Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from	 
Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing (13-SEP-05,	 
GAO-05-859).							 
                                                                 
GAO reported in October 2002 that the visa process needed to be  
strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and recommended that the	 
Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate agencies,	 
(1) develop a clear policy on the role of national security in	 
the visa process, (2) create more comprehensive guidance on how  
consular officers should screen against potential terrorists, (3)
fundamentally reassess staffing requirements, and (4) revamp and 
expand consular training. This report examines State's and other 
agencies' progress in implementing changes to the visa process	 
since 2002, in the areas of policy and guidance; consular	 
resources, including staffing and training; and information	 
sharing.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-859 					        
    ACCNO:   A36598						        
  TITLE:     Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit 
from Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing		 
     DATE:   09/13/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Visas						 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Employee training					 
	     Border security					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Labor force					 
	     Strategic planning 				 

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GAO-05-859

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

                       Report to Congressional Committees

September 2005

BORDER SECURITY

Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Improvements in Staffing and
                              Information Sharing

GAO-05-859

[IMG]

September 2005

BORDER SECURITY

Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Improvements in Staffing and
Information Sharing

                                 What GAO Found

The Department of State (State), the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and other agencies have taken many steps to strengthen the visa
process as an antiterrorism tool. Led by the Assistant Secretary of State
for Consular Affairs, consular officers have received clear guidance on
the importance of national security. We observed that consular officers at
eight posts, including those of interest to antiterrorism efforts, regard
security as their top priority, while recognizing the importance of
facilitating legitimate travel. State has also increased hiring of
consular officers, targeted recruitment of foreign language speakers,
revamped consular training with a focus on counterterrorism, and increased
resources to combat visa fraud. Further, intelligence and law enforcement
agencies have shared more information for consular officers' use in
conducting name checks on visa applicants.

Additional issues require attention. For example, State has not
consistently updated the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign Affairs
Manual to reflect recent policy changes. Consular officers we interviewed
also said that guidance is needed on DHS staff's roles and
responsibilities overseas. Actions are also needed to ensure that State
has sufficient experienced staff with the necessary language skills at key
consular posts. In particular, staffing shortages at the supervisory level
place a burden on new officers. In February 2005, we found that the visa
sections in critical posts in Saudi Arabia and Egypt were staffed with
first-tour officers and no permanent midlevel visa chiefs to provide
guidance. Further improvements in training and fraud prevention are also
needed, and additional information from FBI criminal history files would
allow consular officers to help facilitate efficient visa adjudication.

Improvements and Remaining Challenges to the Visa Process Issue
Improvements Issues requiring attention

Policy	Clarified policies and issued new guidance on national security
concerns Additional guidance needed on DHS and State interagency protocols

Update the Foreign Affairs Manual

                     Staffing Increased hiring and focused

                                  recruitment

Shortage of midlevel officers and unreliable data on interview wait times

                    Training Revamped and expanded consular

training with an emphasis on counterterrorism

Courses needed on terrorism travel trends, fraud prevention, and
post-specific counterterrorism techniques

                 Fraud Increased antifraud        Standard criteria needed to 
                       resources for              identify high-              
            prevention          consular officers                 fraud posts 
                                                       Consular officers need 
           Information Increased information from                  additional 
               sharing intelligence and law              information from FBI 
                       enforcement                  criminal history files to 
                                                        adjudicate visas more 
                                         agencies                 efficiently 

Source: GAO.

United States Government Accountability Office

Contents 

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
Visa Process Strengthened, and
Further Actions Would Support

Ongoing Improvements Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action
Matter for Congressional Consideration Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
1

2 4

8 27 28 29 29

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II Comments from the Department of State

Appendix III	Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Justice

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

  Table

Table 1: Improvements in Consular Training Since 2002

  Figures

Figure 1: Visa Adjudication Process at a U.S. Embassy 7 Figure 2:
Improvements and Remaining Challenges to the Visa Process 9 Figure 3:
Authorized Foreign Service Officer Consular Positions and Distribution of
Staff by Grade, as of April 30, 2005 14

Figure 4: Fingerprint Requirements for Access to Detailed Information in
FBI Files and Proposed Changes 26

Abbreviations

CLASS Consular Lookout and Support System
DHS Department of
Homeland Security
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
NCIC
National Crime Information Center 

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United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

September 13, 2005

Congressional Committees

All 19 of the September 11, 2001, terrorist hijackers were issued a

nonimmigrant visa,1 which is a U.S. travel document that foreign citizens

must generally obtain before entering the country temporarily for

business, tourism, or other reasons.2 In deciding to approve or deny a
visa

application, Department of State (State) consular officers are on the
front

line of defense in protecting the United States against potential
terrorists

and others whose entry would likely be harmful to U.S. national interests.

