Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the
Authority of Federal Security Directors Is Needed (23-SEP-05,
GAO-05-935).
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assigned Federal
Security Directors (FSD) to oversee security, including the
screening of passengers and their baggage, at the nation's more
than 440 commercial airports. FSDs must work closely with
stakeholders to ensure that airports are adequately protected and
prepared in the event of a terrorist attack. This report
addresses (1) the roles and responsibilities of FSDs and the
clarity of their authority relative to that of other airport
stakeholders during security incidents, (2) the extent to which
FSDs formed and facilitated partnerships with airport
stakeholders, and (3) FSDs' views of key changes TSA made to
better support or empower the FSD position.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-935
ACCNO: A37997
TITLE: Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on
the Authority of Federal Security Directors Is Needed
DATE: 09/23/2005
SUBJECT: Agency missions
Airport security
Aviation security
Commercial aviation
Transportation security
Counterterrorism
Federal employees
Internal controls
Policy evaluation
Policies and procedures
Stakeholder consultations
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GAO-05-935
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Report to the Ranking Democratic Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives
September 2005
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
More Clarity on the Authority of Federal Security Directors Is Needed
GAO-05-935
[IMG]
September 2005
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
More Clarity on the Authority of Federal Security Directors Is Needed
What GAO Found
TSA has issued guidance that clearly defines FSDs' roles and
responsibilities. However, TSA's guidance related to FSDs' authority is
outdated and lacks clarity regarding FSD authority relative to other
airport stakeholders. TSA's document that delegates authority to FSDs
gives them authority to supervise and deploy a TSA law enforcement force
that was never established. Also, it does not clearly address FSD
authority during a security incident relative to other parties with
airport security responsibilities. At airports GAO visited, stakeholders
said that this information had never been communicated to them and they
were not always clear on the FSDs' authority in such situations. For
example, confusion arose at one airport over whether the FSD had the
authority to take certain actions during a security incident. In August
2005, TSA officials stated that they were updating guidance on FSDs'
authority but had not finalized their revisions prior to this report's
issuance.
All of the FSDs and most stakeholders at the airports GAO visited reported
developing partnerships that were generally working well. Communication
and coordination were taking place among stakeholders at these airports,
including meetings, briefings, and training exercises. According to TSA,
partnerships with airport stakeholders are essential to FSDs' success in
addressing aviation security and customer service needs. For example, FSDs
rely on law enforcement stakeholders during security incidents since they
do not have their own law enforcement resources. FSDs also rely on air
carriers for passenger volume information to schedule screeners, and air
carriers rely on FSDs for efficient screening that minimizes passenger
wait times.
TSA made changes in 2004 to better support or empower the FSD position,
and most of the 25 FSDs we interviewed generally viewed these changes
favorably. For example, most of the FSDs we interviewed were satisfied
with TSA's new local hiring process that provided more options for FSDs to
be involved in hiring screeners, and most said that the new process was
better than the more centralized hiring process it replaced. Most FSDs we
interviewed also saw value in the headquarters group TSA established to
provide operational support to the field and a communication link among
headquarters, field-based Area Directors, and FSDs.
Number of FSD Positions Dedicated to One Airport or Multiple Airports, as
of January 2005
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
Federal Security Directors Have a Range of Responsibilities, but
TSA's Guidance Regarding FSDs' Authority Is Unclear TSA Provided
Opportunities for Some FSDs to Participate in Developing TSA Aviation
Security Policy FSDs Formed Partnerships with Key Stakeholders and
Participated in Communication and Coordination Efforts TSA Made Changes to
Better Support or Empower the FSD
Position and Was Planning Additional Changes Conclusions Recommendations
for Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
1
3 6
13
19
21
27 36 36 37
Appendix I Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Appendix II Responses to Selected Questions from Interviews with 25
Federal Security Directors
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Figures
Figure 1: Transportation Security Administration Organization Chart 9
Figure 2: Commercial Airports by Airport Security Category, as of January
2005 11 Figure 3: Number of FSD Positions with Responsibility for a
Designated Number of Airports, as of January 2005 12
Abbreviations
ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act
BTS Border and Transportation Security
CBP Customs and Border Protection
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOT Department of Transportation
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FSD Federal Security Director
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement
MANPADS Man Portable Air Defense System
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TSES Transportation Senior Executive Service
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548
September 23, 2005
The Honorable James L. Oberstar
Ranking Democratic Member
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Oberstar:
Federal Security Directors (FSD) are the ranking Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) authorities responsible for leading and coordinating
TSA security activities at the nation's more than 440 commercial airports.
During 2002, the first year FSDs were assigned to airports, FSDs worked to
meet deadlines associated with screening, including deploying over 55,000
passenger and baggage screeners and screening checked baggage using
explosive detection systems. As a part of their security responsibilities,
FSDs must coordinate closely with airport and air carrier officials, local
law enforcement, and emergency response officials to ensure that airports
are adequately protected and prepared in the event of a terrorist attack.
FSDs' success in sustaining and ensuring the effectiveness of aviation
security efforts are dependent on their ability to develop and maintain
effective partnerships with these stakeholders.
In March 2004, after FSDs had been deployed at airports for over 2 years,
we surveyed all 155 FSDs at that time and learned that most thought they
needed certain additional authorities and flexibilities to better address
airport staffing and security needs. Since that survey, TSA has taken
steps
to enhance FSDs' authority and provide flexibilities in certain areas. To
provide additional information on the ability of FSDs to address airport
security needs, this report addresses the following questions: (1) What
are
the roles and the responsibilities of FSDs and how clear is their
authority
relative to that of other airport stakeholders during security incidents?
(2)
To what extent are FSDs involved in the development of TSA aviation
security policy? (3) How have FSDs at selected airports formed and
facilitated partnerships with airport stakeholders, and how are these
partnerships working? (4) What key changes has TSA made or planned to
make to better support or empower the FSD position, and how have
selected FSDs viewed these efforts?
To address these questions, we interviewed TSA's Chief Operating Officer
and officials from TSA's Aviation Security Program Office, Office of Law
Enforcement, Office of Compliance Programs, and Office of Human
Resources, and we reviewed relevant laws and TSA documentation related to
the FSD position. To obtain additional views on the role of the FSD and
FSD-stakeholder partnerships, we met with headquarters officials from the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Border and Transportation Security
Directorate (BTS),1 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI)
Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Investigations Divisions. We also met with
officials from national organizations representing airports (the American
Association of Airport Executives and the Airports Council International),
airport law enforcement officials (the Airport Law Enforcement Agencies
Network), and air carriers (the Air Transport Association). We conducted
site visits to seven airports. We selected these airports because they
incorporated all five airport security categories2- three airports with an
FSD dedicated solely to each airport, and two sets of airports where the
FSD was responsible for at least two airports. At each airport, we met
with the FSD (five in total) or the top-ranking TSA official, as well as
the Assistant FSDs for Law Enforcement and Regulatory Inspection, where
these positions existed. During our meetings with FSDs, we obtained their
views on changes TSA made to further enhance the FSD position, as well as
views on their roles and responsibilities and perspectives on their
partnerships with local stakeholders. At airports, we also met with key
stakeholders-airport managers, airport law enforcement, station managers
representing selected air carriers, and FBI Airport Liaison Agents and
officials from DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (at the two international airports we
visited) to obtain their views on the roles and responsibilities of the
FSD and partnerships and communication mechanisms with FSDs.
To corroborate and expand on what we learned from the FSDs we interviewed
during our site visits, we randomly selected 25 additional FSDs and
telephoned them to obtain their views on a range of topics including
recent TSA initiatives and the development of federal aviation security
policy. We also included selected questions-regarding the
1 BTS, one of five operational directorates within DHS, is tasked with
securing the nation's borders and safeguarding its transportation
infrastructure. TSA is part of the BTS organization. As part of his July
2005 announcement to reorganize the department, the Secretary of DHS
proposed the dissolution of BTS, pending the enactment of legislation to
effect this change.
2 TSA classifies commercial airports in five airport security categories
based on factors such as the number of takeoffs and landings, the extent
of passenger screening, and other security considerations.
Results in Brief
adequacy of the FSDs' authority and flexibility-that we had posed earlier,
in a March 2004 Web-based survey of all 155 FSDs in place at that time
conducted in support of other aviation security reviews. Of the 25 FSDs we
interviewed by telephone as part of this review, 21 were FSDs at the time
of that Web-based survey and, as such, responded to both. The information
we obtained during our seven airport visits and telephone interviews with
25 FSDs cannot be generalized to all airports and FSDs across the nation.
We conducted our work from August 2004 through September 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix
I contains more details about our scope and methodology.
TSA developed guidance that describes the roles and responsibilities of
the FSD position, such as ensuring overall aviation security, providing
regulatory oversight, implementing policy, and managing stakeholder
relationships. However, the document that specifically describes the FSDs'
authority-TSA's Delegation of Authority to FSDs-is outdated, does not
clearly address the extent of FSD authority relative to other airport
stakeholders, and has not been adequately communicated to these
stakeholders. The document has not been updated since FSDs were first
assigned to airports and gives FSDs authority to supervise and deploy a
TSA law enforcement force that was envisioned but never established. Also,
the document describes some of the authorities of FSDs but does not
clearly address the extent of their authority relative to other airport
stakeholders, including law enforcement agencies, during security
incidents. Stakeholders at the airports we visited said they were not
always clear on the authority FSDs had relative to that of other agencies,
particularly FSDs' authority in various security incidents, and that such
information had not been communicated to them. For example, at two
airports, confusion or conflicting opinions arose over whether the FSD had
the authority to take certain actions during particular security
incidents. Stakeholders at the national level also questioned the clarity
of the FSDs' authority relative to other agencies, particularly during
security incidents. For example, FBI headquarters officials stated that
past airport training exercises revealed that some FSDs thought they were
in charge of certain situations for which the FBI had authority. According
to these officials, in an actual security incident, confusion over roles
could result in conflict, confusion, and increased response time. In
addition, 18 of the 25 FSDs we interviewed by telephone said they believed
that TSA needs to do more to clarify their roles and responsibilities for
the benefit of FSDs and stakeholders, and many stated that the authority
of the FSD, in particular,
needed clarification. In August 2005, TSA officials stated that they had
drafted a new Delegation of Authority that clarified FSDs' authority.
