political parties. Figure 1 illustrates some of
    the opportunities citizens have to apply to register to vote.

                     Page 12 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

             Figure 2: Sample of Michigan's Voter Registration Application

                     Page 14 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Figure 3: Sample of Texas' Voter Registration Application

    Once an application is received and accepted, state and local
    jurisdictions compile registration applications into lists of registered
    voters. A citizen's access to voting is based primarily on the appearance
    of his or her name on such a list. For votes cast absentee by mail
    (absentee voting), for votes cast in person prior to Election Day (early
    voting), and for votes cast at the polls on Election Day, election
    officials typically verify an individual's eligibility using a list of
    registered voters or a poll book before allowing him or her to vote.
    Election officials also update and delete information from voter
    registration lists. However, NVRA's provisions specifically prohibit
    removing a name from the voter registration list for a federal election
    solely for failure to vote or for a change of address to another location
    within the same election jurisdiction.

    Page 15 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

      Selected Jurisdictions Reported Challenges Processing Voter Registration
      Applications and Various Steps They Took to Address Them

    In our survey of election officials, all but one of the jurisdictions
    reported that they faced challenges receiving and processing voter
    registration applications and that they took various steps to address
    them. Most of these challenges occurred with applications received from
    voter registration drives sponsored by non-governmental organizations.
    Election officials in half the jurisdictions also reported challenges
    checking voter registration applications for completeness, or for
    accuracy, or for duplicates. And when asked to what extent elections staff
    experienced challenges entering voter information into voter registration
    lists, 4 of 14 jurisdictions reported this as being a challenge, to some
    extent. Election officials reported taking steps to address these
    challenges by hiring extra staff, among other things. Over the past few
    years, our work and the work of others have found that challenges
    processing voter registration applications can result in eligible citizens
    not being registered to vote on Election Day.

    Jurisdictions Reported Challenges Receiving Voter Registration
    Applications from Various Organizations External to Election Offices

    Our survey of election officials representing the 14 jurisdictions showed
    that staff in most of these offices reported challenges receiving voter
    registration applications from various organizations external to election
    offices and most of these challenges occurred with applications received
    from voter registration drives sponsored by non-governmental
    organizations. Citizens in the states and jurisdictions covered by our
    survey can register to vote with various organizations external to
    election offices. In all of the jurisdictions-except those in Wisconsin,
    which is exempt from NVRA because it permits voters to register at the
    polling place on Election Day-citizens can apply to register to vote at
    MVAs and other NVRA agencies. Also, as mentioned earlier, citizens can
    register to vote during registration drives sponsored by political
    parties. Applications from these organizations are then sent
    electronically, or by mail, or are hand-delivered to election offices.
    Figure 4 shows the extent of challenges encountered in the 14
    jurisdictions as reported by the election officials representing those
    jurisdictions when receiving voter registration applications from voter
    registration drives sponsored by nongovernmental organizations, MVAs, and
    other NVRA agencies.

                     Page 16 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Figure 4: Extent of Challenges Reported by 14 Election Jurisdictions
    Receiving Applications from Organizations External to Election Offices:
    MVAs, Other NVRA Agencies, and Voter Registration Drives Sponsored by
    Non-Governmental Organizations

    Great extent Some extent Little or no extent

    Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected
    jurisdictions.

    aWhile Wisconsin is not subject to NVRA, one local jurisdiction responding
    to our survey-the City of Madison-received applications from other
    municipal agencies, such as public libraries or fire stations.

    Election officials representing the 13 jurisdictions that reported
    experiencing challenges to some extent or to a great extent receiving
    applications responded that these challenges occurred for various reasons,
    such as incomplete or inaccurate information on voter registration
    applications or applications that were received close to or after the
    registration deadline. In the states and 14 jurisdictions we selected for
    our

    Page 17 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    review, deadlines for submitting applications to vote varied by state, as
    specified by state statute. In five of the seven states-Arizona, Michigan,
    New York, Texas, and Virginia-registration applications were to be
    received at the election office about 1 month before the election. In one
    state, California, citizens could register 15 days before the election. In
    Wisconsin, which allows "same-day registration," eligible citizens with
    required identification can register to vote at the polling place on the
    day of the election.

    Election officials also reported that they took a variety of steps to try
    to address the challenges they encountered, including contacting
    individual voters to resolve issues with incomplete or inaccurate
    information, adding staff to handle the volume of applications received
    near registration deadlines, and offering training to organizations
    sponsoring voter registration drives. (App. III discusses in greater
    detail responses to our survey with regard to receiving applications from
    external organizations.)

    Election Officials in Half of the 14 Jurisdictions Reported Challenges
    Checking Voter Registration Applications for Completeness, Accuracy, or
    Duplicates

    Election officials representing 7 of the 14 jurisdictions also reported
    that their staff experienced challenges, to some extent or a great extent,
    checking voter registration applications for completeness, accuracy, or
    duplicates. During interviews we conducted prior to the November 2004
    election, state and local election officials told us that they take
    specific steps to check voter registration applications before entering
    voter information into voter registration lists. All of the officials told
    us that they check applications for completeness before entering voter
    information into voter registration lists, and with regard to accuracy,
    took steps to verify eligibility when an applicant applies to register.
    For example, officials in Arizona, Texas, Virginia, and New York said that
    their voter registration computer systems are programmed to calculate the
    age of the applicant, on the basis of the date of birth the registrant
    provides, and reject applications of individuals who will be younger than
    18 years of age on the day of the next election. At the same time, Arizona
    and Michigan match their voter registration applications against state
    motor vehicle agency records to verify information. Also, officials we
    spoke with in the seven states said that they initially verify that an
    applicant resides in the jurisdiction. Finally, to identify duplicate
    registrations, election officials said that they check existing voter
    lists before adding new voters to the registration lists.

    Our survey asked election officials in the 14 jurisdictions the extent to
    which their offices experienced challenges checking voter registration
    applications for completeness, accuracy, or duplicates and officials

                     Page 18 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    representing 7 of the 14 jurisdictions responded that their staff
    experienced, to some or a great extent, challenges in at least one of
    these three areas. Figure 5 shows how election officials in the 14
    jurisdictions responded to our survey regarding checking applications for
    completeness, or accuracy, or duplicates.

    Figure 5: Extent of Challenges Election Officials Reported Experiencing
    When Checking Applications for Completeness, Accuracy, or Duplicates

    Great extent Some extent Little or no extent

    Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected
    jurisdictions.

    In those instances where officials responded that checking applications
    for completeness, accuracy, and duplication was a challenge to some or a
    great extent, they also identified what caused the challenges to occur and
    what actions they took to try to address them. According to officials in 7
    of the 14 jurisdictions, challenges occurred for various reasons-including

                     Page 19 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    difficulties determining what information on the application was
    inaccurate, problems contacting individuals to obtain complete and
    accurate information, insufficient time between receiving the applications
    and the state's registration deadline, and lack of sufficient resources or
    staff to check the applications.

    Officials from these jurisdictions reported that they tried to address
    these challenges by, among other things, sending letters or calling
    applicants to get the correct information, asking individuals to provide
    information at the polls, and hiring additional staff or having staff work
    additional hours. (App. IV discusses responses to our survey regarding
    checking voter registration applications in greater detail.)

    Few of the 14 Jurisdictions Reported That They Experienced Challenges
    Entering Voter Information into Voter Registration Lists

    Our survey also showed that few of the jurisdictions experienced
    challenges entering voter information into voter registration lists and
    scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration system. Once
    election officials receive and address any issues associated with voter
    registration applications, they enter voter registration information into
    voter registration lists. In some jurisdictions with computerized
    registration lists, signatures of new voters are scanned into the voter
    registration system.

    When asked to what extent their staff experienced challenges entering
    voter information into voter registration lists, election officials
    representing 4 of the 14 jurisdictions responded that entering voter
    information into voter registration lists was, to some extent, a challenge
    and the remainder responded little or no challenge. When asked whether
    election office staff experienced challenges scanning signatures of new
    voters into their voter registration system, three of eight officials
    responded that scanning signatures was, to some extent a challenge. The
    remaining six officials responded that this question was not applicable to
    their jurisdictions. Figure 6 shows the election officials' responses to
    questions about entering voter information into lists, and scanning
    signatures of new voters into registration systems.

                     Page 20 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Figure 6: Extent of Challenges Reported by Election Officials Entering
    Voter Information into Voter Registration Lists and Scanning Signatures of
    New Voters into Voter Registration Systems

    Great extent Some extent Little or no extent

    Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected
    jurisdictions.

    In those instances where entering voter information into the list was, to
    some extent, reported as a challenge, two of the four officials responded
    that the challenge occurred because of the high volume of registration
    applications received close to Election Day-a response consistent with
    these officials' responses to our questions about receiving applications
    from organizations, like voter registration drives, external to the
    election office. One of these officials responded that this challenge was
    addressed by hiring additional staff or having staff work overtime. In
    those instances where scanning signatures was a challenge to some extent,
    one official responded that the challenge occurred because of the high
    volume of applications, and three officials responded that the challenge
    occurred because of problems with scanning equipment. Officials also
    responded

                     Page 21 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    that they tried to address this challenge by hiring additional staff or,
    when problems with equipment occurred, having the equipment fixed.

    For example, an election official in one county reported that staff faced
    some challenges entering voter information into the registration list and
    scanning new voters' signatures into the voter registration system because
    the election office (1) needed to hire additional staff to ensure
    information from voter registration applications was in the voter
    registration list by Election Day and (2) had problems with the scanning
    equipment. To address challenges associated with entering and scanning
    voter information, the county official reported that additional staff were
    hired, staff worked additional shifts, and budget requests were submitted
    to upgrade the scanning equipment. This official also reported that their
    office was challenged with having to add registration information for more
    than 400,000 prospective new voters to the voter registration list in the
    15day period immediately prior to the November 2004 presidential election
    while also having to process more than 800,000 absentee ballot
    applications during this same 15-day period. (App. V discusses responses
    to our survey regarding entering information onto voter registration lists
    and systems in greater detail.)

    Past Reports Show That Challenges Processing Voter Registration
    Applications Can Result in Individuals Discovering That They Were Never
    Registered to Vote

    Our past work and the work of others has shown that challenges processing
    voter registration applications-including challenges receiving timely and
    accurate applications, checking them for completeness, and entering
    information into voter registration lists or systems-can have an effect on
    whether a citizen is registered to vote. In October 2001, we issued a
    report that described the operations and challenges associated with each
    stage of the election process, including voter registration.16 We reported
    that, on the basis of a telephone survey, an estimated 46 percent of
    jurisdictions nationwide had problems, in general, with NVRA registrations
    during the November 2000 election. Officials most frequently noted
    challenges with processing incomplete or illegible applications,
    applications that arrived late at the local election office, and
    applications that never arrived. We stated that, according to local
    officials, each of these three situations could result in individuals who
    show up at the polls to vote and discover that they were never registered.

    16GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across the
    Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

                     Page 22 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Other organizations have also reported that challenges processing voter
    registration applications can result in applicants finding that they were
    never registered to vote. In a 2001 report to the Congress, the Federal
    Election Commission (FEC) reported on the results of a survey of election
    officials in the 44 states and the District of Columbia subject to NVRA
    for the period covering 1999 through 2000 on the impact of NVRA on the
    administration of elections for federal office.17 Among other things,
    FEC's survey showed that some election officials expressed concerns about
    problems identifying multiple registrations by the same individual or
    applicants that provided incomplete names. Also, according to FEC, several
    states reported problems with election officials receiving applications
    from MVA offices in a timely manner. Regarding the latter, FEC stated
    that:

    "Several States reported that motor vehicle offices in some areas failed
    to transmit voter registration applications or changes of address to the
    appropriate election authorities in a timely manner. The result,
    unfortunately, was the effective disenfranchisement of those citizens who
    had duly applied but whose registrations were not processed by election
    day."

    Two years later, in another report to the Congress, FEC reported similar
    findings and said that some states also noted similar problems with other
    agencies charged with offering voter registration.18 FEC reiterated its
    conclusion about the disenfranchisement of those who had applied but whose
    registrations were not processed by election day and recommended, as in
    the earlier report, that states develop an ongoing training program for
    personnel in agencies covered by NVRA, such as MVAs, regarding their
    duties and responsibilities under NVRA.

    In 2001, the National Commission on Federal Election Reform, which was
    organized by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of

    17Federal Election Commission, The Impact of the National Voter
    Registration Act on Federal Elections 1999 - 2000.

    18Federal Election Commission, The Impact of the National Voter
    Registration Act on Federal Elections 2001 - 2002.

                     Page 23 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Virginia and The Century Foundation,19 expressed concerns through a task
    force on voter registration that delegating voter registration
    responsibilities to agencies and organizations outside of election
    offices, such as organizations that conduct voter registration drives, can
    result in citizens who thought they had registered being turned away from
    the polls on Election Day. 20 The Commission's final report stated that
    voters can be turned away from the polls because of administrative errors
    by election offices or NVRA agencies that accept voter registration
    applications and noted that, although NVRA does not require it,

    "most states allow practically anyone to go out and register voters by
    taking and transmitting their mail-in applications. These people thus act
    in effect as deputy registrars. Election administrators we have
    encountered in every part of the country tell us of numerous cases where
    these unofficial registrars, often meaning well, mishandle or lose such
    applications. The applicants, of course, rightly believe they have
    registered. Then they show up on Election Day and find out that they are
    not on the list."

    The task force on voter registration went on to say that "third party
    registrars-political parties, advocacy groups and citizens groups that
    conduct voter registration drives-delay to send applications or fail to
    send them at all, sometimes inadvertently, sometimes deliberately."
    According to the task force, agencies other than election offices and
    third party registrars take applications that are incomplete or
    inadmissible, such as applications with postal boxes rather than street
    addresses, and applications that are unsigned.21

    19The National Commission on Federal Election Reform was organized by the
    Miller Center and The Century Foundation in early 2001 to formulate
    concrete proposals for election reform to "help ensure a more effective
    and fair democratic process in elections to come," as stated in the
    Commission's report, To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral
    Process, August 2001.

    20The National Commission on Federal Election Reform's Task Force on the
    Federal Election System, July 2001. This task force report accompanied the
    report of the National Commission on Election Reform.

    21The National Commission on Federal Election Reform, To Assure Pride and
    Confidence in the Electoral Process, August 2001.

