Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Addressing	 
Cybersecurity (19-JUL-05, GAO-05-827T). 			 
                                                                 
Increasing computer interconnectivity has revolutionized the way 
that our government, our nation, and much of the world		 
communicate and conduct business. While the benefits have been	 
enormous, this widespread interconnectivity also poses		 
significant risks to our nation's computer systems and, more	 
importantly, to the critical operations and infrastructures they 
support. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and federal policy	 
established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the	 
focal point for coordinating activities to protect the computer  
systems that support our nation's critical infrastructures. GAO  
was asked to summarize previous work, focusing on (1) DHS's	 
responsibilities for cybersecurity-related critical		 
infrastructure protection (CIP), (2) the status of the		 
department's efforts to fulfill these responsibilities, (3) the  
challenges it faces in fulfilling its cybersecurity		 
responsibilities, and (4) recommendations GAO has made to improve
cybersecurity of our nation's critical infrastructure.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-827T					        
    ACCNO:   A30437						        
  TITLE:     Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in	      
Addressing Cybersecurity					 
     DATE:   07/19/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Computer networks					 
	     Computer security					 
	     Computer security policies 			 
	     Computer systems					 
	     Critical infrastructure				 
	     Critical infrastructure protection 		 
	     Cyber security					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Agency missions					 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-05-827T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO	Testimony before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management,
Government Information, and International Security, Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT Tuesday, July 19, 2005

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Challenges in Addressing Cybersecurity

Statement of David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues

GAO-05-827T

[IMG]

July 2005

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Challenges in Addressing Cybersecurity

                                 What GAO Found

As the focal point for CIP, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
many cybersecurity-related roles and responsibilities that GAO identified
in law and policy (see table below for 13 key responsibilities). DHS
established the National Cyber Security Division to take the lead in
addressing the cybersecurity of critical infrastructures.

While DHS has initiated multiple efforts to fulfill its responsibilities,
it has not fully addressed any of the 13 responsibilities, and much work
remains ahead. For example, the department established the United States
Computer Emergency Readiness Team as a public/private partnership to make
cybersecurity a coordinated national effort, and it established forums to
build greater trust and information sharing among federal officials with
information security responsibilities and law enforcement entities.
However, DHS has not yet developed national cyber threat and vulnerability
assessments or government/industry contingency recovery plans for
cybersecurity, including a plan for recovering key Internet functions.

DHS faces a number of challenges that have impeded its ability to fulfill
its cybersecurity-related CIP responsibilities. These key challenges
include achieving organizational stability, increasing awareness about
cybersecurity roles and capabilities, establishing effective partnerships
with stakeholders, and achieving two-way information sharing with these
stakeholders. In its strategic plan for cybersecurity, DHS identifies
steps that can begin to address the challenges. However, until it
confronts and resolves these underlying challenges and implements its
plans, DHS will have difficulty achieving significant results in
strengthening the cybersecurity of our critical infrastructures. In recent
years, GAO has made a series of recommendations to enhance the
cybersecurity of critical infrastructures that if effectively implemented
could greatly improve our nation's cybersecurity posture.

Table: DHS's Key Cybersecurity Responsibilities

Source: GAO analysis of law and policy.

United States Government Accountability Office

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to join in today's hearing on challenges in
protecting our nation's critical infrastructures from cybersecurity
threats. Increasing computer interconnectivity-most notably growth in the
use of the Internet-has revolutionized the way that our government, our
nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct business. While the
benefits have been enormous, this widespread interconnectivity also poses
significant risks to the government's and our nation's computer systems
and, more importantly, to the critical operations and infrastructures they
support.

As requested, my testimony will focus on (1) DHS's responsibilities for
cybersecurity-related critical infrastructure protection as established in
law and policy, (2) the status of DHS's efforts to enhance the protection
of the computer systems that support the nation's critical infrastructures
and to strengthen information security-both inside and outside the federal
government, (3) the challenges DHS faces in fulfilling its cybersecurity
responsibilities, and (4) recommendations we have made to improve
cybersecurity of national critical infrastructures. In preparing for this
testimony, we relied on our previous work on critical infrastructure
protection and cybersecurity threats; primarily on a recent report on the
challenges faced by DHS in fulfilling its cybersecurity responsibilities.1
All of the work on which this testimony is based was performed in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

  Results in Brief

As the focal point for critical infrastructure protection, DHS has many
cybersecurity-related responsibilities that are called for in law and
policy. These responsibilities include developing plans, building

1GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security
Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities, GAO-05-434
(Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005).

partnerships, and improving information sharing, as well as implementing
activities related to the five priorities in the national cyberspace
strategy: (1) developing and enhancing national cyber analysis and
warning, (2) reducing cyberspace threats and vulnerabilities, (3)
promoting awareness of and training in security issues, (4) securing
governments' cyberspace, and (5) strengthening national security and
international cyberspace security cooperation. To fulfill its
cybersecurity role, in June 2003, the department established the National
Cyber Security Division to serve as a national focal point for addressing
cybersecurity and coordinating the implementation of cybersecurity
efforts.