However, TSA had not completed the revision prior to the issuance of this
report.
TSA does not charge FSDs with responsibility for developing federal
aviation security policy, but it does provide several opportunities for
some FSDs to be involved in developing some such policies. TSA's FSD
Advisory Council provides one mechanism for selected FSDs to be involved
in TSA's development of aviation security policy. The FSD Advisory Council
consists of 22 FSDs who the Administrator selects based on various
factors, such as airport security category. FSD members provide the
Administrator their opinions and guidance on establishing and modifying
TSA policies and procedures when requested and have opportunities for
input in other areas. On occasion, some FSDs also have had the opportunity
to provide input on draft federal aviation security policy through ad hoc
consultation groups organized by TSA's Aviation Security Program Office.
Testing new technology and procedures at their airports has been another
way for some FSDs to be involved in developing federal aviation security
policy.
FSDs responsible for the seven airports we visited reported that they had
entered into partnerships with airport stakeholders, and FSDs and
stakeholders we contacted at these airports said that their partnerships
were generally working well. TSA recognizes that building and maintaining
partnerships with airport stakeholders is essential to FSDs' success in
addressing security as well as maintaining an appropriate level of
customer service. TSA established general guidance for FSDs to follow in
building stakeholder partnerships but has left it to the FSDs to determine
how best to achieve effective partnerships at their respective airports.
FSDs need to partner with law enforcement stakeholders, for example,
because they do not have a law enforcement body of their own to respond to
security incidents. Partnerships can be of mutual benefit to FSDs and
airport stakeholders and can enhance customer service. For example, FSDs
rely on air carrier data on the number of passengers transiting through
checkpoints to appropriately schedule screeners, and air carriers rely on
the FSD to provide an efficient screening process to minimize wait times
for passengers. At the airports we visited, FSDs and stakeholders cited
several ways FSDs maintained partnerships, including being accessible to
their stakeholders to help resolve problems and meeting with stakeholders
to discuss how to implement new security policies. In addition, a variety
of communication and coordination efforts were in place at the airports we
visited, and many of these efforts existed before
TSA assigned FSDs to airports. Formal mechanisms included security and
general airport operations meetings, incident debriefings, and training
exercises to help ensure a coordinated response in the event of a security
incident.
TSA made changes in 2004 to better support or empower the FSD position by
providing FSDs with more authority and flexibility, and FSDs we
interviewed generally viewed most of these efforts favorably. For example,
TSA implemented a local hiring initiative designed to vest FSDs with more
authority to address their screener staffing needs by, among other things,
giving FSDs the flexibility to select their level of participation in the
hiring process. Most of the 25 FSDs we interviewed stated that this new
hiring method addressed their needs better than TSA's former highly
centralized approach, although 12 of the 25 FSDs said that to a great or
very great extent, they still wanted more authority in this area. When we
originally posed the same question regarding FSD authority in hiring
screeners in our March 2004 survey of all 155 FSDs, 88 percent of those
FSDs stated that to a great or very great extent they wanted more
authority in selecting screeners. In another effort to move more decision
making to the field, TSA physically relocated its five Area Director
positions from headquarters to the field and established a group in
headquarters to provide operational support and a communication link among
headquarters, field-based Area Directors, and FSDs. FSDs we interviewed
were split on whether they thought moving the Area Director position to
the field was helpful, but most considered the group TSA established in
headquarters to be a valuable resource. TSA had three other efforts under
way that could significantly affect FSDs-the implementation of a new
staffing model for allocating screeners at airports, a reassessment of the
number of management positions allocated to each FSD, and a reassessment
of which and how many airports are assigned to FSDs. TSA took steps to
involve at least some FSDs in these efforts. However, most of the 25 FSDs
we interviewed said that TSA had not involved them. TSA headquarters
officials said that they acknowledge the importance of FSDs' involvement
in agency planning efforts, and when practical and appropriate, have
attempted to obtain a broad spectrum of FSD input.
To assist TSA in fully communicating key areas of FSD authority to ensure
organizational goals and objectives are achieved, we recommend that the
Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary of Homeland
Security for TSA to update the Delegation of Authority to FSDs to clearly
reflect their authority relative to other airport stakeholders during
security incidents and communicate this information to FSDs and relevant
stakeholders.
Background
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review. DHS, in its written
comments, generally concurred with our findings and recommendations and
agreed that efforts to implement these recommendations are critical to
enable FSDs to effectively oversee security at the nation's commercial
airports. DHS described actions TSA has initiated to revise and update the
Delegation of Authority to FSDs. Once approved, TSA plans to notify FSDs
and airport stakeholders of their responsibilities under the new
Delegation of Authority. A copy of DHS's comments is included as appendix
III.
A federal position dedicated to overseeing security at commercial airports
was first established in 1990 under the Federal Aviation Administration
and was later transferred to TSA. The Federal Aviation Administration
established the position of Federal Security Manager pursuant to a mandate
in the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990.3 Federal Security
Managers, responsible for security at the nation's largest airports,
developed airport security plans in concert with airport operators and air
carriers; provided regulatory oversight to ensure security measures were
contained in airport plans and were properly implemented; and coordinated
daily federal aviation security activities, including those with local law
enforcement. According to TSA officials, regional civil aviation security
field offices, headed by Civil Aviation Security Field Officers and
staffed with security inspectors, had been in place at commercial airports
since the mid-1970s and eventually covered the more than 440 commercial
airports required to have security programs. In practice, the field office
staff performed compliance and enforcement inspections and assessed
penalties, while the Federal Security Managers served in a liaison and
coordination role as on-site security experts. To avoid duplication of
effort, Civil Aviation Security Field Officers were not assigned
responsibilities at airports where Federal Security Managers were
designated or stationed.
In November 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, the President signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA) into law, shifting certain responsibilities for aviation security
from air carriers to the federal government and the newly created TSA.4
Specifically, ATSA created TSA and granted it direct operational
3 Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-604, S: 104,
104 Stat. 3066, 3070-71.
4 Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115
Stat. 597 (2001).
responsibility for, among other things, passenger and checked baggage
screening. On February 17, 2002, pursuant to ATSA, TSA assumed
responsibility from FAA for security at the nation's commercial airports,
including FAA's existing aviation security programs, plans, contracts,
regulations, orders, directives, and personnel.5 On February 22, 2002, FAA
and TSA jointly published a final rule transferring the civil aviation
security regulations from FAA to TSA and amending those rules to comport
with ATSA and enhance security as required by the act. According to TSA
officials, DOT and TSA leadership administratively changed the name of the
Federal Security Manager to Federal Security Director to avoid confusion
with the liaison role of the Federal Security Manager prior to September
11. The FSD role was more comprehensive and had responsibilities that
included overseeing passenger and baggage screening. Airport operators
retained responsibility for the security of the airport operating
environment, that is, perimeter security, access control to secured areas,
and other measures detailed in the approved airport security plan, while
the FSD provided regulatory oversight over these efforts.
FSDs report to one of five Area Directors, based on their geographic
regions, on administrative matters. However, they report to TSA
headquarters (the Aviation Security Program Office and Transportation
Security Operations Center) on operational issues, such as reporting
security incidents. FSDs are part of the Aviation Security Program Office
within TSA's Office of Intermodal Programs, as shown in figure 1. The
Aviation Security Program Office focuses on specific functions related to
TSA's Aviation Security Program, including staffing, training, and
equipping the federal security work force. The Transportation Security
Operations Center serves as a single point of contact for security-related
operations, incidents, or crises in aviation and all surface modes of
transportation. FSDs are to report any security incident at their airport
immediately to the center, which is to provide guidance, if needed, as
well as look for patterns among all incidents that occur throughout the
country. The center provides FSDs daily intelligence briefings based on
incident information from FSDs and information from TSA's Transportation
Security Intelligence Service. The Transportation Security Intelligence
5 ATSA created TSA as an agency within the Department of Transportation.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.107-296, 116 Stat 2135,
enacted in November 2002, transferred TSA to the newly created Department
of Homeland Security, where TSA presently resides as a distinct entity
within the Border and Transportation Security Directorate.
Service provides FSDs, Deputy FSDs, and Assistant FSDs with a classified
Daily Intelligence Summary containing the most current threat information
from the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and
stakeholders and provides the FSD staff with an unclassified TSA Field
Intelligence Summary to be used in briefing screeners and screening
management about current threats and other issues related to aviation
security.
Figure 1: Transportation Security Administration Organization Chart
Source: Developed by GAO based on TSA data.
TSA's Area Directors are responsible for monitoring and annually assessing
the performance of FSDs. FSD performance is to be assessed in terms of
successful accomplishment of organizational goals as well as specific
performance metrics associated with aviation security within the FSD's
area of responsibility. Area Directors are required to follow DHS's
performance management guidance for FSDs who are part of the
Transportation Senior Executive Service (TSES) and TSA's performance
management guidance for FSDs who are not part of the TSES (non-TSES).
According to TSA Human Resources officials, about one-third of the FSDs
are part of the TSES, and they are generally assigned to larger airports.
FSDs are responsible for overseeing security operations at the nation's
commercial airports-443 airports as of January 2005-which TSA classifies
in one of five airport security categories (X, I, II, III, IV). 6 These
categories are based on various factors such as the total number of
takeoffs and landings annually, the extent to which passengers are
screened at the airport, and other special security considerations. In
general, category X airports have the greatest number of passenger
boardings and category IV airports have the fewest. These airports can
vary dramatically, not just in passenger and flight volume, but in other
characteristics, including physical size and layout. Figure 2 identifies
the number of commercial airports by airport security category, as of
January 2005.
6 According to TSA, the total number of commercial airports regulated for
security in the United States varies depending on various factors such as
the type and level of commercial operations that an aircraft operator
conducts at that particular airport, the time of year or season where a
particular airport is located, and the economic stability of that
airport's region.
Figure 2: Commercial Airports by Airport Security Category, as of January 2005
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Note: TSA periodically reviews and updates airport security categories to
reflect current operations. We used the categories in place in January
2005 to conduct the above analysis. Percentages do not total 100 because
of rounding.
