    Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment
    Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts (31-AUG-05,
    GAO-05-813).

    The opportunity for employment is one of the most important
    magnets attracting illegal immigrants to the United States.
    Immigration experts state that strategies to deter illegal
    immigration require both a reliable employment eligibility
    verification process and a worksite enforcement capacity to
    ensure that employers comply with immigration-related employment
    laws. This report examines (1) the current employment
    verification (Form I-9) process and challenges, if any, facing
    verification; and (2) the priorities and resources of U.S.
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) worksite enforcement
    program and any challenges in implementing the program.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-813
        ACCNO:   A35098
      TITLE:     Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment
    Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts
         DATE:   08/31/2005
      SUBJECT:   Eligibility criteria
    	     Eligibility determinations
    	     Employment
    	     Employment requirements
    	     Identity verification
    	     Illegal aliens
    	     Immigrants
    	     Immigration
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Basic Pilot Program
    	     Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot
    	     Program

    	     Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program
    	     DOJ Employment Eligibility Verification
    	     Program

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    GAO-05-813

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO

                           Report to Congressional Requesters

    August 2005

    IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

    Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts

    GAO-05-813

    [IMG]

    August 2005

    IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

    Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts

      What GAO Found

    The current employment verification process is based on employers' review
    of documents presented by new employees to prove their identity and work
    eligibility. On the Form I-9, employers certify that they have reviewed
    employees' documents and that the documents appear genuine and relate to
    the individual presenting them. However, various studies have shown that
    document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and identity fraud
    (fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging to others)
    have made it difficult for employers who want to comply with the
    employment verification process to hire only authorized workers and easier
    for unscrupulous employers to knowingly hire unauthorized workers. The
    large number and variety of documents acceptable for proving work
    eligibility have also hindered verification efforts. In 1997, the former
    Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part of the Department
    of Homeland Security (DHS), issued an interim rule on a reduction in the
    number of acceptable work eligibility documents and, in 1998, proposed a
    further reduction, but this proposal has not yet been finalized. DHS is
    currently reviewing the list of acceptable work eligibility documents, but
    has not established a target time frame for completing this review. The
    Basic Pilot Program, a voluntary program through which participating
    employers electronically verify employees' work eligibility, has potential
    to help enhance the verification process and substantially reduce document
    fraud. Yet, current weaknesses in the program, such as the inability of
    the program to detect identity fraud, DHS delays in entering data into its
    databases, and some employer noncompliance with pilot program requirements
    could, if not addressed, have a significant impact on the program's
    success. Furthermore, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officials
    stated that the current Basic Pilot Program may not be able to complete
    timely verifications if the number of employers using the program
    significantly increased.

    Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs
    that compete for resources and, under the former INS and now under ICE,
    worksite enforcement has been a relatively low priority. Consistent with
    DHS's mission to combat terrorism, after September 11, 2001, INS and then
    ICE focused worksite enforcement resources mainly on removing unauthorized
    workers from critical infrastructure sites to help address those sites'
    vulnerabilities. Since fiscal year 1999, the numbers of employer notices
    of intent to fine and administrative worksite arrests have generally
    declined, according to ICE, due to various factors such as document fraud,
    which makes it difficult to prove employer violations. ICE has not yet
    developed outcome goals and measures for its worksite enforcement program,
    which, given limited resources and competing priorities for those
    resources, may hinder ICE's efforts to determine resources needed for the
    program.

                     United States Government Accountability Office

    Contents

      Letter

    Results in Brief
    Background
    Various Weaknesses Have Undermined the Employment

    Verification Process, but the Basic Pilot Program Shows Potential to
    Enhance the Process Competing Priorities and Lack of Outcome Goals and
    Measures

    May Hinder Worksite Enforcement Efforts Conclusions Recommendations for
    Executive Action Agency Comments

                                           1

                                          5 8

    14

    30 42 44 44

           Appendix I Employment Eligibility Verification Form (Form I-9) 46

    Appendix II Scope and Methodology

    Appendix III Information on the Electronic Form I-9

    Appendix IV	Data on Employer Participation in and Use of the Basic Pilot
    Program

    Appendix V	Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

                  Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 59

      Figures

    Figure 1: Basic Pilot Program Verification Process 12 Figure 2: Number of
    Queries Authorized by DHS through the

    Automated Check and the Immigration Status Verifier

    Check 26

    Figure 3: Investigative Agent Work-years Spent on Worksite Enforcement
    Efforts and Agent Work-years Spent on Other Investigative Areas for Each
    Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2003 33

    Figure 4: Number of Notices of Intent to Fine Issued to Employers for Each
    Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2004 35 Figure 5: Number of Worksite
    Enforcement Arrests for Each Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2003 36

    Figure 6: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries Run by Participating
    Employers for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004 55

    Figure 7: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries that Resulted in
    Employment Authorizations for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004 56

    Abbreviations

    DHS Department of Homeland Security
    ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    IIRIRA Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility

    Act INS U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service IRCA Immigration
    Reform and Control Act SSA Social Security Administration USCIS U.S.
    Citizenship and Immigration Services

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

    August 31, 2005

    The Honorable Jim Sensenbrenner, Jr.
    Chairman
    Committee on the Judiciary
    House of Representatives

    The Honorable John N. Hostettler
    Chairman
    Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims
    Committee on the Judiciary
    House of Representatives

    According to the final report of the U.S. Commission on Immigration
    Reform, immigration contributes to the U.S. national economy by helping
    to keep viable segments of certain labor-intensive industries, expand
    foreign trade, provide valuable language and cultural expertise to U.S.
    companies, and contribute to the economic revitalization of some
    communities.1 Yet, the commission also noted that immigration,
    particularly illegal immigration, has adverse consequences, such as
    helping to depress wages for low-skilled workers and creating net fiscal
    costs for state and local governments. Aliens, including temporary foreign
    workers, legally enter and reside in the United States through a variety
    of
    channels, such as immigration and work visa programs, but aliens also
    illegally enter or overstay visas and reside in the United States. The
    former
    U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimated that about
    7 million unauthorized aliens resided in the United States by January
    2000,
    and other organizations estimated that the unauthorized alien population
    was about 10 million in 2004.2

    1U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American: Immigration
    and Immigrant Policy (Washington, D.C: September 1997).

    2In March 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was merged into
    the Department of Homeland Security. The service's immigration functions
    were divided between U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S.
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is responsible for
    managing and implementing the worksite enforcement program.

    The opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets
    attracting illegal aliens to the United States. To help reduce the
    attraction of this magnet, in 1986 Congress passed the Immigration Reform
    and Control Act (IRCA),3 which made it illegal for individuals and
    entities to knowingly hire, continue to employ, or recruit or refer for a
    fee unauthorized workers. The act established a two-pronged approach for
    helping to limit the employment of unauthorized workers: (1) an employment
    verification process through which employers verify newly hired employees'
    work eligibility and (2) a sanctions program for fining employers who do
    not comply with the act. Under the employment verification process,
    employees and employers must complete the Employment Eligibility
    Verification Form (Form I-9) to certify that the employees are authorized
    to work in the United States.4 Those employers who do not follow the
    verification process can be sanctioned for knowingly hiring, continuing to
    employ, or recruiting or referring for a fee unauthorized workers or for
    improperly completing Forms I-9. Efforts to enforce these sanctions are
    referred to as worksite enforcement.

    In the nearly 20 years since the passage of IRCA, the employment
    eligibility verification process and worksite enforcement program have
    remained largely unchanged. Following the passage of the act, the U.S.
    Commission on Immigration Reform and various immigration experts concluded
    that deterring illegal immigration requires, among other things,
    strategies that focus on disrupting the ability of illegal aliens to gain
    employment through a more reliable employment eligibility verification
    process and a more robust worksite enforcement capacity. In particular,
    the commission report and other studies have found that the single most
    important step that could be taken to reduce unlawful migration is the
    development of a more effective system for verifying work authorization.
    Yet in the 8 years since the commission's final report, few substantial
    enhancements have been applied to the employment verification process, and
    the approach continues to rely on the Form I-9, a procedure of which the
    commission was roundly critical because of its vulnerability to fraud and
    potential to cause discrimination. Moreover, in previous work, we reported
    that employers of unauthorized aliens faced little likelihood that INS
    would investigate, fine, or criminally prosecute them, a circumstance

    3P.L. 99-603, 8 U.S.C. 1324a et seq. 4See appendix I for a copy of the
    Form I-9.

    that provides little disincentive for employers who want to circumvent the
    law.5

    You asked us to review the federal government's policies and programs
    aimed at enforcing immigration laws in the workplace. This report
    addresses the following questions: (1) How does the current employment
    verification process function and what are the challenges facing
    verification? (2) What are the priorities and resources of U.S.
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) worksite enforcement program
    and what challenges, if any, has the agency faced in implementing the
    program?

    To address these objectives, we interviewed officials from the Department
    of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
    (USCIS) and ICE, and officials from the Social Security Administration
    (SSA) in headquarters and selected field locations. We obtained from them
    information on the Form I-9 process and the Basic Pilot Program, a
    voluntary program through which participating employers verify employees'
    work eligibility by electronically checking information on employees'
    Forms I-9 with information in SSA and DHS databases. We analyzed
    information from these agencies, as well as related laws and regulations,
    to determine how the current Form I-9 process functions, identify any
    challenges in the current Form I-9 process, and examine DHS plans to
    modify the process. We also interviewed representatives of 23 employers;6
    12 employer, employee, and advocacy groups;7 and

    5GAO, Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien
    Employment Exist, GAO/GGD-99-33 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 1999).

    6One of the 23 employers we interviewed did not participate in the Basic
    Pilot Program. As a result, when we discuss the views of employers on the
    Basic Pilot Program, we refer to the views of the 22 employers we
    interviewed that participated in the program. The 23 employers we
    interviewed were located in the following states: California, Illinois,
    Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. They were part of the following
    industries: meatpacking, transportation, health care, landscaping,
    manufacturing, accommodation, food services, agriculture, janitorial and
    maintenance, temporary employment, critical infrastructure, local
    government, and newspaper. According to Department of Labor data, there
    were about 5.6 million employer firms in the United States in 2002. The
    most current data available on the number of employers in the United
    States were from 2002.

    7We interviewed officials from 9 employer and employee associations in the
    following industries: construction, agriculture, accommodation, food
    services, retail, health care, and meat. We interviewed officials from
    three advocacy groups that represent a range of views on
    immigration-related issues.

    6 immigration experts8 to obtain their views on the Form I-9 process and
    the Basic Pilot Program. We selected the employers to interview based on a
    mix of criteria, such as the number of employers' pilot program queries
    and geographic location. We selected the employer, employee, and advocacy
    groups to interview based on a mix of criteria, such as industry
    representation and range of views on immigration issues. In addition, we
    examined USCIS and SSA guidance, instructions, and agreements for the
    Basic Pilot Program and the results and methodology of an independent
    evaluation of the program completed by the Institute for Survey Research
    at Temple University and Westat in June 2002.9 We analyzed data on
    employer participation in and use of the Basic Pilot Program to determine
    how participation and use have changed since fiscal year 2000. We assessed
    the reliability of these data by reviewing them for accuracy and
    completeness, interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data,
    and examining documentation on how the data are entered, categorized, and
    verified in the databases. We determined that the independent evaluation
    and these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review.

    To obtain information on the worksite enforcement program priorities and
    resources, we interviewed officials from ICE, the SSA Office of the
    Inspector General, the Department of Labor, the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation, and the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related
    Unfair Unemployment Practices. We also interviewed officials from 12 of
    the 26 ICE Special Agent in Charge field offices10 and 4 U.S. Attorney's
    Offices11 that were located in the same areas as 4 of the field offices we
    visited. We selected the 12 field offices based on a mix of criteria, such
    as number of investigations conducted by field offices, number of

    8The 6 immigration experts we interviewed have a range of views on
    immigration-related issues.

    9Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Basic Pilot
    Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: June 2002).

    10We met with officials from the following 8 field offices: Los Angeles
    and San Diego, California; Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; Newark,
    New Jersey; New York City, New York; and Houston and San Antonio, Texas.
    We spoke with officials from the following 4 field offices over the
    telephone: Denver, Colorado; Miami, Florida; Buffalo, New York; and
    Seattle, Washington.

