Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of
Restricted Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed
(21-JUL-05, GAO-05-928T).
Securing and defending U.S. airspace is an interagency mission
that depends on close interagency coordination and information
sharing. GAO was asked to review (1) the threat assessment for
U.S. aviation, (2) violations of restricted airspace since
September 11, 2001, (3) agencies' individual or coordinated steps
to secure U.S. aviation, and (4) interagency policies and
procedures to manage the response to restricted airspace
violations. GAO will issue a classified report responding to this
request later this year. To keep this testimony unclassified, GAO
focused on the latter three questions.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-928T
ACCNO: A30597
TITLE: Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of
Restricted Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed
DATE: 07/21/2005
SUBJECT: Aircraft pilots
Aviation
Aviation security
Counterterrorism
Homeland security
Interagency relations
Policy evaluation
Risk assessment
Security policies
Security policy violations
Security threats
Transportation security
Flight restrictions
Policies and procedures
******************************************************************
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GAO-05-928T
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Testimony
Before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT HOMELAND SECURITY
Thursday, July 21, 2005
Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted Airspace, but Management
Improvements Are Needed
Statement of Davi M. D'Agostino, Director Defense Capabilities and Management
On July 25, 2005, this testimony was reposted to the Web because the
legend on page 9 was incorrect and the electronic version has been
corrected.
GAO-05-928T
[IMG]
July 2005
HOMELAND SECURITY
Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted Airspace, but Management
Improvements Are Needed
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration reported about 3,400 violations of
restricted airspace from September 12, 2001, to December 31, 2004, most of
which were committed by general aviation pilots. Violations can occur
because (1) pilots may divert from their flight plan to avoid bad weather,
(2) the Administration may establish newly restricted airspace with little
warning, and pilots in the air may be unaware of the new restrictions, or
(3) pilots do not check for notices of restrictions, as required. Also,
terrorists may deliberately enter restricted airspace to test the
government's response or carry out an attack.
Federal agencies have acted individually or have coordinated to enhance
aviation security. For example, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) established a national operations center that disseminates
operational-and intelligence-related information, and has enhanced
passenger and checked baggage screening, secured cockpit doors, and
assessed the risk to some, but not all, commercial airports. Also, few
general aviation airport owners have conducted risk assessments. The North
American Aerospace Defense Command's mission was expanded to include
monitoring domestic air traffic and conducting air patrols. Collectively,
the agencies are operating the National Capital Region Coordination Center
to secure the National Capital Region.
GAO identified gaps in the simultaneous, time-critical, multi-agency
response to airspace violations. While it may not be possible to prevent
all violations or deter all attacks, GAO identified some gaps in policies
and procedures. Specifically, the agencies were operating without (1) an
organization in the lead, (2) fully developed interagency policies and
procedures for the airspace violations response teleconferencing system,
(3) information sharing protocols and procedures, or (4) accepted
definitions of a violation. As a result, opportunities may be missed to
enhance the security of U.S. aviation.
Depiction of a Potential Restricted Airspace Violation
Source: GAO.
United States Government Accountability Office
Chairman Davis and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to provide results of GAO's
work on violations of restricted airspace and the interagency response.
Specifically, I will discuss the unclassified results from our classified
report on violations into restricted airspace that we will issue in
September 2005.
As you know, because of intelligence assessments since the September 11,
2001, attacks, the United States has established additional temporary
flight restrictions over important sites such as selected governmental
operations, national events, and critical infrastructure.1 Established by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), temporary flight restrictions
and other special use airspace measures are national airspace management
tools used to restrict flights into protected airspace. The intent of
establishing restricted airspace is to reduce the number of flights in
that airspace to only those authorized so that the FAA, the Department of
Defense (DOD), the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), and other agencies can more readily
identify an unauthorized aircraft and, if needed, take actions to deter or
defeat it.
Intelligence agencies believe that terrorists remain highly interested in
attacking U.S. aviation with commercial or general aviation aircraft, in
attacking an airport, or in using aircraft to attack targets. Intelligence
agencies differ in their assessments of how significant the threat is from
the use of certain general aviation aircraft in an attack. Our prior work
has shown that the success of interagency efforts depends on melding
multiorganizational efforts through central leadership, an overarching
strategy, effective partnerships, and common definitions.2 Securing and
defending U.S. airspace is a key example of an interagency mission that
depends on close coordination and information sharing between and among
the agencies that share this mission. As many as 7 key government
organizations can be simultaneously involved in responding to a violation
of restricted airspace. TSA is responsible for ensuring that only
authorized
1 Critical infrastructure is defined as systems or assets, whether
physical or virtual, so vital to the nation that the incapacity or
destruction of them would have a debilitating impact on national economic
security, national public health, or safety.
2 GAO, Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but
Uncertainty Remains, GAO-02-610 (Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002).
pilots, cabin crewmembers, or passengers gain access to an aircraft. Once
airborne, FAA becomes the lead agency and is responsible for managing
traffic entering into or operating in U.S. airspace to ensure safe
operations by monitoring aircraft movements using radar and maintaining
communications with the pilots. Either DOD's North American Aerospace
Defense Command (NORAD) or DHS is called in to enforce airspace security
if TSA or FAA cannot prevent someone from taking control of an aircraft
without authorization or flying into restricted airspace without
authorization. During a violation, these agencies carry out their
responsibilities simultaneously. This was the case during the incursions
into the National Capital Region restricted airspace during May 2005.
Today I will provide our findings on (1) violations of restricted airspace
since September 11, 2001, (2) agencies' individual or coordinated steps to
secure U.S. aviation, and (3) interagency policies and procedures to
manage the response to violations of restricted airspace. I will also
summarize our recommendations and the agency comments.
The FAA reported about 3,400 violations of restricted airspace nationwide
from September 12, 2001, to December 31, 2004, most of which were
committed by general aviation pilots. Violations can occur because (1)
pilots may need to divert from their planned flight path to avoid bad
weather and may consequently enter restricted airspace; (2) the FAA may
establish the restricted airspace with little warning, and pilots already
in the air may be unaware of the new restrictions; and (3) pilots may not
check FAA notifications of new restrictions, as required.3 Also,
terrorists might deliberately enter restricted airspace to observe the
government's response or to carry out an attack. Most violations of
restricted airspace occur in the eastern United States due to heavy air
traffic in the area and the large amount of restricted airspace. Moreover,
most violations of restricted airspace in the eastern United States occur
in the National Capital Region. General aviation accounts for about 88
percent of all violations nationwide. We did not review the actions taken
by FAA against pilots who violate restricted airspace, although we do
describe the actions FAA can take.
