Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment
Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts (31-AUG-05,
GAO-05-813).
The opportunity for employment is one of the most important
magnets attracting illegal immigrants to the United States.
Immigration experts state that strategies to deter illegal
immigration require both a reliable employment eligibility
verification process and a worksite enforcement capacity to
ensure that employers comply with immigration-related employment
laws. This report examines (1) the current employment
verification (Form I-9) process and challenges, if any, facing
verification; and (2) the priorities and resources of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) worksite enforcement
program and any challenges in implementing the program.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-813
ACCNO: A35098
TITLE: Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment
Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts
DATE: 08/31/2005
SUBJECT: Eligibility criteria
Eligibility determinations
Employment
Employment requirements
Identity verification
Illegal aliens
Immigrants
Immigration
Program evaluation
Strategic planning
Basic Pilot Program
Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot
Program
Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program
DOJ Employment Eligibility Verification
Program
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-05-813
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
Report to Congressional Requesters
August 2005
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts
GAO-05-813
[IMG]
August 2005
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts
What GAO Found
The current employment verification process is based on employers' review
of documents presented by new employees to prove their identity and work
eligibility. On the Form I-9, employers certify that they have reviewed
employees' documents and that the documents appear genuine and relate to
the individual presenting them. However, various studies have shown that
document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and identity fraud
(fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging to others)
have made it difficult for employers who want to comply with the
employment verification process to hire only authorized workers and easier
for unscrupulous employers to knowingly hire unauthorized workers. The
large number and variety of documents acceptable for proving work
eligibility have also hindered verification efforts. In 1997, the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), issued an interim rule on a reduction in the
number of acceptable work eligibility documents and, in 1998, proposed a
further reduction, but this proposal has not yet been finalized. DHS is
currently reviewing the list of acceptable work eligibility documents, but
has not established a target time frame for completing this review. The
Basic Pilot Program, a voluntary program through which participating
employers electronically verify employees' work eligibility, has potential
to help enhance the verification process and substantially reduce document
fraud. Yet, current weaknesses in the program, such as the inability of
the program to detect identity fraud, DHS delays in entering data into its
databases, and some employer noncompliance with pilot program requirements
could, if not addressed, have a significant impact on the program's
success. Furthermore, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officials
stated that the current Basic Pilot Program may not be able to complete
timely verifications if the number of employers using the program
significantly increased.
Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs
that compete for resources and, under the former INS and now under ICE,
worksite enforcement has been a relatively low priority. Consistent with
DHS's mission to combat terrorism, after September 11, 2001, INS and then
ICE focused worksite enforcement resources mainly on removing unauthorized
workers from critical infrastructure sites to help address those sites'
vulnerabilities. Since fiscal year 1999, the numbers of employer notices
of intent to fine and administrative worksite arrests have generally
declined, according to ICE, due to various factors such as document fraud,
which makes it difficult to prove employer violations. ICE has not yet
developed outcome goals and measures for its worksite enforcement program,
which, given limited resources and competing priorities for those
resources, may hinder ICE's efforts to determine resources needed for the
program.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
Various Weaknesses Have Undermined the Employment
Verification Process, but the Basic Pilot Program Shows Potential to
Enhance the Process Competing Priorities and Lack of Outcome Goals and
Measures
May Hinder Worksite Enforcement Efforts Conclusions Recommendations for
Executive Action Agency Comments
1
5 8
14
30 42 44 44
Appendix I Employment Eligibility Verification Form (Form I-9) 46
Appendix II Scope and Methodology
Appendix III Information on the Electronic Form I-9
Appendix IV Data on Employer Participation in and Use of the Basic Pilot
Program
Appendix V Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 59
Figures
Figure 1: Basic Pilot Program Verification Process 12 Figure 2: Number of
Queries Authorized by DHS through the
Automated Check and the Immigration Status Verifier
Check 26
Figure 3: Investigative Agent Work-years Spent on Worksite Enforcement
Efforts and Agent Work-years Spent on Other Investigative Areas for Each
Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2003 33
Figure 4: Number of Notices of Intent to Fine Issued to Employers for Each
Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2004 35 Figure 5: Number of Worksite
Enforcement Arrests for Each Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2003 36
Figure 6: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries Run by Participating
Employers for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004 55
Figure 7: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries that Resulted in
Employment Authorizations for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004 56
Abbreviations
DHS Department of Homeland Security
ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IIRIRA Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act INS U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service IRCA Immigration
Reform and Control Act SSA Social Security Administration USCIS U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548
August 31, 2005
The Honorable Jim Sensenbrenner, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives
The Honorable John N. Hostettler
Chairman
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives
According to the final report of the U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform, immigration contributes to the U.S. national economy by helping
to keep viable segments of certain labor-intensive industries, expand
foreign trade, provide valuable language and cultural expertise to U.S.
companies, and contribute to the economic revitalization of some
communities.1 Yet, the commission also noted that immigration,
particularly illegal immigration, has adverse consequences, such as
helping to depress wages for low-skilled workers and creating net fiscal
costs for state and local governments. Aliens, including temporary foreign
workers, legally enter and reside in the United States through a variety
of
channels, such as immigration and work visa programs, but aliens also
illegally enter or overstay visas and reside in the United States. The
former
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimated that about
7 million unauthorized aliens resided in the United States by January
2000,
and other organizations estimated that the unauthorized alien population
was about 10 million in 2004.2
1U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American: Immigration
and Immigrant Policy (Washington, D.C: September 1997).
2In March 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was merged into
the Department of Homeland Security. The service's immigration functions
were divided between U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is responsible for
managing and implementing the worksite enforcement program.
The opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets
attracting illegal aliens to the United States. To help reduce the
attraction of this magnet, in 1986 Congress passed the Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA),3 which made it illegal for individuals and
entities to knowingly hire, continue to employ, or recruit or refer for a
fee unauthorized workers. The act established a two-pronged approach for
helping to limit the employment of unauthorized workers: (1) an employment
verification process through which employers verify newly hired employees'
work eligibility and (2) a sanctions program for fining employers who do
not comply with the act. Under the employment verification process,
employees and employers must complete the Employment Eligibility
Verification Form (Form I-9) to certify that the employees are authorized
to work in the United States.4 Those employers who do not follow the
verification process can be sanctioned for knowingly hiring, continuing to
employ, or recruiting or referring for a fee unauthorized workers or for
improperly completing Forms I-9. Efforts to enforce these sanctions are
referred to as worksite enforcement.
In the nearly 20 years since the passage of IRCA, the employment
eligibility verification process and worksite enforcement program have
remained largely unchanged. Following the passage of the act, the U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform and various immigration experts concluded
that deterring illegal immigration requires, among other things,
strategies that focus on disrupting the ability of illegal aliens to gain
employment through a more reliable employment eligibility verification
process and a more robust worksite enforcement capacity. In particular,
the commission report and other studies have found that the single most
important step that could be taken to reduce unlawful migration is the
development of a more effective system for verifying work authorization.
Yet in the 8 years since the commission's final report, few substantial
enhancements have been applied to the employment verification process, and
the approach continues to rely on the Form I-9, a procedure of which the
commission was roundly critical because of its vulnerability to fraud and
potential to cause discrimination. Moreover, in previous work, we reported
that employers of unauthorized aliens faced little likelihood that INS
would investigate, fine, or criminally prosecute them, a circumstance
3P.L. 99-603, 8 U.S.C. 1324a et seq. 4See appendix I for a copy of the
Form I-9.
that provides little disincentive for employers who want to circumvent the
law.5
You asked us to review the federal government's policies and programs
aimed at enforcing immigration laws in the workplace. This report
addresses the following questions: (1) How does the current employment
verification process function and what are the challenges facing
verification? (2) What are the priorities and resources of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) worksite enforcement program
and what challenges, if any, has the agency faced in implementing the
program?
To address these objectives, we interviewed officials from the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) and ICE, and officials from the Social Security Administration
(SSA) in headquarters and selected field locations. We obtained from them
information on the Form I-9 process and the Basic Pilot Program, a
voluntary program through which participating employers verify employees'
work eligibility by electronically checking information on employees'
Forms I-9 with information in SSA and DHS databases. We analyzed
information from these agencies, as well as related laws and regulations,
to determine how the current Form I-9 process functions, identify any
challenges in the current Form I-9 process, and examine DHS plans to
modify the process. We also interviewed representatives of 23 employers;6
12 employer, employee, and advocacy groups;7 and
5GAO, Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien
Employment Exist, GAO/GGD-99-33 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 1999).
6One of the 23 employers we interviewed did not participate in the Basic
Pilot Program. As a result, when we discuss the views of employers on the
Basic Pilot Program, we refer to the views of the 22 employers we
interviewed that participated in the program. The 23 employers we
interviewed were located in the following states: California, Illinois,
Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. They were part of the following
industries: meatpacking, transportation, health care, landscaping,
manufacturing, accommodation, food services, agriculture, janitorial and
maintenance, temporary employment, critical infrastructure, local
government, and newspaper. According to Department of Labor data, there
were about 5.6 million employer firms in the United States in 2002. The
most current data available on the number of employers in the United
States were from 2002.
7We interviewed officials from 9 employer and employee associations in the
following industries: construction, agriculture, accommodation, food
services, retail, health care, and meat. We interviewed officials from
three advocacy groups that represent a range of views on
immigration-related issues.
6 immigration experts8 to obtain their views on the Form I-9 process and
the Basic Pilot Program. We selected the employers to interview based on a
mix of criteria, such as the number of employers' pilot program queries
and geographic location. We selected the employer, employee, and advocacy
groups to interview based on a mix of criteria, such as industry
representation and range of views on immigration issues. In addition, we
examined USCIS and SSA guidance, instructions, and agreements for the
Basic Pilot Program and the results and methodology of an independent
evaluation of the program completed by the Institute for Survey Research
at Temple University and Westat in June 2002.9 We analyzed data on
employer participation in and use of the Basic Pilot Program to determine
how participation and use have changed since fiscal year 2000. We assessed
the reliability of these data by reviewing them for accuracy and
completeness, interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data,
and examining documentation on how the data are entered, categorized, and
verified in the databases. We determined that the independent evaluation
and these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review.
To obtain information on the worksite enforcement program priorities and
resources, we interviewed officials from ICE, the SSA Office of the
Inspector General, the Department of Labor, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related
Unfair Unemployment Practices. We also interviewed officials from 12 of
the 26 ICE Special Agent in Charge field offices10 and 4 U.S. Attorney's
Offices11 that were located in the same areas as 4 of the field offices we
visited. We selected the 12 field offices based on a mix of criteria, such
as number of investigations conducted by field offices, number of
8The 6 immigration experts we interviewed have a range of views on
immigration-related issues.
9Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Basic Pilot
Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: June 2002).
10We met with officials from the following 8 field offices: Los Angeles
and San Diego, California; Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; Newark,
New Jersey; New York City, New York; and Houston and San Antonio, Texas.
We spoke with officials from the following 4 field offices over the
telephone: Denver, Colorado; Miami, Florida; Buffalo, New York; and
Seattle, Washington.
11We met with officials from the following 3 U.S. Attorney's Offices: the
Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney's Office; the Southern
District of Texas U.S. Attorney's Office; and the Western District of
Texas U.S. Attorney's Office. We spoke with the Southern District of
California U.S. Attorney's Office over the telephone.