TSA had 157 FSD positions at commercial airports nationwide, as of January
2005.7 Although an FSD is responsible for security at every commercial
airport, not every airport has an FSD dedicated solely to that airport.
Most category X airports have an FSD responsible for that airport alone.
Other airports are arranged in a "hub and spoke" configuration, in which
an FSD is located at or near a hub airport but also has responsibility
over one or more spoke airports of the same or smaller size that are
generally located in geographic proximity.8 At spoke airports, the
topranking TSA official located at that airport might be a Deputy FSD,
Screening Manager, or even Screening Supervisor, although the FSD has
7 The number of FSDs was based on the most current list TSA had at the
time of our review.
8 In contrast to how TSA uses the terms "hub airport" and "hub and spoke,"
airlines refer to an airline hub as an airport that an airline uses as a
transfer point to get passengers to their intended destination. It is part
of a hub and spoke model, where travelers moving between airports not
served by direct flights change planes en route to their destination.
overall responsibility for the airport. 9 Figure 3 identifies the number
of FSDs responsible for specific numbers of airports. For example, figure
3 shows that 44 FSDs are responsible for a single airport, 37 are
responsible for two airports (one hub and one spoke), and 1 is responsible
for nine airports (one hub and eight spokes).
Figure 3: Number of FSD Positions with Responsibility for a Designated
Number of Airports, as of January 2005
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
FSDs rely on their management staff to help carry out their
responsibilities at airports, but the exact FSD management positions vary
by airport. At larger airports, FSDs might have four Assistant FSDs-one
for Law Enforcement, one for Regulatory Inspection, one for Screening, and
another for Operations. However, not every FSD or airport has these
Assistant FSD positions. Assistant FSDs for Law Enforcement coordinate law
enforcement activities at the airport and often work with local Joint
Terrorism Task Forces. Assistant FSDs for Regulatory Inspection are
responsible for matters related to the enforcement of, and compliance
9 A Screening Manager is responsible for individuals at screening
checkpoints and maintains communication with supervisors regarding any
issues that might reveal a weakness or vulnerable area of security
screening that is discovered during the course of screening duties. A
Screening Supervisor is responsible for supervising personnel performing
preboard security screening of persons and their carry-on and checked
baggage.
with, approved security plans and directives pertaining to airport and
aviation security. These responsibilities include a key function of the
oversight of airport compliance with regulatory requirements and security
measures contained in approved security plans and security directives.
Assistant FSDs for Screening are responsible for passenger and baggage
screening and managing all screener staff, and Assistant FSDs for
Operations are responsible for managing nonscreening operations (e.g.,
exercise planning and execution, crisis management, and vulnerability
assessments) and designated aspects of administrative support. An FSD
responsible for a large airport may also have a Deputy FSD, and that
position could be located at a hub airport where the FSD is located or at
a spoke airport. Other FSD management staff positions vary by airport and
airport size, but may include a Stakeholder Manager, Customer Support
Manager, Training Coordinator, Human Resource Specialist, Financial
Specialist, Scheduling Operations Officer, Screening Supervisors and
Managers, administrative support personnel, as well as other positions.
TSA developed guidance that describes the many roles and responsibilities
of the FSD position, most of which is associated with securing commercial
airports from terrorist threats. However, its guidance addressing FSD
authority is outdated and does not clearly describe the FSDs' authority
relative to other airport stakeholders during a security incident.
Furthermore, some of the stakeholders at airports we visited said that the
FSDs' authority relative to others was not always clear during a security
incident, and that the FSDs' authority in such cases had not been
communicated to them. Most of the 25 FSDs we interviewed by telephone said
that TSA needed to do more to clarify the roles and responsibilities of
the FSD position for the benefit of FSDs and stakeholders, with the
majority of these FSDs stating that their authority needed further
clarification.
Federal Security Directors Have a Range of Responsibilities, but TSA's
Guidance Regarding FSDs' Authority Is Unclear
FSDs Have a Range of The FSD is the ranking TSA authority responsible for
the leadership and Responsibilities Related to coordination of TSA
security activities at the nation's commercial airports. Airport Security
As such, the FSD is responsible for providing day-to-day operational
direction for federal security at the airport or airports to which the FSD
is assigned. ATSA established broad authorities of the FSD, while specific
responsibilities of the FSD are laid out in TSA Delegation Orders, the FSD
position description, and TSA's 2004 Executive FSD Guide, 10 and include
the following:
Overseeing security screening of passengers, baggage, and air cargo. FSDs
are responsible for providing direct oversight of passenger and baggage
screening by managing the local screening force, which is typically
composed of federal employees.11 To carry out this responsibility, FSDs
engage in activities that include ensuring implementation of required
screener-training programs, anticipating and preparing for training on new
screening technologies and procedures, and developing local training
initiatives to test and improve screener performance. In accordance with
regulations, aircraft operators perform their own security screening of
air cargo, and FSDs are responsible for overseeing operators' performance
in implementing required security measures.
Providing regulatory oversight of all U.S. air transportation facilities
and operations. FSDs are responsible for ensuring that airports, airlines
(foreign and domestic), air cargo carriers, and indirect air carriers
comply with TSA regulations and security directives governing such things
as perimeter security, access controls, procedures for challenging
questionable identification documents, aircraft searches, and general
security procedures.12 This is accomplished through administering
appropriate compliance and enforcement actions with the goal of
discovering and correcting deficiencies and vulnerabilities in aviation
security. FSDs oversee civil enforcement activities at their airports
involving findings of noncompliance with security requirements by
10 TSA's Executive FSD Guide: A Tool for Development (August 2004).
11 As of August 2005, five airports rely on a private screening contractor
instead of a federal TSA screening force, and two additional airports have
applied to TSA to use private screeners. Section 108 of ATSA required TSA
to establish a pilot program permitting a small number of commercial
airports to use private screening contractors to conduct passenger and
baggage screening operations rather than federal screeners. Beginning on
November 19, 2004, all commercial airports with federal security screening
became eligible to apply to opt out of using federal screeners through the
Screening Partnership Program. According to TSA guidance, the FSD at a
privately screened airport would not have direct administrative control
over the screening workforce but would still be responsible for overall
security at the airport. For more information see GAO, Aviation Security:
Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress to Allow Airports to Use
Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services, GAO-05-126 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 19, 2004).
12 Indirect air carriers, sometimes referred to as freight forwarders,
consolidate cargo shipments and deliver them to air carriers and cargo
facilities of passenger and all-cargo air carriers that store cargo until
it is placed aboard an aircraft.
airlines, airports, and individuals, including passengers. To carry out
their regulatory oversight responsibilities, FSDs and staff engage in
activities that include conducting stakeholder meetings with all regulated
parties to discuss regulatory changes or educate them on current aviation
threats.
Analyzing and addressing security threats. FSDs are responsible for
conducting analyses of security threats and vulnerabilities in and around
their airports. To carry out this responsibility, FSDs seek intelligence
from sources external to TSA, build systems to analyze the information
received from intelligence organizations and apply it to the local airport
security, and direct TSA regulatory agents to test security measures and
procedures and identify potential security weaknesses.
Building and managing relationships with airport stakeholders. FSDs are
responsible for building and managing relationships with local
stakeholders (e.g., airport management, airlines, and concessionaires) to
ensure that security operations run smoothly. To carry out this
responsibility, FSDs engage in activities that include collaborating with
airlines to identify and resolve issues of efficient passenger flow and
customer service while maintaining security standards. FSDs also
coordinate with airport and airline management; federal, state, and local
governments; law enforcement agencies; and relevant private sector
entities to organize and implement a Federal Security Crisis Management
Plan at each airport. The plan is essentially a protocol for what TSA
employees and airport stakeholders should do in the event of an emergency,
including a terrorist incident, within the airport.
Other FSD responsibilities include communicating information received from
TSA headquarters to appropriate stakeholders, maintaining quality customer
service for airlines and passengers, providing leadership to the TSA
employee population, managing and coordinating their direct staff, and
overseeing management of TSA facilities and equipment resources. In
addition, TSA has directed FSDs to conduct outreach and liaison with the
general aviation community in their areas, although it has not given FSDs
regulatory oversight responsibility over general aviation airports.13
TSA's Guidance Regarding Aspects of FSDs' Authority Is Outdated, Lacks
Clarity, and Has Not Been Adequately Communicated to Stakeholders
FSDs' roles and responsibilities have been fairly well documented, but
their authority relative to other airport stakeholders during security
incidents has not been clearly defined. Section 103 of ATSA addressed FSD
authority at the broadest level by giving FSDs responsibility for
overseeing the screening of passengers and property and for carrying out
any other duties prescribed by the TSA Administrator.14 TSA's Executive
FSD Guide, discussed earlier, describes FSD responsibilities, but it does
not address the FSDs' authority in security incidents. That authority is
addressed more specifically in TSA's June 2002 Delegation of Authority to
Federal Security Directors (Delegation Order), which gives FSDs the
authority to provide for overall security of aviation, including the
security of aircraft and airports and related facilities to which they are
assigned.15
The Delegation Order is outdated in that it gives FSDs the authority to
train, supervise, equip, and deploy a TSA law enforcement force that was
never established. Officials from TSA's Aviation Security Program Office
acknowledged that the document is outdated and has not been updated since
FSDs were first assigned to airports. According to officials from TSA's
Office of Law Enforcement, TSA originally envisioned that all FSDs would
be federal law enforcement officers (e.g., GS-1811-criminal investigators)
and would command a TSA police force. However, the force was never
established, and FSDs were not given federal law enforcement status. TSA
has assigned an Assistant FSD for Law Enforcement to about half the FSDs
in the country, but this is the only law enforcement position
13 General aviation includes a wide range of on-demand activities such as
pilot training, flying for business and personal reasons, delivery of
emergency medical services, and sightseeing. Most of the responsibility
for determining vulnerabilities and enhancing security at general aviation
airports lies with airport operators. For more information on TSA
activities related to general aviation, see GAO, General Aviation
Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but Continued Partnership
with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term Success, GAO-05-144
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004).
14 Pursuant to ATSA, the head of TSA was referred to as the Under
Secretary of Transportation for Security. Since TSA transferred to DHS,
the head of TSA is now referred to as the Assistant Secretary of Homeland
Security for TSA. This position is also referred to as the TSA
Administrator.