Consular officers must balance this security responsibility against the

need to facilitate legitimate travel. In October 2002, we identified

shortcomings and made recommendations on State's policy on the role of

national security in the visa process, procedures for addressing
heightened

border security concerns, staffing, and counterterrorism training of

consular officers.3 Similarly, staff of the National Commission on
Terrorist

Attacks Upon the United States, or the 9-11 Commission, reported that

while there were efforts to enhance border security prior to September 11,

no agency of the U.S. government at that time thought of the visa process

as an antiterrorism tool.4 Indeed, the 9-11 Commission staff reported that
5

consular officers were not trained to screen for terrorists.

Given the widespread congressional interest in ensuring that visa
operations are a tool to prevent those who might pose a threat from
obtaining a visa, we reviewed the changes that State, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and other agencies have made since our 2002

1The United States also grants visas to people who intend to immigrate to
the United States. In this report, we use the term "visa" to refer to
nonimmigrant visas only.

2Most citizens of the 27 countries that participate in the Visa Waiver
Program, Canada, and certain other locations are not required to obtain a
visa for business or pleasure stays of short duration.

3GAO, Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an
Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002).

49-11 Commission, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington, D.C.;
Aug. 21, 2004).

5The 19 September 11, 2001, hijackers received a total of 23 visas at five
different posts from April 1997 through June 2001. See GAO-03-132NI.

  Results in Brief

report to address potential vulnerabilities in the visa process, and
determined whether additional vulnerabilities remain. To assess agencies'
progress in implementing changes to the visa process since 2002, we
reviewed changes in visa policy and guidance; consular resources,
including staffing and training; and the extent to which U.S. agencies
share information with visa adjudicators. In addition, we conducted
structured interviews with visa chiefs and other consular affairs staff
from 25 posts overseas, either via telephone or in person, on issues
related to visa policy and consular resources, among others. We observed
visa operations and interviewed U.S. government officials at 8 U.S.
consular posts in seven countries-Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco,
Spain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom. We chose these countries
because they are of interest to antiterrorism efforts. In Washington,
D.C., we interviewed officials from State, DHS, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). We conducted our work from August 2004 through August
2005, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards
(see app. I for more information on our scope and methodology).

Since our 2002 report, State, DHS, and other agencies have taken many
steps to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. Under the
leadership of the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs,
consular officers are receiving clear guidance on the importance of
addressing national security concerns through the visa process. Our
observations of consular sections at eight posts confirmed that consular
officers overseas regard security as their top priority, while also
recognizing the importance of facilitating legitimate travel to the United
States. In addition, State has established clear procedures on visa
operations worldwide, as well as management controls to ensure that visas
are adjudicated in a consistent manner at each post. State has also
increased its hiring of consular officers; increased hiring of foreign
language proficient Foreign Service officers; revamped consular training
with a focus on counterterrorism; strengthened fraud prevention efforts
worldwide; and improved consular facilities. In addition, consular
officers now have access to more information from intelligence and law
enforcement databases when conducting name checks on visa applicants.

Despite these improvements, additional actions can further enhance the
visa process. For example, Consular Affairs has not consistently updated
the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign Affairs Manual-State's
central resource for all regulations, policies, and guidance-to reflect
recent changes. In addition, consular officers at several posts told us it
is difficult to identify points of contact at DHS's overseas offices
because

DHS has not issued guidance on its staff's roles and responsibilities
overseas. Further, State has not conducted a worldwide, comprehensive
assessment of staffing requirements for visa operations, as we recommended
in 2002. We continue to see a need for such an assessment and believe that
further actions are needed to ensure that State has sufficient staff with
the necessary skills at key consular posts, especially in light of the
increased workload per visa applicant due to additional border security
requirements. In particular, as of April 2005, 26 percent of midlevel
positions were either vacant or filled by entry-level officers, placing a
large burden on these officers. During our February 2005 visits to posts
in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and Cairo, Egypt, the visa sections
were staffed with first-tour, entry-level officers, with no permanent
midlevel visa chiefs to provide guidance, support, and oversight. In
addition, resource constraints alongside new procedural requirements may
create extensive waits for visa interviews, though data gaps prevent a
reliable assessment of these wait times worldwide. Further, despite the
large responsibility placed on consular officers, particularly entry-level
officers, we found that post-specific training was offered in only about
half of the posts we reviewed, and that officers at these posts desired
additional training-in such areas as terrorist travel trends, fraudulent
documentation detection, and counterterrorism techniques. Moreover, we
observed that information sharing at posts between the consular section
and the law enforcement and intelligence communities was inconsistent.
Lastly, additional information from FBI criminal history files would allow
consular officers to help facilitate visa adjudication and the efficient
and effective approval of visas for legitimate travelers to the United
States.

