Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005 Elections
(07-SEP-05, GAO-05-932R).
Fostering a democratic and publicly elected government in Iraq is
a U.S. foreign policy priority. According to the President, the
United States intends to help Iraq achieve democracy and has a
vital national interest in the success of free institutions in
Iraq. Toward that end, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
transferred power to a sovereign Iraqi interim government on June
28, 2004. With assistance from the United Nations (UN) and
international community, the interim government held a national
election for a transitional National Assembly on January 30,
2005. To help Iraq prepare for this election, the United States
obligated approximately $130 million to provide assistance to the
Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI), Iraqi
nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and political entities. Much
of this assistance is directed at not only the January 30
elections but also the two subsequent elections--a constitutional
referendum and political election--scheduled before the end of
2005. As part of our effort to monitor Iraq reconstruction, we
have gathered information on efforts to support Iraq's political
transition. This report was initiated under the Comptroller
General's statutory authority and is being addressed to the
committees of jurisdiction. In particular, this report provides
information on (1) U.S. assistance to Iraq for the elections and
(2) improvements in the elections process that participating
organizations identified for future elections.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-932R
ACCNO: A35900
TITLE: Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005
Elections
DATE: 09/07/2005
SUBJECT: Elections
Federal aid to foreign countries
Foreign governments
International relations
Political activities
Democracy-building programs
Iraq
******************************************************************
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GAO-05-932R
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548
September 7, 2005
Report to Congressional Committees
Subject: Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005 Elections
Fostering a democratic and publicly elected government in Iraq is a U.S.
foreign policy priority. According to the President, the United States
intends to help Iraq achieve democracy and has a vital national interest
in the success of free institutions in Iraq. Toward that end, the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) transferred power to a sovereign
Iraqi interim government on June 28, 2004. With assistance from the United
Nations (UN) and international community,1 the interim government held a
national election for a transitional National Assembly on January 30,
2005. To help Iraq prepare for this election, the United States obligated
approximately $130 million to provide assistance to the Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI),2 Iraqi nongovernmental organizations
(NGO), and political entities. Much of this assistance is directed at not
only the January 30 elections but also the two subsequent elections-a
constitutional referendum and political election-scheduled before the end
of 2005.
As part of our effort to monitor Iraq reconstruction, we have gathered
information on efforts to support Iraq's political transition. This report
was initiated under the Comptroller General's statutory authority and is
being addressed to the committees of jurisdiction. In particular, this
report provides information on (1) U.S. assistance to Iraq for the
elections and (2) improvements in the elections process that participating
organizations identified for future elections.
To address these objectives, we interviewed staff and examined documents
from U.S. agencies, grant recipients, and UN agencies; we also attended a
UN conference on the January 2005 elections. Our description of elections
assistance is limited to programs funded through U.S. appropriations for
nonsecurity elections assistance, as reported in grant agreements and
publicly available Department of State and other U.S. government reports
to Congress.3 To describe U.S. assistance, we interviewed staff in
1In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom, European Union, and
Chile provided technical
advisers to the IECI to assist in the administration of the January 2005
election. The UN also
coordinated this technical assistance to prevent duplication of efforts
and gaps in the assistance.
2The IECI is the Iraqi government body responsible for administering these
three elections. The CPA
established the IECI before the transfer of power to Iraqi authorities.
3Section 2207 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense
and for the
Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (P.L. 108-106) required the
Office of Management and
Budget to submit a report to the Congress every 90 days that updates the
use of the funds appropriated
in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.
Washington, D.C., on-site in Amman, Jordan, and by telephone in Baghdad,
Iraq. We also examined documents such as grant agreements, work plans,
performance monitoring plans, and periodic reporting from the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), the Department of State, the
National Endowment of Democracy, IFES,4 the International Republican
Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and other
grantees. We traveled to Amman, Jordan, to meet with officials from the
U.S. government and implementing partners. Due to security conditions, we
were unable to travel to Iraq. As feasible, we spoke to representatives
from Iraqi NGOs to obtain information on their U.S.-funded programs.
Program results and other data in this correspondence are based on reports
and information from the organizations noted above and our review of U.S.
government oversight of them. We believe the data are sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. To describe improvements for
future Iraqi elections, we attended a UN conference at which organizations
that helped prepare for the elections identified problems and
improvements; we also reviewed the UN's summary report of the conference.