Summary
3 "Each person shall, before conducting any operation under the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 C.F.R. Chapter 1), be familiar with all available
information concerning that operation, including Notices to Airmen issued
under S:91.139," 14 C.F.R. pt. 91, SFAR No. 60 - Air Traffic Control
Emergency Operation.
Since September 11, 2001, federal agencies have acted individually or have
coordinated to secure U.S. airspace and address the threat:
o TSA secured commercial aircraft, limited potential access to
commercial aviation aircraft and facilities, and conducted risk
assessments of some facilities.
o FAA has increased its use of temporarily restricted airspace for
national security purposes and has issued over 220 Notices to Airmen4 to
identify the location of restricted airspace. In addition, the FAA
established the Domestic Events Network,5 an interagency teleconferencing
system that permits the agencies to communicate about and coordinate their
response to violations of restricted airspace.
o NORAD increased air patrols and improved airspace monitoring.
o Collectively, the agencies were operating the National Capital Region
Coordination Center to bring key agencies together to secure the airspace
over the National Capital Region.
We identified gaps in the management of the interagency response to
airspace violations. Individual agency and interagency progress and
coordination to secure airspace is noteworthy. However, we recognize that
it may not be possible to prevent all violations of restricted airspace or
deter all attacks. Airspace security measures could be challenged.
Moreover, in some cases pilots do not check on airspace restrictions, as
they are required to do. Such challenges, along with the complexity of
several agencies simultaneously carrying out their respective agency
responsibilities, highlight the need for clear policies and procedures and
optimal interagency coordination for the most timely and effective
management of the nation's airspace security and violations of restricted
airspace. Nevertheless, potential gaps remain:
o TSA officials told us that the agency has conducted risk assessments6
at some but not all of the commercial airports in the United States.7
4 Pilots are required to check Notices to Airmen before beginning their
flights to avoid any temporary flight restricted zones during their
flights. These notices contain the specific locations and times that
airspace is restricted.
5 While our report discusses management of restricted airspace violations,
the mission of the Domestic Events Network also includes managing the
response to hijackings, suspicious activities, and other events.
6 Risk assessments involve assessing a facility's threats,
vulnerabilities, and critical assets to determine where resources should
be targeted to reduce risk.
o While each agency commands and controls its own resources, no one
organization leads the interagency response to airspace violations. TSA,
FAA, and DOD officials told us that at the National Capital Region
Coordination Center no one organization is in the lead because, depending
on the nature of the airspace violation, each of the agencies
simultaneously carries out its responsibilities during the phases of the
violation. TSA is the executive agent for the Center, but TSA officials
said that they only resolve or "deconflict" agency issues and do not see
themselves as being in charge.
o The agencies have not developed policies and procedures over who has
access to the Domestic Events Network, and FAA personnel told us that
under certain circumstances, they could be cut out of conferences if these
conferences go above a certain security classification and different
communication systems are used.
o As threat conditions warrant, the agencies may take additional steps
to secure the airspace outside the National Capital Region but they have
not begun to develop an overarching plan for such airspace.8 As a result,
interagency coordination may be hampered.
o Agency database records documenting violations were not routinely
shared among FAA, NORAD, or TSA, or with FAA's Strategic Operations
Security Manager, because the agencies have not established information
sharing requirements and protocols. We reviewed FAA data and identified
information we believe agencies could use to better secure U.S. airspace.
Because data are not routinely shared, these agencies may miss
opportunities to enhance security.
o The potential for confusion about what constitutes an airspace
violation exists among the agencies because they do not have a common
definition of an airspace violation. As a result, the agencies may be
unaware of the scope and magnitude of the problem, making it more
difficult to allocate resources efficiently.
We made several recommendations to DHS, DOD, and the Department of
Transportation to strengthen the interagency process for managing the
response to violations of restricted airspace. DHS and DOD nonconcurred
with our recommendation that the three secretaries should determine
whether one agency should manage the interagency process of responding to
violations of restricted airspace, primarily because of concerns about
command and control. DHS and Transportation concurred or partially
7 On this review, we did not evaluate the adequacy of TSA's risk
assessment tools; however, in other reviews GAO is assessing various
aspects of TSA's risk management approaches.
8 Airspace outside the National Capital Region is protected for National
Security Special Events and Presidential movements, and when intelligence
warrants protection.
concurred with most or all of our recommendations. DOD nonconcurred with
most of our recommendations.
Background
After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001,
federal agencies took immediate steps to secure U.S. airspace. FAA
grounded all air traffic and DOD ordered Air Force fighter jets to fly
patrols over selected U.S. cites to deter and respond to any additional
attacks. In the months after the attacks, the President developed certain
national strategies and directives, and Congress established TSA and gave
it the responsibility to provide security for all modes of transportation.
Congress also later passed and the President signed legislation to protect
the homeland against air, land, and maritime threats, including creating
the DHS to coordinate and lead the national homeland security effort.
After the attacks, interagency coordination increased as FAA, NORAD, TSA,
their parent cabinet departments, and other agencies with homeland air
defense or security roles and missions worked together to meet the overall
goal of protecting U.S. airspace.
NORAD and the FAA have historically been the main contributors to
protecting U.S. airspace. FAA's primary mission is to safely manage the
flow of air traffic in the United States, but it contributes to air
security through its control of U.S. airspace. About 17,000 FAA
controllers monitor and manage airspace, support the coordination of
security operations, and provide information to military and law
enforcement agencies when needed. Within NORAD, Continental North American
Aerospace Defense Command Region personnel monitor radar data on aircraft
entering and operating within continental U.S. airspace. NORAD also
conducts air patrols in U.S. airspace.
