Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment
of Checked Baggage Screening Systems (13-JUL-05, GAO-05-896T).
Mandated to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection
systems at airports by December 31, 2003, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) deployed two types of screening
equipment: explosives detection systems (EDS), which use
computer-aided tomography X-rays to recognize the characteristics
of explosives, and explosives trace detection (ETD) systems,
which use chemical analysis to detect traces of explosive
material vapors or residues. This testimony discusses (1) TSA's
deployment of EDS and ETD systems and the impact of initially
deploying these systems, (2) TSA and airport actions to install
EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems, and the
federal resources made available for this purpose, and (3)
actions taken by TSA to optimally deploy checked baggage
screening systems.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-896T
ACCNO: A29758
TITLE: Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems
DATE: 07/13/2005
SUBJECT: Airport security
Aviation security
Checked baggage screening
Counterterrorism
Explosives detection systems
Explosives trace detection
Homeland security
Systems analysis
TSA Explosive Detection System
TSA Explosive Trace Detection System
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-05-896T
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure
Protection, and Cybersecurity, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:00p.m. EDT AVIATION SECURITY
Wednesday, July 13, 2005
Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening
Systems
Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
GAO-05-896T
[IMG]
July 2005
AVIATION SECURITY
Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening
Systems
What GAO Found
TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at the
nation's more than 400 airports to provide the capability to screen all
checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by
Congress. However, in initially deploying EDS and ETD equipment, TSA
placed stand-alone ETD and the minivan-sized EDS machines-mainly in
airport lobbies-that were not integrated in-line with airport baggage
conveyor systems. TSA officials stated that the agency's ability to
initially install in-line systems was limited because of the high costs
and the time required for airport modifications. These interim lobby
solutions resulted in operational inefficiencies, including requiring a
greater number of screeners, as compared with using EDS machines in-line
with baggage conveyor systems.
TSA and airport operators are taking actions to install in-line baggage
screening systems to streamline airport and TSA operations, reduce
screening costs, and enhance security. Eighty-six of the 130 airports we
surveyed either have, are planning to have, or are considering installing
full or partial in-line systems. However, resources have not been made
available to fund these capital-intensive systems on a large-scale basis.
Also, the overall costs of installing in-line baggage screening systems at
each airport are unknown, the availability of future federal funding is
uncertain, and perspectives differ regarding the appropriate role of the
federal government, airport operators, and air carriers in funding these
systems.
TSA has not conducted a systematic, prospective analysis to determine at
which airports it could achieve long-term savings and enhanced
efficiencies and security by installing in-line systems or, where in-line
systems may not be economically justified, by making greater use of
stand-alone EDS systems rather than relying on the labor-intensive and
less efficient ETD screening process. However, at nine airports where TSA
has agreed to help fund the installation of in-line baggage screening
systems, TSA conducted a retrospective cost-benefit analysis which showed
that these in-line systems could save the federal government about $1
billion over 7 years. TSA further estimated that it could recover its
initial investment in the in-line systems at these airports in a little
over 1 year.
EDS and ETD Machines Used by TSA to Screen Checked Baggage
United States Government Accountability Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing on
leveraging technology to improve aviation security, and to discuss our
work on the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) deployment of
checked baggage screening systems. After the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, which highlighted the vulnerability of U.S. aircraft
to acts of terrorism, Congress passed and the President signed into law
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), mandating, among
other things, that all checked baggage at U.S. airports be screened using
explosive detection systems by December 31, 2002.1 To meet this
requirement, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deployed two
types of equipment to screen checked baggage for explosives: (1)
explosives detection systems (EDS) that use specialized x-rays to detect
characteristics of explosives that may be contained in baggage as it moves
along a conveyor belt; and (2) explosive trace detection (ETD) systems,
whereby an individual (i.e., a baggage screener) swabs baggage and then
inserts the swab into the ETD machine, which in turn can detect chemical
residues that may indicate the presence of explosives within a bag.
As we reported in February 2004, largely because of shortages of equipment
and insufficient time to modify airports to accommodate EDS machines, TSA
was unable, at certain airports, to meet the 2002 congressionally
established deadline to screen all checked baggage for explosives using
EDS and ETD machines.2 Recognizing the obstacles encountered by TSA,
Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the Homeland Security
Act of 2002,3 which, in effect, extended the deadline for screening all
checked baggage for explosives until December 31, 2003, for airports at
which TSA was unable to meet the earlier deadline established by ATSA. We
also reported that TSA fell short of fully satisfying the extended 2003
mandate and continued to face challenges in deploying and leveraging
screening equipment and technologies.
My testimony today discusses (1) TSA's initial deployment of EDS and ETD
systems and the impact of that deployment; (2) actions taken by
1Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat.
597 (2001).
2GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T (Washington, D.C.:
February 12, 2004).
3Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
airports and TSA to install automated in-line EDS baggage screening
systems,4 and the key federal resources that have been made available to
fund these systems; and (3) TSA's actions to plan for the optimal
deployment of EDS and ETD equipment, including in-line checked baggage
screening systems, in order to ensure the efficiency, cost effectiveness,
and security of its checked baggage screening operations.
My comments are based primarily on our March 15, 2005, report on our
assessment of TSA's checked baggage screening program.5 As part of that
assessment, we reviewed available documentation on TSA's checked baggage
screening program and interviewed officials from TSA, air carriers,
airports, EDS and ETD equipment manufacturers, and airport industry
associations to obtain information regarding TSA's efforts to improve
checked baggage screening operations using EDS and ETD machines. We also
visited 22 airports to observe baggage screening procedures and discuss
these procedures with TSA, airport, and airline officials. In addition, we
surveyed all 155 federal security directors,6 who oversee federal security
operations at one or more airports in the United States where screening is
required, to obtain their perspectives on the implementation of checked
baggage screening operations at 263 airports under their supervision, and
to obtain information on these airports' plans regarding the incorporation
of EDS machines within the airports' baggage conveyor systems for
screening checked baggage for explosives.7
Summary From its creation in November 2001 through September 2004, TSA
procured and placed about 1,200 EDS machines and about 6,000 ETD
4In-line EDS checked baggage screening systems typically involve checked
baggage undergoing automated screening with EDS machines while on a
conveyor belt that sorts and transports baggage to the proper location for
its ultimate loading onto an aircraft.