We are making recommendations to the Secretaries of State and Homeland
Security to, in consultation with appropriate agencies,

o  clarify certain visa policies and procedures and facilitate their
implementation;

o  ensure that consular sections have the necessary tools to enhance
national security and promote legitimate travel, including effective human
resources and training;

o  ensure that consular managers report, on a weekly basis, posts' wait
times for applicant interviews; and

o  further encourage interactions between consular sections, law
enforcement officials, and intelligence officials at post to increase

information sharing with consular officers on terrorism issues relevant to
the visa process.

We also suggest that Congress consider requiring State and the FBI to
develop and report to Congress on a plan to provide visa adjudicators with
more efficient access to certain information in the FBI's criminal history
records to help facilitate the approval of legitimate travelers. The plan
should describe any potential technical or policy concerns regarding
sharing this information with visa adjudicators, and how these concerns
can be mitigated. The plan should also identify any legislative changes
that may be necessary for its implementation.

We received written comments from State, DHS, and the Department of
Justice, which we have reprinted in appendixes II, III, and IV,
respectively. State agreed with most of our recommendations and stated
that it is taking actions to implement them. State, however, also noted
its belief that it already had a plan to address vulnerabilities in
consular staffing and that the development of a comprehensive plan that we
recommended was not necessary. DHS agreed with our recommendation to
provide additional guidance on the relationship between DHS and State. The
Department of Justice did not comment on the matter for congressional
consideration regarding visa adjudicators' access to certain information
in the FBI's criminal history records; it provided additional information
about other actions that the department is taking to enhance the sharing
of law enforcement and intelligence information in connection with visa
processing.

Background The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, is the
primary body of law governing immigration and visa operations.6 The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 generally grants DHS exclusive authority to
issue regulations on, administer, and enforce the Immigration and
Nationality Act and all other immigration and nationality laws relating to
the functions of U.S. consular officers in connection with the granting or
denial of visas.7 As we reported in July 2005, the act also authorizes
DHS, among other things, to assign employees to any consular post to
review individual visa applications and provide expert advice and training
to consular officers

6P.L. 82-414, 8 U.S.C. S: 1101 et seq. 7State retains authority in certain
circumstances as outlined in the act. See P.L. 107-296.

regarding specific security threats related to the visa process.8 A
subsequent September 2003 Memorandum of Understanding between State and
DHS further outlines the responsibilities of each agency with respect to
visa issuance. DHS is responsible for establishing visa policy, reviewing
implementation of the policy, and providing additional direction. State
manages the visa process, as well as the consular corps and its functions
at 211 visa-issuing posts overseas. In addition, State provides guidance,
in consultation with DHS, to consular officers regarding visa policies and
procedures. In technical comments on a draft of this report, State
emphasized that the Secretary of State has the lead role with respect to
foreign policy-related visa issues.

Several agencies stationed at U.S. embassies and consulates can assist
consular officers and support the visa adjudication process. On a formal
basis, all embassy sections and agencies involved in security, law
enforcement, and intelligence activities are expected to participate in
the congressionally mandated "Visas Viper" terrorist reporting program.
This program is primarily administered through a Visas Viper Committee at
each overseas post and chaired by the deputy chief of mission or the
post's principal officer. The committees meet at least monthly to share
information on known or suspected terrorists and determine whether such
information should be sent to Washington, D.C., for potential inclusion on
watch lists. Interagency information sharing at post can also occur on an
informal basis. For example, overseas FBI officials can assist consular
officers when questions about an applicant's potential criminal history
arise during adjudication. Additionally, DHS's U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement have responsibility for some immigration and border
security programs overseas, and consular officers may seek advice from
these officials on issues such as DHS procedures at U.S. ports of entry.