While DHS has initiated multiple efforts, it has not fully addressed any
of the 13 key cybersecurity-related responsibilities that we identified in
federal law and policy, and it has much work ahead in order to be able to
fully address them. For example, DHS (1) has recently issued the Interim
National Infrastructure Protection Plan, which includes cybersecurity
elements; (2) operates the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
to address the need for a national analysis and warning capability; and
(3) has established forums to foster information sharing among federal
officials with information security responsibilities and among various law
enforcement entities. However, DHS has not yet developed national threat
and vulnerability assessments or developed and exercised government and
government/industry contingency recovery plans for cybersecurity,
including a plan for recovering key Internet functions. Further, DHS
continues to have difficulties in developing partnerships-as called for in
federal policy-with other federal agencies, state and local governments,
and the private sector.

DHS faces a number of challenges that have impeded its ability to fulfill
its cyber-related critical infrastructure protection (CIP)
responsibilities. Key challenges include achieving organizational
stability; gaining organizational authority; overcoming hiring and
contracting issues; increasing awareness about cybersecurity roles and
capabilities; establishing effective partnerships with stakeholders (other
federal agencies, state and local governments and the private sector);
achieving two-way information sharing with these stakeholders; and
demonstrating the value it can provide. In

its strategic plan for cybersecurity, the department has identified steps
that can begin to address these challenges. However, until it effectively
confronts and resolves these underlying challenges, DHS will have
difficulty achieving significant results in strengthening the
cybersecurity of our nation's critical infrastructures, and our nation
will lack the strong cybersecurity focal point envisioned in federal law
and policy.

Over the last several years, we have made a series of recommendations to
enhance the cybersecurity of critical infrastructures, focusing on the
need to (1) develop a strategic analysis and warning capability for
identifying potential cyberattacks, (2) protect infrastructure control
systems, (3) enhance public/private information sharing, and (4) conduct
important threat and vulnerability assessments and address other
challenges to effective cybersecurity. Effectively implementing these
recommendations could greatly improve our nation's cybersecurity posture.

Background

The same speed and accessibility that create the enormous benefits of the
computer age can, if not properly controlled, allow individuals and
organizations to inexpensively eavesdrop on or interfere with computer
operations from remote locations for mischievous or malicious purposes,
including fraud or sabotage. In recent years, the sophistication and
effectiveness of cyberattacks have steadily advanced. These attacks often
take advantage of flaws in software code, circumvent signature-based
tools2 that commonly identify and prevent known threats, and use social
engineering techniques designed to trick the unsuspecting user into
divulging sensitive information or propagating attacks. These attacks are
becoming increasingly automated with the use of botnets- compromised
computers that can be remotely controlled by attackers to automatically
launch attacks. Bots (short for robots)

2 Signature-based tools compare files or packets to a list of
"signatures"-patterns of specific files or packets that have been
identified as threats.

have become a key automation tool used to speed the infection of
vulnerable systems.

Government officials are increasingly concerned about attacks from
individuals and groups with malicious intent, such as crime, terrorism,
foreign intelligence-gathering, and acts of war. As greater amounts of
money are transferred through computer systems, as more sensitive economic
and commercial information is exchanged electronically, and as the
nation's defense and intelligence communities increasingly rely on
commercially available information technology, the likelihood increases
that information attacks will threaten vital national interests.

Recent attacks and threats have further underscored the need to bolster
the cybersecurity of our government's and our nation's computer systems
and, more importantly, of the critical operations and infrastructures they
support. Recent examples of attacks include the following:

0M	In March 2005, security consultants within the electric industry
reported that hackers were targeting the U.S. electric power grid and had
gained access to U.S. utilities' electronic control systems. Computer
security specialists reported that, in a few cases, these intrusions had
"caused an impact." While officials stated that hackers had not caused
serious damage to the systems that feed the nation's power grid, the
constant threat of intrusion has heightened concerns that electric
companies may not have adequately fortified their defenses against a
potential catastrophic strike.

0M	In January 2005, a major university reported that a hacker had broken
into a database containing 32,000 student and employee Social Security
numbers, potentially compromising their identities and finances. In
similar incidents during 2003 and 2004, it was reported that hackers had
attacked the systems of other universities, exposing the personal
information of over 1.8 million people.

0M	In June 2003, the U.S. government issued a warning concerning a virus
that specifically targeted financial institutions. Experts said the
BugBear.b virus was programmed to determine whether a victim had used an
e-mail address for any of the roughly 1,300

financial institutions listed in the virus's code. If a match was found,
the software attempted to collect and document user input by logging
keystrokes and then provided this information to a hacker, who could use
it in attempts to break into the banks' networks.

0M	In November 2002, a British computer administrator was indicted on
charges that he accessed and damaged 98 computers in 14 states between
March 2001 and March 2002, causing some $900,000 in damage. These networks
belonged to the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, and private companies. The indictment alleges that the
attacker was able to gain administrative privileges on military computers,
copy password files, and delete critical system files. The attacks
rendered the networks of the Earle Naval Weapons Station in New Jersey and
the Military District of Washington inoperable.