5GAO, Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, GAO-05-365 (Washington
D.C.: March 15, 2005).
6A TSA federal security director oversees federal security operations at
one or more U.S. commercial airports and has operational responsibility
for the screening of passengers and checked baggage.
7Although we could not independently verify the reliability of all of the
information we obtained, we compared it with other supporting documents,
when available, to determine data consistency and reasonableness. On the
basis of these efforts, we believe the information we obtained is
sufficiently reliable for this testimony. A detailed discussion of our
scope and methodology is contained in appendix I of our March 2005 report
(GAO-05365).
machines at over 400 airports and modified airports for the installation
of this equipment. Although TSA made significant progress in fielding EDS
and ETD equipment to the nation's airports, TSA placed this equipment in a
stand-alone mode-usually in airport lobbies-to conduct the primary
screening of checked baggage for explosives, rather than integrating EDS
machines in-line with airports' baggage conveyor systems. TSA officials
stated that they used EDS machines in stand-alone mode and ETD machines as
an interim solution in order to meet the congressional deadline for
screening all checked baggage for explosives. Officials stated that they
employed these interim solutions because of the significant costs required
to install in-line systems and the need to reconfigure many airports'
baggage conveyor systems to accommodate the equipment. These interim
screening solutions led to operational inefficiencies, including requiring
a greater number of screeners and screening fewer bags for explosives each
hour, as compared with using EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor
systems. Performing primary screening using ETD machines, as is the case
for more than 300 airports, is more labor intensive and less efficient
than screening using the EDS process. TSA's placement of stand-alone EDS
and ETD machines in airport lobbies also resulted in passenger crowding,
which presented unsafe conditions and may have added security risks for
passengers and airport workers. Certain information we obtained and
analyzed regarding explosive detection technologies and their
effectiveness in TSA's checked baggage screening operations are classified
or are considered by TSA to be sensitive security information.
Accordingly, the results of our review of this information have been
removed from this testimony.8
TSA and airport operators are taking actions to install in-line EDS
baggage screening systems-to streamline airport and TSA operations, reduce
screening costs, and enhance security-but resources have not been made
available to fund these systems on a large-scale basis. Most airports that
have installed or are planning to install these capital-intensive in-line
systems have relied on or plan to rely on some form of federal funding to
help install the systems. Although TSA and airports operators are taking
8We issued two additional reports detailing the results of our review,
which discuss results deemed to be classified or sensitive security
information. The report that contains classified and sensitive security
information is GAO, Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to
Optimize the Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems,
GAO-05-135C (Washington D.C.: February 4, 2005). The report containing
sensitive security information but not the classified information is GAO,
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment
of Checked Baggage Screening Systems,
GAO-05-302SU (Washington D.C.: February 4, 2005).
actions to install in-line EDS baggage screening systems, identifying the
resources to fund the systems on a large-scale basis continues to be a
challenge. The issuance of letter of intent (LOI) agreements-TSA's primary
method for funding in-line systems-has been limited to nine airports. An
LOI, though not a binding commitment of federal funding, represents an
intent by TSA to provide funds in future years if they are appropriated by
Congress. This in turn enables an airport to proceed with a project, such
as installing in-line baggage screening systems, because the airport and
investors are aware that allowable costs will likely be reimbursed.
However, TSA has not determined the total cost of installing in-line EDS
baggage screening systems at airports determined to need these systems,
the availability of funding for in-line systems is uncertain, and
perspectives differ regarding the appropriate role of the federal
government and airport operators in funding these systems.
At the time of our March 2005 report,9 TSA had not yet completed a
systematic analyses needed to plan for optimally deploying EDS and ETD
equipment-including installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems or
replacing ETD machines with stand-alone EDS machines-at the nation's more
than 400 airports to enhance security and reduce TSA staffing requirements
and long-term costs. Specifically, TSA had not completed a prospective
analysis to determine at which airports it could achieve longterm savings
and improved security benefits by installing in-line baggage screening
systems rather than continuing to rely on labor-intensive standalone EDS
and ETD machines to screen checked baggage for explosives. TSA's
retrospective cost-benefit analysis conducted on the nine airports with
signed LOI agreements to install in-line screening systems found that
significant savings and other benefits, including reduced screener
staffing requirements and increased baggage throughput, may be achieved
through the installation of in-line systems. Also, for airports where
in-line systems may not be economically justified because of the high cost
of installing these systems, TSA has not conducted an analysis to
determine whether it could achieve savings and other benefits by making
greater use of standalone EDS systems rather than relying on the use of
less efficient and more labor-intensive ETD machines at these airports.
Background With the passage of ATSA in November 2001, TSA assumed from
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) the majority of the
responsibility
9GAO-05-365.
for securing the commercial aviation system. Under ATSA, TSA is
responsible for ensuring that all baggage is properly screened for
explosives at airports in the United States where screening is required,
and for the procurement, installation, and maintenance of explosive
detection systems used to screen checked baggage for explosives. ATSA
required that TSA screen 100 percent of checked baggage using explosive
detection systems by December 31, 2002. As it became apparent that certain
airports would not meet the December 2002 deadline to screen 100 percent
of checked baggage for explosives, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 in
effect extended the deadline to December 31, 2003, for noncompliant
airports.10 Prior to the passage of ATSA in November 2001, only limited
screening of checked baggage for explosives occurred. When this screening
took place, air carriers had operational responsibility for conducting the
screening, while FAA maintained oversight responsibility. With the passage
of ATSA, TSA assumed operational responsibility from air carriers for
screening checked baggage for explosives. Airport operators and air
carriers continued to be responsible for processing and transporting
passenger checked baggage from the check-in counter to the airplane.