Results in Brief
investigators in each field office, and geographic location. We analyzed
ICE headquarters and field office guidance, memos, and other documents on
worksite enforcement to evaluate ICE's priorities for and management of
worksite enforcement efforts. In addition, we analyzed ICE data on
worksite enforcement and assessed the data reliability by reviewing data
for accuracy and completeness, interviewing agency officials knowledgeable
about the data, and examining documentation on how the data are entered,
categorized, and verified in the databases. We determined that these data
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. For more
detailed information on our scope and methodology, see appendix II. We
conducted our work from September 2004 through July 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
The employment verification process is primarily based on employers'
review of their new employees' work eligibility documents, but various
weaknesses, such as the process' vulnerability to fraud, have undermined
this process. Employers certify on the Form I-9 that they have reviewed
documents presented by their employees and that the documents appear
genuine and relate to the individual presenting them. However, various
studies have shown that document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and
identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging
to others) have made it difficult for employers who want to comply with
the employment verification process to ensure that they hire only
authorized workers and have made it easier for unscrupulous employers to
knowingly hire unauthorized workers. The large number and variety of
documents included in the list of acceptable documents for proving work
eligibility have also undermined the process. We have previously reported
on federal government efforts to reduce the number of acceptable work
eligibility documents and make the remaining acceptable documents more
secure. In 1997, the former INS issued an interim rule on reductions in
the number of acceptable work eligibility documents and, in 1998, proposed
a further reduction. However, DHS has not yet finalized the proposal, and
the 1997 interim rule remains in effect. Although department officials
told us that the agency is currently assessing modifications to the list
of acceptable work eligibility documents, the department has not
established a target time frame for completing this assessment and issuing
final regulations on the list of acceptable documents. In addition, the
Basic Pilot Program has potential to enhance this process and help to
significantly reduce document fraud. According to ICE officials, access to
Basic Pilot Program information could help the agency better target its
worksite enforcement efforts at those employers
who do not follow program requirements. If the program is expanded,
however, several current weaknesses in the program, including its
inability to detect identity fraud, DHS delays in entering data into its
databases that may lengthen the pilot program verification process, and
some employer noncompliance with pilot program requirements intended to
protect employees from discriminatory practices, could become more
significant and adversely affect a greater number of employers and
employees, if not addressed. Additionally, USCIS officials told us that
the current Basic Pilot Program may not be able to complete timely
verifications of work eligibility if the number of employers using the
program were to significantly increase, primarily because of limited
program funding and the growth in other verification programs. These
officials said that USCIS is planning to fund an evaluation of the Basic
Pilot Program to assess, among other things, the program's current costs,
any improvements in DHS data accuracy, and employers' compliance with
program requirements. Although the results of this evaluation should help
provide information on the pilot program's weaknesses, without information
on the feasibility and costs of addressing those weaknesses, USCIS and
Congress cannot effectively assess possibilities for future implementation
of the program, including increased program usage.
Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs
that compete for resources and, under the former INS and now under ICE,
worksite enforcement has been a relatively low priority. Consistent with
the DHS mission to combat terrorism, after September 11, 2001, INS and
then ICE focused worksite enforcement resources mainly on identifying and
removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites, such as
airports and nuclear power plants, to help address vulnerabilities at
those sites. We previously reported that if businesses at such sites were
to be compromised by terrorists, this would pose a threat to domestic
security.12 In fiscal year 1999, INS devoted about 9 percent of its agent
investigative work-years to worksite enforcement, and in fiscal year 2003
ICE devoted about 4 percent, although ICE has proposed increasing
resources for worksite enforcement. The number of notices of intent to
fine issued to employers for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers or
improperly completing Forms I-9 and the number of administrative worksite
arrests have also generally declined. For
12GAO, Immigration Enforcement: DHS Has Incorporated Immigration
Enforcement Objectives and Is Addressing Future Planning Requirements,
GAO-05-66 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 2004).
example, the number of notices of intent to fine generally decreased from
417 in fiscal year 1999 to 3 in fiscal year 2004. ICE has attributed this
decline to various factors including the widespread use of counterfeit
documents that make it difficult for ICE agents to prove that employers
knowingly hired unauthorized workers. In addition, INS and ICE have faced
difficulties in setting and collecting fine amounts from employers and in
detaining unauthorized workers arrested at worksites. According to ICE,
pursuit of civil settlements with employers rather than administrative
fines could help address some of the difficulties faced in the fines
process, but it is too early to tell what effect, if any, use of civil
settlements will have on worksite enforcement efforts. Furthermore,
although ICE has identified two output measures for the worksite
enforcement program, these measures address only two elements of the
program. Without additional output goals and measures for the worksite
enforcement program, ICE's ability to effectively determine resources
needed for the program may be hindered, especially given ICE's limited
resources and competing priorities for those resources. Although ICE is
developing outcome goals and measures for the worksite enforcement
program, until it finalizes these goals and measures, the agency may not
be able to effectively evaluate the results of program efforts.
To strengthen the current employment verification process, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security set a specific time
frame for completing the department's review of the Form I-9 process,
including an assessment of the possibility of reducing the number of
acceptable work eligibility documents, and issuing final regulations on
changes to the Form I-9 process and an updated Form I-9. To assist
Congress and USCIS in assessing the possibility of increased or mandatory
use of the Basic Pilot Program, we are recommending that the Secretary of
Homeland Security direct the Director of USCIS to include, in the planned
evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, an assessment of the feasibility
and costs of addressing the Basic Pilot Program's current weaknesses,
including its inability to detect identity fraud, delays in entry of
employment authorization information into databases, and employer
noncompliance with program procedures, and resources that would be needed
to support increased or mandatory use of the program. To help evaluate the
results of worksite enforcement program efforts and determine resource
levels needed for the program, we are recommending that the Secretary of
Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for ICE to establish
additional output goals and measures for the worksite enforcement program,
and set a target time frame for completing the assessment and development
of outcome goals and measures for the
program. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS agreed with the
recommendations.
Background
IRCA provided for sanctions against employers who do not follow the
employment verification (Form I-9) process. Employers who fail to properly
complete, retain, or present for inspection a Form I-9 may face civil or
administrative fines ranging from $110 to $1,100 for each employee for
whom the form was not properly completed, retained, or presented.13 The
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of
1996 limited employer liability for certain technical violations of Form
I-9 paperwork requirements.14 According to the act, a person or entity is
considered to have complied with the employment verification process if
the person or entity made a good faith attempt to properly complete the
Form I-9.15 Employers who knowingly hire or continue to employ
unauthorized aliens may be fined from $275 to $11,000 for each employee,
depending on whether the violation is a first or subsequent offense.
Employers who engage in a pattern or practice of knowingly hiring or
continuing to employ unauthorized aliens are subject to criminal penalties
consisting of fines up to $3,000 per unauthorized employee and up to 6
months imprisonment for the entire pattern or practice.
ICE is primarily responsible for enforcing the employer sanction
provisions of IRCA as well as many other immigration-related laws. ICE has
approximately 5,000 investigative agents in 26 Office of Investigations
field offices that are headed by special agents in charge. ICE's Worksite
Enforcement/Critical Infrastructure Unit oversees programs to protect U.S.
critical infrastructure, including military, economic, industrial, and
transportation infrastructure, and manages the agency's worksite
13In 1999, the Department of Justice increased the amounts of the civil
penalties from those established in IRCA to the current levels to reflect
a ten percent adjustment for inflation. 8 C.F.R. S: 274a.10(b). Under the
Federal Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, as
amended, federal agencies are to make regular adjustments for inflation of
civil monetary penalties that they are charged with enforcing. 28 U.S.C.
2641 note.
148 U.S.C. 1324a(b). IIRIRA of 1996 was enacted within a larger piece of
legislation, the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, P.L.
104-208.
15According to IIRIRA, a person or entity with certain Form I-9 paperwork
violations must be informed of the violation and provided with a period of
not less than 10 business days to correct the violations. If the person or
entity does not correct the violations within the specified time period,
the person or entity would not be considered to have made a good faith
attempt to comply with the Form I-9 requirement.
enforcement efforts. Prior to the creation of ICE in March 2003, INS
enforced IRCA and other immigration-related laws.
Basic Pilot Program Employment Verification Process
IIRIRA required INS to operate three voluntary pilot programs to test
electronic means for employers to verify an employee's eligibility to
work: the Basic Pilot Program, the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot
Program, and the Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program. The three pilot
programs were to test whether pilot verification procedures could improve
the existing Form I-9 process by reducing (1) document fraud and false
claims of U.S. citizenship, (2) discrimination against employees, (3)
violations of civil liberties and privacy, and (4) the burden on employers
to verify employees' work eligibility. IIRIRA established the three pilot
programs to be in effect for 4 years, but Congress extended authorization
for the pilots for an additional 2 years in 2002 and for another 5 years
in 2003.16 Congress also mandated DHS to expand the Basic Pilot Program to
employers in all 50 states by December 2004, which DHS did.17 DHS
terminated the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot Program and the
Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program in 2003 because of technical
difficulties and unintended consequences, such as
16Basic Pilot Extension Act of 2001, P.L. 107-128 and Basic Pilot Program
Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, P.L.108-156.
17P.L. 108-156. IIRIRA required the INS to initially operate the Basic
Pilot Program in at least five of the seven states with the highest
estimated population of undocumented aliens in the United States. In 1997,
INS began offering participation in the Basic Pilot Program to employers
in California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas. In 1999, INS began
offering participation in the Basic Pilot Program to employers in Nebraska
because, at the time, INS was conducting an initiative in the state,
called Operation Vanguard, to help the meatpacking and processing industry
gain and maintain a legal workforce.
increased fraud and discrimination, identified in evaluations of the
18
programs.
The Basic Pilot Program is a part of USCIS's Systematic Alien Verification
for Entitlements Program, which provides a variety of verification
services for federal, state, and local government agencies. USCIS
estimates that there are more than 150,000 federal, state, and local
agency users that verify immigration status through the Systematic Alien
Verification for Entitlements Program. In fiscal year 2004, about 2,300
employers actively used the Basic Pilot Program within the Systematic
Alien Verification for Entitlements Program.
The Basic Pilot Program provides participating employers with an
electronic method to verify their employees' work eligibility. Employers
may participate voluntarily in the Basic Pilot Program but are still
required to complete Forms I-9 for all newly hired employees in accordance
with IRCA. After completing the forms, these employers query the pilot
program's automated system by entering employee information provided on
the forms, such as name and Social Security number, into the pilot Web
site within 3 days of the employees' hire date. The pilot program then
electronically matches that information against information in SSA and, if
necessary, DHS databases to determine whether the employee is eligible to
work, as shown in figure 1. The Basic Pilot Program electronically
notifies employers whether their employees' work authorization was
18Under the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot Program, only the
status of newly hired employees attesting to being work-authorized
noncitizens was electronically checked against information in INS
databases. The evaluation of this pilot program identified several
problems, including inherent discrimination against work-authorized
noncitizens and the lack of strong safeguards against fraudulent
citizenship attestions. The evaluation stated that individuals who
attested to being citizens did not need to show documents proving their
citizen status, and the individuals' information was not queried through
the pilot program. The Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program was
initiated only in Iowa because Iowa was the sole state at the start of the
pilot program issuing driver's licenses and identification cards that
included machine-readable information needed for completing the Form I-9
(e.g., name, date of birth, Social Security number). In evaluating this
pilot program, the Institute for Survey Research and Westat found that the
program had a number of technical and procedural problems, such as card
reader difficulties in reading the driver's licenses and Iowa's no longer
requiring the Social Security number as the driver's license number. This
change in Iowa's requirements resulted in the inability of employers to
use the readers on driver's licenses without Social Security numbers. See
Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Citizen
Attestation Verification Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: April
2003) and Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the
Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: May
2003).
confirmed. Those queries that the DHS automated check cannot confirm the
pilot refers to USCIS staff, called immigration status verifiers, who
check employee information against information in other DHS databases.