                     Page 24 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    More recently, in May 2005, the National Task Force on Election Reform,
    sponsored by the non-profit Election Center,22 also known as the National
    Association of Election Officials, issued a report on various issues
    surrounding the 2004 general election, including voter registration. The
    Task Force stated that voter registration groups operated vigorously
    during the 2004 election and were recognized and welcomed by election
    officials. However, the Task Force expressed the concern that "when voter
    registration forms are delivered to registration authorities after the
    close of registration or not at all, usually at no fault of the applicant,
    voters find themselves not registered and not eligible to vote on Election
    Day."23 The Task Force also pointed out that NVRA agencies, which have
    voter registration as a secondary responsibility, are challenged to
    provide voter registration opportunities to their clients in a consistent
    manner and, although processes for transferring registrations accurately
    and efficiently to voter registration offices have improved, breakdowns
    can still occur.

    We did not analyze the extent to which registration applications
    transferred from an external organization, like a voter registration drive
    or MVA office, to an election office resulted in voters' names not
    appearing on registration lists on Election Day. However, as part of our
    survey of MVA officials in six states and 12 jurisdictions, we asked if
    any state or local election offices contacted MVA offices because
    individuals' names were not on the list of registered voters for the
    November 2004 election.24 Representatives of 5 of the 18 MVA offices
    responded that their offices were contacted by state or local election
    officials about individuals whose names did not appear on the registration
    list, but only 2 of the 5 reported data on the number of individuals
    affected. For example, one of representatives who reported data on the
    number of individuals affected said that the state election board-which
    has access to MVA customer data-analyzed the MVA records for 1,288
    individuals whose names did not appear on voter registration rolls, but
    who said they had registered at MVA locations within the state. The
    representative reported that the board of elections found that 295 (23
    percent) individuals had in fact applied to

    22The Election Center is also known as the National Association of
    Election Officials and is composed almost exclusively of officials who
    serve in voter registration and administration of elections.

    23National Task Force on Election Reform, Election 2004: Review and
    Recommendations by the Nation's Election Administrators, May 2005.

    24Wisconsin and the two jurisdictions in Wisconsin were not included in
    our survey because, as noted in footnote 10, the state is exempt from
    NVRA.

                     Page 25 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    register to vote and their applications were sent to the state board of
    elections office. The representative also reported that, of the remaining
    993 individuals, 591 (46 percent) had indicated that they did not wish to
    apply to register to vote and did not complete applications; 245 (19
    percent) had no record of conducting MVA business or submitting voter
    registration applications at MVA offices; 128 (10 percent) conducted
    Internet, mail, or phone transactions with the MVA but did not request
    that paper voter registration applications be mailed to them; and 29 (2
    percent) submitted their voter registration applications after the
    registration deadline. (App. VII discusses responses to our survey of MVA
    officials in 6 state and 12 local MVA offices in greater detail.)

    Election officials representing all but 1 of the 14 jurisdictions we
    surveyed reported that their offices removed voters' names from voter
    registration lists during 2004 for various reasons, including at the
    request of the voter and upon identification of the voter as ineligible
    due to a felony conviction. However, before removing names, election
    officials reported that their offices took steps to ensure that names of
    eligible voters were not inadvertently removed from lists. Our June 2005
    report identified list maintenance challenges faced by election officials
    in the 14 jurisdictions because of problems using felony, death, and other
    information from existing data sources to verify the accuracy of voter
    registration data.

      Jurisdictions Reported They Removed Voter Names from Registration Lists for
      Various Reasons, but Took Steps to Ensure That Eligible Voters' Names Were Not
      Inadvertently Removed

    Jurisdictions Reported They Took Various Steps to Ensure that Eligible
    Voters Were Not Inadvertently Removed from Voter Registration Lists

    As discussed earlier, NVRA prohibits removing a name from a registration
    list for a federal election solely for non-voting but permits removal for
    certain specified reasons, including at the request of the voter, by
    reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity under state law, the
    death of the voter, or upon written confirmation by the voter regarding a
    move out of the jurisdiction. Our survey of officials in the 14
    jurisdictions showed that all but 1 of the jurisdictions said they removed
    names from voter registration lists during 2004 for a variety of reasons,
    including when the voter requested that his or her name be removed, the
    jurisdiction received a change of address notice from USPS, or data from
    other federal, state, or local organizations showed that the voter was
    ineligible due to a felony conviction or had died. In addition, before
    removing names, jurisdictions reported they took various steps to ensure
    that the names of eligible voters

                     Page 26 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    were not inadvertently removed from voter registration lists, including
    sending letters or postcards to voters to confirm that the voters wanted
    their names removed; sending follow-up notices to voters or phoning voters
    to notify them of removal; or matching voters' identifying information
    contained in voter registration records with felony records or death
    records maintained by other government organizations.

    When asked if their offices removed names of any voters from voter
    registration lists during 2004, 13 of 14 officials responded that, in
    their jurisdictions, names were removed for a variety of reasons,
    including when the voter requested that the name be removed from the list,
    felony records received from federal/state/local courts or correction
    facilities identified the voter as ineligible due to a felony conviction,
    information received from state/county vital statistics offices identified
    the voter as deceased, and change of address information received from
    USPS showed that the voter had moved outside of the jurisdiction where
    registered. Table 1 shows the election officials' responses to questions
    about reasons for removing names of voters from voter registration lists.

                     Page 27 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Table 1: Election Officials' Responses to Questions about Reasons Why
    Voters' Names Were Removed from Voter Registration Lists in 14
    Jurisdictions during 2004

                         Voter requested that name be removed Felony records from
                         federal, state, or local courts or correction facilities
                        identified the voter as a felon Information from state or
                          county vital statistics offices identified the voter as
                             deceased Change of address information from the U.S.
                           Postal Service showed that the voter had moved outside
                             the jurisdiction Newspaper obituaries identified the
                            voter as deceased Information from federal, state, or
                         local courts showed that the voter had been judged to be
                         mentally incompetent Voter failed to respond to a notice
                                from voter registrar and had not voted or had not
                        appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections
    Jurisdictiona       Voter names were removed from voter registration lists
    Gila County, AZ                         during 2004 because: x x x x x x x
    Maricopa County,    x        x        x       x       x       x       x
              AZ
         Los Angeles       x        x        x       x               x
          County, CA
    Yolo County, CA     x        x        x       x       x
    City of Detroit,
              MI           x        x        x       x                       x
        New York City,     x        x        x       x               x
              NY
          Rensselaer
          County, NY       x        x        x       x       x
    Bexar County, TX    x        x        x                       x       x
    Webb County, TX              x        x       x       x               x
          Albermarle       x        x        x               x       x
          County, VA
          Arlington        x        x        x       x               x
          County, VA
           City of         x                         x       x
         Franklin, WI
    City of Madison,    x                                 x
              WI

    Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected
    jurisdictions.

    Note: X = Names removed from voter registration list.

    aDelta Township, MI did not respond to this question because, as the
    election official reported, no names were removed from the voter
    registration list during 2004.

    Election officials also reported that, before removing names from voter
    registration lists during 2004, their offices took a variety of steps to
    ensure that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently removed from
    the voter registration list. For example, election officials representing
    12 of the

                     Page 28 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    13 jurisdictions reported that their offices removed voters' names from
    voter registration lists at the request of the voter. However, before
    doing so, officials representing 4 of the 12 jurisdictions reported that
    their offices sent a letter or postcard to confirm that the voter wanted
    his or her name removed from the voter registration list. Representatives
    of 4 of the 12 jurisdictions reported that their offices took other steps
    including matching the voter's identifying information-e.g., name,
    address, date of birth, and driver's license number-with voter records to
    confirm it was the same person and requiring voters to file a document to
    indicate that they were either moving out of state or, if moving to
    another jurisdiction in the state, a request to transfer to another
    jurisdiction so that a letter can be sent to confirm the new address.
    Election officials representing 3 of the 12 jurisdictions reported that
    their offices did not take any additional steps before removing the names
    of eligible voters from registration lists.

    Election officials from 11 of the 13 jurisdictions also reported that
    their offices removed voters' names from registration lists because felony
    records received from federal, state, or local courts or correction
    facilities identified them as ineligible due to felony convictions. Of the
    11 jurisdictions, officials representing 10 reported that, before removing
    names because of felony convictions, their offices matched the voter
    identifying information (e.g., name, date of birth, social security
    number, and address) contained in voter registration records with felony
    records to confirm it was the same person. Eight of these 11 jurisdictions
    also sent letters to the voters notifying them of removal on the basis of
    felony convictions, and 1 of the 11 also attempted to reach the voters by
    phone to notify them of removal. One of the 11 election officials reported
    that the jurisdiction did not take any additional steps before removing
    the names of these voters from registration lists.

    Regarding deceased voters, election officials in 11 of the 13
    jurisdictions reported that they removed names from voter registration
    lists because information received from state/county vital statistics
    offices showed the voters as deceased. Before removing these names, all 11
    of the election officials reported that they matched the voters'
    identifying information contained in voter registration records with death
    records to confirm it was the same person. According to an election
    official with one jurisdiction, the jurisdiction also sent a letter to the
    deceased voter's next of kin notifying them of removal and another
    election official reported that the office also asked for confirmation,
    and one other jurisdiction attempted to reach the voter's next of kin by
    phone. Election officials representing 8 of the 13 jurisdictions used
    obituaries as a source of information for removing voters' names from
    lists and 3 of the 8 reported

                     Page 29 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    that, before removing names of voters, they also matched voter records
    with state or county vital statistics information. Election officials
    representing 2 of the 13 jurisdictions reported that their offices relied
    exclusively on obituaries as a reason for removing names from voter
    registration lists.

    In addition, election officials in 10 of 13 jurisdictions reported that
    their offices removed names from registration lists because information
    provided by USPS showed that the voters had moved outside the jurisdiction
    where they were registered. Of the 10 jurisdictions, 9 election officials
    reported that their offices matched the voter's identifying information,
    such as name and address, contained in voter registration records with the
    data provided by USPS to confirm it was the same person; 8 reported that
    they sent a notice to the voter of the removal; and 1 reported that, in
    addition to matching, the office sent notices and attempted to reach
    voters by phone. One election official responded that the jurisdiction
    sends a letter to voters and voters' names are removed only after they
    sign and return the letter, indicating they no longer wish to be
    registered, and another official representing one other jurisdiction
    reported that, after receiving notices from voters, the office sends the
    voters letters asking them to confirm their current residence. Regarding
    the latter, the official reported that, if the address is outside of the
    state, voters' names are removed from the list; if it is in the same
    state, the information is forwarded to the receiving jurisdiction. (App.
    VI discusses responses to our survey on removing names from voter
    registration list in greater detail.)

    Jurisdictions Face Challenges Maintaining the Accuracy of Voter
    Registration Lists

    Although officials reported that they took steps to ensure that names of
    eligible voters are not removed from registration lists, election
    officials still face challenges maintaining the accuracy of these lists.
    In June 2005, we issued a report on the efforts of state and local
    officials in the same seven states and 14 local jurisdictions to maintain
    accurate voter registration lists.25 We pointed out that officials faced
    challenges maintaining the accuracy of voter registration lists because of
    problems using existing data sources to verify the accuracy of voter
    registration data. For example:

    25GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Election
    Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478
    (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005).

    Page 30 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    o  	Some state and local officials were concerned about the timeliness of
    death data-with the names of some deceased voters possibly remaining on
    registration lists after the election. Also, one state official and local
    officials in two states said that problems can arise in getting timely
    records on residents who pass away out of state. In one jurisdiction, an
    official expressed the concern that the election office could not identify
    which of several voters with the same name had died because of the lack of
    a birth date on some state death records.

    o  	State and local officials stated that criminal information was often
    incomplete, not timely, or difficult to decipher. Information on felony
    convictions, particularly from federal sources, was not useful because the
    information was old, had limited matching criteria, or was in different
    formats.

    o  	State and local officials were challenged ensuring voters resided
    within an election jurisdiction because of missing information, no street
    numbers in rural areas, new streets, redistricting or untimely forwarding
    of new addresses.

    We stated that some of these challenges might be addressed as state and
    local jurisdictions implement specific HAVA provisions that require states
    to (1) develop interactive computerized statewide voter registration lists
    for federal elections and (2) perform regular list maintenance by
    comparing the voter registration list against state records on felons and
    death.26 However, we also pointed out that other challenges, such as
    identifying duplicate registrations or deceased individuals out of state,
    may continue to be issues. Our June 2005 report echoed some of the issues
    highlighted in our 2001 report, wherein, on the basis of a national survey
    of local election officials, we reported on challenges that election
    officials identified with voter registration, such as obtaining accurate
    and timely information to update voter registration lists.27

    26HAVA, in general, requires states to, among other things, (a) implement
    an interactive statewide voter registration list for federal elections;
    (b) perform regular list maintenance by comparing the voter list against
    state records on felons and death; (c) match applicant information on
    voter registration lists with information in state motor vehicle agency's
    records; and (d) match voter registration application information on voter
    registration lists with Social Security Administration records, as
    appropriate.

    27GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges Across the
    Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

                     Page 31 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

      All Jurisdictions Reported Enabling Provisional Votes to Be Cast but Not All
      Provisional Ballots Met States' Criteria for Whether These Votes Should Count

    HAVA, in general, requires states to implement provisional voting for
    elections for federal office whereby individuals not listed as registered
    or whose eligibility is questioned by an election official must be
    notified about and permitted to cast a provisional ballot. Election
    officials representing all 14 jurisdictions reported offering provisional
    voting to voters, and 9 of the 14 jurisdictions informed voters that
    provisional ballots were available by, for example, posting signs at
    polling places and generating media announcements. In addition, election
    officials in 12 of the 14 jurisdictions reported that their jurisdictions
    offered certain firsttime voters-those who had registered by mail after
    January 1, 2003, but did not provide a copy of required identification
    when they applied to register to vote28-the opportunity to cast
    provisional ballots even if they were unable to provide identification at
    the polling place.29 Election officials we surveyed reported to us that,
    during the November 2004 election, provisional ballots were cast in 13 of
    the 14 jurisdictions and in 11 of the 13, the percentage of ballots
    counted ranged from none to nearly 90 percent. Overall, on the basis of
    the data reported by election officials, the 11 jurisdictions counted 70
    percent of all of the provisional ballots cast. Table 2 shows the number
    of provisional ballots cast and counted, by jurisdiction, during the
    November 2004 election, as reported by election officials.

    28HAVA, in general, requires that provisional ballots be provided to
    first-time voters who registered to vote by mail on or after January 1,
    2003, but were unable to show required identification when either voting
    in person or by mail in a federal election.