Explosive detection systems include EDS and ETD machines. EDS machines,
which cost approximately $1 million each, use computer-aided tomography
X-rays adapted from the medical field to automatically recognize the
characteristic signatures of threat explosives. By taking the equivalent
of hundreds of X-ray pictures of a bag from different angles, the EDS
machine examines the objects inside of the baggage to identify
characteristic signatures of threat explosives. TSA certified, procured,
and deployed EDS machines manufactured by two companies, and has recently
certified a smaller, less costly EDS machine, which is currently being
operationally tested. ETD machines, which cost approximately $40,000 each,
work by detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Because human
operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs, which are then
chemically analyzed in the ETD machines to identify any traces of
explosive materials, the use of ETD is more labor-intensive and subject to
more human error than the automated process of using EDS machines. ETD is
used both for primary, or the initial, screening of
10ATSA also authorized the use of alternative means to screen checked
baggage, such as positive passenger bag match (i.e., air carriers
determining whether the passenger is on the same aircraft as the checked
baggage), canine searches, and searches of bags by hand for time periods
when airports were not able to screen 100 percent of checked baggage using
explosive detection equipment.
checked baggage, as well as secondary screening, which resolves alarms
from EDS machines that indicate the possible presence of explosives inside
a bag. TSA has certified, procured, and deployed ETD machines from three
manufacturers.
As we reported in February 2004, to initially deploy EDS and ETD equipment
to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for explosives, TSA implemented
interim airport lobby solutions and in-line EDS baggage screening
systems.11 The interim lobby solutions involved placing standalone EDS and
ETD machines in the nation's airports, most often in airport lobbies or
baggage makeup areas where baggage is sorted for loading onto aircraft.
For EDS in a stand-alone mode (not integrated with airport's or air
carrier's baggage conveyor system) and ETD, TSA screeners are responsible
for obtaining the passengers' checked baggage from either the passenger or
the air carrier, lifting the bags onto and off of EDS machines or ETD
tables, using TSA protocols to appropriately screen the bags, and
returning the cleared bags to the air carriers to be loaded onto departing
aircraft. In addition to installing stand-alone EDS and ETD machines in
airport lobbies and baggage makeup areas, TSA collaborated with some
airport operators and air carriers to install integrated in-line EDS
baggage screening systems within their baggage conveyor systems.
11GAO-04-440T.
TSA Equipped More than 400 Airports to Screen Checked Baggage for Explosives,
but the Initial Deployment Led to Operational Inefficiencies, and Additional
Security Risks
Since its inception in November 2001 through September 2004, TSA used its
funds to procure and install about 1,200 EDS machines and about 6,000 ETD
machines to screen checked baggage for explosives at over 400 airports and
to modify airport facilities to accommodate this equipment. For the most
part, TSA deployed EDS machines at larger airports and ETD machines at
smaller airports, resulting in primary screening being conducted solely
with ETD machines at over 300 airports. Table 1 summarizes the location of
EDS and ETD equipment at the nation's airports by airport category,12
based on a June 2004 TSA inventory listing. The number of machines shown
in table 1 includes EDS and ETD machines procured by both TSA and FAA
prior to and during the establishment of TSA.
Table 1: EDS and ETD Machines Deployed at U.S. Airports as of June 2004
Number
Airport category Airports EDS machines ETD machines
X 21 679 2,833
I 61 467 2,401
II 50 71
III 124 9
IV 190 2
Total 446 1,228 7,146
Source: GAO analysis of TSA data.
Although TSA made significant progress in fielding this equipment, TSA
used most of its fiscal years 2002 through 2004 funds for its checked
baggage screening program to design, develop, and deploy interim lobby
screening solutions rather than install more permanent in-line EDS baggage
screening systems. During our site visits to 22 category X, I, and II
airports, we observed that in most cases, TSA used stand-alone EDS
machines and ETD machines as the primary method for screening checked
baggage.13 Generally, this equipment was located in airport lobbies and in
baggage makeup areas. In addition, in our survey of 155 federal security
directors, we asked the directors to estimate, for the 263 airports
included
12TSA classifies the over 400 airports in the United States into one of
five categories-X, I, II, III, and IV. Generally, category X airports have
the largest number of passenger boardings, and category IV airports have
the smallest number.
13The 22 airports included 12 category X, 9 category I, and 1 category II
airports.
in the survey, the approximate percentage of checked baggage that was
screened on or around February 29, 2004, using EDS, ETD, or other approved
alternatives for screening baggage such as positive passenger bag match or
canine searches. As shown in table 2, the directors reported that for 130
large to medium-sized airports in our survey (21, 60, and 49 category X,
I, and II airports, respectively), most of the checked baggage was
screened using stand-alone EDS or ETD machines. The average percentage of
checked baggage reported as screened using EDS machines at airports with
partial or full in-line EDS capability ranged from 4 percent for category
II airports to 11 percent for category X airports. In addition, the
directors reported that ETD machines were used to screen checked baggage
93 to 99 percent of the time at category III and IV airports,
respectively.
Table 2: Average Percentage of Checked Baggage Reported as Screened Using
EDS, ETD, or Other Approved Method at 263 Airports on or around February
29, 2004
Airport category X I II III IV Total
Number of airports 21 60 49 73 60 263
Percentage of checked baggage screened using:
EDS (at airports with no in-line EDS capability) 59 59 27 6 0
EDS (at airports with partial or airportwide 11 8 4 0 0
in-line EDS capability)
Totala EDS 70 67 32 6 0
ETD 18 33 66 93 99
Totala EDS and ETD 88 99 98 99 99
Other approved method 12 1 2 2 1
Totala 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Analysis of GAO federal security director survey data.
aPercentages in totals may not add to 100 percent because of rounding.
Stand-alone EDS and ETD machines are both labor-and time-intensive to
operate since each bag must be physically carried to an EDS or ETD machine
for screening and then moved back to the baggage conveyor system prior to
being loaded onto an aircraft. With an in-line EDS system, checked baggage
is screened within an airport's baggage conveyor system, eliminating the
need for a baggage screener or other personnel to physically transport the
baggage from the check-in point to the EDS machine for screening and then
to the airport baggage conveyor system. Further, according to TSA
officials, ETD machines and stand-alone EDS machines are less efficient in
the number of checked bags that can be screened per hour per machine than
are EDS machines that are integrated in-line with the airport baggage
conveyor systems. As shown in table 3, as of October 2003, TSA estimated
that the number of checked bags screened per hour could more than double
when EDS machines were placed in-line versus being used in a stand-alone
mode.14
14According to a senior TSA official in the Office of Security Technology,
these throughput numbers could change as TSA gains greater operational
experience. However, this data did not change between October 2003 and May
2005.
