Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation
Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries
(21-JUN-05, GAO-05-840T).
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993
and 2004, there were 650 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking
in nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. A significant
number of the cases involved material that could be used to
produce either a nuclear weapon or a device that uses
conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a
"dirty bomb"). Over the past decade, the United States has become
increasingly concerned about the danger that unsecured
weapons-usable nuclear material could fall into the hands of
terrorists or countries of concern. In the aftermath of September
11, 2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists may try to
smuggle nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United
States. This testimony summarizes the results of our previous
reports on various U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling both
in the United States and abroad. Specifically, this testimony
discusses (1) the different U.S. federal agencies tasked with
installing radiation detection equipment both domestically and in
other countries, (2) problems with coordination among these
agencies and programs, and (3) the effectiveness of radiation
detection equipment deployed in the United States and other
countries.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-840T
ACCNO: A27179
TITLE: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation
Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries
DATE: 06/21/2005
SUBJECT: Border control
Border security
Counterterrorism
Foreign governments
Homeland security
Interagency relations
Nuclear warfare
Nuclear weapons
Radiation monitoring
Smuggling
Strategic planning
Terrorism
Terrorists
Crime prevention
Nuclear materials
Radiation detection
DOE Megaports Initiative
DOE Second Line of Defense Program
Soviet Union
******************************************************************
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GAO-05-840T
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Testimony
Before the Subcommittees on the Prevention of Nuclear and Biological
Attack and on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, Committee
on Homeland Security, House of Representatives
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT COMBATING NUCLEAR
Tuesday, June 21, 2005
SMUGGLING
Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in
Other Countries
Statement of Gene Aloise, Director Natural Resources and Environment
GAO-05-840T
[IMG]
June 21, 2005
COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING
Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in
Other Countries
What GAO Found
Four U.S. agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), State,
and Homeland Security (DHS), are implementing programs to combat nuclear
smuggling by providing radiation detection equipment and training to
border security personnel. From fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 2005,
the Congress has appropriated about $800 million for these efforts,
including about $500 million to DOE, DOD, and State for international
efforts and about $300 million to DHS for installing radiation detection
equipment at U.S. points of entry. The first major initiatives to combat
nuclear smuggling concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment
at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union. In particular, in
1998, DOE established the Second Line of Defense program, which has
installed equipment at 66 sites mostly in Russia through the end of fiscal
year 2004. In 2003, DOE began its Megaports Initiative to focus on the
threat posed by nuclear smuggling at major foreign seaports and to date
has completed installations at two ports. Regarding efforts at U.S. points
of entry, the U.S. Customs Service began providing its inspectors with
portable radiation detection devices in 1998 and expanded its efforts to
include larger-scale radiation detection equipment after September 11,
2001. This program is continuing under DHS, which reported in May 2005
that it has installed more than 470 radiation portal monitors nationwide
at mail facilities, land border crossings, and seaports.
A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling is the
lack of effective planning and coordination among the responsible
agencies. For example, we reported in 2002 that there was no overall
governmentwide plan to guide U.S. efforts, some programs were duplicative,
and coordination among U.S. agencies was not effective. We found that the
most troubling consequence of this lack of effective planning and
coordination was that the Department of State had installed less
sophisticated equipment in some countries leaving those countries' borders
more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than countries where DOE and DOD had
deployed equipment. Since the issuance of our report, the agencies
involved have made some progress in addressing these issues. Regarding the
deployment of equipment in the United States, we reported that DHS had not
effectively coordinated with other federal agencies and DOE national
laboratories on longer-term objectives, such as attempting to improve the
radiation detection technology. We found that a number of factors hindered
coordination, including competition between DOE national laboratories and
the emerging missions of various federal agencies with regard to radiation
detection.
The effectiveness of the current generation of radiation detection
equipment is limited in its ability to detect illicitly trafficked nuclear
material, especially if it is shielded by lead or other metal. Given the
inherent limitations of radiation detection equipment and difficulties in
detecting certain materials, it is important that the equipment be
installed, operated, and maintained in a way that optimizes its
usefulness. It is also important to note that the deployment of radiation
detection equipment-regardless of how well such equipment works- is not a
panacea for the problem of nuclear smuggling. Rather, combating nuclear
smuggling requires an integrated approach that includes equipment, proper
training of border security personnel in the use of radiation detection
equipment, and intelligence gathering on potential nuclear smuggling
operations.
