Drug Control: Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has 	 
Implemented New Safeguards, but Its Effect on Drug Trafficking Is
Not Clear (06-SEP-05, GAO-05-970).				 
                                                                 
In the 1990s, the United States operated a program in Colombia	 
and Peru called Air Bridge Denial (ABD). The ABD program targeted
drug traffickers that transport illicit drugs through the air by 
forcing down suspicious aircraft, using lethal force if 	 
necessary. The program was suspended in April 2001 when a	 
legitimate civilian aircraft was shot down in Peru and two U.S.  
citizens were killed. The program was restarted in Colombia in	 
August 2003 after additional safeguards were established. To	 
date, the United States has provided about $68 million in support
and plans to provide about $26 million in fiscal year 2006. We	 
examined whether the ABD program's new safeguards were being	 
implemented and its progress in attaining U.S. and Colombian	 
objectives.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-970 					        
    ACCNO:   A35698						        
  TITLE:     Drug Control: Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has  
Implemented New Safeguards, but Its Effect on Drug Trafficking Is
Not Clear							 
     DATE:   09/06/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Accidents						 
	     Aircraft						 
	     Drug trafficking					 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International relations				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Safeguards 					 
	     Safety regulation					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Crime prevention					 
	     Air Bridge Denial Program				 
	     Colombia						 

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GAO-05-970

                 United States Government Accountability Office

                     GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

September 2005

DRUG CONTROL

 Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has Implemented New Safeguards, but Its
                    Effect on Drug Trafficking Is Not Clear

                                       a

GAO-05-970

[IMG]

September 2005

DRUG CONTROL

Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has Implemented New Safeguards, but Its
Effect on Drug Trafficking Is Not Clear

                                 What GAO Found

The United States and Colombia developed additional safeguards for the
renewed ABD program to avoid the problems that led to the accidental shoot
down in Peru. The safety measures aim to reinforce and clarify procedures,
bolster safety monitoring, enhance language skills of ABD personnel, and
improve communication channels. We found the safeguards were being
implemented by the Colombians and U.S. safety monitors. In addition, the
program managers perform periodic reviews and evaluations, including an
annual recertification of the program, and have made efforts to improve
civilian pilots' awareness of the ABD program's procedures.

Our analysis of available data indicates that the ABD program's results
are mixed, but the program's progress cannot be readily assessed because
performance measures with benchmarks and timeframes do not exist. The
stated objective for the program-for the Colombian National Police to take
control of suspicious aircraft-seldom happens. During October 2003 through
July 2005, the Colombian Air Force located only 48 aircraft out of about
390 suspicious tracks pursued; and the military or police took control of
just 14 aircraft-four were already on the ground. Only one resulted in a
drug seizure. However, many of the suspicious aircraft land in remote
locations controlled by insurgent groups that require time to enter
safely. Yet, the air force rarely involves the police besides calling them
at the start of a mission and before firing at the suspicious aircraft. In
addition, many of the suspicious tracks are near border areas with Brazil
and Venezuela, which is too far from an ABD air base for aircraft to
intercept without refueling. Nevertheless, the number of suspicious tracks
has apparently declined from 49 to 30 per month, but the track counts may
not be consistent over time because they are based on subjective criteria,
such as whether an aircraft has inexplicably deviated from its planned
flight path. According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the reduction in
suspicious tracks indicates that Colombia is deterring traffickers and
regaining control of its airspace.

Suspicious Tracks Detected Over Colombia Became Concentrated Along Its
Borders, October 2003 and May 2005

Sources: JIATF-South (data); GAO (presentation); Map Resources (map); Nova
Development (clip art).

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
United States and Colombia Implemented New Safety

Requirements Available ABD Program Data Shows Mixed Results, but the
Program

Lacks Well-Defined Performance Measures Conclusions Recommendations for
Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

1 3 5

7

11 17 18 18

  Appendixes

Appendix I: ABD Safety Checklist 20

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 22

Appendix III:	Comments from the Department of State 24 GAO Comments 27

Table Table 1:	U.S. Support for the ABD Program, Fiscal Years 2002-2006

Figures	Figure 1: Figure 2: Figure 3:

Figure 4:

Suspicious Tracks Identified, Pursued, and Located by
the ABD Program, October 2003-July 2005 12
Law Enforcement Activities by Month since Inception of
ABD Program, October 2003-July 2005 14
Suspicious Tracks Detected Over Colombia Became
Concentrated Along Its Borders, October 2003 and May
2005 15
Distance a Typical Interceptor Aircraft Can Travel from
the Main Air Base in Apiay 17

Contents

Abbreviations

ABD Air Bridge Denial
JIATF-S Joint Interagency Task Force-South
NAS Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy, Bogota
State/INL Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