15 TSA's Delegation of Authority to FSDs was issued on June 14, 2002.
on their staff. Instead, airport police or state or local law enforcement
agencies primarily carry out the law enforcement function at airports.16
Furthermore, the Delegation Order does not clearly address the extent of
FSD authority relative to other parties with responsibilities related to
airport security, including law enforcement agencies. For example, the
Delegation Order gives the FSD authority to clear, close, or otherwise
secure facilities under certain circumstances, and after taking such
action, requires the FSD to provide feedback to the airport operator on
the reasons the security action was taken. The document also provides
that, under certain circumstances, the FSD has the authority to cancel,
delay, return, or divert flights and search and detain persons or
property. However, it does not clearly address what authority, if any,
FSDs have over other parties, such as airport law enforcement personnel,
on which it would need to rely to take these actions. In August 2005, TSA
officials told us that they had drafted a revised Delegation Order that
clarified the authority of FSDs and that it is was being reviewed
internally. They stated that the revised document restates some of the
FSDs' previous authority and provides for some new ones, such as entering
into interagency agreements.
Stakeholders at some of the airports we visited told us that the FSDs'
role, particularly regarding their authority relative to other parties,
was not sufficiently clear, and at least one stakeholder at every airport
we visited said such information had never been communicated to them. At
three of the seven airports, stakeholders said that aspects of the FSD's
authority during a security incident lacked clarity. For example, at two
airports, confusion or conflicting opinions developed over whether the FSD
had the authority to take certain actions during particular security
incidents. Furthermore, six stakeholders at two of the airports we visited
were also unclear about the FSD's authority regarding control over airport
law enforcement personnel and canine teams, access to secured information,
and specific operational changes. Additionally, at least one stakeholder
at each of the seven airports we visited said he or she had never been
briefed or given information on the role of the FSD. Among these
stakeholders was an airport manager who said he had specifically sought
out documents detailing the FSD's roles and authority, including how the
FSD
16 Some airports have their own independent airport police forces; others
rely on state and city police forces. Still others have contractual
agreements for airport security with local sheriff's departments.
would fit into the airport's incident command system. At another airport,
airport management officials said they had to take the initiative, in
conjunction with the FSD and law enforcement stakeholders, to develop a
matrix identifying first responders and the lead agency for various types
of incidents after a potential hijacking situation highlighted the need to
document and share such guidance.
Several stakeholders at the national level also raised questions regarding
the clarity of the FSD's authority relative to that of other parties,
including FSDs' authority in particular security incidents. Specifically,
FBI headquarters officials and representatives of two industry
associations representing airports and airport law enforcement officials
voiced concern about the clarity of FSDs' authority, noting that initially
some of the first FSDs attempted to assert control over airport
stakeholders, such as the airport police department. FBI headquarters
officials were concerned, on the basis of past airport exercises, that
relationships between FSDs and the FBI had not been explicitly delineated.
Officials stated that if a conflict with local FBI authorities occurred
during an actual security incident, it might create confusion and result
in a longer response time. As of October 2004, FBI headquarters officials
informed us that the FBI was attempting to enter into a memorandum of
understanding with TSA to clarify certain aspects of each agency's
authority. TSA officials said that, as of August 2005, TSA and the FBI had
not entered into a memorandum of understanding and were not able to
provide us any additional information on this issue.
Our telephone interviews with selected FSDs also indicated a need for a
clearer statement of their authority. Most (18) of the 25 FSDs we
interviewed said, to varying degrees, that TSA needed to do more to
clarify the role and responsibilities of the FSD position-not just for the
benefit of FSDs and their staff, but for the benefit of airport
stakeholders as well. (These and other responses to selected questions we
posed during our interviews with 25 FSDs are contained in app. II.) More
specifically, when we asked those 18 FSDs what needed further
clarification, 11 said that their authority needed to be further defined.
Among these 11 were 6 FSDs who believed TSA should develop a document that
delineates the authority of the position or update the Delegation Order.
For example, FSDs told us that other agencies do not understand the
authority of the FSD or TSA, and have asked for a document to be made
widely available to federal agencies, state and local law enforcement,
emergency responders, and other airport stakeholders. Four FSDs explained
that clarification of the FSDs' authority is needed with respect to
critical incident response.
TSA Provided Opportunities for Some FSDs to Participate in Developing TSA
Aviation Security Policy
TSA does not charge FSDs with responsibility for developing TSA aviation
security policy. However, TSA does expect FSDs to provide input on draft
policy from TSA headquarters when called upon and to recommend policies
and procedures for addressing emerging or unforeseen security risks and
policy gaps. According to TSA officials, the agency provides several
opportunities for some FSDs to be involved in developing some TSA aviation
security policies through the FSD Advisory Council, ad hoc consultation
groups, and the piloting of new security procedures and technology.
The FSD Advisory Council provides a mechanism for selected FSDs to be
involved in TSA's efforts to develop aviation security policy, according
to TSA officials. The FSD Advisory Council was originally established as a
way for the Aviation Security Program Office to conduct outreach among the
FSDs. However, in May 2004, the TSA Administrator recast the council as an
advisory board reporting directly to him and, for the most part,
responding to his agenda items. The council consists of 22 FSDs who the
Administrator selects based on factors such as geographic location,
airport security category, and strong FSD leadership, according to a TSA
official responsible for council coordination. Most FSDs do not serve on
the council for more than 1 year, but their term is ultimately left to the
Administrator's discretion. Council meetings occur over a 3-day period in
Washington, D.C., generally on a monthly basis. According to TSA
officials, during council meetings, the FSDs provide the Administrator
their opinions and guidance on establishing and modifying TSA policies and
procedures and have opportunities for input in other areas. Four of the
five FSDs at airports we visited, including two who were council members,
saw the council as an effective way for the Administrator to gather input
on new TSA policy initiatives and issues confronting FSDs. The fifth FSD
commented that most of the issues discussed by the council appeared to be
more relevant to airports larger than his.
On occasion, some FSDs have the opportunity to provide input on draft TSA
aviation security policy through ad hoc consultation groups organized by
the Aviation Security Program Office, according to TSA officials. For
instance, when TSA establishes a new standard operating procedure, it
typically consults a selected group drawn from, perhaps, 9 or 10 airports.
These groups are ad hoc and may include different combinations of FSDs,
FSD staff, and airport stakeholders. For example, TSA formed a group of
FSDs, screeners, and airport and air carrier staff from multiple airports
to address anticipated increases in the 2004 summer travel season.
According to the TSA officials, TSA typically consults such groups on most
significant policy developments. However, the more urgent or sensitive a
new policy,
the less likely TSA will have time to obtain input outside of
headquarters. The official stated that TSA does not involve every FSD in
every policy it develops but added that he could not think of any policy
in the last 6 months that had not involved at least some FSDs in its
development.
Participating in pilots of new technology and procedures at their airports
is another way FSDs can be involved in developing TSA aviation security
policy. TSA has a variety of ongoing pilot programs that it generally
characterizes as either technology- or procedure-based. For example, TSA
has tested and evaluated at multiple airports a technology pilot-the
Explosive Trace Detection Portal Program-that is designed to analyze the
air around a passenger for traces of explosive material. TSA's
procedurebased pilots include the Registered Traveler Program, which
identifies participating travelers through biometric identifiers, such as
fingerprints, and helps to expedite these passengers through required
security screening for weapons and explosives. In addition, TSA has
piloted other program initiatives, such as its Next Generation Hiring
Program, which TSA reported provides a more localized approach to screener
hiring that enables FSDs to influence the hiring process for their
airports. TSA first piloted this initiative at Boston Logan International
Airport and gradually expanded testing to other airports, continuing to
make changes before implementing the program nationwide.
Not all FSDs or their airports have been involved in piloting new
technologies and procedures. According to TSA headquarters officials, TSA
decided to limit the airports at which it conducts these types of pilots
to a selected group of "model" airports, although it does conduct pilots
not involving technology or procedures at other airports. As such, in
December 2004, in an effort to streamline the airport selection process
for technology pilots, TSA identified 15 airports and recommended they be
used for such pilots on an ongoing basis.17 According to these officials,
the selected airports provide diversity in geography, demographics, and
baggage and materials to be screened. Ten of the 25 FSDs we interviewed
said TSA had offered their airports opportunities to pilot a new program
or technology (collectively, more than 20 such opportunities), and all of
them subsequently participated.
17 TSA may add other airports to its recommended model airport list on a
case-by-case basis on the recommendation of the Assistant Administrator
for Aviation Security Programs.
Although TSA officials told us that opportunities exist for some FSDs to
be involved in developing TSA aviation security policy, most of the FSDs
(21 of 25) who we interviewed characterized themselves as not involved in
developing such policy. Three of the five FSDs at airports we visited
suggested that TSA should consult FSDs on security policies before issuing
them, although some noted time may not permit this on urgent security
measures. Two of these FSDs said it would be helpful if TSA allowed FSDs a
comment period for new policy, and another said that because TSA does not
involve FSDs in developing policy, its weekly national conference calls
with FSDs are filled with questions and discussions about new security
directives.
FSDs reported they entered into these partnerships at the seven airports
we visited, and FSDs and stakeholders stated that these partnerships were
generally working well. Furthermore, FSDs initiated communication and
coordination efforts with stakeholders or were involved in efforts already
established-such as meetings and briefings-to address a range of issues,
including airport security, operations, and coordination.
FSDs Formed Partnerships with Key Stakeholders and Participated in
Communication and Coordination Efforts
TSA Views Stakeholder Partnerships with FSDs as Essential
As discussed earlier, TSA has given FSDs responsibility for building and
managing relationships with airport stakeholders and has generally left it
to the FSDs to determine how to develop effective stakeholder
relationships. According to TSA's Executive FSD Guide, building and
maintaining stakeholder partnerships is a major responsibility of FSDs,
and these partnerships can create capabilities at airports where the sum
is greater than the parts. TSA further reinforces the importance of FSDs'
building and managing partnerships by including this activity as a
standard rating element on their annual performance assessments. TSA
addressed the importance of partnerships in connection with planning for
increased passenger traffic during the summer months of 2004 in its best
practice guide-the Aviation Partnership Support Plan.18 This document
recognized the need for FSDs and airport stakeholders to work together
toward achieving security and customer service. For example, the plan
addressed the importance of TSA and air carrier station managers working
together to identify a process for communicating, handling, and destroying
18 TSA Aviation Partnership Support Plan (May 14, 2004).
sensitive passenger load data, and it encouraged FSDs to develop formal
working groups to bring together local stakeholders.