Different Classes and Use of Airspace
According to FAA, the agency divides airspace into four categories:
controlled, uncontrolled, special use, and other.9 Controlled airspace may
include special flight restrictions and will have specific defined
dimensions, including altitude ranges, or vertical boundaries, and surface
area, or horizontal boundaries. Any aircraft operating within controlled
airspace must comply with rules governing that airspace or be subject to
enforcement action. Controlled airspace is further divided into classes
ranging from A through E. Each class of airspace has its own level of Air
9 14 C.F.R. pt. 99 (2005).
Traffic Control services and operational requirements that pilots must
follow in order to enter and operate in it. For example, to operate in
class A airspace, pilots must have air traffic controller clearance to
enter and must have communication equipment on board to permit
communication with air traffic controllers. In lesser-restricted airspace,
pilots can navigate by landmarks. Controlled airspace can be further
classified with special flight restrictions. In uncontrolled airspace,
class G, air traffic controllers have no authority or responsibility to
control air traffic.
FAA also reserves airspace for special purposes, called Special Use
Airspace, which is normally established to protect important
infrastructure, including military installations. An Air Defense
Identification Zone10 is restricted airspace in which the ready
notification, location, and control of aircraft are required for national
security reasons.
FAA's other airspace category includes national security areas, military
training routes, and temporary flight restriction areas. A temporary
flight restriction typically restricts flights over specified areas for a
specified period of time. These zones can be established over critical
infrastructure, military operations areas, National Security Special
Events, and United States Secret Service protectees (e.g. such as the
President, whose airspace is protected as he moves throughout the United
States).
FAA notifies pilots of temporary flight restrictions through its Notices
to Airmen program. Pilots are required to check for notices before
beginning their flights to avoid any temporary flight restriction zones
during their flights. If pilots violate such a zone, FAA can take actions
against them ranging from suspending the pilot's certificate to fly in
response to a onetime, first-time violation to revocation of the
certificate when the violation is deliberate or otherwise shows a
disregard for the regulations.
Temporary flight restrictions are one component of a tiered security
aviation system. The system includes ground procedures, such as TSA
passenger screening procedures, and in-flight security procedures,
including reinforced cockpit doors and Federal Air Marshals on selected
domestic and international flights. Temporary flight restrictions are
considered passive air space control measures intended to keep the flying
public out of the protected airspace so that agencies can more readily
identify and respond to pilots exhibiting hostile intent. A temporary
flight
10 14 C.F.R. pt. 71 (2005).
restriction alone will not prevent pilots from entering the protected
airspace.
FAA monitors national airspace traffic to ensure safety and has
established triggers to help identify suspicious aircraft and pilots.
According to FAA procedures, FAA controllers are to advise the pilots to
change their course or altitude if they are on a course toward prohibited
or restricted airspace without authorization, or if they are circling or
loitering over a sensitive area. Sensitive areas include airspace over
dams, nuclear and electrical power plants, chemical storage sites, the
location of the President, or military facilities. Various forms of
suspicious pilot and aircraft activity are being monitored.
If a violation is imminent or underway, responding agencies have only
limited time in which to decide what actions to take. Nonetheless, the
agencies need sufficient time to try to determine the pilot's intent and,
if necessary, to order, scramble, and launch DOD or DHS aircraft to
intercept the violator.
The response to a violation is managed using a process of recognition,
assessment and warning, interdiction, recovery, and follow-up; which
agency takes these actions depends on the specific nature of the
violation. FAA can report a violation of restricted airspace based on
radar tracking. If the offending aircraft deviates from its planned flight
path but is not heading directly toward the protected asset, FAA may
monitor the aircraft and try to contact the pilot but not interdict the
aircraft. Conversely, if NORAD or FAA perceives the aircraft to be a
threat based on its speed, direction, or other information, NORAD can
alert its aircraft and attempt to intercept the violator. If successfully
diverted away from the protected asset or restricted airspace, Secret
Service, FAA, TSA, or local law enforcement officers may meet the aircraft
and interview the pilot upon landing, to identify any hostile intent. On
the other hand, if the offending pilot does not divert and proceeds to
operate in a manner perceived as threatening, the NORAD pilot can be
ordered by the appropriate authorities to engage the violating aircraft.
Figure 1 shows an aircraft deviating from its planned flight path and
shows more highly threatening and, conversely, less threatening violations
of restricted airspace.
Figure 1: A Potential Restricted Airspace Violation
Violations of Restricted Airspace
Source: GAO.
Our review of an FAA database found about 3,400 reported violations of
restricted airspace from September 12, 2001, to December 31, 2004, most of
which were committed by general aviation pilots. According to FAA,
violations occur because (1) pilots may divert from their planned flight
path to avoid bad weather, or may make navigational errors and
consequently enter restricted airspace; (2) FAA may establish airspace
restrictions with little warning, and pilots already in the air may be
unaware of the new restrictions; or (3) pilots may not check for notices
of new restrictions as required by FAA and may consequently enter
restricted airspace without authorization. In addition, terrorists might
deliberately enter restricted airspace to observe the government's
response or to carry out an attack. FAA investigates pilot deviations into
restricted airspace to
General aviation aircraft pilots accounted for about 88 percent of all
violations of restricted U.S. airspace between September 12, 2001, and
December 31, 2004. Figure 3 shows the percentage of incursions by type of
aircraft.
Figure 3: Violations by Type of Aircraft
1%
Large air carrier/air taxi
4%
Unknown/other
U.S. military
General aviation
Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.
Note: Data rounded to the nearest percent. FAA records a violation as
unknown when it is unable to identify the offending aircraft. Unknown
aircraft may include aircraft that depart from the restricted airspace
before authorities can identify them.
According to FAA data, pilot error is the biggest contributor to
restricted airspace violations. Pilots may not check for FAA Notices to
Airmen that indicate the location of restricted airspace, or FAA may
establish such airspace with little warning, and pilots may consequently
enter the airspace. Airspace restrictions can move, such as when the
President travels. Notices on the location of newly restricted airspace
may be issued quickly, and pilots may already be in their aircraft or in
the air when the restriction is announced and implemented. Moreover,
pilots may fly around bad weather or may experience equipment problems and
consequently enter restricted airspace to maintain safe operations.
