DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles
Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk	 
Designation (28-JUN-05, GAO-05-842T).				 
                                                                 
Threats to national security--such as the September 11, 2001,	 
terrorist attacks and high-profile espionage cases--underscore	 
the need for timely, high-quality determinations of who is	 
eligible for a personnel security clearance which allows an	 
individual to access classified information. The Department of	 
Defense (DOD) needs an effective and efficient clearance program 
because it is responsible for about 2 million active clearances  
and provides clearances to more than 20 other executive agencies 
as well as the legislative branch. Despite these imperatives, DOD
has for more than a decade experienced delays in completing	 
hundreds of thousands of clearance requests and impediments to	 
accurately estimating and eliminating its clearance backlog. In  
January 2005, GAO designated DOD's personnel security clearance  
program as a high-risk area. In February 2005, DOD transferred	 
its personnel security investigative functions and about 1,800	 
positions to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), after 2	 
years of negotiation between the agencies. This testimony	 
provides an update on the challenges that led to GAO's high-risk 
designation. It identifies both the positive steps that have been
taken to address previously identified challenges and some of the
remaining hurdles. GAO will continue to monitor this area.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-842T					        
    ACCNO:   A28221						        
  TITLE:     DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but
Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's	 
High-Risk Designation						 
     DATE:   06/28/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Background investigations				 
	     Classified defense information			 
	     Classified information				 
	     Eligibility determinations 			 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Investigations by federal agencies 		 
	     National security personnel system 		 
	     Personnel management				 
	     Security clearances				 
	     Risk management					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Timeliness 					 
	     High Risk Series 2005				 
	     Personnel Security Clearance Program		 

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GAO-05-842T

     

     * Summary
     * Background
     * Progress and Continuing Challenges Found at Each Stage of DOD's
       Personnel Security Clearance Process
          * Preinvestigation Steps Being Taken to Help DOD Identify
            Requirements for Clearances and Address Submission of Requests
            for Clearance Investigations
          * Delays Exist in Completing Investigations, but Recent Steps May
            Decrease the Delays
          * Joint Personnel Adjudication System Consolidates DOD Adjudicative
            Data, but a New Law Requires Wider Consolidation
     * GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
     * Related GAO Products

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Testimony

GAO

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT Tuesday, June 28, 2005

DOD PERSONNEL CLEARANCES

 Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges That
                       Led to GAO's High-Risk Designation

Statement of Derek B. Stewart, Director Defense Capabilities and Management

                                       A

DOD PERSONNEL CLEARANCES

Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges
that Led to GAO's High-Risk Designation

  What GAO Found

While DOD has taken steps to address the problems that led to designating
its clearance program as high risk, continuing challenges are found in
each of the three stages of DOD's personnel security clearance process.
Figure 1 describes the process.

Figure 1: DOD's Process for Determining Clearance Eligibility

Preinvestigation: To address previously identified problems in projecting
clearance workload, DOD is identifying the military and civilian positions
that require clearances. Identifying clearance requirements for contractor
personnel is still in the planning phase. Another problem is the efficient
submission of investigation requests. In the 2 years since DOD and OPM
announced the transfer of DOD's investigative functions and personnel to
OPM, the two agencies did not ensure the seamless submission of DOD
requests to OPM. DOD is developing software to remedy this problem.

Investigation: Delays in completing investigations are continuing. For
February 2005, OPM-which now supplies an estimated 90 percent of the
government's clearance investigations-reported that over 185,000 of its
clearance investigations had exceeded timeliness goals. OPM's effort to
add investigative staff is a positive step, but adding thousands of staff
could result in continued timeliness problems and quality concerns as the
staff gain experience. OPM's workload should decrease because of two
recent initiatives: (1) eliminating a few of the investigative
requirements for some reinvestigations of personnel updating their
clearances and (2) requiring the acceptance of clearances and access
granted to personnel moving from one agency to another.