Figure 1: Basic Pilot Program Verification Process
Source: GAO analysis based on USCIS information.
In cases when the pilot system cannot confirm an employee's work
authorization status either through the automatic check or the check by an
immigration status verifier, the system issues the employer a tentative
nonconfirmation of the employee's work authorization status. In this case,
the employers must notify the affected employees of the finding, and the
employees have the right to contest their tentative nonconfirmations
within 8 working days by contacting SSA or USCIS to resolve any
inaccuracies in their records.19 During this time, employers may not take
any adverse actions against those employees, such as limiting their work
assignments or pay. When employees do not contest their tentative
nonconfirmations within the allotted time, the Basic Pilot Program issues
a final nonconfirmation for the employees. Employers are required to
either immediately terminate or notify DHS of the continued employment of
workers who do not successfully contest the tentative nonconfirmation and
those who the pilot program finds are not work-authorized.
Recent Proposals Related to Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement
There is ongoing congressional consideration about employment verification
and worksite enforcement efforts, and various initiatives have been
proposed related to these issues, including possible new temporary worker
programs. Since January 2004, the current administration has discussed the
possibility of initiating a guest worker program in which foreign workers
would be granted status for employment in the United States for a
specified period of time. Similarly, some recent legislative proposals
would provide a means for foreign workers to obtain temporary employment
and possible permanent residency or citizenship at a later date. Other
initiatives propose revising visa programs to increase the number of
foreign workers legally admitted to the United States. In addition,
legislative proposals have addressed methods for enhancing employment
verification and worksite enforcement efforts. For example, one proposal
would make use of the Basic Pilot Program mandatory for all employers, and
another would increase the fine amounts for employers who knowingly hire
unauthorized workers. These initiatives reflect
19In February 2005 we reported that verification services, like the Basic
Pilot Program, provide a valuable opportunity to prevent many unintended
or careless mistakes when hiring new workers and reporting worker
earnings. In particular, we concluded that the Basic Pilot Program
provides an option for addressing the problem of unauthorized workers'
earnings posted to the Earnings Suspense File, which occurs when
individuals' names or Social Security numbers in wage reports do not match
SSA records. According to SSA officials, when individuals contest SSA
tentative nonconfirmations, SSA can update the individuals' information in
the SSA database when, for example, individuals provide information on
name changes or correct inaccurate birthdates. SSA officials said that
such updates may help prevent wage reporting problems and the posting of
individuals' wage information to the Earnings Suspense File. GAO, Social
Security: Better Coordination among Federal Agencies Could Reduce
Unidentified Earnings Reports, GAO-05-154 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 4,
2005).
Various Weaknesses Have Undermined the Employment Verification Process, but
the Basic Pilot Program Shows Potential to Enhance the Process
differing perspectives on employment verification and worksite enforcement
and touch on a variety of related issues, such as the number of foreign
workers, if any, needed in the United States, the economic impact of
illegal aliens residing in the country, and policy decisions on ways to
address the millions of illegal aliens in the United States.
The current employment verification process relies on employers' review of
work eligibility documents to determine whether employees are authorized
to work, but the process has several weaknesses. Document and identity
fraud have hindered employers' efforts to reliably verify employees' work
eligibility under the Form I-9 process. In addition, the large number and
variety of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility have
undermined the process. We have previously reported on the need to reduce
the number of acceptable work eligibility documents and to improve the
integrity of the documents.20 The Basic Pilot Program, as a voluntary,
automated verification program, offers a mechanism with potential to
enhance the employment verification process by reducing document fraud.
ICE officials said that access to Basic Pilot Program information could
help the agency better target its worksite enforcement efforts by
identifying employers who do not follow program requirements. However,
existing weaknesses in the program, such as the inability of the program
to detect identity fraud, delays in entering data into DHS databases, and
some employer noncompliance with pilot program requirements, could become
more significant and additional resources could be needed if employer
participation in the program greatly increased or was made mandatory.
Current Employment Verification Process Based on Employers' Review of
Documents
In 1986, IRCA established the employment verification process based on
employers' review of documents presented by employees to prove identity
and work eligibility. Under the process, employers must request that newly
hired employees present a document or documents that confirm employees'
identity and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employees must attest that
they are U.S. citizens, lawfully admitted permanent residents, or aliens
authorized to work in the United States. Employers must then certify that
they have reviewed the documents presented by their employees to establish
identity and work eligibility and that the
20GAO, Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and the Question of
Discrimination, GAO/GGD-90-62, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 1990) and
GAO/GGD-99-33.
documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting them. In
making their certifications, employers are expected to judge whether the
documents presented are obviously counterfeit. Employers are deemed in
compliance with IRCA if they have followed the verification procedures,
including instances when an unauthorized alien may have presented
fraudulent documents that appeared genuine. In addition, on the Form I-9,
employers are required to reverify the employment eligibility of
individuals whose work authorization has expired, such as aliens with
temporary work authorization, to determine whether the individuals are
authorized to continue to work.
Document and Identity Fraud Have Undermined the Form I-9 Process
Since the passage of IRCA in 1986, document fraud (use of counterfeit
documents) and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or
information belonging to others) have made it difficult for employers who
want to comply with IRCA to ensure that they employ only authorized
workers through the current verification and reverification processes. In
its 1997 report to Congress, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform
noted that the widespread availability of false documents made it easy for
unauthorized aliens to obtain jobs in the United States. In 1999, we
reported that large numbers of unauthorized aliens have either
fraudulently used valid documents that belong to others or presented
counterfeit documents as evidence of employment eligibility.21
Furthermore, in 2004 we reported that unauthorized workers were able to
use false documents to illegally gain entry to secure areas of critical
infrastructure sites, such as airports, nuclear power plants, and military
bases.22 Representatives from some of the employers and employer
associations we interviewed for this review indicated that, in cases where
employees present documents that employers suspect of being counterfeit,
employers may not request that these employees present other documents
proving their work eligibility because the employees could claim that
employers are discriminating against them. To help protect against
discriminatory hiring practices, such as employers requesting specific
documents from foreign-looking or sounding employees, employers are
prohibited under IRCA from requesting that new employees present specific
documents from among the list of acceptable documents to prove their
identity and work eligibility.
21GAO/GGD-99-33.
22GAO, Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a
Layered Defense, GAO-04-82 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004).
Although studies suggest that the majority of employers comply with IRCA
and try to hire only authorized workers, the studies have also noted that
some employers knowingly hire unauthorized workers, often to exploit the
workers' low cost labor.23 In 1997, the U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform reported that the minority of employers who knowingly hired illegal
aliens avoided sanctions by going through the motions of compliance while
accepting false documents. Likewise, in 1999 we concluded that those
employers who do not want to comply with IRCA can intentionally hire
unauthorized aliens under the guise of having complied with the employment
verification requirements by claiming that unauthorized workers presented
false documents to obtain employment.24
Large Number and Variety of Acceptable Documents Have Hindered Employer
Verification Efforts
The large number and variety of documents that are acceptable for proving
work eligibility have also complicated employer verification efforts under
IRCA. Following passage of IRCA in 1986, employees could present any of 29
different documents to establish their identity and/or work eligibility.
In a 1997 interim rule, INS reduced the number of acceptable work
eligibility documents from 29 to 27. Eight of these documents establish
both identity and employment eligibility (e.g., U.S. passport or permanent
resident card); 12 documents establish identity only (e.g., driver's
license); and 7 documents establish employment eligibility only (e.g.,
Social Security card without the legend "Not Valid for Employment").25 The
interim rule implemented changes to the list of acceptable work
eligibility documents mandated by IIRIRA and was intended to serve as a
temporary measure until INS issued final rules on modifications to the
Form I-9. In 1998, INS proposed a further reduction in the number of
acceptable work eligibility documents to 14 but did not finalize the
proposed rule.
Since the passage of IRCA, various studies have addressed the need to
reduce the number of acceptable work eligibility documents to make the
employment verification process simpler and more secure. In 1990, we
reported that the multiplicity of work eligibility documents contributed
to (1) employer uncertainty about how to comply with the employment
23There are no current reliable data available on the number or percentage
of employers who seek to comply with IRCA and those who attempt to
circumvent it.
24GAO/GGD-99-33.
25See appendix I for the complete list of acceptable work eligibility
documents.
verification requirements and (2) discrimination against authorized
workers.26 A 1992 report prepared by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
noted that the first step to simplifying the employment verification
process was to reduce the current list of acceptable work eligibility
documents and make them more counterfeit-proof.27 In 1998, INS noted that,
when IRCA was first passed, a long, inclusive list of acceptable work
eligibility documents was allowed for the Form I-9 to help ensure that all
persons who were eligible to work could easily meet the requirements, but
as early as 1990, there had been evidence that some employers found the
list confusing. In 1999 we reported that various studies of IRCA's
employment verification process advocated that the number of documents
that employees can use to demonstrate employment eligibility should be
reduced to make the employment verification process more secure and easier
to understand.28
Additionally, some of the employers, employer associations, and
immigration experts we interviewed for this review told us that the large
number of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility and the fact
that the Form I-9 has not been updated have impeded employer efforts to
verify employment eligibility. Representatives from three employer
associations said that member employers have expressed concerns that the
Form I-9 has not been updated to reflect changes in the list of acceptable
work eligibility documents, causing confusion among some employers
regarding which documents are acceptable. In addition, among the 23
employers we interviewed, 5 discussed the need to update the Form I-9 to
reflect revisions to the list of acceptable work eligibility documents.
Two of these employers told us that they manually edit the Form I-9 to
reflect the changes in the list of acceptable work eligibility documents.
DHS officials told us that the department is assessing possible revisions
to the Form I-9 process, including revisions to the number of acceptable
work eligibility documents, but has not established a target time frame
for
26GAO/GGD-90-62.
27U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and
Refugee Affairs, Options for an Improved Employment Verification System
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 1992).
28GAO/GGD-99-33.
completing this assessment.29 They said that the Handbook for Employers,
which provides guidance for completing the Form I-9, would also need to be
updated. In May 2005, DHS released an updated version of the Form I-9 that
changed references from INS to DHS but did not modify the list of
acceptable work eligibility documents on the Form I-9 to reflect changes
made to the list by the 1997 interim rule. In the absence of final
regulations and an updated Form I-9 and handbook, employers, employees,
and other stakeholders may not clearly understand the Form I-9 process,
particularly which documents are acceptable for proving work eligibility.
Proposals Have Been Made to Improve Document Integrity
We have previously reported on efforts to enhance the integrity of
acceptable work eligibility documents, which could help reduce document
fraud and make the employment verification process more secure, especially
if the number of acceptable documents was reduced. For example, in 1999 we
reported that INS had taken steps to increase the integrity of immigration
documents, such as by issuing new employment authorization documents with
visible security features like holograms and by issuing permanent resident
cards with digital photographs and fingerprint images.30 We noted that,
although INS enhanced the integrity of its documents, unauthorized aliens
could present non-INS documents, such as Social Security cards, to
employers to prove work eligibility. In 1998, we reported on estimates of
costs associated with alternative proposals for SSA issuance of enhanced
Social Security cards.31 We are currently reviewing SSA efforts to enhance
the integrity of Social Security cards and how enhanced cards might
strengthen the employment verification process and plan to report on these
issues next year.
