Defense Acquisitions: Progress and Challenges Facing the DD(X)	 
Surface Combatant Program (19-JUL-05, GAO-05-924T).		 
                                                                 
In April 2002, the Department of the Navy launched the DD(X)	 
Destroyer program to develop a stealthy, multi-mission ship that 
would provide advanced land attack capability to support forces  
ashore and contribute to military dominance in shallow coastal	 
waters. Numbers and costs for the DD(X) have changed since the	 
inception of the program. According to the program's official	 
cost estimate, the first ship is expected to cost $3.3 billion,  
with per unit costs decreasing as production progresses. DD(X) is
approaching Milestone B and critical design review--two key	 
decision points that will shape the future of both the program	 
and the Navy itself. This testimony focuses on (1) the challenges
the DD(X) program is expected to encounter, (2) the program's	 
approach and progress in managing attendant risks, and (3)	 
potential consequences if program progress falls short of	 
expectations.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-924T					        
    ACCNO:   A30340						        
  TITLE:     Defense Acquisitions: Progress and Challenges Facing the 
DD(X) Surface Combatant Program 				 
     DATE:   07/19/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Cost analysis					 
	     Cost effectiveness analysis			 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Development systems				 
	     Developmental testing				 
	     Military cost control				 
	     Military research and development			 
	     Military vessels					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Ships						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Systems analysis					 
	     Systems design					 
	     Systems development life cycle			 
	     Weapons systems					 
	     Program costs					 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Program implementation				 
	     DD(X) Destroyer					 
	     DDG-51 Destroyer					 
	     Navy Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21		 

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GAO-05-924T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 3:30 p.m. EDT DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Tuesday, July 19, 2005

       Progress and Challenges Facing the DD(X) Surface Combatant Program

Statement of Paul L. Francis, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management

GAO-05-924T

[IMG]

July 19, 2005

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Progress and Challenges Facing the DD(X) Surface Combatant Program

  What GAO Found

Demanding requirements and time frames present substantial challenges for
the DD(X) program. DD(X)'s revolutionary design and automated operations
require multiple technological advances. For example, to carry out its
primary mission of land attacks, DD(X) must be able to strike land targets
from distances of up to 83 nautical miles (about 96 miles)-a capability
requiring a level of accuracy and range not yet achieved in naval gunfire.
To meet DD(X)'s stealth requirements, new materials, designs, and
construction processes are being developed, including a radical hull
design that reduces the ship's signature by sloping out-not in-from the
ship's deck to the waterline. In addition, many traditionally manned
functions will be automated to appreciably cut crew size and reduce
operational costs. At the same time, the DD(X) program has imposed a tight
schedule-one that calls for concurrent development, design, and
construction.

To reduce risk in the DD(X) program, the Navy is building 10 engineering
development models that represent the ship's most critical subsystems and
technologies. While use of these models is a sound approach, planned
testing of the models continues through system design and, in some cases,
into detailed design and construction, creating risk. Any problems
identified through testing could require design changes and result in
delays and cost increases. Past GAO work shows that demonstrating
technological maturity-that is, the technology has been shown to perform
in its intended environment-at the start of system design and development
is key to reducing risk and meeting cost, schedule, and performance
objectives. In addition, the models are not identical in design to the
subsystems that will actually be installed on the first ships and thus
will require additional work to reach the final design.

The consequences of not meeting the challenges facing the DD(X) program
are significant. If the program fails to demonstrate capabilities, develop
software, or integrate subsystems as planned, these activities will be
pushed into the later stages of design and construction. In these stages,
the cost of work and delays is much higher and the schedule much less
forgiving than in earlier stages. At the same time, the Navy must compete
for funding with other programs, while supporting existing platforms and
deployments, in a time when the discretionary budget is constrained. In
light of the risks framed by the DD(X)'s challenges, decision makers
should consider potential trade-offs in advance, including accepting
reduced mission performance, increased costs, delayed shipyard work,
and/or additional manning. It would be prudent to consider the
palatability of such trade-offs now before authorizing the construction of
the first ship-a commitment the Navy plans to make by the end of this
fiscal year.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of the Navy's
DD(X) Destroyer program, part of the family of future surface combatants.
The DD(X) is being developed as a next-generation multi-mission destroyer.
It is intended to provide advanced land attack capability to support
forces ashore and contribute to military dominance in the shallow coastal
water environment known as the littorals. The DD(X) program began in April
2002 with the award of a design and development contract to Northrop
Grumman Ship Systems. Since that time, the program has been developing key
technologies and a system design to meet the requirements established by
the Navy. Currently DD(X) is approaching key decisions on design and
acquisition strategy that will shape the future of both the program and
the Navy itself.

