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United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

September 7, 2005

Report to Congressional Committees

Subject: Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005 Elections

Fostering a democratic and publicly elected government in Iraq is a U.S. foreign policy priority. According to the President, the United States intends to help Iraq achieve democracy and has a vital national interest in the success of free institutions in Iraq. Toward that end, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) transferred power to a sovereign Iraqi interim government on June 28, 2004. With assistance from the United Nations (UN) and international community,¹ the interim government held a national election for a transitional National Assembly on January 30, 2005. To help Iraq prepare for this election, the United States obligated approximately \$130 million to provide assistance to the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI),² Iraqi nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and political entities. Much of this assistance is directed at not only the January 30 elections but also the two subsequent elections—a constitutional referendum and political election—scheduled before the end of 2005.

As part of our effort to monitor Iraq reconstruction, we have gathered information on efforts to support Iraq's political transition. This report was initiated under the Comptroller General's statutory authority and is being addressed to the committees of jurisdiction. In particular, this report provides information on (1) U.S. assistance to Iraq for the elections and (2) improvements in the elections process that participating organizations identified for future elections.

To address these objectives, we interviewed staff and examined documents from U.S. agencies, grant recipients, and UN agencies; we also attended a UN conference on the January 2005 elections. Our description of elections assistance is limited to programs funded through U.S. appropriations for nonsecurity elections assistance, as reported in grant agreements and publicly available Department of State and other U.S. government reports to Congress.³ To describe U.S. assistance, we interviewed staff in

¹In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom, European Union, and Chile provided technical advisers to the IECI to assist in the administration of the January 2005 election. The UN also coordinated this technical assistance to prevent duplication of efforts and gaps in the assistance.

²The IECI is the Iraqi government body responsible for administering these three elections. The CPA established the IECI before the transfer of power to Iraqi authorities.

³Section 2207 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (P.L. 108-106) required the Office of Management and Budget to submit a report to the Congress every 90 days that updates the use of the funds appropriated in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.

Washington, D.C., on-site in Amman, Jordan, and by telephone in Baghdad, Iraq. We also examined documents such as grant agreements, work plans, performance monitoring plans, and periodic reporting from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State, the National Endowment of Democracy, IFES,⁴ the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and other grantees. We traveled to Amman, Jordan, to meet with officials from the U.S. government and implementing partners. Due to security conditions, we were unable to travel to Iraq. As feasible, we spoke to representatives from Iraqi NGOs to obtain information on their U.S.-funded programs. Program results and other data in this correspondence are based on reports and information from the organizations noted above and our review of U.S. government oversight of them. We believe the data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To describe improvements for future Iraqi elections, we attended a UN conference at which organizations that helped prepare for the elections identified problems and improvements; we also reviewed the UN's summary report of the conference. We conducted our work from September 2004 through July 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Summary

The United States obligated approximately \$130 million for nonsecurity assistance to help Iraq undertake elections in 2005. The largest U.S.-funded area of nonsecurity election assistance was \$41.1 million awarded by USAID to IFES to provide technical expertise directly to the IECI to help it conduct the elections and make key procurements. The Department of State provided \$30 million to NDI and IRI to advise, train, and help organize democratically oriented political parties. Both USAID and the Department of State funded \$25.2 million of voter education efforts in Iraq, with grants obligated to IRI, Voice for Humanity, and Iraqi NGOs to conduct voter outreach. USAID provided an additional grant of \$14.2 million to IFES to build an Iraqi NGO network to identify and monitor elections-related violence. USAID also obligated \$14 million to NDI to develop an Iraqi NGO domestic elections monitor network. The United States sought the participation of Iraqi women in elections with \$5.8 million from the Department of State and through USAID's integrated gender strategy. The United States, through the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I), also helped the Iraqi government provide security to conduct the elections.