According to parties at the airports we visited and TSA guidance,
developing partnerships with airport stakeholders is essential for FSDs to
effectively do their job. First, according to FSDs, FSD staff, and law
enforcement stakeholders at the airports we visited, FSDs lack law
enforcement personnel to respond to a security incident and, therefore,
must rely on federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in these
instances. TSA also recognizes that, for example, FSDs would have to work
with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to respond to a security
incident on an aircraft where the door has been closed for embarkation,
because FSDs do not have the resources needed to respond to such an
incident. Second, developing partnerships can provide benefits to FSDs and
airport stakeholders. For example, FSDs need air carrier data on the
number of passengers transiting airport checkpoints to appropriately
schedule screeners. At the same time, air carriers seek an efficient
screening process to minimize wait times for their customers. Various
parties we interviewed, including airport stakeholders, BTS and FBI
officials, and an industry representative, recognized the importance of
partnerships in helping the airport operate smoothly. For example, one
industry representative said that airport management needs security and
threat information from the FSD, and the FSD needs to understand
nonsecurity issues that affect the FSD's job, such as an upcoming local
event that may increase passenger traffic.
FSDs and Stakeholders Reported Partnerships Were Generally Working Well
FSDs and most of the stakeholders at the seven airports we visited said
that they had developed partnerships, and they described these
partnerships as generally working well. The FSDs responsible for these
airports reported having positive partnerships with airport stakeholders.
More specifically, one FSD said that having common goals with
stakeholders, such as ensuring security, enhanced their partnerships.
Another FSD saw himself as a catalyst for partnerships at his airport and
as a facilitator among stakeholders who did not always get along. At most
of these airports, stakeholders also reported that FSD-stakeholder
partnerships were working well and identified examples of successful
practices. Some spoke of the value of an FSD being accessible to
stakeholders to help resolve problems by, for example, being visible at
the airport and maintaining an open-door policy. Seven stakeholders stated
that the FSDs at their airports discussed TSA security directives and
worked with them when it was not clear how to interpret or implement
them.19 At one airport, the FSD, airport management, and air carriers
teamed together to look for opportunities to enhance security and customer
service. To this end, they formed a working group and developed a proposal
for TSA that addressed issues involving technology, infrastructure,
transportation assets, and local budgetary control for the FSD. Finally,
at another airport, in an effort to manage stakeholders' concerns about
wait times and customer service, the FSD arranged for staff to help screen
all of the airport vendors and concessionaires, as required, but at an
established time to ensure passengers were minimally affected.
Partnerships at airports across the country were generally working well or
better at the time of our review than when TSA first assigned FSDs to
airports, according to several federal agency officials and industry
representatives at the national level. Some airport stakeholders and
industry representatives stated that some FSDs' authoritative management
style and lack of airport knowledge contributed to tensions in earlier
FSDstakeholder relationships. However, during the course of our review,
TSA officials said they received very few complaints about FSDs from
airport stakeholders, and industry representatives and officials from BTS
(which oversees CBP and ICE), and the FBI said that partnerships were
generally working well or had improved. For example, FBI officials had
queried 27 of their Airport Liaison Agents in October 2004 about their
relationships with FSDs, and 20 of the 22 agents who responded
characterized these relationships as generally good. FBI officials told us
that at one airport where coordination and partnerships stood out as being
particularly strong, the FSD met with stakeholders every morning.
TSA established 80 Assistant FSD for Law Enforcement positions across the
country to help FSDs partner and act as liaison with law enforcement
stakeholders and to conduct certain criminal investigations. This position
is always filled by a federal law enforcement officer (a criminal
investigator), and is the only law enforcement officer assigned to an FSD.
Office of Law Enforcement officials stated that this position is essential
for interacting with local law enforcement stakeholders, and they would
19 According to TSA officials, FSDs are responsible for ensuring affected
parties receive security directives, but they do not expect FSDs to
hand-deliver every security directive to every stakeholder.
like to see every FSD have at least one Assistant FSD for Law Enforcement
and more than one at larger airports. Assistant FSDs for Law Enforcement
report directly to their respective FSDs, and at smaller airports without
this position, the FSD takes on responsibility for coordinating with law
enforcement stakeholders.20 Given the number of positions authorized, not
all FSDs have Assistant FSDs for Law Enforcement on their staff. Of the 25
FSDs we interviewed, 13 reported having this position on their staff, and
12 reported not having this position. Regardless of whether these FSDs had
this position, almost all (23) said it was important to have the position
on their staff to coordinate with the law enforcement and intelligence
community and perform criminal investigations.21 An Assistant FSD for Law
Enforcement explained during one airport visit that his familiarity with
legal processes and procedures facilitated his working relationship with
the FBI and U.S. Attorneys. FBI headquarters officials also reported that
the Assistant FSD for Law Enforcement position has helped improve
coordination between TSA and the FBI at airports. TSA did not provide an
agency-level position on whether every FSD needs an Assistant FSD for Law
Enforcement.
Although most of our contacts reported that partnerships between FSDs and
airport stakeholders were generally working well, about half (13) of the
25 FSDs we interviewed said that it is challenging to foster partnerships
with the parties they are responsible for regulating. Several FSDs stated
that while it may be hard to partner with those one regulates, having good
communication and relationships with stakeholders and a mutual
understanding of the responsibility of regulating airport security makes
such partnering possible. According to officials from TSA's Office of
Compliance Programs, the office has articulated a policy of compliance
through cooperation, which has helped FSDs foster partnerships with
airport stakeholders while achieving TSA's regulatory oversight mission.
For example, TSA established a Voluntary Disclosure Program that allows
20 According to TSA Office of Law Enforcement officials, if a specific
need should arise at an airport without an Assistant FSD for Law
Enforcement, the Office of Law Enforcement will instruct the nearest
Assistant FSD for Law Enforcement to respond to the situation.
21 About half (13) of the 25 FSDs said they had a criminal investigator as
part of their management staff (when FSDs have criminal investigators on
their staff, they hold the position of an Assistant FSD for Law
Enforcement), and all of those FSDs considered this position to be
important in addressing their airports' security needs-12 of the 13
considered it very important-and several added that they needed more than
one of these positions on their staff. In addition, 10 of the 12 FSDs who
did not have this position on their staff considered it a position that
would be important in supporting their airports' security needs.
stakeholders to forgo civil penalty actions by bringing violations to the
attention of TSA and taking prompt corrective action. The philosophy
behind this program is that aviation security is well served by providing
incentives to regulated parties to identify and correct their own
instances of noncompliance and to invest more resources in efforts to
preclude their recurrence.22 According to Office of Compliance Program
officials, 75 percent of issues of noncompliance were closed by
administrative action rather than civil enforcement during the past 2
fiscal years. Furthermore, in half the cases reported, FSDs were able to
address the discovered security gaps and close the issue with a note to
the inspection files, instead of writing a formal investigation report.
At one airport we visited, not all stakeholders agreed that partnerships
with the FSD were working well. Airport management, airport law
enforcement, and air carriers at this airport said the FSD was not
accessible, often did not attend meetings to which he had been invited,
and sometimes did not send FSD staff to meetings in his place. These
stakeholders also criticized the FSD for not distributing security
directives and meeting to discuss their implementation. However, local
federal stakeholders at this airport (representing the FBI, CBP, and ICE)
said that the FSD had established positive partnerships with them and had
communicated well.
FSDs and Stakeholders Said They Participated in Many Communication and
Coordination Efforts
According to TSA's Executive FSD Guide, FSDs are responsible for
conducting group or one-on-one meetings with airport managers and air
carriers. FSDs and stakeholders at all seven of the airports we visited
told us that they were involved with these and other communication and
coordination efforts. FSDs and stakeholders described a variety of such
mechanisms, including meetings and training exercises, noting that many of
these were in place before FSDs were assigned to airports. A BTS official
explained that at larger airports, FSDs inherited coordination mechanisms
and relationships established between federal agencies and other
stakeholders. In contrast, at smaller airports, FSDs had to educate
22 TSA's voluntary disclosure policy directive relates to information and
guidance that may be used by aircraft operators (except individuals),
indirect air carriers, foreign air carriers, airports, and flight training
providers when voluntarily disclosing to TSA apparent violations of TSA
regulations (applicable regulations include 49 C.F.R. parts 1542, 1544,
1546, 1548, and 1552). The TSA Voluntary Disclosure program does not apply
to violations or apparent violations committed by individuals serving as
agents of covered regulated entities.
stakeholders on involving and communicating more with federal officials.
At two of the larger airports we visited, stakeholders said that the FSDs
initiated communication and coordination efforts on their own, such as
holding routine intelligence briefings and meetings with law enforcement
agencies and representatives of U.S. Attorneys' Offices. Aside from the
more formal communication and coordination mechanisms, FSDs and some of
the stakeholders at all seven airports we visited said they frequently
shared information and developed partnerships informally through telephone
calls, e-mails, and face-to-face interactions.
At all of the airports we visited, FSDs and stakeholders reported that
meetings to discuss improvements to airport security and operations and
coordination meetings were held, although the type of participants and
frequency of these meetings varied. FSDs and stakeholders reported that
some of these meetings were held on a weekly, monthly, or quarterly basis,
while others were held on an impromptu basis when FSDs or stakeholders had
an issue to discuss. According to an FBI official, most of the Airport
Liaison Agents they had queried were having monthly meetings with their
FSDs. Similarly, a BTS official said that all FSDs had monthly meetings
with representatives from other BTS agencies (ICE and CBP) to improve
coordination of law enforcement and security efforts among these agencies
at airports.23 Although five of the seven airports we visited had standing
formal meetings, two of the smaller airports did not. Rather, at these
airports, the FSD and stakeholders reported interacting daily and holding
meetings on an as-needed basis.