We have published two previous reports on technology development in the
DD(X) program.1 Today I would like to discuss (1) the challenges the DD(X)
is expected to meet, (2) the program's approach and progress in managing
attendant risks, and (3) potential consequences if program progress falls
short of expectations.

The DD(X) program faces a steep challenge that is framed by demanding
requirements and a tight schedule imposed by industrial base concerns.
Several demands have been made of the DD(X) program, including multiple
missions, with a focus on land attack; stealth; manning levels of less
than half of the predecessor Arleigh Burke destroyer; and a construction
schedule that must address industrial base priorities. To meet these
demands, the DD(X) will employ revolutionary designs and automated
operations, requiring multiple technological advances, to be accomplished
on a schedule that calls for concurrent development, design, and
construction.

Key to the management of risk is the building of 10 engineering
development models that represent the ship's most critical subsystems and
technologies. Progress is being made on each, and the delay in the
decision to authorize the first ship has allowed additional work to be

1 GAO, Progress of the DD(X) Destroyer Program, GAO-05-752R (Washington,
D.C.: June 14, 2005); GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Facing the
DD(X) Destroyer Program, GAO-04-973 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 3, 2004).

  Summary

completed. Tests of several engineering development models resulted in
successful demonstration of key components and progress toward final
testing. In other models, tests identified technical problems that will
need to be overcome before ship installation or that have led to changes
in the ship design. Although the use of engineering development models is
a good approach, the timing for their completion entails risk. Our work on
successful commercial and defense product developments shows that
demonstrating mature technology at the start of system development is key
to reducing risk and meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives.
In the case of DD(X), testing of the engineering development models
continues into system design and some extend into detailed design and
construction. In addition, the models are not identical in design to the
subsystems that will actually be installed on the first ships and thus
will require additional work to reach the final design.

The Navy has developed a structured approach for meeting the challenging
demands of the DD(X). At the same time, it must be recognized that these
challenges are, to some extent, conflicting and do not have much give in
them. They may not be simultaneously achievable regardless of the
acquisition strategy. To the extent that the large scope of activities
remaining for the DD(X) do not go as planned, work-in the form of
demonstrating capabilities, developing software, integrating subsystems,
and actual fabrication-will travel to the later stages of design and
construction. In these stages, the cost of work and delays is much higher
and the schedule much less forgiving than in earlier stages. In light of
the risks framed by the DD(X)'s challenges, decision makers will have to
be prepared to make difficult trade-offs. These could include accepting
reduced mission performance, increased costs, delayed shipyard work,
and/or additional manning. It is advisable that the palatability of such
trade-offs be discussed now before the upcoming commitment to authorize
construction of the first ship is made.

Background 	The DD(X) program is currently in the system design phase,
approaching two key decision points. One is Milestone B, when the Navy
will decide on whether to authorize the award of a detail design and
construction contract for production of the lead ship(s). Milestone B was
planned for March 2005 but has been delayed several times and is now
expected to take place before the end of the fiscal year. The other key
decision point is the critical design review, scheduled for September
2005. This review is intended to demonstrate the design maturity of the
ship and its readiness to proceed to production. Following these
decisions, a contract will be awarded for detailed design and
construction. Fabrication is planned to

  The DD(X) Challenge: Deliver Unprecedented Performance on a Tight Schedule

start in 2008. The Navy's most recent cost estimate places the cost of the
first ship at $3.3 billion, with per unit costs decreasing as production
progresses.2

The DD(X) program faces a steep challenge that is framed by demanding
requirements and a tight schedule imposed by industrial base concerns.
Several demands have been made of the DD(X) program. First, the DD(X) is
required to perform not only its primary mission of land attack, but also
anti-submarine, anti-aircraft, and mine warfare tasks. For the land attack
mission alone, the ship must be able to precisely strike land targets from
distances of up to 83 nautical miles, a capability requiring a level of
accuracy and range not yet seen in naval gunfire. Second, the DD(X) must
meet stealth requirements, which affects the destroyer's signature across
all spectrums (infrared, radar cross section, and acoustic). Third, to
reduce operational costs, crew size must be at least half of historical
levels, requiring the automation and computerization of many traditionally
manned functions. Finally, to manage shipyard workloads, the Navy believes
construction of the DD(X) must begin in 2008.

