Nuclear Security: Actions Needed by DOE to Improve Security of	 
Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material at Its Energy, Science and	 
Environment Sites (26-JUL-05, GAO-05-934T).			 
                                                                 
A successful terrorist attack on a Department of Energy (DOE)	 
site containing nuclear weapons material could have devastating  
effects for the site and nearby communities. DOE's Office of the 
Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment (ESE), which 
is responsible for DOE operations in areas such as energy	 
research, manages five sites that contain weapons-grade nuclear  
material. A heavily armed security force equipped with such items
as automatic weapons protects ESE sites. GAO was asked to examine
(1) the extent to which ESE protective forces are meeting DOE's  
existing readiness requirements and (2) the actions DOE and ESE  
will need to take to successfully defend against the larger,	 
revised terrorist threat identified in the October 2004 design	 
basis threat (DBT) by DOE's implementation deadline of October	 
2008.								 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-934T					        
    ACCNO:   A31122						        
  TITLE:     Nuclear Security: Actions Needed by DOE to Improve       
Security of Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material at Its Energy, Science
and Environment Sites						 
     DATE:   07/26/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Combat readiness					 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Nuclear facility security				 
	     Nuclear weapons					 
	     Physical security					 
	     Standards						 
	     Strategic forces					 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Terrorists 					 

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GAO-05-934T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT NUCLEAR SECURITY

Tuesday, July 26, 2005

 Actions Needed by DOE to Improve Security of Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material at
                   its Energy, Science and Environment Sites

Statement of Gene Aloise, Director Natural Resources and Environment

GAO-05-934T

[IMG]

July 26, 2005

NUCLEAR SECURITY

Actions Needed by DOE to Improve Security of Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material at
its Energy, Science and Environment Sites

                                 What GAO Found

Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing weapons-grade nuclear
material generally meet existing key DOE readiness requirements.
Specifically, GAO determined that ESE protective forces generally comply
with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and
equipment standardization and that the five ESE sites had the required
training programs, facilities, and equipment. However, GAO did find some
weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the ability of
protective forces to defend these sites. For example, despite the
importance of training exercises in which protective forces undergo
simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists (force-on-force
exercises), DOE neither sets standards for individual protective force
officers to participate in these exercises, nor does it require sites to
track individual participation. GAO also found that protective force
officers at all five of the ESE sites reported problems with their radio
communications systems. Specifically, according to 66 of the 105
protective force officers GAO interviewed, they did not always have
dependable radio communications as required by the DOE Manual 473.2-2,
Protective Force Program Manual. Security officials stated that related
improvements were under way.

To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in
the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they
will need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include
transforming its current protective force into an elite, possibly
federalized, force, developing and deploying new security technologies to
reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack, consolidating
and eliminating nuclear weapons material between and among ESE sites, and
creating a sound ESE management structure that has sufficient authority to
ensure coordination across all ESE offices that have weapons-grade nuclear
material. However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite force,
are in early stages of development and will require significant commitment
of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the
October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is uncertain.

                          DOE Protective Force Member

Source: DOE.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the work you requested on nuclear
security at the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of the Under Secretary
for Energy, Science and Environment (ESE). My testimony is based on the
report being released today, entitled Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of
the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take
Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat
(GAO-05-611).

DOE has long recognized that a successful terrorist attack on a site
containing the material used in nuclear weapons, such as plutonium or
highly enriched uranium, could have devastating consequences for the site
and its surrounding communities. The risks associated with these
materials, which in specified forms and quantities are referred to as
Category I special nuclear material, vary but include theft for use in an
illegal nuclear weapon; the creation of improvised nuclear devices capable
of producing a nuclear yield; and the creation of so-called "dirty bombs,"
in which conventional explosives are used to disperse radioactive
material.

Because terrorist attacks could have such devastating consequences, an
effective safeguards and security program is essential. For many years, a
key component for DOE security programs has been the development of the
design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies the
potential size and capabilities of adversary forces. In response to the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOE issued an updated DBT in May
2003 and gave its sites until October 2006 to comply with its
requirements. In response to recommendations in our April 2004 report to
this Subcommittee,1 congressional criticism, and a new review of
intelligence data, DOE issued a revised DBT in October 2004. The 2004 DBT
identified a larger terrorist threat for DOE sites than the 2003 DBT.
Consequently, DOE is not requiring full compliance with the 2004 DBT until
October 2008 in order to allow its sites adequate time to implement
measures to defeat this larger terrorist threat. By July 29, 2005, DOE
sites will have to forward 2004 DBT implementation plans to the Deputy
Secretary of Energy and, within 3 months, begin submitting quarterly DBT
implementation reports. At the time of our review, cost estimates were
still preliminary, but

1See GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before
It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-623 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 27, 2004).

security officials at ESE sites said that, collectively, they may require
an additional $384 million-$584 million over the next several years in
order for all ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material to meet
the 2004 DBT.