In addition to meetings, incident debriefings and training exercises to
ensure a coordinated response in the event of a security incident were
conducted at most of the airports we visited. Stakeholders at three of the
airports mentioned that debriefings occurred after an actual incident to
address questions and discuss how the incident had been handled. For
example, at one airport, a stakeholder explained that a debriefing helped
alleviate concerns he had regarding his lack of involvement during a
particular incident. According to TSA, response to an actual event is
typically only as good as the training for it; hence, TSA requires FSDs to
hold quarterly training exercises at their airports. Training exercises
23 In August 2004, the Under Secretary of BTS directed all DHS agencies
with an airport presence to establish a formal committee to ensure that
senior operational managers were communicating across agency lines and
fully coordinating law enforcement and security efforts. The FSD was
tasked with coordinating the establishment of these committees.
included tabletop simulation exercises,24 hijacking scenarios, and Man
Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)25 vulnerability assessments to
identify areas where a MANPADS attack could be launched. Sometimes
protocols or security directives are written as a result of airport
incidents and debriefings. At all seven airports we visited, protocols for
responding to incidents existed, according to FSDs, their staff, or
stakeholders, and at most of these airports, protocols were written into
the Airport Security Plan. However, a TSA headquarters official explained
that a protocol cannot exist for every possible incident, given that
security incidents are often unique.
TSA has made a number of changes intended to provide FSDs with more
authority and flexibility in carrying out their responsibilities, and most
FSDs we interviewed responded favorably to these changes. In addition, TSA
was planning additional efforts during our review that could affect FSDs,
and the majority of the 25 FSDs we interviewed said they were not involved
in these efforts.
TSA Made Changes to Better Support or Empower the FSD Position and Was
Planning Additional Changes
Most FSDs We Interviewed To further support or empower the FSD position,
TSA increased FSDs' Viewed the Changes TSA authority to address
performance and conduct problems, established a Made Favorably local
hiring initiative, increased flexibility to provide screener training,
relocated Area Director positions to the field, and established a report
group and a mentoring program. The majority of FSDs we interviewed had
positive views of most of these changes.26
24 A tabletop exercise is a focused practice activity that places the
participants in a simulated situation requiring them to function in the
capacity that would be expected of them in a real event. Its purpose is to
promote preparedness by testing policies and plans and by training
personnel.
25 MANPADS are shoulder-launched surface-to-air guided missiles that are
accurate, concealable, transportable, and designed to be user-friendly.
DHS, in partnership with other federal agencies, is working to counter the
threat of MANPADS to civilian commercial aircraft. As part of its overall
MANPADS strategy, TSA is performing airport vulnerability assessments to
identify and map the areas around an airport from which a MANPADS attack
could be initiated, and it is working with surrounding communities to
coordinate the efforts of agencies responsible for responding to this type
of threat.
26 Some of the changes we discussed with FSDs during airport visits had
just recently been implemented by TSA.
Local hiring initiative. TSA developed a local screener hiring initiative
that, among other things, vested more hiring authority with FSDs to
address airport staffing needs. To meet a post-September 11 statutory
deadline, TSA brought a workforce of 57,000 federal screeners on board
within 6 months using a highly centralized approach of recruiting,
assessing, hiring, and training.27 With this accomplished, TSA began
piloting a reengineered local hiring initiative, called Next Generation
Hiring, in June 2004. Its goal was to ensure the involvement of FSDs and
their staff in the hiring process, streamline the process, and make the
process more responsive to the full range of airport needs. The program
was designed to give FSDs and their staff the flexibility to determine
which aspects, or phases, of local hiring they wish to participate in, and
how much contractor support they need.28 TSA incorporated modifications as
a result of lessons learned from its pilot and initial implementation
sites as it gradually rolled out this initiative to additional locations.
By March 2005, TSA had established 12 fully operational local hiring
centers around the country, with locations based on various factors,
including geography and operational need.
When we asked all 155 FSDs in our March 2004 survey if they wanted more
authority in selecting screeners, 136 (88 percent) said they wanted more
authority to do this to a great or very great extent, and another 9
percent said they wanted more authority in this area to a moderate extent.
When we interviewed 25 FSDs during this review, approximately 1 year after
TSA began rolling out the Next Generation Hiring program, 12 reported that
they wanted more authority in selecting screeners to a great or very great
extent, even given their participation options under Next Generation
Hiring, and another 8 said they wanted more authority in this area to a
29
moderate extent.
27 We previously reported that TSA's hiring process hindered the ability
of some FSDs to adequately staff passenger and baggage screening
checkpoints. See GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing
and Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004).
28 For each of the three basic phases of hiring (recruiting, interviewing,
and job offer and acceptance), FSDs may choose whether they want to
conduct the phase primarily on their own, work in partnership with the TSA
contractor, or turn the execution over to the contractor. Joint execution
is not an option for the third phase-job offer and orientation.
29 Of the 25 FSDs we interviewed in the spring of 2005 as part of this
review, 21 had responded to our Web-based survey of all FSDs, which we
conducted in March 2004 as part of other GAO reviews.
Nevertheless, 18 of the 25 FSDs stated that Next Generation Hiring
provided for their airports' screener staffing needs better than TSA's
former hiring process to a very great, great, or moderate extent. In
addition, 14 of the 25 FSDs stated that, overall, they were satisfied with
the new program's ability to meet their screener staffing needs, but 7
said they were not satisfied.30 Comments from those dissatisfied FSDs
included statements that the contractor had not done a good job in the
recruiting aspect of the process and that the new hiring process still
takes too long- a comment echoed by some FSDs we interviewed during our
airport visits earlier in the program's rollout.
TSA officials stated that the goal of Next Generation Hiring was not
necessarily to reduce the time it takes to bring a new screener on board
at every airport. Rather, the goal was to be more responsive to all local
hiring needs-not just the needs of the largest airports. According to a
program official, early data on Next Generation Hiring have been positive,
though limited. For example, data from a nonscientific sample of several
airports showed that under Next Generation Hiring, fewer screeners
resigned within their first month than before the program was in place
(about 18 percent resigned in the first month before Next Generation
Hiring; about 7.5 percent resigned in the first month after the program
was initiated at those airports). Officials also concluded, on the basis
of their limited data and anecdotal information, that candidates selected
at airports where the FSD and staff were conducting the hiring process
were more selective in accepting offers because they had more knowledge of
what the job would entail than contractors did when they handled the
hiring process.
Increased flexibility to provide screener training. TSA expanded FSDs'
flexibility to offer training locally to screeners in two respects in
April 2004. First, TSA developed and implemented a new basic screener
training program to cover the technical aspects of both passenger and
checked baggage screening, and allowed FSDs to choose whether new
screeners would receive instruction in one or both of these screening
functions during initial training. According to TSA officials, this
approach provides the optimum training solution based on the specific
needs of each airport and reflects the fact that, at some airports, the
FSD does not need all screeners to be fully trained in both passenger and
checked baggage screening. Second, TSA offered FSDs the flexibility to
deliver basic screener training using either contractors or local TSA
employees as
30 The remaining 4 FSDs said they had no opinion on this issue.
instructors, provided they have experience as instructors and are approved
by TSA.31
Prior to TSA providing FSDs with more training flexibility, 110 of the 155
FSDs (71 percent) who responded to our March 2004 survey said that they
wanted more flexibility to design and conduct local training to a great or
very great extent.32 A year later, when we asked 25 FSDs during this
review about their satisfaction with the flexibility they had in offering
training locally to screeners, 21 said they were satisfied. Several noted
this was an area where they had seen improvement in the flexibility TSA
had given them.
Increased authority to address performance and conduct problems. TSA
expanded FSDs' authority to address employee performance and conduct
problems over time, beginning in 2003 when FSDs were delegated authority
to suspend employees for up to 3 days. In July 2004, FSDs were delegated
the authority to take the full range of disciplinary actions, including
removal, in accordance with TSA policy. In September 2004, TSA again
increased the authority of FSDs by allowing them to use a streamlined,
one-step process in taking certain disciplinary actions, such as the
termination of employment for screeners involved in theft or the use of
drugs or alcohol.33 During our telephone interviews with FSDs, conducted
more than 6 months after the last of these increases in FSD authority, 24
of the 25 FSDs said they were satisfied with their current authority to
address employee performance and conduct problems.
31 For local employees to be approved as instructors by TSA, they must be
nominated by an FSD and have a current or prior instructor certification
by a recognized training and development organization or have at least 2
years of experience as an instructor. In addition, local TSA instructors
must have successfully completed the course of instruction they will be
teaching and demonstrate instructional skills by assisting a TSA-approved
instructor in classroom instruction and monitoring actual classroom
instruction. We reported this and other information related to TSA
screener training and performance issues in GAO, Aviation Security:
Screener Training and Performance Measurement Strengthened, but More Work
Remains, GAO-05-457 (Washington, D.C: May 2, 2005).
32 The question posed in that survey asked FSDs about their need for more
flexibility to design and conduct local training and did not specify
screener training.
33 In addition, the one-step process may be used to suspend screener
personnel for 3 days or less; suspend, remove, or reduce pay band or rate
of pay for any employee serving a trial period; and to indefinitely
suspend screeners for serious misconduct that necessitates immediate
action under certain designated conditions. All indefinite suspensions
must be reviewed for legal sufficiency by a TSA counsel and may be
coordinated with a designated Employee Relations Specialist prior to
issuance.
Moreover, 2 of the 5 FSDs we interviewed during our airport visits said
that their increased authority in this area was an important change that
exemplified TSA's efforts to further empower FSDs.
Relocation of Area Director positions. In September 2004, as part of an
overall reorganization effort, TSA physically relocated its five Area
Director positions from the Aviation Security Program Office in
headquarters to the field. According to TSA headquarters officials, the
goal was to move more TSA authority and decision making from headquarters
to the field and to create efficiencies in TSA's processes and procedures.
In making this change, TSA named five existing FSDs-one in each of TSA's
five geographic areas-to assume the responsibility of being Area Directors
in addition to continuing to serve as FSDs of major airports. FSDs in each
of the new Area Directors' geographic regions report to their respective
Area Director on administrative matters. However, they report to TSA
headquarters (the Aviation Security Program Office and Transportation
Security Operations Center) on operational issues, such as reporting
security incidents. To support these "dual hatted" FSDs with their
additional Area Director responsibilities, TSA authorized each to hire
five additional staff.