To meet these demands, performance and schedule objectives, the DD(X) will
employ revolutionary designs and automated operations, requiring multiple
technological advances, to be accomplished on a schedule that calls for
concurrent development, design, and construction. To meet stealth
requirements, completely new materials, designs, and construction
processes are being developed, including a revolutionary hull design-the
tumblehome hull form-which widens as it approaches the waterline. Another
departure from traditional shipbuilding design is the peripheral vertical
launch system, which situates missile enclosures peripherally instead of
centrally. Several new technologies are being developed to provide the
needed weaponry, radars, signature reduction, fire suppression, and
propulsion. Advances in automation are necessary to replace many
manpower-intensive tasks. For example, the advanced gun system will be
completely automated, requiring crew only for the command to fire and
replenishment of its magazines. Fire suppression will also be highly
automated. This level of sophistication necessitates a large software
development effort-14 to 16 million lines of code.

2The quoted estimate assumes alternating production at two shipyards
beginning in fiscal year 2007.

  DD(X) Acquisition Strategy Requires Completing Technology Maturity During
  Detail Design and Construction

To reduce risk in the DD(X) program and demonstrate the ship's 12
technologies, the Navy is building 10 engineering development models that
represent the ship's most critical subsystems. The development models are
described in table 1.

Table 1: Description of Engineering Development Models

Engineering development models Description

Advanced gun system	Will provide long-range fire support for forces ashore
through the use of unmanned operations and the longrange land attack
projectile.

Integrated deckhouse and A composite structure that integrates apertures
of radar apertures and communications systems.

Dual band radar 	Horizon and volume search improved for performance in
adverse environments.

Integrated power system	Power system that integrates power generation,
propulsion, and power distribution and management.

Total ship computing Provides single computing environment for all ship
environment systems to speed command while reducing manning.

Peripheral vertical launch system

Multipurpose missile launch system located on the periphery of the ship to
reduce damage to ship systems.

Integrated undersea warfare system

System for mine avoidance and submarine warfare with automated software to
reduce workload.

Infrared mockup Seeks to reduce ship's heat signature in multiple areas.

Hull form Designed to significantly reduce radar cross section.

Autonomic fire suppression Intended to reduce crew size by providing a
fully system automated response to fires.

Source: DD(X) program office and contractors.

The engineering development models are the most significant aspect of the
program's risk reduction strategy. They represent a disciplined process
for generating the information needed for development. In using
engineering development models, the Navy seeks to achieve increasing
levels of technology maturity by first defining the requirements and risks
of a developmental technology and then executing a series of tests to
reduce these risks and prove the utility of a technology. It is these
tests that provide confidence in a technology's ability to operate as
intended. Once the technology is demonstrated, the subsystem can be
integrated into the ship's system design. The progress of technology
maturity is recorded and

communicated clearly through the use of established metrics,3 affording
the program manager and others readily available information for use in
decision making. While engineering development models provide the Navy
with vital information on the progress of technologies, the models are
being completed later than they should, putting more pressure on the
remainder of the program.

Our reviews of commercial and Department of Defense acquisition programs
have identified a number of specific practices that ensure that high
levels of knowledge are achieved at key junctures in development and used
to make investment decisions. The most important practice is achieving a
high level of technology maturity at the start of system development. A
technology reaches full maturity when its performance is successfully
demonstrated in its intended environment. Maturing a technology to this
level before including it into system design can reduce risk by creating
confidence that a technology will work as expected and allows the
developer to focus on integrating mature technologies into the ship
design. This improves the ability to establish realistic cost, schedule,
and performance objectives as well as the ability to meet them. Including
the technologies in the system design before reaching maturity raises the
risk of discovering problems late and can increase the cost and time
needed to complete design and fabrication.

The DD(X) program is based on a concurrent schedule that calls for
developing and testing key subsystems during system design and into
detailed design. The schedule for DD(X) and its attendant development
models is shown in figure 1. Most of the testing of the development models
takes place during the program's system design, which culminates in
critical design review. In some cases, the testing of development models
continues through the start of DD(X) construction. If problems are found
in testing, as has been the case with other programs, they could result in
changes in the design, delays in product delivery, and increases in
product cost.

3One metric utilized by the DD(X) program office is technology readiness
levels. This metric incorporates many of the factors that determine
technology maturity, including form, fit, and function, into a single
digit numerical score.