We conducted our work from September 2004 through July 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary
The United States obligated approximately $130 million for nonsecurity
assistance to help Iraq undertake elections in 2005. The largest
U.S.-funded area of nonsecurity election assistance was $41.1 million
awarded by USAID to IFES to provide technical expertise directly to the
IECI to help it conduct the elections and make key procurements. The
Department of State provided $30 million to NDI and IRI to advise, train,
and help organize democratically oriented political parties. Both USAID
and the Department of State funded $25.2 million of voter education
efforts in Iraq, with grants obligated to IRI, Voice for Humanity, and
Iraqi NGOs to conduct voter outreach. USAID provided an additional grant
of $14.2 million to IFES to build an Iraqi NGO network to identify and
monitor elections-related violence. USAID also obligated $14 million to
NDI to develop an Iraqi NGO domestic elections monitor network. The United
States sought the participation of Iraqi women in elections with $5.8
million from the Department of State and through USAID's integrated gender
strategy. The United States, through the Multi-National Force - Iraq
(MNF-I), also helped the Iraqi government provide security to conduct the
elections.
The UN, which coordinated assistance from the international community,
convened a post-elections conference that included IECI, IFES, UN, and
USAID officials to assess preparations for the January 30, 2005, elections
and to identify areas needing improvement before the next elections.
Conference participants identified overall elections management, media
involvement in the elections process, and voter education as areas needing
improvement. For example, regarding elections management, participants
noted that reporting systems and communication practices among elections
headquarters, governorate offices, and district offices need to be
improved to avoid confusion about official policy guidance. In addition,
participants suggested that the IECI develop a way to address regional
differences in voter education. For example, the development of materials
by the IECI in languages such
4IFES was formally known as the International Foundation for Election
Systems.
as Assyrian and Turkmen would help avoid inconsistencies and inaccurate
translations of official voter education materials.
Background
On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred power to a sovereign Iraqi interim
government. Under the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the
Transitional Period, this interim government was responsible for holding
an election for a 275-member transitional National Assembly. The election
occurred on January 30, 2005, and as a result, 12 political entities won
at least one seat in the National Assembly (see table 1). Out of
approximately 14.3 million registered voters, almost 8.5 million voted,
according to State Department reporting. The transitional National
Assembly first met on March 16, 2005, and subsequently elected the
Presidency Council-a president and two deputies.
Table 1: Transitional National Assembly Results from the January 2005
Election
Political entity Number of seats
Unified Iraq Coalition 140
Kurdistan Alliance List 75
Iraqi List 40
Iraqis 5
Turkman Iraq Front 3
National Independent Cadres and Elites 3
Islamic Action Organization in Iraq/ Central Direction 2
Islamic Group of Kurdistan/Iraq 2
Nation Union 2
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering 1
National Democratic Alliance 1
Al Rafideen National List 1
Total 275
Source: IFES.
A key function of the National Assembly is to write a draft constitution
that the Iraqi people will then vote on in a general referendum to be held
by October 15, 2005, (see fig. 1). If the permanent constitution is
approved, elections for a permanent government would take place no later
than December 15, 2005, and the permanent government would take office no
later than December 31, 2005. However, if a majority of Iraqi voters do
not approve the draft constitution or if two-thirds of the voters in three
or more governorates reject it, the National Assembly will be dissolved.
Elections for a new National Assembly would then take place by December
15, 2005. The new government would continue to operate under the
transitional law and would be responsible for drafting another
constitution.
Figure 1: Timeline for Iraqi Elections
December 15,
2005
Elections for
permanent
government held
December 31, 2005
New National
Assembly and
permanent
government take
office
Phase 1: Interim government Phase 2: Transitional government
Source: GAO analysis of the Law of Administration of Iraq for the
Transitional Period, March 8, 2004.
U.S. Programs Help Develop the Capacity of Iraqis to Undertake 2005
Elections
The United States obligated about $130 million in nonsecurity assistance
for the Iraqi 2005 elections in the areas of elections administration
assistance, political party development, voter education, elections
violence monitoring, domestic monitoring, and women's participation. Most
of the major programs related to the elections are to continue through the
end of 2005. Figure 2 illustrates the breakdown of U.S.funded areas of
nonsecurity elections assistance; enclosure 1 provides a list of the
grants that fund U.S. electoral assistance to Iraq. In addition to
nonsecurity assistance, the Department of Defense provided security and
logistics support to the Iraqi government throughout the electoral
process.