The 25 FSDs we interviewed were divided on whether they thought having
Area Directors in the field was helpful-12 said it was helpful and 12 said
it was not helpful-and some offered comments.34 On one hand, several FSDs
said that field-based Area Directors who were also FSDs had a much better
understanding of what FSDs encounter each day. On the other hand, several
said that FSDs were better served by Area Directors located at
headquarters because they were more aware of everything that was taking
place and had more staff to support them. Views on this topic were also
mixed among the five FSDs we interviewed during our airport visits.
Two Area Directors were among the 25 FSDs we interviewed, and both thought
the change to field-based Area Directors was helpful but thought that the
position should be further empowered. One explained that the Area
Directors should be involved in operational issues in addition to
administrative matters, although he would need additional staff if he also
had this responsibility. The other Area Director said that, as one of only
five Area Directors, he is responsible for too many airports.
34 One FSD had no opinion.
Report Group.35 In conjunction with moving the Area Director positions out
of headquarters, TSA established this group in September 2004 to conduct
some of the duties previously performed by Area Directors when at
headquarters. It was also intended to provide operational support and a
communication link between TSA headquarters and field-based Area
Directors, and in turn, FSDs and their staff. The group manages and
standardizes communications (including sending daily recaps of each day's
business), continually updates point-of-contact lists that identified who
FSDs and their staff should contact when a problem arises, and serves as a
troubleshooter for unresolved issues. For example, FSDs and their staff
may call the Report Group for assistance if they have already contacted
the appropriate headquarters contacts and their issue or question was not
resolved.
Of the 25 FSDs we interviewed, 16 considered the Report Group to be a
valuable resource, and 7 said they did not consider it valuable. Although
TSA established the group just prior to our airport visits, FSDs we
interviewed at that time saw the potential value of the group and noted
that its daily recaps were already helpful in consolidating and sharing
consistent information, as were the point-of-contact lists.
Mentoring Program. TSA began offering an optional mentoring experience to
newly appointed FSDs and Deputy FSDs in April 2004 to support their
transition into their new positions. Under this program, mentor
coordinators match new FSDs and Deputy FSDs (mentoring colleagues) with
more experienced counterparts (mentors) at other airports somewhat
comparable in size and complexity. As TSA names new FSDs and Deputies, the
coordinators offer them a choice of prescreened volunteer mentors, give
participants suggested steps for proceeding with the mentoring
relationship, and provide a list of frequently asked questions and answers
about the program.
Only 2 of the 5 FSDs we visited and 4 of the 25 FSDs we interviewed had
participated in the Mentoring Program-either by being a mentor or by being
mentored-and all but one saw it as having value.36 One FSD, who
35 This group was named the Communications Liaison Group when it was
initially established in September 2004 and was later renamed the Report
Group. When established, the group was composed of former Area Directors
and their staff.
36 Of the 25 FSDs we interviewed by telephone, only 4 were named FSDs
after TSA established the Mentoring Program.
had been mentored, explained that having a mentor helped him learn a very
challenging job and provided the opportunity to bounce ideas off of an
experienced FSD. About half (13) of the 25 FSDs said that they were not
familiar with TSA's mentoring program.
TSA Was Planning Additional Initiatives That Could Affect FSDs
At the time we interviewed FSDs, TSA was planning the following three
additional initiatives that could affect at least some FSDs. The majority
of the 25 FSDs we interviewed said they were not involved in these
efforts.
TSA's Screening Allocation Model. TSA has been developing a model for
determining screener staffing levels after initially deploying its federal
screener workforce in 2002 based on estimates of screeners performing
screening functions under privatized agencies, instead of a model. In
September 2003, in an effort to right-size and stabilize its screener
workforce, TSA hired a consultant to conduct a study of screener staffing
levels at the nation's commercial airports. Among other things, the
consultant was tasked with (1) developing a comprehensive modeling
approach with appropriate details to account for the considerable
variability that occurs among airports, (2) creating a staffing analysis
model to be used as a management tool to determine daily and weekly
staffing levels and deploying the model to commercial airports nationwide,
and (3) developing user-friendly simulation software to determine optimum
screener staffing levels for each commercial airport with federal
screeners. In March 2004, while awaiting the completion of this model, TSA
established specific airport staffing limits to meet a congressionally
mandated cap for screeners set at the level of 45,000 full-time-equivalent
positions. In the summer of 2004, the model was selected, developed, and
deployed for airport data input. That fall, TSA officials told us they
expected the model, which was being validated with airports at the time,
would demonstrate TSA's need for screeners beyond the mandated cap. FSDs
we interviewed during our airport visits shared this view and the
expectation that many airports would see increases in their screener
allocations. In July 2005, TSA finalized and submitted to Congress its
standards for determining aviation security staffing for all airports at
which screening is required.37
The Screening Allocation Model does not give FSDs the authority to
determine the number of screeners authorized for their airports, nor was
it intended to do so. When asked if they would like to have greater
authority in determining screener staffing levels for the airports they
oversee, 23 of the 25 FSDs we interviewed answered that, to a great or
very great extent, they would like greater authority. One FSD commented,
for example, that there will always be a need for FSDs to have a way to
adjust screener numbers and that the screener staffing system needs to
have sufficient flexibility to address sudden changes in screening
demands. This view was fairly consistent with what FSDs had said a year
earlier in our March 2004 survey, when we posed the same question to all
FSDs. At that time, 145 of 154 FSDs (94 percent) answered in the same way
when asked if they wanted more authority in determining the number of
screeners for their airports.
Although TSA officials said that they had obtained a variety of data from
FSDs during the course of the development of its Screening Allocation
Model, not all of the FSDs we contacted saw themselves as having been
involved in the model's development. Of the 25 FSDs we interviewed, 14
said that TSA had not involved them or provided them with the opportunity
to have input into the development of the model. Of the 14 FSDs who said
they were not involved, 11 were dissatisfied regarding their lack of
involvement. Furthermore, among the 11 FSDs who said they were involved in
developing the model, 5 were dissatisfied regarding their level of
involvement.38 According to TSA officials, FSDs provided information for
the model regarding their respective airports, and headquarters validated
the numbers the model generated for each airport.
37 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, required TSA to develop and submit, to the
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate and the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives, standards for determining aviation security staffing at
commercial airports no later than 90 days after December 17, 2004, the
date of the act's enactment, and GAO to conduct an analysis of these
standards. TSA's submission of its Report to Congress-Aviation Security
Staffing Standards-constituted TSA's submission to meet this reporting
requirement of the law.
38 Ten of the 25 FSDs pointed out that the model, as modified, functions
under a 45,000 screener cap, which is too low and does not take into
account real-life factors such as screener vacation time, military time,
training time, or sick leave. As a result, according to one FSD, security
lines are longer and service is poorer.
Reassessments of airport hub and spoke configurations and FSD management
staff. TSA began two related reviews in June 2004: (1) a reassessment of
the hub and spoke configurations of commercial airports and (2) a
reassessment of the number of management and administrative positions
allocated to each FSD.39 The hub and spoke reassessment could result in
changes to the number or the specific airports for which some FSDs are
responsible. According to TSA headquarters officials, TSA undertook this
reassessment because some FSDs had airports in more than one state, and
complexities arose when working with multiple state laws and regulations,
as well as U.S. Attorneys and police departments from multiple state
jurisdictions. Officials anticipated that after TSA completes its review,
a few situations will continue in which FSDs have responsibility for
airports in more than one state, but only when the distance between
certain airports necessitates.
Related to its review of hub and spoke configurations, TSA undertook a
reassessment of FSD management staff levels, recognizing that some
airports-typically smaller ones-were overstaffed, while others- typically
larger airports-were understaffed. According to TSA officials, TSA
initially distributed FSD staff based on the security classification of
the airport and, to a lesser extent, the size or annual number of aircraft
boardings. This, coupled with resource constraints that resulted in fewer
positions being authorized than were needed, resulted in an imbalance in
FSD staff among airports. Authorizations for the FSD staff positions
ranged from 1 position at category III and IV airports with a minimum
threshold of boardings, to 16 positions at category X and large category I
airports. TSA made decisions regarding some of these positions (e.g.,
whether a particular FSD should be assigned a Deputy FSD or an Assistant
FSD for Law Enforcement), while FSDs were left to make decisions about
other positions (e.g., whether to include a Training Coordinator or a
Human Resources Specialist as one of the FSD's management staff). Although
TSA made adjustments to some FSDs' staff levels over time, officials
recognized that an across-the-board reassessment was needed.
The majority of the 25 FSDs we interviewed said that they were not
involved in either of these two reassessment efforts, and most who were
not involved were dissatisfied with their lack of involvement. Fourteen of
39 According to TSA officials, the hub and spoke reconfigurations and new
FSD staffing numbers were rolled out to the field in late July 2005-about
1 year after TSA began the reassessment and several months after we
conducted telephone interviews with FSDs.
the 25 FSDs said they had not been involved in TSA's reassessment of
airport hub and spoke configurations, and 19 of the 25 FSDs said they had
not been involved the reassessment of FSD management staff levels. TSA
headquarters officials said that they acknowledge the importance of FSDs'
involvement in agency planning efforts, and when practical and
appropriate, TSA has attempted to obtain a broad spectrum of FSD input.
They said that in conducting these two particular reassessments, they
formed a team that included three FSDs and three Deputy FSDs.
For FSDs to carry out their responsibilities effectively, FSDs, their
staff, and airport stakeholders need a clear statement of the FSDs'
authority, relative to other stakeholders, in the event of security
incidents. TSA's primary document outlining FSDs' authority is outdated,
and neither it, nor other statements TSA has issued, delineates the
authority of the FSD in various security situations relative to other
parties. The absence of a clear understanding of the authority of the
position has reportedly resulted in confusion during past security
incidents and has raised concerns among some stakeholders at both the
national and airport levels about possible ambiguity regarding FSDs'
authority during future incidents. Updating TSA's Delegation of Authority
to FSDs to clarify their authority relative to others and developing other
documents, as warranted, would benefit FSDs by further enabling them to
communicate and share consistent information about their authority with
their staff and airport stakeholders, including law enforcement agencies.