Figure 1: DD(X) First Ship and Engineering Development Models Schedule

Advanced gun system

Integrated deckhouse

Dual band radar

Power system

Computing environment

Peripheral vertical launch

Undersea warfare system

Infrared mockup

Hull form

Autonomic fire suppression

Approximate end of testing

Final development model test not yet scheduled

Sources: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

As you can see, testing of some engineering development models continues
through the detailed design and construction phase. Not shown here are the
events that will follow tests of the development models. The development
models demonstrate the technologies but are not identical in design to the
subsystems that will actually be installed on the first ships. Tests
performed with development models may also not demonstrate the full
functionality of the systems needed for DD(X). In some cases, such as the
dual band radar, substantial changes will be needed. Results of testing
need to be analyzed and integrated into the final design, and production
plans will need to be finalized and approved before the subsystems are
manufactured. Testing of the final subsystems will take place before and
after installation into the ship.

In responding to our September 2004 report,4 the Department of Defense
stated that it is appropriate to take a reasonable amount of risk in
developing technologies for the lead ship of DD(X) given the long
production time associated with shipbuilding. Yet DD(X) will proceed from
the start of system development to initial capability in the same or less
time as other major acquisition programs for which DOD does call for
demonstration of technology maturity before development start. Table 2
gives time periods for DD(X) and DDG-51, as well as other nonshipbuilding
systems.

Table 2: Comparison of Time from System Development to Initial Capability

              System             Start of system     Initial     Time elapsed 
                                 development       capability    
               DD(X)               March 2004     January 2013    8 years, 10 
                                                                       months 
              DDG-51               March 1983     February 1993   9 years, 11 
                                                                       months 
      F/A-18E/F Super Hornet        May 1992     September 2001    9 years, 4 
                                                                       months 
      Expeditionary Fighting      December 2000  September 2010    9 years, 9 
              Vehicle                                                  months 
       Joint Strike Fighter       October 2001     March 2012     10 years, 5 
                                                                       months 
                                    June 1991     December 2005   14 years, 6 
           F/A-22 Raptor                                               months 

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Other shipbuilding programs have developed acquisition strategies that
sought to mature key technologies before their inclusion into system
design, especially if they are vital to the performance or design. The
CVN-21 program had a risk-reduction strategy that defined a timeline for
making decisions about a technology in line with the start of system
design. One example of a technology that followed this strategy was the
electromagnetic aircraft launching system, an advanced technology key to
meeting system requirements. While there were other technologies not
matured to levels as high as the launch system, the majority followed the
risk-reduction strategy and had options to switch to an existing
technology should development fail. The Navy tested the Virginia class
submarine's nonpenetrating periscope at sea before including it into
requirements, assuring that the submarine's design could benefit from that
technology while reducing the risk it would delay design.

4 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Facing the DD(X) Destroyer
Program, GAO-04973 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 3, 2004).

  Progress on Engineering Development Models

Much of the testing to this date has been for components of subsystems,
for example tests on the turbine engines that supply electricity to the
integrated power system. Tests of several engineering development models
resulted in successful demonstration of key components and progress toward
final testing. One example is the advanced gun system, which has been able
to rapidly change design or correct deficiencies to meet requirements and
demonstrate capability. In other cases, tests identified technical
problems that will need to be overcome before ship installation or that
have led to changes in the ship design. Examples include the integrated
power system or the dual band radar. While these problems could be
considered normal for any developmental program, especially when this many
new technologies are being developed simultaneously, they are occurring as
the program approaches a decision on starting detail design and
construction.

                              Advanced Gun System

The advanced gun system is a large caliber, unmanned gun system designed
to fire long-range projectiles in support of land attack missions, such as
strikes at specific targets or suppressing fire in support of ground
troops. The DD(X) design calls for two gun systems with approximately 300
rounds in each magazine, as well as an additional 320 rounds in an
auxiliary magazine. Because the gun system provides supporting fire for
land attack, a fundamental mission objective of the DD(X), it needs to be
able to quickly and accurately hit a substantial number of land-based
targets from a significant distance. The system consists of the mount (the
gun together with its housing and movement mechanisms), a fully automated
magazine, and a munition known as the long-range land attack projectile. A
schedule of key events for the advanced gun system can be seen in table 3.