Figure 2: U.S.-funded Areas of Nonsecurity Elections Assistance5
Note: Percentages do not add due to rounding. Total U.S. nonsecurity
elections assistance is $130.3 million.
U.S. Programs Provide Iraq with Elections Administration Assistance
Of the approximately $130 million in U.S. assistance for Iraqi elections,
USAID obligated more than $41 million, approximately 32 percent, for
elections administration assistance. USAID provided initial funding for
elections administration in September and November 2003, with two grants
totaling more than $1 million to IFES to conduct a pre-election assessment
and develop a plan and budget to administer the elections. IFES identified
Iraq's electoral needs, including an electoral institution, legal
framework, voter education effort, and election security. USAID also
provided two smaller grants to Iraqi authorities to test the reliability
of the Public Distribution Information System database6 for use in voter
registration. These assessments helped lay the foundation for future U.S.
assistance and, according to one IFES official, for executing the January
2005 elections. For example, the IECI used the database to develop the
voter rolls.
In September 2004, USAID obligated $40 million to IFES to develop the IECI
as an elections administrative and regulatory body. This assistance
included providing the IECI with a legal review of elections regulations,
training staff, planning logistics, and procuring needed items for the
January 30 elections. For example, IFES procured the
5Obligation amounts are through March 31, 2005.
6The Public Distribution System established a database containing
information on Iraqis for the
purposes of distributing food rations under the Oil for Food Program.
printed voter registration forms because the IECI lacked appropriate
contracting processes. IFES also paid to have the voter lists printed and
distributed for a public challenge period. IFES is continuing such
assistance activities to the IECI to support the upcoming elections.
U.S. Programs Assist the Nonpartisan Development of Iraqi Political
Entities and Parties
The United States obligated nearly $30 million of the approximately $130
million in U.S. assistance for Iraqi elections for political party
development and assistance. These grants were provided by the National
Endowment for Democracy and USAID and were implemented by NDI and IRI. The
objective of the nonpartisan assistance was to build and strengthen
movements and parties to build a broad democratic coalition that is
supportive of a stable, democratic Iraq. Neither NDI nor IRI excluded
political entities or candidates from their training programs based on
their political leanings.
Both State and USAID provided funding to NDI and IRI to assess Iraqi
political parties' needs and capacities. NDI and IRI conducted a joint
assessment in early 2004 that provided an analysis of emerging political
organizations and the political environment for party development in Iraq.
The assessment described Iraqi political entities, including their
staffing, membership, recruitment, finances, and platforms. The report
made the recommendation that party assistance should never be in the form
of direct cash assistance but could include access to meeting space,
telecommunications and internet access, printing, and photocopying
facilities.
NDI's and IRI's political party programs have operated since 2003 and
include training Iraqi leaders and representatives from political entities
in organizing a campaign, developing a constituency, and understanding
IECI regulations. According to NDI and IRI sources, the nonpartisan
political party assistance programs also helped political leaders and
representatives develop communication skills such as public speaking and
message development; the program also helped political parties produce
commercials and other outreach materials. NDI and IRI conducted group
workshops and consultations, created resource centers and media centers,
and issued newsletters and other outreach materials as part of their
programs. According to NDI reports, NDI provided training to 40 of the 111
political entities running in the national elections and to 35 of the 87
women elected to the transitional National Assembly.
U.S. Programs Assist Iraqi NGOs' Capacity to Develop and Implement Voter
Education Campaign
The United States obligated more than $25 million, approximately 19
percent of the total for Iraqi electoral assistance, to voter education
activities. Some of these grants, including IRI's voter education program,
are scheduled to continue through the end of 2005.7
7For more information on the duration of projects, refer to enclosure 1.
USAID obligated nearly $24 million to IRI to develop an NGO network, the
Civic Coalition for Free Elections, to design and implement a national
voter education campaign to inform and mobilize voters. According to IRI,
this network, made up of 63 NGOs, developed public service announcements
for television. For example, IRI reported that the coalition organized
Iraq's first televised candidate debates that included airing
IRI-developed announcements to viewers during station breaks. The
coalition and other civic groups developed and disseminated thousands of
election brochures, t-shirts, and posters. The coalition also assisted the
Rafadin Women's Coalition with a voter education campaign to emphasize the
message that women should vote according to their own beliefs. IRI further
reported that it worked separately with eight Sunni organizations and five
women's organizations to execute voter education activities targeting
specific groups and geographic regions. For example, according to IRI, an
Iraqi coalition member organized an elections conference for 130 women
civic leaders from Kirkuk and Mosul.