The private contractors who operate DOE's facilities counter the terrorist
threat contained in the DBT with a multifaceted protective system. While
specific measures vary from site to site, a key universal component of
DOE's protective system is a heavily armed protective force equipped with
such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor, and
chemical protective gear.

On June 22, 2004, we testified before this Subcommittee, identifying
several issues that could impede ESE's ability to fully meet the threat
contained in the May 2003 DBT by DOE's October 2006 deadline.2 Not the
least of theses issues was the lack of a departmentwide, multiyear, fully
resourced implementation plan for meeting DBT requirements; the plan would
have to include important programmatic activities, such as the closure of
facilities and the transportation of special nuclear material.

Subsequently, you asked us to examine ESE in more detail and to determine,
for the five ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material, (1) the
extent to which ESE protective forces are meeting DOE's existing readiness
requirements and (2) what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to
successfully defend against the larger, revised terrorist threat
identified in the October 2004 DBT by DOE's implementation deadline of
October 2008.

To determine the extent to which protective forces at ESE sites are
meeting existing DOE readiness requirements, we reviewed pertinent
literature about the factors that affect the readiness of forces, such as
military forces, that are like those defending ESE sites. We conducted
structured interviews with 105 randomly selected ESE protective force
officers at the five ESE sites that contain Category I special nuclear
material. While the responses from these interviews are not projectable to
the entire universe of ESE protective force officers, we did speak to
about 10 percent of the total protective forces at the five sites. We
asked the

2See GAO, Nuclear Security: Several Issues Could Impede the Ability of
DOE's Office of Energy, Science and Environment to Meet the May 2003
Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-894T (Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2004).

officers questions designed to determine their readiness to defend the
sites, including questions about their morale, training, and equipment. We
also reviewed the training records of the 105 officers for selected
firearms and physical fitness qualifications to determine if these
officers complied with existing DOE requirements and regulations. Finally,
we reviewed the equipment used by ESE protective forces to determine if it
met current DOE requirements.

To determine what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully
defend against the new threat identified in the October 2004 DBT by DOE's
implementation deadline of October 2008, we reviewed the October 2004 DBT
and associated guidance documents. We discussed the October 2004 DBT with
officials in DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance and
with officials in ESE's Offices of Environmental Management; Nuclear
Energy, Science and Technology; and Science, which oversee the five ESE
sites that contain Category I special nuclear material. Finally, where
available, we reviewed documents prepared by ESE officials on how they
plan to comply with the October 2004 DBT. We performed our work between
March 2004 and July 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

In summary, we found the following:

o  	Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing Category I special
nuclear material generally meet existing DOE readiness requirements.
However, we did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely
affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. With
respect to current readiness, 102 of the 105 officers we interviewed
stated that they believed that they and their fellow officers understood
what was expected of them if the site were attacked by a terrorist group.
Moreover, 65 of the 105 officers rated themselves as highly ready to
defend their site while 20 officers rated themselves as somewhat or
moderately ready. Supporting their views, we found that the five ESE sites
we visited had the required training programs, facilities, and equipment,
and that the 105 protective force members whose records we reviewed
generally complied with existing DOE standards for firearms proficiency,
physical fitness levels, and equipment standardization. However, we did
find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the ability
of protective forces to defend these sites. For example, despite the
importance of training exercises in which protective forces undergo
simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists (force-on-force
exercises), DOE neither sets standards for individual protective force
officers to participate in these exercises, nor requires sites to track
individual

participation. While 84 of the 105 protective force officers we
interviewed stated they had participated in a force-on-force exercise,
only 46 of the 84 protective force officers believed that the
force-on-force exercises they had participated in were either realistic or
somewhat realistic. We also found that protective force officers at all
five of the ESE sites reported problems with their radio communications
systems. Specifically, according to 66 of the 105 protective force
officers we interviewed, they did not always have dependable radio
communications, as required by DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force
Program Manual. Site security officials stated that improvements were
underway and would be completed this year.