In addition, we have previously reported on the possible use of biometrics
in verification and identification processes-such as those used at U.S.
ports of entry.32 Biometrics covers a wide range of technologies that can
be
29In addition to developing a rule on the reduction of the number of
acceptable work eligibility documents, DHS is also developing regulations
on the electronic Form I-9, which employers were authorized to use
beginning at the end of April 2005. See appendix III for more information
on the electronic Form I-9.
30GAO/GGD-99-33.
31GAO, Social Security: Mass Issuance of Counterfeit-Resistant Cards
Expensive, but Alternatives Exist, GAO/HEHS-98-170 (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
20, 1998).
32GAO, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security,
GAO-03-174 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002).
used to verify identity by measuring and analyzing human
characteristics.33 Biometrics can theoretically be very effective personal
identifiers because the characteristics they measure are thought to be
distinct to each person. Because they are tightly bound to an individual,
biometrics are more reliable, cannot be forgotten, and are less easily
lost, stolen, or guessed. While biometrics may show promise in enhancing
verification and identification processes, we have also reported on the
trade-offs for using biometric indicators, such as concerns regarding the
protections under current law for biometric data, the absence of clear
criteria governing data sharing, and infrastructure processes such as the
binding of an identity to the biometric data. We reported that while a
biometric placed on a token, such as a passport or visa, cannot
necessarily link a person to his or her identity, it can reduce the
potential for an individual to assume multiple identities. We also
reported that although federal agencies are required by statute to provide
security protections for information collected and maintained by or for
the agency commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm that would
result from unauthorized disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction of the information, poor information security is a widespread
federal problem with potentially severe consequences. In reporting on the
possible use of biometrics in verification and identification processes,
we identified several examples of such risks associated with using
biometric data.34
Recent laws and legislative proposals have addressed possible ways to
enhance the integrity of documents and strengthen the employment
verification process. The Real ID Act of 2005 mandated that states must
meet minimum standards in developing and issuing driver's licenses before
federal government authorities can accept state driver's licenses as
identification for official purposes.35 These standards include (1) adding
physical security features to prevent counterfeiting and tampering, (2)
including common machine-readable technology on driver's licenses, and (3)
requiring driver's license applicants to provide evidence of their dates
of birth and Social Security numbers. The Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required SSA to form a task force to,
among other things, establish standards for safeguarding Social Security
33GAO, Information Security: Challenges in Using Biometrics, GAO-03-1137T
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003).
34GAO-03-174.
35P.L. 109-13, 49 U.S.C. 30301 note.
cards from counterfeiting, tampering, alteration, and theft.36 In addition
to these laws, various legislative proposals address possible ways to make
identity and work eligibility documents more secure and to enhance the
employment verification process. For example, one recent proposal would
mandate that individuals can present only machine-readable, counterfeit
and tamper-resistant Social Security cards to obtain employment. According
to the proposal, these machine-readable cards would allow employers to
check employees' work authorization status against information maintained
in an employment eligibility database.37 These laws and proposals differ
in the extent to which they address issues related to enhancing employment
verification through electronic means, such as the availability and
accessibility of machine-readable technology and the security and privacy
of information maintained on documents and in databases.
Basic Pilot Program Shows
Promise in Enhancing Employment Verification, but Current Weaknesses Could
Undermine Increased Use
Basic Pilot Program May Help Employers Reliably Verify Work Eligibility
and Decrease Document Fraud
Various immigration experts have noted that the most important step that
could be taken to reduce unlawful migration is the development of a more
effective system for verifying work authorization. In particular, the U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform concluded that the most promising option
for verifying work authorization was a computerized registry based on
employers' electronic verification of an employee's Social Security number
with records on work authorization for aliens. The Basic Pilot Program,
which is currently available on a voluntary basis to all employers in the
United States, operates in a similar way to the computerized registry
recommended by the commission. Yet only a small portion-about 2,300
36P.L. 108-458.
37Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Social Security Protection Act of
2005, H.R. 98, 109th Cong.
ICE Sees Additional Benefit in Access to Basic Pilot Program Data
in fiscal year 2004-of the approximately 5.6 million employer firms
nationwide actively used the pilot program.38
The Basic Pilot Program assists employers in detecting document fraud by
helping to eliminate employer guesswork as to whether information
contained on work eligibility documents presented by employees is
authentic or counterfeit. If newly hired employees present counterfeit
documents containing false information, the pilot program would not
confirm the employees' work eligibility because the employees' Form I-9
information, such as a false name or Social Security number, would not
match SSA and DHS database information when queried through the Basic
Pilot Program. In the evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, the Institute
for Survey Research at Temple University and Westat found that the program
appeared to reduce unauthorized employment arising from employee
presentation of counterfeit or altered documents containing false
information. Twenty of the 22 employers we interviewed who participated in
the Basic Pilot Program indicated that the program helps them to reliably
verify newly hired employees' work authorization status.
ICE has no direct role in monitoring employer use of the Basic Pilot
Program and does not have direct access to program information, which is
maintained by USCIS. ICE officials noted that, in a few cases, they have
requested and received pilot program data from USCIS on specific employers
who participate in the program and are under ICE investigation. ICE
officials told us that program data could indicate cases in which
employers do not follow program requirements and therefore would help ICE
better target its worksite enforcement efforts toward those employers. For
example, the Basic Pilot Program's confirmation of numerous queries of the
same Social Security number could indicate that the Social Security
38The number of employers who actively used the program in fiscal year
2004 includes a small number of employers who switched between two
versions of the program and, as a result, were counted twice as active
users. USCIS is not able to easily determine which employers were counted
twice. In addition, the approximately 2,300 employers who actively used
the pilot program in fiscal year 2004 do not reflect the number of
worksites or individual business establishments using the program. In
2002, the most recent year for which data are available, there were
approximately 5.6 million firms in the United States. Under the Basic
Pilot Program, one employer may have multiple worksites that use the pilot
program. For example, a hotel chain could have multiple individual hotels
using the Basic Pilot Program. This hotel chain would represent one
employer using the pilot program. A firm is a business organization
consisting of one or more domestic establishments in the same state and
industry that were specified under common ownership or control. See
appendix IV for data on employer participation and use of the Basic Pilot
Program.
Basic Pilot Program Does Not Help Employers Detect Identity Fraud in
Verifying Employees' Work Eligibility
number is being used fraudulently or that an unscrupulous employer is
knowingly hiring unauthorized workers by accepting the same Social
Security number for multiple employees. However, USCIS officials stated
that they have concerns about providing ICE with broader access to Basic
Pilot Program information for the worksite enforcement program. USCIS
officials said that, if ICE has access to pilot program information for
worksite enforcement purposes, that access might create a disincentive for
employers to participate in this voluntary program and could be used for
purposes other than identifying potentially unscrupulous employers. These
officials stated that employers may be less likely to join or participate
in the program because the employers may believe that they are more likely
to be targeted for a worksite enforcement investigation as a result of
program participation.
ICE suggested that there could be possible benefits to their worksite
enforcement efforts if employers were required to participate in a
mandatory automated verification program like the Basic Pilot Program. ICE
officials said that a mandatory automated verification system could help
ICE focus worksite enforcement efforts on employers who try to evade using
the program. They also stated that a mandatory system like the pilot
program could limit the ability of employers who knowingly hired
unauthorized workers to claim that the workers presented false documents
to obtain employment, assisting ICE agents in proving employer violations
of IRCA. Officials from 7 of the 12 Special Agent in Charge field offices
we interviewed suggested that a mandatory Basic Pilot Program could help
them better target their worksite enforcement efforts.
Although an automated verification program like the Basic Pilot Program
has potential to enhance the employment verification process and help
employers detect use of counterfeit documents, the program cannot
currently help employers detect identity fraud. In 2002 we reported that,
although not specifically or comprehensively quantifiable, the prevalence
of identity fraud seemed to be increasing, a development that may affect
employers' ability to reliably verify employment eligibility.39 If an
unauthorized worker presents valid documentation that belongs to another
person authorized to work, the Basic Pilot Program may find the worker to
be work-authorized. Similarly, if an employee presents counterfeit
documentation that contains valid information and appears
39GAO, Identity Theft: Prevalence and Cost Appear to Be Growing,
GAO-02-363 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2002).
Delays in Data Entry May Lengthen the Pilot Program Verification Process
authentic, the Basic Pilot Program may verify the employee as
workauthorized. DHS officials told us that the department is currently
considering possible ways to enhance the Basic Pilot Program to help it
detect cases of identity fraud, for example, by modifying the program to
provide a digitized photograph associated with employment authorization
information presented by an employee. Yet, DHS cannot fully assess
possible ways to modify the Basic Pilot Program to address identity fraud
in the absence of data on the costs and feasibility of implementing such
modifications.
In addition, the Basic Pilot Program does not assist employers in
verifying the work authorization status of employees whose status requires
reverification and therefore does not help employers detect document or
identity fraud in the reverification process. Employers currently may not
use the Basic Pilot Program to re-verify the employment eligibility of
individuals whose work authorization has expired, and employers agree not
to use the pilot program for reverification when registering to
participate in the program. Therefore, participating employers cannot
fully use the Basic Pilot Program to verify the work authorization status
of all employees for whom verification, including reverification, is
required under the Form I-9 process. According to one USCIS official, the
pilot program does not face any technological or other limitations that
would prevent the program from being used for reverification purposes, if
such use was required or allowed as part of the pilot program.
Another current weakness in the Basic Pilot Program that could affect the
program's success if use increased or was made mandatory is delays in the
entry of information on immigrants' and nonimmigrants' arrivals and
employment authorization into DHS databases. Although the majority of
pilot program queries entered by participating employers are confirmed via
the automated SSA and DHS verification checks, about 15 percent of queries
authorized by DHS required manual verification by immigration status
verifiers in fiscal year 2004.40 According to USCIS, immigration status
verifiers typically resolve cases referred to them for verification within
24 hours, but a small number of cases take longer. For example, nine
employers we interviewed reported that a small number of
40In fiscal year 2004, about 10 percent of total Basic Pilot Program
queries were referred to DHS for verification. Of these queries referred
to DHS for verification, about 85 percent were confirmed via the DHS
automated check.
immigration status verifier verifications took longer than 24 hours to
resolve, with a few verifications taking as long as 2 weeks to resolve.
Immigration status verifiers reported that the primary reason for queries
to require verification by them is because of delays in entry of
employment authorization information into DHS databases. USCIS officials
told us that those verifications that take longer than a few days to
resolve are generally caused by delays in the entry of data on employees
who received employment authorization documents generated by a computer
and camera that are not directly linked to DHS databases, such as those
used at ports of entry for refugees and at USCIS field offices. They said
that information on the employment authorization documents generated
through this process is electronically sent to USCIS headquarters for
entry but is sometimes lost or not entered into databases in a timely
manner. By contrast, employment authorization documents issued at USCIS
service centers are produced via computers that are used to update data in
USCIS databases, which USCIS officials told us represent the majority of
employment authorization documents currently issued by USCIS. The Temple
University Institute for Survey Research and Westat found that
verifications that require immigration status verifiers' review lengthen
the time needed to complete the employment verification process. In
addition, among the 22 employers we interviewed, 7 reported that they may
experience some losses in work time, training, or money for background
checks and physicals when employees contest tentative nonconfirmations.