USAID also provided $1 million to Voice for Humanity to implement a voter
education campaign through the use of media players with pre-recorded
messages and programming. These messages and programs emphasized elections
as a path to security and peace. According to Voice for Humanity, it
distributed 15,000 such devices throughout Iraq through social networks
that included tribal sheiks, religious leaders, and political leaders in
the latter half of January 2005. Further, Voice for Humanity estimated
that 20 percent of the devices were provided to Sunnis.
U.S. Programs Assist Iraqi NGOs' Capacity to Systematically Monitor
Electionsrelated Violence
USAID obligated $14.2 million, approximately 11 percent of the nearly $130
million in U.S. assistance for Iraqi elections, to IFES to build an Iraqi
NGO network that would identify and monitor elections-related violence.
According to IFES officials, 45 days before the January 2005 elections,
IFES-trained monitors were operating throughout Iraq gathering information
on elections-related violence. Once the monitors verified the information,
they aggregated these incidents into a Web-based database designed to
track information about where, when, and who had been involved in
electionsrelated violence. The program also reported having recruited and
hired local staff for each governorate and opened regional offices in
Baghdad, Erbil, and Basra. IFES conflict mitigation program is scheduled
to continue through early 2006.
U.S. Programs Assist Iraqi Capacity to Monitor and Report on Electoral
Events
USAID obligated $14 million, approximately 11 percent of the total U.S.
assistance for Iraqi elections, to develop an Iraqi NGO domestic elections
monitor network and train party agent elections monitors. NDI reported
having provided training and assistance to help form the Iraqi Election
Information Network (EIN) comprised of over 150 NGOs. According to EIN,
more than 8,000 domestic monitors were deployed on January 30 to
approximately 80 percent of polling stations. In February 2005, EIN issued
and disseminated a final report that described polling center security,
ballot box integrity, opening and closing of polling stations, voter
finger inking, voter identity verification, and vote counting.
NDI and IRI also provided party agent monitor8 training through their
political party assistance programs. IRI created an educational manual in
cooperation with IECI to inform party officials about the rules
surrounding party agent monitors. According to IRI, 15,000 copies of the
manual were distributed to political parties in the Baghdad area.
U.S. Programs Encourage Women's Participation in Elections through
Multiple Programs
The United States obligated more than $5.8 million in grants, primarily
through the Department of State, for local nongovernmental organizations
to encourage women's participation in the electoral process. Grantees
reported having provided leadership training for women candidates-designed
to, among other things, enhance candidates' public speaking and media
skills-in Baghdad, Basra, Erbil, and Sulaymaniya, as well as follow-up
consultations with women elected to national and regional legislative
bodies. The grants were also used to establish women's centers to organize
trainings, provide resources, and build an advocacy network for women.
Additional grant activities included voter education to increase awareness
and public support for women's involvement in the political process. In
addition to Department of State funding, the U.S. Institute of Peace
provided funding to conduct conferences to train Iraqi women on candidacy
and political participation. USAID has supported the participation of
women by developing a strategy to incorporate gender considerations into
each of its grants.9
The Department of Defense (DOD) Helped Provide Security and Logistics
In addition to U.S. nonsecurity assistance, DOD provided support to the
Iraqi government for both security and logistics as part of MNF-I.10 At
the time of Iraq's elections, more than 159,000 U.S. forces and 24,500
coalition forces were operating throughout Iraq as part of MNF-I. The
Iraqi Ministry of Interior was responsible for providing a secure
environment for all phases of elections, preventing threats and criminal
activities, and facilitating full public participation in the elections.
Iraqi Armed Forces and Iraqi Police were responsible for providing
security at the polling sites. MNF-I forces provided support as needed to
Iraqi forces.11 Figure 3 depicts the security concept developed for the
elections. In addition to its security support, DOD provided logistics
assistance to the Iraqi government, including transporting election
materials throughout the country to polling places and counting stations.
8Whereas EIN monitors are considered independent and nonpartisan, party
agent monitors represent
their respective parties while undertaking monitoring activities.