To reduce violations, FAA has conducted safety seminars, provided a
tollfree number for pilots to call and check for restricted airspace,
identified
the location of restricted airspace on its Web site, and encouraged pilots
to check for and be attentive to notices on restricted airspace.11
FAA Actions to Temporarily Suspend or Permanently Revoke Pilot
Certificates
Federal Agencies Have Taken Individual and Coordinated Actions to Mitigate the
Terrorist Threat to U.S. Aviation
TSA Has Acted to Secure Aviation
When a pilot enters restricted airspace without authorization, FAA
investigates and decides what actions to take against the pilot. After the
September 2001 attacks, FAA strengthened the actions that it could take.
For example, FAA no longer issues warning notices or letters of correction
to pilots. Instead, FAA will now suspend a pilot's certificate for 30 to
90 days for a single, inadvertent, first-time violation of a temporary
flight restriction area that was established with a notice. The temporary
suspension's length depends on the degree of danger to other aircraft and
persons or property on the ground, the pilot's level of experience, prior
violations record, and certain other factors. If a pilot deliberately
enters restricted airspace without authorization, FAA will revoke the
pilot's certificate.
Federal agencies have undertaken individual and coordinated initiatives to
secure U.S. aviation by trying to ensure that only authorized personnel
gain access to aircraft or airports, expanding efforts to educate pilots
about the location of restricted airspace and the circumstances under
which they may enter such airspace, improving the monitoring of domestic
airspace, enhancing their ability to enforce airspace restrictions, and
trying to effectively coordinate a response to each restricted airspace
violation in the event that prevention fails. TSA, FAA, and DOD have
individually and in a coordinated way directed resources to mitigate the
risk of terrorists using commercial aircraft as weapons or targets.12 Some
of the most publicly visible changes are the advent of TSA operations at
over 400 airports, which include more rigorous passenger screening
procedures.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted November 2001,
authorized TSA to secure all modes of transportation.13 Since then, TSA
has established the Transportation Security Operations Center, a national
11 We did not evaluate the effectiveness of these efforts.
12 The resources discussed are not meant to be all-inclusive, but are used
to highlight some of the resources that have been provided. Providing an
all-inclusive list was beyond the scope of our review.
13 Pub. L. No. 107-71 (2001).
FAA Has Taken Steps to Monitor Airspace and Support a Coordinated
Interagency Response to Violations
center that operates around the clock and analyzes and disseminates
operational-and intelligence-related information for all modes of
transportation. TSA has also enhanced passenger and checked baggage
screening, expanded the Federal Air Marshal Service to place more marshals
on international and domestic commercial flights, and secured cockpit
doors to prevent unauthorized entry to the flight decks of commercial
airliners.14 In addition, the Federal Flight Deck Officers program is
training pilots on commercial passenger and cargo aircraft in how to use
lethal force against an intruder on the flight deck. In addition, TSA has
expanded background checks for more of the aviation workforce.
TSA is also working to fully implement a risk management approach that
would include risk assessment tools for targeting resources to improve
security. For example, the tool might indicate the level of preparedness
of a facility, given probable threat scenarios. The tool may show that,
based on a particular threat scenario, a facility's physical security may
be vulnerable, or access controls to the facility may be weak. Based on
the findings from use of the tool, owners and operators could take actions
to reduce these risks.
After September 11, 2001, FAA established additional temporary flight
restrictions over sensitive sites in the United States and established a
teleconferencing system to coordinate the nation's response to violations
of restricted airspace. Many of the additional temporary flight
restrictions were established over selected critical infrastructures.
Prior to the attacks, temporary flight restrictions were rarely used for
national security purposes. Since the attacks, FAA has issued over 220
Notices to Airmen identifying temporary flight restrictions. In addition,
the amount of airspace associated with some temporary flight restrictions
has increased both vertically and laterally. For example, presidential
temporary flight restrictions around the President have increased
laterally from 3 to 30 nautical miles and vertically from 3,000 feet to
18,000 feet.
To alert DOD, TSA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other agencies
of suspicious activities or potential violations of protected airspace,
FAA established the Domestic Events Network after the September 11, 2001,
attacks. As discussed earlier, FAA also increased the sanctions against
pilots who enter restricted airspace without
14 In November 2003, the Federal Air Marshal Service was transferred to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
NORAD's Mission Has Expanded to Defend Domestic U.S. Airspace
authorization, and it has continued to educate pilots about restricted
airspace.
After the September 2001 attacks, NORAD's mission was expanded beyond
defending just external airspace to include domestic airspace. NORAD also
committed more fighters, refueling, and early warning aircraft to support
its expanded mission. These aircraft are part of DOD's Operation Noble
Eagle15 and conduct air patrols over Washington, D.C., New York City,
Chicago, Los Angeles, and other cities based on the threat level and
threat intelligence received and analyzed. NORAD continually evaluates
such information and directs operations such as that of ordering fighters
to patrol airspace over these and other cities as appropriate. NORAD can
also expand its overall national air defense response levels and commit
additional resources according to the threat level.
To facilitate its current domestic military mission, NORAD expanded its
ability to monitor domestic airspace. Prior to the September 2001 attacks,
NORAD did not monitor domestic airspace. However, following the attacks
and the expansion of NORAD's mission to include domestic air defense, the
command gained access to FAA's domestic airspace radar system, with a
software upgrade. During our review, NORAD was testing replacement
software that would allow it to achieve efficiencies in securing domestic
airspace. However, air defense-sector radar operations crews we
interviewed expressed concerns about the new software. We briefed NORAD
officials on these concerns, and the officials responded that they would
not accept the software until air defense personnel were satisfied with
its performance. Moreover, in addition to normal software development
meetings that NORAD had conducted with the users, NORAD also held special
meetings to address the air defense-sector personnel's concerns. System
testing was scheduled through 2005.
