    Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from
    Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing (13-SEP-05,
    GAO-05-859).

    GAO reported in October 2002 that the visa process needed to be
    strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and recommended that the
    Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate agencies,
    (1) develop a clear policy on the role of national security in
    the visa process, (2) create more comprehensive guidance on how
    consular officers should screen against potential terrorists, (3)
    fundamentally reassess staffing requirements, and (4) revamp and
    expand consular training. This report examines State's and other
    agencies' progress in implementing changes to the visa process
    since 2002, in the areas of policy and guidance; consular
    resources, including staffing and training; and information
    sharing.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-859
        ACCNO:   A36598
      TITLE:     Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit
    from Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing
         DATE:   09/13/2005
      SUBJECT:   Visas
    	     Terrorism
    	     Counterterrorism
    	     Employee training
    	     Border security
    	     Homeland security
    	     Interagency relations
    	     Labor force
    	     Strategic planning

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    GAO-05-859

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

                           Report to Congressional Committees

    September 2005

    BORDER SECURITY

    Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Improvements in Staffing and
                                  Information Sharing

    GAO-05-859

    [IMG]

    September 2005

    BORDER SECURITY

    Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Improvements in Staffing and
    Information Sharing

                                     What GAO Found

    The Department of State (State), the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS), and other agencies have taken many steps to strengthen the visa
    process as an antiterrorism tool. Led by the Assistant Secretary of State
    for Consular Affairs, consular officers have received clear guidance on
    the importance of national security. We observed that consular officers at
    eight posts, including those of interest to antiterrorism efforts, regard
    security as their top priority, while recognizing the importance of
    facilitating legitimate travel. State has also increased hiring of
    consular officers, targeted recruitment of foreign language speakers,
    revamped consular training with a focus on counterterrorism, and increased
    resources to combat visa fraud. Further, intelligence and law enforcement
    agencies have shared more information for consular officers' use in
    conducting name checks on visa applicants.

    Additional issues require attention. For example, State has not
    consistently updated the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign Affairs
    Manual to reflect recent policy changes. Consular officers we interviewed
    also said that guidance is needed on DHS staff's roles and
    responsibilities overseas. Actions are also needed to ensure that State
    has sufficient experienced staff with the necessary language skills at key
    consular posts. In particular, staffing shortages at the supervisory level
    place a burden on new officers. In February 2005, we found that the visa
    sections in critical posts in Saudi Arabia and Egypt were staffed with
    first-tour officers and no permanent midlevel visa chiefs to provide
    guidance. Further improvements in training and fraud prevention are also
    needed, and additional information from FBI criminal history files would
    allow consular officers to help facilitate efficient visa adjudication.

    Improvements and Remaining Challenges to the Visa Process Issue
    Improvements Issues requiring attention

    Policy	Clarified policies and issued new guidance on national security
    concerns Additional guidance needed on DHS and State interagency protocols

    Update the Foreign Affairs Manual

                         Staffing Increased hiring and focused

                                      recruitment

    Shortage of midlevel officers and unreliable data on interview wait times

                        Training Revamped and expanded consular

    training with an emphasis on counterterrorism

    Courses needed on terrorism travel trends, fraud prevention, and
    post-specific counterterrorism techniques

                     Fraud Increased antifraud        Standard criteria needed to
                           resources for              identify high-
                prevention          consular officers                 fraud posts
                                                           Consular officers need
               Information Increased information from                  additional
                   sharing intelligence and law              information from FBI
                           enforcement                  criminal history files to
                                                            adjudicate visas more
                                             agencies                 efficiently

    Source: GAO.