        Table 3: Schedule of Key Events Relating to Advanced Gun System

2004 2005 2006 and beyond

October: Virtual testing of gun system First quarter: Component testing
ends To be determined: Munition firing from gun

Second quarter: Component testing April: Factory acceptance testing of the
system begins magazine

December: First munition guided flight test	January-February: Munition
guided flight tests

May: Factory acceptance testing of the mount

May: Long-range land attack projectile preliminary design review

July: Land-based testing of the mount and magazine

April-September: Further guided flight tests of munition

Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

In October 2004 the advanced gun system was tested using a physicsbased
software model that included the software functionality for all major
components of the advanced gun system and incorporated the results of
physical testing. Results met or exceeded expectations for response time,
rate of fire, sustained rate of fire, range, and pallet unloading rate.
The contractor has begun verifying the results through testing of physical
components. In April, the magazine component of the advanced gun system
successfully completed factory acceptance testing by demonstrating its
ability to meet requirements and has been shipped to Dugway, Utah, for
integration into further land-based tests. In May, the mount component
completed similar testing. Land-based tests scheduled to begin in mid-July
will demonstrate the entire firing sequence of the advanced gun system.
However, these tests will not demonstrate the ability of the gun system to
communicate target information to the munition or the ability to move the
gun side to side. The munition will not be tested with the gun until after
ship installation.

The munition for advanced gun system, known as long-range land attack
projectile, has completed four flight tests at Point Mugu, California; and
has successfully demonstrated launch, tail fin deployment, canard
deployment, rocket motor ignition, global positioning system acquisition,
and some flight maneuvers. The first guided flight test failed when the
canards deployed improperly and controlled flight was lost. The issue was
identified, corrected, and successfully resolved in later flight tests.
The current schedule calls for completion of an additional three flight
tests by

the end of September 2005. Flight testing of the munition will continue
after critical design review.

Recently, the design of the advanced gun system was changed to support
ease of production for DD(X). The advanced gun system will now be
constructed as a single modular unit, transported to the shipyard, and
installed as a block. This redesign has added some weight, which has been
accounted for in the current design.

Integrated Deckhouse and Apertures

Integrated deckhouse and apertures refers to the superstructure on the
deck of the ship and the openings in which radar, sensor, and
communication equipment are placed. The deckhouse is dependant on the use
of recently developed composite materials to meet requirements for weight.
A major focus of deckhouse design is to reduce the ship's radar cross
section signature. A separate technical challenge, referred to as cosite
interference, involves placing apertures in precise locations to ensure
the signals from the multitude of antennas do not interfere with one
another. The contractor, Northrop Grumman, is building two test articles
to fulfill requirements for the testing of the deckhouse. One is a fire
and shock test article that will be subjected to underwater explosions;
the other is an integrated deckhouse article that will be tested for radar
cross section and antenna placement. A schedule for key events for the
integrated deckhouse can be seen in table 4.

        Table 4: Schedule of Key Events Relating to Integrated Deckhouse

2004 2005
August: Begin antenna predelivery tests February: End antenna predelivery
tests
November: Begin fire and shock testing March: Shielding effectiveness
tests
(postponed) April: Lightning-protection tests

2006 and beyond

To be determined: Fire and shock testing (postponed)

June: Co-site interference tests

July: End fire and shock testing (postponed)

September: Radar cross section tests

Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Construction on the fire and shock test article continues to be delayed
due to questions about the material properties of the composites involved,
and lack of adequate test facilities. Further time is needed to conduct
analysis of composite properties regarding issues such as structural
strength, corrosion, toxicity of fumes when composites catch fire, and
ability to

bind composites with the steel hull. The program office states that the
ability of the deckhouse design to meet requirements will continue to be
analyzed in support of the critical design review. In addition, facilities
for shock testing of large-scale articles, such as those needed for
testing of the deckhouse, are not available until 2006. Testing of the
fire and shock article has been delayed until the next contract period,
after DD(X) critical design review.

Since May 2004, a series of changes involving equipment, antenna size, and
positioning have been made to the deckhouse, which has caused changes in
the placement of apertures. The integrated deckhouse test article was
scheduled to begin testing for radar cross section in May, including all
deckhouse antennas and the multifunction radar (half of the dual band
radar system), and for co-site interference in June.

The deckhouse has experienced some problems remaining within its margins
for weight. To reduce weight, the program has made a number of changes to
the design including modifications to fragmentation protection, and
redesigned power and cooling systems for the radars and other components.
The program office states that the deckhouse is now in compliance with its
weight budget.

                                Dual Band Radar

The dual band radar monitors airborne and surface activities, guides
weaponry to targets, and conducts environmental mapping. The dual band
radar is made up of two major radar systems, the multifunction radar and
the volume search radar, unique technologies that are brought to bear
jointly on a range of critical tasks to improve overall depth and quality
of battlespace vision. The volume search radar specializes in providing
information on aircraft, missiles, and other activities in the vast, open
sky environment. In contrast, the multifunction radar is designed to
monitor airspace at horizon or near the surface levels for threats such as
low-flying antiship cruise missiles. Key events for the dual band radar
can be seen in table 5.