Table 3: Bags Per Hour Screened by Stand-alone and In-line EDS Machines
and ETD Machines
Bags per hour Type of equipment Stand-alone In-line
EDS machines
CTX 2500-stand-alone only 120 NA
CTX 5500 180 250
CTX 9000-in-line only NA 425
L3 6000 180 425
ETD machines-stand-alone only 36 NA
Source: TSA.
NA: Not applicable.
In January 2004, TSA, in support of its planning, budgeting, and
acquisition of security screening equipment, reported to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) that the efficiency benefits of in-line rather
than standalone EDS are significant, particularly with regard to bags per
hour screened and the number of TSA screeners required to operate the
equipment. According to TSA officials, at that time, a typical lobby-based
screening unit consisting of a stand-alone EDS machine with three ETD
machines had a baggage throughput of 376 bags per hour with a staffing
requirement of 19 screeners. In contrast, TSA estimated that approximately
425 bags per hour could be screened by in-line EDS machines with a
staffing requirement of 4.25 screeners.
In order to achieve the higher throughput rates and reduce the number of
screener staff needed to operate in-line baggage screening systems, TSA
(1) uses a screening procedure known as "on-screen alarm resolution" and
(2) networks multiple in-line EDS machines together, referred to as
"multiplexing," so that the computer-generated images of bags from these
machines are sent to a central location where TSA screeners can monitor
the images of suspect bags centrally from several machines using the
onscreen alarm resolution procedure. When an EDS machine alarms,
indicating the possibility that explosive material may be contained in the
bag, the on-screen alarm resolution procedure allows screeners to examine
computer-generated images of the inside of a bag to determine if suspect
items identified by the EDS machines are in fact suspicious. If a
screener, by viewing these images, is able to determine that the suspect
item or items identified by the EDS machine are in fact harmless, the
screener is allowed to clear the bag, and it is sent to the airline
baggage makeup area for loading onto the aircraft. If the screener is not
able to
make the determination that the bag does not contain suspicious objects,
the bag is sent to a secondary screening room where the bag is further
examined by a screener. In secondary screening, the screener opens the bag
and examines the suspect item or items, and usually swabs the items to
collect a sample for analysis using an ETD machine. TSA also uses this
on-screen alarm resolution procedure with stand-alone EDS machines.15
A TSA official estimated that the on-screen alarm resolution procedure
with in-line EDS baggage screening systems will enable TSA to reduce by 40
to 60 percent the number of bags requiring the more labor-intensive
secondary screening using ETD machines. In estimating the potential
savings in staffing requirements, TSA officials stated that they expect to
achieve a 20 to 25 percent savings because of reductions in the number of
staff needed to screen bags using ETD to resolve alarms from in-line EDS
machines.
TSA also reported that because procedures for using stand-alone EDS and
ETD machines require screeners to lift heavy baggage onto and off of the
machines, the interim lobby screening solutions used by TSA led to
significant numbers of on-the-job injuries.16 In addition, in responding
to our survey about 263 airports, numerous federal security directors
reported that on-the-job injuries related to lifting heavy baggage onto or
off the EDS and ETD machines were a significant concern at the airports
for which they were responsible. Specifically, these federal security
directors reported that on-the-job injuries caused by lifting heavy bags
onto and off of EDS machines were a significant concern at 65 airports,
and were a significant concern with the use of ETD machines at 110
airports. To reduce on-the-job injuries, TSA has provided training to
screeners on proper lifting procedures. However, according to TSA
officials, in-line EDS screening systems would significantly reduce the
need for screeners to handle baggage, thus further reducing the number of
on-the-job injuries being experienced by TSA baggage screeners.
In addition, during our site visits to 22 large and medium-sized airports,
several TSA, airport, and airline officials expressed concern regarding
the security risks caused by overcrowding due to ETD and stand-alone EDS
15TSA began implementing the on-screen alarm resolution procedure in May
2004 after pilot testing the procedure.
16TSA was unable to provide GAO with data on the on-the-job injuries
sustained during baggage screening operations.
Airports and the Federal Government Are Taking Actions to Install In-line
Baggage Screening Systems, but Resources Have Not Been Made Available to Fund
These Systems on a Large-Scale Basis
machines being located in airport lobbies. The location of the equipment
resulted in less space available to accommodate passenger movement and
caused congestion due to passengers having to wait in lines in public
areas to have their checked baggage screened. TSA headquarters officials
also reported that large groups of people congregating in crowded airport
lobbies increases security risks by creating a potential target for
terrorists. The TSA officials noted that crowded airport lobbies have been
the scenes of terrorist attacks in the past. For example, in December
1985, four terrorists walked to the El Al ticket counter at Rome's
Leonardo DaVinci Airport and opened fire with assault rifles and grenades,
killing 13 and wounding 75. On that same day, three terrorists killed
three people and wounded 30 others at Vienna International Airport.
Airport operators and TSA are taking actions to install in-line EDS
baggage screening systems because of the expected benefits of these
systems. Our survey of federal security directors and interviews with
airport officials revealed that 86 of 130 category X, I, and II airports
(66 percent) included in our survey either have, are planning to have, or
are considering installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems
throughout or at a portion of their airports. As of July 2004, 12 airports
had operational in-line systems airportwide or at a particular terminal or
terminals, and an additional 45 airports were actively planning or
constructing in-line systems. Our survey of federal security directors
further revealed that an additional 33 of the 130 category X, I, and II
airports we surveyed were considering developing in-line systems.