NORAD is also trying to improve the data that it collects and records on
violations of restricted airspace. Our review found discrepancies in the
numbers of violations of restricted airspace recorded between the air
defense sectors and NORAD headquarters. For example, from January through
November 2004, the Northeast Air Defense Sector reported 2,069 cases where
aircraft were monitored for violations of restricted airspace
15 Operation Noble Eagle is a DOD-led military mission that began on
September 11, 2001, to defend the United States against terrorism or
foreign aggression.
and other activities.16 However, NORAD headquarters had information on
only 266, or 13 percent of the cases. NORAD headquarters acted to correct
the problem and is implementing a new reporting system and conducting
training. NORAD's air defense sectors are primarily responsible for
tracking and cataloging restricted airspace violations. NORAD headquarters
officials told us that their airspace data had not been shared outside
DOD. However, in July 2005, DOD informed us that it is planning to share
information contained in its new system with the FAA upon completion of an
interagency memorandum of understanding.
Coordinated Agency Initiatives Taken to Secure U.S. Aviation
Interagency Management of the Response to Airspace Violations Could Benefit
from Closing Gaps in Policies and Procedures
The agencies have recognized that individual actions alone are not
sufficient to respond to violations of restricted airspace, and
consequently they have also coordinated their efforts to try and enhance
the response to each violation. The agencies have established the National
Capital Region Coordination Center to enhance the effectiveness of air
security and air defense operations in the national capital region. The
center's primary mission is to facilitate rapid coordination and
information sharing among participating agencies in preventing, deterring,
and interdicting air threats to the region. To facilitate center
operations, the participating agencies approved a concept of operations
plan in May 2005 that identifies agency roles and missions in securing and
defending national capital region airspace and specifies certain
interagency operating protocols.
The individual and coordinated agencies' actions represent noteworthy
efforts to counter the threat to U.S. aviation and the homeland. However,
it is important to recognize that it may not be possible to prevent all
restricted airspace violations or to deter all attacks. Airspace security
measures could be challenged. In addition, in some cases, some pilots do
not consult FAA notices on the location of restricted airspace as required
by FAA, and consequently sometimes inadvertently enter restricted airspace
without authorization. Although FAA has established stricter sanctions
against pilots and stepped up its outreach efforts, violations continued
at the time of our review. Consequently, the interagency management of the
response to airspace violations could benefit from
16 NORAD may monitor for other activities if, for example, it receives
intelligence information that indicates an aircraft may present a
potential threat. Because NORAD data includes information on other
airspace activity as well as violations into restricted airspace, NORAD
data did not correspond to FAA data for the same time period.
filling gaps in policies and procedures. We also identified gaps in TSA's
risk assessment of the aviation sector.
Gaps in TSA Risk Assessments
TSA has made improvements in airspace security; however, TSA does not have
complete knowledge of the level of risk existing in the commercial
aviation sector. While agency officials told us that they conducted
vulnerability assessments, a component of risk assessments, at many of the
commercial airports, they had not assessed all of them. TSA officials
explained that they had not yet established milestones for specific
actions needed to complete the risk assessments. As a result, TSA lacks
assurance that some airport managers have taken reasonable steps to
enhance security.
General aviation airports and aircraft are also a concern because TSA has
generally not assessed the level of security existing at these airports.
About 19,000 general aviation airports operate in the United States, and
TSA's overall vulnerability assessments at these airports have been
limited. Most general aviation airports are not required to provide the
same level of screening for pre-boarding passengers as at commercial
airports. TSA has reviewed some general aviation airports for
vulnerabilities and developed risk assessment tools to enable managers to
conduct self-assessments. Nonetheless, the assessments are voluntary, and
the completion of these assessments has been limited.17 Thus, TSA plans to
outreach to airport managers to promote use of the tool. In a November
2004 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct
the Assistant Secretary of TSA to develop an implementation plan with
milestones and time frames to execute a risk management approach for
general aviation, and the agency concurred with our recommendation.
Gaps in the Interagency Management of Violations
While improvements have been made in the overall management response to
airspace violations, the interagency response to airspace violations
suggests that there are opportunities for further improvement, because
these agencies have not formally developed an interagency program to
institutionalize the defense of restricted airspace. Specifically, the
agencies do not have:
17 GAO, General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed,
but Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term
Success, GAO-05-144 (Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004).
o an organization in charge,
o interagency policies and procedures,
o protocols for information sharing, and
o common definitions of restricted airspace violations.
Leadership Over the National Capital Region Coordination Center Is
Uncertain
Interagency Coordination Is Occurring, but Policies and Procedures Are Not
Well Established
Each agency simultaneously acts and commands and controls its own
resources in responding to a violation of restricted airspace. At the same
time, TSA, FAA, and DOD officials told us that, at the National Capital
Region Coordination Center, determining who leads the interagency response
is difficult, may change depending on the nature of the airspace
violation, and may shift during the course of a violation, as the agencies
monitor the intruder's flight and consider the appropriate response. TSA
is the executive agency for the center, but TSA officials said that they
only resolve or "deconflict" agency issues and do not see themselves as
being in charge of the interagency process for responding to violations of
restricted airspace. At the same time, DOD pointed out that the response
at the center has little or no effect on NORAD's response, because NORAD
and FAA control National Capital Region airspace. Without central
leadership, the potential exists for a somewhat slower response to a
violation as the agencies decide who is in charge while the violating
aircraft continues to operate in restricted airspace.
While the interagency coordination achieved at the time our report was
noteworthy, TSA, FAA, DOD, and other agencies had not implemented certain
key policies and procedures that are critical to multi-organizational
success, particularly when they are acting simultaneously in a
time-critical operation. For example, the agencies had not agreed on
policies and procedures to specify who has access to Domestic Events
Networkinitiated conferences, and under what circumstances. Additionally,
according to FAA, during a violation FAA personnel may not have access to
DOD's classified teleconference systems if the interagency response goes
beyond a certain national security classification, because FAA officials
may lack appropriate security clearances. In other cases, according to DOD
officials, when a secure conference is taking place, FAA officials cannot
connect themselves into the conference, the originating party must call
them and FAA must subsequently answer the call, in order to participate.
If unable to participate, FAA officials told us that they may be unable to
effectively manage other aircraft in the area in a timely manner,
potentially resulting in aircraft collisions or exposing aircraft
transiting the area to danger if the decision is made to shoot down the
violator.