The process for determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains
several steps, including documentation reviews, in-person interviews,

8The act also requires that DHS on-site personnel in Saudi Arabia review
all visa applications prior to adjudication by consular officers. P.L.
107-296, Sec. 428(e) and Sec. 428(i). See GAO, Border Security: Actions
Needed to Strengthen Management of Department of Homeland Security's Visa
Security Program, GAO-05-801 (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005).

collection of biometrics9 (fingerprints), and cross-referencing an
applicant's name against the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS)
10 (see fig. 1).

9Biometrics is a wide range of technologies that can be used to verify a
person's identity by measuring and analyzing that person's physiological
characteristics. In this case, and for the purposes of this report,
"biometric identifiers" refers to fingerprints. See GAO, Technology
Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security, GAO-03-174 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).

10CLASS is a State Department name-check database that posts use to access
critical information for visa adjudication. The system contains records
provided by numerous agencies and includes information on persons with
visa refusals, immigration violations, and terrorism concerns.

Figure 1: Visa Adjudication Process at a U.S. Embassy

Sources: GAO; Nova Development (clip art).

In 2002, we recommended actions to strengthen the visa process as an
antiterrorism tool, including

o  establishing a clear policy on the priority attached to addressing
national security concerns through the visa process;

o  creating more comprehensive, risk-based guidelines and standards on how
consular officers should use the visa process as a screen against
potential terrorists;

o  performing a fundamental reassessment of staffing and language skill
requirements for visa operations; and

o  revamping and expanding consular training courses to place more
emphasis on detecting potential terrorists.

  Visa Process Strengthened, and Further Actions Would Support Ongoing
  Improvements

Since our 2002 report, State, DHS, and other agencies have taken numerous
steps to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool and increase
its overall efficiency and effectiveness. In particular, the Assistant
Secretary in the Bureau of Consular Affairs has taken a leadership role in
implementing changes to the visa process and promoting the use of the
process as a screen against potential terrorists. However, additional
actions could enhance the visa process. State has increased and clarified
visa policies and guidance, but additional steps are needed to ensure
these changes are implemented. Additionally, State has increased resources
to strengthen the visa process, including hiring additional consular
officers, targeting recruitment, and expanding training efforts; however,
staffing limitations remain a concern, posts seek further training, and
other gaps remain. Lastly, while interagency information-sharing efforts
have increased, consular officers do not have direct access to detailed
information from the FBI's criminal history records, which would help
facilitate the approval of visas for legitimate travelers. Figure 2
summarizes the steps taken to improve the visa process since 2002 and
areas that require additional management attention.

      Figure 2: Improvements and Remaining Challenges to the Visa Process

                                  Source: GAO.

    Visa Policies, Procedures, and Guidance Enhanced, but Additional Steps
    Needed to Ensure They Are Implemented

We reported in October 2002 that consular officers held differing views on
balancing the need for national security and customer service in the visa
process. In addition, State had not issued comprehensive policy guidance
to posts regarding how consular officers should react to the heightened
border security concerns following the September 11 attacks. Since our
report, State implemented several changes to address these issues, and
consular officials stated that our 2002 report and its recommendations
provided a framework for these changes. For example, in February 2003,
Consular Affairs issued guidance identifying national security as the
first priority of the visa process. Consular officers we interviewed said
the guidance was generally clear, and officers at all eight posts we
visited viewed security as the most critical element of the visa process.
In addition, Consular Affairs identified certain areas where additional
guidance was needed to improve visa procedures. For example, State has
issued more than 80 standard operating procedures, in consultation with
DHS, to inform consular officers on issues such as

o  citizens of countries requiring special clearance requirements and
other name-check procedures;11

o  fingerprint requirements; and

o  annotating visas with current and historical information about a visa
applicant to assist immigration inspectors at ports of entry.

To reinforce standard operating procedures and internal controls, State
created Consular Management Assistance Teams that conduct management
reviews of consular sections worldwide. These teams comprise Consular
Affairs officials, diplomatic security officials, and DHS officials, and
they report directly to the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs.
According to State, as of June 2005, the teams have completed 81 field
visits and have provided guidance to posts on standard operating
procedures, as well as other areas where consular services could become
more efficient. In addition, State has regional consular officer positions
overseas, through which five experienced officers serve as regional

11Section 306 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
2002 restricts the issuance of visas to aliens who are nationals of
countries that are state sponsors of international terrorism unless the
Secretary of State determines the alien does not pose a safety or security
threat. Currently, citizens from Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan,
and Syria must, under this provision, undergo security clearances from
agencies in Washington, D.C., prior to adjudication by a consular officer.

officers to 56 posts in Europe, Near East, and Africa. These officers
provide support and guidance to less-experienced officers in small
consular sections at neighboring posts where, in many instances, there are
no other officers at post with recent consular experience.