The UN, which coordinated assistance from the international community, convened a post-elections conference that included IECI, IFES, UN, and USAID officials to assess preparations for the January 30, 2005, elections and to identify areas needing improvement before the next elections. Conference participants identified overall elections management, media involvement in the elections process, and voter education as areas needing improvement. For example, regarding elections management, participants noted that reporting systems and communication practices among elections headquarters, governorate offices, and district offices need to be improved to avoid confusion about official policy guidance. In addition, participants suggested that the IECI develop a way to address regional differences in voter education. For example, the development of materials by the IECI in languages such

⁴IFES was formally known as the International Foundation for Election Systems.

as Assyrian and Turkmen would help avoid inconsistencies and inaccurate translations of official voter education materials.

Background

On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred power to a sovereign Iraqi interim government. Under the *Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period*, this interim government was responsible for holding an election for a 275-member transitional National Assembly. The election occurred on January 30, 2005, and as a result, 12 political entities won at least one seat in the National Assembly (see table 1). Out of approximately 14.3 million registered voters, almost 8.5 million voted, according to State Department reporting. The transitional National Assembly first met on March 16, 2005, and subsequently elected the Presidency Council—a president and two deputies.


Table 1: Transitional National Assembly Results from the January 2005 Election

Political entity	Number of seats
Unified Iraq Coalition	140
Kurdistan Alliance List	75
Iraqi List	40
Iraqis	5
Turkman Iraq Front	3
National Independent Cadres and Elites	3
Islamic Action Organization in Iraq/ Central Direction	2
Islamic Group of Kurdistan/Iraq	2
Nation Union	2
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering	1
National Democratic Alliance	1
Al Rafideen National List	1
Total	275

Source: IFES.

A key function of the National Assembly is to write a draft constitution that the Iraqi people will then vote on in a general referendum to be held by October 15, 2005, (see fig. 1). If the permanent constitution is approved, elections for a permanent government would take place no later than December 15, 2005, and the permanent government would take office no later than December 31, 2005. However, if a majority of Iraqi voters do not approve the draft constitution or if two-thirds of the voters in three or more governorates reject it, the National Assembly will be dissolved. Elections for a new National Assembly would then take place by December 15, 2005. The new government would continue to operate under the transitional law and would be responsible for drafting another constitution.

Figure 1: Timeline for Iraqi Elections




Source: GAO analysis of the Law of Administration of Iraq for the Transitional Period, March 8, 2004.

U.S. Programs Help Develop the Capacity of Iraqis to Undertake 2005 Elections

The United States obligated about \$130 million in nonsecurity assistance for the Iraqi 2005 elections in the areas of elections administration assistance, political party development, voter education, elections violence monitoring, domestic monitoring, and women’s participation. Most of the major programs related to the elections are to continue through the end of 2005. Figure 2 illustrates the breakdown of U.S.-funded areas of nonsecurity elections assistance; enclosure 1 provides a list of the grants that fund U.S. electoral assistance to Iraq. In addition to nonsecurity assistance, the Department of Defense provided security and logistics support to the Iraqi government throughout the electoral process.

Figure 2: U.S.-funded Areas of Nonsecurity Elections Assistance⁵



Source: GAO analysis of data from Department of State, USAID, and U.S. Institute for Peace.

Note: Percentages do not add due to rounding. Total U.S. nonsecurity elections assistance is \$130.3 million.

U.S. Programs Provide Iraq with Elections Administration Assistance

Of the approximately \$130 million in U.S. assistance for Iraqi elections, USAID obligated more than \$41 million, approximately 32 percent, for elections administration assistance. USAID provided initial funding for elections administration in September and November 2003, with two grants totaling more than \$1 million to IFES to conduct a pre-election assessment and develop a plan and budget to administer the elections. IFES identified Iraq's electoral needs, including an electoral institution, legal framework, voter education effort, and election security. USAID also provided two smaller grants to Iraqi authorities to test the reliability of the Public Distribution Information System database⁶ for use in voter registration. These assessments helped lay the foundation for future U.S. assistance and, according to one IFES official, for executing the January 2005 elections. For example, the IECI used the database to develop the voter rolls.

In September 2004, USAID obligated \$40 million to IFES to develop the IECI as an elections administrative and regulatory body. This assistance included providing the IECI with a legal review of elections regulations, training staff, planning logistics, and procuring needed items for the January 30 elections. For example, IFES procured the

⁵Obligation amounts are through March 31, 2005.