A

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548

September 6, 2005

The Honorable Tom Davis Chairman, Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives

The Honorable Mark E. Souder

Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Chairman, Caucus on International
Narcotics Control United States Senate

Drug traffickers in South America often move illegal drugs by aircraft in
and out of Colombia.1 This is referred to as the "air bridge." To reduce
this drug trafficking, the United States began operating a program in the
1990s called Air Bridge Denial (ABD) in Colombia and Peru. The ABD program
identified aircraft suspected of drug trafficking and forced them to land,
using lethal force if necessary. However, the program was suspended in
April 2001 after a legitimate civilian aircraft was shot down in Peru,
killing two U.S. citizens. In August 2003, Colombia and the United States
resumed ABD operations in Colombia after entering into a Letter of
Agreement outlining each country's responsibilities and safety measures to
address

                                       2

concerns.

The ABD program's stated goal is to help Colombia stop the trafficking of
illegal drugs-primarily cocaine-in its airspace by forcing suspicious
aircraft to land safely so that law enforcement authorities can take
control of the aircraft, arrest suspects, and seize drugs. Aircraft
suspected of involvement in drug trafficking are usually first identified
by relocatable

1Almost all of the cocaine and nearly half of the heroin entering the
United States are from Colombia.

2The United States determined in 2003 not to implement the ABD program in
Peru.

over-the-horizon radar.3 Following this initial identification, a
surveillance aircraft containing tracking equipment is sent to visually
identify the source of the suspicious radar track,4 and, if it appears to
be a drug trafficking aircraft, an aircraft equipped with weapons is sent
to intercept or force the aircraft to land using the minimal force
necessary. The Colombian Air Force operates the ABD program and provides
crews for both the U.S.owned surveillance aircraft and Colombia's
interceptor aircraft. The program is overseen by the Department of State's
(State) Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(INL), which has a contract with a U.S. company, ARINC, to maintain the
surveillance aircraft and provide safety monitors and operational and
training support. In addition, the Department of Defense's (Defense) Joint
Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) provides radar intelligence to
the Colombian Air Force regarding suspicious tracks in and approaching
Colombia, collects and analyzes data on the performance of the program,
and helps ensure that the aircrews perform the required safety procedures.

At your request, we examined the status of the Colombian ABD program.
Specifically, we examined (1) the changes made to the ABD program to
address safety concerns raised after the Peru incident and whether these
new safeguards were being followed and (2) the program's progress in
attaining U.S. and Colombian objectives.

To address these objectives, we reviewed ABD program and budget
documentation and met with cognizant U.S. officials at the Departments of
State and Defense in Washington, D.C. We traveled to Colombia and met with
officials from the Colombian government, Colombian Air Force, and the U.S.
Embassy, as well as ARINC personnel operating the ABD program. We also
visited an ABD air base in Apiay, Colombia, where many ABD missions
originate, and visited the Colombian Air Force's ABD command center in
Bogota. In addition, we met with JIATF-South personnel in Key West,
Florida, to discuss their role in the program. We performed our work

3This type of radar bounces a radio wave off the earth's ionosphere (from
two locations in the United States and one in Puerto Rico) and can scan an
area up to 1,800 miles wide. The radar can determine the location of an
aircraft within a 7 to 10 mile radius, its speed, and general course of
movement. However, the radar cannot detect an aircraft's altitude.

4Radar can identify the path of an aircraft, known as its track. Tracks
are considered suspicious if the aircraft has not filed a flight plan or
is flying at a low altitude. When the aircraft is visually located,
certain characteristics make it suspicious, such as having blacked-out
windows, a missing tail number, or flying at night without lights.

from January 2005 through August 2005 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief	To avoid the problems that led to the accidental shoot
down in Peru, the U.S. and Colombian governments established a number of
safeguards, which we found were being implemented by the Colombians and
U.S. safety monitors. Additionally, program managers perform periodic
reviews and evaluations, including an annual recertification of the
program. In April 2003, Colombia and the United States signed a Letter of
Agreement that requires the program to operate under the following
conditions:

o 	A set of procedures, developed by the U.S. and Colombian governments,
must be followed during each ABD mission. All of the ABD participants we
met with were knowledgeable about the procedures listed in the safety
checklist and stated that the steps were followed.5 We viewed video
recordings of previous ABD missions and observed the start of an ABD
mission from the Colombian Air Force's ABD command center in Bogota and
noted that the checklist was followed in detail.

o 	Some personnel are exclusively assigned to ensure that operations are
safe and deliberate. Three U.S. safety monitors supervise the
implementation of the procedural checklist for each mission and can stop
any mission in which they have safety concerns.

o 	All U.S. safety monitors must be fluent in Spanish and the Colombian
pilots and mission directors are required to be proficient in English.
They are tested annually by the State Department and ARINC. U.S. safety
monitors are native Spanish speakers or were formerly trained by the U.S.
military as linguists.

o 	A dedicated communication channel is reserved for the U.S. safety
monitors, and an ABD mission will not proceed if communication among the
monitors is lost. This has occurred three times since the restart of the
program.