United States Government Accountability Office
Messers. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work assessing U.S.
government efforts to combat nuclear smuggling both at home and in other
countries through the deployment of radiation detection equipment at
border crossings and other points of entry.1 According to the
International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 2004, there were 650
confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological
materials worldwide. A significant number of the cases involved material
that could be used to produce either a nuclear weapon or a device that
uses conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a "dirty
bomb"). Over the past decade, the United States has become increasingly
concerned about the danger that unsecured weapons-usable nuclear material2
from the former Soviet Union or other countries could fall into the hands
of terrorists or countries of concern. In the aftermath of September 11,
2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle
nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United States. This could
happen in several ways: nuclear materials could be hidden in a car, train,
or ship; carried in personal luggage through an airport; or walked across
an unprotected border. If terrorists were to smuggle a nuclear weapon or
dirty bomb into the United States, the consequences could be devastating
to our national and economic interests.
My testimony today summarizes the results of our previous reports on
various U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling both in the United States
and in other countries. Specifically, I will discuss (1) the activities of
the various U.S. federal agencies tasked with installing radiation
detection equipment both domestically and in other countries, (2) problems
with coordination and planning among these agencies and programs, and
1See GAO, Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in
Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign
Seaports, GAO-05-375 (Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005); Customs Service:
Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment, GAO-03-235T
(Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002); Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S.
Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened
Coordination and Planning, GAO-02-426 (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002);
and related GAO products cited at the end of this testimony.
2Weapons-usable nuclear material is (1) uranium that has been enriched to
consist of 20 percent or more of uranium-235 or uranium-233 isotopes and
(2) any plutonium containing less than 80 percent of the isotope
plutonium-238 and less than 10 percent of the isotopes plutonium-241 and
plutonium-242. These types of materials are of the quality used to make
nuclear weapons.
Summary
(3) the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment deployed in the
United States and other countries.
Four U.S. agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), State,
and Homeland Security (DHS), are implementing programs to combat nuclear
smuggling in the United States and other countries by providing radiation
detection equipment and training to border security personnel. From fiscal
year 1994 through fiscal year 2005, the Congress has appropriated about
$800 million for these efforts, including about $500 million to DOE, DOD,
and State for international efforts and about $300 million to DHS for
installing radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of entry. Initial
concerns about the threat posed by nuclear smuggling were focused on
nuclear materials originating in the former Soviet Union. As a result, the
first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling concentrated on
deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the
former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, in
1998, DOE established the Second Line of Defense program, which, through
the end of fiscal year 2004, had installed equipment at 66 sites mostly in
Russia. In 2003, DOE implemented a second program, the Megaports
Initiative, to focus on the threat posed by nuclear smuggling at major
foreign seaports. The Megaports Initiative has completed installations at
two foreign seaports and is currently working to equip five others with
radiation detection equipment. Regarding efforts to combat nuclear
smuggling at U.S. points of entry, the U.S. Customs Service (now called
the Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol) began providing its inspectors
with portable radiation detection devices in 1998, and expanded its
efforts to include larger-scale radiation detection equipment after
September 11, 2001. This program is continuing under DHS. In May 2005, DHS
reported that it has installed more than 470 radiation portal monitors
nationwide at sites including international mail and package handling
facilities, land border crossings, and seaports.
A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling both
domestically and in other countries is the lack of effective planning and
coordination among the agencies responsible for implementing these
programs. For example, regarding U.S. efforts to deploy radiation
detection equipment in other countries, we reported in 2002 that there was
no overall governmentwide plan to guide U.S. efforts, some programs were
duplicative, and coordination among the various U.S. agencies involved
with these efforts was not effective. We found that the most troubling
consequence of this lack of effective planning and coordination was that
different agencies had pursued separate approaches to installing radiation
detection equipment at other countries' borders, and some agencies were
installing better equipment than others. As a result, some countries'
border crossings were more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others.
Since the issuance of our report, a governmentwide plan encompassing U.S.
international efforts to combat nuclear smuggling has been developed;
duplicative programs have been consolidated; and coordination among the
agencies, although still a concern, has improved. Regarding the deployment
of equipment in the United States, we reported that DHS had not
coordinated with other federal agencies and DOE national laboratories on
longer-term objectives, such as attempting to improve the radiation
detection technology used in portal monitors. We found that a number of
factors hindered coordination, including competition between the DOE
national laboratories and the emerging missions of various federal
agencies with regard to radiation detection. DHS agreed with our
assessment and told us that it is taking corrective actions to address
these concerns.