    29Local election officials in the two jurisdictions in Arizona said this
    was not applicable. In an April 2005 letter from the U.S. Department of
    Justice to the Arizona Secretary of State, Justice's Civil Rights Division
    concluded that it was permissible for a state to mandate that potential
    voters show identification at the polls prior to receiving provisional
    ballots. Local election officials in 2 of 14 jurisdictions surveyed
    reported that 12,815 first-time voters cast provisional ballots during the
    November 2004 election. The election officials representing the remaining
    jurisdictions said no first-time voters cast provisional ballots.

                     Page 32 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Table 2: Number and Percentage of Provisional Ballots Election Officials
    Reported Cast and Counted in the November 2004 Election in 14
    Jurisdictions

                             Number of provisional ballots

    Percent of provisional Jurisdiction Cast Counted ballots counted

                            Gila County, AZ      575           505
                        Maricopa County, AZ    68,642        50,719
                     Los Angeles County, CA    204,578          166,894
                            Yolo County, CA     2,050           a               a
                        City of Detroit, MI     1,350          123
                         Delta Township, MI             4       1
                          New York City, NY    140,779       77,804
                      Rensselaer County, NY     1,914          972
                           Bexar County, TX     2,996          602
                            Webb County, TX            60      23
                       Albemarle County, VA            49       a               a
                       Arlington County, VA      147           19
                       City of Franklin, WI             0       0               b
                        City of Madison, WI             5       0
                                      Total    423,149          297,662       70c

    Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected
    jurisdictions.

    aRespondents said they did not know how many provisional ballots were
    counted. Thus, the percentage of provisional votes counted could not be
    computed.

    bNot applicable since no provisional ballots were cast.

    cExcludes Yolo County, Calif., Albemarle County, Va., and City of
    Franklin, Wis. because respondents from Yolo County, Calif., and Albemarle
    County, Va., said they did not know how many provisional ballots were
    counted and no provisional ballots were cast in the City of Franklin, Wis.

    To better understand what proportion of total ballots cast constituted
    provisional ballots cast, we compared the number of provisional ballots
    cast, as reported in our survey, with Web-based state and local data on

                     Page 33 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    total ballots cast for president for the 2004 election.30 Our comparison
    showed that the percent of provisional ballots cast, relative to total
    ballots cast in the 13 jurisdictions, ranged from less than 1 percent in 6
    of the 13 jurisdictions to as much as 7 percent in one of the 13
    jurisdictions. Table 3 shows the number of provisional ballots cast as a
    percent of total ballots cast, by jurisdiction, for the November 2004
    election.

    30Total ballots cast does not necessarily represent the total number of
    votes cast and officially counted in any jurisdiction. In some
    jurisdictions, total ballots cast may include ballots where votes cast may
    or may not have been counted for a variety of reasons, including
    improperly marked ballots, ballots submitted without a mark for any
    particular candidate, ballots that included a mark for two candidates in
    the same election, or provisional ballots cast that were not counted. For
    purposes of this analysis, total ballots cast can include votes cast but
    not counted. For example, in Maricopa County, Arizona, the total number of
    ballots cast for president during the 2004 election was 1,211,963-which
    included 19,212 votes cast but not counted for a variety reasons-and the
    total number of votes cast and counted was 1,192,751.

                     Page 34 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Table 3: Number of Provisional Ballots Cast as a Percentage of Total
    Ballots Cast for President in the November 2004 Election in 14
    Jurisdictions

                                                              Provisional ballots
                                                                             cast
                                   Total ballots  Provisional  as a percentage of
                                                                            total
                      Jurisdiction         casta ballots cast        ballots cast
                   Gila County, AZ        21,158          575
               Maricopa County, AZ     1,211,963       68,642
               Los Angeles County,     3,023,280      204,578
                                CA
                   Yolo County, CA        72,269        2,050
               City of Detroit, MI       326,098        1,350                  <1
                Delta Township, MI        18,060            4                  <1
                 New York City, NY     2,459,653      140,779
                Rensselaer County,        72,983        1,914
                                NY
                  Bexar County, TX       475,314        2,996
                   Webb County, TX        42,030           60                  <1
              Albemarle County, VA        43,726           49                  <1
              Arlington County, VA        94,650          147                  <1
              City of Franklin, WI        18,418            0
               City of Madison, WI       138,078            5                  <1

    Source: GAO survey of local election officials and Web sites of respective
    Secretaries of State, counties, or cities.

    aTotal ballots cast does not necessarily represent the total number of
    votes cast and officially counted in any jurisdiction. In some
    jurisdictions, total ballots cast may include ballots where votes cast may
    or may not have been counted for a variety of reasons, including
    improperly marked ballots, ballots submitted without a mark for any
    particular candidate, ballots that included a mark for two candidates in
    the same election, or provisional ballots cast that were not counted. For
    purposes of this analysis, total ballots cast can include votes cast but
    not counted. For example, in Maricopa County, Arizona, the total number of
    ballots cast for president during the 2004 election was 1,211,963-which
    included 19,212 votes cast but not counted for a variety reasons-and the
    total number of votes cast and counted was 1,192,751.

    Under HAVA, states have discretion to determine if an individual is
    eligible to vote and to determine whether the provisional ballot should be
    counted as a vote in accordance with state law. When asked to report the
    most frequent reasons why provisional ballots were not counted after the
    November 2004 election, election officials reported that the most frequent
    reasons were that individuals did not meet the residency eligibility
    requirements for the precincts where the provisional votes were cast,
    election officials did not have evidence that the individuals had
    registered or tried to register to vote before the election, and local
    election officials did not have evidence that the individuals casting
    provisional ballots had applied to register to vote at motor vehicle
    agency offices. Figure 7 shows the main reasons that provisional ballots
    were not counted after the

                     Page 35 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    November 2004 election in the 13 jurisdictions we surveyed where
    provisional ballots were cast in November 2004.

      Figure 7: Reasons That Provisional Ballots Were Not Counted for the November
                        2004 Election in Selected Jurisdictions

    Source: GAO survey of election officials representing 14 selected
    jurisdictions.

    aJurisdictions could select more than one reason.

    bOther reasons included voter did not provide acceptable identification or
    proof of residence; voter did not sign voter registration form; persons
    casting ballots were too young; voter was a convicted felon whose voting
    rights had not been restored; voters did not provide complete information
    on the voter registration applications or on the provisional ballots.

    To enable voters who cast provisional ballots in the November 2004
    election to learn whether their votes counted, HAVA requires that state or
    local election officials establish free means of receiving the
    information. Local election officials in 12 of the 13 jurisdictions where
    provisional ballots were cast for the November 2004 election said that
    they set up freeaccess mechanisms to inform provisional voters about the
    outcome of their provisional votes during the November 2004 election,
    including tollfree telephone numbers, Web sites, and letters sent to the
    provisional voters who cast provisional ballots.31 They also said that
    provisional voters were provided written information at their polling
    places about how to

    31While New York State had not passed legislation to implement provisional
    voting requirements in HAVA by the time of the November 2004 election, New
    York had a form of provisional voting in place referred to as affidavit
    ballots. The New York City election office said that letters were sent to
    voters whose affidavit ballots did not count.

                     Page 36 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    find out about the outcome of their provisional ballots. Eight of the 13
    jurisdictions said that provisional voters had access to information about
    the outcome of their ballots within 10 days after the election.

    Local election officials in 8 of the 14 jurisdictions said that they
    experienced challenges implementing provisional voting for the November
    2004 election. In these jurisdictions, the election officials said that
    they viewed provisional voting as a challenge for various reasons,
    including some poll workers were not familiar with provisional voting or,
    in one jurisdiction representing a large number of precincts, staff
    reported not having sufficient time to process provisional ballots. To
    address these challenges, the officials reported that they provided
    additional training to poll workers and hired additional staff to count
    provisional ballots within the time frames allowed.

    In addition, local election officials in 3 of the 14 jurisdictions said
    that they experienced challenges verifying the identification of
    first-time voters who applied to register to vote after January 1, 2003,
    and who did not provide identification with their applications.
    Specifically, these officials said that this requirement was very
    time-consuming due to the high number of voters, they needed additional
    staff to send notices to these voters to notify them that they needed to
    provide the necessary identification, and the state did not have a
    statewide voter registration database to verify the voters'
    identification. (App. VII discusses responses to our survey on HAVA
    provisional voting and identification requirements in greater detail.)

    As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
    this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after
    the report date. At that time we will make copies available to others on
    request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's
    Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    If you or your staffs have any questions regarding this report, please
    contact me at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points for

                     Page 37 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
    the last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix X.

    William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues

                     Page 38 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

                           Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    Our objectives were to describe election officials' characterization of
    their experiences in 14 jurisdictions within 7 states with regard to the
    November 2004 election: (1) managing the voter registration process and
    any challenges related to receiving voter registration applications,
    checking them for completeness, accuracy, and duplication; and entering
    information into voter registration lists; (2) removing voter names from
    voter registration lists and ensuring that the names of eligible voters
    were not inadvertently removed; and (3) implementing provisional voting
    and identification requirements in accordance with HAVA and addressing any
    challenges encountered. In addition, we describe the experiences of
    selected motor vehicle agency (MVA) offices during 2004 in carrying out
    voter registration application procedures-specifically, assisting MVA
    clients with completing voter registration applications, accepting
    applications from these clients, and forwarding application to state or
    local elections offices.

    We first selected states and, subsequently, local jurisdictions within
    those states consistent with our earlier report on maintaining accurate
    voter registration lists.1 We selected the following states using a
    non-probability sample: Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, Texas,
    Virginia, and Wisconsin. Our selection of the seven states took into
    consideration several voter registration-related factors and unique
    characteristics of the states that might affect the implementation of
    HAVA. For example, Wisconsin has same day registration, which exempts the
    state from the HAVA provisional voting requirement; Arizona has on-line
    voter registration; and Michigan has a reputation as a model for
    registration practices. Also, we selected New York State because, when
    receiving voter registration applications or checking applications with
    voter registration lists, New York State may have to rely on social
    security number verification procedures more than other states because it
    has a large population who live in New York City and may not have driver's
    licenses. We also selected states to provide geographic diversity and
    variation in election administration-some administer elections at the
    county level and others at lower levels such as city or townships. Our
    goal was not to target a particular state, but rather to identify a range
    of issues facing states in managing the voter registration process,
    including updating voter registration lists, and implementing HAVA
    provisional voting and identification requirements. Information from these
    seven states cannot be

    1GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Election
    Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478
    (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005)

    Page 39 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    generalized to all states. Table 4 describes the voter
    registration-related characteristics of each state.

           Table 4: State Selection Factors State Voter registration-related
                                    characteristics

    Arizona  o  No statewide database prior to HAVA.

    o  Did not request a waiver from HAVA database and verification
    requirements deadline of January 1, 2004.

    o  Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 12.8.

    o  Voter registration administered at county level.

    o  Has implemented an on-line voter registration process.

    California  o  	Statewide database prior to HAVA that is compiled from
    local election lists. Local jurisdictions can access entire list.

    o  Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
    deadline of January 1, 2004.

    o  Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 26.2.

    o  Voter registration administered at county level.

    Michigan  o  Unified statewide database.

    o  Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
    deadline of January 1, 2004.

    o  Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 5.3.

    o  Voter registration administered at township, city, and village level.

    o  Secretary of State responsible for election and motor vehicle licensing
    functions.

    New York  o  No statewide database prior to HAVA.

    o  Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
    deadline of January 1, 2004.

    o  Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 20.4.

    o  Voter registration administered at county level.

    o  Expected higher use of social security records for registrant
    verification due to fewer drivers in New York City.

    Texas  o  	Statewide database prior to HAVA that is compiled from local
    election lists. Local jurisdictions do not have access to entire list.

    o  Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
    deadline of January 1, 2004.

    o  Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 13.9.

    o  Voter registration administered at county level.

    Virginia  o  Unified statewide database.

    o  Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
    deadline of January 1, 2004.

    o  Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 8.1.

    o  Voter registration administered at county level.

    o  May use 9-digit social security number for voter registration
    verification (rather than 4 digits outlined by HAVA).

    Wisconsin  o  No statewide database prior to HAVA. Some jurisdictions
    currently do not maintain voter registration rolls.

    o  Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
    deadline of January 1, 2004.

    o  Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 3.6.

    o  Voter registration administered at municipal level.

    o  Allows Election Day voter registration.

    Source: GAO.

    Page 40 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    Within each state, we selected the two jurisdictions using a
    nonprobability sample. Our selection criteria for the 14 jurisdictions (2
    jurisdictions in each of the 7 states) included population size, the
    proximity of the locations to our site visits with state election and
    motor vehicle officials, suggestions by state election and motor vehicle
    officials, and proximity to an MVA office. The local jurisdictions we
    selected were:

    o  Maricopa County, Arizona;

    o  Gila County, Arizona;

    o  Los Angeles County, California;

    o  Yolo County, California;

    o  City of Detroit, Michigan;

    o  Delta Township, Michigan;

    o  New York City, New York;

    o  Rensselaer County, New York;

    o  Bexar County, Texas;

    o  Webb County, Texas;

    o  Arlington County, Virginia;

    o  Albemarle County, Virginia;

    o  City of Franklin City, Wisconsin; and

    o  City of Madison, Wisconsin.

    To address our objectives, we used a multi-pronged approach. First, we
    reviewed HAVA and other relevant laws, state reports, and documents
    related to the voter registration process in the seven states. Second, we
    interviewed state and local election officials in the 7 states and 14
    jurisdictions to obtain information on their registration processes and
    implementation of the HAVA requirements for provisional voting and voter
    identification. Third, because so many voter registrations originate with
    applications from motor vehicle agencies, we also interviewed officials
    from these agencies in 10 jurisdictions to discuss their procedures for
    processing voter registration applications.2 In Michigan, where we spoke
    only with Secretary of State officials, the Secretary of State's office is
    responsible for elections and motor vehicle functions, such as issuing
    driver's licenses.

    2We did not survey MVA officials in Wisconsin regarding voter registration
    under NVRA; MVA offices in Wisconsin do not participate in voter
    registration because the state is exempt from NVRA. Wisconsin's exemption
    from NVRA, in general, is based upon the fact that it did not, and still
    does not, have voter registration requirements for federal elections under
    state laws that were in effect on the NVRA-specified exemption date of
    August 1, 1994.