While in-line EDS baggage screening systems have a number of potential
benefits, the total cost to install these systems is unknown, and limited
federal resources have been made available to fund these systems on a
large-scale basis. In-line baggage screening systems are capital-intensive
because they often require significant airport modifications, including
terminal reconfigurations, new conveyor belt systems, and electrical
upgrades. TSA has not determined the total cost of installing in-line EDS
baggage screening systems at airports that it had determined need these
systems to maintain compliance with the congressional mandate to screen
all checked baggage for explosives using explosive detection systems, or
to achieve more efficient and streamlined checked baggage screening
operations. However, TSA and airport industry association officials have
estimated that the total cost of installing in-line systems is-a rough
orderof-magnitude estimate-from $3 billion to more than $5 billion. TSA
officials stated that they have not conducted a detailed analysis of the
costs required to install in-line EDS systems at airports because most of
their efforts have been focused on deploying and maintaining a sufficient
number of EDS and ETD machines to screen all checked baggage for
explosives. TSA officials further stated that the estimated costs to
install in-line baggage screening systems would vary greatly from airport
to airport depending on the size of the airport and the extent of airport
modifications that would be required to install the system. While we did
not independently verify the estimates, officials from the Airports
Council International-North America and American Association of Airport
Executives estimated that project costs for in-line systems could range
from about $2 million for a category III airport to $250 million for a
category X airport.17
TSA and airport operators are relying on LOI agreements as their principal
method for funding the modification of airport facilities to incorporate
inline baggage screening systems.18 As of January 2005, TSA had issued
eight LOIs to reimburse nine airports for the installation of in-line EDS
baggage screening systems for a total cost of $957.1 million to the
federal government over 4 years. In addition, TSA officials stated that as
of July 2004, they had identified 27 additional airports that they believe
would benefit from receiving LOIs for in-line systems because such systems
are needed to screen an increasing number of bags due to current or
projected growth in passenger traffic. TSA officials stated that without
such systems, these airports would not remain in compliance with the
congressional mandate to screen all checked baggage using EDS and ETD.19
However,
17Joint Statement of David Z. Plavin, President, Airports Council
International-North America (ACI-NA) and Todd Hauptli, Sr. Executive Vice
President, American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) before the
House Aviation Subcommittee Hearing on Passenger and Baggage Screening
Problems; February 12, 2004. GAO did not independently verify cost figures
provided in this testimony.
18The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No.
108-7, 117 Stat. 386, approved the use of LOIs as a vehicle to leverage
federal government and industry funding to support facility modification
costs for installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems. When an LOI is
established to provide multiyear funding for a project, the airport
operator is responsible for providing-up front-the total funding needed to
complete the project, even though the LOI is not a binding commitment of
federal funds. Work proceeds with the understanding that TSA will, if
sufficient funding is appropriated, reimburse the airport operator for a
percentage of the facility modification costs, with the airport funding
the remainder of the costs. LOIs issued by TSA for in-line baggage
screening systems provide for reimbursement payments over a multiple year
period, contingent upon the appropriation of sufficient funding to cover
such projects.
19TSA officials stated that the number of airports that could benefit most
from in-line checked baggage screening systems varies depending on
changing airport circumstances, such as adding new terminals or an
increased or decreased number of flights.
because TSA would not identify these 27 airports, we were unable to
determine whether these airports are among the 45 airports we identified
as in the process of planning or constructing in-line systems.
TSA officials stated that they also use other transaction agreements as an
administrative vehicle to directly fund, with no long-term commitments,
airport operators for smaller in-line airport modification projects.20
Under these agreements, as implemented by TSA, the airport operator also
provides a portion of the funding required for the modification. As of
September 30, 2004, TSA had negotiated arrangements with eight airports to
fund small permanent in-line projects or portions of large permanent
inline projects using other transaction agreements.21 These other
transaction agreements range from about $640,000 to help fund the
conceptual design of an in-line system for one terminal at the Dallas
Fort-Worth airport to $37.5 million to help fund the design and
construction of in-line systems and modification of the baggage handling
systems for two terminals at the Chicago O'Hare International Airport. TSA
officials stated that they would continue to use other transaction
agreements to help fund smaller in-line projects.22
Airport operators also used the FAA's Airport Improvement Program- grants
to maintain safe and efficient airports-in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to
help fund facility modifications needed to accommodate installing in-line
systems. Twenty-eight of 53 airports that reported either having
constructed or planning to construct in-line systems relied on the Airport
Improvement Program as their sole source of federal funding.
20Other transaction agreements are administrative vehicles used by TSA to
directly fund airport operators for smaller airport modification projects
without undertaking a long-term commitment. These transactions take many
forms; are generally not required to comply with federal laws and
regulations that apply to contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements;
and enable the federal government and others entering into these
agreements to freely negotiate provisions that are mutually agreeable.
21The eight airports included four category X airports: Dallas Fort-Worth
International, Chicago O'Hare International, Detroit Metro Wayne County,
and San Francisco International; three category I airports: Piedmont Triad
International (North Carolina), Pittsburgh International, and Sacramento
International; and one category II airport Harrisburg International
(Pennsylvania). These eight airports were among the 45 airports that we
identified as being in the process of planning or constructing in-line
systems.
22TSA also used four other transaction agreements to fund work related to
interim solutions, three of these agreements were for partial in-line
systems that eventually were to be replaced by permanent in-line systems.
Airport officials at over half of the 45 airports that we identified are
in the process of planning or constructing in-line systems stated that
they will require federal funding in order to complete the planning and
construction of these in-line systems. TSA officials also reported that
additional airports will require in-line systems to maintain compliance
with the congressional mandate to screen 100 percent of checked baggage
for explosives. Despite this reported need, TSA officials stated that they
do not have sufficient resources in their budget to fund additional LOIs
beyond the eight LOIs that have already been issued. The Vision
100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (Vision 100)23 provided for
the creation of the Aviation Security Capital Fund to help pay for, among
other things, placing EDS machines in line with airport baggage handling
systems.24 However, according to OMB officials, the President's fiscal
year 2005 budget request, which included the Aviation Security Capital
Fund's mandatory appropriation of $250 million, only supported continued
funding for the eight LOIs that have already been issued and did not
provide resources to support new LOIs for funding the installation of
in-line systems at additional airports. Further, while the fiscal year
2005 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act provided $45
million for installing explosive detection systems in addition to the $250
million from the Aviation Security Capital Fund, Congress directed, in the
accompanying conference report, that the $45 million be used to assist in
the continued funding of the existing eight LOIs. Further, the President's
fiscal year 2006 budget request for TSA provides approximately $240.5
million for the continued funding of the eight existing LOIs and does not
allocate any funding for new LOI agreements for in-line system integration
activities. The fiscal year 2006 Department of Homeland Security
appropriations bill passed by the House on May 17, 2005, and the
appropriations bill pending before the Senate include, among other things
$75 million and $14 million for installation of checked baggage explosive
detection systems, respectively. The committee reports accompanying the
House and Senate appropriations bills state that the amounts included for
installation are in addition to the $250 million mandatory appropriation
of
23Vision100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176,
177 Stat. 2490 (2003).
24Vision 100 authorizes a $250 million mandatory appropriation for the
Aviation Security Capital Fund for each of fiscal years 2004 through 2007.