o  	To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained
in the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they
will need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include
transforming its current protective force into an "elite force"-modeled on
U.S. Special Forces, developing and deploying new security technologies to
reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack, consolidating
and eliminating nuclear weapons material between and among sites, and
creating a sound ESE management structure that has sufficient authority to
ensure coordination across all ESE offices that have Category I special
nuclear material. However, these initiatives, particularly an elite force,
are in the early stages of development and will require a significant
commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE. Consequently,
their completion by the 2008 October DBT implementation deadline is
uncertain.

In our report to you we made five recommendations to the Secretary of
Energy to track and increase protective force officers' participation in
force-on-force training exercises, correct weaknesses with protective
force officers' equipment, coordinate implementation of DOE's various
efforts designed to meet the 2004 DBT through the development of a
departmentwide, multiyear implementation plan, and create a more effective
ESE security organization.

DOE concurred with our report, accepted our recommendations and provided
an update on actions it anticipated taking to address our recommendations.
While we believe that most of DOE's anticipated actions will be responsive
to our recommendations, we are concerned about DOE's response to our
recommendation that it develop a departmentwide, multiyear implementation
plan for meeting the 2004 DBT requirements. Specifically, in responding to
this recommendation, DOE cited only individual efforts to address the
development of an elite force, the deployment of enhanced security
technologies, and the consolidation

of special nuclear material, not the development of a departmentwide,
multiyear implementation plan. While each of these efforts is important,
we continue to believe that DOE cannot be successful in meeting the
requirements of the 2004 DBT by its deadline of October 2008 without an
integrated effort that is built around a comprehensive plan.

                                   Background

Five ESE sites collectively contain substantial quantities of Category I
special nuclear material. These include the following:

o  	the Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina, and the Hanford
Site in Richland, Washington, which are managed by the Office of
Environmental Management;

o  	the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and the
Argonne National Laboratory-West, which are located in Idaho Falls, Idaho,
and are managed by the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology3;
and

o  	the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which is
managed by the Office of Science.

Contractors operate each site for ESE. DOE has requested over $300 million
in fiscal year 2006 for security at these five sites.

Within DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, DOE's
Office of Security develops and promulgates orders and policies to guide
the department's safeguards and security programs. DOE's overall security
policy is contained in DOE Order 470.1, Safeguards and Security Program,
which was originally approved in 1995. The key component of DOE's approach
to security is the DBT, a classified document that identifies the
characteristics of the potential threats to DOE assets. A classified
companion document, the Adversary Capabilities List, provides additional
information on terrorist capabilities and equipment. The DBT traditionally
has been based on a classified, multiagency intelligence community
assessment of potential terrorist threats, known as the Postulated Threat.
The threat from terrorist groups is generally the most demanding threat
contained in the DBT.

3The two Idaho sites were consolidated as a single site, now known as the
Idaho National Laboratory, in February 2005.

DOE counters the terrorist threat specified in the DBT with a multifaceted
protective system. While specific measures vary from site to site, all
protective systems at DOE's most sensitive sites employ a defense-indepth
concept that includes the following:

o  a variety of integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting
intruders;

o  physical barriers, such as fences and antivehicle obstacles;

o  	numerous access control points, such as turnstiles, badge readers,
vehicle inspection stations, radiation detectors, and metal detectors;

o  	operational security procedures, such as a "two person" rule that
prevents only one person from having access to special nuclear material;
and

o  hardened facilities and vaults.

Each site also has a heavily armed protective force that is often equipped
with such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor,
and chemical protective gear. These protective forces are comprised of
Security Police Officers who are classified into three groups: Security
Police Officer-I, Security Police Officer-II, and Security Police
Officer-III. Security Police Officer-Is are only assigned to fixed, armed
posts. Generally, very few of these officers are used at ESE sites because
of the limited roles they can fill. Security Police Officer-IIs generally
are assigned to posts such as access control booths, or to foot or vehicle
patrols. Finally, Security Police Officer-IIIs are responsible for
operations such as hostage rescue and the recapture and recovery of
special nuclear material. According to federal regulations, Security
Police Officer-IIIs have more demanding physical fitness and training
standards than Security Police Officer-Is or Security Police Officer-IIs.
The ESE sites we visited employ about 1,000 Security Police Officer-IIs
and Security Police Officer-IIIs. ESE protective forces work for private
contractors and are unionized.