                     Page 41 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    Following our site visits, we sent a questionnaire to the same officials
    in the 14 local elections offices in the seven states to gather
    information about their experiences with the November 2004 election. We
    did not survey state election officials because voter registration and
    operations are carried out at the local level (e.g., county, city, or
    township). Consistent with our objectives, our survey focused primarily on
    (1) challenges, if any, processing voter registration applications,
    specifically, challenges receiving voter registration applications from
    MVAs, other NVRA agencies, and voter registration drives sponsored by
    nongovernmental organizations; checking voter registration applications
    for completeness, accuracy, and duplicates; and entering voter information
    into registration lists or systems; (2) whether voters names were removed
    from voter registration lists, reasons why names were removed, and steps
    taken to ensure that voters names were not inadvertently removed; and (3)
    HAVA's provisional voting and first-time voter identification
    requirements, specifically, the number of provisional ballots cast and
    counted, including reasons, if any, why jurisdictions did not count
    provisional ballots; how voters were informed about provisional voting and
    its outcome; and whether first-time voters who registered by mail were
    allowed to cast provisional ballots if they did not provide
    identification. We also sent a survey to the state and local motor vehicle
    agency officials in six of the seven states3 to gather information about
    (1) their experiences assisting citizens in filling out voter registration
    applications and forwarding applications to election offices and (2) their
    experiences with the November 2004 election related to voter registration
    applications.

    Because our surveys were not sample surveys, there are no sampling errors.
    However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce
    errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example,
    difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, in the sources
    of information that are available to respondents, or in how the responses
    we received are entered into a database or were analyzed, can introduce
    unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps in the
    development of the surveys, the data collection, and the data analysis to
    minimize these nonsampling errors and help ensure the accuracy of the
    answers that were obtained. For example, a social science survey
    specialist designed the surveys in collaboration with our staff with
    subject matter expertise. When the data were analyzed, a second,
    independent

    3We did not send a survey to motor vehicle agency officials in Wisconsin
    because of its exemption from NVRA.

                     Page 42 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    analyst checked all computer programs. With regard to numbers received as
    part of our surveys, such as the number of provisional ballots cast and
    counted, we determined that the data reported via the surveys were
    sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report by asking the survey
    respondents to identify any limitations associated with using the numbers
    provided and actions taken to check the accuracy of the numbers. We did
    not independently verify the accuracy or completeness of responses
    provided from our surveys of election officials and MVA officials. Local
    election officials and state and local MVA officials we surveyed were
    provided the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their responses for
    this report and, on the basis of the comments we received, we made
    technical changes, where appropriate. The results of our work cannot be
    generalized to state and local election jurisdictions or MVA offices
    either nationwide or at the state level. Appendix II contains the survey
    we sent to local election officials, and appendix IX contains the survey
    we sent to state and local officials representing MVAs.

    We also reviewed state and local Internet sites, such as sites maintained
    by Secretaries of State and County and City Clerks Offices to obtain data
    on total ballots cast for president for the 2004 elections in the seven
    states and 14 jurisdictions covered by our review. We used these data to
    show the relative proportion of provisional ballots cast to total ballots
    cast for each of the jurisdictions. These data were used for limited
    comparison purposes; we asked election officials to verify the accuracy of
    these data but we did not independently asses their reliability. In
    addition, we reviewed relevant federal and state statutes pertinent to the
    state and local jurisdictions covered by our review. To obtain information
    on the challenges facing state and local election officials during the
    registration process, we reviewed our past reports on various aspects of
    the election process as well as reports by the Federal Election
    Commission, the National Commission on Federal Reform, and a Task Force
    Report to Accompany the Commission's Report-both organized by the Miller
    Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and the Century
    Foundation-and a May 2005 report by the National Task Force on Election
    Reform, sponsored by the Election Center, which is also called the
    National Association of Election Officials. We also reviewed various
    reports developed by the Election Reform Information Project, a
    clearinghouse for election reform information and an online forum for
    learning about, discussing, and analyzing election reform issues and
    providing research on questions of interest to the election reform
    community. After the November 2000 election, the Election Reform
    Information Project received a 3-year grant from the Pew Charitable Trusts
    via the University of Richmond.

                     Page 43 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    Our work was performed from January 2004 through September 2005 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

                     Page 44 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix II: Survey of Local Election Officials

    Appendix III: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Receiving
    Voter Registration Applications

    This appendix summarizes the responses of local election office
    representatives to questions in our survey related to challenges they
    encountered during the November 2004 election in receiving voter
    registration applications from organizations external to the election
    office-motor vehicle agencies (MVA), other National Voter Registration Act
    (NVRA) agencies, and non-governmental organizations that sponsor voter
    registration drives; why these challenges occurred; and steps that
    election officials took to try to address these challenges. The statements
    in this appendix reflect the responses to our survey by the applicable
    local election officials and were not independently verified by us.

                                  Gila County, Arizona

    Staff in the Gila County election office experienced little or no
    challenges receiving registration applications from MVA offices. However,
    staff faced some challenges receiving applications from NVRA agencies
    other than MVA offices and voter registration drives held by
    non-governmental organizations. These challenges occurred because
    applications from these sources were received after the voter registration
    deadline. A representative from the county election office reported that
    political candidates and parties that sponsored voter registration drives
    did not send all voter registration applications to the election office
    after receiving them from people who completed them. The election office
    tried to address these challenges by talking to the candidates and
    political parties about turning in applications on a timely basis.

                                Maricopa County, Arizona

    Staff in the Maricopa County election office experienced little or no
    challenges receiving registration applications from NVRA agencies other
    than MVA offices. However, staff faced some challenges receiving
    applications from MVA offices and faced challenges to great extent
    receiving applications from voter registration drives held by
    nongovernmental organizations. Receiving applications from MVA offices and
    voter registration drives was challenging because the county election
    office received applications from these sources too close to the
    registration deadline. A representative from the county election office
    reported encountering numerous occasions when individuals who indicated
    that they wanted to apply to register to vote at MVA offices were not
    given voter registration forms to complete, and consequently these
    individuals were not registered to vote. Staff in the county election
    office tried to address these challenges by (1) adding additional staff
    and resources to update the voter registration list in time for the
    election and (2) allowing the aforementioned MVA clients who showed copies
    of their applications for driver's licenses indicating that they had
    requested to

                     Page 66 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix III: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Receiving Voter Registration Applications

    register to vote to complete voter registration forms so that they could
    be added to the voter registration list.

    Los Angeles County, California

    Staff in the Los Angeles County election office experienced little or no
    challenges receiving registration applications from MVA and NVRA agencies.
    However, staff faced some challenges receiving applications from voter
    registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. These
    challenges occurred because the county election office received these
    applications close to or after the voter registration deadline. To address
    these challenges, staff from the county election office contacted these
    organizations and will be developing a training program focused on legal
    requirements for registering voters.

    Yolo County, California 	Staff in the Yolo County election office faced
    little or no challenges receiving registration applications from MVA and
    NVRA agencies. However, staff faced some challenges receiving applications
    from voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations.
    These challenges occurred because the county election office received the
    applications after the voter registration deadline, but a representative
    from the county election office said that the applications were still
    processed.

    City of Detroit, Michigan 	Staff in the Detroit election office faced
    challenges to a great extent receiving applications from MVA offices, NVRA
    agencies, and voter registration drives held by non-governmental
    organizations. These challenges occurred because the applications were
    received either too close to or after the voter registration deadline. The
    representative who responded to our survey said that the election office
    did not try to address this challenge.

                                Delta Township, Michigan

    Staff in the Delta Township election office faced little or no challenge
    receiving voter registration applications from MVA and NVRA agencies.
    However, staff faced challenges to a great extent receiving applications
    from voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations.
    These challenges occurred because applications were received either too
    close to or after the voter registration deadline and were incomplete. To
    address this challenge, the office added these applications to the voter
    registration list and sent verification letters to applicants whose
    applications were incomplete. If staff in the election office was not able
    to verify incomplete information on applicants before the election, the

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    Appendix III: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Receiving Voter Registration Applications

     affected applicants' names were coded on the voter registration lists so that
           poll workers could ask them to identify themselves before voting.

                                New York City, New York

    Staff in the New York City election office faced little or no challenges
    receiving registration applications from MVA and NVRA agencies. However,
    staff faced some challenges receiving applications from voter registration
    drives held by non-governmental organizations. These challenges occurred
    because the applications were received too close to the voter registration
    deadline. To address these challenges, the city election office requested
    that non-governmental organizations submit all voter registration forms as
    soon as possible and not wait until the last minute. A representative from
    the city election office said that most of these groups complied with this
    request, but some did not. Staff in the city election office also
    addressed these challenges by hiring additional data entry staff to handle
    the large volume of registrations and by working extended hours to process
    the applications received before the deadline.

    Rensselaer County, Staff in the county election office faced little or no
    challenges receiving

    New York	registration applications from MVA offices, other NVRA agencies,
    and voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations.

                                  Bexar County, Texas

    Staff in the county election office experienced little or no challenges
    receiving applications from MVA and other NVRA agencies. However, staff
    faced some challenges receiving applications from voter registration
    drives held by non-governmental organizations. These challenges occurred
    because these applications were not properly completed, had missing
    information, had invalid addresses, or were turned in on a Friday even
    though the county election office had asked the organizations sponsoring
    voter registration drives not to do so. According to the official, the
    latter resulted in staff having to work overtime and weekends to process
    registrations. To address these challenges, staff from the county election
    office discussed these issues with leaders of the non-governmental
    organizations, state election officials, and political parties, among
    others.

    Webb County, Texas 	Staff in the county election office faced some
    challenges receiving voter registration applications from MVA offices and
    faced little or no challenges receiving applications from other NVRA
    agencies. In addition, staff did not know or had no basis to judge whether
    the office faced challenges receiving applications from voter registration
    drives sponsored by non-

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    Appendix III: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Receiving Voter Registration Applications

    governmental organizations. The challenges in receiving applications from
    MVA offices occurred because some applications got lost in the mail and
    were not received at the county election office. To address this
    challenge, staff reviewed information received from the Secretary of State
    and MVA offices, and mailed new applications to persons who had completed
    their applications at MVA offices. Staff also installed a lock box at the
    local MVA office so that MVA staff could keep completed voter registration
    applications in the lock box and staff from the county election office
    could pick up the applications at the MVA office 3 times a week.

                               Albemarle County, Virginia

    Staff in the county election office faced little or no challenges
    receiving voter registration applications from MVA offices. However, staff
    faced some challenges receiving applications from other NVRA agencies and
    voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. An
    official from the county election office said that these challenges
    occurred because (1) some NVRA agencies may not have been in compliance
    with NVRA and (2) the county election office may not have received
    applications from individuals who completed voter registration
    applications at a voter registration drive. To address these challenges,
    staff from the county election office contacted staff in NVRA agencies to
    encourage compliance with NVRA and offered training to all private groups
    who contacted the office about voter registration drives.

                               Arlington County, Virginia

    Staff in the county election office faced some challenges receiving
    applications from MVA offices and faced little or no challenges receiving
    applications from other NVRA agencies. In addition, staff faced challenges
    to a great extent receiving applications from voter registration drives
    held by non-governmental organizations. The challenges in receiving
    applications from MVA offices and voter registration drives occurred
    because the county election office received applications too close to the
    voter registration deadline and the county election office did not have
    enough staff to handle the applications that were received. To address
    these challenges, staff worked extra hours and the office extended the
    hours of temporary staff to process applications and meet deadlines.

    City of Franklin, Wisconsin 	In response to questions about receiving
    applications from MVAs and NVRA agencies other than MVAs, a representative
    from the city election office said that this was not applicable. However,
    staff faced challenges to a great extent receiving applications from voter
    registration drives held by non-governmental organizations. These
    challenges occurred because

    Page 69 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix III: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Receiving Voter Registration Applications

    (1) the city election office received these applications too close to or
    after the registration deadline, (2) the city election office did not have
    enough resources or staff to handle the applications, and (3) the
    applications contained inaccurate information, which required staff in the
    election office to do extensive follow-up work. To address these
    challenges, staff in the city election office attempted to make direct
    contact with the voters.

                               City of Madison, Wisconsin

    Staff in the city election office faced some challenges receiving voter
    registration applications from NVRA agencies other than MVA offices and
    from voter registration drives held by non-governmental organizations.
    These challenges occurred due to incomplete applications. In response to a
    question about receiving applications from MVAs, a representative from the
    city election office said this was not applicable. Staff in the city
    election office tried to address these challenges by sending letters to
    the applicants, if time allowed, and returning incomplete applications to
    staff in the NVRA agencies and non-governmental organizations sponsoring
    the voter registration drives.

                     Page 70 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Checking
    Voter Registration Applications

    This appendix summarizes the responses of local election office
    representatives to questions in our survey related to challenges their
    offices encountered during the November 2004 election with regard to
    checking voter registration applications for completeness, accuracy, or
    duplicates, and if challenges occurred, why they occurred and any actions
    taken to overcome them. The statements in this appendix reflect the
    responses to our survey by the applicable local election officials and
    were not independently verified by us.

    Gila County, Arizona 	Checking voter registration applications to ensure
    information on the applications was complete and accurate and to identify
    duplicate applications posed little or no challenges to staff in the
    election office.

    Maricopa County, Arizona 	Election office staff experienced some
    challenges checking voter registration applications to ensure the
    information in the applications was complete and accurate and to identify
    duplicate applications. These challenges occurred because local election
    office encountered problems contacting the individuals to obtain complete
    or accurate information. Staff in the local election office tried to
    address these challenges by putting the applications in a suspense file
    and sending letters to the applicants requesting the missing information.

    Los Angeles County, While election staff experienced little or no
    challenges checking individual

    California 	applications for completeness and duplicates, they experienced
    challenges, to some extent, checking the accuracy of voter registration
    applications because the elections office did not have sufficient time,
    resources, and staff to check them. To address this challenge, additional
    staff were hired, multiple work shifts were added, and a great deal of
    overtime was worked.

    Yolo County, California 	Election office staff experienced little or no
    challenges checking voter registration applications for accuracy,
    completeness, or duplicates.

    City of Detroit, Michigan 	Election office staff experienced challenges,
    to a great extent, checking voter registration applications for
    completeness, accuracy, and duplicates. The challenges they faced checking
    voter registration applications were due to problems with (1) determining
    what information was inaccurate, (2) contacting individuals to obtain
    complete or accurate information, and

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    Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Checking Voter Registration Applications

    (3) checking the accuracy of information in the applications against
    various databases, such as motor vehicle or Social Security Administration
    databases, or against state records. To overcome this challenge, election
    office staff attempted to reach the applicants by telephone and mailed
    response cards to them to verify the information contained in their
    applications.