Table 5 - Schedule of Key Events Relating to Dual Band Radar 2004 2005
2006

September-October: September: Multifunction radar February: Integration
and test Multifunction radar tests for cross section tests of volume
search radar array clutter rejection and sensitivity February-May:
Multifunction

2007 and beyond

August: Dual band radar landbased tests

To be determined: Continued development of volume search radar to meet
requirements

radar at sea tests

May: Engineering development model "string" test for the volume search
radar

June: Volume search radar Array delivery

Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Testing and development of the multifunction radar is proceeding well.
There have been a number of design changes, including a power/cooling
system redesign that reduced weight. These changes will be validated in
land based tests with the volume search radar in August 2007. Tests of the
multifunction radar's clutter rejection capabilities and firm track range,
two key functions required for demonstration, have been proven in
demonstrations with realistic targets. In a simulated scenario, the
multifunction radar has demonstrated the ability to guide an Evolved Sea
Sparrow Missile against an inbound cruise missile. Testing of the radar's
ability to communicate with one of its own outbound missiles will take
place in 2007, when the fully assembled dual band radar undergoes
landbased tests. A significant risk remaining is ensuring that the shape
and placement of the multifunction radar meets radar cross section
requirements.

The transmit/receive units, the individual radiating elements that are the
essence of the volume search radar, encountered difficulties when a key
component failed in testing. Officials believe they have identified a
solution to the problem, but a further design iteration is needed to fully
satisfy performance requirements for the engineering development model.
Additional iterations of design will be necessary before ship
installation.

The schedule for construction of the dual band radar is already
challenging, with the radar for the first DD(X) scheduled for placement
after the ship is already afloat. Additional delay in development of the
volume search radar could affect the schedule for ship construction.

Integrated Power System

The integrated power system centrally generates and distributes power to
the ship for all functions, including propulsion. This design allows
greater flexibility in power use and will allow the integration of
high-energy weapons in the future. The integrated power system consists of
three primary components: turbine generator sets, a power distribution
system, and propulsion motors. A significant technical challenge is
development of the propulsion motors, which are used to turn the shaft and
propeller. To reduce risk the program carried two designs of propulsion
motor, the permanent magnet motor and the advanced induction motor. A
schedule of events for the integrated power system can be seen in table 6.

      Table 6: Schedule of Key Events Relating to Integrated Power System

Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

The program has completed initial testing on propulsion motors for DD(X).
The program carried two designs of propulsion motor, the permanent magnet
motor and the advanced induction motor. The program preferred to use the
permanent magnet motor due to its ability to meet requirements with less
weight and noise, but carried the advanced induction motor as a backup.
Recently, the permanent magnet motor failed to demonstrate the speed
needed to produce the required power. The advanced induction motor tested
successfully in October 2004 and has now been selected as the propulsion
motor for DD(X). Carrying a backup to a critical new technology is a smart
strategy and paid off on the propulsion motor. This change does have has
implications for design as the advanced induction motor is heavier and
less efficient than the permanent magnet motor, will require more space,
and operates at a different voltage. It will take two advanced induction
motors linked together to replace one permanent magnet motor.

Navy officials stated that the advanced induction motor will be tested
this summer to 18.25 megawatts, half of what the ship requires per
propeller and half of what the permanent magnet motor was to demonstrate.
The advanced induction motor will also demonstrate half of the torque
needed per propeller. While two advanced induction motors will be needed
to turn

one shaft in the final design, program officials state that there is
little risk in simply adding a second motor to reach full power. During
demonstrations this summer, the advanced induction motor will also be
tested for integration with the power distribution system.

Factory acceptance tests on turbine generators were performed to
demonstrate their ability to produce the power needed for DD(X). The
design for DD(X) requires two main turbine generators and two auxiliary
turbine generators that are tested to similar requirements. The main
turbine generator set, a Rolls-Royce MT-30 turbine and a generator
produced by Curtiss-Wright, was tested in October 2004. Due to limitations
of contractor facilities, the turbine engine and the generator were tested
separately. Some problems with heat were experienced in testing of the
turbine engine, but program officials have stated these issues have been
resolved. The program tested two different turbine engines for the
auxiliary generator sets, a Rolls-Royce MT-5 and a General Electric LM500.
Both turbine generator sets demonstrated they were able to produce the
power necessary and actually produced more power than predicted.

Design of the power distribution system was also changed to reduce weight
and improve performance. According to officials, the Navy will use a
system it has been developing called "integrated fight through power,"
which includes the use of solid state components and rapid switching
technologies.