⁶The Public Distribution System established a database containing information on Iraqis for the purposes of distributing food rations under the Oil for Food Program.

printed voter registration forms because the IECI lacked appropriate contracting processes. IFES also paid to have the voter lists printed and distributed for a public challenge period. IFES is continuing such assistance activities to the IECI to support the upcoming elections.

U.S. Programs Assist the Nonpartisan Development of Iraqi Political Entities and Parties

The United States obligated nearly \$30 million of the approximately \$130 million in U.S. assistance for Iraqi elections for political party development and assistance. These grants were provided by the National Endowment for Democracy and USAID and were implemented by NDI and IRI. The objective of the nonpartisan assistance was to build and strengthen movements and parties to build a broad democratic coalition that is supportive of a stable, democratic Iraq. Neither NDI nor IRI excluded political entities or candidates from their training programs based on their political leanings.

Both State and USAID provided funding to NDI and IRI to assess Iraqi political parties' needs and capacities. NDI and IRI conducted a joint assessment in early 2004 that provided an analysis of emerging political organizations and the political environment for party development in Iraq. The assessment described Iraqi political entities, including their staffing, membership, recruitment, finances, and platforms. The report made the recommendation that party assistance should never be in the form of direct cash assistance but could include access to meeting space, telecommunications and internet access, printing, and photocopying facilities.

NDI's and IRI's political party programs have operated since 2003 and include training Iraqi leaders and representatives from political entities in organizing a campaign, developing a constituency, and understanding IECI regulations. According to NDI and IRI sources, the nonpartisan political party assistance programs also helped political leaders and representatives develop communication skills such as public speaking and message development; the program also helped political parties produce commercials and other outreach materials. NDI and IRI conducted group workshops and consultations, created resource centers and media centers, and issued newsletters and other outreach materials as part of their programs. According to NDI reports, NDI provided training to 40 of the 111 political entities running in the national elections and to 35 of the 87 women elected to the transitional National Assembly.

U.S. Programs Assist Iraqi NGOs' Capacity to Develop and Implement Voter Education Campaign

The United States obligated more than \$25 million, approximately 19 percent of the total for Iraqi electoral assistance, to voter education activities. Some of these grants, including IRI's voter education program, are scheduled to continue through the end of 2005.⁷

⁷For more information on the duration of projects, refer to enclosure 1.

USAID obligated nearly \$24 million to IRI to develop an NGO network, the Civic Coalition for Free Elections, to design and implement a national voter education campaign to inform and mobilize voters. According to IRI, this network, made up of 63 NGOs, developed public service announcements for television. For example, IRI reported that the coalition organized Iraq's first televised candidate debates that included airing IRI-developed announcements to viewers during station breaks. The coalition and other civic groups developed and disseminated thousands of election brochures, t-shirts, and posters. The coalition also assisted the Rafadin Women's Coalition with a voter education campaign to emphasize the message that women should vote according to their own beliefs. IRI further reported that it worked separately with eight Sunni organizations and five women's organizations to execute voter education activities targeting specific groups and geographic regions. For example, according to IRI, an Iraqi coalition member organized an elections conference for 130 women civic leaders from Kirkuk and Mosul.

USAID also provided \$1 million to Voice for Humanity to implement a voter education campaign through the use of media players with pre-recorded messages and programming. These messages and programs emphasized elections as a path to security and peace. According to Voice for Humanity, it distributed 15,000 such devices throughout Iraq through social networks that included tribal sheiks, religious leaders, and political leaders in the latter half of January 2005. Further, Voice for Humanity estimated that 20 percent of the devices were provided to Sunnis.

U.S. Programs Assist Iraqi NGOs' Capacity to Systematically Monitor Elections-related Violence

USAID obligated \$14.2 million, approximately 11 percent of the nearly \$130 million in U.S. assistance for Iraqi elections, to IFES to build an Iraqi NGO network that would identify and monitor elections-related violence. According to IFES officials, 45 days before the January 2005 elections, IFES-trained monitors were operating throughout Iraq gathering information on elections-related violence. Once the monitors verified the information, they aggregated these incidents into a Web-based database designed to track information about where, when, and who had been involved in elections-related violence. The program also reported having recruited and hired local staff for each governorate and opened regional offices in Baghdad, Erbil, and Basra. IFES conflict mitigation program is scheduled to continue through early 2006.