5In two ABD missions, the safety procedures were not correctly
implemented. Since ABD missions that result in locating a suspicious
aircraft are recorded and reviewed, U.S. program officials were made aware
of the mistake and followed up with the aircrews.

In addition, in the Peru accident the pilot of the legitimate civilian
aircraft was not aware that the ABD aircrew was calling him over the
radio. The Letter of Agreement requires the Colombian government to inform
civilian pilots about the ABD program-in particular, about the procedures
used when intercepting an aircraft and the consequences of not complying.

Our analysis of available program data indicates that the ABD program's
results are mixed, but the program's progress cannot be readily assessed
because performance measures with benchmarks and timeframes do not exist.6
The Letter of Agreement's stated objective for the program-for the
Colombian police to take control of suspicious aircraft-seldom happens. As
of July 2005, out of about 390 suspicious aircraft tracks pursued, the
Colombian Air Force located only 48; and the military or police took
control of just 14 aircraft,7 arresting four suspects and impounding
several aircraft. Only one resulted in a drug seizure. However, many of
the aircraft pursued by the ABD program land in remote locations that are
often controlled by insurgent groups, where, without sufficient time to
prepare, the National Police cannot reach the scene to make arrests or
seize drugs. Yet, the Colombian Air Force rarely involves the police
besides notifying them when a suspicious aircraft track is first pursued
and prior to firing at the aircraft. Furthermore, in recent months, many
of the suspicious tracks have been along Colombia's border with Brazil and
Venezuela8 where the ABD surveillance aircraft cannot reach them before
they leave Colombian airspace or disappear from radar. Nevertheless, the
number of suspicious aircraft tracks over Colombia has apparently declined
from about 49 to 30 per month, but the track counts may not be consistent
over time because they are partly based on subjective criteria, such as
whether an aircraft has inexplicably deviated from its planned flight
path. According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the reduction in
suspicious tracks indicates that Colombia is deterring traffickers and
regaining control of its airspace-one of Colombia's goals for the program.

6Although State and Defense developed draft performance measures in early
2005, they lacked benchmarks and timeframes.

7Four of these aircraft were already on the ground when they were
identified as suspicious.

8Much of this area is at least an hour flight from the closest ABD air
base. The program's surveillance aircraft are located at three ABD air
bases -in Apiay, approximately 60 miles south of Bogota; in Barranquilla,
near the coast of the Caribbean Sea; and in Cali, near the coast of the
Pacific Ocean.

To help assess the ABD program's progress, we recommend that the Secretary
of State establish performance measures for the program that include
benchmarks and timeframes. To increase the program's law enforcement
activities, we recommend that the Secretary of State encourage Colombia to
seek ways to more actively involve the National Police in ABD missions.
Finally, to enhance Colombia's ability to interdict suspicious aircraft,
we recommend that the Secretary of State encourage Colombia to establish
ABD air bases closer to the area of most current suspicious tracks. In
commenting on a draft of this report, State found it to be an accurate
assessment of the program. Additionally, State commented that they were in
the process of establishing benchmarks and timeframes for performance
measures implemented this year.

Background	After the Peru accident, a joint investigation by the United
States and Peru reviewed the circumstances of the accident and made
several conclusions.9 The investigation team was comprised of U.S.
representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, as well as
Peruvian officials from its Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

According to U.S. officials, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe requested
the restart of the ABD program to help combat drug trafficking. After
initial discussions, the United States decided to assist Colombia in
restarting a revised ABD program that would be managed by the Colombian
Air Force and overseen by State/INL. In addition, U.S. officials said that
Colombia had existing infrastructure that facilitated the program's
restart, such as air bases and a national air command center.