The effectiveness of the current generation of radiation detection
equipment is limited in its ability to detect illicitly trafficked nuclear
material, especially if it is shielded by lead or other metal. In
addition, the manner in which radiation detection equipment is deployed,
operated, and maintained can also limit its effectiveness. For example, in
October 2002, we testified that radiation pagers-small radiation detection
devices worn by inspectors on their belts-have severe limitations and are
inappropriate for some tasks. DOE officials told us that radiation pagers
have a limited range and are not designed to detect weapons-usable nuclear
material. Given the inherent limitations of currently deployed radiation
detection equipment and difficulties in detecting certain dangerous
nuclear materials, it is important that the equipment be installed,
operated, and maintained in a way that optimizes its usefulness. We
reported that the manner in which DHS had deployed radiation detection
equipment at some U.S. points of entry reduced its effectiveness. For
example, at one site we visited, DHS was allowing trucks to pass through
portal monitors at speeds higher than what experts consider optimal for
detecting nuclear material. Regarding U.S. assistance to help other
countries combat nuclear smuggling, we found that serious problems with
the installation, operation, and maintenance of equipment had undermined
U.S. efforts. For example, we reported in 2002 that about half of the
radiation portal monitors provided to one country in the former Soviet
Union were never installed or were not operational. Additionally, we
reported in March 2005, that DOE's Megaports Initiative faces technical
challenges related to deploying radiation detection equipment at foreign
seaports. For example, environmental conditions at many ports, such as the
existence of high
Background
Several U.S. Agencies Have Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
winds and sea spray, can affect radiation detection equipment's
performance and sustainability.
It is important to note that the deployment of radiation detection
equipment-regardless of how well the equipment performs-is not a panacea
for the problem of nuclear smuggling. Rather, as we have noted in our past
work, combating nuclear smuggling requires an integrated approach that
includes equipment, proper training of border security personnel in the
effective use of radiation detection equipment, and intelligence gathering
on potential nuclear smuggling operations.
Radiation detection equipment can detect radioactive materials used in
medicine and industry; in commodities that are sources of naturally
occurring radiation, such as kitty litter; and in nuclear materials that
could be used in a nuclear weapon. The capability of the equipment to
detect nuclear material depends on many factors, including the amount of
material, the size and capacity of the detection device, the distance from
the detection device to the nuclear material, and whether the material is
shielded from detection. Detecting actual cases of illicit trafficking in
weapons-usable nuclear material is complicated because one of the
materials that is of greatest concern-highly enriched uranium-is among the
most difficult materials to detect because of its relatively low level of
radioactivity. In contrast, medical and industrial radioactive sources,
which could be used in a radiological dispersion device (or "dirty bomb"),
are highly radioactive and easier to detect. Because of the complexities
of detecting and identifying nuclear material, customs officers and border
guards who are responsible for operating detection equipment must also be
trained in using handheld radiation detectors to pinpoint the source of an
alarm, identify false alarms, and respond to cases of nuclear smuggling.
Four U.S. agencies have implemented programs to combat nuclear smuggling
both domestically and in other countries by providing radiation detection
equipment and training to border security personnel. From fiscal year 1994
through fiscal year 2005, the Congress has appropriated about $800 million
for these efforts, including about $500 million to DOE, DOD, and State for
international efforts and about $300 million to DHS for installing
radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of entry. Initial concerns
about the threat posed by nuclear smuggling were focused on nuclear
materials originating in the former Soviet Union. As a result, the first
major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling during the late 1990s
concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in
countries of the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe.
Assistance included providing these countries with commercially available
radiation detection equipment such as portal monitors (stationary
equipment designed to detect radioactive materials carried by pedestrians
or vehicles) and smaller, portable radiation detectors. In addition, U.S.
agencies provided technical support to promote the development and
enforcement of laws and regulations governing the export of nuclearrelated
technology and other equipment and training to generally improve these
countries' ability to interdict nuclear smuggling.
One of the main U.S. efforts providing radiation detection equipment to
foreign governments is DOE's Second Line of Defense program, which began
installing equipment at key border crossing sites in Russia in 1998.
According to DOE, through the end of fiscal year 2004, the Second Line of
Defense program had completed installations at 66 sites, mostly in Russia.
Additionally, in 2003, DOE began its Megaports Initiative, which seeks to
install radiation detection equipment at major foreign seaports to enable
foreign government personnel to screen shipping containers entering and
leaving these ports for nuclear and other radioactive material. In March
2005, we reported that the Megaports Initiative had completed
installations at two foreign ports and is currently working to equip five
others with radiation detection equipment. Other U.S. agencies also have
programs to provide radiation detection equipment and training to foreign
governments, including two programs at the Department of State-the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and Export Control and Related
Border Security program-and two programs at DOD-the International
Counterproliferation Program and the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation Prevention Initiative.