U.S. Programs Assist Iraqi Capacity to Monitor and Report on Electoral Events

USAID obligated \$14 million, approximately 11 percent of the total U.S. assistance for Iraqi elections, to develop an Iraqi NGO domestic elections monitor network and train party agent elections monitors. NDI reported having provided training and assistance to help form the Iraqi Election Information Network (EIN) comprised of over 150 NGOs. According to EIN, more than 8,000 domestic monitors were deployed on January 30 to approximately 80 percent of polling stations. In February 2005, EIN issued and disseminated a final report that described polling center security, ballot box integrity, opening and closing of polling stations, voter finger inking, voter identity verification, and vote counting.

NDI and IRI also provided party agent monitor⁸ training through their political party assistance programs. IRI created an educational manual in cooperation with IECEI to inform party officials about the rules surrounding party agent monitors. According to IRI, 15,000 copies of the manual were distributed to political parties in the Baghdad area.

U.S. Programs Encourage Women's Participation in Elections through Multiple Programs

The United States obligated more than \$5.8 million in grants, primarily through the Department of State, for local nongovernmental organizations to encourage women's participation in the electoral process. Grantees reported having provided leadership training for women candidates—designed to, among other things, enhance candidates' public speaking and media skills—in Baghdad, Basra, Erbil, and Sulaymaniya, as well as follow-up consultations with women elected to national and regional legislative bodies. The grants were also used to establish women's centers to organize trainings, provide resources, and build an advocacy network for women. Additional grant activities included voter education to increase awareness and public support for women's involvement in the political process. In addition to Department of State funding, the U.S. Institute of Peace provided funding to conduct conferences to train Iraqi women on candidacy and political participation. USAID has supported the participation of women by developing a strategy to incorporate gender considerations into each of its grants.⁹

The Department of Defense (DOD) Helped Provide Security and Logistics

In addition to U.S. nonsecurity assistance, DOD provided support to the Iraqi government for both security and logistics as part of MNF-I.¹⁰ At the time of Iraq's elections, more than 159,000 U.S. forces and 24,500 coalition forces were operating throughout Iraq as part of MNF-I. The Iraqi Ministry of Interior was responsible for providing a secure environment for all phases of elections, preventing threats and criminal activities, and facilitating full public participation in the elections. Iraqi Armed Forces and Iraqi Police were responsible for providing security at the polling sites. MNF-I forces provided support as needed to Iraqi forces.¹¹ Figure 3 depicts the security concept developed for the elections. In addition to its security support, DOD provided logistics assistance to the Iraqi government, including transporting election materials throughout the country to polling places and counting stations.


⁸Whereas EIN monitors are considered independent and nonpartisan, party agent monitors represent their respective parties while undertaking monitoring activities.

⁹Due to the agency's integrated approach, we did not determine the amount of USAID's funding that contributes to women's participation.

¹⁰We did not determine the cost of DOD's support for the elections because it is embedded in DOD's overall operating costs in Iraq.

¹¹In a statement to the Congress, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency said that attacks on Iraq's election day reached about 300, double the previous 1-day high of about 150 during Ramadan in 2004.

Figure 3: Iraqi Ministry of Interior's Security Concept for Polling Centers



Sources: GAO adaptation of Iraqi Ministry of Interior diagram (data); Nova Development (clip art).

Note: This is a notional concept diagram illustrating the Iraqi Ministry of Interior's general plan for polling center security. Each polling center was secured according to its configuration and individual security needs.

Participants in UN Conference Noted Improvements Needed before Upcoming Elections

In March 2005, the UN convened a conference to assess the electoral activities and preparations that led to the January 30 elections and to define areas requiring additional assistance before the next elections. Conference participants included IECI, IFES, the UN, USAID, and United Kingdom Department for International Development officials; representatives of the international monitoring effort; and experts from academia. Conference participants identified areas needing improvement, including overall elections management, access to media, and voter education. The following summarizes the key areas for improvement that were discussed at the conference.