Of that mandatory amount, the act designates $125 million as priority
funding to fulfill intentions to obligate under LOIs. In fiscal year 2004,
Congress provided $250 million for the physical modification of airports
to install checked baggage explosive detection systems but did so separate
from the Aviation Security Capital Fund because a provision of that act
precluded the use of funds to establish the Fund in fiscal year 2004.
the Aviation Security Capital Fund but do not earmark these funds
specifically for the installation of in-line EDS systems.
In addition, perspectives differ regarding the appropriate role of the
federal government, airport operators, and air carriers in funding these
capital-intensive in-line EDS systems. Airport operators and TSA have
shared in the total costs-25 percent and 75 percent respectively under LOI
agreements, which have been TSA's primary method for funding inline EDS
systems. A 75 percent federal cost-share will apply to any project under
an LOI for fiscal year 2005.25 Further, the President's fiscal year 2006
budget request for TSA requests to maintain the 75 percent federal
government cost share for projects funded by LOIs at large and medium
airports. For fiscal year 2006 appropriations for DHS, both the Senate, in
its pending appropriations bill, and the House, in its committee report,
also propose to maintain the 75 percent federal cost share for LOIs.
However, in testimony before Congress, an aviation industry official
expressed a different perspective regarding the cost sharing between the
federal government and the aviation industry for installing in-line
checked baggage screening systems. Testifying in July 2004, the official
said that airports contend that the cost of installing in-line systems
should be met entirely by the federal government, given its direct
responsibility for screening checked baggage, as established by law, in
light of the national security imperative for doing so, and because of the
economic efficiencies of this strategy. Although the official stated that
airports have agreed to provide a local match of 10 percent of the cost of
installing in-line systems at medium and large airports, as stipulated by
Vision 100, he expressed opposition to the administration's proposal,
which was subsequently
25The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution authorized
TSA to issue LOIs for terminal modifications related to the installation
of in-line baggage screening systems and mandated that each LOI provide
for a 75 percent federal cost-share of the project's cost, with the
remaining 25 percent to be paid by the airport operator at airports with
at least 0.25 percent of the total number of passenger boardings each year
at all airports (and 90 percent for projects at all other airports).
Subsequently, Vision 100 instituted a 90 percent federal cost-share of the
project's cost, with the remaining 10 percent to be paid by the airport
operator at medium and large hub airports (and 95 percent for projects at
any other airport) though TSA continued to operate at the 75 percent
cost-share. The fiscal year 2005 DHS Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
108-334, 118 Stat.1298, signed into law in October 2004, reestablished the
federal cost-share at 75 percent for any medium or large hub airport
during fiscal year 2005.
adopted by Congress for fiscal year 2005, to reestablish the airport's
costshare at 25 percent.26
In July 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States (the 9/11 Commission) also addressed the issue of the federal
government/airport cost-share for installing EDS in-line baggage screening
systems.27 Specifically, the commission recommended that TSA expedite the
installation of in-line systems and that the aviation industry should pay
its fair share of the costs associated with installing these systems,
since the industry will derive many benefits from the systems. Although
the 9/11 Commission recommended that the aviation industry should pay its
fair share of the costs of installing in-line systems, the commission did
not report what it believed the fair share to be.28
26TSA officials stated that the increased cost-share to 90 percent as
stipulated in Vision 100 would further constrain their ability to fund
future LOIs, as well as impact their ability to assist airports to achieve
and maintain compliance with the congressional mandate to screen all
checked baggage for explosives.
27The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington, D.C.: July 2004).
28The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, enacted in December 2004, requires the
Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct a cost-sharing study that must
include, among other things, a proposed formula for cost sharing among the
federal, state, and local governments and the private sector for projects
to install in-line baggage screening equipment that reflects the benefits
that each such entity will derive from the projects, including national
security benefits and labor and other cost savings.
TSA Has Not Systematically Planned for the Optimal Deployment of Checked
Baggage Screening Equipment to Ensure the Efficient and Cost-Effective
Screening for Explosives while Enhancing Security Benefits
At the time of our March 2005 report,29 TSA has not completed a
systematic, prospective analysis of individual airports or groups of
airports to determine at which airports installing in-line EDS systems
would be cost-effective in terms of reducing long-term screening costs for
the government and would improve security. Such an analysis would enable
TSA to determine at which airports it would be most beneficial to invest
limited federal resources for in-line systems rather than continue to rely
on the stand-alone EDS and ETD machines to screen checked baggage for
explosives, and it would be consistent with best practices for preparing
benefit-cost analysis of government programs or projects called for by OMB
Circular A-94.30 TSA officials stated that they had not conducted the
analyses related to the installation of in-line systems at individual
airports or groups of airports because they have used available staff and
funding to ensure all airports have a sufficient number of EDS or ETD
machines to meet the congressional mandate to screen all checked baggage
with explosive detection systems. During the course of our review, in
September 2004, TSA contracted for services to develop methodologies and
criteria for assessing the effectiveness and suitability of airport
screening solutions requiring significant capital investment, such as
those projects associated with the LOI program. In July 2005, TSA
officials stated that TSA and DHS are reviewing a draft report from the
study. According to these officials, the study will provide TSA with a
strategic plan for its checked baggage screening program, including the
best screening solution for airports processing most of the airlines'
baggage volume, and the capital costs and staffing requirements for each
solution.
Although TSA had not conducted a systematic analysis of cost savings and
other benefits that could be derived from the installation of in-line
baggage screening systems, TSA's limited, retrospective cost-benefit
analysis of inline projects at the nine airports with signed LOI
agreements found that significant savings and other benefits may be
achieved through the
29GAO-05-365.