In May 2005, we reported that federal agencies are facing a set of
emerging cybersecurity threats that are the result of increasingly
sophisticated methods of attack and the blending of once distinct types of
attack into more complex and damaging forms.3 Examples of these threats
include spam (unsolicited commercial e-mail), phishing (fraudulent
messages used to obtain personal or sensitive data), and spyware (software
that monitors user activity without the user's knowledge or consent). Spam
consumes significant resources and is used as a delivery mechanism for
other types of cyberattacks; phishing can lead to identity theft, loss of
sensitive information, and reduced trust and use of electronic government
services; and spyware can capture and release sensitive data, make
unauthorized changes, and decrease system performance.

3 GAO, Information Security: Emerging Cybersecurity Issues Threaten
Federal Information Systems, GAO-05-231 (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2005).

  DHS's Responsibilities for Cybersecurity in Support of Critical Infrastructure
  Protection Are Many and Varied

Federal law and policies call for critical infrastructure protection (CIP)
activities that are intended to enhance the cyber and physical security of
both the public and private infrastructures that are essential to national
security, national economic security, and national public health and
safety.4 Federal policy designates certain federal agencies as lead
federal points of contact for the critical infrastructure sectors and
assigns them responsibility for infrastructure protection activities in
their assigned sectors and for coordination with other relevant federal
agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector to carry out
related responsibilities (see app. 1). In addition, federal policy
establishes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the focal point
for the security of cyberspace-including analysis, warning, information
sharing, vulnerability reduction, mitigation, and recovery efforts for
public and private critical infrastructure information systems. To
accomplish this mission, DHS is to work with other federal agencies, state
and local governments, and the private sector.

Among the many CIP responsibilities established for DHS and identified in
federal law and policy are 13 key cybersecurity-related responsibilities.
These include general CIP responsibilities that have a cyber element (such
as developing national plans, building partnerships, and improving
information sharing) as well as responsibilities that relate to the five
priorities established by the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. The
five priorities are (1) developing and enhancing national cyber analysis
and warning, (2) reducing cyberspace threats and vulnerabilities, (3)
promoting awareness of and training in security issues, (4) securing
governments' cyberspace, and (5) strengthening national security and
international cyberspace security cooperation. Table 1 provides a
description of each of these responsibilities.

4This law and these policies include the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, and the National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace.

Table 1: Thirteen DHS Cybersecurity Responsibilities

General CIP responsibilities with a Description cyber element

Develop a national plan for critical Developing a comprehensive national
plan for securing the key resources and critical infrastructure protection
that includes infrastructure of the United States, including information
technology and cybersecurity. telecommunications systems (including
satellites) and the physical and technological

assets that support such systems. This plan is to outline national
strategies, activities, and

milestones for protecting critical infrastructures.

Develop partnerships and coordinate with other federal agencies, state and
local governments, and the private sector.

Fostering and developing public/private partnerships with and among other
federal agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and
others. DHS is to serve as the "focal point for the security of
cyberspace."

Improve and enhance public/private information sharing involving cyber attacks,
                         threats, and vulnerabilities.

Improving and enhancing information sharing with and among other federal
agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and others
through improved partnerships and collaboration, including encouraging
information sharing and analysis mechanisms. DHS is to improve sharing of
information on cyber attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities.

Responsibilities related to the cyberspace strategy's five priorities

Develop and enhance national cyber

Providing cyber analysis and warnings, enhancing analytical capabilities,
and developing a national indications and warnings architecture to
identify precursors to attacks.

                       analysis and warning capabilities.

Provide and coordinate incident response Providing crisis management in
response to threats to or attacks on critical information

and recovery planning efforts.	systems. This entails coordinating efforts
for incident response, recovery planning, exercising cybersecurity
continuity plans for federal systems, planning for recovery of Internet
functions, and assisting infrastructure stakeholders with cyber-related
emergency recovery plans.

Identify and assess cyber threats and Leading efforts by the public and
private sector to conduct a national cyber threat

vulnerabilities. 	assessment, to conduct or facilitate vulnerability
assessments of sectors, and to identify cross-sector interdependencies.

Support efforts to reduce cyber threats Leading and supporting efforts by
the public and private sector to reduce threats and

and vulnerabilities. 	vulnerabilities. Threat reduction involves working
with law enforcement community to investigate and prosecute cyberspace
threats. Vulnerability reduction involves identifying and remediating
vulnerabilities in existing software and systems.

Promote and support research and development efforts to strengthen
cyberspace security.

Collaborating and coordinating with members of academia, industry, and
government to optimize cybersecurity related research and development
efforts to reduce vulnerabilities through the adoption of more secure
technologies.

Promote awareness and outreach. 	Establishing a comprehensive national
awareness program to promote efforts to strengthen cybersecurity
throughout government and the private sector, including the home user.

Foster training and certification. Improving cybersecurity-related
education, training, and certification opportunities.

Enhance federal, state, and local Partnering with federal, state, and
local governments in efforts to strengthen the

government cybersecurity. 	cybersecurity of the nation's critical
information infrastructure to assist in the deterrence, prevention,
preemption of, and response to terrorist attacks against the United
States.

Strengthen international cyberspace Working in conjunction with other
federal agencies, international organizations, and security. industry in
efforts to promote strengthened cybersecurity on a global basis.

Integrate cybersecurity with national Coordinating and integrating
applicable national preparedness goals with its National security.
Infrastructure Protection Plan.