9Due to the agency's integrated approach, we did not determine the amount
of USAID's funding that
contributes to women's participation.
10We did not determine the cost of DOD's support for the elections because
it is embedded in DOD's
overall operating costs in Iraq.
11In a statement to the Congress, the Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency said that attacks on
Iraq's election day reached about 300, double the previous 1-day high of
about 150 during Ramadan in
2004.
Figure 3: Iraqi Ministry of Interior's Security Concept for Polling
Centers
Sources: GAO adaptation of Iraqi Ministry of Interior diagram (data); Nova
Development (clip art). Note: This is a notional concept diagram
illustrating the Iraqi Ministry of Interior's general plan for polling
center security. Each polling center was secured according to its
configuration and individual security needs.
Participants in UN Conference Noted Improvements Needed before Upcoming
Elections
In March 2005, the UN convened a conference to assess the electoral
activities and preparations that led to the January 30 elections and to
define areas requiring additional assistance before the next elections.
Conference participants included IECI, IFES, the UN, USAID, and United
Kingdom Department for International Development officials;
representatives of the international monitoring effort; and experts from
academia. Conference participants identified areas needing improvement,
including overall elections management, access to media, and voter
education. The following summarizes the key areas for improvement that
were discussed at the conference.
o IECI management: According to participants in the conference, aspects
of IECI's management need to be formalized and strengthened. For example,
it was rare that IECI headquarters' instructions were formally issued to
the field as institutional guidance, resulting in confusion among field
electoral
administration personnel, who were unable to identify official policy
guidance. Participants noted that reporting systems and communication
practices among headquarters, governorate offices, and district offices
need improvement. In addition, conference participants recommended that
management and decision-making practices in the IECI Board of
Commissioners and Electoral Administration ought to be formalized. These
include clarifying and defining the roles and responsibilities of IECI
staff and officials, documenting the decisions, and making the decisions
accessible.
o Media issues: According to conference participants, the Chairman of
the Board of Commissioners should be the only official representative of
the IECI to the media to convey public information on policy issues. At
the time of the January elections, more than one board member held press
conferences, creating confusion as to who could make official IECI
statements. Participants also agreed that an independent monitoring entity
was needed to observe and assess media involvement in the electoral
process, as well as candidates' and political entities' electoral
activities in the media. A monitoring entity would help the IECI
understand the media's role in elections and ways to work effectively with
the media to convey information.
o Voter education: Participants noted that voter education efforts
needed to be improved, particularly throughout diverse regions. Poor
translations into other languages, such as Assyrian and Turkmen, resulted
in inaccuracies and showed a lack of sensitivity to these populations.
Participants suggested that these languages should be used in future
elections. In addition, the IECI should develop a way to maintain a
consistent message regarding the elections and electoral process
throughout the country while addressing regional differences in
perceptions and culture. Further, the IECI should work more closely with
both governmental and nongovernmental groups to assist in conducting the
voter education campaign to reach a larger number of voters, and in
strengthening public outreach at governorate and district levels. In
addition, because of limited access to electricity and television,
conference participants noted that the use of radio and interactive
face-to-face activities were needed.
In addition to these specific recommendations, participants identified the
following areas that needed improvement.
o Training: Conference participants believed that training for polling
staff, security personnel, media officials, and reporters on their roles
and responsibilities in electoral activities needed to be improved. For
example, because of insufficient training of polling staff, an unknown
number of ballots were excluded from the official vote count due to
improper processing.
o International assistance: Conference participants also called for the
prompt deployment of more international experts to additional locations to
assist in electoral events. Because of the limited training and experience
of IECI personnel, international advisers are important in providing
assistance and advice.
o Legal framework: According to participants, establishing mechanisms to
ensure equity among candidates, including provisions to limit spending and
report finances, is another area where improvements are needed.
o Candidate certification: Conference participants stated that the IECI
needed more resources to verify candidates' compliance with certification
requirements. The IECI currently has limited resources, which hampers it
from investigating candidates' affiliation with militias.
o Filing election complaints: According to conference participants,
expanding the times and locations and better publicizing the procedures
for filing complaints is also needed. Although there were media reports
and allegations of voter fraud, the IECI did not investigate because it
did not receive any complaints through the official process.