    United States Government Accountability Office

    Contents

      Letter

    Results in Brief
    Background
    Visa Process Strengthened, and
    Further Actions Would Support

    Ongoing Improvements Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action
    Matter for Congressional Consideration Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
    1

    2 4

    8 27 28 29 29

    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

    Appendix II Comments from the Department of State

    Appendix III	Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

    Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Justice

    Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

      Table

    Table 1: Improvements in Consular Training Since 2002

      Figures

    Figure 1: Visa Adjudication Process at a U.S. Embassy 7 Figure 2:
    Improvements and Remaining Challenges to the Visa Process 9 Figure 3:
    Authorized Foreign Service Officer Consular Positions and Distribution of
    Staff by Grade, as of April 30, 2005 14

    Figure 4: Fingerprint Requirements for Access to Detailed Information in
    FBI Files and Proposed Changes 26

    Abbreviations

    CLASS Consular Lookout and Support System
    DHS Department of
    Homeland Security
    FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
    NCIC
    National Crime Information Center

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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    United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

    September 13, 2005

    Congressional Committees

    All 19 of the September 11, 2001, terrorist hijackers were issued a

    nonimmigrant visa,1 which is a U.S. travel document that foreign citizens

    must generally obtain before entering the country temporarily for

    business, tourism, or other reasons.2 In deciding to approve or deny a
    visa

    application, Department of State (State) consular officers are on the
    front

    line of defense in protecting the United States against potential
    terrorists

    and others whose entry would likely be harmful to U.S. national interests.

    Consular officers must balance this security responsibility against the

    need to facilitate legitimate travel. In October 2002, we identified

    shortcomings and made recommendations on State's policy on the role of

    national security in the visa process, procedures for addressing
    heightened

    border security concerns, staffing, and counterterrorism training of

    consular officers.3 Similarly, staff of the National Commission on
    Terrorist

    Attacks Upon the United States, or the 9-11 Commission, reported that

    while there were efforts to enhance border security prior to September 11,

    no agency of the U.S. government at that time thought of the visa process

    as an antiterrorism tool.4 Indeed, the 9-11 Commission staff reported that
    5

    consular officers were not trained to screen for terrorists.

    Given the widespread congressional interest in ensuring that visa
    operations are a tool to prevent those who might pose a threat from
    obtaining a visa, we reviewed the changes that State, the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS), and other agencies have made since our 2002

    1The United States also grants visas to people who intend to immigrate to
    the United States. In this report, we use the term "visa" to refer to
    nonimmigrant visas only.

    2Most citizens of the 27 countries that participate in the Visa Waiver
    Program, Canada, and certain other locations are not required to obtain a
    visa for business or pleasure stays of short duration.

    3GAO, Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an
    Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002).

    49-11 Commission, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National
    Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington, D.C.;
    Aug. 21, 2004).

    5The 19 September 11, 2001, hijackers received a total of 23 visas at five
    different posts from April 1997 through June 2001. See GAO-03-132NI.

      Results in Brief

    report to address potential vulnerabilities in the visa process, and
    determined whether additional vulnerabilities remain. To assess agencies'
    progress in implementing changes to the visa process since 2002, we
    reviewed changes in visa policy and guidance; consular resources,
    including staffing and training; and the extent to which U.S. agencies
    share information with visa adjudicators. In addition, we conducted
    structured interviews with visa chiefs and other consular affairs staff
    from 25 posts overseas, either via telephone or in person, on issues
    related to visa policy and consular resources, among others. We observed
    visa operations and interviewed U.S. government officials at 8 U.S.
    consular posts in seven countries-Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco,
    Spain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom. We chose these countries
    because they are of interest to antiterrorism efforts. In Washington,
    D.C., we interviewed officials from State, DHS, and the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (FBI). We conducted our work from August 2004 through August
    2005, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards
    (see app. I for more information on our scope and methodology).

    Since our 2002 report, State, DHS, and other agencies have taken many
    steps to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. Under the
    leadership of the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs,
    consular officers are receiving clear guidance on the importance of
    addressing national security concerns through the visa process. Our
    observations of consular sections at eight posts confirmed that consular
    officers overseas regard security as their top priority, while also
    recognizing the importance of facilitating legitimate travel to the United
    States. In addition, State has established clear procedures on visa
    operations worldwide, as well as management controls to ensure that visas
    are adjudicated in a consistent manner at each post. State has also
    increased its hiring of consular officers; increased hiring of foreign
    language proficient Foreign Service officers; revamped consular training
    with a focus on counterterrorism; strengthened fraud prevention efforts
    worldwide; and improved consular facilities. In addition, consular
    officers now have access to more information from intelligence and law
    enforcement databases when conducting name checks on visa applicants.