Stakeholders need to be clear on which agency has authority or lead
responsibility in the event of various types of security incidents to
reduce the likelihood of confusion or a delayed response.
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
To clarify the authority of the Federal Security Director during various
security incidents and help ensure a consistent understanding of the
authority of FSDs among FSDs, their staff, and airport stakeholders, we
recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant
Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security
Administration to take the following two actions:
o update TSA's Delegation of Authority to FSDs to clearly reflect the
authority of FSDs relative to other airport stakeholders during security
incidents and
o communicate the authority of the FSD position, as warranted, to FSDs
and all airport stakeholders.
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment. On
September 15, 2005, we received written comments on the draft report,
which are reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS, in its written
comments, generally concurred with our findings and recommendations, and
agreed that efforts to implement these recommendations are critical to
enable FSDs to effectively oversee security at the nation's commercial
airports. Regarding our recommendation that TSA update its Delegation of
Authority to FSDs and communicate this information to FSDs and relevant
stakeholders, DHS stated that a new restatement of the Delegation Order
has been drafted by a working group composed of FSDs from the FSD Advisory
Council and the Office of Chief Counsel. The Delegation Order has a new
concise format that restates some of the FSDs' previous authorities and
proposes some new authorities, such as entering into interagency
agreements and administering oaths, consistent with the evolving
operational requirements in the field. DHS further stated that the
Delegation Order is being internally coordinated for comment and clearance
and will be presented for consideration of senior leadership and the
Administrator. At that time, FSDs and airport stakeholders will be
notified of their responsibilities under the new Delegation Order.
TSA also provided additional technical comments on our draft report, which
we have incorporated where appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies to appropriate
congressional committees and subcommittees, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for TSA, and other
interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's
Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3404 or at [email protected]. Contact points for our
Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Cathleen A. Berrick
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
To examine the role of the Federal Security Director (FSD), we addressed
the following questions: (1) What are the roles and the responsibilities
of FSDs and how clear is their authority relative to that of other airport
stakeholders during security incidents? (2) To what extent are FSDs
involved in the development of federal aviation security policy? (3) How
have FSDs at selected airports formed and facilitated partnerships with
airport stakeholders, and how are these partnerships working? (4) What key
changes has the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) made or
planned to make to better support or empower the FSD position, and how
have selected FSDs viewed these efforts?
To address aspects of each of these objectives, we interviewed TSA's Chief
Operating Officer and other TSA officials from headquarters offices,
including the Aviation Security Program Office, Office of Law Enforcement,
Office of Compliance Programs, and Office of Human Resources. We reviewed
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, and other relevant laws, as
well as TSA documents related to the FSD position, including delegations
of authority, position descriptions, the Executive FSD Guide, performance
management guidance, and the FSD Advisory Council Charter. We also
reviewed TSA documents related to its recent operational changes, such as
the Next Generation Hiring Guide, Communication Liaison Group Mission
Statement,1 and the TSA Management Directive on Addressing Performance and
Conduct Problems. We met with Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
headquarters officials from the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate, which oversees TSA, and Counter-Terrorism Division and
Criminal Investigations Division officials within the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) headquarters. To address all but the fourth objective,
we also met with representatives of four national associations-the
American Association of Airport Executives, Airports Council
1 The Communications Liaison Group was subsequently renamed the Report
Group, but the original mission statement remained in effect.
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
International, Air Transport Association, and Airport Law Enforcement
Agencies Network. 2
In addition, to address all of this report's objectives, we conducted
field visits to seven airports. We selected these airports because they
were close to our staff and incorporated all five airport security
categories- three airports with an FSD dedicated to a single airport and
two sets of airports where the FSD was responsible for at least two
airports. Specifically, we visited three category X airports (Los Angeles
International Airport, California; Washington Dulles International
Airport, Virginia; and Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport,
Virginia); Bob Hope Airport, California (category I); Long Beach-Daugherty
Field Airport, California (category II); Charlottesville-Albemarle
Airport, Virginia (category III); and Shenandoah Valley Airport, Virginia
(category IV).
At each airport we visited, we met with local TSA officials and key
airport stakeholders to discuss the role of the FSD and FSD-stakeholder
partnerships and communication mechanisms. We met with the FSD (at the
three airports with dedicated FSDs and the two hub airports) or the
top-ranking TSA official (at the two spoke airports), as well as the
Assistant FSDs for Law Enforcement and Regulatory Inspection, where these
positions existed. During our meetings with FSDs, we also obtained their
views on changes TSA had made or planned to make to enhance the FSD
position. We also met with key airport stakeholders, including airport
managers, airport law enforcement officials, station managers representing
selected air carriers (15 representatives of 12 air carriers and,
additionally, two air carrier representative groups specific to two
airports we visited), and FBI Airport Liaison Agents and officials from
DHS's Customs and Border Protection as well as Immigration and Customs
2 The American Association of Airport Executives, which represents over
800 airports (mostly domestic) and has approximately 4,000 members, works
to shape federal policy governing aviation and ensure that the airport
perspective is included as legislation and regulations are developed. The
Airports Council International, with 567 members operating over 1,540
airports in 175 countries and territories, is an international association
of airports whose primary purpose is to advance the interests of airports
and to promote professional excellence in airport management and
operations. The Air Transport Association is the only trade association of
principal U.S. airlines. Among other things, it works with its members to
support measures that enhance airport safety and security. The Airport Law
Enforcement Agencies Network is composed of domestic and foreign airport
law enforcement agencies, or port authorities and their associated
national law enforcement, regulatory, or intelligence agencies. Its
mandates include facilitating the exchange of information concerning
airport-related crimes among member agencies and providing insight and
experience to governmental agencies.
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Enforcement (at the two international airports we visited). At each
airport, we conducted a single joint interview with representatives from
multiple air carriers, and we selected air carriers through different
means. At airports with an air carrier council, we asked the council head
to identify approximately three carriers. Although we left the final
decision to the council head, we suggested that he or she include the
largest or one of the largest carriers (according to the percentage of the
airport's passenger travel) at the airport, an independent air carrier,
and an international carrier, if it was an international airport. At
airports without an air carrier council, the Air Transport Association or
the airport operator recommended the air carriers. At the smallest
airports, we met with all air carriers because of the small numbers.
Because we selected a nonprobability sample of airports to visit, the
information we obtained during these visits cannot be generalized to all
airports or FSDs across the nation.
To corroborate what we learned from the five FSDs during our field visits,
we telephoned 25 additional FSDs to obtain their views on a range of
topics including recent TSA initiatives and federal aviation security
policy. We also included selected questions-regarding their need for
greater authority and flexibility-that we had posed in our March 2004
Web-based survey of all 155 FSDs, conducted to support other GAO aviation
security reviews. This allowed us to make a rough comparison between the
2004 responses and 2005 responses to these questions. We selected a random
sample of FSDs in place since September 1, 2004, to ensure they had an
experience base from which to answer our questions.3 We excluded from the
list the five FSDs we interviewed during our airport visits and
individuals who were no longer FSDs. 4 TSA reviewed our selection
procedures but did not know the identities of the specific 25 FSDs we
interviewed. The 25 FSDs were from a cross section of all five airport
security categories. A GAO survey specialist who was involved in designing
the Web-based survey, along with GAO staff knowledgeable about issues
facing FSDs developed the structured telephone interview
3 Twenty-one of the 25 FSDs we interviewed had responded to our March 2004
survey of all FSDs. Twenty of the 21 FSDs were named as FSDs in 2002, and
the other 1 became an FSD in 2003. The 4 FSDs who were not included in the
March 2004 survey were not named as FSDs until later in 2004, after we
conducted the initial survey.
4 We based our sample on a September 2004 list of FSDs. We subsequently
updated this list based on our review of TSA press releases of new FSD
assignments made from September 2004 through March 2005, and then verified
our revised list with TSA for accuracy and completeness before drawing our
sample of FSDs.
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
instrument. We conducted pretest interviews with 3 FSDs to ensure that the
questions were clear and concise, and subsequently conducted the 25
telephone interviews from late April to early May 2005. Although the
telephone interviews were conducted with a random sample of FSDs, the
sample is too small to generalize the interview results to all FSDs across
the nation with reliable statistical precision.
The practical difficulties of conducting interviews may introduce errors,
commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in
how a particular question is interpreted, in the sources of information
that are available to respondents, or in how the data were analyzed can
introduce unwanted variability into the results. We took steps in the
development of the questions, the data collection, and the data analysis
to minimize these nonsampling errors. For example, a survey specialist
helped develop the interview questions in collaboration with GAO staff
with subject matter expertise. Then, as mentioned earlier, the draft
questions were pretested to ensure that the questions were relevant,
clearly stated, and easy to comprehend. Interviews were conducted by GAO
staff familiar with the subject matter and proper interviewing procedures.
Finally, when the data were analyzed, a second, independent analyst
checked to make sure that the results were correct.
We conducted our work from August 2004 through September 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions from Interviews with 25 Federal
Security Directors
Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions from Interviews with 25
Federal Security Directors Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions
from Interviews with 25 Federal Security Directors Appendix II: Responses
to Selected Questions from Interviews with 25 Federal Security Directors
Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions from Interviews with 25
Federal Security Directors Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions
from Interviews with 25 Federal Security Directors Appendix II: Responses
to Selected Questions from Interviews with 25 Federal Security Directors
Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions from Interviews with 25
Federal Security Directors Appendix II: Responses to Selected Questions
from Interviews with 25 Federal Security Directors Appendix II: Responses
to Selected Questions from Interviews with 25 Federal Security Directors
Appendix III: Comments from the
Department of Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact Cathleen A. Berrick, (202) 512-8777 or [email protected]
Acknowledgments In addition to the contact mentioned above, Glenn Davis,
Assistant Director; David Alexander; Grace Coleman; Tracey Cross; Wayne
Ekblad; David Hancock; Stuart Kaufman; Janice Latimer; Thomas Lombardi;
and Lori Weiss made key contributions to this report.
(440322) Page 55 GAO-05-935 Aviation Security
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