In addition to these efforts at foreign borders, the U.S. Customs Service
began providing its inspectors at U.S. borders and points of entry with
small handheld radiation detection devices, known as radiation pagers, in
fiscal year 1998. After September 11, 2001, this effort was expanded by
DHS's Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol. In the spring of 2002, DHS
conducted a pilot project to test the use of radiation portal
monitorslarger-scale radiation detection equipment that can be used to
screen vehicles and cargo. In October 2002, DHS began its deployment of
portal monitors at U.S. points of entry. In May 2005, DHS reported that it
has installed more than 470 radiation portal monitors nationwide at sites
including international mail and package handling facilities, land border
crossings, and seaports.
U.S. Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling in the United States and Other
Countries Have Lacked Effective Planning and Coordination
A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling both
domestically and in other countries is the lack of effective planning and
coordination among the agencies responsible for implementing these
programs. Regarding assistance to foreign countries, we reported in 2002
that there was no overall governmentwide plan to guide U.S. efforts, some
programs were duplicative, and coordination among the U.S. agencies was
not effective. We found that the most troubling consequence of this lack
of effective planning and coordination was that DOE, State, and DOD were
pursuing separate approaches to enhancing other countries' border
crossings. Specifically, radiation portal monitors installed in more than
20 countries by State are less sophisticated than those installed by DOE
and DOD. As a result, some border crossings where U.S. agencies have
installed radiation detection equipment are more vulnerable to nuclear
smuggling than others.3 We found that there were two offices within DOE
that were providing radiation detection equipment and two offices within
State that have funded similar types of equipment for various countries.
We made several recommendations to correct these problems and, since the
issuance of our report, a governmentwide plan encompassing U.S. efforts to
combat nuclear smuggling in other countries has been developed; some
duplicative programs have been consolidated; and coordination among the
agencies, although still a concern, has improved.
Regarding efforts to deploy radiation detection equipment at U.S. points
of entry, we reported that DHS had not coordinated with other federal
agencies and DOE national laboratories on longer-term objectives such as
attempting to improve the radiation detection technology used in portal
monitors. We also noted that DHS was not sharing data generated by portal
monitors installed at U.S. points of entry with DOE national laboratories
other than Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, which is DHS's primary
contractor for deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of
entry. Experts from DOE's national laboratories told us that achieving
improvements to existing radiation detection technologies largely depends
on analyzing data on the types of radioactive cargo passing through
deployed portal monitors. We found that a number of factors hindered
coordination, including competition between the DOE national laboratories
and the emerging missions of various federal
3Portal monitors installed by the Department of State do not have the
ability to detect neutron radiation, which translates into a decreased
ability of those monitors to be able to detect plutonium, one of the
nuclear materials of greatest proliferation concern.
Currently Deployed Radiation Detection Equipment Has Limitations
agencies with regard to radiation detection. DHS agreed with our
assessment and told us that it would be taking corrective actions.
Additionally, other DOE national laboratories and federal agencies are
independently testing numerous different radiation portal monitors using a
variety of nuclear and radiological materials and simulating possible
smuggling scenarios. However, they are not sharing lessons learned or the
results of these tests with other federal agencies. For example, DOD's
Defense Threat Reduction Agency has a large testing facility near Sandia
National Laboratories in New Mexico and has pilot tested radiation
detection equipment at entrances to certain military bases. However, it is
unclear how and with whom the results of such testing are shared to
facilitate the development of improved radiation detection technologies.
In April 2005, DHS announced its intent to create the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) to coordinate U.S. efforts to develop improved
radiation detection technologies. DHS has requested over $227 million in
fiscal year 2006 to initiate this effort. Through DNDO, DHS plans to lead
the development of a national test bed for radiation detection
technologies at the Nevada Test Site.
Recently, concerns have been raised about the ability of radiation
detection equipment to detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material. As we
have reported in the past, certain factors can affect the general
capability of radiation detection equipment. In particular, nuclear
materials are more difficult to detect if lead or other metal is used to
shield them. For example, we reported in March 2005 that a cargo container
containing a radioactive source passed through radiation detection
equipment that DOE had installed at a foreign seaport without being
detected because of the presence of large amounts of scrap metal in the
container. Additionally, detecting actual cases of illicit trafficking in
weapons-usable nuclear material is complicated because one of the
materials of greatest concern in terms of proliferation-highly enriched
uranium-is among the most difficult materials to detect due to its
relatively low level of radioactivity.