Source: GAO analysis of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-7, and the National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace.

In June 2003, DHS established the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD),
under its Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate,
to serve as a national focal point for addressing cybersecurity issues and
to coordinate implementation of the cybersecurity strategy. NCSD also
serves as the government lead on a public/private partnership supporting
the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) and as the lead for
federal government incident response. NCSD is headed by the Office of the
Director and includes a cybersecurity partnership program as well as four
branches: US-CERT Operations, Law Enforcement and Intelligence, Outreach
and Awareness, and Strategic Initiatives.

  DHS Has Initiated Efforts That Begin to Address Its Responsibilities,

but More Work Remains DHS has initiated efforts that begin to address each
of its 13 key responsibilities for cybersecurity; however, the extent of
progress varies among these responsibilities, and more work remains to be
done on each. For example, DHS (1) has recently issued an interim plan for
infrastructure protection that includes cybersecurity plans, (2) is
supporting a national cyber analysis and warning capability through its
role in US-CERT, and (3) has established forums to build greater trust and
to encourage information sharing among federal officials with information
security responsibilities and among various law enforcement entities.
However, DHS has not yet developed a national cyber threat assessment and
sector vulnerability assessments-or the identification of cross-sector
interdependencies-that are called for in the cyberspace strategy. The
importance of such assessments is illustrated in our recent reports on
vulnerabilities in infrastructure control systems and in wireless
networks.5 Further, the department has not yet developed and exercised
government and government/industry contingency

5GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges and Efforts to Secure
Control Systems, GAO-04-354, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2004) and
Information Security: Federal Agencies Need to Improve Controls over
Wireless Networks, GAO-05-383, (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005).

recovery plans for cybersecurity, including a plan for recovering key
Internet functions. The department also continues to have difficulties in
developing partnerships, as called for in federal policy, with other
federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector.
Without such partnerships, it is difficult to develop the trusted, two-way
information sharing that is essential to improving homeland security.

Table 2 provides an overview of the steps that DHS has taken related to
each of its 13 key responsibilities and identifies the steps that remain.

Table 2: Overview of Progress and Remaining Activities on DHS's 13
Cybersecurity-related Responsibilities

     DHS Responsibility           DHS Progress          Status/What Remains   
Develop a national plan   Issued Interim National   The plan is not yet    
        for critical             Infrastructure        comprehensive and      
       infrastructure      Protection Plan that        complete. DHS plans to 
       protection that     includes cybersecurity-        add sector-specific 
includes cybersecurity.     related initiatives     cybersecurity details  
                                                       and milestones in      
                                                        subsequent versions.  

Develop partnerships and Undertook numerous initiatives to foster
Information sharing has been limited. More
coordinate with other federal partnerships and enhance information sharing
work is needed to address barriers to effective
agencies, state and local with other federal agencies, state and local
partnerships and information sharing.
governments, and the private governments, and the private sector about
sector. cyber attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities.
Improve and enhance public/private Initiatives include the National Cyber
Security
information sharing involving cyber Response System and Information
Sharing and

attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities. Analysis Center (ISAC)
partnerships.

Develop and enhance national Provides cyber analysis and warning Efforts
are not complete. DHS has not yet cyber analysis and warning capabilities
through continuous operational developed the indications and warning
capabilities. support of the US-CERT; is working to enhance architecture
required by HSPD-7, and important

tools and communication mechanisms for analytical tools are not yet
mature.
providing analysis and warning of potential
cyber incidents.

Provide and coordinate incident Improved ability to coordinate a response
to Plans and exercises for recovering from attacks response and recovery
planning cyber attacks with federal, state, and local are not yet complete
and comprehensive. DHS efforts. governments and private-sector entities
does not yet have plans for testing federal

through the communications capabilities continuity plans, recovering key
Internet developed for US-CERT, continued expansion functions, or
providing technical assistance to of backup communication capabilities,
and both private-sector and other government establishment of
collaboration mechanisms. entities as they develop their own emergency

recovery plans

    Identify and assess  Participated in national     Assessments are not yet 
       cyber threats     efforts to identify and             complete.DHS has 
and vulnerabilities.  assess cyber threats and       not yet completed the 
                         has begun taking                 comprehensive cyber 
                         steps to facilitate         threat and vulnerability 
                         sector-specific                   assessments-or the 
                         vulnerability             
                                assessments            identification of      
                                                          cross-sector        
                                                   interdependencies-that are 
                                                            called for in the 
                                                      cyberspace strategy.    

Support efforts to reduce cyber

                Initiated efforts to reduce threats by enhancing

threats and vulnerabilities.

collaboration with the law enforcement community and to reduce
vulnerabilities by shoring up guidance on software and system security
Efforts are not complete. Vulnerability reduction efforts are limited
until the cyber-related vulnerability assessments (discussed in the
previous section) are completed. Promote and support research and
Collaborated with the Executive Office of the A comprehensive plan is not
yet in place, and development efforts to strengthen President and with
other federal departments the milestones for key activities have not yet
cyberspace security. and agencies to develop a national research been
established. The stakeholders expect to

and development plan for CIP, including issue a plan with a roadmap,
investment plan,

cybersecurity. and milestones next year.