Prior to the restart of Colombia's ABD program, a committee of
representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, as
well as the Colombian government developed a Letter of Agreement outlining
the program's goal, safety requirements, operational procedures, and each
country's responsibilities. The Letter of Agreement, which was signed in
April 2003, states that the program's goal is to increase the Colombian
government's ability to stop aerial drug trafficking over Colombia.
Colombia is required to provide personnel and interceptor aircraft,
designate the areas where the program can operate in Colombia's

9Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, Peru Investigation Report: The April 20, 2001
Peruvian Shootdown Accident, (Washington, DC: 2001).

airspace, and manage the daily operations. The United States is primarily
responsible for providing the program with surveillance aircraft,
personnel, training, and funds to maintain and operate the equipment,
while ensuring that the program is regularly reviewed. Finally, a U.S.
Presidential determination was necessary to restart the program, and is
required annually to allow U.S. employees and its agents to assist
Colombia in the use of force against civilian aircraft reasonably
suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking.10

Since 2002, the United States has provided $68.4 million and surveillance
aircraft for the ABD program (see table 1) and plans to provide an
additional $25.9 million in fiscal year 2006. State/INL provided $57.2
million to support ARINC operations, including the U.S. personnel involved
in the program and maintenance of the surveillance aircraft. State's
Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in the U.S. Embassy in Bogota provided
$11.2 million for training, aircraft operations, logistics support, and
construction at ABD air bases. At no cost to State, the department also
transferred five U.S.owned Cessna Citation surveillance aircraft used in
the prior ABD programs, which are equipped with tracking systems. Also,
Defense gave Colombia two additional surveillance aircraft, which have yet
to be used for surveillance. The fiscal year 2006 request for
approximately $26 million for the program is planned to continue existing
operations and construct additional infrastructure. U.S. and Colombian
officials said they do not intend for Colombia to fully finance the
program in the near future.

10The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (P.
L.103-337, Sec. 1012) as amended, provides civil immunity for U.S.
employees and agents assisting a foreign country in interdicting drug
trafficking aircraft where, among other things the President determines
that drug trafficking threatens the national security of that country. The
President is required to provide an annual report regarding the procedures
used to interdict aircraft to the Congress.

       Table 1: U.S. Support for the ABD Program, Fiscal Years 2002-2006

                              Dollars in millions

                                  Fiscal years

              Department                              2005        2006 
         of State office  2002   2003    2004 (estimated)   (proposed)  Total 
                    INLa  $9.0  $15.6   $14.0        $18.6       $21.0  $78.2 
                     NAS  3.6      1.9    1.1          4.6         4.9   16.1 
                   Total $12.6  $17.5   $15.1        $23.2       $25.9  $94.3 

Source: State/INL.

aIn 2003, State/INL began paying ARINC to maintain the surveillance
aircraft, supply personnel to monitor operations, and provide other
operational support.

Note: Funds from other NAS country accounts were used to support the ABD
program and these amounts are included above.

United States and In response to the findings of the Peru investigation
and other

determinations, the United States and Colombia developed new
safeguardsColombia Implemented for the renewed ABD program which were
implemented consistently in the New Safety interdiction missions we
observed. The program also undergoes multiple Requirements evaluations to
ensure that all elements of the Letter of Agreement are

followed.

    New Safety Requirements Developed for ABD Program

The renewed ABD program has new safeguards in place, which were prompted
by the review of the Peru accident. The investigation of the Peru incident
found that crewmembers did not fully perform some procedures, neglected
the safety of the mission, had limited foreign language skills, and were
talking on a congested communication system. In response, safeguards were
developed to reinforce and clarify procedures, bolster safety monitoring,
enhance language skills of ABD personnel, and improve communication
channels. Another factor of the accident-the civilian pilot's unawareness
of the ABD program's procedures-was addressed by teaching civilian pilots
about the program.

In the Letter of Agreement for the renewed program, U.S. and Colombian
officials require ABD personnel to follow specific procedures summarized
in a safety checklist to ensure safe operations and clarify the roles of
the United States and Colombia (see app. I). According to the Peru
investigative report, the aircrews involved in the accident did not fully
execute the program's procedures, particularly aircraft identification.
Also,

the documentation of ABD procedures had become less specific over time.
The procedural checklist for the renewed program lists the specific steps
that must be taken to execute an ABD mission, including visually
identifying the suspicious aircraft; calling to the aircraft over the
radio; and, if necessary, requesting permission from the Commander of the
Colombian Air Force to fire at the aircraft. In particular, the list
provides the exact wording for crewmembers to use when confirming the
completion of checklist steps to avoid confusion among the participants.
While at the Colombian Air Force's ABD command center in Bogota, we
observed ABD personnel following the checklist during the start of an ABD
mission.