USCIS has taken steps to increase the timeliness and accuracy of
information entered into databases used as part of the Basic Pilot
Program. In June 2004, USCIS reported that, among other improvements, it
had started work to expedite data entry for new lawful permanent residents
and arriving nonimmigrants and to improve data entry for changes in work
authorization status.41 For example, USCIS said that it has worked to
reduce the time in which data are available for Basic Pilot Program
verifications by expediting submission of data on newly arrived immigrants
and nonimmigrants from ports of entry and field offices to USCIS service
centers for data entry. The agency reported that, as a result of its
efforts, data on new immigrants are now typically available for
verification within 10 to 12 days of an immigrant's arrival in the United
States while previously, the information was not available for up to 6 to
9 months after arrival. Moreover, USCIS reported it has worked to
41DHS, Report to Congress on the Basic Pilot Program (Washington, D.C.:
June 2004).
increase the timeliness and availability of temporary work authorization
information in its databases by increasing the number of employment
authorization documents issued by service centers as compared with the
number of documents issued through computers not directly linked to DHS
databases. The department reported that, while in 1999 less than half of
all employment authorization documents were issued by service centers,
over three-quarters of the cards are now issued through service centers.
USCIS officials told us that the agency has continued these efforts to
improve the timeliness and accuracy of information entered into DHS
databases and noted that the agency is currently planning to fund another
evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program that will include a review of the
accuracy of DHS database information.
Furthermore, analysis of the Basic Pilot Program database indicates that
the timeliness and accuracy of the DHS automated checks against the Basic
Pilot Program database have improved. In fiscal year 2004, about 10
percent of all queries were referred to DHS for verification. Among those
queries authorized by DHS, the percentage of queries verified by the DHS
automated check increased from about 67 percent in fiscal year 2000 to
about 85 percent in fiscal year 2004, as shown in figure 2.
Employer Noncompliance with Pilot Program Procedures May Adversely Affect
Employees
Figure 2: Number of Queries Authorized by DHS through the Automated Check
and the Immigration Status Verifier Check
Number of queries
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Fiscal year
Employment authorizations issued by DHS immigration status verifier review
Employment authorizations issued by DHS automated check
Source: GAO analysis of USCIS data.
Note: Data have been rounded to the nearest hundred.
Although USCIS has taken some steps to improve the timeliness and accuracy
of information entered into databases used as part of the Basic Pilot
Program and plans to review the accuracy of database information as part
of its planned evaluation of the pilot program, USCIS cannot effectively
assess future use of the pilot program, including possible increased
program usage, without information on the costs and feasibility of ways to
further reduce delays in the entry of information into DHS databases.
Another factor that may reduce the effectiveness of the pilot program if
usage is increased or made mandatory is employer noncompliance with Basic
Pilot Program requirements. These requirements are intended to safeguard
employees queried through the program from such harm as discrimination or
reduced training and pay. The Temple University
Current Program May Not Complete Timely Verifications if Use Greatly
Increased
Institute for Survey Research and Westat evaluation of the Basic Pilot
Program concluded that the majority of employers surveyed appeared to be
in compliance with Basic Pilot Program procedures. However, the evaluation
found evidence of some noncompliance with these procedures that
specifically prohibit screening job applicants and taking actions that
adversely affect employees while they are contesting tentative
nonconfirmations, such as limiting employees' work assignments or pay. For
example, 30 percent of the employers surveyed for the evaluation reported
restricting work assignments while employees contested tentative
nonconfirmations, a practice that is prohibited under the Basic Pilot
Program. Of the 22 employers we interviewed who participate in the pilot,
7 reported using the Basic Pilot Program in a way that did not conform
with pilot program procedures, including using the pilot program to screen
job applicants before offering jobs to the applicants.
The Basic Pilot Program provides a variety of reports that may help USCIS
determine whether employers follow program requirements. For example,
these reports could help USCIS identify employers who do not appear to
refer employees contesting tentative nonconfirmations to SSA or DHS, which
is required under pilot program procedures. USCIS could then follow up to
determine if such employers are following pilot procedures that require
employers to refer all employees with tentative nonconfirmations to SSA or
DHS. USCIS officials told us that efforts to review employers' use of the
pilot program have been limited by lack of staff available to oversee and
examine employer use of the program, and they noted that there are
currently 15 USCIS headquarters staff members responsible for
administering USCIS verification programs, including the Basic Pilot
Program. The officials said that, as part of the next evaluation of the
pilot program, USCIS plans to assess the extent to which employers follow
pilot program requirements and procedures, such as employer adherence to
requirements to notify employees of tentative nonconfirmations. However,
without information on the costs and feasibility of routinely reviewing
employers' use of the pilot program, USCIS cannot fully determine possible
ways to regularly examine employer use of the program and therefore the
extent to which employers comply with pilot program requirements.
According to USCIS officials, due to the growth in other USCIS
verification programs, current USCIS staff may not be able to complete
timely verifications if the number of employers using the Basic Pilot
Program were to significantly increase. In particular, these officials
said that if a significant number of new employers registered for the
program or if the program were mandatory for all employers or a segment of
employers, additional resources would be needed to maintain timely
verifications, given the growth in other verification programs. For
example, the REAL ID Act of 200542 mandated that states must meet minimum
standards in issuing driver's licenses and nondriver identification cards,
including verifying the immigration status of all noncitizen applicants,
before federal government authorities can accept the licenses and cards
for official purposes beginning in 2008. Currently, USCIS has
approximately 38 immigration status verifiers available for completing
Basic Pilot Program verifications, and these verifiers reported that they
are able to complete the majority of current required checks within their
target time frame of 24 hours.43 However, USCIS officials said that
because of the growth in other verification programs that would increase
the number of verifications that require checks by immigration status
verifiers, the agency has serious concerns about its ability to complete
timely verifications if the number of Basic Pilot Program users greatly
increased.
USCIS officials also stated that the agency lacks funding to further
expand the Basic Pilot Program. The Basic Pilot Program and other
verification programs have been funded by fees USCIS receives from
applicants for adjudication of immigration and citizenship benefits. USCIS
allocated about $3.5 million from its fee accounts for all of its
verification programs, including the Basic Pilot Program, in fiscal year
2005.44 USCIS officials said that this allocation included a $500,000
increase for additional employee verifications by employers using the
Basic Pilot Program. However, these officials told us that current funding
levels allocated for USCIS verification programs would not be sufficient
to cover costs associated with mandatory use of the Basic Pilot Program
for all employers, should this be adopted. In 2004, we reported that USCIS
fees were not sufficient to fully
42P.L. 109-13, codified at 49 U.S.C. 30301.
43Other immigration status verifiers are dedicated to completing manual
verifications for other USCIS verification programs.
44According to USCIS, in fiscal year 2005, the agency allocated about
$475,000 to reimburse SSA for Basic Pilot Program query costs and about
$337,500 for employer query costs. In addition, USCIS estimated about $7
million in annual costs for verifications by immigration status verifiers.
fund the agency's operations but noted that cost data were insufficient to
determine the full extent of the funding shortfall.45
The Temple University Institute for Survey Research and Westat estimated a
range of costs associated with expanding the dial-up version of the pilot
program,46 including costs for making the program mandatory for a selected
group of employers, like employers with more than 10 employees, and making
the program mandatory for all employers, regardless of the number of
employees. The report estimated that a mandatory dial-up version of the
pilot program for all employers would cost the federal government,
employers, and employees about $11.7 billion total per year, with
employers bearing most of the costs.47 USCIS has worked with participating
employers to switch them to the Web-based version of the program and
discontinued the dial-up version in June 2005. The Temple University
Institute for Survey Research and Westat did not estimate costs for a
mandatory Web-based version, although they noted that operating costs
associated with such a program would be less than for the dial-up version
because employer computer maintenance and telephone costs would be lower.
As part of the next evaluation of the pilot program, USCIS plans to assess
the costs and potential time frames associated with making the Web-based
version mandatory for all employers or specific segments of employers.
Given the growth in other USCIS verification programs, USCIS cannot
effectively assess potential costs for making the Web-based version of the
Basic Pilot Program mandatory without information on other possible
resources needed for the program, such as staff needed for conducting
manual verifications.
45GAO, Immigration Application Fees: Current Fees Are Not Sufficient to
Fund U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Operations, GAO-04-309R
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 5, 2004). In April 2004, USCIS raised its fees for
immigration benefit applications.
46Under the dial-up version of the Basic Pilot Program, employers
installed pilot program software directly onto a computer and used a
dedicated telephone line to access the pilot system.
47The Institute for Survey Research and Westat estimated that the
contractor who runs the Basic Pilot Program charged $0.28 per query. They
estimated that it cost about $6 to resolve each query that required review
by immigration status verifiers.
Competing Priorities and Lack of Outcome Goals and Measures May Hinder
Worksite Enforcement Efforts
The worksite enforcement program is one of various ICE immigration
enforcement programs, and has been a relatively low priority. Since fiscal
year 1999, the number of notices of intent to fine issued to employers for
violations of IRCA and the number of administrative worksite arrests have
declined, which, according to ICE, are due to various factors, such as the
widespread use of counterfeit documents that make it difficult for ICE
agents to prove employer violations. INS and ICE have also faced
difficulties in setting and collecting meaningful fine amounts and in
detaining unauthorized workers arrested at worksites. In addition, ICE has
not yet developed outcome goals and measures for the worksite enforcement
program, making it difficult for ICE and Congress to assess program
performance and determine resource levels for the program.
Worksite Enforcement Has Been a Relatively Low Priority for ICE, but ICE Has
Proposed Additional Resources for the Program
Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs
formerly managed by INS and now managed by ICE, and competes for resources
with these other program areas, such as alien smuggling and fraud. Among
INS and ICE responsibilities, worksite enforcement has been a relatively
low priority. For example, in the 1999 INS Interior Enforcement Strategy,
the strategy to block and remove employers' access to undocumented workers
was the fifth of five interior enforcement priorities.48 In this same
year, we reported that, relative to other enforcement programs in INS,
worksite enforcement received a small portion of INS's staffing and
enforcement budget. We noted that the number of employer investigations
INS was able to conduct each year covered only a fraction of the estimated
number of employers who may
49
have hired unauthorized aliens.
In keeping with the primary mission of DHS to combat terrorism, after
September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE focused investigative resources
primarily on national security cases, such as investigations of aliens in
the United States who may have overstayed their authorized time periods
for being in the country and the National Security Entry and Exit
Registration System; on participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces;50
and on critical
48INS, Interior Enforcement Strategy (Washington, D.C.: January 1999).
49GAO/GGD-99-33.
50The National Security Entry and Exit Registration System domestic
registration required selected groups of aliens from a number of countries
to register with immigration authorities between November 2002 and April
2003. Joint Terrorism Task Forces are multiagency investigative teams
composed of federal, state, and local agencies that work jointly with
other nonmember agencies to investigate terrorism matters.
infrastructure protection. In particular, INS and then ICE focused
available resources for worksite enforcement mainly on identifying and
removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites, such as
airports and nuclear power plants, to help reduce vulnerabilities at those
sites. In 2004, we reported that, if critical infrastructure-related
businesses were to be compromised by terrorists, this would pose a serious
threat to domestic security.51 In 2003, we testified that, given ICE's
limited resources, it needs to ensure that it targets those industries
where employment of illegal aliens poses the greatest potential risk to
national security.52 According to ICE officials, the agency adopted this
focus on critical infrastructure protection because the fact that
unauthorized workers can obtain employment at critical infrastructure
sites indicates that there are vulnerabilities in those sites' hiring and
screening practices, and unauthorized workers employed at those sites are
vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists, smugglers, traffickers, or other
criminals.