    11We met with officials from the following 3 U.S. Attorney's Offices: the
    Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney's Office; the Southern
    District of Texas U.S. Attorney's Office; and the Western District of
    Texas U.S. Attorney's Office. We spoke with the Southern District of
    California U.S. Attorney's Office over the telephone.

      Results in Brief

    investigators in each field office, and geographic location. We analyzed
    ICE headquarters and field office guidance, memos, and other documents on
    worksite enforcement to evaluate ICE's priorities for and management of
    worksite enforcement efforts. In addition, we analyzed ICE data on
    worksite enforcement and assessed the data reliability by reviewing data
    for accuracy and completeness, interviewing agency officials knowledgeable
    about the data, and examining documentation on how the data are entered,
    categorized, and verified in the databases. We determined that these data
    were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. For more
    detailed information on our scope and methodology, see appendix II. We
    conducted our work from September 2004 through July 2005 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    The employment verification process is primarily based on employers'
    review of their new employees' work eligibility documents, but various
    weaknesses, such as the process' vulnerability to fraud, have undermined
    this process. Employers certify on the Form I-9 that they have reviewed
    documents presented by their employees and that the documents appear
    genuine and relate to the individual presenting them. However, various
    studies have shown that document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and
    identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging
    to others) have made it difficult for employers who want to comply with
    the employment verification process to ensure that they hire only
    authorized workers and have made it easier for unscrupulous employers to
    knowingly hire unauthorized workers. The large number and variety of
    documents included in the list of acceptable documents for proving work
    eligibility have also undermined the process. We have previously reported
    on federal government efforts to reduce the number of acceptable work
    eligibility documents and make the remaining acceptable documents more
    secure. In 1997, the former INS issued an interim rule on reductions in
    the number of acceptable work eligibility documents and, in 1998, proposed
    a further reduction. However, DHS has not yet finalized the proposal, and
    the 1997 interim rule remains in effect. Although department officials
    told us that the agency is currently assessing modifications to the list
    of acceptable work eligibility documents, the department has not
    established a target time frame for completing this assessment and issuing
    final regulations on the list of acceptable documents. In addition, the
    Basic Pilot Program has potential to enhance this process and help to
    significantly reduce document fraud. According to ICE officials, access to
    Basic Pilot Program information could help the agency better target its
    worksite enforcement efforts at those employers

    who do not follow program requirements. If the program is expanded,
    however, several current weaknesses in the program, including its
    inability to detect identity fraud, DHS delays in entering data into its
    databases that may lengthen the pilot program verification process, and
    some employer noncompliance with pilot program requirements intended to
    protect employees from discriminatory practices, could become more
    significant and adversely affect a greater number of employers and
    employees, if not addressed. Additionally, USCIS officials told us that
    the current Basic Pilot Program may not be able to complete timely
    verifications of work eligibility if the number of employers using the
    program were to significantly increase, primarily because of limited
    program funding and the growth in other verification programs. These
    officials said that USCIS is planning to fund an evaluation of the Basic
    Pilot Program to assess, among other things, the program's current costs,
    any improvements in DHS data accuracy, and employers' compliance with
    program requirements. Although the results of this evaluation should help
    provide information on the pilot program's weaknesses, without information
    on the feasibility and costs of addressing those weaknesses, USCIS and
    Congress cannot effectively assess possibilities for future implementation
    of the program, including increased program usage.

    Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs
    that compete for resources and, under the former INS and now under ICE,
    worksite enforcement has been a relatively low priority. Consistent with
    the DHS mission to combat terrorism, after September 11, 2001, INS and
    then ICE focused worksite enforcement resources mainly on identifying and
    removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites, such as
    airports and nuclear power plants, to help address vulnerabilities at
    those sites. We previously reported that if businesses at such sites were
    to be compromised by terrorists, this would pose a threat to domestic
    security.12 In fiscal year 1999, INS devoted about 9 percent of its agent
    investigative work-years to worksite enforcement, and in fiscal year 2003
    ICE devoted about 4 percent, although ICE has proposed increasing
    resources for worksite enforcement. The number of notices of intent to
    fine issued to employers for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers or
    improperly completing Forms I-9 and the number of administrative worksite
    arrests have also generally declined. For

    12GAO, Immigration Enforcement: DHS Has Incorporated Immigration
    Enforcement Objectives and Is Addressing Future Planning Requirements,
    GAO-05-66 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 2004).

    example, the number of notices of intent to fine generally decreased from
    417 in fiscal year 1999 to 3 in fiscal year 2004. ICE has attributed this
    decline to various factors including the widespread use of counterfeit
    documents that make it difficult for ICE agents to prove that employers
    knowingly hired unauthorized workers. In addition, INS and ICE have faced
    difficulties in setting and collecting fine amounts from employers and in
    detaining unauthorized workers arrested at worksites. According to ICE,
    pursuit of civil settlements with employers rather than administrative
    fines could help address some of the difficulties faced in the fines
    process, but it is too early to tell what effect, if any, use of civil
    settlements will have on worksite enforcement efforts. Furthermore,
    although ICE has identified two output measures for the worksite
    enforcement program, these measures address only two elements of the
    program. Without additional output goals and measures for the worksite
    enforcement program, ICE's ability to effectively determine resources
    needed for the program may be hindered, especially given ICE's limited
    resources and competing priorities for those resources. Although ICE is
    developing outcome goals and measures for the worksite enforcement
    program, until it finalizes these goals and measures, the agency may not
    be able to effectively evaluate the results of program efforts.

    To strengthen the current employment verification process, we are
    recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security set a specific time
    frame for completing the department's review of the Form I-9 process,
    including an assessment of the possibility of reducing the number of
    acceptable work eligibility documents, and issuing final regulations on
    changes to the Form I-9 process and an updated Form I-9. To assist
    Congress and USCIS in assessing the possibility of increased or mandatory
    use of the Basic Pilot Program, we are recommending that the Secretary of
    Homeland Security direct the Director of USCIS to include, in the planned
    evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, an assessment of the feasibility
    and costs of addressing the Basic Pilot Program's current weaknesses,
    including its inability to detect identity fraud, delays in entry of
    employment authorization information into databases, and employer
    noncompliance with program procedures, and resources that would be needed
    to support increased or mandatory use of the program. To help evaluate the
    results of worksite enforcement program efforts and determine resource
    levels needed for the program, we are recommending that the Secretary of
    Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for ICE to establish
    additional output goals and measures for the worksite enforcement program,
    and set a target time frame for completing the assessment and development
    of outcome goals and measures for the

    program. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS agreed with the
    recommendations.

                                       Background

    IRCA provided for sanctions against employers who do not follow the
    employment verification (Form I-9) process. Employers who fail to properly
    complete, retain, or present for inspection a Form I-9 may face civil or
    administrative fines ranging from $110 to $1,100 for each employee for
    whom the form was not properly completed, retained, or presented.13 The
    Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of
    1996 limited employer liability for certain technical violations of Form
    I-9 paperwork requirements.14 According to the act, a person or entity is
    considered to have complied with the employment verification process if
    the person or entity made a good faith attempt to properly complete the
    Form I-9.15 Employers who knowingly hire or continue to employ
    unauthorized aliens may be fined from $275 to $11,000 for each employee,
    depending on whether the violation is a first or subsequent offense.
    Employers who engage in a pattern or practice of knowingly hiring or
    continuing to employ unauthorized aliens are subject to criminal penalties
    consisting of fines up to $3,000 per unauthorized employee and up to 6
    months imprisonment for the entire pattern or practice.

    ICE is primarily responsible for enforcing the employer sanction
    provisions of IRCA as well as many other immigration-related laws. ICE has
    approximately 5,000 investigative agents in 26 Office of Investigations
    field offices that are headed by special agents in charge. ICE's Worksite
    Enforcement/Critical Infrastructure Unit oversees programs to protect U.S.
    critical infrastructure, including military, economic, industrial, and
    transportation infrastructure, and manages the agency's worksite

    13In 1999, the Department of Justice increased the amounts of the civil
    penalties from those established in IRCA to the current levels to reflect
    a ten percent adjustment for inflation. 8 C.F.R. S: 274a.10(b). Under the
    Federal Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, as
    amended, federal agencies are to make regular adjustments for inflation of
    civil monetary penalties that they are charged with enforcing. 28 U.S.C.
    2641 note.

    148 U.S.C. 1324a(b). IIRIRA of 1996 was enacted within a larger piece of
    legislation, the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, P.L.
    104-208.

    15According to IIRIRA, a person or entity with certain Form I-9 paperwork
    violations must be informed of the violation and provided with a period of
    not less than 10 business days to correct the violations. If the person or
    entity does not correct the violations within the specified time period,
    the person or entity would not be considered to have made a good faith
    attempt to comply with the Form I-9 requirement.

    enforcement efforts. Prior to the creation of ICE in March 2003, INS
    enforced IRCA and other immigration-related laws.

        Basic Pilot Program Employment Verification Process

    IIRIRA required INS to operate three voluntary pilot programs to test
    electronic means for employers to verify an employee's eligibility to
    work: the Basic Pilot Program, the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot
    Program, and the Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program. The three pilot
    programs were to test whether pilot verification procedures could improve
    the existing Form I-9 process by reducing (1) document fraud and false
    claims of U.S. citizenship, (2) discrimination against employees, (3)
    violations of civil liberties and privacy, and (4) the burden on employers
    to verify employees' work eligibility. IIRIRA established the three pilot
    programs to be in effect for 4 years, but Congress extended authorization
    for the pilots for an additional 2 years in 2002 and for another 5 years
    in 2003.16 Congress also mandated DHS to expand the Basic Pilot Program to
    employers in all 50 states by December 2004, which DHS did.17 DHS
    terminated the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot Program and the
    Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program in 2003 because of technical
    difficulties and unintended consequences, such as

    16Basic Pilot Extension Act of 2001, P.L. 107-128 and Basic Pilot Program
    Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, P.L.108-156.

    17P.L. 108-156. IIRIRA required the INS to initially operate the Basic
    Pilot Program in at least five of the seven states with the highest
    estimated population of undocumented aliens in the United States. In 1997,
    INS began offering participation in the Basic Pilot Program to employers
    in California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas. In 1999, INS began
    offering participation in the Basic Pilot Program to employers in Nebraska
    because, at the time, INS was conducting an initiative in the state,
    called Operation Vanguard, to help the meatpacking and processing industry
    gain and maintain a legal workforce.

    increased fraud and discrimination, identified in evaluations of the

    18

    programs.

    The Basic Pilot Program is a part of USCIS's Systematic Alien Verification
    for Entitlements Program, which provides a variety of verification
    services for federal, state, and local government agencies. USCIS
    estimates that there are more than 150,000 federal, state, and local
    agency users that verify immigration status through the Systematic Alien
    Verification for Entitlements Program. In fiscal year 2004, about 2,300
    employers actively used the Basic Pilot Program within the Systematic
    Alien Verification for Entitlements Program.

    The Basic Pilot Program provides participating employers with an
    electronic method to verify their employees' work eligibility. Employers
    may participate voluntarily in the Basic Pilot Program but are still
    required to complete Forms I-9 for all newly hired employees in accordance
    with IRCA. After completing the forms, these employers query the pilot
    program's automated system by entering employee information provided on
    the forms, such as name and Social Security number, into the pilot Web
    site within 3 days of the employees' hire date. The pilot program then
    electronically matches that information against information in SSA and, if
    necessary, DHS databases to determine whether the employee is eligible to
    work, as shown in figure 1. The Basic Pilot Program electronically
    notifies employers whether their employees' work authorization was

    18Under the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot Program, only the
    status of newly hired employees attesting to being work-authorized
    noncitizens was electronically checked against information in INS
    databases. The evaluation of this pilot program identified several
    problems, including inherent discrimination against work-authorized
    noncitizens and the lack of strong safeguards against fraudulent
    citizenship attestions. The evaluation stated that individuals who
    attested to being citizens did not need to show documents proving their
    citizen status, and the individuals' information was not queried through
    the pilot program. The Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program was
    initiated only in Iowa because Iowa was the sole state at the start of the
    pilot program issuing driver's licenses and identification cards that
    included machine-readable information needed for completing the Form I-9
    (e.g., name, date of birth, Social Security number). In evaluating this
    pilot program, the Institute for Survey Research and Westat found that the
    program had a number of technical and procedural problems, such as card
    reader difficulties in reading the driver's licenses and Iowa's no longer
    requiring the Social Security number as the driver's license number. This
    change in Iowa's requirements resulted in the inability of employers to
    use the readers on driver's licenses without Social Security numbers. See
    Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Citizen
    Attestation Verification Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: April
    2003) and Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the
    Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: May
    2003).

    confirmed. Those queries that the DHS automated check cannot confirm the
    pilot refers to USCIS staff, called immigration status verifiers, who
    check employee information against information in other DHS databases.