Promote awareness and outreach. 	Made progress in increasing cybersecurity
The effectiveness of awareness and outreach awareness by implementing
numerous activities is unclear. Many CIP stakeholders are awareness and
outreach initiatives, including still uncertain of DHS's cybersecurity
roles. the National Cyber Alert System, the National Cyber Security
Awareness Month program, and the US CERT public Web site.

Foster training and certification. 	Initiated multiple efforts to improve
the Efforts are not yet complete. Much work education of future
cybersecurity analysts, remains to be done to develop certification
including cosponsoring the National Centers of standards. Academic
Excellence in Information Assurance program and fostering the scholarship
for service program.

Enhance federal, state, and local Supports multiple interagency groups'
efforts to Efforts are not yet complete. State and local

government cybersecurity. 	improve government cybersecurity, including
government stakeholders have expressed the Chief Information Security
Officers forum, concerns about the scope of these efforts . the National
Cyber Response Coordination Group, and the Government Forum of Incident
Response and Security Teams.

     Strengthen     Works in conjunction with other        More remains to be 
international                foreign                    done. DHS plans to 
                                                                       create 
     cyberspace   governments to promote a global               and pursue an 
     security.    culture of                           international strategy 
                                                                    to secure 
                         security. Initiatives include   cyberspace and to    
                                  participation in the promote collaboration, 
                     G-8 High Tech Crime working group   coordination, and    
                                               and the  information sharing   
                                                                with          
                    International Watch and Warning        international      
                                                            communities.      
                   Framework/Multilateral Conference.  

Integrate cybersecurity with Formed the National Cyber Response Important
testing remains to be done. Early

national security. 	Coordinating Group-a forum of national tests of this
coordination showed the need to security, law enforcement, defense,
improve communication protocols; additional intelligence, and other
government agencies- testing is warranted. that coordinates
intragovernmental and public/private preparedness and response to and
recovery from national-level cyber incidents and physical attacks that
have significant cyber consequences.

                    Source: GAO analysis of DHS information.

  DHS Continues to Face Challenges in Establishing Itself as a

National Focal Point for Cyberspace Security DHS faces a number of
challenges that have impeded its ability to fulfill its cyber CIP
responsibilities. Key challenges include achieving organizational
stability, gaining organizational authority, overcoming hiring and
contracting issues, increasing awareness about cybersecurity roles and
capabilities, establishing effective partnerships with stakeholders (other
federal, state, and local governments and the private sector), achieving
two-way information sharing with these stakeholders, and providing and
demonstrating the value DHS can provide.

Organizational stability: Over the last year, multiple senior DHS
cybersecurity officials-including the NCSD Director, the Deputy Director
responsible for Outreach and Awareness, and the Director of the US-CERT
Control Systems Security Center, the Under Secretary for the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate and the Assistant
Secretary responsible for the Information Protection Office-have left the
department. Infrastructure sector officials stated that the lack of stable
leadership has diminished NCSD's ability to maintain trusted relationships
with its infrastructure partners and has hindered its ability to
adequately plan and execute activities. According to one private-sector
representative, the importance of organizational stability in fostering
strong partnerships cannot be over emphasized.

Organizational authority: NCSD does not have the organizational authority
it needs to effectively serve as a national focal point for cybersecurity.
Accordingly, its officials lack the authority to represent and commit DHS
to efforts with the private sector. Infrastructure and cybersecurity
officials, including the chairman of the sector coordinators and
representatives of the cybersecurity industry, have expressed concern that
the cybersecurity division's relatively low position within the DHS
organization hinders its ability to accomplish cybersecurity-related
goals. NCSD's lack of authority has led to some missteps, including DHS's
cancellation of an important cyber event without explanation and its
taking almost a year to issue formal responses to private sector
recommendations

that resulted from selected National Cyber Security Summit task
forces-even though responses were drafted within months.

A congressional subcommittee also expressed concern that DHS's
cybersecurity office lacks the authority to effectively fulfill its role.
In 2004 and again in 2005, the subcommittee proposed legislation to
elevate the head of the cybersecurity office to an assistant secretary
position. Among other benefits, the subcommittee reported that such a
change could

o  provide more focus and authority for DHS's cybersecurity mission,

o  allow higher level input into national policy decisions, and

o  	provide a single visible point of contact within the federal
government for improving interactions with the private sector.

To try to address these concerns, DHS recently announced that it would
elevate responsibility for cybersecurity to an assistant secretary
position.

Hiring and contracting: Ineffective DHS management processes have impeded
the department's ability to hire employees and maintain contracts. We
recently reported that since DHS's inception, its leadership has provided
a foundation for maintaining critical operations while it undergoes
transformation.6 However, in managing its transformation, we noted that
the department still needed to overcome a number of significant
challenges, including addressing systemic problems in human capital and
acquisition systems. Federal and nonfederal officials expressed concerns
about its hiring and contracting processes. For example, an NCSD official
reported that the division has had difficulty in hiring personnel to fill
vacant positions. These officials stated that once they found qualified
candidates, some candidates decided not to apply and another one withdrew
his acceptance because he felt that DHS's hiring process had taken too
long. In addition, a cybersecurity division official stated that there had
been times when DHS did not

6GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207, (Washington, D.C.: January,
                                     2005).

renew NCSD contracts in a timely manner, requiring that key contractors
work without pay until approvals could be completed and payments could be
made. In other cases, NCSD was denied services from a vendor because the
department had repeatedly failed to pay this vendor for its services.
External stakeholders, including an ISAC representative, also noted that
NCSD is hampered by how long it takes DHS to award a contract.