Agency Comments
We requested comments from the USAID and the Departments of State and
Defense. USAID provided written comments, which are reproduced in
enclosure 2, and technical comments, which we have incorporated as
appropriate. USAID found the report to be factually correct. The
Department of State declined to provide written comments, but provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. The
Department of Defense declined to comment.
Concluding Remarks and Observations
Elections are a critical goal for achieving the U.S. policy objective of a
peaceful and stable Iraq. As of the issuance of this report, Iraq was on
schedule for undertaking the referendum by October 15, 2005. The United
States also continues to support the capacity of Iraqis (including the
IECI, civil society groups, and political parties) to execute the next set
of electoral events by funding IECI technical assistance, voter education,
political party assistance, conflict mitigation, domestic monitoring,
women's participation, and military support. Programs in these areas are
scheduled to continue through 2005 or the next parliamentary elections.
The UN has continued its involvement in Iraqi elections, holding a
conference in March 2005 where participants noted areas requiring
additional assistance before the next elections, including IECI
management, media issues, and voter education. The UN also conducted a
needs assessment mission in June 2005 for the upcoming constitutional
referendum and subsequent political elections.
We are sending copies of this letter to interested congressional
committees. We are also sending copies to the Administrator of USAID, the
Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you
or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at
(202) 512-8979. Contact points for of our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs maybe found on the last page of this report.
The GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in enclosure 3.
Joseph A. Christoff
Director, International Affairs and Trade
Enclosures - 3
List of Recipients
The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Chairman
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Lantos
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Chairman
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Mitch McConnell
Chairman
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable Jim Kolbe
Chairman
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Enclosure I
Table 2: U.S. Assistance for Iraqi Elections by Area of Assistance as of
March 31, 2005
Page 15
GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq
Development
of detailed March
Electoral operation November Erbil and Survey of Supporting 9, Sub-total August Iraq: December December Coordination Conference January Sub-total
ELECTIONS Grant Technical September Pre-Election September plan and 5, 2003 Sulaymaniyah Public June 10, Governing creation 2004 Obligated POLITICAL Grant Department January 1, Department Political February Department 16, Assessment of 1, 2003 Political 5, 2003 Committee of of 21, 2004 Obligated
ADMINISTRATION Grantee Grant effective USAID IFES Assistance 1, 2004 - $40,000,000 USAID IFES Assessment 5, 2003 - 484,840 USAID IFES corresponding - 557,475 USAID Central Distribution 2004 - 7,070 USAID Council - of Voters - 9,680 for Area $41,054,056 PARTY Grantee Grant effective of State/ NDI 2004-February $17,687,261 of State/ IRI Party 1, 2004 11,724,242 of State/ NDI 2003 - 315,364 USAID NDI Political - 140,000 USAID IRI Parties' - 110,000 USAID National National - 9,494 for Area $29,986,361
ASSISTANCE: name dates to the January in Iraq October budgets for December Statistics System, September General Register June as of ASSISTANCE: name dates NED Political 28, 2005 NED Development - August NED October Organizations January Assessment: January Democratic Democratic February as of
$41.1M IECI 31, 2006 10, 2003 administering 27, 2003 Office Kurdistan 9, 2004 Secretariat Database 9, March 31, $30M Party in Iraq 31, 2005 Democracy 15, and Parties 31, 2004 Iraq 15, 2004 Forces Parties 21, 2004 March 31,
electoral Region 2004 2005 Strengthening Education and 2003 2005
U.S. Obligated events in U.S. Obligated and Coalition Organizational
agency amount Iraq agency amount Building Development
Page 16
GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq
Domestic Translating
Oversight Iraq July and October June June Preparation February Election February February Iraqi February February Sub-total