    Figure 1: Basic Pilot Program Verification Process

                    Source: GAO analysis based on USCIS information.

    In cases when the pilot system cannot confirm an employee's work
    authorization status either through the automatic check or the check by an
    immigration status verifier, the system issues the employer a tentative
    nonconfirmation of the employee's work authorization status. In this case,
    the employers must notify the affected employees of the finding, and the
    employees have the right to contest their tentative nonconfirmations
    within 8 working days by contacting SSA or USCIS to resolve any
    inaccuracies in their records.19 During this time, employers may not take
    any adverse actions against those employees, such as limiting their work
    assignments or pay. When employees do not contest their tentative
    nonconfirmations within the allotted time, the Basic Pilot Program issues
    a final nonconfirmation for the employees. Employers are required to
    either immediately terminate or notify DHS of the continued employment of
    workers who do not successfully contest the tentative nonconfirmation and
    those who the pilot program finds are not work-authorized.

        Recent Proposals Related to Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement

    There is ongoing congressional consideration about employment verification
    and worksite enforcement efforts, and various initiatives have been
    proposed related to these issues, including possible new temporary worker
    programs. Since January 2004, the current administration has discussed the
    possibility of initiating a guest worker program in which foreign workers
    would be granted status for employment in the United States for a
    specified period of time. Similarly, some recent legislative proposals
    would provide a means for foreign workers to obtain temporary employment
    and possible permanent residency or citizenship at a later date. Other
    initiatives propose revising visa programs to increase the number of
    foreign workers legally admitted to the United States. In addition,
    legislative proposals have addressed methods for enhancing employment
    verification and worksite enforcement efforts. For example, one proposal
    would make use of the Basic Pilot Program mandatory for all employers, and
    another would increase the fine amounts for employers who knowingly hire
    unauthorized workers. These initiatives reflect

    19In February 2005 we reported that verification services, like the Basic
    Pilot Program, provide a valuable opportunity to prevent many unintended
    or careless mistakes when hiring new workers and reporting worker
    earnings. In particular, we concluded that the Basic Pilot Program
    provides an option for addressing the problem of unauthorized workers'
    earnings posted to the Earnings Suspense File, which occurs when
    individuals' names or Social Security numbers in wage reports do not match
    SSA records. According to SSA officials, when individuals contest SSA
    tentative nonconfirmations, SSA can update the individuals' information in
    the SSA database when, for example, individuals provide information on
    name changes or correct inaccurate birthdates. SSA officials said that
    such updates may help prevent wage reporting problems and the posting of
    individuals' wage information to the Earnings Suspense File. GAO, Social
    Security: Better Coordination among Federal Agencies Could Reduce
    Unidentified Earnings Reports, GAO-05-154 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 4,
    2005).

      Various Weaknesses Have Undermined the Employment Verification Process, but
      the Basic Pilot Program Shows Potential to Enhance the Process

    differing perspectives on employment verification and worksite enforcement
    and touch on a variety of related issues, such as the number of foreign
    workers, if any, needed in the United States, the economic impact of
    illegal aliens residing in the country, and policy decisions on ways to
    address the millions of illegal aliens in the United States.

    The current employment verification process relies on employers' review of
    work eligibility documents to determine whether employees are authorized
    to work, but the process has several weaknesses. Document and identity
    fraud have hindered employers' efforts to reliably verify employees' work
    eligibility under the Form I-9 process. In addition, the large number and
    variety of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility have
    undermined the process. We have previously reported on the need to reduce
    the number of acceptable work eligibility documents and to improve the
    integrity of the documents.20 The Basic Pilot Program, as a voluntary,
    automated verification program, offers a mechanism with potential to
    enhance the employment verification process by reducing document fraud.
    ICE officials said that access to Basic Pilot Program information could
    help the agency better target its worksite enforcement efforts by
    identifying employers who do not follow program requirements. However,
    existing weaknesses in the program, such as the inability of the program
    to detect identity fraud, delays in entering data into DHS databases, and
    some employer noncompliance with pilot program requirements, could become
    more significant and additional resources could be needed if employer
    participation in the program greatly increased or was made mandatory.

        Current Employment Verification Process Based on Employers' Review of
        Documents

    In 1986, IRCA established the employment verification process based on
    employers' review of documents presented by employees to prove identity
    and work eligibility. Under the process, employers must request that newly
    hired employees present a document or documents that confirm employees'
    identity and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employees must attest that
    they are U.S. citizens, lawfully admitted permanent residents, or aliens
    authorized to work in the United States. Employers must then certify that
    they have reviewed the documents presented by their employees to establish
    identity and work eligibility and that the

    20GAO, Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and the Question of
    Discrimination, GAO/GGD-90-62, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 1990) and
    GAO/GGD-99-33.

    documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting them. In
    making their certifications, employers are expected to judge whether the
    documents presented are obviously counterfeit. Employers are deemed in
    compliance with IRCA if they have followed the verification procedures,
    including instances when an unauthorized alien may have presented
    fraudulent documents that appeared genuine. In addition, on the Form I-9,
    employers are required to reverify the employment eligibility of
    individuals whose work authorization has expired, such as aliens with
    temporary work authorization, to determine whether the individuals are
    authorized to continue to work.

        Document and Identity Fraud Have Undermined the Form I-9 Process

    Since the passage of IRCA in 1986, document fraud (use of counterfeit
    documents) and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or
    information belonging to others) have made it difficult for employers who
    want to comply with IRCA to ensure that they employ only authorized
    workers through the current verification and reverification processes. In
    its 1997 report to Congress, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform
    noted that the widespread availability of false documents made it easy for
    unauthorized aliens to obtain jobs in the United States. In 1999, we
    reported that large numbers of unauthorized aliens have either
    fraudulently used valid documents that belong to others or presented
    counterfeit documents as evidence of employment eligibility.21
    Furthermore, in 2004 we reported that unauthorized workers were able to
    use false documents to illegally gain entry to secure areas of critical
    infrastructure sites, such as airports, nuclear power plants, and military
    bases.22 Representatives from some of the employers and employer
    associations we interviewed for this review indicated that, in cases where
    employees present documents that employers suspect of being counterfeit,
    employers may not request that these employees present other documents
    proving their work eligibility because the employees could claim that
    employers are discriminating against them. To help protect against
    discriminatory hiring practices, such as employers requesting specific
    documents from foreign-looking or sounding employees, employers are
    prohibited under IRCA from requesting that new employees present specific
    documents from among the list of acceptable documents to prove their
    identity and work eligibility.

    21GAO/GGD-99-33.

    22GAO, Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a
    Layered Defense, GAO-04-82 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004).

    Although studies suggest that the majority of employers comply with IRCA
    and try to hire only authorized workers, the studies have also noted that
    some employers knowingly hire unauthorized workers, often to exploit the
    workers' low cost labor.23 In 1997, the U.S. Commission on Immigration
    Reform reported that the minority of employers who knowingly hired illegal
    aliens avoided sanctions by going through the motions of compliance while
    accepting false documents. Likewise, in 1999 we concluded that those
    employers who do not want to comply with IRCA can intentionally hire
    unauthorized aliens under the guise of having complied with the employment
    verification requirements by claiming that unauthorized workers presented
    false documents to obtain employment.24

        Large Number and Variety of Acceptable Documents Have Hindered Employer
        Verification Efforts

    The large number and variety of documents that are acceptable for proving
    work eligibility have also complicated employer verification efforts under
    IRCA. Following passage of IRCA in 1986, employees could present any of 29
    different documents to establish their identity and/or work eligibility.
    In a 1997 interim rule, INS reduced the number of acceptable work
    eligibility documents from 29 to 27. Eight of these documents establish
    both identity and employment eligibility (e.g., U.S. passport or permanent
    resident card); 12 documents establish identity only (e.g., driver's
    license); and 7 documents establish employment eligibility only (e.g.,
    Social Security card without the legend "Not Valid for Employment").25 The
    interim rule implemented changes to the list of acceptable work
    eligibility documents mandated by IIRIRA and was intended to serve as a
    temporary measure until INS issued final rules on modifications to the
    Form I-9. In 1998, INS proposed a further reduction in the number of
    acceptable work eligibility documents to 14 but did not finalize the
    proposed rule.

    Since the passage of IRCA, various studies have addressed the need to
    reduce the number of acceptable work eligibility documents to make the
    employment verification process simpler and more secure. In 1990, we
    reported that the multiplicity of work eligibility documents contributed
    to (1) employer uncertainty about how to comply with the employment

    23There are no current reliable data available on the number or percentage
    of employers who seek to comply with IRCA and those who attempt to
    circumvent it.

    24GAO/GGD-99-33.

    25See appendix I for the complete list of acceptable work eligibility
    documents.

    verification requirements and (2) discrimination against authorized
    workers.26 A 1992 report prepared by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
    noted that the first step to simplifying the employment verification
    process was to reduce the current list of acceptable work eligibility
    documents and make them more counterfeit-proof.27 In 1998, INS noted that,
    when IRCA was first passed, a long, inclusive list of acceptable work
    eligibility documents was allowed for the Form I-9 to help ensure that all
    persons who were eligible to work could easily meet the requirements, but
    as early as 1990, there had been evidence that some employers found the
    list confusing. In 1999 we reported that various studies of IRCA's
    employment verification process advocated that the number of documents
    that employees can use to demonstrate employment eligibility should be
    reduced to make the employment verification process more secure and easier
    to understand.28

    Additionally, some of the employers, employer associations, and
    immigration experts we interviewed for this review told us that the large
    number of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility and the fact
    that the Form I-9 has not been updated have impeded employer efforts to
    verify employment eligibility. Representatives from three employer
    associations said that member employers have expressed concerns that the
    Form I-9 has not been updated to reflect changes in the list of acceptable
    work eligibility documents, causing confusion among some employers
    regarding which documents are acceptable. In addition, among the 23
    employers we interviewed, 5 discussed the need to update the Form I-9 to
    reflect revisions to the list of acceptable work eligibility documents.
    Two of these employers told us that they manually edit the Form I-9 to
    reflect the changes in the list of acceptable work eligibility documents.

    DHS officials told us that the department is assessing possible revisions
    to the Form I-9 process, including revisions to the number of acceptable
    work eligibility documents, but has not established a target time frame
    for

    26GAO/GGD-90-62.

    27U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and
    Refugee Affairs, Options for an Improved Employment Verification System
    (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 1992).

    28GAO/GGD-99-33.

    completing this assessment.29 They said that the Handbook for Employers,
    which provides guidance for completing the Form I-9, would also need to be
    updated. In May 2005, DHS released an updated version of the Form I-9 that
    changed references from INS to DHS but did not modify the list of
    acceptable work eligibility documents on the Form I-9 to reflect changes
    made to the list by the 1997 interim rule. In the absence of final
    regulations and an updated Form I-9 and handbook, employers, employees,
    and other stakeholders may not clearly understand the Form I-9 process,
    particularly which documents are acceptable for proving work eligibility.

        Proposals Have Been Made to Improve Document Integrity

    We have previously reported on efforts to enhance the integrity of
    acceptable work eligibility documents, which could help reduce document
    fraud and make the employment verification process more secure, especially
    if the number of acceptable documents was reduced. For example, in 1999 we
    reported that INS had taken steps to increase the integrity of immigration
    documents, such as by issuing new employment authorization documents with
    visible security features like holograms and by issuing permanent resident
    cards with digital photographs and fingerprint images.30 We noted that,
    although INS enhanced the integrity of its documents, unauthorized aliens
    could present non-INS documents, such as Social Security cards, to
    employers to prove work eligibility. In 1998, we reported on estimates of
    costs associated with alternative proposals for SSA issuance of enhanced
    Social Security cards.31 We are currently reviewing SSA efforts to enhance
    the integrity of Social Security cards and how enhanced cards might
    strengthen the employment verification process and plan to report on these
    issues next year.