Consistent with these priorities, in 2003 ICE headquarters issued a memo
requiring field offices to request approval from ICE headquarters prior to
opening any worksite enforcement investigation not related to the
protection of critical infrastructure sites, such as investigations of
farms and restaurants. ICE officials told us that the purpose of this memo
was to help ensure that field offices focused worksite enforcement efforts
on critical infrastructure protection operations. Field office
representatives told us that noncritical infrastructure worksite
enforcement was one of the few investigative areas for which offices had
to request approval from ICE headquarters to open an investigation.
According to ICE, the agency recently issued a memo delegating authority
to approve noncritical infrastructure worksite enforcement cases to field
offices' Special Agents in Charge. Eight of the 12 offices we interviewed
told us that worksite enforcement was not an office priority unless the
worksite enforcement case related to critical infrastructure protection.
ICE has inspected Forms I-9 and employer records at hundreds of critical
infrastructure sites as of March 2005. For example, as part of Operation
Tarmac, ICE conducted investigations at nearly 200 airports nationwide
and, as part of Operation Glow Worm, conducted investigations at more than
50 nuclear power
51GAO-05-66.
52GAO, Homeland Security: Challenges to Implementing the Immigration
Interior Enforcement Strategy, GAO-03-660T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10,
2003).
plants as of March 2005.53 Between October 2004 and the beginning of May
2005, about 77 percent of the worksite enforcement cases opened by ICE
were related to critical infrastructure protection.54
Since fiscal year 1999, INS and ICE have dedicated a relatively small
portion of overall agent resources to the worksite enforcement program. As
shown in figure 3, in fiscal year 1999, INS allocated about 240 full-time
equivalents to worksite enforcement efforts, while in fiscal year 2003,
ICE allocated about 90 full-time equivalents.55 Between fiscal years 1999
and 2003, the percentage of agent work-years spent on worksite enforcement
efforts generally decreased from about 9 percent to about 4 percent.
53Operations Tarmac and Glow Worm were ICE initiatives to detect and
remove unauthorized workers from airports and nuclear power plants,
respectively.
54Data are not available on the number of critical infrastructure and
noncritical infrastructure worksite enforcement cases ICE opened prior to
fiscal year 2005 because before fiscal year 2005, ICE's case management
system did not distinguish between the two case types.
55One full-time equivalent is equal to one work-year or 2,080 nonovertime
hours.
Figure 3: Investigative Agent Work-years Spent on Worksite Enforcement
Efforts and Agent Work-years Spent on Other Investigative Areas for Each
Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2003
Work-years
3,000
2,499 2,4722,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Fiscal year
Work-years for worksite enforcement
Work-years for all other investigative areas
Source: GAO analysis of INS case management data.
Although worksite enforcement may remain a low priority relative to other
programs, ICE has proposed increasing agent resources for the worksite
enforcement program by adding staff to its headquarters' worksite
enforcement unit,56 which was comprised of three staff members as of July
2005, and hiring additional worksite enforcement staff for field offices.
In particular, ICE plans to use the $5 million provided for fiscal year
2005 by a congressional conference report for the worksite enforcement
program to fund additional headquarters positions for the worksite
enforcement unit.57 In its fiscal year 2006 budget submission, ICE
requested funding for 117 compliance officers, 20 additional investigative
agents, and
56ICE headquarters' worksite enforcement unit is responsible for managing
the agency's worksite enforcement program.
57H.R. Conf. Rep. 108-774 (2004) accompanying the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108-334.
6 additional program managers for worksite enforcement. ICE has proposed
hiring these compliance officers to conduct the administrative elements of
worksite enforcement cases, such as the inspection of Forms I-9 and other
employment records. ICE officials said that these officers would pass
cases involving potential criminal violations to investigative agents for
review. ICE officials told us that the agency would use the compliance
officers only for worksite enforcement efforts. According to ICE,
compliance enforcement officers are less costly than investigative agents.
ICE estimates that each investigative agent would cost the agency
approximately $167,000 to $176,000 in fiscal year 2006, while one
compliance enforcement officer would cost about $76,000. At this point, it
is unclear what impact, if any, these additional resources would have on
worksite enforcement efforts.
ICE Attributes Decline in Numbers of Employer Fine Notices and Worksite
Arrests to Document Fraud and Resource Allocation Decisions
The number of notices of intent to fine issued to employers as well as the
number of unauthorized workers arrested at worksites have generally
declined. Between fiscal years 1999 and 2004, the number of notices of
intent to fine issued to employers for improperly completing Forms I-9 or
knowingly hiring unauthorized workers generally decreased from 417 to 3.58
(See figure 4.)
58ICE worksite enforcement investigations can span several fiscal years.
For example, ICE can open an investigation in one fiscal year, but may not
complete the case, including issuing a notice of intent to fine, if
warranted, for several fiscal years. In addition, after ICE issues a
notice of intent to fine, employers may negotiate with ICE attorneys to
set a final amount for the fine. Therefore, ICE could issue a notice of
intent to fine in one fiscal year, but not issue the final order for the
fine until the following fiscal year.
Figure 4: Number of Notices of Intent to Fine Issued to Employers for Each
Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2004
The number of unauthorized workers arrested during worksite enforcement
operations has also declined since fiscal year 1999. As shown in figure 5,
the number of administrative worksite arrests declined by about 84 percent
from 2,849 in fiscal year 1999 to 445 in fiscal year 2003.
Figure 5: Number of Worksite Enforcement Arrests for Each Fiscal Year from
1999 through 2003
According to ICE records, worksite enforcement criminal arrests totaled
159 in fiscal year 2004 and 81 in the period from October 2004 through
April 2005.59
ICE attributes the decline in the number of notices of intent to fine
issued to employers and number of administrative worksite arrests to
various factors including the widespread availability and use of
counterfeit
59These data on worksite enforcement criminal arrests for fiscal years
2004 and 2005 do not include data on the number of worksite enforcement
administrative arrests for those fiscal years. Fiscal year 2004 and 2005
data cannot be compared with data for previous fiscal years because the
way INS agents entered data on investigative work-years into the INS case
management system differs from the way ICE agents enter such data into the
ICE system. Following the creation of ICE in March 2003, the case
management system used to enter and maintain information on immigration
investigations changed. With the establishment of ICE, agents began using
the legacy U.S. Customs Service's case management system, called the
Treasury Enforcement Communications System, for entering and maintaining
information on investigations, including worksite enforcement operations.
Prior to the creation of ICE, the former INS entered and maintained
information on investigative activities in the Performance Analysis
System, which captured information on immigration investigations
differently than the Treasury Enforcement Communications System.
documents and the allocation of resources to other priorities. Various
studies have shown that the availability and use of fraudulent documents
have made it difficult for ICE agents to prove that employers knowingly
hire unauthorized workers. For example, in previous work we reported that
the prevalence of document fraud made it difficult for INS to prove that
an employer knowingly hired an unauthorized alien.60 In 1996, the
Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General reported that the
proliferation of cheap fraudulent documents made it possible for the
unscrupulous employer to avoid being held accountable for hiring illegal
aliens.61 ICE officials told us that employers who agents suspect of
knowingly hiring unauthorized workers can claim that they were unaware
that their workers presented false documents at the time of hire, making
it difficult for agents to prove that the employer willfully violated
IRCA. In commenting on a draft of this report, ICE also noted that the
IIRIRA provision that limited employer liability for certain Form I-9
paperwork violations affects ICE's ability to substantiate employer
charges for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers and, therefore, the
number of notices of intent to fine that ICE issues. This provision came
into effect in 1996, so it is unclear what effect, if any, the provision
had on the decline in the number of notices of intent to fine issued
between fiscal years 1999 and 2004.
In addition, according to ICE, the allocation of INS and ICE resources to
other priorities has contributed to the decline in the numbers of notices
of intent to fine and worksite arrests. For example, INS focused its
worksite enforcement resources on egregious employer violators who were
linked to other criminal violations like smuggling, fraud, or worker
exploitation, and de-emphasized administrative employer cases and fines.
Furthermore, INS investigative resources were redirected from worksite
enforcement activities to criminal alien cases, which consumed more
investigative hours by the late 1990s than any other enforcement activity.
After September 11, 2001, INS and ICE focused investigative resources on
national security cases and, in particular, focused worksite enforcement
efforts on critical infrastructure protection, which is consistent with
DHS's primary mission to combat terrorism. According to ICE, the
redirection of
60GAO/GGD-99-33 and GAO, Identity Fraud: Prevalence and Links to Alien
Illegal Activities, GAO-02-830T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002).
61Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Immigration and
Naturalization Service Efforts to Combat Harboring and Employing Illegal
Aliens in Sweatshops, I-96-08 (Washington, D.C.: May 1996).
resources from other enforcement programs to perform national
securityrelated investigations resulted in fewer resources for traditional
program areas like fraud and noncritical infrastructure worksite
enforcement. Additionally, some ICE field representatives, as well as
immigration experts we interviewed, noted that the focus on critical
infrastructure protection does not address the majority of worksites in
industries that have traditionally provided the magnet of jobs attracting
illegal aliens to the United States.
INS and ICE Have Faced Difficulties in Setting Fine Amounts and in Detaining
Unauthorized Workers, but Have Taken Steps to Address Difficulties
INS and ICE have faced difficulties in setting and collecting final fine
amounts that meaningfully deter employers from knowingly hiring
unauthorized workers and in detaining unauthorized workers arrested at
worksites. ICE officials told us that because fine amounts are so low, the
fines do not provide a meaningful deterrent. These officials also said
that when agents could prove that an employer knowingly hired an
unauthorized worker and issued a notice of intent to fine, the fine
amounts agents recommended were often negotiated down in value during
discussions between agency attorneys and employers. The amount of
mitigated fines may be, in the opinion of some ICE officials, so low that
they believe that employers view the fines as a cost of doing business,
making the fines an ineffective deterrent for employers who attempt to
circumvent IRCA. ICE officials at 11 of the 12 field offices at which we
interviewed staff said that they experienced instances in which fine
amounts were mitigated down in value. According to ICE, the agency
mitigates employer fine amounts because doing so may be a more efficient
use of government resources than pursuing employers who contest or ignore
fines, which could be more costly to the government than the fine amount
sought. Recently, ICE settled a worksite enforcement case with a large
company without going through the administrative fine process. As part of
the settlement, the company agreed to pay $11 million and company
contractors agreed to pay $4 million in forfeitures-more than any
administrative fine amount ever issued against an employer for IRCA
violations, according to ICE.
One ICE official said that use of such civil settlements instead of
pursuit of administrative fines, specifically in regard to investigations
of noncritical infrastructure employers, could be a more efficient use of
investigative resources. ICE officials also said that use of civil
settlements could help ensure employers' future compliance by including in
the settlements a requirement to enter into compliance agreements, such as
the Basic Pilot Program. ICE recently employed this strategy in its $15
million settlement with the large company. As part of the settlement, the
company agreed to
enter into a compliance program with ICE. Other compliance agreements with
employers could involve mandatory participation in the Basic Pilot
Program. Additionally, ICE officials said that the agency has proposed
working with employers who are not the subjects of worksite enforcement
investigations to help them ensure compliance with IRCA through enhanced
education and partnerships. In April 2005, ICE issued its interim
strategic plan, which, as part of its objective on identifying critical
industries for worksite enforcement operations, included an approach for
partnering with businesses to help them comply with IRCA.62 This
partnership program, called the ICE Mutual Agreement between Government
and Employers, is intended to provide employers with training and best
practices for complying with IRCA. In addition to implementing this
partnership program, ICE plans to promote expanded use of the Basic Pilot
Program to help encourage employers in critical industries to strengthen
their ability to verify employees' work eligibility. The practice of civil
settlements with employers and joint compliance programs are in the early
stages of implementation; therefore the extent to which they may address
the difficulties faced in setting fine amounts that provide a meaningful
deterrent is not yet known.