Despite these improvements, some consular officers we interviewed stated
that it has been difficult to synthesize and consistently apply all of the
changes to the visa process. The guidance provided to consular officers in
the field is voluminous and can change rapidly, according to consular
officials. The Consular Affairs Bureau may notify its officers overseas of
policy changes through cables, postings on its internal Web site, and
informal communications. However, the bureau has not consistently updated
the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign Affairs Manual-State's
central Internet resource for all regulations, policies, and guidance-to
reflect these changes. Throughout 2005, the bureau updated several
portions of the manual, but, as of June 2005, some sections had not been
updated since October 2004, such as policies on consular duties,
clearances at post, and the submission of fingerprints to the FBI for visa
applications. Consular officials also stated that they are overhauling the
standard operating procedures to eliminate those that are obsolete and
incorporate current requirements into the manual. While the Consular
Affairs Bureau's internal Web site contains all of the standard operating
procedures, it also links to out-of-date sections in the manual, which do
not yet incorporate all updated procedures. As a result, there is no
single, reliable source for current information. The visa chief at one
post in Africa told us that while the additional guidance from Consular
Affairs has been a positive step, consular officers should not have to go
back to paper files to locate it. Some posts we visited had developed
their own methods-such as creating standard operating procedure reference
books and holding weekly staff meetings to discuss all new policies-to
help ensure that all consular officers were applying the new procedures
consistently and appropriately. The consular section in London, for
example, created a post-specific internal Web site to post guidance for
consular officers. According to State officials, in August 2004, Consular
Affairs developed a classified Web site to post additional guidance that
is accessible to all consular officers, but only 48 percent of visa chiefs
we interviewed reported having used the Web site.

Consular officers also indicated that additional guidance is needed on
certain interagency protocols. Specifically, 15 out of 25 visa chiefs we
interviewed reported that additional guidance would be helpful regarding
the interaction between the Bureau of Consular Affairs and DHS. For
example, DHS personnel stationed overseas work on a variety of

immigration and border security activities and largely serve in a regional
capacity. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services staff, for instance,
have regional offices in Rome, Bangkok, and Mexico City that can assist
consular officers in surrounding posts. However, DHS has not provided
guidance to consular officers regarding the roles and geographic
responsibilities of its personnel. In addition, consular officers at
several posts told us it is difficult to identify points of contact at
DHS's overseas offices when questions arise on issues such as immigration
violation records in CLASS. Further, consular officers at all posts we
reviewed stated they would like additional information on DHS procedures
at the ports of entry into the United States, such as guidance on how to
resolve cases in which visa holders have been denied entry to the United
States. For example, detailed information on the reason why a visa holder
was not allowed into the United States-the person was recently placed on a
watch list, for example-is not automatically transferred to CLASS. A
senior consular official stated that State and DHS are working to create a
link between consular and border inspectors' databases that would allow
the transfer of data, including transcripts of interviews at ports of
entry.

    Resources for Visa Function Increased, but Staffing Shortages and Other Gaps
    Remain a Concern

In 2002, we found that at some posts the demand for visas, combined with
increased workload per visa applicant, exceeded the available staff. As a
result, we recommended that State perform a fundamental reassessment of
staffing requirements for visa operations. We continue to see the need for
such an assessment. While State has been able to hire more entry-level
officers in recent years, we found that more than one-quarter of State's
midlevel consular positions were either vacant or filled by an entry-level
officer.12 In addition, consular headquarters officials may not have
accurate statistics on wait times for visa interviews from which to
allocate resources effectively, and visa applicants may be using
inaccurate waittime information when planning their travel to the United
States. State has also increased its targeted recruitment of foreign
language proficient officers, but gaps remain. Further, State has expanded
its training efforts, but additional training would further benefit
consular officers. Moreover, State has strengthened its fraud prevention
efforts, but has not developed systematic criteria to identify high-fraud
posts. Finally, State has increased

12Foreign Service officers are assigned a grade, which ranges from FS-06
to FS-01, corresponding from entry-level to midlevel, respectively.
According to State, officers at grades 6 through 4 are classified as
junior officers; 3 through 1 are midlevel officers. In addition, members
of the senior Foreign Service are senior officers. In this report, we
refer to them as entry-level, midlevel, and senior-level officers.

      State Has Hired More Consular Officers, but Has Not Assessed Overall
      Resource Needs