Total Ship Computing Program officials estimate that DD(X) will require 14
to 16 million lines of

Environment 	new and reused software code. The total ship computing
environment, which accounts for a large portion of the software, will
provide a common architecture for major ship systems to facilitate
integration and to speed command and control while reducing manning. A
schedule of events for the total ship computing environment can be seen in
table 7.

    Table 7: Schedule of Events Relating to Total Ship Computing Environment

Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

While not a physical technology, the magnitude of software development for
DD(X) still needs time for development, design, testing, and correction
like the other engineering development models. An engineering development
model for the computing environment is being developed for testing and
includes three of six software releases. These three releases include the
critical infrastructure functionality needed, as well as some
functionality for anti-air, undersea, and land attack missions. To prove
the functionality of the computing environment, it will be tested in a
software integration center and connected with data from other engineering
development models.

Computing environment development plans include many of the software best
practices identified in our past work, including developing software in an
evolutionary environment, following disciplined development process, and
using meaningful metrics to measure progress. While robust development
plans are in place, the computing environment is on a tight schedule that
continues beyond the start of construction and has limited margin for
correction of defects found in testing. While the total ship computing
environment has not experienced significant challenges thus far, a
demanding effort lies ahead. About three-quarters of the software
development effort occurs during the detail design and construction phase.

Additional engineering development models

Our review of the remaining engineering development models has been less
extensive. Nonetheless, I would like to highlight a few aspects of these
systems.

The peripheral vertical launch system consists of the missile launcher,
referred to as the advanced vertical launch system, and the enclosure for
the launcher, referred to as the peripheral vertical launch system. The
system is located on the sides of the ship to improve survivability,
rather than the more traditional central positioning. A demonstration in
May 2004 to test the peripheral vertical launch system against expected
threats resulted in destruction of the test article that necessitated
redesign and further testing. A second test replicating the same
conditions with the new design and representative materials was held in
June 2005.

The integrated undersea warfare system is used to detect mines and
submarines in the littorals and consists of medium and high-frequency
arrays, towed arrays, and decision-making software to reduce workload.
Tests for the demonstration of mine warfare systems were scheduled for
May, and were to take place on a vessel modified to carry DD(X) sonar

and processing equipment. Submarine warfare tests were scheduled for June.
According to program officials, at-sea tests of algorithms for
antisubmarine warfare, a key component in reducing manning, have been
changed to laboratory testing due to a lack of test ships. Significant
advances in the automation of submarine detection and tracking may be
required to meet manpower goals.

As a part of requirements for signature management, the DD(X) program
seeks to reduce the heat signature of the ship using material treatments
on the deckhouse and passive air cooling for engine exhaust. The use of
subsystems or materials to reduce heat signature has changed due to design
trade-offs for performance, weight, and cost. A sheeting water system for
the hull has been deleted from the ship design and replaced with an
alternate system. Program officials have determined that further testing
of exhaust suppressors for the main turbine generator is no longer
necessary. Program officials stated that the operational requirements are
still achievable using the new design.

DD(X) uses a radically new hull design to reduce the radar cross section
of the ship. Development also includes design of a new propeller. Scale
models of the hull form are currently being tested for factors like
resistance, efficiency of the propeller, and capsize probability.
Development of the software model used to predict hull form behavior is
continuing.

The autonomic fire suppression system utilizes new technologies, such as
smart valves, flexible hosing, nozzles, sensors, and autonomic operations
to reduce the crew and time needed for damage control. This system is
vital for meeting requirements for ship survivability and manning. Testing
for the system was performed on two Navy test ships and has been
successful. An initial test aboard the ex-Peterson, a former destroyer
used as a test ship, successfully demonstrated the system's ability to
detect damage and control fires. Tests aboard the ex-Shadwell, another
larger test ship, demonstrated the same abilities for specific ship
environments. Because the exact components used in testing aboard the
ex-Shadwell may not be the ones used in ship construction, Navy officials
state that it is unclear how the engineering development model will
translate into final ship design.

  Consequences of Not Meeting DD(X) Challenges Must Be Discussed Early

The Navy developed a structured approach for meeting the challenging
demands of the DD(X) - multiple mission requirements, stealth, reduced
manning, and industrial base timeframes. This strategy builds in some
margins for risk, such as for additional weight and manning, should they
become necessary. At the same time, it must be recognized that these
challenges are, to some extent, conflicting and do not have much give in
them. They may not be simultaneously achievable, regardless of the
acquisition strategy.