Concept of Operations Plan for the National Capital Region Is Completed,
but Remaining Airspace Is Not Covered
Information Sharing Protocols and Procedures Have Not Been Established
In April 2005, the agencies completed their interagency concept of
operations plan for the National Capital Region Coordination Center, but
the concept of operations plan does not address when and how
responsibility for response is passed from agency to agency during a
violation. Also, the agencies have not begun to develop a plan covering
any other U.S. airspace. Such plans outline the general concept of program
operations with specific actions and responsibilities to be assigned to
participating agencies in a separate, more detailed plan. Without a
concept of operations plan, the effective passing of responsibility from
one agency to another to respond to a restricted airspace violation cannot
be ensured, potentially leading to confusion and a slower response.
Information sharing protocols and procedures have not been established by
the agencies or within some parts of FAA. After the agencies complete the
response to an airspace violation, FAA and NORAD officials record the
violation in separate databases. These databases consist of records of
violations that, taken together, could reveal trends indicating testing or
training for an attack. However, neither FAA nor NORAD routinely shares
even parts of its data with the other. Furthermore, the FAA database was
not routinely shared with the agency's own Strategic Operations Security
Manager, despite the manager's repeated attempts to obtain access. In May
2005, FAA finally agreed to share parts of the database with its own
Strategic Operations Security Manager. Although the FAA database was set
up for a different purpose, the manager had previously indicated that he
could use information to enhance security; however, he told us that the
FAA department that maintains the database had previously refused to
provide the information, citing the need to protect pilot information.
We also obtained access to key elements of the database18 and found
information that could suggest approaches to reducing violations of
restricted airspace. For example, we could identify aircraft that
repeatedly violated restricted airspace and the airports from which the
flights originated. Specifically, we found 2 general aviation aircraft
that had accounted for 6 violations each, and 29 airports, 17 of which are
in Maryland and Virginia, that had accounted for about 30 percent of all
airspace violations nationwide. This is the type of information that was
not shared with the FAA Strategic Operations Security Manager, but which
such an office might find useful in light of intelligence agency threat
18 FAA excluded pilot information from the key elements we obtained.
Common Definitions Have Not Been Accepted
Conclusions
assessments about the potential for terrorist use of general aviation
aircraft.
Additionally, FAA enforcement actions taken on airspace violations are not
routinely shared with other agencies. Since agencies do not have this
information, they have little knowledge as to the disposition and
effectiveness of their collective efforts, and they may be hampered in
their ability to target limited resources effectively. For example, NORAD
air defense-sector personnel did not have aggregated or general
information about FAA's administrative enforcement actions against pilots
who had violated restricted airspace in their sectors.19
Finally, the potential for confusion exists about what constitutes a
restricted airspace violation because no common definition has been
accepted. FAA and NORAD, the primary agencies collecting airspace
violations data, define it differently. NORAD uses the term "incursion"
and defines different types of incursions depending on various factors,
including airspeed and direction. FAA uses the term "pilot deviation" and
defines it as the actions of a pilot that result in the violation of a
Federal Aviation Regulation or a NORAD Air Defense Identification Zone, a
category of restricted airspace. However, the terms are not synonymous,
and a violation can trigger a response in one agency but not another, even
though multiple agencies share the responsibility for restricted airspace
security and an appropriate, timely response is critical. Moreover,
without a common definition that can be used as a basis for collecting
nationwide data, the agencies may not be aware of the scope and magnitude
of violations, making it potentially more difficult to target resources
efficiently and enhance security.
After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the fragmented missions of agencies
involved in securing and defending U.S. airspace converged into a broader
interagency mission to protect the airspace. Since September 11, 2001,
several involved agencies took actions that represent noteworthy efforts
to counter the threat to U.S. aviation and the homeland. TSA has attempted
to identify vulnerabilities of aircraft and airports and consequently
implemented and continues to implement security enhancements. Although TSA
is finishing the development of a risk
19 Such information would not have to include privacy information that
could be used to identify individual pilots.
assessment tool to assess general aviation threats, TSA has not
established milestones with specific actions needed to complete a similar
risk assessment for the commercial aviation sector. Until the assessment
is completed, TSA may lack complete knowledge as to the level of risk in
commercial aviation, and it cannot be assured that commercial aircraft
owners and operators at some airports are effectively targeting resources
to mitigate the risk of terrorists' using commercial aircraft to attack
population centers and critical infrastructure. Because the interagency
process to manage the response to restricted airspace violations is a
timecritical operation, the implications of not having well-developed
policies, procedures, information sharing protocols, and common
definitions are serious. In addition, if information and databases are not
appropriately shared, opportunities to better target limited resources and
proactively identify emerging threats could be missed.
Recommendations for We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security
direct the Assistant Secretary of TSA to establish milestones with
specific actions Executive Action needed to complete risk assessments
applicable to the commercial aviation sector.
We further recommend that the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security,
and Transportation work together to
o determine the extent to which one agency should be in charge of
leading the interagency process of responding to violations of restricted
airspace as they occur;
o determine the degree to which interagency policies, procedures, and
other guidance on the Domestic Events Network are needed to evaluate its
effectiveness and identify potential improvements;
o develop a concept of operations plan or other relevant document to
guide the interagency process of responding to violations in all U.S.
airspace;
o establish information sharing requirements and protocols; and
o establish common definitions.
In addition, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and
Transportation work together to determine the extent to which key elements
of FAA's pilot deviations database could be shared with NORAD.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the
Administrator of FAA to take the following actions:
o Obtain necessary security clearances for appropriate FAA personnel to
ensure that they are not excluded from airspace violations conferences
that require such clearances; and
o Ensure that FAA shares sufficient data from its airspace violation
database
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
(also known as its pilot deviations database) with FAA's office of the
Strategic Operations Security Manager to meet the needs of that office.
We received unclassified written comments from DHS, classified written
comments from DOD, and unclassified oral comments from the Department of
Transportation on the classified draft report that we will issue to you in
September 2005. We have included the DHS comments in their entirety in
appendix II and the unclassified portion of DOD's comments in appendix
III. Each agency also provided technical comments, and we incorporated
them in our draft report and this statement where appropriate.