VOTER Grant and Voter July 9, Voice Small February Khuramal Democracy July 8, Kurdish 24, Kurdish Printing of 1, 2004 Free Women's June 17, Free Women's 20, Free Women's 17, Department Kurdish for 1, 2005 Department Kurdish Voters' October Department and 1, 2005 Department Elections 1, 2005 Department Organization Constitutional 1, 2005 Department Nahrain Informing 1, 2005 Obligated
EDUCATION U.S. Grantee Grant effective Obligated USAID IRI Education 2004 - $23,900,000 USAID for Media 1, 2005 1,000,000 USAID Cultural and 2004 - 5,320 USAID Institute Elections 2004 - 7,346 USAID Institute the - 10,433 USAID Women's Elections 2004 - 7,998 USAID Women's Elections 2004 - 7,998 USAID Women's Elections 2004 - 7,998 of State/ Institute Constitution - 55,000 of State/ Institute Civic 1, 2004 - 60,000 of State/ Democracy - 38,000 of State/ Concordia and - 34,000 of State/ for Human Awareness - 45,000 of State/ Electronic Iraqi - 39,000 for Area $25,218,093
ASSISTANCE: agency name dates amount Activities January Humanity Outreach - April Center Elections 8/20/2004 for Seminars October for Guidelines December Association Seminar - September Association Seminar - August Association Seminar - August NED for and January NED for Education September NED Education January NED Constitution January NED Rights Campaign in January NED Encylopedia People January as of
$25.2M Voter 8, 2006 Project 5, 2005 Workshops Elections 24, Elections to Assist 31, 2004 Baghdad 9, 2004 Ninewa 31, Kirkuk 9, Elections Democratic 31, 2006 Elections in Iraq 30, 2005 Center for in Mosul 31, 2006 Workshops 31, 2006 Coordination Iraq 31, 2006 31, 2006 March 31,
Education 2004 National 2004 2004 Elections Nongovernmental 2005
Campaign Minority Organizations
Page 17
GAO-05-932R Rebuilding Iraq
Building
A New October
Domestic Preparing Building Iraq: Women's 1, 2004
Domestic Sub-total Oversight Sub-total Iraqi Women A New Women's June Empowerment - Sub-total
ELECTIONS Oversight July 9, Obligated and Voter July 9, Domestic July 9, Obligated WOMEN'S Strengthening September September Johns as Leaders, September The Iraqi September Kurdish September Iraq: December Role in 28, Project & December Obligated Total
VIOLENCE U.S. Grant Grant Obligated and Voter 2004 - for Area DOMESTIC U.S. Grant Grant Obligated Education 2004 - Oversight 2004 - for Area POLITICAL U.S. Grant Grant Obligated Department Women's 1, 2004 - Department Women's 1, 2004 - Department Hopkins Advocates, 11, 2004 Department Independent women's 17, 2004 Department Human Women and 23, 2004 Woodrow Women's 1, 2004 Woodrow the 2004 - Women's Advancing 31, 2004 for Area obligated
MONITORING: agency Grantee name effective amount USAID IFES Education January $14,200,000 as of $14,200,000 MONITORING: agency Grantee name effective amount USAID NDI Activities January $14,000,000 USAID IRI and Voter January n/aa as of $14,000,000 PARTICIPATION: agency Grantee name effective amount of State NDI Political November $1,500,000 of State IRI Leadership February 1,500,000 of State University and - 854,000 of State Women's educational - 1,300,000 of State Rights Democracy - January USIP Wilson Role in - 61,780 USIP Wilson Political August 60,970 USIP Empowerment Women's & 19,472 as of $5,847,475 as of $130,305,985
$14.2M dates Activities 8, 2006 March 31, $14M dates - Domestic 8, 2006 Education 8, 2006 March 31, $5.8M dates Participation 30, 2005 Institute 28, 2006 / SAIS Participants December Forum Institute September Watch in Iraq 6, 2006 Center the February Center Process 31, Groups Role in October March 31, March 31,
- Conflict 2005 Elections Activities - 2005 in Iraq in the 1, 2005 15, 2005 Political 28, 2005 on the 2004 Politics - 1, 2004 2005 2005
Management Monitors Political Political Process Eve of Babylon - May
and Party Process the 31, 2005
Mitigation Poll-watcher January
Program Training 550,000 2005"
Source: GAO analysis of grant agreements from USAID, the Department of
State, NED, and USIP.
aIRI's grant is for both party agent monitor training and for voter
education activities. We do not have a breakdown between the two
components of the grants. IRI's total amount obligated for this award is
indicated under Voter Education in this table.
Enclosure 2
Comments from the U.S. Agency International Development
Enclosure 3
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact: Joseph A. Christoff (202) 512-8979
Staff Acknowledgments: In addition to the individual named above, Tetsuo
Miyabara, Valerie Leman Nowak, Friendly Vang-Johnson, and Christina Werth
made key contributions to this report. Lynn Cothern, Martin de Alteriis,
Etana Finkler, and Mary Moutsos provided technical assistance.
(320312)
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