Adjudication: In the past, DOD had difficulty monitoring who had been
adjudicated for clearances and when the clearances needed to be renewed.
While the Joint Personnel Adjudication System has combined databases from
DOD's 10 adjudicative facilities to enhance monitoring, wider
consolidation of government databases may be required. The Director of OPM
will need to integrate all federal agencies into a single governmentwide
database in order to meet a requirement established in a recent law. As of
September 30, 2003, DOD had a backlog of roughly 90,000 adjudications.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Chairman Voinovich and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense's (DOD)
personnel security clearance program. As you know, Mr. Chairman, it is one
of the 25 areas GAO has designated as high risk in our recent report,
High-Risk Series: An Update.1 GAO's high-risk list focuses on those major
programs and operations that need urgent attention and transformation in
order to ensure that our national government functions in the most
economical, efficient, and effective manner possible. Also, some federal
programs and operations are designated high risk because of their greater
vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

Threats to our national security-such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks and high-profile espionage cases-underscore the need for timely,
high-quality determinations of who is eligible for a personnel security
clearance that will allow the individual access to classified information.
An increase in the operations and deployments of military personnel since
September 11, 2001, and the sensitive technology that military personnel,
government civilians, and contractors use are other factors suggesting the
need for an effective and efficient clearance program. Because of its size
and the many parts of the government affected by DOD's personnel security
clearance program, an efficient and effective process is needed. The
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) is
responsible for the clearances issued to approximately 2 million personnel
and for coordinating and implementing DOD-wide policies related to access
to classified information. While most of those personnel are
servicemembers and DOD's federal employees and contractor personnel,
OUSD(I) is also responsible for the clearances of contractors for more
than 20 other federal agencies as well as for staff in the legislative
branch of the federal government.2

Notwithstanding the critical mission of DOD and the size of its program,
our prior reviews for more than a decade have documented persistent
problems with DOD's personnel security clearance program. (See the

1 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January
2005).

2 A list of agencies and a discussion of the executive order authorizing
DOD to enter into agreements with these agencies can be found in footnote
9 in GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to
Reduce Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility
for Industry Personnel, GAO-04-632 (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004).

    Page 1 GAO-05-842T

reports listed at the end of this statement.) Since fiscal year 2000, DOD
has declared its personnel security clearance investigations program to be
a systemic weakness-a management control problem that affects more than
one DOD component and may jeopardize the department's operations- under
the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982. In addition, an
October 2002 House Committee on Government Reform report recommended to
the Secretary of Defense to include DOD's clearance adjudication process
(use of background investigative information to determine eligibility for
a clearance) as a material weakness.3 After noting in our May 2004 report4
that DOD had dealt with the impediments to timely clearances in a
piecemeal fashion, we recommended that DOD develop and implement an
integrated, comprehensive management plan to eliminate the backlog, reduce
the delays in conducting investigations and determining eligibility for
security clearances, and overcome the impediments that could allow such
problems to recur. Although DOD partially concurred with our
recommendation, the department had not implemented such a plan as of May
2005.

The longstanding delays in completing hundreds of thousands of clearance
requests and the impediments that hinder DOD's ability to accurately
estimate and eliminate its clearance backlog led us to declare the program
a high-risk area in January 2005.5 Specifically, we found delays and
impediments in all three stages of DOD's personnel security clearance
process shown in Figure 1. Shortly after we placed DOD's clearance program
on our high-risk list, a major change in the program occurred. In February
2005, DOD transferred its personnel security investigative functions and
about 1,800 investigative positions to the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM). Now, DOD obtains nearly all of its clearance investigations from
OPM.6 The Deputy Associate Director of OPM's Center for Investigations
Services estimated that OPM is responsible for about 90

3 Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, Defense
Security Service: The Personnel Security Investigations [PSI] Backlog
Poses a Threat to National Security, H.R. Rep. No. 107-767, at 2 (2002).

4 GAO-04-632.

5 GAO-05-207.

6 Currently the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and
National Reconnaissance Office each have a 1-year waiver that allows them
to contract for their own personnel security clearance investigations.
OUSD(I) officials said they do not anticipate that the waivers will be
granted after the current waivers expire.

percent of the more than 650,000 investigations for security clearances
conducted in fiscal year 2004, in addition to nearly 842,000 public trust,
regulatory, and non-sensitive background investigations.7

         Figure 1: DOD's Process for Determining Clearance Eligibility

Source: DOD.

Today, I would like to provide the Subcommittee with an update on the
challenges that led to our designation of DOD's personnel security
clearance program as a high-risk area. I will discuss both the positive
steps that have been taken to address previously identified concerns and
some of the remaining hurdles. My comments will be organized around the
three stages (preinvestigation, investigation, and adjudication) in DOD's
personnel security clearance process.