    In addition, we have previously reported on the possible use of biometrics
    in verification and identification processes-such as those used at U.S.
    ports of entry.32 Biometrics covers a wide range of technologies that can
    be

    29In addition to developing a rule on the reduction of the number of
    acceptable work eligibility documents, DHS is also developing regulations
    on the electronic Form I-9, which employers were authorized to use
    beginning at the end of April 2005. See appendix III for more information
    on the electronic Form I-9.

    30GAO/GGD-99-33.

    31GAO, Social Security: Mass Issuance of Counterfeit-Resistant Cards
    Expensive, but Alternatives Exist, GAO/HEHS-98-170 (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
    20, 1998).

    32GAO, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security,
    GAO-03-174 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002).

    used to verify identity by measuring and analyzing human
    characteristics.33 Biometrics can theoretically be very effective personal
    identifiers because the characteristics they measure are thought to be
    distinct to each person. Because they are tightly bound to an individual,
    biometrics are more reliable, cannot be forgotten, and are less easily
    lost, stolen, or guessed. While biometrics may show promise in enhancing
    verification and identification processes, we have also reported on the
    trade-offs for using biometric indicators, such as concerns regarding the
    protections under current law for biometric data, the absence of clear
    criteria governing data sharing, and infrastructure processes such as the
    binding of an identity to the biometric data. We reported that while a
    biometric placed on a token, such as a passport or visa, cannot
    necessarily link a person to his or her identity, it can reduce the
    potential for an individual to assume multiple identities. We also
    reported that although federal agencies are required by statute to provide
    security protections for information collected and maintained by or for
    the agency commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm that would
    result from unauthorized disclosure, disruption, modification, or
    destruction of the information, poor information security is a widespread
    federal problem with potentially severe consequences. In reporting on the
    possible use of biometrics in verification and identification processes,
    we identified several examples of such risks associated with using
    biometric data.34

    Recent laws and legislative proposals have addressed possible ways to
    enhance the integrity of documents and strengthen the employment
    verification process. The Real ID Act of 2005 mandated that states must
    meet minimum standards in developing and issuing driver's licenses before
    federal government authorities can accept state driver's licenses as
    identification for official purposes.35 These standards include (1) adding
    physical security features to prevent counterfeiting and tampering, (2)
    including common machine-readable technology on driver's licenses, and (3)
    requiring driver's license applicants to provide evidence of their dates
    of birth and Social Security numbers. The Intelligence Reform and
    Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required SSA to form a task force to,
    among other things, establish standards for safeguarding Social Security

    33GAO, Information Security: Challenges in Using Biometrics, GAO-03-1137T
    (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003).

    34GAO-03-174.

    35P.L. 109-13, 49 U.S.C. 30301 note.

    cards from counterfeiting, tampering, alteration, and theft.36 In addition
    to these laws, various legislative proposals address possible ways to make
    identity and work eligibility documents more secure and to enhance the
    employment verification process. For example, one recent proposal would
    mandate that individuals can present only machine-readable, counterfeit
    and tamper-resistant Social Security cards to obtain employment. According
    to the proposal, these machine-readable cards would allow employers to
    check employees' work authorization status against information maintained
    in an employment eligibility database.37 These laws and proposals differ
    in the extent to which they address issues related to enhancing employment
    verification through electronic means, such as the availability and
    accessibility of machine-readable technology and the security and privacy
    of information maintained on documents and in databases.

                               Basic Pilot Program Shows

        Promise in Enhancing Employment Verification, but Current Weaknesses Could
        Undermine Increased Use

    Basic Pilot Program May Help Employers Reliably Verify Work Eligibility
    and Decrease Document Fraud

    Various immigration experts have noted that the most important step that
    could be taken to reduce unlawful migration is the development of a more
    effective system for verifying work authorization. In particular, the U.S.
    Commission on Immigration Reform concluded that the most promising option
    for verifying work authorization was a computerized registry based on
    employers' electronic verification of an employee's Social Security number
    with records on work authorization for aliens. The Basic Pilot Program,
    which is currently available on a voluntary basis to all employers in the
    United States, operates in a similar way to the computerized registry
    recommended by the commission. Yet only a small portion-about 2,300

    36P.L. 108-458.

    37Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Social Security Protection Act of
    2005, H.R. 98, 109th Cong.

    ICE Sees Additional Benefit in Access to Basic Pilot Program Data

    in fiscal year 2004-of the approximately 5.6 million employer firms
    nationwide actively used the pilot program.38

    The Basic Pilot Program assists employers in detecting document fraud by
    helping to eliminate employer guesswork as to whether information
    contained on work eligibility documents presented by employees is
    authentic or counterfeit. If newly hired employees present counterfeit
    documents containing false information, the pilot program would not
    confirm the employees' work eligibility because the employees' Form I-9
    information, such as a false name or Social Security number, would not
    match SSA and DHS database information when queried through the Basic
    Pilot Program. In the evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, the Institute
    for Survey Research at Temple University and Westat found that the program
    appeared to reduce unauthorized employment arising from employee
    presentation of counterfeit or altered documents containing false
    information. Twenty of the 22 employers we interviewed who participated in
    the Basic Pilot Program indicated that the program helps them to reliably
    verify newly hired employees' work authorization status.

    ICE has no direct role in monitoring employer use of the Basic Pilot
    Program and does not have direct access to program information, which is
    maintained by USCIS. ICE officials noted that, in a few cases, they have
    requested and received pilot program data from USCIS on specific employers
    who participate in the program and are under ICE investigation. ICE
    officials told us that program data could indicate cases in which
    employers do not follow program requirements and therefore would help ICE
    better target its worksite enforcement efforts toward those employers. For
    example, the Basic Pilot Program's confirmation of numerous queries of the
    same Social Security number could indicate that the Social Security

    38The number of employers who actively used the program in fiscal year
    2004 includes a small number of employers who switched between two
    versions of the program and, as a result, were counted twice as active
    users. USCIS is not able to easily determine which employers were counted
    twice. In addition, the approximately 2,300 employers who actively used
    the pilot program in fiscal year 2004 do not reflect the number of
    worksites or individual business establishments using the program. In
    2002, the most recent year for which data are available, there were
    approximately 5.6 million firms in the United States. Under the Basic
    Pilot Program, one employer may have multiple worksites that use the pilot
    program. For example, a hotel chain could have multiple individual hotels
    using the Basic Pilot Program. This hotel chain would represent one
    employer using the pilot program. A firm is a business organization
    consisting of one or more domestic establishments in the same state and
    industry that were specified under common ownership or control. See
    appendix IV for data on employer participation and use of the Basic Pilot
    Program.

    Basic Pilot Program Does Not Help Employers Detect Identity Fraud in
    Verifying Employees' Work Eligibility

    number is being used fraudulently or that an unscrupulous employer is
    knowingly hiring unauthorized workers by accepting the same Social
    Security number for multiple employees. However, USCIS officials stated
    that they have concerns about providing ICE with broader access to Basic
    Pilot Program information for the worksite enforcement program. USCIS
    officials said that, if ICE has access to pilot program information for
    worksite enforcement purposes, that access might create a disincentive for
    employers to participate in this voluntary program and could be used for
    purposes other than identifying potentially unscrupulous employers. These
    officials stated that employers may be less likely to join or participate
    in the program because the employers may believe that they are more likely
    to be targeted for a worksite enforcement investigation as a result of
    program participation.

    ICE suggested that there could be possible benefits to their worksite
    enforcement efforts if employers were required to participate in a
    mandatory automated verification program like the Basic Pilot Program. ICE
    officials said that a mandatory automated verification system could help
    ICE focus worksite enforcement efforts on employers who try to evade using
    the program. They also stated that a mandatory system like the pilot
    program could limit the ability of employers who knowingly hired
    unauthorized workers to claim that the workers presented false documents
    to obtain employment, assisting ICE agents in proving employer violations
    of IRCA. Officials from 7 of the 12 Special Agent in Charge field offices
    we interviewed suggested that a mandatory Basic Pilot Program could help
    them better target their worksite enforcement efforts.

    Although an automated verification program like the Basic Pilot Program
    has potential to enhance the employment verification process and help
    employers detect use of counterfeit documents, the program cannot
    currently help employers detect identity fraud. In 2002 we reported that,
    although not specifically or comprehensively quantifiable, the prevalence
    of identity fraud seemed to be increasing, a development that may affect
    employers' ability to reliably verify employment eligibility.39 If an
    unauthorized worker presents valid documentation that belongs to another
    person authorized to work, the Basic Pilot Program may find the worker to
    be work-authorized. Similarly, if an employee presents counterfeit
    documentation that contains valid information and appears

    39GAO, Identity Theft: Prevalence and Cost Appear to Be Growing,
    GAO-02-363 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2002).

    Delays in Data Entry May Lengthen the Pilot Program Verification Process

    authentic, the Basic Pilot Program may verify the employee as
    workauthorized. DHS officials told us that the department is currently
    considering possible ways to enhance the Basic Pilot Program to help it
    detect cases of identity fraud, for example, by modifying the program to
    provide a digitized photograph associated with employment authorization
    information presented by an employee. Yet, DHS cannot fully assess
    possible ways to modify the Basic Pilot Program to address identity fraud
    in the absence of data on the costs and feasibility of implementing such
    modifications.

    In addition, the Basic Pilot Program does not assist employers in
    verifying the work authorization status of employees whose status requires
    reverification and therefore does not help employers detect document or
    identity fraud in the reverification process. Employers currently may not
    use the Basic Pilot Program to re-verify the employment eligibility of
    individuals whose work authorization has expired, and employers agree not
    to use the pilot program for reverification when registering to
    participate in the program. Therefore, participating employers cannot
    fully use the Basic Pilot Program to verify the work authorization status
    of all employees for whom verification, including reverification, is
    required under the Form I-9 process. According to one USCIS official, the
    pilot program does not face any technological or other limitations that
    would prevent the program from being used for reverification purposes, if
    such use was required or allowed as part of the pilot program.

    Another current weakness in the Basic Pilot Program that could affect the
    program's success if use increased or was made mandatory is delays in the
    entry of information on immigrants' and nonimmigrants' arrivals and
    employment authorization into DHS databases. Although the majority of
    pilot program queries entered by participating employers are confirmed via
    the automated SSA and DHS verification checks, about 15 percent of queries
    authorized by DHS required manual verification by immigration status
    verifiers in fiscal year 2004.40 According to USCIS, immigration status
    verifiers typically resolve cases referred to them for verification within
    24 hours, but a small number of cases take longer. For example, nine
    employers we interviewed reported that a small number of

    40In fiscal year 2004, about 10 percent of total Basic Pilot Program
    queries were referred to DHS for verification. Of these queries referred
    to DHS for verification, about 85 percent were confirmed via the DHS
    automated check.

    immigration status verifier verifications took longer than 24 hours to
    resolve, with a few verifications taking as long as 2 weeks to resolve.

    Immigration status verifiers reported that the primary reason for queries
    to require verification by them is because of delays in entry of
    employment authorization information into DHS databases. USCIS officials
    told us that those verifications that take longer than a few days to
    resolve are generally caused by delays in the entry of data on employees
    who received employment authorization documents generated by a computer
    and camera that are not directly linked to DHS databases, such as those
    used at ports of entry for refugees and at USCIS field offices. They said
    that information on the employment authorization documents generated
    through this process is electronically sent to USCIS headquarters for
    entry but is sometimes lost or not entered into databases in a timely
    manner. By contrast, employment authorization documents issued at USCIS
    service centers are produced via computers that are used to update data in
    USCIS databases, which USCIS officials told us represent the majority of
    employment authorization documents currently issued by USCIS. The Temple
    University Institute for Survey Research and Westat found that
    verifications that require immigration status verifiers' review lengthen
    the time needed to complete the employment verification process. In
    addition, among the 22 employers we interviewed, 7 reported that they may
    experience some losses in work time, training, or money for background
    checks and physicals when employees contest tentative nonconfirmations.