30OMB Circular A-94 Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost
Analysis of Federal Programs, January 22, 2002. Agencies use this guidance
to support government decisions to initiate, review, or expand programs
that would result in measurable costs or benefits extending for 3 or more
years into the future.
installation of these systems.31 This analysis was conducted in May 2004-
after the eight LOI agreements for the nine airports were signed in July
and September 2003 and February 2004-to estimate potential future cost
savings and other benefits that could be achieved from installing in-line
systems instead of using stand-alone EDS systems. TSA estimated that
inline baggage screening systems at these airports would save the federal
government about $1 billion32 compared with stand-alone EDS systems and
that TSA would recover its initial investment in a little over 1 year. 33
TSA's analysis also provided data to estimate the cost savings for each
airport over the 7-year period. According to TSA's data, federal cost
savings varied from about $50 million to over $250 million at eight of the
nine airports, while at one airport, there was an estimated $90 million
loss.34
According to TSA's analysis of the nine LOI airports, in-line cost savings
critically depend on how much an airport's facilities have to be modified
to accommodate the in-line configuration. Savings also depend on TSA's
costs to buy, install, and network the EDS machines; subsequent
maintenance cost; and the number of screeners needed to operate the
machines in-line instead of using stand-alone EDS systems. In its
analysis, TSA also found that a key factor driving many of these costs is
throughput-how many bags an in-line EDS system can screen per hour
31We reviewed the TSA cost model showing savings expected to be achieved
with in-line rather than stand-alone EDS equipment at nine airports. We
assessed the model's logic to ensure its completeness and correctness of
calculations. Also, as discussed in appendix IV of our March 2005 report
(GAO-05-365), we conducted a Monte Carlo simulation to: (1) illustrate
sensitivity of potential cost savings of replacing stand-alone with
in-line EDS systems to alternative values of key cost drivers and (2) to
explore the variability in the key factors used by TSA in their model.
Based on our review of TSA's cost model, we believe that it is
sufficiently reliable for the analyses we conducted and the information
included in this testimony.
32This figure refers to the net present value saved over 7 years if
received up front.
33For a basis of comparison, Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94
stipulates using a 7 percent real discount rate to compute the present
value of cost savings. TSA used a 4 percent real discount rate. Following
Office of Management and Budget guidance, cost savings are $1.14 billion.
In addition, in TSA's analysis, the federal government does not pay for
$319 million, or 25 percent, of project costs. Accounting for these costs
to reflect total costs, as recommended by Circular A-94, lowers overall
savings to $820 million.
34The relatively large costs for upfront in-line EDS at one airport are
not offset by the modest amount of estimated operation and maintenance
cost savings; therefore, the in-line EDS system may be more costly than
EDS stand-alone. By contrast, at another airport the upfront costs of
in-line EDS are lower than for stand-alone EDS, and there is a substantial
amount of estimated operation and maintenance cost savings. Therefore, the
in-line EDS system this latter airport may be less costly than stand-alone
EDS.
compared with the rate for a stand-alone system. TSA used this factor to
determine how many stand-alone EDS machines could be replaced by a single
in-line EDS machine while achieving the same throughput. According to
TSA's analysis, in-line EDS would reduce by 78 percent the number of TSA
baggage screeners and supervisors required to screen checked baggage at
these nine airports, from 6,645 to 1,477 screeners and supervisors.
However, the actual number of TSA screeners and supervisor positions that
could be eliminated would be dependent on the individual design and
operating conditions at each airport.
TSA also reported that aside from increased efficiency and lower overall
costs, there were a number of qualitative benefits that in-line systems
would provide over stand-alone systems, including:
o fewer on-the-job injuries, since there is less lifting of baggage when
EDS machines are integrated into the airport's baggage conveyor system;
o less lobby disruption because the stand-alone EDS and ETD machines
would be removed from airport lobbies; and
o unbroken chain of custody of baggage because in-line systems are more
secure, since the baggage handling is performed away from passengers.
TSA's retrospective analysis of these nine airports indicates the
potential for cost savings through the installation of in-line EDS baggage
screening systems at other airports, and it provides insights about key
factors likely to influence potential cost savings from using in-line
systems at other airports. This analysis also indicates the merit of
conducting prospective analyses of other airports to provide information
for future federal government funding decisions as required by the OMB
guidance on costbenefit analyses.35 This guidance describes best practices
for preparing benefit-cost analysis of government programs or projects,
one of which involves analyzing uncertainty. Given the diversity of
airport designs and operations, TSA's analysis could be modified to
account for uncertainties in the values of some of the key factors, such
as how much it will cost to modify an airport to install an in-line
system. Analyzing uncertainty in this manner is consistent with OMB
guidance.
35OMB Circular A-94.
TSA also has not systematically analyzed which airports could benefit from
the implementation of additional stand-alone EDS systems in lieu of
labor-intensive ETD systems at more than 300 airports that rely on ETD
machines, and where in-line EDS systems may not be appropriate or
costeffective. More specifically, TSA has not prepared a plan that
prioritizes which airports should receive EDS machines (including machines
that become surplus because of the installation of in-line systems) to
balance short-term installation costs with future operational savings.
Furthermore, TSA has not yet determined the potential long-term operating
cost savings and the short-term costs of installing the systems, which are
important factors to consider in conducting analyses to determine whether
airports would benefit from the installation of EDS machines. TSA
officials said that they had not yet had the opportunity to develop such
analyses or plans, and they did not believe that such an exercise would
necessarily be an efficient use of their resources, given the fluidity of
baggage screening at various airports.
There is potential for TSA to benefit from the introduction of smaller
stand-alone EDS machines-in terms of labor savings and added
efficiencies-at some of the more than 300 airports where TSA relies on the
use of ETD machines to screen checked baggage. Stand-alone EDS machines
are able to screen a greater number of bags in an hour than the ETD used
for primary screening while lessening reliance on screeners during the
screening process. For example, TSA's analysis showed that an ETD machine
can screen 36 bags per hour, while the stand-alone EDS machines can screen
120 to 180 bags per hour. As a result, it would take three to five ETD
machines to screen the same number of bags that one stand-alone EDS
machine could process. In addition, greater use of the stand-alone EDS
machines could reduce staffing requirements. For example, one stand-alone
EDS machine would potentially require 6 to 14 fewer screeners than would
be required to screen the same number of bags at a screening station with
three to five ETD machines. This calculation is based on TSA estimates
that 4.1 screeners are required to support each primary screening ETD
machine, while one stand-alone EDS machine requires 6.75
screeners-including staff needed to operate ETD machines required to
provide secondary screening.