My comments are based primarily on our completed work and our
institutional knowledge from our prior reviews of the clearance process at
DOD and other agencies. In addition, we used information from the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 20048 and perspectives
and statistical data that DOD and OPM officials supplied

7 The Deputy Associate Director of OPM's Center for Investigations
Services noted that the following departments/agencies have statutory or
delegated authority to conduct background investigations: Central
Intelligence Agency; Department of State; Department of the Treasury;
Internal Revenue Service; Bureau of Engraving and Printing; Federal Bureau
of Investigation; National Security Agency; U.S. Agency for International
Development; Department of Homeland Security; Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection; U.S. Secret Service; Small Business Administration;
Broadcasting Board of Governors; Department of Justice-Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives;

U.S. Postal Service; Tennessee Valley Authority; National Reconnaissance
Office; and Peace Corps. Even though these agencies have authority to
conduct their own investigations, some of them request OPM to conduct all
or part of their investigations.

8 Pub. L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 17, 2004).

during interviews and in written documents gathered as part of our routine
monitoring of steps that had been taken to improve DOD's personnel
security clearance program. We conducted our work in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards between February and June
2005.

DOD has taken steps to address challenges found in each of the three

  Summary

stages of its personnel security clearance process, but this progress
cannot be fully evaluated at this time because many of the steps have not
been completed. In the preinvestigation stage, previous uncertainty in
projecting the number and types of clearances made it difficult for DOD to
determine budgets and staffing needs. The military services have begun
identifying which military and civilian positions require clearances and
the level of the clearance needed; however, the clearance requirements
process for contractor personnel is still in the planning phase. Also, DOD
has not been able to make full use of OPM's electronic system for
submitting requests for clearance investigations. Despite having 2 years
between the time when OPM and DOD announced an agreement to transfer DOD's
investigative functions and personnel to OPM and when this transfer
actually occurred, DOD and OPM did not ensure that software was available
for the seamless submission of requests from DOD's system to OPM's.
Converting a DOD request for investigation into a format that is
acceptable to OPM's system and obtaining missing or corrected data to open
the investigation delays completion of the clearance process. Until these
two issues are fully addressed, DOD will continue to encounter problems
determining budgets and staff and minimizing the delays in completing the
clearance process.

For the investigation stage, OPM reported that more than 185,000 of its
clearance investigations had exceeded timeliness goals during February
2005. In December 2003, DOD and OPM did not have sufficient numbers of
investigative personnel. Combined, they had about 4,200
full-time-equivalent investigative staff, but an OPM official at that time
estimated that DOD and OPM would need about 8,000 full-time-equivalent
investigative staff to eliminate backlogs and deliver investigations on
time. Since then, OPM has added investigative staff, but adding thousands
of staff could result in continued timeliness problems and quality
concerns as the staff gain experience. However, the governmentwide
investigative workload should decrease because of two recent developments:
(1) the elimination of formerly required interviews and other data
gathering during some reinvestigations for renewal of top secret
clearances and (2) the

                                   Background

requirement for government agencies to accept clearances and access
granted to personnel by other agencies.

For the third step in the clearance process, the adjudication stage, our
reviews documented problems in monitoring overdue reinvestigations and
generating accurate estimates of the backlog that were both partially due
to DOD maintaining separate databases for each of its 10 adjudication
facilities. DOD has largely implemented its Joint Personnel Adjudication
System to consolidate the databases and thereby has addressed some of our
adjudication-related concerns. While this is a positive step, the Director
of OPM must now establish and maintain a single governmentwide database as
required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
As of September 30, 2003, DOD had a backlog of roughly 90,000 completed
investigations that had not been adjudicated within prescribed time
limits. In addition, even though we made four recommendations for
improving DOD's adjudicative process in April 2001 and DOD concurred with
those recommendations, none has been fully implemented at this time.

Since 1997, all federal agencies have been subject to a common set of
personnel security investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines for
determining whether servicemembers, government employees, industry
personnel, and others are eligible to receive a security clearance.9
Clearances allow personnel to access classified information categorized
into three levels: top secret, secret, and confidential.10 The expected
damage to national defense and foreign relations that unauthorized
disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause is "exceptionally grave
damage" for top secret information, "serious damage" for secret
information, and "damage" for confidential information. Individuals who
need access to classified information for extended periods of time are
required to periodically renew their clearance (a reinvestigation). The
time

9 The White House, "Implementation of Executive Order 12968," Memorandum
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 1997). This memorandum approves the
adjudication guidelines, temporary eligibility standards, and
investigative standards required by Executive Order 12968, Access to
Classified Information (Aug. 2, 1995).