    USCIS has taken steps to increase the timeliness and accuracy of
    information entered into databases used as part of the Basic Pilot
    Program. In June 2004, USCIS reported that, among other improvements, it
    had started work to expedite data entry for new lawful permanent residents
    and arriving nonimmigrants and to improve data entry for changes in work
    authorization status.41 For example, USCIS said that it has worked to
    reduce the time in which data are available for Basic Pilot Program
    verifications by expediting submission of data on newly arrived immigrants
    and nonimmigrants from ports of entry and field offices to USCIS service
    centers for data entry. The agency reported that, as a result of its
    efforts, data on new immigrants are now typically available for
    verification within 10 to 12 days of an immigrant's arrival in the United
    States while previously, the information was not available for up to 6 to
    9 months after arrival. Moreover, USCIS reported it has worked to

    41DHS, Report to Congress on the Basic Pilot Program (Washington, D.C.:
    June 2004).

    increase the timeliness and availability of temporary work authorization
    information in its databases by increasing the number of employment
    authorization documents issued by service centers as compared with the
    number of documents issued through computers not directly linked to DHS
    databases. The department reported that, while in 1999 less than half of
    all employment authorization documents were issued by service centers,
    over three-quarters of the cards are now issued through service centers.
    USCIS officials told us that the agency has continued these efforts to
    improve the timeliness and accuracy of information entered into DHS
    databases and noted that the agency is currently planning to fund another
    evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program that will include a review of the
    accuracy of DHS database information.

    Furthermore, analysis of the Basic Pilot Program database indicates that
    the timeliness and accuracy of the DHS automated checks against the Basic
    Pilot Program database have improved. In fiscal year 2004, about 10
    percent of all queries were referred to DHS for verification. Among those
    queries authorized by DHS, the percentage of queries verified by the DHS
    automated check increased from about 67 percent in fiscal year 2000 to
    about 85 percent in fiscal year 2004, as shown in figure 2.

    Employer Noncompliance with Pilot Program Procedures May Adversely Affect
    Employees

    Figure 2: Number of Queries Authorized by DHS through the Automated Check
    and the Immigration Status Verifier Check

    Number of queries

    60,000

    50,000

    40,000

    30,000

    20,000

    10,000

    0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

    Fiscal year

    Employment authorizations issued by DHS immigration status verifier review

    Employment authorizations issued by DHS automated check

    Source: GAO analysis of USCIS data.

    Note: Data have been rounded to the nearest hundred.

    Although USCIS has taken some steps to improve the timeliness and accuracy
    of information entered into databases used as part of the Basic Pilot
    Program and plans to review the accuracy of database information as part
    of its planned evaluation of the pilot program, USCIS cannot effectively
    assess future use of the pilot program, including possible increased
    program usage, without information on the costs and feasibility of ways to
    further reduce delays in the entry of information into DHS databases.

    Another factor that may reduce the effectiveness of the pilot program if
    usage is increased or made mandatory is employer noncompliance with Basic
    Pilot Program requirements. These requirements are intended to safeguard
    employees queried through the program from such harm as discrimination or
    reduced training and pay. The Temple University

    Current Program May Not Complete Timely Verifications if Use Greatly
    Increased

    Institute for Survey Research and Westat evaluation of the Basic Pilot
    Program concluded that the majority of employers surveyed appeared to be
    in compliance with Basic Pilot Program procedures. However, the evaluation
    found evidence of some noncompliance with these procedures that
    specifically prohibit screening job applicants and taking actions that
    adversely affect employees while they are contesting tentative
    nonconfirmations, such as limiting employees' work assignments or pay. For
    example, 30 percent of the employers surveyed for the evaluation reported
    restricting work assignments while employees contested tentative
    nonconfirmations, a practice that is prohibited under the Basic Pilot
    Program. Of the 22 employers we interviewed who participate in the pilot,
    7 reported using the Basic Pilot Program in a way that did not conform
    with pilot program procedures, including using the pilot program to screen
    job applicants before offering jobs to the applicants.

    The Basic Pilot Program provides a variety of reports that may help USCIS
    determine whether employers follow program requirements. For example,
    these reports could help USCIS identify employers who do not appear to
    refer employees contesting tentative nonconfirmations to SSA or DHS, which
    is required under pilot program procedures. USCIS could then follow up to
    determine if such employers are following pilot procedures that require
    employers to refer all employees with tentative nonconfirmations to SSA or
    DHS. USCIS officials told us that efforts to review employers' use of the
    pilot program have been limited by lack of staff available to oversee and
    examine employer use of the program, and they noted that there are
    currently 15 USCIS headquarters staff members responsible for
    administering USCIS verification programs, including the Basic Pilot
    Program. The officials said that, as part of the next evaluation of the
    pilot program, USCIS plans to assess the extent to which employers follow
    pilot program requirements and procedures, such as employer adherence to
    requirements to notify employees of tentative nonconfirmations. However,
    without information on the costs and feasibility of routinely reviewing
    employers' use of the pilot program, USCIS cannot fully determine possible
    ways to regularly examine employer use of the program and therefore the
    extent to which employers comply with pilot program requirements.

    According to USCIS officials, due to the growth in other USCIS
    verification programs, current USCIS staff may not be able to complete
    timely verifications if the number of employers using the Basic Pilot
    Program were to significantly increase. In particular, these officials
    said that if a significant number of new employers registered for the
    program or if the program were mandatory for all employers or a segment of

    employers, additional resources would be needed to maintain timely
    verifications, given the growth in other verification programs. For
    example, the REAL ID Act of 200542 mandated that states must meet minimum
    standards in issuing driver's licenses and nondriver identification cards,
    including verifying the immigration status of all noncitizen applicants,
    before federal government authorities can accept the licenses and cards
    for official purposes beginning in 2008. Currently, USCIS has
    approximately 38 immigration status verifiers available for completing
    Basic Pilot Program verifications, and these verifiers reported that they
    are able to complete the majority of current required checks within their
    target time frame of 24 hours.43 However, USCIS officials said that
    because of the growth in other verification programs that would increase
    the number of verifications that require checks by immigration status
    verifiers, the agency has serious concerns about its ability to complete
    timely verifications if the number of Basic Pilot Program users greatly
    increased.

    USCIS officials also stated that the agency lacks funding to further
    expand the Basic Pilot Program. The Basic Pilot Program and other
    verification programs have been funded by fees USCIS receives from
    applicants for adjudication of immigration and citizenship benefits. USCIS
    allocated about $3.5 million from its fee accounts for all of its
    verification programs, including the Basic Pilot Program, in fiscal year
    2005.44 USCIS officials said that this allocation included a $500,000
    increase for additional employee verifications by employers using the
    Basic Pilot Program. However, these officials told us that current funding
    levels allocated for USCIS verification programs would not be sufficient
    to cover costs associated with mandatory use of the Basic Pilot Program
    for all employers, should this be adopted. In 2004, we reported that USCIS
    fees were not sufficient to fully

    42P.L. 109-13, codified at 49 U.S.C. 30301.

    43Other immigration status verifiers are dedicated to completing manual
    verifications for other USCIS verification programs.

    44According to USCIS, in fiscal year 2005, the agency allocated about
    $475,000 to reimburse SSA for Basic Pilot Program query costs and about
    $337,500 for employer query costs. In addition, USCIS estimated about $7
    million in annual costs for verifications by immigration status verifiers.

    fund the agency's operations but noted that cost data were insufficient to
    determine the full extent of the funding shortfall.45

    The Temple University Institute for Survey Research and Westat estimated a
    range of costs associated with expanding the dial-up version of the pilot
    program,46 including costs for making the program mandatory for a selected
    group of employers, like employers with more than 10 employees, and making
    the program mandatory for all employers, regardless of the number of
    employees. The report estimated that a mandatory dial-up version of the
    pilot program for all employers would cost the federal government,
    employers, and employees about $11.7 billion total per year, with
    employers bearing most of the costs.47 USCIS has worked with participating
    employers to switch them to the Web-based version of the program and
    discontinued the dial-up version in June 2005. The Temple University
    Institute for Survey Research and Westat did not estimate costs for a
    mandatory Web-based version, although they noted that operating costs
    associated with such a program would be less than for the dial-up version
    because employer computer maintenance and telephone costs would be lower.
    As part of the next evaluation of the pilot program, USCIS plans to assess
    the costs and potential time frames associated with making the Web-based
    version mandatory for all employers or specific segments of employers.
    Given the growth in other USCIS verification programs, USCIS cannot
    effectively assess potential costs for making the Web-based version of the
    Basic Pilot Program mandatory without information on other possible
    resources needed for the program, such as staff needed for conducting
    manual verifications.

    45GAO, Immigration Application Fees: Current Fees Are Not Sufficient to
    Fund U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Operations, GAO-04-309R
    (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 5, 2004). In April 2004, USCIS raised its fees for
    immigration benefit applications.

    46Under the dial-up version of the Basic Pilot Program, employers
    installed pilot program software directly onto a computer and used a
    dedicated telephone line to access the pilot system.

    47The Institute for Survey Research and Westat estimated that the
    contractor who runs the Basic Pilot Program charged $0.28 per query. They
    estimated that it cost about $6 to resolve each query that required review
    by immigration status verifiers.

      Competing Priorities and Lack of Outcome Goals and Measures May Hinder
      Worksite Enforcement Efforts

    The worksite enforcement program is one of various ICE immigration
    enforcement programs, and has been a relatively low priority. Since fiscal
    year 1999, the number of notices of intent to fine issued to employers for
    violations of IRCA and the number of administrative worksite arrests have
    declined, which, according to ICE, are due to various factors, such as the
    widespread use of counterfeit documents that make it difficult for ICE
    agents to prove employer violations. INS and ICE have also faced
    difficulties in setting and collecting meaningful fine amounts and in
    detaining unauthorized workers arrested at worksites. In addition, ICE has
    not yet developed outcome goals and measures for the worksite enforcement
    program, making it difficult for ICE and Congress to assess program
    performance and determine resource levels for the program.

        Worksite Enforcement Has Been a Relatively Low Priority for ICE, but ICE Has
        Proposed Additional Resources for the Program

    Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs
    formerly managed by INS and now managed by ICE, and competes for resources
    with these other program areas, such as alien smuggling and fraud. Among
    INS and ICE responsibilities, worksite enforcement has been a relatively
    low priority. For example, in the 1999 INS Interior Enforcement Strategy,
    the strategy to block and remove employers' access to undocumented workers
    was the fifth of five interior enforcement priorities.48 In this same
    year, we reported that, relative to other enforcement programs in INS,
    worksite enforcement received a small portion of INS's staffing and
    enforcement budget. We noted that the number of employer investigations
    INS was able to conduct each year covered only a fraction of the estimated
    number of employers who may

                                           49

    have hired unauthorized aliens.

    In keeping with the primary mission of DHS to combat terrorism, after
    September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE focused investigative resources
    primarily on national security cases, such as investigations of aliens in
    the United States who may have overstayed their authorized time periods
    for being in the country and the National Security Entry and Exit
    Registration System; on participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces;50
    and on critical

    48INS, Interior Enforcement Strategy (Washington, D.C.: January 1999).

    49GAO/GGD-99-33.

    50The National Security Entry and Exit Registration System domestic
    registration required selected groups of aliens from a number of countries
    to register with immigration authorities between November 2002 and April
    2003. Joint Terrorism Task Forces are multiagency investigative teams
    composed of federal, state, and local agencies that work jointly with
    other nonmember agencies to investigate terrorism matters.

    infrastructure protection. In particular, INS and then ICE focused
    available resources for worksite enforcement mainly on identifying and
    removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites, such as
    airports and nuclear power plants, to help reduce vulnerabilities at those
    sites. In 2004, we reported that, if critical infrastructure-related
    businesses were to be compromised by terrorists, this would pose a serious
    threat to domestic security.51 In 2003, we testified that, given ICE's
    limited resources, it needs to ensure that it targets those industries
    where employment of illegal aliens poses the greatest potential risk to
    national security.52 According to ICE officials, the agency adopted this
    focus on critical infrastructure protection because the fact that
    unauthorized workers can obtain employment at critical infrastructure
    sites indicates that there are vulnerabilities in those sites' hiring and
    screening practices, and unauthorized workers employed at those sites are
    vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists, smugglers, traffickers, or other
    criminals.