    Despite these improvements, additional actions can further enhance the
    visa process. For example, Consular Affairs has not consistently updated
    the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign Affairs Manual-State's
    central resource for all regulations, policies, and guidance-to reflect
    recent changes. In addition, consular officers at several posts told us it
    is difficult to identify points of contact at DHS's overseas offices
    because

    DHS has not issued guidance on its staff's roles and responsibilities
    overseas. Further, State has not conducted a worldwide, comprehensive
    assessment of staffing requirements for visa operations, as we recommended
    in 2002. We continue to see a need for such an assessment and believe that
    further actions are needed to ensure that State has sufficient staff with
    the necessary skills at key consular posts, especially in light of the
    increased workload per visa applicant due to additional border security
    requirements. In particular, as of April 2005, 26 percent of midlevel
    positions were either vacant or filled by entry-level officers, placing a
    large burden on these officers. During our February 2005 visits to posts
    in Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and Cairo, Egypt, the visa sections
    were staffed with first-tour, entry-level officers, with no permanent
    midlevel visa chiefs to provide guidance, support, and oversight. In
    addition, resource constraints alongside new procedural requirements may
    create extensive waits for visa interviews, though data gaps prevent a
    reliable assessment of these wait times worldwide. Further, despite the
    large responsibility placed on consular officers, particularly entry-level
    officers, we found that post-specific training was offered in only about
    half of the posts we reviewed, and that officers at these posts desired
    additional training-in such areas as terrorist travel trends, fraudulent
    documentation detection, and counterterrorism techniques. Moreover, we
    observed that information sharing at posts between the consular section
    and the law enforcement and intelligence communities was inconsistent.
    Lastly, additional information from FBI criminal history files would allow
    consular officers to help facilitate visa adjudication and the efficient
    and effective approval of visas for legitimate travelers to the United
    States.

    We are making recommendations to the Secretaries of State and Homeland
    Security to, in consultation with appropriate agencies,

    o  clarify certain visa policies and procedures and facilitate their
    implementation;

    o  ensure that consular sections have the necessary tools to enhance
    national security and promote legitimate travel, including effective human
    resources and training;

    o  ensure that consular managers report, on a weekly basis, posts' wait
    times for applicant interviews; and

    o  further encourage interactions between consular sections, law
    enforcement officials, and intelligence officials at post to increase

    information sharing with consular officers on terrorism issues relevant to
    the visa process.

    We also suggest that Congress consider requiring State and the FBI to
    develop and report to Congress on a plan to provide visa adjudicators with
    more efficient access to certain information in the FBI's criminal history
    records to help facilitate the approval of legitimate travelers. The plan
    should describe any potential technical or policy concerns regarding
    sharing this information with visa adjudicators, and how these concerns
    can be mitigated. The plan should also identify any legislative changes
    that may be necessary for its implementation.

    We received written comments from State, DHS, and the Department of
    Justice, which we have reprinted in appendixes II, III, and IV,
    respectively. State agreed with most of our recommendations and stated
    that it is taking actions to implement them. State, however, also noted
    its belief that it already had a plan to address vulnerabilities in
    consular staffing and that the development of a comprehensive plan that we
    recommended was not necessary. DHS agreed with our recommendation to
    provide additional guidance on the relationship between DHS and State. The
    Department of Justice did not comment on the matter for congressional
    consideration regarding visa adjudicators' access to certain information
    in the FBI's criminal history records; it provided additional information
    about other actions that the department is taking to enhance the sharing
    of law enforcement and intelligence information in connection with visa
    processing.