10 Classified Designations, 5 C.F.R. S: 1312.4 (2005).

Page 5 GAO-05-842T

frames for reinvestigations are 5 years for top secret clearances, 10
years for secret clearances, and 15 years for confidential clearances.11

In addition to requiring different time frames for renewal, the different
levels of clearances require that different types of background
information be gathered and used in making the adjudicative decision about
whether an individual is or is not eligible for a clearance (see table 1).
Much of the information for a secret or confidential clearance is gathered
through electronic files. The investigation for a top secret clearance
requires the information needed for the secret or confidential clearance
as well as additional data which are gathered through time-consuming
tasks, such as interviews with the subject of the investigation request,
references in the workplace, and neighbors. OPM officials estimated that
the time required to gather information to complete initial investigations
for top secret clearances is twice that needed for reinvestigations for
top secret clearances and 10 times as much as that needed for initial
investigations or reinvestigations for secret or confidential clearances.
DOD estimated that adjudicators' reviews of the longer investigative
reports for top secret clearances also take three times as long as the
reviews of investigative reports for determining eligibility for secret or
confidential clearances. Moreover, if the clearance required for a
position is upgraded from secret to top secret, the investigation and
adjudication would need to be performed twice as often (every 5 years
instead of every 10 years).

11 Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to
Classified Information, 32 C.F.R. Part 147, Subpart B, Attach. A and
Attach. C (2004).

Page 6 GAO-05-842T

Table 1: Information Gathered to Determine Eligibility for a Security Clearance

                                 Type of security clearance and investigation
                                 Confidential or secret      Top secret
                            Initial investigation or
Type of information gathered reinvestigation       Initial Reinvestigation 
                                                investigation 
1. Personnel security               X              X              X        
questionnaire: The subject's                               
self-reported answers on a   
paper SF-86 form or an       
electronic form              
2. National agency check:             X            X            X
Data from the Federal                                   
Bureau of Investigation,     
military records centers,    
Department of the Treasury,  
etc.                         
3. Credit check: Data from            X            X            X
credit bureaus where the                                
subject                      
lived/worked/attended school 
for at least                 
6months                      
4. Local agency checks: Data          X            X            X
from law enforcement                                    
agencies where the subject   
lived/worked/attended        
school during past 5 years   
5. Date and place of birth:           X          X   
Corroboration of                                 
information supplied on the                      
personnel security                               
questionnaire                
6. Citizenship: For                                     
individuals born outside of                           X 
the                                                     
United States, verification                             
of U.S. citizenship directly                            
from the appropriate                                    
registration authority                                  
7. Education: Corroboration                           X         X
of most recent or                                       
significant claimed          
attendance, degree, or       
diploma                      
8. Employment: Review of                              X         X
employment records                                      
and interviews with                                     
workplace references, such                              
as                                                      
supervisors and coworkers    
9. References: Data from                              X         X
interviews with                                         
subject-identified and       
investigator-developed leads 
10. National agency check                             X         X
for spouse or                                           
cohabitant: National agency  
check without fingerprint    
11. Former spouse: Data from                          X         X
interview(s)                                            
conducted with spouse(s)     
divorced within the last     
10 years                     
12. Neighborhoods:                                         
Interviews with neighbors                             X         X
and                                                     
verification of residence                               
through records check                                   
13. Public records:                                        
Verification of issues, such                          X         X
as                                                      
bankruptcy, divorce, and                                
criminal and civil court                                
cases                                                   
14. Subject interview:                                X         X
Collection of relevant data,                            
resolution of significant                               
inconsistencies, or both                                
                   Source: DOD. 