    Consistent with these priorities, in 2003 ICE headquarters issued a memo
    requiring field offices to request approval from ICE headquarters prior to
    opening any worksite enforcement investigation not related to the
    protection of critical infrastructure sites, such as investigations of
    farms and restaurants. ICE officials told us that the purpose of this memo
    was to help ensure that field offices focused worksite enforcement efforts
    on critical infrastructure protection operations. Field office
    representatives told us that noncritical infrastructure worksite
    enforcement was one of the few investigative areas for which offices had
    to request approval from ICE headquarters to open an investigation.
    According to ICE, the agency recently issued a memo delegating authority
    to approve noncritical infrastructure worksite enforcement cases to field
    offices' Special Agents in Charge. Eight of the 12 offices we interviewed
    told us that worksite enforcement was not an office priority unless the
    worksite enforcement case related to critical infrastructure protection.
    ICE has inspected Forms I-9 and employer records at hundreds of critical
    infrastructure sites as of March 2005. For example, as part of Operation
    Tarmac, ICE conducted investigations at nearly 200 airports nationwide
    and, as part of Operation Glow Worm, conducted investigations at more than
    50 nuclear power

    51GAO-05-66.

    52GAO, Homeland Security: Challenges to Implementing the Immigration
    Interior Enforcement Strategy, GAO-03-660T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10,
    2003).

    plants as of March 2005.53 Between October 2004 and the beginning of May
    2005, about 77 percent of the worksite enforcement cases opened by ICE
    were related to critical infrastructure protection.54

    Since fiscal year 1999, INS and ICE have dedicated a relatively small
    portion of overall agent resources to the worksite enforcement program. As
    shown in figure 3, in fiscal year 1999, INS allocated about 240 full-time
    equivalents to worksite enforcement efforts, while in fiscal year 2003,
    ICE allocated about 90 full-time equivalents.55 Between fiscal years 1999
    and 2003, the percentage of agent work-years spent on worksite enforcement
    efforts generally decreased from about 9 percent to about 4 percent.

    53Operations Tarmac and Glow Worm were ICE initiatives to detect and
    remove unauthorized workers from airports and nuclear power plants,
    respectively.

    54Data are not available on the number of critical infrastructure and
    noncritical infrastructure worksite enforcement cases ICE opened prior to
    fiscal year 2005 because before fiscal year 2005, ICE's case management
    system did not distinguish between the two case types.

    55One full-time equivalent is equal to one work-year or 2,080 nonovertime
    hours.

    Figure 3: Investigative Agent Work-years Spent on Worksite Enforcement
    Efforts and Agent Work-years Spent on Other Investigative Areas for Each
    Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2003

    Work-years

    3,000

    2,499 2,4722,500

    2,000

    1,500

    1,000

    500

    0

                                1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

    Fiscal year

    Work-years for worksite enforcement

    Work-years for all other investigative areas

    Source: GAO analysis of INS case management data.

    Although worksite enforcement may remain a low priority relative to other
    programs, ICE has proposed increasing agent resources for the worksite
    enforcement program by adding staff to its headquarters' worksite
    enforcement unit,56 which was comprised of three staff members as of July
    2005, and hiring additional worksite enforcement staff for field offices.
    In particular, ICE plans to use the $5 million provided for fiscal year
    2005 by a congressional conference report for the worksite enforcement
    program to fund additional headquarters positions for the worksite
    enforcement unit.57 In its fiscal year 2006 budget submission, ICE
    requested funding for 117 compliance officers, 20 additional investigative
    agents, and

    56ICE headquarters' worksite enforcement unit is responsible for managing
    the agency's worksite enforcement program.

    57H.R. Conf. Rep. 108-774 (2004) accompanying the Department of Homeland
    Security Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108-334.

    6 additional program managers for worksite enforcement. ICE has proposed
    hiring these compliance officers to conduct the administrative elements of
    worksite enforcement cases, such as the inspection of Forms I-9 and other
    employment records. ICE officials said that these officers would pass
    cases involving potential criminal violations to investigative agents for
    review. ICE officials told us that the agency would use the compliance
    officers only for worksite enforcement efforts. According to ICE,
    compliance enforcement officers are less costly than investigative agents.
    ICE estimates that each investigative agent would cost the agency
    approximately $167,000 to $176,000 in fiscal year 2006, while one
    compliance enforcement officer would cost about $76,000. At this point, it
    is unclear what impact, if any, these additional resources would have on
    worksite enforcement efforts.

        ICE Attributes Decline in Numbers of Employer Fine Notices and Worksite
        Arrests to Document Fraud and Resource Allocation Decisions

    The number of notices of intent to fine issued to employers as well as the
    number of unauthorized workers arrested at worksites have generally
    declined. Between fiscal years 1999 and 2004, the number of notices of
    intent to fine issued to employers for improperly completing Forms I-9 or
    knowingly hiring unauthorized workers generally decreased from 417 to 3.58
    (See figure 4.)

    58ICE worksite enforcement investigations can span several fiscal years.
    For example, ICE can open an investigation in one fiscal year, but may not
    complete the case, including issuing a notice of intent to fine, if
    warranted, for several fiscal years. In addition, after ICE issues a
    notice of intent to fine, employers may negotiate with ICE attorneys to
    set a final amount for the fine. Therefore, ICE could issue a notice of
    intent to fine in one fiscal year, but not issue the final order for the
    fine until the following fiscal year.

    Figure 4: Number of Notices of Intent to Fine Issued to Employers for Each
    Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2004

    The number of unauthorized workers arrested during worksite enforcement
    operations has also declined since fiscal year 1999. As shown in figure 5,
    the number of administrative worksite arrests declined by about 84 percent
    from 2,849 in fiscal year 1999 to 445 in fiscal year 2003.

    Figure 5: Number of Worksite Enforcement Arrests for Each Fiscal Year from
    1999 through 2003

    According to ICE records, worksite enforcement criminal arrests totaled
    159 in fiscal year 2004 and 81 in the period from October 2004 through
    April 2005.59

    ICE attributes the decline in the number of notices of intent to fine
    issued to employers and number of administrative worksite arrests to
    various factors including the widespread availability and use of
    counterfeit

    59These data on worksite enforcement criminal arrests for fiscal years
    2004 and 2005 do not include data on the number of worksite enforcement
    administrative arrests for those fiscal years. Fiscal year 2004 and 2005
    data cannot be compared with data for previous fiscal years because the
    way INS agents entered data on investigative work-years into the INS case
    management system differs from the way ICE agents enter such data into the
    ICE system. Following the creation of ICE in March 2003, the case
    management system used to enter and maintain information on immigration
    investigations changed. With the establishment of ICE, agents began using
    the legacy U.S. Customs Service's case management system, called the
    Treasury Enforcement Communications System, for entering and maintaining
    information on investigations, including worksite enforcement operations.
    Prior to the creation of ICE, the former INS entered and maintained
    information on investigative activities in the Performance Analysis
    System, which captured information on immigration investigations
    differently than the Treasury Enforcement Communications System.

    documents and the allocation of resources to other priorities. Various
    studies have shown that the availability and use of fraudulent documents
    have made it difficult for ICE agents to prove that employers knowingly
    hire unauthorized workers. For example, in previous work we reported that
    the prevalence of document fraud made it difficult for INS to prove that
    an employer knowingly hired an unauthorized alien.60 In 1996, the
    Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General reported that the
    proliferation of cheap fraudulent documents made it possible for the
    unscrupulous employer to avoid being held accountable for hiring illegal
    aliens.61 ICE officials told us that employers who agents suspect of
    knowingly hiring unauthorized workers can claim that they were unaware
    that their workers presented false documents at the time of hire, making
    it difficult for agents to prove that the employer willfully violated
    IRCA. In commenting on a draft of this report, ICE also noted that the
    IIRIRA provision that limited employer liability for certain Form I-9
    paperwork violations affects ICE's ability to substantiate employer
    charges for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers and, therefore, the
    number of notices of intent to fine that ICE issues. This provision came
    into effect in 1996, so it is unclear what effect, if any, the provision
    had on the decline in the number of notices of intent to fine issued
    between fiscal years 1999 and 2004.

    In addition, according to ICE, the allocation of INS and ICE resources to
    other priorities has contributed to the decline in the numbers of notices
    of intent to fine and worksite arrests. For example, INS focused its
    worksite enforcement resources on egregious employer violators who were
    linked to other criminal violations like smuggling, fraud, or worker
    exploitation, and de-emphasized administrative employer cases and fines.
    Furthermore, INS investigative resources were redirected from worksite
    enforcement activities to criminal alien cases, which consumed more
    investigative hours by the late 1990s than any other enforcement activity.
    After September 11, 2001, INS and ICE focused investigative resources on
    national security cases and, in particular, focused worksite enforcement
    efforts on critical infrastructure protection, which is consistent with
    DHS's primary mission to combat terrorism. According to ICE, the
    redirection of

    60GAO/GGD-99-33 and GAO, Identity Fraud: Prevalence and Links to Alien
    Illegal Activities, GAO-02-830T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002).

    61Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Immigration and
    Naturalization Service Efforts to Combat Harboring and Employing Illegal
    Aliens in Sweatshops, I-96-08 (Washington, D.C.: May 1996).

    resources from other enforcement programs to perform national
    securityrelated investigations resulted in fewer resources for traditional
    program areas like fraud and noncritical infrastructure worksite
    enforcement. Additionally, some ICE field representatives, as well as
    immigration experts we interviewed, noted that the focus on critical
    infrastructure protection does not address the majority of worksites in
    industries that have traditionally provided the magnet of jobs attracting
    illegal aliens to the United States.

        INS and ICE Have Faced Difficulties in Setting Fine Amounts and in Detaining
        Unauthorized Workers, but Have Taken Steps to Address Difficulties

    INS and ICE have faced difficulties in setting and collecting final fine
    amounts that meaningfully deter employers from knowingly hiring
    unauthorized workers and in detaining unauthorized workers arrested at
    worksites. ICE officials told us that because fine amounts are so low, the
    fines do not provide a meaningful deterrent. These officials also said
    that when agents could prove that an employer knowingly hired an
    unauthorized worker and issued a notice of intent to fine, the fine
    amounts agents recommended were often negotiated down in value during
    discussions between agency attorneys and employers. The amount of
    mitigated fines may be, in the opinion of some ICE officials, so low that
    they believe that employers view the fines as a cost of doing business,
    making the fines an ineffective deterrent for employers who attempt to
    circumvent IRCA. ICE officials at 11 of the 12 field offices at which we
    interviewed staff said that they experienced instances in which fine
    amounts were mitigated down in value. According to ICE, the agency
    mitigates employer fine amounts because doing so may be a more efficient
    use of government resources than pursuing employers who contest or ignore
    fines, which could be more costly to the government than the fine amount
    sought. Recently, ICE settled a worksite enforcement case with a large
    company without going through the administrative fine process. As part of
    the settlement, the company agreed to pay $11 million and company
    contractors agreed to pay $4 million in forfeitures-more than any
    administrative fine amount ever issued against an employer for IRCA
    violations, according to ICE.

    One ICE official said that use of such civil settlements instead of
    pursuit of administrative fines, specifically in regard to investigations
    of noncritical infrastructure employers, could be a more efficient use of
    investigative resources. ICE officials also said that use of civil
    settlements could help ensure employers' future compliance by including in
    the settlements a requirement to enter into compliance agreements, such as
    the Basic Pilot Program. ICE recently employed this strategy in its $15
    million settlement with the large company. As part of the settlement, the
    company agreed to

    enter into a compliance program with ICE. Other compliance agreements with
    employers could involve mandatory participation in the Basic Pilot
    Program. Additionally, ICE officials said that the agency has proposed
    working with employers who are not the subjects of worksite enforcement
    investigations to help them ensure compliance with IRCA through enhanced
    education and partnerships. In April 2005, ICE issued its interim
    strategic plan, which, as part of its objective on identifying critical
    industries for worksite enforcement operations, included an approach for
    partnering with businesses to help them comply with IRCA.62 This
    partnership program, called the ICE Mutual Agreement between Government
    and Employers, is intended to provide employers with training and best
    practices for complying with IRCA. In addition to implementing this
    partnership program, ICE plans to promote expanded use of the Basic Pilot
    Program to help encourage employers in critical industries to strengthen
    their ability to verify employees' work eligibility. The practice of civil
    settlements with employers and joint compliance programs are in the early
    stages of implementation; therefore the extent to which they may address
    the difficulties faced in setting fine amounts that provide a meaningful
    deterrent is not yet known.