    Background The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, is the
    primary body of law governing immigration and visa operations.6 The
    Homeland Security Act of 2002 generally grants DHS exclusive authority to
    issue regulations on, administer, and enforce the Immigration and
    Nationality Act and all other immigration and nationality laws relating to
    the functions of U.S. consular officers in connection with the granting or
    denial of visas.7 As we reported in July 2005, the act also authorizes
    DHS, among other things, to assign employees to any consular post to
    review individual visa applications and provide expert advice and training
    to consular officers

    6P.L. 82-414, 8 U.S.C. S: 1101 et seq. 7State retains authority in certain
    circumstances as outlined in the act. See P.L. 107-296.

    regarding specific security threats related to the visa process.8 A
    subsequent September 2003 Memorandum of Understanding between State and
    DHS further outlines the responsibilities of each agency with respect to
    visa issuance. DHS is responsible for establishing visa policy, reviewing
    implementation of the policy, and providing additional direction. State
    manages the visa process, as well as the consular corps and its functions
    at 211 visa-issuing posts overseas. In addition, State provides guidance,
    in consultation with DHS, to consular officers regarding visa policies and
    procedures. In technical comments on a draft of this report, State
    emphasized that the Secretary of State has the lead role with respect to
    foreign policy-related visa issues.

    Several agencies stationed at U.S. embassies and consulates can assist
    consular officers and support the visa adjudication process. On a formal
    basis, all embassy sections and agencies involved in security, law
    enforcement, and intelligence activities are expected to participate in
    the congressionally mandated "Visas Viper" terrorist reporting program.
    This program is primarily administered through a Visas Viper Committee at
    each overseas post and chaired by the deputy chief of mission or the
    post's principal officer. The committees meet at least monthly to share
    information on known or suspected terrorists and determine whether such
    information should be sent to Washington, D.C., for potential inclusion on
    watch lists. Interagency information sharing at post can also occur on an
    informal basis. For example, overseas FBI officials can assist consular
    officers when questions about an applicant's potential criminal history
    arise during adjudication. Additionally, DHS's U.S. Citizenship and
    Immigration Services, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement have responsibility for some immigration and border
    security programs overseas, and consular officers may seek advice from
    these officials on issues such as DHS procedures at U.S. ports of entry.

    The process for determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains
    several steps, including documentation reviews, in-person interviews,

    8The act also requires that DHS on-site personnel in Saudi Arabia review
    all visa applications prior to adjudication by consular officers. P.L.
    107-296, Sec. 428(e) and Sec. 428(i). See GAO, Border Security: Actions
    Needed to Strengthen Management of Department of Homeland Security's Visa
    Security Program, GAO-05-801 (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005).

    collection of biometrics9 (fingerprints), and cross-referencing an
    applicant's name against the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS)
    10 (see fig. 1).

    9Biometrics is a wide range of technologies that can be used to verify a
    person's identity by measuring and analyzing that person's physiological
    characteristics. In this case, and for the purposes of this report,
    "biometric identifiers" refers to fingerprints. See GAO, Technology
    Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security, GAO-03-174 (Washington,
    D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).

    10CLASS is a State Department name-check database that posts use to access
    critical information for visa adjudication. The system contains records
    provided by numerous agencies and includes information on persons with
    visa refusals, immigration violations, and terrorism concerns.

    Figure 1: Visa Adjudication Process at a U.S. Embassy

    Sources: GAO; Nova Development (clip art).

    In 2002, we recommended actions to strengthen the visa process as an
    antiterrorism tool, including

    o  establishing a clear policy on the priority attached to addressing
    national security concerns through the visa process;

    o  creating more comprehensive, risk-based guidelines and standards on how
    consular officers should use the visa process as a screen against
    potential terrorists;

    o  performing a fundamental reassessment of staffing and language skill
    requirements for visa operations; and

    o  revamping and expanding consular training courses to place more
    emphasis on detecting potential terrorists.