While, at the time of the accident, the program did not have U.S.
personnel dedicated to monitoring safety, three U.S. personnel are now
responsible for safety and implementation of safeguards for each mission.
The Peru investigation concluded that the interceptor crewmembers were
focused on forcing aircraft to land and not on the overall safety of the
mission. Under the renewed program, the three U.S. safety monitors are
located at the Colombian Air Force's command center in Bogota; at
JIATF-South in Key West, Florida; and onboard the surveillance aircraft.
The safety monitor onboard the aircraft observes the completion of
checklist procedures and alerts the U.S. monitors on the ground when each
procedure is accomplished. If any of the three monitors objects to an
action taken during the mission, the monitor immediately stops the
mission. For example, if a monitor objects to the firing of warning shots
because he is not confident that the suspicious aircraft is involved in
drug trafficking, he will immediately pull all U.S. resources out of the
mission, including the surveillance aircraft and U.S. personnel. However,
if the problem is resolved, the mission can resume. As of June 2005, the
U.S. monitors had objected to actions in ten missions, two of which were
due to incorrect implementation of the checklist.

The Letter of Agreement with Colombia requires all U.S. safety monitors to
be fluent in Spanish and the Colombian crewmembers, besides the weapons
controllers, to be proficient in English because language barriers among
the aircrew members contributed to the Peru accident. The aircrews
involved in the Peru accident had flown on previous operational missions
together and had some foreign language skills; however, they were not
proficient enough to communicate clearly during the high stress of an
interception. For example, one of the crewmembers in the Peru incident
obtained the suspicious aircraft's tail number so that ground personnel
could determine the owners of the aircraft. However, other participants in
the mission did not understand the message, and never

learned that the plane was a legitimate civilian aircraft. Under the
renewed program, the U.S. safety monitors are native Spanish speakers or
were formerly trained as linguists with the U.S. military. Annually, ARINC
tests the U.S. monitors fluency in Spanish and the NAS tests the
Colombians' proficiency in English.

Additionally, the renewed ABD program has incorporated improved
communications systems and procedures to ensure the communications mishaps
that contributed to the Peru accident do not reoccur. An ABD interception
requires the coordination of many individuals, including ground personnel
in the ABD command center in Bogota and JIATF-South in Key West, Florida,
and aircrews in the surveillance and interceptor aircraft. During the Peru
accident, the aircrews were talking simultaneously over the same radio
channels and were not able to hear each other clearly. For example, the
crew of the suspicious aircraft called the closest air control tower when
they saw the interceptor aircraft following them, but the control tower
did not receive the call because it was too far away. Although the ABD
aircrews were monitoring the tower's radio frequency, they did not hear
the call because other communication was occurring at the same time. For
the new program, a satellite radio channel is dedicated to the U.S.
monitors, and the Colombian crewmembers communicate on various radio
channels. A satellite phone is also available if radio communication is
impaired. The U.S. monitors must suspend the mission if communication
among them is lost, which has happened three times.

Although not a finding of the Peru investigation, the Letter of Agreement
with Colombia recognizes that a community of civilian pilots unaware of
the ABD program can threaten the safety of the program's operations.
Pilots who do not know how to respond to an ABD interception may put
themselves and the ABD aircrews at undue risk. The pilot of the suspicious
aircraft in Peru was unaware that he was being called over the radio by
the ABD aircrew. The Letter of Agreement with Colombia requires the
Colombian government to inform the public of the program's operating
procedures, which the government does through publicly posted notices and
required training courses for pilots and air traffic controllers. The
government also teaches the civilian pilots how to respond to an ABD
interception, as well as the consequences of not complying with the
Colombian Air Force's commands.

    Program Regularly Reviewed

The program managers that we interviewed said that the program's
operations are reviewed and evaluated regularly by the program managers
and cognizant U.S. agency officials. For example:

o 	The United States recertifies the program once a year, a process that
serves as the basis for the President's annual decision on whether to
continue supporting the program. The program was first certified in May
2003 before it could restart and again in July 2004 by a team of
representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security,
Justice, and Transportation. The 2004 certification team ensured that the
major components of the Letter of Agreement- operational procedures,
training requirements, logistics support, and information to civilian
pilots-were in place by reviewing official documents, performing
interviews, and observing training and operational exercises.

o 	The crew of the surveillance aircraft records a video of each ABD
mission once the suspicious aircraft is located. Both Colombian and U.S.
program managers review the video to determine if the checklist was
followed. We reviewed recordings of some ABD missions and observed the
implementation of the safety procedures.

o 	U.S. and Colombian managers of the program meet every six months to
plan for the future and discuss Colombia's needs for the program. After
the U.S. managers consider Colombia's needs, they determine whether to
fund the requests for such items as repaving runways at ABD operating
locations.

In addition, the Congress requires an annual report from the President on
the program's resources and procedures used to intercept drug trafficking
aircraft. The report certifies that the procedures agreed to in the Letter
of Agreement were followed in the interception of aircraft engaged in
illegal drug trafficking during the preceding year.