- IECI management:** According to participants in the conference, aspects of IECI's management need to be formalized and strengthened. For example, it was rare that IECI headquarters' instructions were formally issued to the field as institutional guidance, resulting in confusion among field electoral

administration personnel, who were unable to identify official policy guidance. Participants noted that reporting systems and communication practices among headquarters, governorate offices, and district offices need improvement. In addition, conference participants recommended that management and decision-making practices in the IECI Board of Commissioners and Electoral Administration ought to be formalized. These include clarifying and defining the roles and responsibilities of IECI staff and officials, documenting the decisions, and making the decisions accessible.

- **Media issues:** According to conference participants, the Chairman of the Board of Commissioners should be the only official representative of the IECI to the media to convey public information on policy issues. At the time of the January elections, more than one board member held press conferences, creating confusion as to who could make official IECI statements. Participants also agreed that an independent monitoring entity was needed to observe and assess media involvement in the electoral process, as well as candidates' and political entities' electoral activities in the media. A monitoring entity would help the IECI understand the media's role in elections and ways to work effectively with the media to convey information.
- **Voter education:** Participants noted that voter education efforts needed to be improved, particularly throughout diverse regions. Poor translations into other languages, such as Assyrian and Turkmen, resulted in inaccuracies and showed a lack of sensitivity to these populations. Participants suggested that these languages should be used in future elections. In addition, the IECI should develop a way to maintain a consistent message regarding the elections and electoral process throughout the country while addressing regional differences in perceptions and culture. Further, the IECI should work more closely with both governmental and nongovernmental groups to assist in conducting the voter education campaign to reach a larger number of voters, and in strengthening public outreach at governorate and district levels. In addition, because of limited access to electricity and television, conference participants noted that the use of radio and interactive face-to-face activities were needed.

In addition to these specific recommendations, participants identified the following areas that needed improvement.

- **Training:** Conference participants believed that training for polling staff, security personnel, media officials, and reporters on their roles and responsibilities in electoral activities needed to be improved. For example, because of insufficient training of polling staff, an unknown number of ballots were excluded from the official vote count due to improper processing.
- **International assistance:** Conference participants also called for the prompt deployment of more international experts to additional locations to assist in electoral events. Because of the limited training and experience of IECI personnel, international advisers are important in providing assistance and advice.

- **Legal framework:** According to participants, establishing mechanisms to ensure equity among candidates, including provisions to limit spending and report finances, is another area where improvements are needed.
- **Candidate certification:** Conference participants stated that the IECI needed more resources to verify candidates' compliance with certification requirements. The IECI currently has limited resources, which hampers it from investigating candidates' affiliation with militias.
- **Filing election complaints:** According to conference participants, expanding the times and locations and better publicizing the procedures for filing complaints is also needed. Although there were media reports and allegations of voter fraud, the IECI did not investigate because it did not receive any complaints through the official process.


Agency Comments

We requested comments from the USAID and the Departments of State and Defense. USAID provided written comments, which are reproduced in enclosure 2, and technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. USAID found the report to be factually correct. The Department of State declined to provide written comments, but provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. The Department of Defense declined to comment.

Concluding Remarks and Observations

Elections are a critical goal for achieving the U.S. policy objective of a peaceful and stable Iraq. As of the issuance of this report, Iraq was on schedule for undertaking the referendum by October 15, 2005. The United States also continues to support the capacity of Iraqis (including the IECI, civil society groups, and political parties) to execute the next set of electoral events by funding IECI technical assistance, voter education, political party assistance, conflict mitigation, domestic monitoring, women's participation, and military support. Programs in these areas are scheduled to continue through 2005 or the next parliamentary elections. The UN has continued its involvement in Iraqi elections, holding a conference in March 2005 where participants noted areas requiring additional assistance before the next elections, including IECI management, media issues, and voter education. The UN also conducted a needs assessment mission in June 2005 for the upcoming constitutional referendum and subsequent political elections.

We are sending copies of this letter to interested congressional committees. We are also sending copies to the Administrator of USAID, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at <http://www.gao.gov>. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8979. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs maybe found on the last page of this report. The GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in enclosure 3.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Joseph A. Christoff". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized initial 'J'.