DHS and DOD disagreed with our draft report recommendation that the
secretaries of the three departments work together to appoint an
organization responsible for determining the extent to which one agency
should be in charge of countering violations of restricted airspace as
they occur. DHS maintains that each agency should maintain full authority
to execute its own portion of the mission that contributes to the
interagency effort. DHS and DOD both pointed out that the Interagency
Airspace Protection Working Group in the Homeland Security Council
addresses interagency coordination issues, and DHS indicated that the
working group may be a vehicle for addressing the gaps we identified. We
note that, to date, the issues we highlighted in our testimony remain
unresolved. Nevertheless, we revised our recommendation to suggest that
the secretaries of the three departments work together to determine the
extent to which one agency should be in charge of leading the interagency
process of responding to violations of restricted airspace. Ultimately, we
believe that if the agencies can collectively resolve the issues and gaps
we identified in our report, which they acknowledged, then an organization
in charge may not be needed.
As discussed above, DHS agreed or partially agreed with the rest of our
recommendations, while DOD disagreed with most of the recommendations and
agreed with some. Department of Transportation officials agreed with the
recommendations in our draft report.
DHS generally concurred with our recommendation to establish milestones
with specific actions needed to complete risk assessments
applicable to the commercial aviation sector. In its response, DHS said
that it continues to conduct assessments as part of its risk-based
management approach. While these are good first steps, we still believe it
is also important to establish milestones with specific actions needed to
ensure that the assessments are completed within a reasonable time period
and are effectively managed. While DHS disagreed with having a lead
agency, its comments stated that more could be done to coordinate efforts
during violations, but that the focus should be on open communications to
ensure flexibility in responding to the violation. DHS told us that the
Interagency Airspace Protection Working Group meets regularly and
addresses relevant national airspace issues, but we noted that there is
still an absence of an air security strategy, plan, or concept of
operations, and the issues we found that could enhance air security such
as information sharing and common definitions still need to be addressed.
DHS concurred with our recommendations to determine the degree to which
interagency policies and procedures on the Domestic Events Network are
needed; develop a concept of operations for management of the interagency
response to violations in all U.S. airspace; and establish information
sharing requirements and protocols. With regard to our recommendation to
establish common definitions, DHS concurred in part, citing that each
agency's mission and command and control processes require that it develop
its own definitions for airspace violations. However, DHS agreed to share
its definitions with other agencies. We agree that sharing definitions is
important; however, it is unclear to us whether simply sharing and not
harmonizing definitions would sufficiently reduce confusion during the
interagency operation responding to violations of restricted airspace.
This is especially a concern in a time-critical function where clear
decisions are imperative.
DOD concurred or partially concurred with some of our recommendations and
nonconcurred with others. DOD also noted that we omitted from our draft
report certain DOD procedures officials supplied to us that integrate
DOD's response to violations of restricted airspace with those of other
agencies. We acknowledge that DOD has internal procedures that discuss the
way DOD interacts with other agencies, and we considered those procedures
as part of our analysis. DOD's procedures notwithstanding, we identified a
number of potential gaps in the interagency process of responding to
violations of restricted airspace that remain unaddressed.
We recommended that the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Defense, and
Transportation work together to accomplish five initiatives. First, DOD
nonconcurred with our recommendation that the three secretaries work
together to identify an organization that would be responsible for
addressing interagency coordination issues. As did DHS, DOD pointed out
that the Interagency Airspace Protection Working Group already addresses
interagency coordination for homeland air defense. Nonetheless, problems
remain. For example, as we point out in our report, information sharing
protocols and procedures have not been established, a concept of
operations plan for airspace outside the national capital region has not
been developed, and common definitions have not been adopted. DOD also
pointed out that TSA hosts agencies at the National Capital Region
Coordination Center. While true, TSA officials told us that they view
their role as one of deconflicting rather than of leading interagency
efforts. As stated earlier, we believe that if the agencies can
effectively resolve the issues and gaps we identified in the interagency
process of responding to violations of restricted airspace without having
an organization in charge, then an organization in charge may not be
needed.
Second, DOD nonconcurred with our recommendation that the three
secretaries work together to determine the extent to which one agency
should be in charge of leading the interagency process of responding to
violations of restricted airspace as they occur. DOD stated that our
report is misleading because it implies that having someone in charge
would prevent some airspace violations. DOD also stated that DHS has
managed air security by hardening commercial aircraft cockpit doors,
placing armed Federal Air Marshals on some flights, and taking other
actions. DOD also pointed out that FAA manages airspace for flight safety
and DOD defends domestic airspace. DOD stated that all of these missions
occur at all times and there is never a "lead change." As discussed above,
we revised and clarified our recommendation to suggest that the
secretaries of the three departments determine the extent to which one
agency should be in charge of leading the interagency process of
responding to restricted airspace violations. Our recommendation is
intended to enhance the response to violations of restricted airspace and
is not premised on the notion that its adoption would prevent the
violations from occurring. Moreover, while steps taken by DHS, FAA, and
DOD to secure aviation, ensure flight safety, and defend homeland airspace
are important contributions, they generally do not contribute to knowing
who is in charge of the response as a violation is occurring. Also, we
agree with DOD that there is never a "lead change," because the
interagency process lacks central leadership. Finally, we did not
recommend that a specific agency or individual be in charge. We
recommended that the departments study the question of whether it would be
advantageous to have someone in the lead. If the departments determined
that such a change would be beneficial, they would presumably also
determine what, if any, changes in law would be needed.
We acknowledge, however, that if the agencies can effectively resolve the
issues and gaps we identified in the interagency process of responding to
restricted airspace violations, then an organization in charge may not be
needed.
Third, we recommended that the three secretaries determine whether
interagency policies, procedures, or other guidance is necessary to
evaluate Domestic Events Network performance and identify improvements.
DOD nonconcurred and stated that the Domestic Events Network is not
designed for decision making. We note that the network is a telephone
conferencing system that permits communication between the agencies
responding to violations of restricted airspace for the purpose of
deciding on the coordinated response. We are not aware that the agencies
have evaluated network performance to determine whether enhancements are
possible, and our recommendation was intended to promote such an
evaluation. We continue to believe that government initiatives benefit
from appropriate evaluation of performance, and consequently we stand by
our recommendation.