  Available ABD Program Data Shows Mixed Results, but the Program Lacks
  Well-Defined Performance Measures

Our analysis of available data-the number of suspicious tracks and law
enforcement activities-indicates that the ABD program's progress to date
is mixed. The Colombian Air Force surveillance aircraft pursued less than
half of the almost 900 suspicious tracks identified since October 200311
and few were located. But the number of suspicious tracks appears to have
declined, although the consistency of the suspicious track data is
unknown. The program's primary objective-to safely force suspicious
aircraft to land so law enforcement authorities can gain control of it-has
not happened very often. In addition, the location of most suspicious
tracks has changed, making them more difficult to locate and intercept.

State/INL does not have clear performance measures that can be used to
help assess the ABD program's progress toward eliminating aerial drug
trafficking in Colombia. State/INL officials told us that they began
developing measures in early 2005, but they do not contain benchmarks or
timeframes. These same officials said they will meet with Defense shortly
to review data related to these measures for the first time.

    ABD Program Located Few Aircraft

Since October 2003, the Colombians pursued about 390 out of approximately
880 suspicious tracks, and located 48 of them (see fig. 1).12 Tracks are
often difficult to locate because the relocatable over-the-horizon radar
does not provide the suspicious aircraft track's altitude or the exact
location. Furthermore, according to Colombian Air Force officials, drug
traffickers use hundreds of clandestine airstrips in Colombia. Often the
airstrips are camouflaged and suspicious aircraft are hidden from view.
Therefore, when surveillance aircraft do not interdict suspicious aircraft
in the air, they are unlikely to find them once they land and disappear
from radar.

11Complete data for September 2003, the first full month of the program,
was not available.

12During October 2003 through March 2004, NAS did not document the number
of aircraft located. We counted the number of aircraft located as those
fired on or involved in a law enforcement activity. Beginning in April
2004, NAS began documenting the number of aircraft located.

Figure 1: Suspicious Tracks Identified, Pursued, and Located by the ABD Program,
                             October 2003-July 2005

Number of suspicious tracks 2003 2004 2005 Time (in months) Not pursued
Pursued and not located

Pursued and located Source: GAO analysis of State/INL data.

Recently, the Colombian Air Force asked the United States to permanently
increase the number of flight hours (from 180 to 300 per month) for the
surveillance aircraft to spend more time training and locating clandestine
airstrips. According to U.S. and Colombian officials, once these airstrips
are located, the ABD aircrews can focus on them when searching for a
suspicious aircraft in the area. To date, based on our review of ABD
documents, identification of clandestine airstrips has not assisted in
locating any suspicious aircraft. Some State/INL officials are skeptical
that more flying time, which would increase maintenance and fuel costs,
would produce greater results for the program.

    Suspicious Tracks Reduced, but Accuracy of Count Unknown

The number of suspicious aircraft tracks over Colombia has apparently
declined from approximately 49 to 30 a month, a decrease of about 40
percent, between the first 11 months of the program and the last 11 months
(see fig. 1). According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the reduction in
tracks indicates that the program is deterring drug traffickers from
transporting drugs by air, and is allowing the Colombian government to
meet its goal of regaining control of its airspace, but performance
measures with benchmarks and timeframes linking the reduction of
suspicious tracks to the overall goal have not been developed. Moreover,
the accuracy of the suspicious track data over time is suspect due to the
nature of the process, which relies on some subjective criteria. The
process for determining whether a track is suspicious or legitimate is
partly based on the judgment of JIATF-South and Colombian Air Force
personnel, who screen thousands of tracks every month looking for
suspicious movements. For example, personnel consider whether the aircraft
has inexplicably deviated from its planned flight path or the aircraft's
altitude is unusually low. However, no definitive criteria exist for such
factors, which can therefore be interpreted differently among operators.

    ABD Missions Lack Involvement of Law Enforcement Personnel

The National Police seldom take control of suspicious aircraft, arrest
individuals suspected of drug trafficking, or seize drugs. Since October
2003, law enforcement was involved in 14 instances (see fig. 2), arresting
four suspects and impounding several aircraft. However, in four of these
instances, the aircraft was already on the ground. Only one ABD mission
resulted in a drug seizure-0.6 metric tons (about 1,300 pounds) of
cocaine.13 Because State/INL has not established performance measures
regarding law enforcement activities, determining whether the objectives
of the ABD program are being met is difficult. However, State/INL
officials said they would like law enforcement authorities to more often
take control of suspicious aircraft, which may contain drugs, weapons, or
cash that goes unaccounted for if the military or police do not arrive.

13By way of comparison, U.S. interdiction efforts seized or disrupted 196
metric tons (approximately 432,000 pounds) of cocaine in 2004, according
to the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

Figure 2: Law Enforcement Activities by Month since Inception of ABD
Program, October 2003-July 2005 Number of law enforcement activities

Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
                       Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July

2003 2004 2005

Time (in months) Source: GAO analysis of State/INL data.