Awareness of DHS roles and capabilities: Many infrastructure stakeholders
are not yet aware of DHS's cybersecurity roles and capabilities.
Department of Energy critical infrastructure officials stated that the
roles and responsibilities of DHS and the sectorspecific agencies need to
be better clarified in order to improve coordination. In addition, during
a regional cyber exercise, privatesector and state and local government
officials reported that the mission of NCSD and the capabilities that DHS
could provide during a serious cyber-threat were not clear to them. NCSD's
manager of cyber analysis and warning operations acknowledged that the
organization has not done an adequate job reaching out to the private
sector regarding the department's role and capabilities.

Effective partnerships: NCSD is responsible for leveraging the assets of
key stakeholders, including other federal, state, and local governments
and the private sector, in order to facilitate effective protection of
cyber assets. The ability to develop partnerships greatly enhances the
agency's ability to identify, assess, and reduce cyber threats and
vulnerabilities, establish strategic analytical capabilities, provide
incident response, enhance government cybersecurity, and improve
international efforts. According to one infrastructure sector
representative, effective partnerships require building relationships with
mutually developed goals; shared benefits and responsibilities; and
tangible, measurable results. However, this individual reported that DHS
has not typically adopted these principles in pursuing partnerships with
the private sector, which dramatically diminishes cybersecurity gains that
government and industry could otherwise achieve. For example, it has often
informed the infrastructure sectors about government initiatives or sought
input after most key decisions have been made. Also, the department has
not demonstrated that it recognizes the value of leveraging existing
private sector mechanisms, such as

information-sharing entities and processes that are already in place and
working. In addition, the instability of NCSD's leadership positions to
date has led to problems in developing partnerships. Representatives from
two ISACs reported that turnover at the cybersecurity division has
hindered partnership efforts. Additionally, IT sector representatives
stated that NCSD needs continuity of leadership, regular communications,
and trusted policies and procedures in order to build the partnerships
that will allow the private sector to share information.

Information sharing: We recently identified information sharing in support
of homeland security as a high-risk area, and we noted that establishing
an effective two-way exchange of information to help detect, prevent, and
mitigate potential terrorist attacks requires an extraordinary level of
cooperation and perseverance among federal, state, and local governments
and the private sector.7 However, such effective communications are not
yet in place in support of our nation's cybersecurity. Representatives
from critical infrastructure sectors stated that entities within their
respective sectors still do not openly share cybersecurity information
with DHS. As we have reported in the past, much of the concern is that the
potential release of sensitive information could increase the threat to an
entity. In addition, sector representatives stated that when information
is shared, it is not clear whether the information will be shared with
other entities-such as other federal entities, state and local entities,
law enforcement, or various regulators-and how it will be used or
protected from disclosure. Representatives from the banking and finance
sector stated that the protection provided by the Critical Infrastructure
Information Act and the subsequently established Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information Program is not clear and has not overcome the
trust barrier. Sector representatives have expressed concerns that DHS is
not effectively communicating information to them. According to one
infrastructure representative, DHS has not matched private sector efforts
to share valuable information with a corresponding level of trusted
information sharing. An official from the water sector noted

7GAO-05-207.

that when representatives called DHS to inquire about a potential
terrorist threat, they were told that DHS could not share any information
and that they should "watch the news."

Providing value: According to sector representatives, even when
organizations within their sectors have shared information with NCSD, the
entities do not consistently receive useful information in return. They
noted that without a clear benefit, they are unlikely to pursue further
information sharing with DHS. Federal officials also noted problems in
identifying the value that DHS provides. According to Department of Energy
officials, the department does not always provide analysis or reports
based on the information that agencies provide. Federal and nonfederal
officials also stated that most of US-CERT's alerts have not been useful
because they lack essential details or are based on already available
information. Further, Treasury officials stated that US-CERT needed to
provide relevant and timely feedback regarding the incidents that are
reported to it.

Clearly, these challenges are not mutually exclusive. That is, addressing
challenges in organizational stability and authority will help NCSD build
the credibility it needs in order to establish effective partnerships and
achieve two-way information sharing. Similarly, effective partnerships and
ongoing information sharing with its stakeholders will allow DHS to better
demonstrate the value it can add.

DHS has identified steps in its strategic plan for cybersecurity that can
begin to address these challenges. Specifically, it has established goals
and plans for improving human capital management that should help
stabilize the organization. Further, the department has developed plans
for communicating with stakeholders that are intended to increase
awareness of its roles and capabilities and to encourage information
sharing. Also, it has established plans for developing effective
partnerships and improving analytical and watch and warning capabilities
that could help build partnerships and begin to demonstrate added value.
However, until it begins to address these underlying challenges, DHS
cannot achieve significant results in coordinating cybersecurity
activities, and our nation will lack the effective focal point it needs

to better ensure the security of cyberspace for public and private
critical infrastructure systems.

  Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Enhance Cybersecurity of Critical
  Infrastructures

Over the last several years, we have made a series of recommendations to
enhance the cybersecurity of critical infrastructures, focusing on the
need to (1) develop a strategic analysis and warning capability for
identifying potential cyberattacks, (2) protect infrastructure control
systems, (3) enhance public/private information sharing, and (4) conduct
important threat and vulnerability assessments and address other
challenges to effective cybersecurity. These recommendations are
summarized below.

Strategic Analysis and Warnings: In 2001, we reported on the analysis and
warnings efforts within DHS's predecessor, the National Infrastructure
Protection Center, and identified several challenges that were impeding
the development of an effective strategic analysis and warning
capability.8 We reported that a generally accepted methodology for
analyzing strategic cyber-based threats did not exist. Specifically, there
was no standard terminology, no standard set of factors to consider, and
no established thresholds for determining the sophistication of attack
techniques. We also reported that the Center did not have the
industry-specific data on factors such as critical systems components,
known vulnerabilities, and interdependencies.

We therefore recommended that the responsible executive-branch officials
and agencies establish a capability for strategic analysis of
computer-based threats, including developing a methodology,

8GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in
Developing National Capabilities, GAO-01-323 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25,
2001).

acquiring expertise, and obtaining infrastructure data. However, officials
have taken little action to establish this capability, and therefore our
recommendations remain open today.

Control Systems: In March 2004, we reported that several factors-including
the adoption of standardized technologies with known vulnerabilities and
the increased connectivity of control systems to other systems-contributed
to an escalation of the risk of cyber-attacks against control systems. 9
We recommended that DHS develop and implement a strategy for coordinating
with the private sector and with other government agencies to improve
control system security, including an approach for coordinating the
various ongoing efforts to secure control systems. DHS concurred with our
recommendation and, in December 2004, issued a highlevel national strategy
for control systems security. This strategy includes, among other things,
goals to create a capability to respond to attacks on control systems and
to mitigate vulnerabilities, bridge industry and government efforts, and
develop control systems security awareness. However, the strategy does not
yet include underlying details and milestones for completing activities.

Information Sharing: In July 2004, we recommended actions to improve the
effectiveness of DHS's information-sharing efforts.10 We recommended that
officials within the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate (1) proceed with and establish milestones for developing an
information-sharing plan and (2) develop appropriate DHS policies and
procedures for interacting with ISACs, sector coordinators (groups or
individuals designated to represent their respective infrastructure
sectors' CIP activities), and sector-specific agencies and for
coordination and information sharing within the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate and other DHS components. These
recommendations remain open today. Moreover, we recently designated
establishing appropriate and effective information

9 GAO-04-354.

10GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Improving Information Sharing
with Infrastructure Sectors, GAO-04-780 (Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2004).

sharing mechanisms to improve homeland security as a new highrisk area.11
We reported that the ability to share security-related information can
unify the efforts of federal, state, and local government agencies and the
private sector in preventing or minimizing terrorist attacks.

Threat and Vulnerability Assessments and Other Challenges:

Most recently, in May 2005, we reported that while DHS has made progress
in planning and coordinating efforts to enhance cybersecurity, much more
work remains to be done to fulfill its basic responsibilities-including
conducting important threat and vulnerability assessments and recovery
plans. Further, we reported that DHS faces key challenges in building its
credibility as a stable, authoritative, and capable organization and in
leveraging private/public assets and information in order to clearly
demonstrate the value it can provide. We made recommendations to
strengthen the department's ability to implement key cybersecurity
responsibilities by prioritizing and completing critical activities and
resolving underlying challenges.

We recently met with DHS's acting director for cybersecurity who told us
that DHS agreed with our findings and has initiated plans to address our
recommendations. He acknowledged that DHS has not adequately leveraged
their public and private stakeholders in a prioritized manner and it plans
to begin its prioritized approach by focusing stakeholders on information
sharing, preparedness, and recovery. He also added that NCSD is attempting
to prioritize its major activities consistent with the secretary's vision
of risk management and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
approach.

11GAO-05-207.

In summary, as our nation has become increasingly dependent on timely,
reliable information, it has also become increasingly vulnerable to
attacks on the information infrastructure that supports the nation's
critical infrastructures (including the energy, banking and finance,
transportation, telecommunications, and drinking water infrastructures).
Federal law and policy acknowledge this by establishing DHS as the focal
point for coordinating cybersecurity plans and initiatives with other
federal agencies, state and local governments, and private industry. DHS
has made progress in planning and coordinating efforts to enhance
cybersecurity, but much more work remains to be done for the department to
fulfill its basic responsibilities-including conducting important threat
and vulnerability assessments and recovery plans.