  Progress and Continuing Challenges Found at Each Stage of DOD's Personnel
  Security Clearance Process

We found that DOD has taken steps to address challenges found at all three
stages of its personnel security clearance process, but many of the steps
have not yet resulted in implementations that fully address the
challenges. In the preinvestigation stage, DOD has begun decreasing the
uncertainty in its projections of how many and what levels of clearances
are required by identifying the clearances needed for military and
civilian positions and developing software that will result in electronic
submissions of clearance investigation requests to OPM. Regarding the
second stage of the clearance process, OPM has been hiring investigative
staff to address past personnel shortages and the resulting delays from
having too few staff for the investigative workload. Adding thousands of
staff could, however, result in continued timeliness problems as well as
quality concerns until the staff gain experience. Regarding the
adjudication stage, DOD's Joint Personnel Adjudication System consolidated
the databases for 10 DOD adjudication facilities to enhance monitoring of
adjudicative decisions and time frames for renewing clearances, but a new
law requires a governmentwide clearance database.

Preinvestigation Steps Being Taken to Help DOD Identify Requirements for
Clearances and Address Submission of Requests for Clearance Investigations

At this time, DOD is uncertain about the number and level of clearances
that it requires and has experienced problems submitting investigation
requests, but the department has begun addressing these problems. DOD's
inability to accurately project such clearance requirements makes it
difficult to determine budgets and staffing needs. DOD is addressing this
problem by identifying the clearance needs for military and civilian
positions, but no military service had completed this task as of May 2005.
Similarly, in response to our May 2004 recommendation to improve the
projection of clearance requirements for industry personnel, DOD indicated
that it is developing a plan and computer software to have the
government's contracting officers authorize the number of industry
personnel investigations required to perform the classified work on a
given contract and link the clearance investigations to the contract
number.

Despite having 2 years between the time when OPM and DOD announced an
agreement for the transfer of DOD's investigative functions and personnel
to OPM and when the transfer actually occurred, DOD cannot make full use
of OPM's Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (eQIP),
the system used to submit materials required to start a background
investigation. To overcome this challenge to the prompt and efficient
submission of investigation requests, DOD is developing software that will
convert the department's submissions into the eQIP format. Also,

Delays Exist in Completing Investigations, but Recent Steps May Decrease the
Delays

OPM told us that about 11 percent of the February 2005 clearance
investigation requests submitted outside of eQIP were returned to the
requesting offices when missing or discrepant information could not be
obtained telephonically. Converting a DOD request for investigation into a
format that is compatible with OPM's eQIP and obtaining missing or
corrected data to open an investigation delays the completion of the
clearance process. OPM does not monitor how many days elapse between
initial submissions and resubmissions of corrected material and,
therefore, does not include that time in its calculations of the average
time required to complete an investigation. Until DOD implements the
software currently being developed and fully determines its clearance
requirements, the department will continue to encounter problems
determining budgets and staff and minimizing the delays in completing the
clearance process.

DOD and the rest of the government serviced by OPM are not receiving
completed investigations promptly, but recent initiatives may decrease
these delays. For February 2005, OPM told us that it had more than 185,000
investigations governmentwide that had taken longer than its goals for
closing cases: 120 days for initial investigations and 180 days for
reinvestigations. The current goals for completing a case allow more time
than did the DOD goals reported in our earlier work and, therefore,
comparison of the investigation backlog size that OPM reported in February
2005 to the backlog size cited in our prior reviews would not provide any
meaningful information.12 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 requires that not later than December 17, 2006, and ending
December 17, 2009, each authorized adjudicative agency shall make a
determination on at least 80 percent of all applicants for personnel
security clearances within an average of 120 days-90 days to complete the
investigation and 30 days to complete the adjudication-of

12 For example, DOD's performance goals were to have 75 percent of its
in-house investigations completed in the following time frames: 120 days
for a periodic reinvestigation for a top secret clearance, 90 days for an
initial top secret clearance, and 75 days for either a secret or
confidential clearance being issued initially. Therefore, if these DOD
goals were applied to the current OPM inventory of investigations, the
size of the backlog would be higher.

Page 9 GAO-05-842T

receiving the security clearance application.13 Also, not later than
February 15, 2006, and annually thereafter through 2011, a report on the
progress made during the preceding year toward meeting these goals is to
be supplied to appropriate congressional committees.14 Table 2 shows that,
across the government, standard service for both initial investigations
and reinvestigations for top secret clearances resulted in more than 1
year elapsing, on average, between submitting the investigation requests
and closing the investigations. OPM does, however, permit agencies to
request priority (expedited) processing on a limited number of
investigations, and those investigations took less time to close. Table 2
also shows a difference in the time required to close initial
investigations and reinvestigations for top secret clearances.