    The former INS also faced difficulties in collecting total fine amounts
    from employers, but collection efforts have improved. We previously
    reported that the former INS faced difficulties in collecting total fine
    amounts from employers for a number of reasons including that employers
    went out of business, moved, or declared bankruptcy.63 In 1996, the
    Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General reported that the
    deterrent effect of civil fines on sweatshop operators was adversely
    affected by collection difficulties and noted that INS had no national
    system for billing, tracking, and collecting employer fines. In 1998, INS
    created the Debt Management Center to centralize the collections process,
    and the center is now responsible for collecting fines ICE issued against
    employers for violations of IRCA and providing other collection services
    for ICE and USCIS. The

    62ICE's objective for identifying critical industries for worksite
    enforcement operations included the following five elements: (1) identify
    and remove unauthorized workers from critical industries; (2) implement
    and expand an ICE-employer partnership program to enhance employer
    compliance, training, and information sharing; (3) investigate criminal
    employers linked to smuggling, trafficking, worker exploitation, and other
    criminal violations; (4) revitalize employer sanctions to provide
    financial deterrence; and (5) promote use of employment eligibility
    verification technology, like the Basic Pilot Program. See ICE, Interim
    Strategic Plan (Washington, D.C.: April 2005).

    63GAO/GGD-99-33.

    ICE Debt Management Center has collected total amounts on most of the
    invoices issued to employers for final fine amounts between fiscal years
    1999 and 2004-about 94 percent as of the end of June 2005.64

    In addition, ICE's Office of Detention and Removal has limited detention
    space, and unauthorized workers detained during worksite enforcement
    investigations are a low priority for that space.65 In 2004, the Under
    Secretary for Border and Transportation Security sent a memo to the
    Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Assistant
    Secretary for ICE outlining the priorities for the detention of aliens.
    According to this memo, aliens who are subjects of national security
    investigations were among those groups of aliens given the highest
    priority for detention, while aliens arrested as a result of worksite
    enforcement investigations were among those groups of aliens given the
    lowest priority. Officials in 8 of the 12 field offices we interviewed
    told us that lack of sufficient detention space has limited the
    effectiveness of worksite enforcement efforts. For example, ICE officials
    stated that if investigative agents arrest unauthorized aliens at
    worksites, the aliens would likely be released because the Office of
    Detention and Removal detention centers do not have sufficient space to
    house the aliens. Field office representatives said that offices can
    expend a large amount of resources to arrest unauthorized aliens at
    worksites and that these aliens would likely be released and may re-enter
    the workforce, in some cases returning to the worksites from where they
    were originally arrested. As a result, the use of resources to arrest
    unauthorized aliens at worksites may be unproductive. A congressional
    conference report for fiscal year 2005 provided funds to the Office of
    Detention and Removal for an additional 1,950 bed spaces.66 Given
    competing priorities for detention space, the effect, if any, these
    additional bed spaces will have on ICE's priority given to workers
    detained as a result of worksite enforcement operations cannot currently
    be determined.

    64The Debt Management Center issues invoices to employers for collecting
    fine amounts. According to ICE, multiple invoices can be issued for each
    final order for an employer fine, as a payment plan is typically
    established for employers as part of the final order for the fine amount.

    65The Office of Detention and Removal is primarily responsible for
    identifying and removing criminal aliens from the United States. The
    office is also responsible for managing ICE's space for detaining aliens.

    66H.R. Con. Rep. 109-72 (2005) accompanying the Emergency Supplemental
    Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami
    Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-13.

        ICE Has Not Yet Developed Outcome Goals and Measures for Worksite
        Enforcement

    Given ICE's limited resources and competing priorities for those
    resources, ICE's lack of performance goals and measures for the worksite
    enforcement program may hinder the agency's ability to effectively
    determine and allocate resources for the program. Performance goals and
    measures are intended to provide Congress and agency management with the
    information to systematically assess a program's strengths, weaknesses,
    and performance. A performance goal is the target level of
    performance-either output or outcome-expressed as a tangible, measurable
    objective against which actual achievement will be compared. A performance
    measure can be defined as an indicator, statistic, or metric used to gauge
    program performance and may typically include outputs and outcomes.
    Outputs provide status information about an initiative or program in terms
    of completing an action in a specified time frame. Outcomes show results
    or outcomes related to an initiative or program in terms of its
    effectiveness, efficiency, or impact. Outputs should support or lead to
    outcomes and, for each outcome goal, there are typically several output
    goals. Outputs and outcomes together help agencies determine and report on
    products or services provided through a program and the results of those
    products or services.

    ICE lacks output goals and measures necessary to inform its resource
    allocation decisions. Output goals and measures are an essential
    management tool in managing programs for results. They help provide the
    information that agencies need to aid in determining resources for a
    program and whether they are using program resources efficiently and
    effectively. ICE officials told us that the agency does not plan to focus
    on developing and using output goals and measures for worksite
    enforcement, such as the number of cases initiated or number of worksite
    arrests made, because they believe that such goals and measures do not
    adequately indicate ICE's level of effort for worksite enforcement.
    Therefore, the ICE officials said that ICE plans to focus on developing
    outcome goals and measures for the program that better reflect the
    program's effect. Yet in its fiscal year 2006 budget request, ICE
    identified two output measures for its worksite enforcement program: a 20
    percent increase in the number of administrative worksite case completions
    and criminal employer case presentations made to the U.S. Attorney's
    Office in fiscal year 2007 and a 30 percent increase in these two
    indicators in fiscal year 2008. Although these two measures would provide
    a general indication of ICE's level of worksite enforcement activity,
    these measures alone would not allow ICE or Congress to effectively
    determine resources needed for the worksite enforcement program because
    these indicators address only two elements of the worksite enforcement
    program and do not address other program elements, such as critical
    infrastructure

    protection. Furthermore, in July 2005 the Secretary of Homeland Security
    discussed the need for DHS, of which ICE is a part, to be an effective
    steward of its resources. Without additional output goals and measures for
    worksite enforcement, ICE's ability to effectively determine and allocate
    worksite enforcement resources needed to meet program goals, especially
    given other agency priorities for resources, and to fully assess whether
    the agency is using those resources effectively and efficiently in
    implementing the program may be hindered.

    In addition, ICE lacks outcome goals and measures that may hinder its
    ability to effectively assess the results of its worksite enforcement
    program efforts, including critical infrastructure protection efforts.
    Outcome measures provide agencies with an assessment of the results of a
    program activity or policy compared to its intended purposes. ICE
    officials told us that the agency plans to develop outcome goals and
    measures for its worksite enforcement program, but it has not yet
    developed these goals and measures. As a first step, ICE officials told us
    that field offices conducted baseline threat-level assessments in August
    and September 2004 to help identify regional risks, such as risks to
    critical infrastructure sites. These officials stated that an action plan
    will be developed to address these risks. Field office agents will then
    measure how well a particular threat has been addressed by measuring the
    impact of ICE's investigative activities on deterring threats or
    decreasing vulnerabilities to national security. ICE has not yet
    established target time frames for developing worksite enforcement program
    outcome goals and measures and, without these goals and measures, ICE may
    not be able to effectively assess the results of program efforts. For
    example, until ICE fully develops outcome goals and measures, it may not
    be able to completely determine the extent to which its critical
    infrastructure protection efforts have resulted in the elimination of
    unauthorized workers' access to secure areas of critical infrastructure
    sites, one possible goal that ICE may use for its worksite enforcement
    program.

    Conclusions 	Efforts to reduce the employment of unauthorized workers in
    the United States necessitate a strong employment eligibility verification
    process and a credible worksite enforcement program to help ensure that
    employers are meeting verification requirements. The current Form I-9
    employment verification process has not fundamentally changed since its
    establishment in 1986, and ongoing weaknesses in the process have
    undermined its effectiveness. Although DHS and the former INS have been
    assessing changes in the process since 1997, DHS has not yet issued final
    regulations on these changes, and it has not established a definitive time
    frame for

    completing the assessment. Completion of this assessment and issuance of
    final regulations should strengthen the current employment verification
    process and make it simpler and more secure. Furthermore, the Basic Pilot
    Program, or a similar automated verification system, if implemented on a
    much larger scale, shows promise for enhancing the employment verification
    process and reducing document fraud. However, current weaknesses in pilot
    program implementation would have to be fully addressed to help ensure the
    efficient and effective operation of an expanded or mandatory pilot
    program, or a similar automated employment verification program, and the
    cost of additional resources would be a consideration. Although USCIS
    plans to review current pilot program weaknesses, additional information
    on the costs and feasibility of addressing these weaknesses is needed to
    assist USCIS and Congress in assessing possible future use of the Basic
    Pilot Program, including increased program usage.

    Even with a strengthened employment verification process, a credible
    worksite enforcement program is needed because no verification process is
    foolproof and not all employers may want to comply with the law. ICE's
    focus on critical infrastructure protection since September 11, 2001 is
    consistent with the DHS mission to combat terrorism by detecting and
    mitigating vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks at critical infrastructure
    sites which, if exploited, could pose serious threats to domestic
    security. This focus on critical infrastructure protection, though,
    generally does not address noncritical infrastructure employers'
    noncompliance with IRCA. As a result, employers, particularly those not
    located at or near critical infrastructure sites, who attempt to
    circumvent IRCA face less of a likelihood that ICE will investigate them
    for failing to comply with the current employment verification process or
    knowingly hiring unauthorized workers. ICE is taking some steps to address
    difficulties it has faced in its worksite enforcement efforts, but it is
    too early to tell whether these steps will improve the effectiveness of
    the worksite enforcement program. In addition, given ICE's limited
    resources and competing priorities for those resources, additional output
    goals and measures are needed to help ICE track the progress of its
    worksite enforcement efforts, effectively determine the resources needed
    to meet worksite enforcement program goals, and ensure that program
    resources are used efficiently and effectively. Moreover, a target time
    frame for developing outcome goals and measures is needed to assist
    Congress and ICE in determining whether the worksite enforcement program,
    including critical infrastructure protection, is achieving its desired
    outcomes.

    Recommendations for To strengthen the current employment verification
    process, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the
    followingExecutive Action action:

    o  	set a specific time frame for completing the department's review of
    the Form I-9 process, including an assessment of the possibility of
    reducing the number of acceptable work eligibility documents, and issuing
    final regulations on changes to the Form I-9 process and an updated Form
    I-9.

    To assist Congress and USCIS in assessing the possibility of increased or
    mandatory use of the Basic Pilot Program, we recommend that the Secretary
    of Homeland Security direct the Director of USCIS to take the following
    action:

    o  	include, in the planned evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, an
    assessment of the feasibility and costs of addressing the Basic Pilot
    Program's current weaknesses, including its inability to detect identity
    fraud in the verification and reverification processes, delays in entry of
    new arrival and employment authorization information into DHS databases,
    and employer noncompliance with program procedures, and resources needed
    to support any increased or mandatory use of the program.

    To assist Congress and ICE in determining the resources needed for the
    worksite enforcement program and to help ensure the efficient and
    effective use of program resources, we recommend that the Secretary of
    Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for ICE to take the
    following two actions:

    o  	establish additional output goals and measures for the worksite
    enforcement program to clearly indicate the target level of ICE worksite
    enforcement activity and the resources needed to implement the program,
    and

    o  	set a specific time frame for completing the assessment and
    development of outcome goals and measures for the worksite enforcement
    program to provide a target level of performance for worksite enforcement
    efforts and measures to assess the extent to which program results have
    met program goals.