                                Delta Township, Michigan

    Although checking applications for accuracy or duplicates posed little or
    no challenge to election office staff, they experienced challenges, to
    some extent, checking the completeness of voter registration applications.
    These challenges occurred because hundreds of registration forms were
    received too close to the registration deadline and staff encountered
    difficulties determining what information was not accurate. To address
    these challenges, election staff added the names of the applicants to the
    voter registration lists and sent the applicants letters asking them to
    verify the information contained in their registration applications. If
    the applicants did not respond to the letters, their names were placed on
    the registration list and if they appeared at the polls to vote, they were
    asked to provide identification.

    New York City, New York	Election office staff faced little or no
    challenges checking voter registration applications to ensure information
    on the applications was complete and accurate and to identify duplicate
    applications.

    Rensselaer County, Election office staff faced little or no challenges
    checking voter

    New York	registration applications to ensure information on the
    applications was complete and accurate and to identify duplicate
    applications.

    Bexar County, Texas 	Election office staff faced little or no challenges
    checking voter registration applications to ensure information on the
    applications was complete and accurate and to identify duplicate
    applications.

    Webb County, Texas 	Election staff experienced little or no challenges
    checking voter registration applications to ensure information on the
    applications was complete and to identify duplicate applications. The
    official who responded to our survey did not know the extent of
    challenges, if any, that staff may have experienced checking voter
    registration applications for accuracy.

    Page 72 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Checking Voter Registration Applications

    Albemarle County, Virginia 	Election office staff faced little or no
    challenges checking voter registration applications to ensure information
    on the applications was complete and accurate and to identify duplicate
    applications.

    Arlington County, Virginia 	Election office staff experienced some
    challenges checking voter registration applications for completeness,
    accuracy, and duplicates. These challenges occurred because the election
    office did not have enough resources and staff to check the applications,
    and staff did not have enough time to check the applications between the
    registration deadline and when voting began. To address these challenges,
    staff worked extra hours.

                              City of Franklin, Wisconsin

    To a great extent, election office staff experienced challenges checking
    applications for completeness, accuracy, and duplicates. Staff experienced
    these challenges because of (1) difficulties determining what information
    was inaccurate, (2) problems contacting individuals to obtain complete or
    accurate information, and (3) insufficient time between the state's
    registration deadline and when voting began to check whether applications
    were complete, accurate, or duplicates. To overcome these challenges,
    staff from the election office attempted to make direct contact with the
    voters.

    City of Madison, Wisconsin 	To some extent, election office staff faced
    challenges checking applications for completeness and accuracy but had
    little or no problems checking applications for duplicates. The challenges
    of checking the completeness and accuracy of applications occurred because
    of problems with contacting individuals to obtain complete and accurate
    information. To overcome these challenges, additional staff were hired.

    Page 73 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix V: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Entering
    Information into Voter Registration Lists

    This appendix summarizes the responses of local election office
    representatives to questions in our survey related to challenges they
    encountered during the November 2004 election entering information on
    eligible voters into voter registration lists, and when challenges
    occurred, why they occurred and actions taken to overcome them. The
    statements in this appendix reflect the responses to our survey by the
    applicable local election officials and were not independently verified by
    us.

    Gila County, Arizona 	Entering information on eligible voters into voter
    registration lists posed little or no challenges to staff in the election
    office. However, scanning signatures of new voters into the voter
    registration system posed challenges to some extent because staff in the
    election office encountered problems with the scanning equipment. To
    address the challenges of scanning new voters' signatures into the voter
    registration system, the equipment was repaired.

    Maricopa County, Arizona 	Election office staff experienced challenges, to
    little or no extent, entering voter information into voter registration
    lists and scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration
    system.

    Los Angeles County, To some extent, election office staff experienced
    challenges entering voter

    California 	information into voter registration lists and scanning
    signatures of new voters into the voter registration system. These
    challenges occurred because the election office lacked sufficient
    resources and staff and had problems with the scanning equipment. To
    address these challenges, additional staff were hired, and staff worked
    additional shifts and a great deal of overtime. In addition, budget
    requests were submitted to upgrade the scanning equipment.

    Yolo County, California 	Election office staff experienced challenges, to
    little or no extent, entering voter information into voter registration
    lists and scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration
    system.

    City of Detroit, Michigan 	To some extent, election office staff
    experienced challenges scanning signatures of new voters into the voter
    registration system but experience little or no challenges entering
    information on eligible voters into the voter registration lists. Scanning
    signatures of new voters into the voter registration system was a
    challenge because there were too many

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    Appendix V: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Entering Information into Voter Registration Lists

    applications to enter into the system by the registration deadline or
    Election Day and because of problems with the scanning equipment. To
    address this challenge, election office staff scanned as many signatures
    as possible and waited until the equipment malfunctioning could be
    corrected.

    Delta Township, Michigan 	Election office staff experienced challenges, to
    little or no extent, entering voter information into voter registration
    lists and scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration
    system.

    New York City, New York	Election office staff experienced challenges, to
    little or no extent, entering voter information into voter registration
    lists and scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration
    system.

    Rensselaer County, Election office staff experienced challenges, to little
    or no extent, entering

    New York	voter information into voter registration lists and scanning
    signatures of new voters into the voter registration system.

    Bexar County, Texas 	Election office staff experienced challenges, to
    little or no extent, entering voter information into voter registration
    lists. Scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration
    system was not applicable to this election office.

    Webb County, Texas 	Election office staff experienced challenges, to
    little or no extent, entering voter information into voter registration
    lists. Scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration
    system was not applicable to this election office.

    Albemarle County, Virginia 	Election office staff experienced challenges,
    to little or no extent, entering voter information into voter registration
    lists. Scanning signatures of new voters into the voter registration
    system was not applicable to this election office.

    Arlington County, Virginia 	Election office staff experienced challenges,
    to some extent, entering information on eligible voters into voter
    registration lists because the election office lacked sufficient resources
    and staff to enter the

    Page 75 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration Appendix V: Reported
    Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Entering Information into
    Voter Registration Lists

    registration application information into these lists by registration
    deadline or Election Day. To address these challenges, election office
    staff worked extra hours to meet deadlines for entering information on
    eligible voters into the voter registration lists. Scanning signatures of
    new voters into the voter registration system was not applicable to this
    election office.

    City of Franklin, Wisconsin 	To some extent, election office staff
    experienced challenges entering information on eligible voters into voter
    registration lists because of the volume of registration applications that
    had to be entered by the state's registration deadline or Election Day. To
    address these challenges, staff worked extended hours and additional staff
    was hired to process registration applications that were required to be
    entered into voter registration lists by Election Day. Scanning signatures
    of new voters into the voter registration system was not applicable to
    this election office.

    City of Madison, Wisconsin 	To some extent, election office staff
    experienced challenges entering information on eligible voters into voter
    registration lists because of the volume of registration applications that
    had to be entered by the state's registration deadline or Election Day. To
    address these challenges, staffing was increased and the office operated
    with extended hours. Scanning signatures of new voters into the voter
    registration system was not applicable to this election office.

    Page 76 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Removing
    Names from Voter Registration Lists

    This appendix describes the responses of local election officials,
    representing 14 jurisdictions on their reported experiences removing the
    names of voters from voter registration lists during 2004. All but 1 of
    the 14 local election officials responding to our survey reported that
    voters' names were removed from registration lists during 2004 for various
    reasons, such as voter requested name be removed or records identified
    voter as deceased or as ineligible due to a felony conviction. For
    information on the reasons that election officials in each jurisdiction
    removed names of voters from registration lists, see table 1. The local
    election officials also reported steps that they took before removing
    voters' names from the voter registration lists in order to ensure that
    names of eligible voters were not inadvertently removed. The statements in
    this appendix reflect the responses to our survey by the applicable local
    election officials and were not independently verified by us.

                                  Gila County, Arizona

    Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
    steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
    inadvertently removed:

    o  	sent the voter a follow-up notice about removal, because the voter
    failed to respond to a notice from the voter registrar and had not voted
    or had not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections, but
    received no response to the follow-up notice;

    o  	sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address
    information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had moved
    to another jurisdiction or felony records identified the voter as
    ineligible due to a felony conviction;

    o  	sent a letter or postcard to the voter to confirm that the voter
    wanted his/her name removed from the voter registration list as requested;

    o  	sent a letter to the voter notifying of removal because court records
    identified the voter as ineligible due to mental incompetence;

    o  	sent a letter to the deceased voter's next of kin notifying of removal
    and asking for confirmation of the voter's death;

    o  	contacted the funeral home to obtain the deceased voter's identifying
    information (such as name, date of birth, and address);

    o  	matched information from a newspaper obituary with information from
    the state/county vital statistics offices; and

    o  	matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
    date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
    registration list with information received from various sources on
    changes of address (i.e., the U.S. Postal Service National Change of
    Address list), felony convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths.

    Page 77 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Removing Names from Voter Registration Lists

                                Maricopa County, Arizona

    Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
    steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
    inadvertently removed:

    o  	mailed two notices to the voter-one to the mailing address on file and
    one to the residence address, if different from the mailing address-when
    the office received information indicating that the voter had moved from
    the address on file; if both notices were returned undeliverable, moved
    the voter to an inactive registration list and if no voter activity
    occurred through two federal elections, the voter's registration was
    canceled;

    o  	canceled the voter's registration when the voter requested in writing
    that his/her name be removed from the registration list;

    o  	matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
    date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
    registration list with information received from various sources on
    changes of address (i.e., the U.S. Postal Service National Change of
    Address list), felony convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths;

    o  	sent a letter to the voter asking if he/she wanted to remain
    registered in the county when information from the U.S. Postal Service
    indicated that the voter had moved to another jurisdiction, and if the
    voter signed and returned the letter indicating that he/she no longer
    wanted to be registered in the county, the registration was canceled;

    o  	sent a letter to the voter notifying of removal because court records
    identified the voter as ineligible due to a felony conviction and gave the
    voter an opportunity to inform the election office that the information
    provided from the courts was incorrect or that the felony was overturned;
    and

    o  	sent a letter to the deceased voter's family asking to confirm the
    voter's death when information provided by the state/county vital
    statistics offices or newspaper obituaries was insufficient to positively
    identify the voter as deceased.

    Los Angeles County, California

    Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
    steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
    inadvertently removed:

    o  	matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
    date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
    registration list with information received from various sources on
    changes of address (e.g., the U.S. Postal Service National Change of
    Address list), felony convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths;

    o  	sent the voter a letter and attempted to reach the voter by phone to
    notify of removal on the basis of a felony conviction; and

    Page 78 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Removing Names from Voter Registration Lists

    o  	sent the voter a letter notifying of removal because court records
    identified the voter as ineligible due to mental incompetence.

                                Yolo County, California

    Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
    steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
    inadvertently removed:

    o  	matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
    date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
    registration list with information received from various sources on
    changes of address (i.e., the U.S. Postal Service National Change of
    Address list), felony convictions, and deaths;

    o  	sent the voter a letter or notice of removal to confirm that the voter
    wanted his/her name removed from the voter registration list as requested
    or to notify the voter of removal on the basis of change-ofaddress
    information from the U.S. Postal Service; and

    o  	matched information from newspaper obituaries with information from
    state/county vital statistics offices.

                               City of Detroit, Michigan

    Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
    steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
    inadvertently removed:

    o  	matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
    date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
    registration list with information received from various sources on
    changes of address and deaths;

    o  	sent the voter a follow-up notice about removal because the voter
    failed to respond to a notice from the voter registrar and had not voted
    or had not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections, but
    received no response to the follow-up notice;

    o  	sent the voter a notice of removal because the voter no longer resided
    in the jurisdiction; and

    o  	canceled the voter's registration as requested by the voter and
    annotated the registration card with the reason the registration was
    canceled.

    No steps were taken before removing a voter's name from the voter
    registration list when felony records identified the voter as ineligible
    due to a felony conviction.

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    Removing Names from Voter Registration Lists

                                New York City, New York

    Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
    steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
    inadvertently removed:

    o  	matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
    date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
    registration list with information received from various sources on
    changes of address, felony convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths;

    o  	sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address
    information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had moved
    to another jurisdiction, or felony records identified the voter as
    ineligible due to a felony conviction, or court records identified the
    voter as ineligible due to mental incompetence; and

    o  	sent the voter a letter or postcard to confirm that the voter wanted
    his/her name removed from the voter registration list as requested.

    Rensselaer County, New York

    Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
    steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
    inadvertently removed:

    o  	sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address
    information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had moved
    to another jurisdiction and

    o  	matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
    date of birth, and social security number) contained in thevoter
    registration list with information received from various sources on
    changes of address, felony convictions, or deaths.

    No steps were taken before removing voters' names from the voter
    registration list when voters requested that names be removed or newspaper
    obituaries identified voters as deceased.

    Bexar County, Texas 	Before removing names from the voter registration
    list, the following steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible
    voters were not inadvertently removed:

    o  	sent the voter a follow-up notice about removal because the voter
    failed to respond to a notice from the voter registrar and had not voted
    or had not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections, but
    received no response to the follow-up notice;

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    Removing Names from Voter Registration Lists

    o  	sent a letter or postcard to the voter to confirm that the voter
    wanted his/her name removed from the voter registration list as requested;

    o  	sent the voter a letter notifying of removal on the basis of a felony
    conviction or mental incompetence; and

    o  	matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
    date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
    registration list with information received from various sources on felony
    convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths.

                                   Webb County, Texas

    Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
    steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
    inadvertently removed:

    o  	sent the voter a follow-up notice about removal because voter failed
    to respond to a notice from the voter registrar and had not voted or had
    not appeared to vote in the most recent two federal elections, but
    received no response to the follow-up notice;

    o  	sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address
    information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had moved
    to another jurisdiction;

    o  	sent the voter a letter notifying of removal on the basis of a felony
    conviction;

    o  	matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
    date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
    registration list with information received from various sources on felony
    convictions and deaths;

    o  	attempted to reach the deceased voter's next of kin by phone to notify
    of removal and to ask for confirmation of voter's death; and

    o  	matched information from a newspaper obituary with information from
    state/county vital statistics offices.

                               Albemarle County, Virginia

    Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
    steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
    inadvertently removed:

    o  	required the voter to file a document with the election office before
    any action was taken to remove the name from registration list as the
    voter requested;

    o  	matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
    date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
    registration list with information received from various sources on

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    Removing Names from Voter Registration Lists

    felony convictions, mental incompetence, deaths, or change of

    registration notice from another state; and  o  sent the voter a letter
    notifying of removal on the basis of a felony conviction.