As steps on the procedural checklist, ABD personnel contact the Colombian
National Police in Bogota at the start of an interdiction mission and
prior to firing at the aircraft. But, besides these calls, the Colombian
Air Force usually does not involve the police in ABD missions. Further,
the police face various challenges in reaching the locations where
suspicious aircraft land-often in remote areas of Colombia that are not
accessible by road. The police cannot travel to some locations without
additional resources, including security and transportation, according to
INL officials.14 But, according to U.S. officials, greater planning and
coordination between the Colombian Air Force and National Police could
enable law enforcement to more frequently take control of suspicious
aircraft. For example, in the February 2005 ABD mission that yielded 1,300
pounds of cocaine, one armed Colombian Navy helicopter provided cover for
another Navy helicopter to land and seize as much cocaine from the
aircraft as it could carry, while the Colombian Army and National Police
arrived later and confiscated the remaining cocaine.

14Insurgent groups have some degree of control over 40 percent of
Colombia's territory and can pose a threat to the police.

Changes in Suspicious In recent months, the majority of suspicious tracks
are concentrated along Tracks Locations Limit Colombia's borders (see fig.
3), making it more difficult for surveillance and Interdiction Capability
interceptor aircraft to reach the aircraft before it lands or leaves
Colombian

airspace. Once a suspicious aircraft lands, surveillance aircraft often
have

difficulty locating it.

Figure 3: Suspicious Tracks Detected Over Colombia Became Concentrated
Along Its Borders, October 2003 and May 2005

Sources: JIATF-South (data); GAO (presentation); Map Resources (map); Nova
Development (clip art).

From November 2003 to July 2005, 141 suspicious tracks were not pursued by
surveillance aircraft because they were near borders or too far away. In
particular, suspicious tracks along Colombia's southeastern border with
Brazil and Venezuela are at least an hour flight from the closest ABD air
base in Apiay, leaving surveillance and interceptor aircraft little time
to find and intercept a suspicious aircraft before having to refuel (see
fig. 4). For example, one ABD interceptor aircraft, the A-37B Dragonfly,
takes 50

minutes to fly to Caruru (about 250 miles) in southeastern Colombia, but
it can remain in that area for only 10 minutes before leaving to refuel.15
ABD program managers and safety monitors said it usually takes about 25
minutes to complete an ABD mission when all resources are in place, from
visually locating the aircraft to forcing it to land. However, some ABD
missions have lasted as long as six or seven hours and utilized multiple
surveillance and interceptor aircraft.

15Caruru is an area where numerous suspicious aircraft have been located.

Figure 4: Distance a Typical Interceptor Aircraft Can Travel from the Main
Air Base in Apiay

Sources: Colombian Air Force (data); GAO (presentation); Map Resources
(map).

Conclusions	The United States agreed to help Colombia restart the ABD
program at the request of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. U.S. funding
provided for the program through fiscal year 2005 totals over $68 million;
almost $26 million is proposed for 2006. We found the results of the ABD
program mixed.

A primary U.S. concern regarding the program-the safety of the ABD
aircrews and innocent civilians-is addressed in detail in the Letter of
Agreement between the United States and Colombia. However, the

agreement does not include performance measures with benchmarks and
timeframes to help with assessing results. Although State has begun
developing such measures, assessing the program's effectiveness and
determining whether additional resources might contribute to increased
results is difficult.

Although the number of suspicious aircraft tracks has apparently
declined-from about 49 to 30 per month, the Colombian Air Force seldom
locates the suspicious aircraft. Moreover, drug traffickers do not face a
great risk of being arrested even if they are detected. Out of about 390
suspicious tracks pursued since the start of the program, the Colombian
Air Force located 48; law enforcement or military authorities went to the
scene of 14, including four that were already on the ground. Besides
calling the Colombian National Police during a mission, as required by the
procedural checklist, the Colombian Air Force rarely involves the police.
Without sufficient notice, the police cannot respond quickly and safely to
suspicious aircraft on the ground because much of Colombia is not
controlled by the government. Moreover, many of the suspicious aircraft
tracks detected in recent months are along Colombia's border regions with
Brazil and Venezuela where ABD aircraft are often too far away to threaten
the trafficking mission.