      Visa Process Strengthened, and Further Actions Would Support Ongoing
      Improvements

    Since our 2002 report, State, DHS, and other agencies have taken numerous
    steps to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool and increase
    its overall efficiency and effectiveness. In particular, the Assistant
    Secretary in the Bureau of Consular Affairs has taken a leadership role in
    implementing changes to the visa process and promoting the use of the
    process as a screen against potential terrorists. However, additional
    actions could enhance the visa process. State has increased and clarified
    visa policies and guidance, but additional steps are needed to ensure
    these changes are implemented. Additionally, State has increased resources
    to strengthen the visa process, including hiring additional consular
    officers, targeting recruitment, and expanding training efforts; however,
    staffing limitations remain a concern, posts seek further training, and
    other gaps remain. Lastly, while interagency information-sharing efforts
    have increased, consular officers do not have direct access to detailed
    information from the FBI's criminal history records, which would help
    facilitate the approval of visas for legitimate travelers. Figure 2
    summarizes the steps taken to improve the visa process since 2002 and
    areas that require additional management attention.

          Figure 2: Improvements and Remaining Challenges to the Visa Process

                                      Source: GAO.

        Visa Policies, Procedures, and Guidance Enhanced, but Additional Steps
        Needed to Ensure They Are Implemented

    We reported in October 2002 that consular officers held differing views on
    balancing the need for national security and customer service in the visa
    process. In addition, State had not issued comprehensive policy guidance
    to posts regarding how consular officers should react to the heightened
    border security concerns following the September 11 attacks. Since our
    report, State implemented several changes to address these issues, and
    consular officials stated that our 2002 report and its recommendations
    provided a framework for these changes. For example, in February 2003,
    Consular Affairs issued guidance identifying national security as the
    first priority of the visa process. Consular officers we interviewed said
    the guidance was generally clear, and officers at all eight posts we
    visited viewed security as the most critical element of the visa process.
    In addition, Consular Affairs identified certain areas where additional
    guidance was needed to improve visa procedures. For example, State has
    issued more than 80 standard operating procedures, in consultation with
    DHS, to inform consular officers on issues such as

    o  citizens of countries requiring special clearance requirements and
    other name-check procedures;11

    o  fingerprint requirements; and

    o  annotating visas with current and historical information about a visa
    applicant to assist immigration inspectors at ports of entry.

    To reinforce standard operating procedures and internal controls, State
    created Consular Management Assistance Teams that conduct management
    reviews of consular sections worldwide. These teams comprise Consular
    Affairs officials, diplomatic security officials, and DHS officials, and
    they report directly to the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs.
    According to State, as of June 2005, the teams have completed 81 field
    visits and have provided guidance to posts on standard operating
    procedures, as well as other areas where consular services could become
    more efficient. In addition, State has regional consular officer positions
    overseas, through which five experienced officers serve as regional

    11Section 306 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
    2002 restricts the issuance of visas to aliens who are nationals of
    countries that are state sponsors of international terrorism unless the
    Secretary of State determines the alien does not pose a safety or security
    threat. Currently, citizens from Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan,
    and Syria must, under this provision, undergo security clearances from
    agencies in Washington, D.C., prior to adjudication by a consular officer.

    officers to 56 posts in Europe, Near East, and Africa. These officers
    provide support and guidance to less-experienced officers in small
    consular sections at neighboring posts where, in many instances, there are
    no other officers at post with recent consular experience.