Table 2: February 2005 Governmentwide Findings on the Types of
Investigations for Different Clearances, Average Number of Days Used to
Close an Investigation, and the Number of Investigations Exceeding Goals
for Closing

                                   Type of  Average number   Number exceeding 
                                                                          the 
Type of investigation        processing of days to close goals for closing 
Initial investigations and    Priority                87               555 
reinvestigations for                                     
secret/confidential           Standard               160            99,543 
clearances                                               
Initial investigations for    Priority               115             1,938 
top secret clearances                                    
                                 Standard               370            47,444 
Reinvestigations for top      Standard               498            36,320 
secret clearances                                        
Total                                                              185,800 

Source: OPM.

In February and May 2004, we reported that different risks are associated
with delays in completing initial investigations and reinvestigations.15
Delays in completing initial personnel security clearances can have
negative impacts on the costs of performing classified work within or for

13 Pub. L. No. 108-458, S: 3001(g) (Dec. 17, 2004). The act also notes
that the time frame for completing clearances will reduce further once 5
years have elapsed from the enactment. At that time, the act notes that to
the extent practical, each authorized adjudicative agency shall make a
determination on at least 90 percent of all applications for a personnel
security clearance within an average of 60 days-40 days to complete the
investigation and 20 days to complete the adjudication.

14 Pub. L. No. 108-458, S: 3001(h) (Dec. 17, 2004).

15 GAO-04-344 and GAO-04-632.

the U.S. government. For example, delays in clearing industry personnel
can affect the cost, timeliness, and quality of contractor performance on
defense contracts. Conversely, delays in completing reinvestigations may
lead to a heightened risk of national security breaches because the longer
individuals hold clearances, the more likely they are to be working with
critical information systems.

Our prior review noted that delays in completing personnel security
clearance investigations for DOD and other agencies have resulted, in
part, from a shortage of investigative staff. In February 2004, we noted
that the Deputy Associate Director of OPM's Center for Investigations
Services estimated that OPM and DOD would need a total of roughly 8,000
full-time-equivalent investigative personnel16 to eliminate backlogs and
deliver investigations in a timely fashion to their customers.17 To reach
its goal of 8,000, OPM must add and retain approximately 3,800 full-time
equivalent investigative staff, and retain all of the estimated 4,200
full-time-equivalent staff that OPM and DOD had combined in December 2003.
In our February 2004 report, we noted that OPM's primary contractor was
adding about 100 and losing about 70 investigators per month. If the high
rate of turnover has continued, the ability to grow investigative capacity
could be difficult. In addition, OPM could be left with a large number of
investigative staff with limited experience.

OPM's Deputy Associate Director noted that the inexperience among
investigative staff results in investigations not being completed as
quickly as they might have been if the investigators were more
experienced. The OPM official also noted that the quality of the
investigations is not where she would like to see it. As we noted in our
September 2004 testimony before this subcommittee,18 OPM had continued to
use its investigations contractor to conduct personnel security clearance
investigations on its own employees even though we raised an internal
control concern about

In our February 2004 report, we noted that OPM's estimate includes workers
who may be

(1) investigators or investigative technicians, (2) federal or contracted
staff, and (3) full-or part-time employees.

17 GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to
Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size, GAO-04-344 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 9, 2004).

18 GAO, Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11
Commission's Proposed Reforms, GAO-04-1084T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14,
2004).

this practice during our 1996 review. 19 OPM officials indicated that they
plan to use the government employees that were transferred from DOD to
address this concern.

In addition to adding staff, two other initiatives should decrease delays
in completing clearance investigations. A new DOD initiative-the phased
periodic reinvestigation (phased PR)-that we discussed in our May 2004
report can make more staff available and thereby decrease the workload
associated with some reinvestigations for top secret clearances.20 The
phased approach to periodic reinvestigations involves conducting a
reinvestigation in two phases; a more extensive reinvestigation would be
conducted only if potential security issues were identified in the initial
phase. Specifically, investigative staff would verify residency records
and conduct interviews of listed references, references developed during
the investigation, and individuals residing in the neighborhood only if
potential security issues were identified in other parts of the standard
reinvestigation process. The Defense Personnel Security Research Center
showed that at least 20 percent of the normal investigative effort could
be saved with almost no loss in identifying critical issues needed for
adjudication. In December 2004, the President approved the use of the
phased PR for personnel needing to renew their top secret clearances.