The former INS also faced difficulties in collecting total fine amounts
from employers, but collection efforts have improved. We previously
reported that the former INS faced difficulties in collecting total fine
amounts from employers for a number of reasons including that employers
went out of business, moved, or declared bankruptcy.63 In 1996, the
Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General reported that the
deterrent effect of civil fines on sweatshop operators was adversely
affected by collection difficulties and noted that INS had no national
system for billing, tracking, and collecting employer fines. In 1998, INS
created the Debt Management Center to centralize the collections process,
and the center is now responsible for collecting fines ICE issued against
employers for violations of IRCA and providing other collection services
for ICE and USCIS. The
62ICE's objective for identifying critical industries for worksite
enforcement operations included the following five elements: (1) identify
and remove unauthorized workers from critical industries; (2) implement
and expand an ICE-employer partnership program to enhance employer
compliance, training, and information sharing; (3) investigate criminal
employers linked to smuggling, trafficking, worker exploitation, and other
criminal violations; (4) revitalize employer sanctions to provide
financial deterrence; and (5) promote use of employment eligibility
verification technology, like the Basic Pilot Program. See ICE, Interim
Strategic Plan (Washington, D.C.: April 2005).
63GAO/GGD-99-33.
ICE Debt Management Center has collected total amounts on most of the
invoices issued to employers for final fine amounts between fiscal years
1999 and 2004-about 94 percent as of the end of June 2005.64
In addition, ICE's Office of Detention and Removal has limited detention
space, and unauthorized workers detained during worksite enforcement
investigations are a low priority for that space.65 In 2004, the Under
Secretary for Border and Transportation Security sent a memo to the
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Assistant
Secretary for ICE outlining the priorities for the detention of aliens.
According to this memo, aliens who are subjects of national security
investigations were among those groups of aliens given the highest
priority for detention, while aliens arrested as a result of worksite
enforcement investigations were among those groups of aliens given the
lowest priority. Officials in 8 of the 12 field offices we interviewed
told us that lack of sufficient detention space has limited the
effectiveness of worksite enforcement efforts. For example, ICE officials
stated that if investigative agents arrest unauthorized aliens at
worksites, the aliens would likely be released because the Office of
Detention and Removal detention centers do not have sufficient space to
house the aliens. Field office representatives said that offices can
expend a large amount of resources to arrest unauthorized aliens at
worksites and that these aliens would likely be released and may re-enter
the workforce, in some cases returning to the worksites from where they
were originally arrested. As a result, the use of resources to arrest
unauthorized aliens at worksites may be unproductive. A congressional
conference report for fiscal year 2005 provided funds to the Office of
Detention and Removal for an additional 1,950 bed spaces.66 Given
competing priorities for detention space, the effect, if any, these
additional bed spaces will have on ICE's priority given to workers
detained as a result of worksite enforcement operations cannot currently
be determined.
64The Debt Management Center issues invoices to employers for collecting
fine amounts. According to ICE, multiple invoices can be issued for each
final order for an employer fine, as a payment plan is typically
established for employers as part of the final order for the fine amount.
65The Office of Detention and Removal is primarily responsible for
identifying and removing criminal aliens from the United States. The
office is also responsible for managing ICE's space for detaining aliens.
66H.R. Con. Rep. 109-72 (2005) accompanying the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami
Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-13.
ICE Has Not Yet Developed Outcome Goals and Measures for Worksite
Enforcement
Given ICE's limited resources and competing priorities for those
resources, ICE's lack of performance goals and measures for the worksite
enforcement program may hinder the agency's ability to effectively
determine and allocate resources for the program. Performance goals and
measures are intended to provide Congress and agency management with the
information to systematically assess a program's strengths, weaknesses,
and performance. A performance goal is the target level of
performance-either output or outcome-expressed as a tangible, measurable
objective against which actual achievement will be compared. A performance
measure can be defined as an indicator, statistic, or metric used to gauge
program performance and may typically include outputs and outcomes.
Outputs provide status information about an initiative or program in terms
of completing an action in a specified time frame. Outcomes show results
or outcomes related to an initiative or program in terms of its
effectiveness, efficiency, or impact. Outputs should support or lead to
outcomes and, for each outcome goal, there are typically several output
goals. Outputs and outcomes together help agencies determine and report on
products or services provided through a program and the results of those
products or services.
ICE lacks output goals and measures necessary to inform its resource
allocation decisions. Output goals and measures are an essential
management tool in managing programs for results. They help provide the
information that agencies need to aid in determining resources for a
program and whether they are using program resources efficiently and
effectively. ICE officials told us that the agency does not plan to focus
on developing and using output goals and measures for worksite
enforcement, such as the number of cases initiated or number of worksite
arrests made, because they believe that such goals and measures do not
adequately indicate ICE's level of effort for worksite enforcement.
Therefore, the ICE officials said that ICE plans to focus on developing
outcome goals and measures for the program that better reflect the
program's effect. Yet in its fiscal year 2006 budget request, ICE
identified two output measures for its worksite enforcement program: a 20
percent increase in the number of administrative worksite case completions
and criminal employer case presentations made to the U.S. Attorney's
Office in fiscal year 2007 and a 30 percent increase in these two
indicators in fiscal year 2008. Although these two measures would provide
a general indication of ICE's level of worksite enforcement activity,
these measures alone would not allow ICE or Congress to effectively
determine resources needed for the worksite enforcement program because
these indicators address only two elements of the worksite enforcement
program and do not address other program elements, such as critical
infrastructure
protection. Furthermore, in July 2005 the Secretary of Homeland Security
discussed the need for DHS, of which ICE is a part, to be an effective
steward of its resources. Without additional output goals and measures for
worksite enforcement, ICE's ability to effectively determine and allocate
worksite enforcement resources needed to meet program goals, especially
given other agency priorities for resources, and to fully assess whether
the agency is using those resources effectively and efficiently in
implementing the program may be hindered.
In addition, ICE lacks outcome goals and measures that may hinder its
ability to effectively assess the results of its worksite enforcement
program efforts, including critical infrastructure protection efforts.
Outcome measures provide agencies with an assessment of the results of a
program activity or policy compared to its intended purposes. ICE
officials told us that the agency plans to develop outcome goals and
measures for its worksite enforcement program, but it has not yet
developed these goals and measures. As a first step, ICE officials told us
that field offices conducted baseline threat-level assessments in August
and September 2004 to help identify regional risks, such as risks to
critical infrastructure sites. These officials stated that an action plan
will be developed to address these risks. Field office agents will then
measure how well a particular threat has been addressed by measuring the
impact of ICE's investigative activities on deterring threats or
decreasing vulnerabilities to national security. ICE has not yet
established target time frames for developing worksite enforcement program
outcome goals and measures and, without these goals and measures, ICE may
not be able to effectively assess the results of program efforts. For
example, until ICE fully develops outcome goals and measures, it may not
be able to completely determine the extent to which its critical
infrastructure protection efforts have resulted in the elimination of
unauthorized workers' access to secure areas of critical infrastructure
sites, one possible goal that ICE may use for its worksite enforcement
program.
Conclusions Efforts to reduce the employment of unauthorized workers in
the United States necessitate a strong employment eligibility verification
process and a credible worksite enforcement program to help ensure that
employers are meeting verification requirements. The current Form I-9
employment verification process has not fundamentally changed since its
establishment in 1986, and ongoing weaknesses in the process have
undermined its effectiveness. Although DHS and the former INS have been
assessing changes in the process since 1997, DHS has not yet issued final
regulations on these changes, and it has not established a definitive time
frame for
completing the assessment. Completion of this assessment and issuance of
final regulations should strengthen the current employment verification
process and make it simpler and more secure. Furthermore, the Basic Pilot
Program, or a similar automated verification system, if implemented on a
much larger scale, shows promise for enhancing the employment verification
process and reducing document fraud. However, current weaknesses in pilot
program implementation would have to be fully addressed to help ensure the
efficient and effective operation of an expanded or mandatory pilot
program, or a similar automated employment verification program, and the
cost of additional resources would be a consideration. Although USCIS
plans to review current pilot program weaknesses, additional information
on the costs and feasibility of addressing these weaknesses is needed to
assist USCIS and Congress in assessing possible future use of the Basic
Pilot Program, including increased program usage.
Even with a strengthened employment verification process, a credible
worksite enforcement program is needed because no verification process is
foolproof and not all employers may want to comply with the law. ICE's
focus on critical infrastructure protection since September 11, 2001 is
consistent with the DHS mission to combat terrorism by detecting and
mitigating vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks at critical infrastructure
sites which, if exploited, could pose serious threats to domestic
security. This focus on critical infrastructure protection, though,
generally does not address noncritical infrastructure employers'
noncompliance with IRCA. As a result, employers, particularly those not
located at or near critical infrastructure sites, who attempt to
circumvent IRCA face less of a likelihood that ICE will investigate them
for failing to comply with the current employment verification process or
knowingly hiring unauthorized workers. ICE is taking some steps to address
difficulties it has faced in its worksite enforcement efforts, but it is
too early to tell whether these steps will improve the effectiveness of
the worksite enforcement program. In addition, given ICE's limited
resources and competing priorities for those resources, additional output
goals and measures are needed to help ICE track the progress of its
worksite enforcement efforts, effectively determine the resources needed
to meet worksite enforcement program goals, and ensure that program
resources are used efficiently and effectively. Moreover, a target time
frame for developing outcome goals and measures is needed to assist
Congress and ICE in determining whether the worksite enforcement program,
including critical infrastructure protection, is achieving its desired
outcomes.
Recommendations for To strengthen the current employment verification
process, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the
followingExecutive Action action:
o set a specific time frame for completing the department's review of
the Form I-9 process, including an assessment of the possibility of
reducing the number of acceptable work eligibility documents, and issuing
final regulations on changes to the Form I-9 process and an updated Form
I-9.
To assist Congress and USCIS in assessing the possibility of increased or
mandatory use of the Basic Pilot Program, we recommend that the Secretary
of Homeland Security direct the Director of USCIS to take the following
action:
o include, in the planned evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, an
assessment of the feasibility and costs of addressing the Basic Pilot
Program's current weaknesses, including its inability to detect identity
fraud in the verification and reverification processes, delays in entry of
new arrival and employment authorization information into DHS databases,
and employer noncompliance with program procedures, and resources needed
to support any increased or mandatory use of the program.
To assist Congress and ICE in determining the resources needed for the
worksite enforcement program and to help ensure the efficient and
effective use of program resources, we recommend that the Secretary of
Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for ICE to take the
following two actions:
o establish additional output goals and measures for the worksite
enforcement program to clearly indicate the target level of ICE worksite
enforcement activity and the resources needed to implement the program,
and
o set a specific time frame for completing the assessment and
development of outcome goals and measures for the worksite enforcement
program to provide a target level of performance for worksite enforcement
efforts and measures to assess the extent to which program results have
met program goals.