Joseph A. Christoff
Director, International Affairs and Trade

Enclosures - 3

List of Recipients

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Chairman

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
Chairman

The Honorable Tom Lantos
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Chairman

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Mitch McConnell
Chairman
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Jim Kolbe
Chairman
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Enclosure I

Table 2: U.S. Assistance for Iraqi Elections by Area of Assistance as of March 31, 2005

ELECTIONS ADMINISTRATION ASSISTANCE: \$41.1M				
U.S. agency	Grantee	Grant name	Grant effective dates	Obligated amount
USAID	IFES	Electoral Technical Assistance to the IECI	September 1, 2004 – January 31, 2006	\$40,000,000
USAID	IFES	Pre-Election Assessment in Iraq	September 5, 2003 – October 10, 2003	484,840
USAID	IFES	Development of detailed operation plan and corresponding budgets for administering electoral events in Iraq	November 5, 2003 – December 27, 2003	557,475
USAID	Erbil and Sulaymaniyah Central Statistics Office	Survey of Public Distribution System, Kurdistan Region	June 10, 2004 – September 9, 2004	7,070
USAID	Governing Council – General Secretariat	Supporting creation of Voters Register Database	March 9, 2004 – June 9, 2004	9,680
Sub-total Obligated for Area as of March 31, 2005				\$41,054,056
POLITICAL PARTY ASSISTANCE: \$30M				
U.S. agency	Grantee	Grant name	Grant effective dates	Obligated amount
Department of State/ NED	NDI	Political Party Strengthening and Coalition Building	January 1, 2004- February 28, 2005	\$17,687,261
Department of State/ NED	IRI	Political Party Development in Iraq	February 1, 2004 – August 31, 2005	11,724,242
Department of State/ NED	NDI	Democracy Education and Organizational Development	August 16, 2003 – October 15, 2003	315,364
USAID	NDI	Iraq: Assessment of Political Organizations and Parties	December 1, 2003 – January 31, 2004	140,000
USAID	IRI	Political Parties' Assessment: Iraq	December 5, 2003 – January 15, 2004	110,000
USAID	Coordination Committee of National Democratic Forces	Conference of National Democratic Parties	January 21, 2004 – February 21, 2004	9,494
Sub-total Obligated for Area as of March 31, 2005				\$29,986,361

VOTER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE: \$25.2M				
U.S. agency	Grantee	Grant name	Grant effective dates	Obligated amount
USAID	IRI	Domestic Oversight and Voter Education Activities Voter Education Campaign	July 9, 2004 – January 8, 2006	\$23,900,000
USAID	Voice for Humanity	Iraq Small Media Outreach Project	February 1, 2005 – April 5, 2005	1,000,000
USAID	Khuramal Cultural Center	Democracy and Elections Workshops	July 8, 2004 – 8/20/2004	5,320
USAID	Kurdish Institute for Elections	Elections Seminars	July 24, 2004 – October 24, 2004	7,346
USAID	Kurdish Institute for Elections	Translating and Printing of the Guidelines to Assist National Minority	October 1, 2004 – December 31, 2004	10,433
USAID	Free Women's Association	Women's Elections Seminar – Baghdad	June 17, 2004 – September 9, 2004	7,998
USAID	Free Women's Association	Women's Elections Seminar – Ninewa	June 20, 2004 – August 31, 2004	7,998
USAID	Free Women's Association	Women's Elections Seminar – Kirkuk	June 17, 2004 – August 9, 2004	7,998
Department of State/ NED	Kurdish Institute for Elections	Preparation for Constitution and Democratic Elections	February 1, 2005 – January 31, 2006	55,000
Department of State/ NED	Kurdish Institute for Elections	Voters' Civic Education in Iraq	October 1, 2004 – September 30, 2005	60,000
Department of State/ NED	Center for Non-governmental Organizations	Election and Democracy Education in Mosul	February 1, 2005 – January 31, 2006	38,000
Department of State/ NED	Concordia	Elections and Constitution Workshops	February 1, 2005 – January 31, 2006	34,000
Department of State/ NED	Iraqi Organization for Human Rights Coordination	Constitutional Awareness Campaign in Iraq	February 1, 2005 – January 31, 2006	45,000
Department of State/ NED	Nahrain Electronic Encyclopedia	Informing Iraqi People	February 1, 2005 – January 31, 2006	39,000
Sub-total Obligated for Area as of March 31, 2005				\$25,218,093