  Recommendations for Executive Action

First, to help in assessing whether the ABD program is making progress
toward meeting its overall goal of reducing illegal drug trafficking in
Colombia's airspace, we recommend that the Secretary of State work with
Colombia to define performance measures with benchmarks and timeframes.
These performance measures, as well as results, should be included in the
annual report to the Congress regarding the ABD program. Second, because
the police are seldom involved in ABD missions, we recommend that the
Secretary of State encourage Colombia to seek ways to more actively
involve the National Police. Finally, because many of the suspicious
aircraft tracks are difficult for Colombia to locate and interdict given
the current location of its ABD air bases, we recommend that the Secretary
of State encourage Colombia to establish ABD air bases closer to the
current activity of suspicious aircraft tracks.

Agency Comments and 	State provided written comments on a draft of this
report (see appendix III). Overall, it found the report to be an accurate
assessment of the intent

Our Evaluation and execution of the program and noted that it is
developing benchmarks

and timeframes for its performance measures. Defense did not provide
written comments. However, neither department commented on our
recommendations. In addition, State and Defense officials provided
technical comments and updates that we incorporated throughout the report,
as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to interested congressional committees and the Secretaries of State and
Defense. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
call me at (202) 512-4268 or [email protected]. Key contributors to this
report were Al Huntington, Hynek Kalkus, Summer Pachman, and Kerry
Lipsitz. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.

Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade

                                   Appendix I

                              ABD Safety Checklist

Appendix I ABD Safety Checklist

                 Source: State/INL (data); GAO (presentation).

Appendix II

Scope and Methodology

To review the changes made to the ABD program to address safety concerns
and to determine whether these safeguards were followed, we reviewed ABD
program documentation provided by the Department of State's Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL) and the
Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) at the U.S. Embassy, Bogota, and the
Department of Defense's Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South).
We also discussed the new safeguards with knowledgeable U.S. officials at
State and Defense in Washington, D.C.; Bogota, Colombia; and Key West,
Florida; officials from the Colombian government and Colombian Air Force
in Bogota; and ARINC contractors located in Bogota and an ABD air base in
Apiay, Colombia. We also interviewed officials involved in the negotiation
of the agreement between the United States and Colombia prior to
restarting the program.

To evaluate the program's progress in attaining U.S. and Colombian
objectives, we examined data regarding law enforcement activities;
suspicious tracks; aircraft pursued, located, and fired at. This data was
documented by NAS in reports prepared monthly for State/INL containing the
number of missions flown that month and their results. However, complete
data for August and September 2003 was unavailable, and the data for
October 2003 to March 2004 did not include the number of tracks pursued
and identified. By using an event log prepared by NAS with narratives of
ABD missions beginning in August 2003, we extrapolated some of the data
and corroborated all law enforcement activities and aircraft fired on. We
also compared the number of suspicious tracks recorded by NAS with
JIATF-South's count. The numbers reported were not the same for most
months. We used the NAS count of suspicious tracks because it is more
inclusive of tracks detected by Colombia and does not include tracks that
were later determined to be friendly aircraft. We interviewed cognizant
officials at State/INL, NAS, and JIATF-South about the data. Further, we
discussed the numbers of suspicious tracks with the Colombian Air Force.
Based on our ability to corroborate most of the data with multiple
sources, we determined that it was sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

We traveled to Colombia in April 2005 and met with NAS officials and other
cognizant U.S. Embassy, Bogota, officials, and with ARINC managers at
their offices at the Government of Colombia's Ministry of Defense in
Bogota. We also visited an ABD air base in Apiay where we met with ARINC
contractors serving as monitors onboard the surveillance aircraft.
Additionally, we visited the Colombian Air Force's ABD command center in
Bogota where we interviewed both ARINC contractors and Colombian Air

Appendix II Scope and Methodology

Force officials. We witnessed the start of an ABD mission at the command
center and reviewed video recordings of previous ABD missions at the U.S.
Embassy.

                                  Appendix III

                     Comments from the Department of State

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

Appendix III
Comments from the Department of State

                                 See comment 1.

                                 See comment 2.

Appendix III
Comments from the Department of State

See comment 3. Paragraph is now on page 13.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

                                  Appendix III
                     Comments from the Department of State

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter dated
August 23, 2005.

GAO Comments 1.	State officials provided us draft performance measures for
the ABD program that they told us were developed in April 2005 with
representatives from Defense and the Colombian government.

2.	We recognized the U.S. role of program oversight and the Colombian
government's role of operating and managing the program throughout the
report.

3.	We made no substantive changes. This section addressed only the initial
identification of a suspect track. Our analysis found that three of the
six criteria used to determine if a track is suspicious were subjective.
The checklist and other steps taken to further identify suspect aircraft
are discussed elsewhere in the report.

4.	We gave examples of the criteria used to determine if an aircraft is
suspected of drug trafficking.

5.	A discussion of U.S. government intelligence support to the ABD program
was not within the scope of our report.

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