    No steps were taken before removing voters' names from the voter
    registration lists when newspaper obituaries identified voters as
    deceased.

                               Arlington County, Virginia

    Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
    steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
    inadvertently removed:

    o  	matched the voter's identifying information (such as name, address,
    date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter
    registration list with information received from various sources on
    changes of address, felony convictions, mental incompetence, and deaths;

    o  	sent a letter asking the voter to confirm current residence because
    change-of-address information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the
    voter had moved to another jurisdiction;

    o  	sent the voter a postcard to confirm a request to remove his/her name
    from the voter registration list; and

    o  	sent the voter a letter notifying of removal on the basis of a felony
    conviction or on the basis of court records that identified the voter as
    ineligible due to mental incompetence.

                              City of Franklin, Wisconsin

    Before removing names from the voter registration list, the following
    steps were taken to ensure that names of eligible voters were not
    inadvertently removed:

    o  	matched voter's identifying information (such as name, address, date
    of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter registration
    list with information received from the U.S. Postal Service National
    Change of Address list;

    o  	sent the voter a notice of removal because change-of-address
    information from the U.S. Postal Service showed that the voter had moved
    to another jurisdiction; and

    o  	attempted to reach the voter by phone to confirm that he/she had moved
    outside the jurisdiction.

    No steps were taken before removing voters' names from the voter
    registration list when voters requested that names be removed or newspaper
    obituaries identified voters as deceased.

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                          Names from Voter Registration Lists

    City of Madison, Wisconsin 	When the office received voter cancellation
    cards from other municipalities, staff checked the voters' dates of birth
    before removing their names from the voter registration list to ensure
    that names of eligible voters were not inadvertently removed from the
    list. No steps were taken before removing voters' names from the voter
    registration lists when voters requested that their names be removed or
    newspaper obituaries identified voters as deceased.

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    Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Implementing Provisional Voting

    This appendix summarizes the responses of local election office
    representatives to questions in our survey and interviews about their
    experiences during the November 2004 election in implementing the
    requirements in HAVA for provisional voting and identification
    requirements for certain first-time voters who applied to register to vote
    after January 1, 2003. Unless otherwise noted, the statements in this
    appendix reflect the responses to our survey by the applicable local
    election officials and were not independently verified by us.

                                  Gila County, Arizona

    In Gila County, 575 provisional ballots were cast and 505 of these
    ballots- 88 percent-were counted. For a provisional vote to count, the
    voter had to be a qualified voter in the precinct. The main reasons for
    not counting the other 70 provisional ballots were that (1) the voters did
    not meet the residency eligibility requirements, (2) the election office
    received voter registration applications very close to or after the
    registration deadline, and (3) the provisional ballots or the envelopes
    containing those ballots were incomplete or illegible. The county election
    office did not experience challenges implementing the provisional voting
    requirements during the November 2004 election.

    The county election office used various means to inform voters of the
    availability of provisional ballots and the outcome of provisional votes.
    Representatives we spoke with at the county election office told us that
    they notified voters of the availability of provisional ballots by posting
    signs at polling places. Voters were also provided with written
    information at their polling places informing them that they could find
    out whether or not their provisional votes were counted and, if the votes
    were not counted, the reason they were not counted. Voters who cast
    provisional ballots could find out the outcome of their votes by calling a
    toll-free telephone number, calling the local election office, calling the
    state election office, and via a letter from the local election office
    informing voters of the outcome of their provisional votes. Information on
    the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters
    between 6 and 10 days after the election.

    In response to a question in our survey asking if the county allowed
    firsttime voters who registered by mail as of January 2003 but did not
    provide a copy of identification with their applications to cast
    provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at the
    polling place, the

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    Implementing Provisional Voting

    representative who responded to the survey said this was not applicable.
    Arizona passed a ballot initiative in 2004 requiring voters to show
    identification prior to receiving ballots.1 The county election office did
    not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these
    firsttime voters.

                                Maricopa County, Arizona

    In Maricopa County, 68,642 provisional ballots were cast and 50,719 of
    these ballots-74 percent-were counted. For a provisional vote to count,
    the voter had to be a qualified voter in the precinct. The main reasons
    for not counting the other 17,923 provisional ballots were that (1) no
    evidence existed that the individuals who cast these ballots had
    registered or tried to register to vote directly with the elections
    office, (2) the voters did not meet the residency eligibility requirement,
    and (3) other reasons including election officials not receiving voter
    registration applications until after the state's deadline to register to
    vote. In describing challenges that the county election office faced in
    implementing provisional voting for the November 2004 election, officials
    from the county election office said they had to modify the form and
    envelope used for provisional voting to provide a statement for the voter
    to sign to indicate U.S. citizenship.

    Voters were informed of the availability of provisional ballots and
    outcome of provisional votes using various means. Representatives we spoke
    with at the county election office told us that they notified voters of
    the availability of provisional ballots by posting signs at polling
    places. Voters were also provided with written information at their
    polling places informing them that they could find out whether or not
    their provisional votes were counted and, if the votes were not counted,
    the reason they were not counted. Voters who cast provisional ballots
    could find out the outcome of their votes by calling a toll-free telephone
    number, checking a Web site, calling the local election office, calling
    the state election office, visiting the local election office, and via a
    letter from the local election office informing voters of the outcome of
    their provisional votes. Information on the outcome of the provisional
    votes was made available to the voters between 6 and 10 days after the
    election.

    1Local election officials in the two jurisdictions in Arizona said that
    the HAVA requirement to provide a provisional ballot in such instance was
    not applicable. In a letter from the U.S. Department of Justice to the
    Arizona Secretary of State, Justice's Civil Rights Division concluded that
    it was permissible for a state to mandate that potential voters show
    identification at the polls prior to receiving provisional ballots.

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    Implementing Provisional Voting

    In response to a question in our survey asking if the county allowed
    firsttime voters who registered by mail as of January 2003 but did not
    provide a copy of identification with their applications to cast
    provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at the
    polling place, the representative who responded to the survey said this
    was not applicable. Arizona passed a ballot initiative in 2004 requiring
    voters to show identification prior to receiving ballots. The county
    election office did not report experiencing challenges verifying the
    identification of these firsttime voters.

    Los Angeles County, California

    In Los Angeles County, 204,578 provisional ballots were cast during the
    November 2004 election and 166,894 of these ballots-82 percent-were
    counted. Provisional votes are counted when they are cast by qualified
    voters in any precinct within the county. The main reasons for not
    counting the other 37,684 ballots were that (1) no evidence existed that
    the voters had registered or tried to register to vote, (2) the voters did
    not sign the voter registration forms, and (3) the voters did not provide
    dates or places of birth on the voter registration forms or the
    provisional ballot envelopes. The county election office experienced
    challenges implementing the HAVA provisional voting requirements during
    the November 2004 election and took steps to address these challenges.
    Provisional voting was a challenge because staff had to prepare duplicate
    ballots to remove ineligible or invalid contests when voters cast their
    provisional ballots at the wrong precinct. To overcome this challenge,
    staffing was increased to prepare the duplicate ballots.

    Voters were informed of the availability of provisional ballots and how to
    find out the outcome of provisional votes using various means.
    Representatives we spoke with at the county election office told us that
    voters were notified of the availability of provisional ballots by posting
    signs at polling places, conducting public education campaigns, and
    working with community-based organizations. Also, they said that
    information on provisional voting is contained in California's Voting Bill
    of Rights and the state's election code. Voters were provided written
    information at their polling places informing them that they could find
    out the outcome of their provisional votes by calling a toll-free
    telephone number or the local election office. Information on the outcome
    of the provisional votes was made available to the voters more than 10
    days after the election.

    The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January
    2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications
    to

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    Implementing Provisional Voting

    cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification
    at the polling place; 12,264 of these first-time voters cast provisional
    ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert pollworkers and
    elections staff of first-time voters who were required to provide
    identification at the polls because they did not provide it when they
    registered by mail, notations were made to the voter file, voter roster,
    and absentee identification envelope. The county election office reported
    experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these first-time
    voters. Specifically, this proved to be a challenge because the state did
    not have a statewide voter registration database to verify the
    identification of these voters. To overcome this challenge, voters were
    requested to provide identification at the polls and absentee voters were
    requested to enclose identification with their ballots.

                                Yolo County, California

    In Yolo County, 2,050 provisional ballots were cast during the November
    2004 election. The representative from the election office who responded
    to our survey did not know how many of these provisional ballots were
    counted. For a provisional vote to count, the voter had to be a qualified
    voter in any precinct within the county. The most frequently cited reason
    for not counting provisional ballots were (1) a lack of evidence that the
    voters had submitted voter registration applications at MVA offices, (2)
    voters not providing identification as required by HAVA for individuals
    who registered by mail and were voting for the first time in the precinct
    or jurisdiction, and (3) voters not signing a sworn statement that they
    met the qualifications to be eligible to vote in the precinct or
    jurisdiction. The county election office did not experience challenges
    implementing the HAVA provisional voting requirement during the November
    2004 election.

    The county election office used various means to inform voters of the
    availability of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes.
    Representatives we spoke with at the county election office told us that
    voters were notified of the availability of provisional ballots by posting
    signs at polling places and mailing sample ballots to voters. Voters were
    also provided written information at their polling places informing them
    that they could find out the outcome of their provisional votes by calling
    a toll-free telephone number or the local election office. Information on
    the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters more
    than 10 days after the election.

    The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January
    2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications
    to cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide
    identification at

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    Implementing Provisional Voting

    the polling place. The representative from the county election office who
    responded to our survey did not know how many first-time voters cast
    provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert
    pollworkers and elections staff about first-time voters who needed to
    provide identification at the polls because they did not provide it when
    they registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with
    notes, codes, or marks next to the voters' names. The county election
    office did not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification
    of these first-time voters.

                               City of Detroit, Michigan

    In Detroit, 1,350 provisional ballots were cast during the November 2004
    election, and 123 of these ballots-9 percent-were counted. Provisional
    votes are counted when they are cast by qualified voters in their assigned
    precincts. The main reasons for not counting the other 1,227 provisional
    ballots were that the voters did not (1) provide acceptable identification
    or proof of residence, (2) sign sworn statements that they met the
    qualifications to be eligible to vote in the precincts or jurisdictions,
    or (3) meet the residency eligibility requirements for the precincts or
    jurisdictions. The election office experienced challenges implementing
    provisional voting during the November 2004 election. Provisional voting
    was a challenge because Detroit has the largest number of voting precincts
    in Michigan, and the 6-day time frame for processing provisional ballots
    was very challenging and unrealistic. To overcome this challenge, the
    entire department's employees were mobilized to process provisional
    ballots.

    The election office used various means to inform voters of the
    availability of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes.
    Representatives we spoke with at the election office told us that election
    staff notified voters of the availability of provisional ballots by
    speaking to community and church groups and through a voter education
    program. Voters were provided with written information at their polling
    places informing them that they could find out the outcome of their
    provisional votes by contacting the local election office by phone and in
    person, and by receiving a letter from the election office. Information on
    the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters
    within 6 to 10 days after the election.

    The city allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January
    2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications
    to cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide
    identification at the polling place. The representatives from the city
    election office who

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    Implementing Provisional Voting

    responded to our survey did not know how many of these first-time voters
    cast provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert poll
    workers and elections staff about first-time voters who needed to provide
    identification at the polls because they did not provide it when they
    registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with notes,
    codes, or marks next to the voters' names. The city election office did
    not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these
    firsttime voters.

                                Delta Township, Michigan

    In Delta Township, four provisional ballots were cast during the November
    2004 election, and one of these ballots was counted. Provisional votes are
    counted when they are cast by qualified voters in their assigned
    precincts. The reason for not counting the other three ballots was that
    the voters' registration applications were postmarked after the
    registration deadline. The township election office experienced challenges
    implementing the HAVA provisional voting requirement during the November
    2004 election and took steps to address these challenges. Provisional
    voting was a challenge because it was viewed as too complex and
    time-consuming for poll workers to administer along with all the other
    issues they face on Election Day. To overcome this challenge, the election
    office provided the poll workers with general information on provisional
    voting and instructed staff in precincts to call the election office about
    each provisional envelope ballot being considered.

    The election office used various means to inform voters of the
    availability of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes.
    Representatives we spoke with at the election office told us that voters
    in the township were notified of the availability of provisional ballots
    primarily through the media. Voters were also provided with written
    information at their polling places informing them that they could find
    out the outcome of their provisional votes by calling a toll-free
    telephone number, calling the local or state election office telephone
    number, or visiting the local election office in person. Information on
    the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters
    within 5 days after the election.

    Delta Township allowed first-time voters who registered by mail to cast
    provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at the
    polling place. To alert pollworkers and elections staff about first-time
    voters who needed to provide identification at the polls because they did
    not provide it when they registered by mail, the voter registration list
    was marked with notes, codes, or marks next to the voters' names. None of
    these first-time voters cast provisional ballots during the November 2004

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    Implementing Provisional Voting

    election. The county election office reported experiencing challenges
    verifying the identification of these first-time voters. Specifically,
    this was viewed as very time-consuming due to the high volume of voters,
    and that other voters suffered because this resulted in delays. To
    overcome these challenges, poll workers asked for identification as
    needed.

                                New York City, New York

    In New York City, 140,779 provisional ballots were cast and 77,804 of
    these ballots-55 percent-were counted. Provisional votes are counted when
    they are cast by qualified voters in their precincts. The main reasons for
    not counting the other 62,975 provisional ballots were that (1) no
    evidence existed that the individuals who cast these ballots had
    registered or tried to register to vote directly with the elections
    office, (2) the envelopes or ballots were incomplete or illegible, and (3)
    voters did not meet the residency eligibility requirements. The city
    election office did not report experiencing challenges with implementing
    provisional voting.

    In response to a question about how the city election office notified
    voters of the availability of provisional ballots, election office
    representatives said that voters were already familiar with the system.2
    Voters were not provided with written information at their polling places
    informing them that they could find out whether or not their provisional
    votes were counted and, if the votes were not counted, the reason they
    were counted. Instead, the election office sent letters to only those
    provisional voters whose ballots were not counted because state election
    law requires notifying only those voters whose provisional ballots were
    not counted. Information on the outcome of the provisional ballots was
    made available to the voters more than 10 days after the election.