ELECTIONS VIOLENCE MONITORING: \$14.2M				
U.S. agency	Grantee	Grant name	Grant effective dates	Obligated amount
USAID	IFES	Domestic Oversight and Voter Education Activities – Conflict Management and Mitigation Program	July 9, 2004 – January 8, 2006	\$14,200,000
Sub-total Obligated for Area as of March 31, 2005				\$14,200,000
DOMESTIC MONITORING: \$14M				
U.S. agency	Grantee	Grant name	Grant effective dates	Obligated amount
USAID	NDI	Domestic Oversight and Voter Education Activities – Domestic Elections Monitors	July 9, 2004 – January 8, 2006	\$14,000,000
USAID	IRI	Domestic Oversight and Voter Education Activities – Political Party Poll-watcher Training	July 9, 2004 – January 8, 2006	n/a ^a
Sub-total Obligated for Area as of March 31, 2005				\$14,000,000
WOMEN’S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: \$5.8M				
U.S. agency	Grantee	Grant name	Grant effective dates	Obligated amount
Department of State	NDI	Strengthening Women’s Political Participation in Iraq	September 1, 2004 – November 30, 2005	\$1,500,000
Department of State	IRI	Women’s Leadership Institute	September 1, 2004 – February 28, 2006	1,500,000
Department of State	Johns Hopkins University / SAIS	Preparing Iraqi Women as Leaders, Advocates, and Participants in the Political Process	September 11, 2004 – December 1, 2005	854,000
Department of State	Independent Women’s Forum	The Iraqi women’s educational Institute	September 17, 2004 – September 15, 2005	1,300,000
Department of State	Kurdish Human Rights Watch	Women and Democracy in Iraq	September 23, 2004 – January 6, 2006	550,000
USIP	Woodrow Wilson Center	Building A New Iraq: Women’s Role in the Political Process	December 1, 2004 – February 28, 2005	61,780
USIP	Woodrow Wilson Center	Building A New Iraq: Women’s Role in the Political Process on the Eve of the January 2005”	June 28, 2004 – August 31, 2004	60,970
USIP	Women’s Empowerment Groups	Women’s Empowerment Project & Advancing Women’s Role in Politics – Babylon	October 1, 2004 – December 31, 2004 & October 1, 2004 – May 31, 2005	19,472
Sub-total Obligated for Area as of March 31, 2005				\$5,847,475
Total obligated as of March 31, 2005				\$130,305,985

Source: GAO analysis of grant agreements from USAID, the Department of State, NED, and USIP.

^aIRI's grant is for both party agent monitor training and for voter education activities. We do not have a breakdown between the two components of the grants. IRI's total amount obligated for this award is indicated under Voter Education in this table.

Enclosure 2
Comments from the U.S. Agency International Development



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

August 19, 2005

Mr. Joseph A. Christoff
Director, International Affairs and Trade
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Christoff:

I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) formal response to the draft GAO report entitled Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005 Election [GAO-05-932R].

USAID has reviewed the report and finds it to be factually correct. We have a few minor technical corrections that will be transmitted to you shortly via separate e-mail, which do not materially alter the substance of your findings.

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this review.

Sincerely,

Steven G. Wisecarver
Acting Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Management

U.S. Agency for International Development
Office of Iraq Reconstruction
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.
Washington DC 20523

Tel: 202-712-0448
Fax 202-216-3872

Enclosure 3

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact: Joseph A. Christoff (202) 512-8979

Staff Acknowledgments: In addition to the individual named above, Tetsuo Miyabara, Valérie Leman Nowak, Friendly Vang-Johnson, and Christina Werth made key contributions to this report. Lynn Cothorn, Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, and Mary Moutsos provided technical assistance.

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