As DHS strives to fulfill its mission, it faces key challenges in building
its credibility as a stable, authoritative, and capable organization and
in leveraging private and public assets and information in order to
clearly demonstrate the value it can provide. Until it overcomes the many
challenges it faces and completes critical activities, DHS cannot
effectively function as the cybersecurity focal point intended by law and
national policy. As such, there is increased risk that large portions of
our national infrastructure are either unaware of key areas of
cybersecurity risks or unprepared to effectively address cyber
emergencies. Over the last several years, we have made a series of
recommendations to enhance the cybersecurity of critical infrastructures.
These include (1) developing a strategic analysis and warning capability
for identifying potential cyberattacks, (2) protecting infrastructure
control systems, (3) enhancing public/private information sharing, and (4)
conducting important threat and vulnerability assessments and address
other challenges to effective cybersecurity. Effectively implementing
these recommendations could greatly improve our nation's cybersecurity
posture.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any
questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have at this time.

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, please
contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at [email protected]. Other key
contributors to this report include Joanne Fiorino, Michael Gilmore,
Barbarol James, Colleen Phillips, and Nik Rapelje.

  Appendix I: Infrastructure Sectors and Lead Agencies Identified by Federal
  Policies on Critical Infrastructure Protection

Sector Description Lead agency

Agriculture 	Provides for the fundamental need for food. The
infrastructure includes Department of Agriculture supply chains for feed
and crop production.

Banking and finance 	Provides the financial infrastructure of the nation.
This sector consists of Department of the Treasury commercial banks,
insurance companies, mutual funds, governmentsponsored enterprises,
pension funds, and other financial institutions that carry out
transactions, including clearing and settlement.

Chemicals and hazardous Transforms natural raw materials into commonly
used products benefiting Department of Homeland

materials	society's health, safety, and productivity. The chemical
industry produces Security more than 70,000 products that are essential to
automobiles, pharmaceuticals, food supply, electronics, water treatment,
health, construction, and other necessities.

Commercial facilities	Includes prominent commercial centers, office
buildings, sports stadiums, Department of Homeland theme parks, and other
sites where large numbers of people congregate Security to pursue business
activities, conduct personal commercial transactions, or enjoy
recreational pastimes.

          Dams           Comprises approximately 80,000 dam     Department of 
                          facilities, including larger and           Homeland 
                       nationally symbolic dams that are major    Security    
                            components of other critical        
                      infrastructures that provide electricity  
                                     and water.                 
Defense industrial Supplies the military with the means to   Department of 
          base        protect the nation by producing           Defense       
                      weapons, aircraft, and ships and          
                      providing essential services, including   
                        information technology and supply and   
                                    maintenance.                

Drinking water and water Sanitizes the water supply through about 170,000
public water systems. Environmental Protection treatment systems These
systems depend on reservoirs, dams, wells, treatment facilities, Agency

pumping stations, and transmission lines.

                            Saves lives and property from     Department of   
     Emergency services      accidents and disaster. This        Homeland     
                                        sector               
                          includes fire, rescue, emergency                    
                          medical services, and law              Security
                          enforcement                        
                                    organizations.           
                           Provides the electric power used   Department of   
           Energy         by all sectors, including critical      Energy      
                          infrastructures, and the refining, 
                          storage, and distribution of oil   
                          and gas.                           
                              The sector is divided into     
                           electricity and oil and natural   
                                         gas.                
                          Carries out the post-harvesting of                  
            Food          the food supply, including            Department of 
                          processing                          Agriculture and
                                  and retail sales.           Department of   
                                                                Health and    
                                                              Human Services  
         Government         Ensures national security and     Department of   
                          freedom and administers key public     Homeland     
                                      functions.                 Security     
                          Includes the buildings owned and                    
Government facilities  leased by the federal government    Department of   
                          for                                    Homeland
                               use by federal entities.          Security     
                             Provides communications and      Department of   
Information technology   processes to meet the needs of       Homeland     
and telecommunications     businesses and government.         Security     

Sector Description Lead agency

National monuments and Includes key assets that are symbolically equated
with traditional Department of the Interior icons American values and
institutions or U.S. political and economic power.

Nuclear reactors,  Includes 104 commercial nuclear      Department of      
                      reactors; research and test nuclear  Homeland           
     materials, and   reactors; nuclear materials; and the Security working   
         waste                transportation, storage, and with the           
                                                  disposal 
                        of nuclear materials and waste.    Nuclear Regulatory 
                                                                       Agency 
                                                           and Department of  
                                                           Energy             

Postal and shipping 	Delivers private and commercial letters, packages,
and bulk assets. The Department of Homeland U.S. Postal Service and other
carriers provide the services of this sector. Security

Public health and Mitigates the risk of disasters and attacks and also
provides recovery Department of Health and healthcare assistance if an
attack occurs. The sector consists of health departments, Human Services

clinics, and hospitals.

Transportation systems Enables movement of people and of assets that are
vital to our economy, Department of Homeland mobility, and security via
aviation, ships, rail, pipelines, highways, trucks, Security in
collaboration with buses, and mass transit. the Department of
Transportation

 Source: GAO analysis based on the President's National Strategy documents and
                                    HSPD-7.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

    GAO's Mission

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts newly
released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To have
GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."

Order by Mail or Phone 	The first copy of each printed report is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out
to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25
percent. Orders should be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: 	Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061

    To Report Fraud, Contact:

Waste, and Abuse in Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: [email protected] Programs Automated answering system: (800)
424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4400Congressional U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street
NW, Room 7125 Relations Washington, D.C. 20548

Public Affairs 	Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548

                                 RECYCLED PAPER
*** End of document. ***