    The city allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January
    2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications
    to cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide
    identification at the polling place; 551 of these first-time voters cast
    provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. The names of these
    voters were marked on the registration list so that poll workers knew that
    these voters needed to show identification. The county election office did
    not report

    2While New York State had not passed legislation to implement the
    provisional voting requirements in the Help America Vote Act by the time
    of the November 2004 election, New York had a form of provisional voting
    in place referred to as affidavit ballots.

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    Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices Implementing Provisional
    Voting

    experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these first-time
    voters.

    Rensselaer County, New York

    In Rensselaer County, 1,914 provisional ballots were cast and 972 of these
    ballots-51 percent-were counted. For a provisional vote to count, the
    voter had to be a qualified voter in the precinct. The main reasons for
    not counting the other 942 provisional ballots were that (1) the county
    election office received registration applications after the state's
    registration deadline, (2) no evidence that individuals had registered or
    tried to register directly with the election office, and (3) voters did
    not meet residency eligibility requirements. The county election office
    did not report experiencing challenges with implementing provisional
    voting.

    In response to a question about how the county election office notified
    voters of the availability of provisional ballots, election office
    representatives said that poll worker inspectors did so if they were not
    listed in the voter rolls. Voters were not provided with written
    information at their polling places informing them that they could find
    out whether or not their provisional votes were counted and, if the votes
    were not counted, the reason they were not counted. Voters who cast
    provisional ballots could find out the outcome of their votes by calling
    the election office. Information on the outcome of the provisional votes
    was made available to the voters more than 10 days after the election.

    The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail as of January
    2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their applications
    to cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide
    identification at the polling place. None of these first-time voters cast
    provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. The names of these
    voters were marked on the registration list so that poll workers knew that
    these voters needed to show identification. The county election office did
    not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these
    first-time voters.

    Bexar County, Texas 	In Bexar County, 2,996 provisional ballots were cast
    during the November 2004 election and 602 of these ballots-20 percent-were
    counted. Provisional votes are counted when they are cast by qualified
    voters in their assigned precincts. The main reasons that the other 2,394
    provisional ballots were not counted were that (1) voters did not meet the
    residency eligibility requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction and
    (2) no evidence existed that the individuals had registered or tried to
    register directly with

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    Implementing Provisional Voting

    the elections office or had submitted their voter registration
    applications at MVA offices. The county election office reported
    experiencing minor challenges implementing provisional voting during the
    November 2004 election, which included missing signatures and provisional
    ballots cast in incorrect precincts. To address this issue, efforts were
    made to review all available records for the missing or incorrect
    information, such as the voter registration database, secretary of state
    records, motor vehicle agency records, and cards containing the voters'
    original signatures.

    The election office used various means to inform voters of the
    availability of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes, such
    as posting signs at polling places. This information was also made
    available to voters upon request. Voters were not provided with written
    information at their polling places informing them that they could find
    out whether or not their provisional votes were counted and, if the votes
    were not counted, the reasons they were not counted. Voters could find out
    the outcome of their provisional votes by calling the local election
    office or by receiving a letter from the election office. Information on
    the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to the voters
    within 6 to 10 days after the election.

    The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail after January
    2003 and did not send a copy of identification with their applications to
    cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification
    at the polling place. The representative from the county election office
    did not know how many first-time voters cast provisional ballots during
    the November 2004 election. To alert poll workers and elections staff
    about first-time voters who needed to provide identification at the polls
    because they did not provide it when they registered by mail, the voter
    registration list was marked with notes, codes, or marks next to the
    voters' names. The county election office did not report experiencing
    challenges verifying the identification of these first-time voters.

    Webb County, Texas 	In Webb County, 60 provisional ballots were cast
    during the November 2004 election and 23 of these ballots were counted.
    Provisional votes are counted when they are cast by qualified voters in
    their assigned precincts. The main reasons for not counting the other 37
    ballots were (1) voters did not meet the residency eligibility
    requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction, (2) a lack of evidence that
    the individuals had submitted their voter registration applications at MVA
    offices, and (3) the county election office received voter registration
    applications after registration deadline.

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    Implementing Provisional Voting

    The county election office did not report experiencing challenges with
    implementing provisional voting.

    The election office provided written information to voters who cast
    provisional ballots informing them that they would receive a letter from
    the election office notifying them of the outcome of their votes.
    Information on the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to
    the voters in 5 days or less after the election.

    The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail after January
    2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their registrations
    to cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide
    identification at the polling place. None of these first-time voters cast
    provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert
    pollworkers and elections staff about first-time voters who needed to
    provide identification at the polls because they did not provide it when
    they registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with
    notes, codes, or marks next to the voters' names. The county election
    office did not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification
    of these first-time voters.

                               Albemarle County, Virginia

    In Albemarle County, 49 provisional ballots were cast during the November
    2004 election. The representative from the county election office who
    responded to our survey did not know how many provisional ballots were
    counted. For provisional votes to be counted, they must be cast by
    qualified voters in their assigned precincts. The main reasons for not
    counting provisional votes were that (1) voters did not meet the residency
    eligibility requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction because they had
    moved from one jurisdiction to another within Virginia and had not updated
    their voter registration records within the required time frame and (2) no
    evidence existed that the individuals had submitted their voter
    registration applications at MVA offices or at other NVRA agencies. The
    county election office reported experiencing challenges implementing
    provisional voting. Specifically, provisional voting was viewed as a
    challenge because ballots were provided to ineligible voters to placate
    them, given the common misperception among some voters that they could
    cast ballots anywhere. In addition, because various groups created a high
    level of mistrust among voters, who at times were confrontational or
    disruptive, provisional ballots were provided to placate voters and to
    keep order at the polls. To address these challenges, the county election
    office said it would expand outreach efforts to ensure individuals who
    were moving understood the need to provide the election office with a
    timely change of address.

                     Page 93 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Implementing Provisional Voting

    The county election office used various means to inform voters of the
    availability of provisional ballots and outcome of provisional votes.
    Representatives we spoke with at the county registrar office told us that
    voters were notified of the availability of provisional ballots through
    the media. Voters were also provided with written information at their
    polling places informing them that they could find out the outcome of
    their provisional votes by calling a toll-free telephone number, calling
    the local or state election office, contacting the local election office
    in person, or receiving a letter from the local election office.
    Information on the outcome of the provisional votes was made available to
    the voters within 6 to 10 days after the election.

    The county allowed first-time voters who registered by mail after January
    2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with their registrations
    to cast provisional ballots if they were not able to provide
    identification at the polling place. None of these first-time voters cast
    provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert
    pollworkers and elections staff about first-time voters who needed to
    provide identification at the polls because they did not provide it when
    they registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with
    notes, codes, or marks next to the voters' names. The county election
    office did not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification
    of these first-time voters.

                               Arlington County, Virginia

    In Arlington County, 147 provisional ballots were cast during the November
    2004 election and 19 of these ballots-13 percent-were counted. Provisional
    votes are counted when they are cast by qualified voters in their assigned
    precincts. The main reasons for not counting the other 128 ballots were
    (1) a lack of evidence that the individuals had registered or tried to
    register directly with the elections office, (2) a lack of evidence that
    the individuals had submitted their voter registration applications at MVA
    offices, and (3) that they did not meet the residency eligibility
    requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction. The county election office
    reported experiencing challenges implementing provisional voting.
    Specifically, provisional voting was viewed as a challenge because some
    poll workers did not understand, according to the county election office,
    that anyone who insisted on voting a provisional ballot was entitled to do
    so and, as a result, some voters whose names were not in the registration
    list might not have been offered provisional ballots. Provisional voting
    was also a challenge because, according to the county election office,
    lawyers stationed outside the polls sometimes erroneously told voters that
    they could insist on voting a provisional ballot even though poll workers
    had directed them to their correct polling places. The

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         Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
                            Implementing Provisional Voting

    election office plans to address some of these issues during training
    sessions for poll workers.

    The county registrar office used various means to inform voters of the
    availability and outcome of provisional votes. Representatives we spoke
    with at the county registrar office told us that voters were notified of
    the availability of provisional ballots by posting signs at polling
    places. Voters were also provided with written information at their
    polling places informing them that they could find out the outcome of
    their provisional votes by calling a toll-free telephone number, calling
    the local or state election office telephone number, contacting the local
    election office in person, or by receiving a letter from the local
    election office. Information on the outcome of the provisional votes was
    made available to the voters within 6 to 10 days after the election.

    The county allowed first-time voters who applied to register to vote by
    mail after January 2003 but did not provide a copy of identification with
    their registrations to cast provisional ballots if they were not able to
    provide identification at the polling place. None of these first-time
    voters cast provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. To
    alert pollworkers and elections staff about first-time voters who needed
    to provide identification at the polls because they did not provide it
    when they registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with
    notes, codes, or marks next to the voters' names. The county election
    office did not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification
    of these first-time voters.

                              City of Franklin, Wisconsin

    No provisional ballots were cast in Franklin during the November 2004
    election. If provisional ballots had been cast, voters would have been
    provided written information at their polling places informing them that
    they could find out the outcome of their provisional votes. Provisional
    votes would have been counted if the ballots were cast by qualified voters
    in their assigned precincts. The election office reported experiencing
    challenges implementing provisional voting and took steps to address these
    challenges. Specifically, providing thorough instructions to all election
    workers and voters about provisional voting during an extremely
    high-turnout election was challenging. To address this issue, the city
    election office provided thorough and repeated poll worker education.

    Provisional ballots were made available to individuals who applied to
    register to vote after January 2003 but did not send a copy of
    identification with their applications. None of these first-time voters
    cast provisional

                     Page 95 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Implementing Provisional Voting

    ballots during the November 2004 election. To alert pollworkers and
    elections staff about first-time voters who needed to provide
    identification at the polls because they did not provide it when they
    registered by mail, the voter registration list was marked with notes,
    codes, or marks next to the voters' names. The city election office did
    not report experiencing challenges verifying the identification of these
    first-time voters.

                               City of Madison, Wisconsin

    In Madison, five provisional ballots were cast during the November 2004
    election but none were counted. Provisional votes are counted when they
    are cast by qualified voters in their assigned precincts. The main reason
    these provisional votes were not counted was that the voters did not
    provide identification as required by HAVA for voters who applied by mail
    after January 2003 and were voting for the first time in the precinct.
    These voters were instructed to bring their identification to the local
    election office within 24 hours after the election but did not do so. The
    city election office did not report experiencing challenges implementing
    provisional voting.

    Voters were provided with written information at their polling places
    informing them that they could contact the local election office to find
    out the outcome of their provisional votes. However, the local election
    office did not provide information to voters on the outcome of provisional
    votes since this information is only provided when provisional votes
    count.3

    The representative from the city election office did not know if
    first-time voters who registered by mail after January 2003 but did not
    send a copy of identification with their applications were allowed to cast
    provisional ballots if they were not able to provide identification at the
    polling place. To alert poll workers and elections staff about first-time
    voters who needed to provide identification at the polls because they did
    not provide it when they registered by mail, the voter registration list
    was marked with notes, codes, or marks next to the voters' names. The city
    election office reported experiencing challenges verifying the
    identification of these firsttime voters. Specifically, the city election
    office required additional staff to

    3With respect to provisional voting, under HAVA, states that had either
    (1) no voter registration requirements for voters with respect of federal
    elections (North Dakota) or (2) polling place registration on Election Day
    with respect to federal elections (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
    Wisconsin, and Wyoming) in effect on and after August 1, 1994, are not
    subject to HAVA's provisional voting requirements.

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    Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of Selected Local Election Offices
    Implementing Provisional Voting

    send notices to these voters to notify them that they needed to submit the
    necessary documentation or bring it to the polling place on Election Day.

                     Page 97 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices
    with Voter Registration Applications

    This appendix describes the responses of state and local motor vehicle
    agency (MVA) representatives to our survey about their experiences during
    2004 in carrying out various voter registration application tasks-
    specifically, assisting MVA clients with completing voter registration
    applications, accepting applications from these clients, and forwarding
    applications to state or local elections offices. It also describes
    actions MVA officials reported that they took when individuals and state
    or local election officials contacted their offices about individuals who
    said they submitted their applications to MVA offices but their names were
    not on the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November
    2004 election. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses to
    our survey by the applicable state and local MVA officials and were not
    independently verified by us.

    In 1993, NVRA, also known as the "motor voter" law, was enacted. NVRA,
    among other things, established procedures to facilitate the registration
    of eligible citizens to vote in federal elections by providing them the
    opportunity to apply to register to vote at various locations, such as
    motor vehicle and other NVRA agencies primarily in states that have a
    voter registration requirement.1 Under NVRA, an eligible citizen
    conducting certain transactions at a motor vehicle agency (MVA)- such as
    applying for, renewing, or changing the address on a driver's license-can
    simultaneously apply to register to vote or, if applicable, change the
    voter's address.

    In 2001, we reported that about 46 percent of the jurisdictions responding
    to our nationwide survey expressed concerns about applications received
    from NVRA agencies. For example, officials most frequently noted
    challenges with processing incomplete or illegible applications,
    applications that arrived late at the local election office, and
    applications that never arrived. Because local election officials around
    the country expressed concerns about processing applications submitted at
    MVAs, as noted in our 2001 report, we surveyed MVA officials in six
    states2 and 12 local jurisdictions about their experiences during 2004 in
    carrying out

    1Under NVRA, states that had either (1) no voter registration requirements
    for voters with respect to federal elections (North Dakota) or (2) polling
    place registration on Election Day with respect to federal elections
    (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) in effect on and
    after August 1, 1994, are not subject to NVRA.

    2Wisconsin was not included in our survey because MVA offices in this
    state do not participate in voter registration because, as noted in
    footnote 1 in this appendix, the state is exempt from NVRA.

         Page 98 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration Appendix VIII: Reported
      Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with Voter Registration
                                      Applications

    voter registration application tasks and assisting voters who said they
    had submitted their applications to a MVA office but their names were
    missing from the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the
    November 2004 election. Appendix IX provides a copy of the survey sent to
    MVA officials in each of the six states and 12 local jurisdictions.

    As figure 8 illustrates, state MVA representatives reported, for the most
    part, that during 2004 MVA staff found that helping clients complete their
    voter registration applications, accepting applications from clients, and
    forwarding applications to state or local elections offices was either
    very easy, somewhat easy, or neither difficult nor easy.