Fourth, we recommended that the secretaries work together to develop a
concept of operations plan for management of violations in all U.S.
airspace. DOD nonconcurred on the basis that the agencies do not manage
violations but respond to them. Nonetheless, DOD agreed that an overall
air strategy and identification of roles and missions for each agency
should be considered. We agree that an overall strategy for securing U.S.
air space would be beneficial, and we believe that if such a strategy is
developed, a concept of operations plan or other relevant document would
follow. As a result of DOD's comment, we have revised our recommendation
to one of developing a concept of operations plan or other relevant
document to guide the interagency response to violations of restricted
airspace.
Finally, DOD concurred with our recommendations that the secretaries work
together to establish information sharing protocols and procedures and
establish common definitions.
We had also recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation
work together to determine the extent to which key elements of the FAA's
pilot deviation database could be shared with NORAD, and DOD nonconcurred.
In its comments, DOD stated that it does not require access to private
citizen data contained in the FAA database. We agree that DOD does not
require such information. However, we recommended that DOD meet with the
Department of Transportation to
determine whether any elements would be useful, and if so, to pursue a
means to obtain them. Consequently, we stand by our recommendation.
Department of Transportation officials told us that they agreed with our
recommendations and indicated that a national air security policy should
be established to outline major goals and responsibilities for each of the
agencies with responsibilities for the protection of U.S. airspace.
Department officials also stated that without a national policy, the
agencies would continue to work without unified, common goals.
Transportation officials suggested that a policy coordinating committee be
established for air security to address interagency issues. They also
agreed that information sharing is critical to enhance air security and
told us that they had begun sharing pilot deviations data with the FAA
Strategic Operations Security Manager as we had recommended. We agree with
the Department's overall comments and believe that this is the type of
dialogue that should take place between the Departments of Homeland
Security, Defense, and Transportation.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. Thank you again for the
opportunity to discuss these issues. At this time, I would be happy to
address any questions.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In conducting our review of the response to violations of restricted
airspace, we visited key offices within DOD, DHS, and FAA that have
responsibility for oversight and management of U.S. airspace. We conducted
our review in the Washington, D.C., area, at DOD, including the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Defense
Intelligence Agency, and Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Office;
DHS, including the Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United
States Secret Service, and the Transportation Security Administration,
including the National Capital Region Coordination Center; FAA
Headquarters, Domestic Events Network, Air Traffic Control System Command
Center, and the Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control
facility. We also met with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Counterterrorism Center, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association. We did not review ground-based air defense batteries
that are also part of the homeland air defense system.
We conducted fieldwork at U.S. Northern Command and NORAD, Colorado
Springs, Colorado, as well as NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector, Rome,
New York; Western Air Defense Sector, Tacoma, Washington; and the
Continental U.S. NORAD Region and Southeast Air Defense Sector near Panama
City, Florida. In addition, we visited the Air Force's Air Combat Command,
Langley, Virginia, and 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron, Ogden, Utah;
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Air and Marine Operations Center,
Riverside, California; and FAA's Air Traffic Control Center, Fort Worth,
Texas.
To determine the extent to which violations of restricted airspace have
occurred since September 11, 2001, we met with NORAD and FAA officials to
obtain relevant data from their incursion and pilot deviation databases,
respectively, and discussed their methods for determining what constitutes
an incursion/pilot deviation. After determining that NORAD's database was
not adequate to accurately identify the number of violations of restricted
airspace, we obtained relevant portions of FAA's pilot deviation database
and performed the analysis necessary to develop the data provided in the
report. We reviewed the reliability of the FAA database to determine the
numbers of incursions. We (1) performed electronic testing of the data
elements needed for our analysis and looked for obvious errors in accuracy
and completeness, (2) reviewed related documentation, and (3) interviewed
officials knowledgeable about the data. We noted several limitations in
the data, including missing values for key data elements and the fact that
events might be both over-and under-
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
reported due to varying definitions of pilot deviations. We were able to
partially correct for these problems and consequently determined that the
data were sufficiently reliable to illustrate analyses for tracking
violations of restricted airspace. However, because we could not fully
correct for data errors, the data presented should be considered estimates
rather than precise numbers.
To identify the actions taken individually or in coordinated fashion to
secure U.S. airspace and aviation and to mitigate the threat since
September 11, 2001, we interviewed officials at the National Capital
Region Coordination Center; the headquarters of NORAD and its Continental
U.S. NORAD Region and the three continental U.S. based air defense
sectors, TSA, FAA, and Air Combat Command; and the Air and Marine
Operations Center. We discussed and reviewed changes in operational
responsibilities and plans of these organizations both pre-and
post-September 11, 2001. To better understand these actions, we toured and
observed the workings of the National Capital Region Coordination Center,
the air defense sectors, the Domestic Events Network, and the Air and
Marine Operations Center. While at some of these centers, we observed the
agencies' responses to actual violations of restricted airspace, the
interaction of the agencies involved in responding, and the steps taken by
the various agencies involved to address the violation. We discussed with
agency officials the procedures for responding to incursions into
restricted airspace and reviewed pertinent documentation relating to those
procedures where they existed.
In examining interagency policies and procedures that govern the
management of airspace violations, we first reviewed existing GAO work
that found that the success of interagency efforts depends on melding
multi-organizational efforts through central leadership, an overarching
strategy, effective partnerships, and common definitions. We then compared
the extent to which agencies with responsibility for preventing or
responding to violations of restricted airspace have established an
organization in charge, interagency policies and procedures, protocols for
the sharing of database records documenting violations of restricted
airspace, and common definitions of restricted airspace.
We conducted our review from June 2004 through April 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact Davi M. D'Agostino (202) 512-5431
Acknowledgments Brian J. Lepore, Lorelei St. James, James F. Reid, James
R. Nelson, Carissa D. Bryant, Ronald La Due Lake, Rebecca Shea, Michael C.
Zola, Cheryl Weissman, and R.K. Wild made key contributions to this
statement.
Related GAO Products
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, But
Continued Partnership with Private Sector is Critical to Long-Term
Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004.
Homeland Defense: Progress Made in Organizing to Achieve Northern
Command's Mission, but Challenges Remain. GAO-04-622C. Washington, D.C.:
September 8, 2004.
Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to be
Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington, D.C.: August 27, 2003.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. forces for
Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003.
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to
Success. GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002.
Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but
Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations.
GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
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