The manner in which radiation detection equipment is deployed, operated,
and maintained can also limit its effectiveness. Given the inherent
limitations of currently deployed radiation detection equipment and
difficulties in detecting certain nuclear materials, it is important that
it be installed, operated, and maintained in a way that optimizes
authorities' ability to interdict illicit nuclear materials. In our past
reports, we have noted many problems with the radiation detection
equipment currently
deployed at U.S. and foreign borders. Specifically, in October 2002, we
testified that radiation detection pagers have severe limitations and are
inappropriate for some tasks. DOE officials told us that the pagers have a
limited range and are not designed to detect weapons-usable nuclear
material. According to U.S. radiation detection vendors and DOE national
laboratory specialists, pagers are more effectively used in conjunction
with other radiation detection equipment, such as portal monitors.
In addition, the manner in which DHS had deployed radiation detection
equipment at some U.S. points of entry reduced its effectiveness.
Specifically, we identified a wide range of problems, such as (1) allowing
trucks to pass through portal monitors at speeds higher than what experts
consider optimal for detecting nuclear material, (2) reducing the
sensitivity of the portal monitors in an attempt to limit the number of
nuisance alarms from naturally occurring radioactive materials, such as
kitty litter and ceramics, and (3) not deploying enough handheld radiation
detection equipment to certain border sites, which limited the ability of
inspectors to perform secondary inspections on suspicious cargo or
vehicles.
Regarding problems with the U.S. programs to deploy radiation detection
equipment in other countries, we reported that:
o About half of the portal monitors provided to one country in the
former Soviet Union were never installed or were not operational.
Officials from this country told us that they were given more equipment
than they could use.
o A radiation portal monitor provided to Bulgaria by the Department of
State was installed on an unused road that was not expected to be
completed for 1-1/2 years.
o Mobile vans equipped with radiation detection equipment furnished by
the Department of State have limited utility because they cannot operate
effectively in cold climates or are otherwise not suitable for conditions
in some countries.
o DOE has found that environmental conditions at many seaports, such as
the existence of high winds and sea spray, can affect radiation detection
equipment's performance and sustainability.
Environmental conditions are not the only challenge facing DOE and DHS in
installing radiation detection equipment at seaports in the United States
and other countries. One of the biggest challenges at seaports is adapting
the equipment to the port environment while minimizing the impact on the
flow of commerce and people. DOE's Megaports Initiative had made limited
progress in installing radiation detection equipment at foreign seaports
it had identified as highest priority largely due to concerns of some
countries about the impact of radiation detection equipment on the flow of
commerce through their ports. DHS has faced similar concerns from port
operators in the United States.
It is important to note that radiation detection equipment is only one of
the tools in the toolbox that customs inspectors and border guards must
use to combat nuclear smuggling. Combating nuclear smuggling requires an
integrated approach that includes equipment, proper training, and
intelligence gathering on smuggling operations. In the past, most known
interdictions of weapons-usable nuclear materials have resulted from
police investigations rather than from detection by radiation detection
equipment installed at border crossings. However, there have been recent
reports of incidents where radioactive materials were discovered and
seized as a result of alarms raised by radiation detection equipment.
Because of the complexity of detecting nuclear material, the customs
officers or border guards who are responsible for operating radiation
detection equipment must also be well-trained in using handheld radiation
detectors to pinpoint the source of an alarm, identifying false alarms,
and responding to cases of nuclear smuggling. Without a clear
understanding of how radiation detection equipment works and its
limitations, inspectors may not be using the equipment as effectively as
possible.
Although efforts to combat nuclear smuggling through the installation of
radiation detection equipment are important, the United States should not
and does not rely upon radiation detection equipment at foreign or U.S.
borders as its sole means for preventing nuclear materials or a nuclear
warhead from reaching the United States. Recognizing the need for a broad
approach to the problem, the U.S. government has multiple initiatives that
are designed to complement each other. For example, DOE is securing
nuclear material at its source through the Material Protection, Control,
and Accounting program, which seeks to improve the physical security of
nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union. In addition, DHS has other
initiatives to identify containers at foreign seaports that are considered
high risk for containing smuggled goods, such as nuclear material and
other dangerous materials. Supporting all of these programs is
intelligence information that can give us advanced notice of nuclear
material smuggling and is a critical component to prevent dangerous
materials from entering the United States.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any
questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittees may have.
For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202)
512-3841 or at [email protected]. R. Stockton Butler, Julie Chamberlain,
Nancy Crothers, Christopher Ferencik, Emily Gupta, Jennifer Harman,
Winston Le, Glen Levis, F. James Shafer, Jr., and Gene Wisnoski made key
contributions to this statement.
Related GAO Products
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing
Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports.
GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better
Integration. GAO-05-157. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.
Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection
Equipment. GAO-03-235T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002.
Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New
Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November 18,
2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling.
GAO-02-989T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO-02-426.
Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.
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