    Despite these improvements, some consular officers we interviewed stated
    that it has been difficult to synthesize and consistently apply all of the
    changes to the visa process. The guidance provided to consular officers in
    the field is voluminous and can change rapidly, according to consular
    officials. The Consular Affairs Bureau may notify its officers overseas of
    policy changes through cables, postings on its internal Web site, and
    informal communications. However, the bureau has not consistently updated
    the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign Affairs Manual-State's
    central Internet resource for all regulations, policies, and guidance-to
    reflect these changes. Throughout 2005, the bureau updated several
    portions of the manual, but, as of June 2005, some sections had not been
    updated since October 2004, such as policies on consular duties,
    clearances at post, and the submission of fingerprints to the FBI for visa
    applications. Consular officials also stated that they are overhauling the
    standard operating procedures to eliminate those that are obsolete and
    incorporate current requirements into the manual. While the Consular
    Affairs Bureau's internal Web site contains all of the standard operating
    procedures, it also links to out-of-date sections in the manual, which do
    not yet incorporate all updated procedures. As a result, there is no
    single, reliable source for current information. The visa chief at one
    post in Africa told us that while the additional guidance from Consular
    Affairs has been a positive step, consular officers should not have to go
    back to paper files to locate it. Some posts we visited had developed
    their own methods-such as creating standard operating procedure reference
    books and holding weekly staff meetings to discuss all new policies-to
    help ensure that all consular officers were applying the new procedures
    consistently and appropriately. The consular section in London, for
    example, created a post-specific internal Web site to post guidance for
    consular officers. According to State officials, in August 2004, Consular
    Affairs developed a classified Web site to post additional guidance that
    is accessible to all consular officers, but only 48 percent of visa chiefs
    we interviewed reported having used the Web site.

    Consular officers also indicated that additional guidance is needed on
    certain interagency protocols. Specifically, 15 out of 25 visa chiefs we
    interviewed reported that additional guidance would be helpful regarding
    the interaction between the Bureau of Consular Affairs and DHS. For
    example, DHS personnel stationed overseas work on a variety of

    immigration and border security activities and largely serve in a regional
    capacity. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services staff, for instance,
    have regional offices in Rome, Bangkok, and Mexico City that can assist
    consular officers in surrounding posts. However, DHS has not provided
    guidance to consular officers regarding the roles and geographic
    responsibilities of its personnel. In addition, consular officers at
    several posts told us it is difficult to identify points of contact at
    DHS's overseas offices when questions arise on issues such as immigration
    violation records in CLASS. Further, consular officers at all posts we
    reviewed stated they would like additional information on DHS procedures
    at the ports of entry into the United States, such as guidance on how to
    resolve cases in which visa holders have been denied entry to the United
    States. For example, detailed information on the reason why a visa holder
    was not allowed into the United States-the person was recently placed on a
    watch list, for example-is not automatically transferred to CLASS. A
    senior consular official stated that State and DHS are working to create a
    link between consular and border inspectors' databases that would allow
    the transfer of data, including transcripts of interviews at ports of
    entry.

        Resources for Visa Function Increased, but Staffing Shortages and Other Gaps
        Remain a Concern

    In 2002, we found that at some posts the demand for visas, combined with
    increased workload per visa applicant, exceeded the available staff. As a
    result, we recommended that State perform a fundamental reassessment of
    staffing requirements for visa operations. We continue to see the need for
    such an assessment. While State has been able to hire more entry-level
    officers in recent years, we found that more than one-quarter of State's
    midlevel consular positions were either vacant or filled by an entry-level
    officer.12 In addition, consular headquarters officials may not have
    accurate statistics on wait times for visa interviews from which to
    allocate resources effectively, and visa applicants may be using
    inaccurate waittime information when planning their travel to the United
    States. State has also increased its targeted recruitment of foreign
    language proficient officers, but gaps remain. Further, State has expanded
    its training efforts, but additional training would further benefit
    consular officers. Moreover, State has strengthened its fraud prevention
    efforts, but has not developed systematic criteria to identify high-fraud
    posts. Finally, State has increased

    12Foreign Service officers are assigned a grade, which ranges from FS-06
    to FS-01, corresponding from entry-level to midlevel, respectively.
    According to State, officers at grades 6 through 4 are classified as
    junior officers; 3 through 1 are midlevel officers. In addition, members
    of the senior Foreign Service are senior officers. In this report, we
    refer to them as entry-level, midlevel, and senior-level officers.

          State Has Hired More Consular Officers, but Has Not Assessed Overall
          Resource Needs