The DD(X) strategy relies on multiple activities occurring concurrently to
meet its schedule. To the extent things do not go as planned, work-in the
form of demonstrating capabilities, developing software, integrating
subsystems, and actual fabrication-will travel to the later stages of
design and construction. In these stages, the cost of work and delays is
much higher and the schedule much less forgiving than in earlier stages.
In light of the risks framed by the DD(X)'s challenges, decision makers
will have to be prepared to make difficult trade-offs. For example,

o  	If technologies do not perform as expected or have unintended
consequences, such as additional weight, will the user accept lower
performance or will more time and money be allocated to delivering
required performance?

o  	If costs increase, will more money be provided or will performance
tradeoffs be considered to reduce cost?

o  	If the schedule will not allow the ship, as currently scoped, to be
ready for in-yard fabrication, will scope be reduced to maintain schedule
or will industrial base consequences attendant to a schedule delay be
accepted?

o  	If the ship actually demands a larger crew than planned, can the
manning be afforded and accommodated aboard ship or will workload be
reduced to meet planned crew size?

In planning for such contingencies, there are a number of factors that
should be considered. Earlier this year, we issued a report on cost growth
experienced by previous shipbuilding programs.5 One of the key factors in
cost growth was the extent to which the maturity of design affects costs.
In the course of doing this work, shipbuilders emphasized the importance

5GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management Practices Could Help
Minimize Cost Growth in Navy Shipbuilding Programs, GAO-05-183
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2005)

of properly sequencing work to achieve cost efficiency. They pointed out
that the cost of performing a task increases if it is delayed further into
the construction process. For example, one shipbuilder estimated that the
same task performed early in the construction process at a steel,
electrical or other shop is 3 times more expensive when delayed until
assembling units or sections of the ship at the dock, and 8 times more
expensive if the ship is afloat. According to another shipbuilder, before
construction begins on a particular section of the ship, firm information
is needed on equipment and components including such information as the
dimensions, weight, and power and cooling requirements. When technologies
are still being developed and tested, the Navy's ability to gather this
information and finalize design is constrained. When firm information is
not available and construction proceeds, the potential exists that work
will not be done in the most efficient sequence and that changes will lead
to redoing work already completed, increasing cost and delaying delivery.

Another factor is the DD(X) does not have fallback technologies that could
mitigate changes to design and performance. The program has passed the
decision point for inclusion of the two viable fallback technologies the
program began with, a different hull form and the advanced induction
motor. If the other technologies embodied in the engineering development
models run into difficulties, they cannot be substituted. Thus, their
consequences, whether in performance, weight, or manning, would have to be
ameliorated through trade-offs.

When considering the possibility of cost growth, it must be taken into
account that spending on the program comes at a time when the Navy is also
procuring Virginia class submarines, Littoral Combat Ships, amphibious
vessels, support vessels, and the last of the Arleigh Burke class
destroyers. In addition to DD(X) the Navy is also developing new aircraft
carriers and aircraft, and may soon start development of new cruisers and
submarines. The Navy must compete for funding for these programs with
other services, while simultaneously supporting existing platforms and
deployments, at a time when the discretionary budget is constrained.

Finally, delays in the schedule for DD(X) construction would reduce the
flow of work to the shipyards at the time that DDG-51 construction is
drawing to a close. This could result in declining workloads, revenues,
and employment levels.

As the cost, schedule, and capabilities of a program change, the business
case for that program changes as well. The business case for DD(X), or a

similar capability, has already changed multiple times since the Navy
launched the future destroyer development effort in 1995. Originally,
under the DD-21 program, the Navy planned to build 32 ships at an average
cost of approximately $1 billion when the cost of development is also
included. After the program transitioned to DD(X) the number of ships
required changed repeatedly with numbers ranging from 24 ships to 16 to

8. The latest program baseline, released in April 2004, outlines a
purchase of 8 ships at an average cost of around $2.9 billion with the
inclusion of development costs.6 A new life cycle cost estimate, released
in March of 2005, presents different figures on number of ships and costs.
Even this estimate does not reflect the current acquisition strategy
proposed by the Navy. The Navy will have to decide what constitutes an
acceptable business case for the DD(X) and at what point the business case
becomes unacceptable.

It is important that these contingencies be confronted now and discussed
because once the detail design and construction phase begins, it will be
very difficult to change course on the program.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I will be pleased to answer any questions.

Contact Information 	For further information on this testimony, please
contact Paul L. Francis at (202) 512-4841.

Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Karen
Zuckerstein, J. Kristopher Keener, and Marc Castellano.

               6Amounts are in fiscal year 2005 constant dollars.

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