    Agency Comments 	We requested comments on this report from the Secretary
    of Homeland Security. In its response, DHS agreed with our
    recommendations. DHS's

    comments are reprinted in Appendix V. DHS also provided technical
    comments, which we considered and incorporated where appropriate. We also
    received technical comments from SSA, which we considered and incorporated
    where appropriate.

    As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
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    date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
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    Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Labor, the Attorney
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    If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
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    last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
    report are listed in appendix VI.

    Richard M. Stana
    Director, Homeland Security

    and Justice Issues

                       Page 46 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement

                       Page 47 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement

                       Page 48 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement

                           Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

    To determine how the employment eligibility verification (Form I-9)
    process functions, we examined laws related to the employment verification
    process, including the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and the
    Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996;
    federal regulations on the Form I-9 process; and former U.S. Immigration
    and Naturalization Service (INS) guidance on the Form I-9, such as the
    Handbook for Employers, which provides instructions for completing the
    form. We evaluated this information to identify the Form I-9 requirements,
    including employer and employee responsibilities for completing the form,
    and challenges to meeting those requirements. We examined our past reports
    and other studies, such as the 1997 U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform
    Report to Congress, to obtain further information on the employment
    verification process. We analyzed former INS plans for addressing Form I-9
    challenges, including its plans to modify the list of acceptable work
    eligibility documents. We also examined U.S. Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement's (ICE) interim guidelines on the electronic Forms I-9 to
    determine what guidance, if any, they provide to employers using the
    electronic form.

    To determine challenges to the Form I-9 process and obtain information on
    the Basic Pilot Program, we also interviewed and obtained information from
    U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), ICE, and Social
    Security Administration (SSA) officials. In addition, we interviewed
    representatives of 23 employers; 12 employer, employee, and advocacy
    groups; and 6 immigration experts to obtain their views on employment
    verification and worksite enforcement.1 We selected the employers to
    interview based on a mix of the following criteria: the total number of
    Basic Pilot Program queries; the total number or percentage of pilot
    program queries that resulted in authorized employment, tentative
    nonconfirmations, and final nonconfirmations; geographic proximity to the
    ICE field offices we visited; previous records of being sanctioned for
    Form I-9 violations; and industry categorization. The 23 employers we
    interviewed were located in the following states: California, Illinois,
    Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. The 23 employers were also part
    of the following industries: meat processing, transportation, health care,
    landscaping, manufacturing, accommodation, food services, agriculture,
    janitorial and maintenance, temporary employment, critical infrastructure,
    local government, and newspaper.

    1According to Department of Labor data, there were about 5.6 million
    employer firms in the United States in 2002, the year for which the most
    current data are available.

    Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

    One of the employers we interviewed did not participate in the Basic Pilot
    Program. As a result, when we discuss employers' views on the Basic Pilot
    Program, we refer to the views of the 22 employers we interviewed who
    participated in the Basic Pilot Program.

    We selected the 9 employer and employee associations with which to meet
    based on a mix of criteria, including industry categorization, gross
    output by industry in 2002, number of paid employees by industry in 2002,
    and estimates of the number of illegal immigrants employed by industry.2
    We interviewed officials from employer and employee associations in the
    following industries: construction, agriculture, accommodation, food
    services, retail, health care, and meat. We selected the 3 advocacy groups
    to interview based on the groups' interest in issues related to employment
    verification and worksite enforcement efforts and interviewed officials
    from advocacy groups that represent a range of views on these issues. We
    selected the 6 immigration experts to interview based on the experts'
    range of views on immigration issues. We analyzed information from these
    agencies, employers, groups, and experts to determine their views on the
    Form I-9 process and difficulties in verifying work eligibility through
    the process. We used information obtained from employers, employer and
    employee associations, and advocacy groups only as anecdotal examples, as
    information from these entities cannot be generalized to all employers and
    groups in the United States.

    Furthermore, we evaluated information from USCIS and SSA on the Basic
    Pilot Program, including the Basic Pilot Program user's manual and
    memorandum of understanding for employers, to determine how the pilot
    program functions and how it might assist participating employers in
    reliably verifying employees' work eligibility and in detecting
    counterfeit documents. We analyzed this information to determine ongoing
    challenges in implementing the Basic Pilot Program and ways these
    challenges could affect increased or mandatory use of the pilot program.
    We did not evaluate security measures in place for the Basic Pilot Program
    or the program's vulnerability to security risks. To identify pilot
    program challenges, we examined the findings and methodology of the
    evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program completed by the Institute for
    Survey Research at Temple University and Westat in June 2002. In addition,
    we analyzed

    2At the time of selection, 2002 data on gross output by industry from the
    Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce were the most current
    data available. Also, the most recent data available on the total number
    of paid employees by industry from the U.S. Census Bureau, Department of
    Commerce were from 2002.

    Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

    data on employer participation in and use of the Basic Pilot Program,
    including data on Basic Pilot Program employment authorizations, to
    determine how participation and use have changed since fiscal year 2000.
    We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing them for accuracy
    and completeness, interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the
    data, and examining documentation on how the data are entered,
    categorized, and verified in the databases. We determined that the
    independent evaluation and these data were sufficiently reliable for the
    purposes of our review.

    To obtain information on the implementation of the worksite enforcement
    program, we interviewed officials from ICE, the SSA Office of the
    Inspector General, the Department of Labor, the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation, and the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related
    Unfair Unemployment Practices. We also interviewed officials from 12 of
    the 26 ICE Special Agent in Charge field offices. We met with officials
    from the following 8 field offices: Los Angeles and San Diego, California;
    Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; Newark, New Jersey; New York City,
    New York; and Houston and San Antonio, Texas. We spoke with officials from
    the following 4 field offices over the telephone: Denver, Colorado; Miami,
    Florida; Buffalo, New York; and Seattle, Washington. We selected the 12
    field offices based on a mix of the following criteria: the number of
    investigators in each field office in fiscal year 2003, the number of
    investigations conducted by each field office in fiscal year 2003,3 the
    estimated number of undocumented immigrants in the state in which each
    field office was located, the number of sanctions issued to employers as a
    result of closed cases located in the same city as the field office
    between calendar years 1986 and 2000,4 the number of critical
    infrastructure operations in which the field office participated from
    October 2001 through April 2004, the number of employers located in the
    same city as the field office that participated in the Basic Pilot
    Program, and geographic area. We also interviewed officials from 4 U.S.
    Attorney's Offices that were located in the same areas as 4 of the field
    offices we visited. We met with officials from the following 3 U.S.
    Attorney's Offices:

    3At the time of selection, the most current data available on the number
    of investigators in each field office and the number of investigations
    conducted by each field office were from fiscal year 2003.

    4At the time of selection, the most current data available on the number
    of sanctions issued to employers located in the same city as the field
    offices were from calendar years 1986 through 2000.

    Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

    the Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney's Office; the Southern
    District of Texas U.S. Attorney's Office; and the Western District of
    Texas U.S. Attorney's Office. We spoke with the Southern District of
    California U.S. Attorney's Office over the telephone. We used information
    obtained from the field offices only as anecdotal examples, as information
    from these entities cannot be generalized to all field offices in the
    United States.

    We analyzed ICE headquarters and field office guidance, memos, and other
    documents on worksite enforcement to evaluate ICE's priorities for and
    management of worksite enforcement efforts and to identify any challenges
    in program implementation. We analyzed ICE's April 2005 Interim Strategic
    Plan to determine ICE's strategy for its worksite enforcement program. We
    also examined former INS guidance and strategies and other studies, such
    as reports from the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General,
    to determine how worksite enforcement priorities, implementation, and
    challenges have evolved.

    In addition, we separately analyzed ICE and INS data on the worksite
    enforcement program and assessed their validity and reliability by
    reviewing them for accuracy and completeness, interviewing agency
    officials knowledgeable about the data, and examining documentation on how
    the data are entered, categorized, and verified in the databases. We
    determined that the data from each agency were sufficiently reliable for
    the purposes of our review. However, we could not compare the INS and ICE
    data because, following the creation of ICE in March 2003, the case
    management system used to enter and maintain information on immigration
    investigations changed. With the establishment of ICE, agents began using
    the legacy U.S. Customs Service's case management system, called the
    Treasury Enforcement Communications System, for entering and maintaining
    information on investigations, including worksite enforcement operations.
    Prior to the creation of ICE, the former INS entered and maintained
    information on investigative activities in the Performance Analysis
    System, which captured information on immigration investigations
    differently than the Treasury Enforcement Communications System.

    Additionally, ICE officials indicated that, in a few cases, the INS and
    ICE data did not completely account for all worksite enforcement
    operations results. ICE officials told us that agents use judgment in
    categorizing cases entered into both systems and there are a limited
    number of instances in which agents did not appropriately categorize
    cases. For example, ICE officials told us that, in reviewing worksite
    enforcement cases in the ICE

    Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

    system for fiscal year 2004, they found a few cases that agents
    inappropriately categorized as worksite enforcement.

    To determine the investigative agent work-years, or full-time equivalents,
    that INS spent on the worksite enforcement program for each fiscal year
    from 1999 through 2003, we divided the total hours INS reported spending
    on employer investigations by the total hours spent on all investigations,
    including agent hours spent on leave, training, and other administrative
    and noninvestigative work. We then multiplied this result by 2,080 hours,
    which constitute one work-year, to determine the number of work-years
    spent on worksite enforcement.

    We conducted our work from September 2004 through July 2005 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendix III: Information on the Electronic Form I-9

    In October 2004, Congress authorized the electronic Form I-9 to be
    implemented by the end of April 2005.1 ICE has provided interim guidelines
    for using electronic Forms I-9, until the agency issues final regulations
    on their use. The interim guidelines specify that employers will have
    options for completing, signing, storing, and presenting for inspection
    electronic Forms I-9. For example, the guidelines note that employers may
    choose to complete Forms I-9 on paper and store the forms electronically
    or they may choose to both electronically complete and store Forms I-9.
    The guidelines also state that electronic signatures could be generated
    through various technologies such as electronic signature pads, personal
    identification numbers, biometrics, and dialog boxes. The guidelines also
    state that employers could use electronic storage systems to retain Forms
    I-9 that include quality assurance steps to prevent and detect the
    unauthorized creation, addition, alteration, deletion, or deterioration of
    electronically stored data. In addition, employers may consider an
    electronic storage system that includes an indexing system and ability to
    reproduce legible and readable hard copies of electronically stored forms.

                                     1P.L. 108-390.

    Appendix IV: Data on Employer Participation in and Use of the Basic Pilot
    Program

    Employer participation in and use of the Basic Pilot Program has generally
    increased. Between fiscal years 2002 and 2004, the number of employers
    actively using the Basic Pilot Program increased from 1,205 to 2,305. In
    addition, as shown in figure 6, the number of total queries processed
    through the Basic Pilot Program has generally increased since fiscal year
    2000.

    Figure 6: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries Run by Participating
    Employers for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004

    Number of queries 700,000 657,000

    600,000

    500,000

    400,000

    300,000

    200,000

    100,000

    0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Fiscal year

    Source: GAO analysis of data from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
    Services. Note: Data have been rounded to the nearest thousand.

    As shown in figure 7, the majority of Basic Pilot Program queries that
    resulted in employment authorizations for each fiscal year from 2000
    through 2004 were issued by SSA.

    Appendix IV: Data on Employer Participation in and Use of the Basic Pilot
    Program

    Figure 7: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries that Resulted in
    Employment Authorizations for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004

    Employment authorizations

                                        700,000

                                        600,000

                                        500,000

                                        400,000

                                        300,000

                                        200,000

                                        100,000

    0

    8,700

    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Fiscal year

    Total DHS employment authorizations resulting from immigration status
    verifier reviews

    Total DHS automated employment authorizations

    Total SSA employment authorizations

    Source: GAO analysis of data from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
    Services.

    Note: Data have been rounded to the nearest hundred.

                       Page 57 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement

                       Page 58 GAO-05-813 Immigration Enforcement

    Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    GAO Contact

      Staff Acknowledgments

    (440347)

    Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777

    In addition to the contact named above, Orlando Copeland, Michele Fejfar,
    Ann H. Finley, Rebecca Gambler, Kathryn Godfrey,
    Charles Michael Johnson, Eden C. Savino, and Robert E. White made key
    contributions to this report.

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