Protective force duties and requirements, such as physical fitness
standards, are explained in detail in DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force
Program Manual, as well as in DOE regulations (10 C.F.R. pt. 1046,
Physical Protection of Security Interests). DOE issued the current
Protective Force Program Manual in June 2000. Although protective forces
are expected to comply with the duties and requirements established in DOE
policies, deviations from these policies are allowed as long as certain
approval and notification criteria are met.

In addition to complying with these security requirements, DOE protective
systems, including protective forces, also must meet performance
standards. For example, DOE sites are required to demonstrate that their
protective systems are capable of defending special nuclear material
against terrorist forces identified in the DBT. The performance of
protective systems is formally and regularly examined through
vulnerability assessments. A vulnerability assessment is a systematic
evaluation process in which qualitative and quantitative techniques are
applied to detect vulnerabilities and arrive at effective protection of
specific assets, such as special nuclear material. To conduct such
assessments, DOE uses, among other things, subject matter experts, such as
U.S. Special Forces; computer modeling to simulate attacks; and
forceon-force exercises, in which the site's protective forces undergo
simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists. In addition to their use
in evaluating the effectiveness of physical protection strategies, DOE
believes force-onforce exercises are the most realistic representation of
adversary attacks that can be used to train protective forces.

Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing Category I special
nuclear material generally meet existing key DOE readiness requirements.
Specifically, we determined that ESE protective forces generally comply
with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and
equipment standardization and that the five ESE sites had the required
training programs, facilities, and equipment. In addition, we found that
the majority of the 105 protective force members we interviewed at ESE
sites generally believe that they currently are ready to perform their
mission of protecting the site's special nuclear material. However, we did
find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could impair the ability of ESE
protective forces to defend their sites.

  Protective Forces at ESE Sites Generally Meet Established DOE Readiness
  Requirements, but Some Weaknesses in Protective Force Practices Exist

Protective Force Officers Are Confident in Their Current Overall Readiness
and Generally Meet the DOE Training and Equipment Requirements We Reviewed

A ready force should possess a sufficient number of experienced, trained,
and properly equipped personnel. Through realistic and comprehensive
training, these personnel are forged into a cohesive unit that can perform
its tasks even under extreme conditions. DOE orders and federal
regulations establish the framework for ensuring that DOE protective
forces are ready to perform their mission. We found that ESE protective
force officers generally believe that they are ready to perform their
mission. Specifically, 102 of the 105 officers we interviewed stated that
they believed that they, and their fellow officers, understood what was
expected of them should the site be attacked by a terrorist group.
Moreover, 65 of the 105 officers rated the readiness of their site's

protective force as high, while 20 officers rated their protective force
as somewhat or moderately ready to defend the site. Only a minority of the
officers (16 of 105) we interviewed rated the readiness of their force to
defend their sites as low. In addition, the majority of officers we
interviewed believed they and the protective force officers with whom they
worked on a regular basis have formed a cohesive unit that would be able
to perform their most essential mission-that of protecting special nuclear
material. For example, of the 105 officers we interviewed, 84 officers
responded that they had a high degree of confidence in their fellow
officers in the event of a terrorist attack, and 88 reported that their
fellow officers would be willing to risk their lives in defense of their
site.

As called for in DOE's Protective Force Program Manual, readiness is
achieved through appropriate training and equipment. Each of the five
sites we visited had formally approved annual training plans. Each site
generally had the training facilities, such as firearms ranges,
classrooms, computer terminals, and exercise equipment, which enabled them
to meet their current DOE and federal training requirements. Furthermore,
each site maintained computerized databases for tracking individual
protective force officers' compliance with training requirements. To
determine if these programs and facilities were being used to implement
the DOE requirements and federal regulations, we focused on three key
areas- firearms proficiency, physical fitness, and protective force
officer equipment.