    Experiences of

      Selected State MVA Offices

    Figure 8: MVA Officials' Characterization of How Difficult or Easy It Was
    for MVA Staff to Assist Clients with Completing Voter Registration
    Applications, Accept Applications from Clients, and Forward Applications
    to Election Offices

    aThe state MVA officials responded not applicable when asked how difficult
    or easy it was for staff to help MVA clients complete the voter
    registration application because they said MVA staff do not help clients
    complete the application.

    Discussed below, by state, are the reasons MVA representatives reported
    that MVA staff did not experience difficulty performing the voter
    registration application tasks and the assistance staff provided to
    individuals who said they had submitted their applications to MVA offices,

    Page 99 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency
    Offices with Voter Registration Applications

    but their names were not on the voter registration lists when they went to
    vote in the November 2004 election.

    Arizona

    When asked how difficult or easy it was for staff to help MVA clients
    complete the voter registration application, the state MVA representative
    responded "not applicable" because staff do not help MVA clients complete
    their voter registration applications. Accepting voter registration
    applications was easy because the electronic form walks the clients
    through each part of it. MVA clients cannot proceed through the form if
    all the required boxes have not been completed. Forwarding the
    applications to the state or local elections offices was more time
    consuming than difficult or easy.

    Twelve individuals contacted the state MVA office saying that they had
    submitted a voter registration application to their MVA office or another
    MVA office, but their names were missing from the voter registration lists
    when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. The MVA office
    referred these individuals to the local election office and checked the
    MVA electronic transaction information for their voter registration
    applications. State or local election officials contacted the state MVA
    office about individuals who said they were told their names were not on
    the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
    election. However, the state or local election officials did not know
    whether the individuals had said that they had submitted their voter
    registration applications to the state MVA office or another MVA office.

    California

    When asked how difficult or easy it was for staff to help MVA clients
    complete the voter registration application, the state MVA representative
    responded not applicable because staff do not help MVA clients complete
    their voter registration applications. Accepting applications from MVA
    clients and forwarding these applications to state or local elections
    offices was very easy.

    The state MVA office was not contacted by individuals who said that their
    names were missing from the voter registration lists when they went to
    vote in the November 2004 election. But the MVA office was contacted by
    state or local elections officials who indicated that the individuals said
    they had submitted their voter registration applications to the state MVA
    office or another MVA office, but their names were missing from the voter
    registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election.
    The state MVA representative, who did not know how many individuals

                    Page 100 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency
    Offices with Voter Registration Applications

    had contacted the state or local elections officials, reported that when
    the elections officials provided adequate information, the MVA office
    researched the driver's license database to determine if the individuals'
    claims could be confirmed and informed the elections officials of the
    outcome of the MVA research.

    Michigan

    Helping MVA clients to complete their voter registration applications and
    accepting the completed applications from them were very easy because the
    MVA offices process thousands of voter registrations annually following
    standard procedures that have not changed substantially in many years.
    Also, the voter registration applications are printed automatically with
    the voter name, address, and date of birth. The clients only have to
    verify the information in the application and sign it. Forwarding
    applications to the state or local elections offices was somewhat easy
    because clients are not always sure about their city or township. MVA
    offices are provided with pre-printed mailing labels for forwarding the
    applications to the various election jurisdictions, which makes the
    process quite simple overall.

    The state MVA representative did not know how many individuals or state or
    local elections officials had contacted the state MVA office or another
    MVA office about individuals who said that their names were not on the
    voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
    election because this information was not collected or tracked.

    New York

    The state MVA representative responded that helping MVA clients to
    complete their voter registration applications, accepting the completed
    applications from them, and forwarding the applications to state or local
    elections offices were neither difficult nor easy for MVA staff during
    2004. The state MVA office has not been made aware of any difficulties
    that MVA staff might have encountered in carrying out these voter
    registration application tasks.

    Individuals and state or local elections officials had contacted the state
    MVA office about 421 individuals, in total, who said that they had
    submitted their voter registration applications to the state MVA office or
    another MVA office, but their names were not on the voter registration
    lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. The state MVA
    office searched its electronic files to determine whether the 421
    individuals had indicated they wanted to apply to register to vote at the
    time of the MVA transaction. Also, if necessary, the state MVA office

                    Page 101 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency
    Offices with Voter Registration Applications

    pulled the original source documents to determine the individuals' intent
    to apply to register to vote.

    Texas

    The state MVA representative responded that helping MVA clients to
    complete their voter registration applications was neither difficult nor
    easy for MVA staff during 2004, but this task added time to processing MVA
    transactions. Accepting the completed applications from the clients also
    was neither difficult nor easy and added time to processing MVA
    transactions. MVA staff had to review the completed applications before
    accepting them and forwarding them to the state or local elections
    offices. Forwarding the completed voter registration applications to state
    or local election offices was neither difficult nor easy. Applications
    were either mailed or hand delivered to the state or local elections
    offices.

    Individuals and state or local elections officials had contacted the state
    MVA office about individuals who said that they had submitted their voter
    registration applications to the state MVA office or another MVA office,
    but their names were not on the voter registration lists when they went to
    vote in the November 2004 election. However, the state MVA office did not
    know how many individuals had said that they had submitted their voter
    registration applications to the state MVA office or another MVA office.

    Virginia

    Helping MVA clients to complete their voter registration applications and
    accepting the completed applications from them were neither difficult nor
    easy because MVA has been handling voter registration since 1996. MVA
    staff provide the same level of service for voter registration as they do
    for other MVA transactions. Forwarding applications to the state or local
    elections offices is very easy because the applications are mailed daily
    to the state board of elections by all of the MVA offices.

    Four individuals contacted the state MVA office saying that they had
    submitted a voter registration application to their MVA office or another
    MVA office, but their names were missing from the voter registration list
    when they went to vote in the November 2004 election. The MVA office(s)
    and the state board of elections office researched various automated
    systems and paper records to determine when the clients had conducted
    business with the MVA and the disposition of any voter registration
    applications. The MVA clients were advised by letter of the outcome of
    this research. Also, the state board of elections office contacted the
    state MVA office indicating that 1,288 individuals had said that they had
    submitted their voter registration applications to the MVA state office or

        Page 102 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration Appendix VIII: Reported
      Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with Voter Registration
                                      Applications

    another MVA office, but their names were missing from the voter
    registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election.
    MVA assisted the state board of elections office in verifying the
    individuals' claims and determining when they submitted an application to
    a MVA office. The state board of elections office, which has access to MVA
    records and houses all voter registration information, found that 295
    individuals had applied to register to vote at a MVA office and their
    applications were sent to the state board of elections office. Of the
    remaining 993 individuals, 591 had indicated that they did not wish to
    apply to register to vote and did not complete an application; 245 had no
    record of conducting MVA business or submitting a voter registration
    application at a MVA office; 128 conducted an Internet, mail, or phone
    transaction with MVA but did not request that a paper voter registration
    application be mailed to them; and 29 submitted their voter registration
    applications after the registration deadline.

      Experiences of Selected Local MVA Offices

    Gila County, Arizona

    The MVA representative responded not applicable when asked how difficult
    or easy was it for staff to help MVA clients complete the voter
    registration application because staff do not help MVA clients complete
    their voter registration applications. The customer completes the
    application and MVA staff glance at it to ensure all the information has
    been completed. Accepting applications from clients and forwarding the
    applications to the elections offices is very easy because, after the
    clients complete their applications, a copy of the application is given to
    them and the original applications are mailed daily to the elections
    offices.

    The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election
    officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from
    the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
    election.

    Maricopa County, Arizona 	When asked how difficult or easy it was for
    staff to help MVA clients complete the voter registration application, the
    MVA representative

    Page 103 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration Appendix VIII: Reported
    Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency Offices with Voter
    Registration Applications

    responded not applicable. Accepting applications from MVA clients and
    forwarding the applications to election offices was very easy.

    One individual contacted the MVA office saying that he/she had submitted a
    voter registration application to their MVA office or another MVA office,
    but his/her name was missing from the voter registration list when he/she
    went to vote in the November 2004 election. The MVA office referred the
    individual to the local election office. No state or local election
    officials contacted the MVA office about individuals who said they were
    told that their names were not on the lists of registered voters when they
    went to vote in the November 2004 election.

    Los Angeles County, California

    The MVA representative responded not applicable when asked how difficult
    or easy was it for staff to help MVA clients complete the voter
    registration application because staff do not help MVA clients complete
    their voter registration applications. Accepting applications from clients
    and forwarding the applications to the elections offices is very easy
    because the applications are collected and mailed to the elections offices
    daily.

    The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election
    officials about individuals who said their names were missing from the
    voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
    election.

                                Yolo County, California

    When asked how difficult or easy it was for staff to help MVA clients
    complete the voter registration application, the MVA representative
    responded not applicable because MVA staff do not assist MVA clients with
    completing voter registration forms. MVA staff provide clients the forms,
    accept the completed forms from the clients and note in the MVA database
    that the forms were received, and forward the forms to the local voter
    registrars. Accepting the forms from the clients and forwarding them to
    the elections offices was very easy. Most forms are forwarded weekly to
    the local registrars by mail and a special pickup is arranged for the
    deadline day before an election.

    The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election
    officials about individuals who said their names were missing from the
    voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
    election.

                    Page 104 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency
    Offices with Voter Registration Applications

                               City of Detroit, Michigan

    Assisting clients with completing their voter registration applications
    and accepting the applications from them was very easy because the
    applications are completed by computer as part of other transactions. The
    individuals only have to sign their applications. Forwarding applications
    to the elections offices was very easy because applications are presorted
    and pre-printed labels are used for mailing them to the elections offices
    weekly. Around the time of elections, applications are forwarded daily to
    the elections offices.

    The representative from the MVA office did not know whether individuals or
    state/local election officials had contacted their MVA office about
    individuals who said their names were missing from the voter registration
    lists when they went to vote in the November 2004 election because this
    information was not collected or tracked.

                                Delta Township, Michigan

    Assisting clients with completing their voter registration applications
    and accepting applications from them was very easy because thousands of
    these transactions are processed yearly; the clients check the information
    in their applications and sign them. Forwarding applications to the
    elections offices was neither easy nor difficult, but it can be time
    consuming based the volume of applications and the need to separate them
    by election jurisdictions.

    The representative from the MVA office did not know whether state or local
    election officials contacted the MVA office about individuals who said
    their names were missing from the voter registration lists when they went
    to vote in the November 2004 election because this information was not
    collected or tracked. Approximately 12 individuals contacted the MVA
    office saying that they had submitted their voter registration
    applications to their MVA office or another MVA office, but their names
    were missing from the voter registration lists when they went to vote in
    the November 2004 election. The MVA office referred the individuals to the
    local election office and tried to look up a record of the voter
    registration applications the individuals reportedly submitted.

    New York City, New York	Assisting MVA clients with completing the voter
    registration form, accepting forms from them, and forwarding the forms to
    the elections offices was very easy. When assisting clients with
    completing the forms, MVA staff question information on the voter
    registration forms only if the clients have not filled out any of the
    information on the voter registration forms.

                    Page 105 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency
    Offices with Voter Registration Applications

    The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election
    officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from
    the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
    election.

    Rensselaer County, New York

    Assisting MVA clients with completing their voter registration forms was
    very easy because MVA staff do not assist clients with completing the
    forms. Accepting the voter registration forms and forwarding them to the
    local elections offices was also very easy. The forms are mailed to the
    elections offices.

    Two individuals contacted the MVA office saying that they had submitted a
    voter registration application to their MVA office or another MVA office,
    but their names were missing from the voter registration lists when they
    went to vote in the November 2004 election. The MVA office referred the
    individuals to the local election office. No state or local election
    officials contacted the MVA office.

    Bexar County, Texas 	Assisting MVA clients with completing the voter
    registration application, accepting applications from them, and forwarding
    the applications to the elections offices was very easy.

    The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election
    officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from
    the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
    election.

                                   Webb County, Texas

    Assisting MVA clients with completing the voter registration application,
    accepting applications from them, and forwarding the applications to the
    elections offices is somewhat easy. The applications are very easy for the
    clients to complete, and staff forward the applications to the elections
    offices daily. MVA staff review incomplete applications for accuracy.

    The MVA office was contacted by individuals saying that their names were
    missing from the voter registration list when they went to vote in the
    November 2004 election. The representative from the MVA office did not
    know how many of these individuals contacted the MVA office. The MVA
    office was not contacted by state/local election officials about
    individuals who said they were told that their names were not on the lists
    of registered voters when they went to vote in the November 2004 election.

                    Page 106 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of Selected Motor Vehicle Agency
    Offices with Voter Registration Applications

                               Albemarle County, Virginia

    Assisting MVA clients with completing their voter registration
    applications was neither difficult nor easy because MVA clerks are
    responsible for quickly reviewing the applications to ensure all parts
    have been completed and informing the clients of any parts of the
    application that are incomplete. If clients have questions about the voter
    registration application, MVA staff refer the clients to the local voter
    registrar or the state election office because the MVA is responsible for
    providing clients the opportunity to apply to register to vote, not
    answering voter registration questions or verifying clients' responses
    contained in the applications. Accepting applications from MVA clients was
    somewhat easy because sometimes the clients do not complete all parts of
    their applications and return incomplete applications to the MVA clerk.
    Forwarding applications to elections offices was also neither difficult
    nor easy because a policy and procedure are in place for carrying out this
    activity.

    The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election
    officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from
    the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
    election.

                               Arlington County, Virginia

    Assisting clients with completing their voter registration applications
    was neither difficult nor easy because MVA clerks do a quick review of the
    applications to make sure they are complete but do not verify any of the
    clients' responses. MVA offices are tasked with providing their clients
    with the opportunity to apply to register to voter. Accepting applications
    from the clients and forwarding them to the elections offices was somewhat
    easy. Forwarding these applications is a task that is performed daily.

    The MVA office was not contacted by individuals or state/local election
    officials about individuals who said that their names were missing from
    the voter registration lists when they went to vote in the November 2004
    election.

                    Page 107 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

    Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency Officials

    Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency Officials

    Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency Officials

    Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency Officials

    Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency Officials

    Appendix IX: Survey of Motor Vehicle Agency Officials

    Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

      GAO Contact Acknowledgments

    (440203)

    William O. Jenkins, Jr. (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov

    In addition to the contact named above, John Mortin and Linda Watson,
    Assistant Directors; Leo Barbour; Amy Bernstein; Katherine Davis; Gina
    Flacco; Evan Gilman; Mary Martin; and Maria Santos made key contributions
    to this report.

    Page 114 GAO-05-997 Managing Voter Registration

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