Agency Comments We requested comments on this report from the Secretary
of Homeland Security. In its response, DHS agreed with our
recommendations. DHS's
comments are reprinted in Appendix V. DHS also provided technical
comments, which we considered and incorporated where appropriate. We also
received technical comments from SSA, which we considered and incorporated
where appropriate.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after
the
date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Labor, the Attorney
General, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and appropriate
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or [email protected]. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the
last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix VI.
Richard M. Stana
Director, Homeland Security
and Justice Issues
Page 46 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement
Page 47 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement
Page 48 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To determine how the employment eligibility verification (Form I-9)
process functions, we examined laws related to the employment verification
process, including the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996;
federal regulations on the Form I-9 process; and former U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) guidance on the Form I-9, such as the
Handbook for Employers, which provides instructions for completing the
form. We evaluated this information to identify the Form I-9 requirements,
including employer and employee responsibilities for completing the form,
and challenges to meeting those requirements. We examined our past reports
and other studies, such as the 1997 U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform
Report to Congress, to obtain further information on the employment
verification process. We analyzed former INS plans for addressing Form I-9
challenges, including its plans to modify the list of acceptable work
eligibility documents. We also examined U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement's (ICE) interim guidelines on the electronic Forms I-9 to
determine what guidance, if any, they provide to employers using the
electronic form.
To determine challenges to the Form I-9 process and obtain information on
the Basic Pilot Program, we also interviewed and obtained information from
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), ICE, and Social
Security Administration (SSA) officials. In addition, we interviewed
representatives of 23 employers; 12 employer, employee, and advocacy
groups; and 6 immigration experts to obtain their views on employment
verification and worksite enforcement.1 We selected the employers to
interview based on a mix of the following criteria: the total number of
Basic Pilot Program queries; the total number or percentage of pilot
program queries that resulted in authorized employment, tentative
nonconfirmations, and final nonconfirmations; geographic proximity to the
ICE field offices we visited; previous records of being sanctioned for
Form I-9 violations; and industry categorization. The 23 employers we
interviewed were located in the following states: California, Illinois,
Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. The 23 employers were also part
of the following industries: meat processing, transportation, health care,
landscaping, manufacturing, accommodation, food services, agriculture,
janitorial and maintenance, temporary employment, critical infrastructure,
local government, and newspaper.
1According to Department of Labor data, there were about 5.6 million
employer firms in the United States in 2002, the year for which the most
current data are available.
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
One of the employers we interviewed did not participate in the Basic Pilot
Program. As a result, when we discuss employers' views on the Basic Pilot
Program, we refer to the views of the 22 employers we interviewed who
participated in the Basic Pilot Program.
We selected the 9 employer and employee associations with which to meet
based on a mix of criteria, including industry categorization, gross
output by industry in 2002, number of paid employees by industry in 2002,
and estimates of the number of illegal immigrants employed by industry.2
We interviewed officials from employer and employee associations in the
following industries: construction, agriculture, accommodation, food
services, retail, health care, and meat. We selected the 3 advocacy groups
to interview based on the groups' interest in issues related to employment
verification and worksite enforcement efforts and interviewed officials
from advocacy groups that represent a range of views on these issues. We
selected the 6 immigration experts to interview based on the experts'
range of views on immigration issues. We analyzed information from these
agencies, employers, groups, and experts to determine their views on the
Form I-9 process and difficulties in verifying work eligibility through
the process. We used information obtained from employers, employer and
employee associations, and advocacy groups only as anecdotal examples, as
information from these entities cannot be generalized to all employers and
groups in the United States.
Furthermore, we evaluated information from USCIS and SSA on the Basic
Pilot Program, including the Basic Pilot Program user's manual and
memorandum of understanding for employers, to determine how the pilot
program functions and how it might assist participating employers in
reliably verifying employees' work eligibility and in detecting
counterfeit documents. We analyzed this information to determine ongoing
challenges in implementing the Basic Pilot Program and ways these
challenges could affect increased or mandatory use of the pilot program.
We did not evaluate security measures in place for the Basic Pilot Program
or the program's vulnerability to security risks. To identify pilot
program challenges, we examined the findings and methodology of the
evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program completed by the Institute for
Survey Research at Temple University and Westat in June 2002. In addition,
we analyzed
2At the time of selection, 2002 data on gross output by industry from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce were the most current
data available. Also, the most recent data available on the total number
of paid employees by industry from the U.S. Census Bureau, Department of
Commerce were from 2002.
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
data on employer participation in and use of the Basic Pilot Program,
including data on Basic Pilot Program employment authorizations, to
determine how participation and use have changed since fiscal year 2000.
We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing them for accuracy
and completeness, interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the
data, and examining documentation on how the data are entered,
categorized, and verified in the databases. We determined that the
independent evaluation and these data were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of our review.
To obtain information on the implementation of the worksite enforcement
program, we interviewed officials from ICE, the SSA Office of the
Inspector General, the Department of Labor, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related
Unfair Unemployment Practices. We also interviewed officials from 12 of
the 26 ICE Special Agent in Charge field offices. We met with officials
from the following 8 field offices: Los Angeles and San Diego, California;
Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; Newark, New Jersey; New York City,
New York; and Houston and San Antonio, Texas. We spoke with officials from
the following 4 field offices over the telephone: Denver, Colorado; Miami,
Florida; Buffalo, New York; and Seattle, Washington. We selected the 12
field offices based on a mix of the following criteria: the number of
investigators in each field office in fiscal year 2003, the number of
investigations conducted by each field office in fiscal year 2003,3 the
estimated number of undocumented immigrants in the state in which each
field office was located, the number of sanctions issued to employers as a
result of closed cases located in the same city as the field office
between calendar years 1986 and 2000,4 the number of critical
infrastructure operations in which the field office participated from
October 2001 through April 2004, the number of employers located in the
same city as the field office that participated in the Basic Pilot
Program, and geographic area. We also interviewed officials from 4 U.S.
Attorney's Offices that were located in the same areas as 4 of the field
offices we visited. We met with officials from the following 3 U.S.
Attorney's Offices:
3At the time of selection, the most current data available on the number
of investigators in each field office and the number of investigations
conducted by each field office were from fiscal year 2003.
4At the time of selection, the most current data available on the number
of sanctions issued to employers located in the same city as the field
offices were from calendar years 1986 through 2000.
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
the Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney's Office; the Southern
District of Texas U.S. Attorney's Office; and the Western District of
Texas U.S. Attorney's Office. We spoke with the Southern District of
California U.S. Attorney's Office over the telephone. We used information
obtained from the field offices only as anecdotal examples, as information
from these entities cannot be generalized to all field offices in the
United States.
We analyzed ICE headquarters and field office guidance, memos, and other
documents on worksite enforcement to evaluate ICE's priorities for and
management of worksite enforcement efforts and to identify any challenges
in program implementation. We analyzed ICE's April 2005 Interim Strategic
Plan to determine ICE's strategy for its worksite enforcement program. We
also examined former INS guidance and strategies and other studies, such
as reports from the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General,
to determine how worksite enforcement priorities, implementation, and
challenges have evolved.
In addition, we separately analyzed ICE and INS data on the worksite
enforcement program and assessed their validity and reliability by
reviewing them for accuracy and completeness, interviewing agency
officials knowledgeable about the data, and examining documentation on how
the data are entered, categorized, and verified in the databases. We
determined that the data from each agency were sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of our review. However, we could not compare the INS and ICE
data because, following the creation of ICE in March 2003, the case
management system used to enter and maintain information on immigration
investigations changed. With the establishment of ICE, agents began using
the legacy U.S. Customs Service's case management system, called the
Treasury Enforcement Communications System, for entering and maintaining
information on investigations, including worksite enforcement operations.
Prior to the creation of ICE, the former INS entered and maintained
information on investigative activities in the Performance Analysis
System, which captured information on immigration investigations
differently than the Treasury Enforcement Communications System.
Additionally, ICE officials indicated that, in a few cases, the INS and
ICE data did not completely account for all worksite enforcement
operations results. ICE officials told us that agents use judgment in
categorizing cases entered into both systems and there are a limited
number of instances in which agents did not appropriately categorize
cases. For example, ICE officials told us that, in reviewing worksite
enforcement cases in the ICE
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
system for fiscal year 2004, they found a few cases that agents
inappropriately categorized as worksite enforcement.
To determine the investigative agent work-years, or full-time equivalents,
that INS spent on the worksite enforcement program for each fiscal year
from 1999 through 2003, we divided the total hours INS reported spending
on employer investigations by the total hours spent on all investigations,
including agent hours spent on leave, training, and other administrative
and noninvestigative work. We then multiplied this result by 2,080 hours,
which constitute one work-year, to determine the number of work-years
spent on worksite enforcement.
We conducted our work from September 2004 through July 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix III: Information on the Electronic Form I-9
In October 2004, Congress authorized the electronic Form I-9 to be
implemented by the end of April 2005.1 ICE has provided interim guidelines
for using electronic Forms I-9, until the agency issues final regulations
on their use. The interim guidelines specify that employers will have
options for completing, signing, storing, and presenting for inspection
electronic Forms I-9. For example, the guidelines note that employers may
choose to complete Forms I-9 on paper and store the forms electronically
or they may choose to both electronically complete and store Forms I-9.
The guidelines also state that electronic signatures could be generated
through various technologies such as electronic signature pads, personal
identification numbers, biometrics, and dialog boxes. The guidelines also
state that employers could use electronic storage systems to retain Forms
I-9 that include quality assurance steps to prevent and detect the
unauthorized creation, addition, alteration, deletion, or deterioration of
electronically stored data. In addition, employers may consider an
electronic storage system that includes an indexing system and ability to
reproduce legible and readable hard copies of electronically stored forms.
1P.L. 108-390.
Appendix IV: Data on Employer Participation in and Use of the Basic Pilot
Program
Employer participation in and use of the Basic Pilot Program has generally
increased. Between fiscal years 2002 and 2004, the number of employers
actively using the Basic Pilot Program increased from 1,205 to 2,305. In
addition, as shown in figure 6, the number of total queries processed
through the Basic Pilot Program has generally increased since fiscal year
2000.
Figure 6: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries Run by Participating
Employers for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004
Number of queries 700,000 657,000
600,000
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Fiscal year
Source: GAO analysis of data from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services. Note: Data have been rounded to the nearest thousand.
As shown in figure 7, the majority of Basic Pilot Program queries that
resulted in employment authorizations for each fiscal year from 2000
through 2004 were issued by SSA.
Appendix IV: Data on Employer Participation in and Use of the Basic Pilot
Program
Figure 7: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries that Resulted in
Employment Authorizations for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004
Employment authorizations
700,000
600,000
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
0
8,700
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Fiscal year
Total DHS employment authorizations resulting from immigration status
verifier reviews
Total DHS automated employment authorizations
Total SSA employment authorizations
Source: GAO analysis of data from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services.
Note: Data have been rounded to the nearest hundred.
Page 57 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement
Page 58 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Staff Acknowledgments
(440347)
Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777
In addition to the contact named above, Orlando Copeland, Michele Fejfar,
Ann H. Finley, Rebecca Gambler, Kathryn Godfrey,
Charles Michael Johnson, Eden C. Savino, and Robert E. White made key
contributions to this report.
GAO's Mission
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts newly
released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To have
GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out
to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25
percent. Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061
To Report Fraud, Contact:
Waste, and Abuse in Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: [email protected] Programs Automated answering system: (800)
424-5454 or (202) 512-7470
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4400Congressional U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street
NW, Room 7125 Relations Washington, D.C. 20548
Public Affairs Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
*** End of document. ***