o  	Firearms Proficiency. DOE's Protective Force Program Manual states
that protective force officers must demonstrate their proficiency with the
weapons that are assigned to them every 6 months. According to the
training records of the 105 protective force officers we interviewed, 79
had met this proficiency requirement with their primary weapon, the M-4 or
M16 semiautomatic rifle. Of the 26 officers who had not met this
requirement within the 6 month time frame, 11 officers were all located at
one site and 8 of these 11 officers did not meet the requirement until 2
to 5 months after the required time. According to an official at this
site, seven of the eight officers could not complete the requirement in a
timely fashion because the site's firing range was closed for the
investigation of an accidental weapon discharge that had resulted in an
injury to a protective force officer. We determined that 2 of the 26
officers did not complete the requirement for medical reasons. We were not
given reasons why the remaining officers did not meet the requirement.

o  	Physical Fitness. Under DOE regulations,4 DOE's contractors'
protective force personnel who are authorized to carry firearms must meet
a minimum standard for physical fitness every 12 months. There are two
standards for such personnel-Offensive Combative and Defensive Combative.
All Security Police Officer-IIIs, which include DOE special response team
members, must meet the Offensive Combative standard, which requires a
1-mile run in no more than 8 minutes 30 seconds and a 40-yard
prone-to-running dash in no more than 8 seconds. All other protective
officers authorized to carry firearms must meet the Defensive Combative
standard, which requires a one-half mile run in no more than 4 minutes 40
seconds and a 40-yard prone-to-running dash in no more than 8.5 seconds.
According to the training records of the 105 protective force officers we
reviewed, 103 of the 105 protective force officers had met the standard
required by federal regulation for their position. Two officers who did
not meet the requirement were on medical restriction. The records for
another officer showed him as having met the requirement, but additional
records provided by the site showed the officer had completed the run in a
time that exceeded the standard. Site officials could not provide an
explanation for this discrepancy.

o  	Protective Officer Equipment. DOE's Protective Force Program Manual
sets a number of requirements for protective force equipment. For example,
all Security Police Officers are required to carry a minimum set of
equipment, including a portable radio, a handgun, and an intermediate
force weapon such as a baton. In addition, a mask to protect against a
chemical attack must be carried or available to them. All Security Police
Officer-IIs and Security Police Officer-IIIs must also have access to
personal protective body armor. In addition, firearms must be kept
serviceable at all times and must be inspected by a DOE-certified armorer
at least twice a year to ensure serviceability. Issued firearms must be
inventoried at the beginning of each shift, an inventory of all firearms
in storage must be conducted weekly, and a complete inventory of all
firearms must be conducted on a monthly basis. Finally, DOE protective
forces equipment must be tailored to counter adversaries identified in the
DBT. To this end, sites employ a variety of equipment, including automatic
weapons, night vision equipment, and body armor. In most cases, each
site's protective forces carried or had access to the required minimum
standard duty equipment. Most sites demonstrated that they had access to
certified armorers, and each site maintained the required firearms
maintenance, inspection, and inventory records, often kept in a detailed

410 C.F.R. pt. 1046, subpt. B, app. A.

computerized database. The appropriate policies and procedures were also
in place for the inventory of firearms. In addition, some sites have
substantially increased their protective forces weaponry since September
11, 2001, or have plans to further enhance these capabilities to meet the
2004 DBT.

Some Weaknesses in ESE Site Protective Force Practices Exist

While protective forces at ESE sites are generally meeting current DOE
requirements, we identified some weaknesses in ESE protective force
practices that could adversely affect the current readiness of ESE
protective forces to defend their sites. These include protective force
officers' lack of participation in realistic force-on-force exercises; the
frequency and quality of training opportunities; the lack of dependable
communications systems; insufficient protective gear, including protective
body armor and chemical protective gear; and the lack of armored vehicles.

o  	Performance Testing and Training. According to DOE's Protective Force
Program Manual, performance tests are used to evaluate and verify the
effectiveness of protective force programs and to provide needed training.
A force-on-force exercise is one type of performance test during which the
protective force engages in a simulated battle against a mock adversary
force, employing the weapons, equipment, and methodologies postulated in
the DBT. DOE believes that force-on-force exercises are a valuable
training tool for protective force officers. Consequently, DOE policy
requires that force-on-force exercises be held at least once a year at
sites that possess Category I quantities of special nuclear material or
Category II quantities that can be rolled up to Category I quantities.
However, DOE neither sets standards for individual protective force
officers' participation in these exercises, nor requires sites to track
individual participation. While 84 of the 105 protective force officers we
interviewed stated they had participated in a force-on-force exercise,
only 46 of the 84 protective force officers believed that the
force-on-force exercises they had participated in were either realistic or
somewhat realistic. Additionally, protective force officers often told us
that they did not have frequent and realistic tactical training. In this
regard, 33 of the 84 protective force officers reported that safety
considerations interfered with the realism of the force-on-force
exercises, with some protective force officers stating that they were
limited in the tactics they could employ. For example, some protective
force officers stated that they were not allowed to run up stairwells,
climb fences, or exceed the speed limit in patrol vehicles. Contractors'
protective force managers agreed that safety requirements limited the kind
of realistic force-on-force training that are needed to ensure effective
protective force performance.