Another source of investigative, as well as adjudicative, workload
reduction may result from the recent reciprocity requirements contained in
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.21 Our May
2004 report noted that the lack of reciprocity (the acceptance of
clearance and access granted by another department, agency, or military
service) was cited as an obstacle that can cause contractor delays in
filling positions and starting work on government contracts. Under the new
law, all security clearance background investigations and determinations
completed by an authorized investigative agency or authorized adjudicative
agency shall be accepted by all agencies.

19 GAO, Privatization of OPM's Investigations Service, GAO/GGD-96-97R
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 1996). 20 GAO-04-632. 21 Pub. L. No. 108-458,
S: 3001(d) (Dec. 17, 2004).

Page 12 GAO-05-842T

Joint Personnel Adjudication System Consolidates DOD Adjudicative Data, but a
New Law Requires Wider Consolidation

DOD's Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) consolidated 10 DOD
adjudication databases to provide OUSD(I) with better monitoring of
adjudication-related problems, but a new law requires wider consolidation.
Past delays in implementing DOD's JPAS greatly inhibited OUSD(I)'s ability
to monitor overdue reinvestigations and generate accurate estimates for
that portion of the backlog. In addition to correcting these problems,
implementation of much of JPAS has eliminated the need for DOD's 10
adjudication facilities to maintain their own databases of adjudicative
information. This consolidation may also assist with a requirement in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.22 Among other
things, the law requires that not later than December 17, 2005, the
Director of OPM shall, in cooperation with the heads of the certain other
government entities, establish and commence operating and maintaining a
single, integrated, secure database into which appropriate data relevant
to the granting, denial, and revocation of a security clearance or access
pertaining to military, civilian, or government contractor personnel shall
be entered from all authorized investigative and adjudicative agencies.
OPM officials stated that JPAS and OPM's Clearance Verification System
account for over 90 percent of the government's active security clearances
and that the remaining clearances are primarily housed in classified
record systems (e.g., the Central Intelligence Agency's Scattered Castles)
devoted to the intelligence community.

Additionally, DOD may move closer toward the 9/11 Commission's
recommendation of having a single government agency responsible for
providing and maintaining clearances by co-locating its 10 adjudication
facilities on a single military installation. The recent base realignment
and closure list includes a recommendation to co-locate all of DOD's
adjudication facilities. While co-location-if it occurs-would not be the
same as consolidation, it might provide opportunities for greater
communication within DOD. However, the proposed co-location at Fort Meade,
Maryland, could also result in the loss of trained staff who might choose
not to relocate, such as some of the roughly 400 employees in the Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office and the Defense Office of Hearings
and Appeals Personal Security Division in Columbus, Ohio.

22 Pub. L. No. 108-458, S: 3001(e) (Dec. 17, 2004).

In our February 2004 report,23 we noted that DOD had (1) as of September
30, 2003, a backlog of roughly 90,000 completed investigations that had
not been adjudicated within prescribed time limits, (2) no DOD-wide
standard for determining how quickly adjudications should be completed,
and

(3) inadequate adjudicator staffing. Also at the time of our report, the
DOD Office of Inspector General was examining whether the Navy
adjudicative contracts led to contractors' staff performing an inherently
governmental function-adjudication. Because of that examination, it was
unclear whether the Army and Air Force adjudication facilities would be
able to use similar contracting to eliminate their backlogs.

Although DOD concurred with our April 200124 recommendations for improving
its adjudicative process, it has not fully implemented any of the
recommendations as of May 2005. OUSD(I) reported the following progress
for those four recommendations. (Our recommendations appear in italics,
followed by a summary of DOD's response and/or actions.)

     o Establish detailed documentation requirements to support adjudication
       decisions. Use of JPAS will require greater documentation on adverse
       information and possible factors to mitigate that information, but
       this feature of JPAS has not been fully implemented.
     o Require that all DOD adjudicators use common explanatory guidance. DOD
       has developed this guidance and is awaiting review by the Personnel
       Security Working Group of Policy Coordinating Committee for Records
       Access and Information Security Policy, an interagency group.
     o Establish common adjudicator training requirements and develop
       appropriate continuing education opportunities for all DOD
       adjudicators. A work plan has been developed to establish an
       adjudicator certification process, to be implemented in late 2005 or
       early 2006. The plan will include continuing education requirements.
     o Establish a common quality assurance program to be implemented by
       officials in all DOD adjudication facilities and monitor compliance

23 GAO-04-344.

24 GAO, DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility
for Top Secret Security Clearances, GAO-01-465 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18,
2001).