Without a plan for installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems, and
for using additional stand-alone EDS systems in place of ETD machines at
the nation's airports, it is unclear how TSA will make use of new
technologies for screening checked baggage for explosives, such as the
smaller and faster EDS machines that may become available through TSA's
research and development programs. For example, TSA is working
with private sector firms to enhance existing EDS systems and develop new
screening technologies through its research and development (R&D) efforts.
As part of these efforts, in fiscal year 2003, TSA spent almost $2.4
million to develop a new computer-aided tomography explosives detection
system that is smaller and lighter than systems currently deployed in
airport lobbies. The new system is intended to replace systems currently
in use, including larger and heavier EDS machines and ETD equipment. The
smaller size of the system creates opportunities for TSA to transfer
screening operations to other locations such as airport check-in counters.
TSA certified this equipment in December 2004 and is operationally testing
the machine at three airports to evaluate its operational efficiency.
TSA's checked baggage screening R&D efforts are part of a broader DHS
program focused on researching and developing technologies to detect,
prevent, and mitigate terrorist threats. In September 2004, we reported
that TSA and DHS have made some progress in managing transportation
security R&D programs according to applicable laws and R&D best
practices.36 However, we found that their efforts were incomplete in
several areas. For example, as of our September 2004 report, although both
TSA and DHS had established processes to select and prioritize R&D
projects that include risk management principles, they had not yet
completed vulnerability and criticality assessments, which we have
identified as key elements of a risk management approach, for all modes of
transportation.37 In the absence of completed risk assessments, TSA and
DHS officials reported basing funding decisions on other factors- such as
available threat intelligence, expert judgment, and information about past
terrorist incidents. However, TSA officials stated that they do not use
formal threat assessments to make R&D decisions. During our review, we
also found limited evidence of coordination between TSA and DHS, or
between these agencies and other federal agencies, such as the Department
of Transportation, and industry stakeholders. Without such coordination,
DHS raises the risk that its R&D resources will not be effectively
leveraged and that duplication may occur. We also found that although many
of TSA's R&D projects were in later phases of
36GAO, Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS Are Researching and
Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management, GAO-04-890
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004).
37 GAO, Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach,
GAO-02-150T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2001).
Concluding Observations
development, the agency had not estimated deployment dates, without which
managers do not have information needed to plan, budget, and track the
progress of projects. We also found that TSA and DHS did not have adequate
databases to monitor and manage the spending of the hundreds of millions
of dollars that Congress had appropriated for R&D. In moving forward, it
will be important for DHS to resolve the these challenges to help ensure
that limited R&D recourses are focused on the areas of greatest need.
TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems at the
nation's airports-mainly as part of interim lobby screening solutions-to
provide the capability to screen all checked baggage for explosives, as
mandated by Congress. With the objective of initially fielding this
equipment largely accomplished, TSA needs to shift its focus from
equipping airports with interim screening solutions to systematically
planning for the more optimal deployment of checked baggage screening
systems. Part of such planning should include analyzing which airports
should receive federal support for in-line EDS baggage screening systems
based on cost savings that could be achieved from more effective and
efficient baggage screening operations and on other factors, including
enhanced security. Also, for airports, where in-line systems may not be
economically justified because of high investment costs, a cost
effectiveness analysis could be used to determine the benefits of
additional stand-alone EDS machines to screen checked baggage in place of
the more labor-intensive ETD machines that are currently being used at the
more than 300 airports. In addition, TSA should consider the costs and
benefits of the new technologies being developed through its research and
development efforts, which could provide smaller EDS machines that have
the potential to reduce the costs associated with installing in-line EDS
baggage screening systems or to replace ETD machines currently used as the
primary method for screening.
An analysis of airport baggage screening needs would also help enable TSA
to determine whether expected reduced staffing costs, higher baggage
throughput, and increased security would justify the significant up-front
investment required to install in-line baggage screening. TSA's
retrospective analysis of nine airports installing in-line baggage
screening systems with LOI funds, while limited, demonstrated that cost
savings could be achieved through reduced staffing requirements for
screeners and increased baggage throughput. In fact, the analysis showed
that using in-line systems instead of stand-alone systems at these nine
airports would save the federal government about $1 billion over 7 years
and that TSA's
initial investment would be recovered in a little over 1 year. However,
this analysis also showed that a cost savings may not be achieved for all
airports. In considering airports for in-line baggage screening systems or
the continued use of stand-alone EDS and ETD machines, a systematic
analysis of the costs and benefits of these systems would help TSA justify
the appropriate screening for a particular airport, and such planning
would help support funding requests by demonstrating enhanced security,
improved operational efficiencies, and cost savings to both TSA and the
affected airport.
To assist TSA in planning for the optimal deployment of checked baggage
screening systems, we recommended in our March 2005 report that TSA
systematically evaluate baggage screening needs at airports, including the
costs and benefits of installing in-line baggage screening systems at
airports that do not yet have in-line systems installed. DHS agreed with
our recommendation, stating that TSA has initiated an analysis of
deploying inline EDS machines and is in the process of formulating
criteria to identify those airports that would benefit from an in-line EDS
system. DHS also stated that TSA has begun conducting an analysis of the
airports that rely heavily on ETD machines as the primary checked baggage
screening technology to identify those airports that would benefit from
augmenting ETDs with stand-alone EDS equipment.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee have.
Contact Information For further information on this testimony, please
contact Cathleen A. Berrick at (202) 512-3404.
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Charles
Bausell, Amy Bernstein, Kevin Copping, Christine Fossett, David Hooper,
Noel Lance, Thomas Lombardi, and Alper Tunca.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
GAO's Mission
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts newly
released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To have
GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out
to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25
percent. Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061
To Report Fraud, Contact:
Waste, and Abuse in Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: [email protected] Programs Automated answering system: (800)
424-5454 or (202) 512-7470
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4400Congressional U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street
NW, Room 7125 Relations Washington, D.C. 20548
Public Affairs Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
*** End of document. ***