o  	Communications Equipment. According to DOE's Protective Force Program
Manual, the radios protective force officers use must be capable of
two-way communications, provide intelligible voice communications, and be
readily available in sufficient numbers to equip protective force
personnel. In addition, a sufficient number of batteries must be available
and maintained in a charged condition. Protective force officers at all
five of the sites we visited reported problems with their radio
communications systems. Specifically, 66 of the 105 protective force
officers reported that they did not always have dependable radio
communications, with 23 officers identifying sporadic battery life, and 29
officers reporting poor reception at some locations on site as the two
most significant problems. In addition, some of the protective force
officers believed that radio communications were not sufficient to support
their operations and could not be relied on if a terrorist attack
occurred. Site security officials at two sites acknowledged that efforts
were under way to improve radio communications equipment. In addition,
security officials said other forms of communications, such as telephones,
cellular telephones, and pagers, were provided for protective forces to
ensure that they could communicate effectively.

o  	Protective Body Armor. DOE's Protective Force Program Manual requires
that Security Police Officer-IIs and -IIIs wear body armor or that body
armor be stationed in a way that allows them to quickly put it on to
respond to an attack without negatively impacting response times. At one
site, we found that most Security Police Officer-IIs had not been issued
protective body armor because the site had requested and received in July
2003 a waiver to deviate from the requirement to equip all Security Police
Officer-IIs with body armor. The waiver was sought for a number of
reasons, including the (1) increased potential for heat-related injuries
while wearing body armor during warm weather, (2) increased equipment load
that armor would place on protective force members, (3) costs of acquiring
the necessary quantity of body armor and the subsequent replacement costs,
and (4) associated risks of not providing all Security Police Officer-IIs
with body armor could be mitigated by using cover provided at the site by
natural and man-made barriers. According to a site security official, this
waiver is currently being reviewed because of the increased threat
contained in the 2004 DBT.

o  	Special Response Team Capabilities. Security Police Officers-IIIs
serve on special response teams responsible for offensive operations, such
as hostage rescue and the recapture and recovery of special nuclear
material. Special response teams are often assigned unique equipment,
including specially encrypted radios; body armor that provides increased
levels of protection; special suits that enable officers to operate and
fight in

chemically contaminated environments; special vehicles, including armored
vehicles; submachine guns; light machine guns; grenade launchers; and
precision rifles, such as Remington 700 rifles and Barrett .50 caliber
rifles. These response teams are also issued breaching tools to allow them
to reenter facilities to which terrorists may have gained access. Each
site with Category I special nuclear material must have a special response
team capability available on a continuous basis. However, one ESE site
does not have this capability and, instead, relies on another
organization, through a formal memorandum of understanding, to provide a
special response team. This arrangement, however, has not been
comprehensively performance-tested, as called for in the memorandum of
understanding. Site officials state that they will soon conduct the first
comprehensive performance test of this memorandum of understanding.

o  	Chemical Protective Gear. DOE's Protective Force Program Manual
specifies that all Security Police Officer-IIs and -IIIs be provided, at a
minimum, with protective masks that provide for nuclear, chemical, and
biological protection. Other additional chemical protective gear and
procedures are delegated to the sites. At the four sites with special
response teams, we found that the teams all had special suits that allowed
them to operate and fight in environments that might be chemically
contaminated. For Security Police Officers-IIs, chemical protective
equipment and expectations for fighting in chemically contaminated
environments varied. For example, two sites provided additional protective
equipment for their Security Police Officer-IIs and expected them to fight
in such environments. Another site did not provide additional equipment
but expected its Security Police Officer-IIs to evacuate along with other
site workers. Finally, the one site that did not have a special response
team expected its Security Police Officer-IIs to fight in chemically
contaminated environments. However, the site provided no additional
protective gear for its officers other than standard-duty issue
long-sleeved shirts and the required protective masks.

o  	Protective Force Vehicles. We found that ESE sites currently do not
have the same level of vehicle protection as National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) sites that also have Category I special nuclear
material. Specifically, while not a DOE requirement, all NNSA sites with
Category I special nuclear material currently operate armored vehicles.
However, only one of the five ESE sites with Category I special nuclear
material operated armored vehicles at the time of our review. One other
ESE site was planning to deploy armored vehicles.