Page 14 GAO-05-842T

through annual reporting. OUSD(I) indicates DOD is developing criteria and
a form to assess the quality of the investigations that DOD is receiving.
Also, in the future, cases are to be randomly selected from JPAS and
reviewed by a team of adjudicators from the various adjudication
facilities.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared
statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have at this
time. In summary, Mr. Chairman, we will continue to monitor this area as
we do for all of the high-risk programs on our list. Much remains to be
done to bring lasting solutions to this high-risk area. As we stated in
our report, High-Risk Series: An Update, perseverance by the
administration in implementing GAO's recommended solutions and continued
oversight and action by the Congress are both essential.

Appendix I

                     GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Derek B. Stewart, (202) 512-5559

  GAO Contact

Individuals making key contributions to this statement include Alissa H.

  Acknowledgments

Czyz, Jack E. Edwards, Julia C. Matta, and Mark A. Pross.

Related GAO Products

Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform DOD
Business Operations. GAO-05-629T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.

Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but
Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-394.
Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.

DOD's High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires Sound
Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T. Washington,
D.C.: April 13, 2005.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207 . Washington, D.C.: January 2005.

Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11
Commission's Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.: September
14, 2004.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce Backlogs
and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry
Personnel. GAO-04-632. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004.

DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs and
Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry
Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.

Security Clearances: FBI Has Enhanced Its Process for State and Local Law
Enforcement Officials. GAO-04-596 . Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2004.

Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its
Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332 .
Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2004.

DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to Eliminating
Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344 . Washington, D.C.: February
9, 2004.

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of
Its Expanded Mission and Workforce but Additional Actions Needed.
GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.

Related GAO Products

DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility for Top
Secret Security Clearances. GAO-01-465. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2001.

DOD Personnel: More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance
Reinvestigation Is Needed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246 . Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2000.

DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security
Clearance Reinvestigations. GAO/NSIAD-00-215 . Washington, D.C.: August
24, 2000.

DOD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program Are Being
Addressed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-148 . Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000.

DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National
Security Risks. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-65. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2000.

DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National
Security Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-12. Washington, D.C.: October 27, 1999.

Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to Relinquish
Its Authority to OPM. GAO/GGD-99-173 . Washington, D.C.: September 7,
1999.

Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History
Screening. GAO/NSIAD-99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 1999.

Executive Office of the President: Procedures for Acquiring Access to and
Safeguarding Intelligence Information. GAO/NSIAD-98-245. Washington, D.C.:
September 30, 1998.

Privatization of OPM's Investigations Service. GAO/GGD-96-97R .
Washington, D.C.: August 22, 1996.

Cost Analysis: Privatizing OPM Investigations. GAO/GGD-96-121R .
Washington, D.C.: July 5, 1996.

Related GAO Products

Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the Executive
Office of the President. GAO/NSIAD-96-20 . Washington, D.C.: October 19,
1995.

Privatizing OPM Investigations: Perspectives on OPM's Role in Background
Investigations. GAO/T-GGD-95-185 . Washington, D.C.: June 14, 1995.

Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating Investigations and
Adjudicative Functions. GAO/NSIAD-95-101. Washington, D.C.: March 24,
1995.

Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual Orientation in the Clearance
Process. GAO/NSIAD-95-21 . Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995.

Personnel Security Investigations. GAO/NSIAD-94-135R . Washington, D.C.:
March 4, 1994.

Nuclear Security: DOE's Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance Work
Load. GAO/RCED-93-183 . Washington, D.C.: August 12, 1993.

Personnel Security: Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate Duplicative
Background Investigations. GAO/RCED-93-23. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 1993.

Security Clearances: Due Process for Denials and Revocations by Defense,
Energy, and State. GAO/NSIAD-92-99 . Washington, D.C.: May 6, 1992.

DOD Special Access Programs: Administrative Due Process Not Provided When
Access Is Denied or Revoked. GAO/NSIAD-93-162 . Washington, D.C.: May 5,
1993.

Administrative Due Process: Denials and Revocations of Security Clearances
and Access to Special Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-14 . Washington, D.C.: May
5, 1993.

Due Process: Procedures for Unfavorable Suitability and Security Clearance
Actions. GAO/NSIAD-90-97FS. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1990.

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