  DOE and ESE Officials Need to Take Several Prompt and Coordinated Actions to
  Address the New DBT Requirements by 2008

To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in
the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they
need to take several actions. These include transforming its current
protective force into an elite force, developing and deploying new
security technologies, consolidating and eliminating special nuclear
material, and making organizational improvements within ESE's security
program. However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite force,
are in early stages of development and will require a significant
commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their
completion by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is uncertain.
The status of these initiatives is as follows:

o  	Elite Forces. DOE officials believe that the way its sites, including
those sites managed by ESE, currently train their contractor-operated
protective forces will not be adequate to defeat the terrorist threat
contained in the 2004 DBT. This view is shared by most protective force
officers (74 out of 105) and their contractor protective force managers
who report that they are not at all confident in their current ability to
defeat the new threats contained in the 2004 DBT. In response, the
department has proposed the development of an elite force that would be
patterned after U. S. Special Forces and might eventually be converted
from a contractor-operated force into a federal force. Nevertheless,
despite broad support, DOE's proposal for an elite force remains largely
in the conceptual phase. DOE has developed a preliminary draft
implementation plan that lays out highlevel milestones and key activities,
but this plan has not been formally approved by the Office of Security and
Safety Performance Assurance. The draft implementation plan recognizes
that DOE will have to undertake and complete a number of complex tasks in
order to develop the elite force envisioned. For example, DOE will have to
revise its existing protective forces policies to incorporate, among other
things, the increased training standards that are needed to create an
elite force. Since this proposal is only in the conceptual phase,
completing this effort by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is
unlikely.

o  	New Security Technologies. DOE is seeking to improve the effectiveness
and survivability of its protective forces by developing and deploying new
security technologies. It believes technologies can reduce the risk to
protective forces in case of an attack and can provide additional response
time to meet and defeat an attack. Sixteen of the 105 protective force
officers we interviewed generally supported this view and said they needed
enhanced detection technologies that would allow them to detect
adversaries at much greater ranges than is currently possible at most
sites. However, a senior DOE official recently conceded that the
department has not yet taken the formal steps necessary to coordinate
investment in

emerging security technologies and that the role of technology in helping
sites meet the new threats contained in the 2004 DBT by the department's
deadline of October 2008 is uncertain.

o  	Consolidation and Elimination of Materials. ESE's current strategy to
meet the October 2008 deadline relies heavily on consolidating and
eliminating special nuclear material between and among ESE sites. For
example, the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology plans to
down-blend special nuclear material and extract medically useful isotopes
at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory-an Office of Science site. This
action would eliminate most of the security concerns surrounding the
material. Neither program office, however, has been able to formally agree
on its share of additional security costs, which have increased
significantly because of the new DBT. In addition, neither ESE nor DOE has
developed a comprehensive, departmentwide plan to achieve the needed
cooperation and agreement among the sites and program offices to
consolidate special nuclear material, as we recommended in our April 2004
report. In the absence of a comprehensive plan, completing most of these
consolidation activities by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline
is unlikely.

o  	Organizational Improvements. The ESE headquarters security
organization is not well suited to meeting the challenges associated with
implementing the 2004 DBT. Specifically, there is no centralized security
organization within the Office of the Under Secretary, ESE. The individual
who serves as the Acting ESE Security Director has been detailed to the
Office by DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance and
has no programmatic authority or staff. This lack of authority limits the
Director's ability to facilitate ESE and DOE-wide cooperation on such
issues as material down-blending at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and
material consolidation at other ESE sites.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.

GAO Contact and For further information on this testimony, please contact
Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841. James Noel, Jonathan Gill, Don Cowan, and
Preston Heard Staff made key contributions to this testimony.

  Acknowledgments

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