Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in Transforming
Immigration Programs (14-OCT-04, GAO-05-81).
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumed responsibility
for the immigration enforcement and services programs of the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 2003. The
three DHS bureaus with primary responsibility for immigration
functions are U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), and U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This transfer creates a great
opportunity for DHS to address long-standing management and
operational problems within INS. The Homeland Security Act
requires GAO to review the transfer of immigration functions to
DHS. In response, this report assesses the status of (1)
communication and coordination of roles and responsibilities, (2)
integration of immigration and customs investigators in ICE, and
(3) administrative services and systems in CBP, CIS, and ICE.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-81
ACCNO: A13053
TITLE: Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in
Transforming Immigration Programs
DATE: 10/14/2004
SUBJECT: Agency missions
Customs administration
Federal agency reorganization
Immigration and naturalization law
Immigration or emigration
Internal controls
Law enforcement
Performance measures
Personnel management
Border control
Homeland security
Policies and procedures
******************************************************************
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GAO-05-81
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO
Report to Congressional Committees
October 2004
HOMELAND SECURITY
Management Challenges Remain in Transforming Immigration Programs
GAO-05-81
Highlights of GAO-05-81, a report to congressional committees
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumed responsibility for the
immigration enforcement and services programs of the former Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) in 2003. The three DHS bureaus with
primary responsibility for immigration functions are U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS),
and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This transfer creates
a great opportunity for DHS to address long-standing management and
operational problems within INS.
The Homeland Security Act requires GAO to review the transfer of
immigration functions to DHS. In response, this report assesses the status
of (1) communication and coordination of roles and responsibilities, (2)
integration of immigration and customs investigators in ICE, and (3)
administrative services and systems in CBP, CIS, and ICE.
GAO recommends that DHS use key practices to create a mechanism for
periodically obtaining and considering employee feedback on their ideas
and concerns and provides specific guidance on roles and responsibilities
and administrative services. DHS commented on a draft of this report and
generally agreed with our findings and recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-81.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Richard M. Stana at (202)
512-8777 or [email protected].
October 2004
HOMELAND SECURITY
Management Challenges Remain in Transforming Immigration Programs
Most of the field officials with whom GAO spoke generally characterized
communication and coordination with other DHS immigration programs in
their geographic area as good or excellent. Other officials noted, that in
some areas related to investigative techniques and other operations,
unresolved issues regarding the roles and responsibilities of CBP, CIS,
and ICE give rise to disagreements and confusion, with the potential for
serious consequences. According to headquarters and field officials, some
guidance has been made available to the field, and there are plans to
provide more.
Most ICE field officials GAO contacted said they have taken initial steps
toward integrating the former immigration and customs investigators, such
as establishing cross-training and pay parity. Most of these officials
said, however, that additional important steps remained to be completed to
fully integrate investigators. They reported that the lack of uniform
policies and procedures for some ICE operations has caused confusion and
hindered the creation of a new integrated culture. Headquarters officials
said they were responding to these challenges.
Officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE expressed confusion about a new shared
services system for mission support when interviewed 3 to 4 months after
the system was instituted. They also expressed frustration with problems
they have encountered with travel, budget, and payroll systems, which are
not a part of the shared services system. Additionally, the realignment of
staff for shared services, along with other events, has resulted in some
mission staff being assigned administrative work as a collateral duty,
which may affect mission productivity.
Key practices used by other public and private organizations that have
undergone successful mergers and transformations may be helpful to DHS in
addressing the challenges raised in this report and in transforming
immigration enforcement and services. These key practices include
establishing communication strategies to create shared expectations and
involving employees to gain ownership for changes.
Reorganization of INS into DHS
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
Communication and Coordination Generally Considered Good or
Excellent by Program Officials, yet Some Cite a Need for Clearer Guidance
on Roles and Responsibilities Some Steps Taken and Some Steps Remain to be
Completed in Integrating Immigration and Customs Investigators into ICE
Many Officials Expressed Difficulty Understanding Administrative
Services Key Practices for Successful Mergers and Transformations
Conclusions Recommendations Agency Comments
1
3 7
12
21
28 38 41 42 43
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 56
GAO Contacts 56 Staff Acknowledgments 56
Tables
Table 1: Summary of Interview Responses by ICE's SACs and ASACs Regarding
Communication and Coordination with CBP, CIS, and other ICE Programs 13
Figures
Figure 1: Immigration Programs in DHS 10 Figure 2: Division of CBP, CIS,
and ICE Roles Under DHS's Shared Services 30
Figure 3: Key Practices for Successful Mergers and Organizational
Transformations 39
Abbreviations
ASAC associate special agent in charge
CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
COSS Customs Overtime Scheduling System
DHS Department of Homeland Security
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FFMS Federal Financial Management System
FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
RAC resident agent in charge
SAC special agent in charge
TECS Treasury Enforcement Communications System
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separately.
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548
October 14, 2004
Congressional Committees
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and led to the most substantial reorganization of the
federal government since the 1940s.1 The duties and responsibilities of
several former agencies were transferred to DHS, including responsibility
for immigration enforcement and services. These functions were transferred
from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which was abolished
in 2003. Transfer of the immigration functions creates a great opportunity
for DHS to successfully address long-standing management and operational
problems within INS that we have reported over the years.
Our past work on transformations has shown that it is unrealistic to
expect DHS to have fully resolved these difficult and long-standing
problems after just one and a half years in operation. As we have
reported,2 successful organizational transformations can take 5 to 7 years
to implement, and the three DHS bureaus with primary responsibility for
immigration functions-U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), and U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE)-are in the process of transformation as they
develop new ways of dealing with each other and managing their
performance. We have also reported that in the short term, the experience
of private sector mergers is that productivity and effectiveness, for
example, decline as attention is concentrated on critical and immediate
issues. Given the gravity of DHS's mission, a focus on critical and
immediate issues is understandable. Nevertheless, because any failure by
DHS to effectively carry out its mission could expose the nation to very
serious consequences, it is important that DHS start immediately to take
advantage of its unique opportunity to transform immigration management
and program operations and provide the immigration enforcement and
services that the American people need.
1P.L. 107-296 (2002).
2GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers
and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).
The Homeland Security Act requires us to review the transfer of functions
from INS to DHS, and identify issues associated with the transition.3 This
report is intended to satisfy the requirements of the mandate. To help
formulate the objectives to respond to this mandate, we spoke with
immigration experts in the public and private sectors and representatives
of pro-and anti-immigration advocacy groups in the Washington, D.C., area,
and reviewed prior reports that we and others have issued. From these
efforts, we identified three issues that, early in the transition,
appeared to represent significant management challenges and that we
believed related to a range of mission and mission support activities.
Thus, this report assesses the status of (1) communication and
coordination among immigration programs in DHS, (2) integration of
immigration and customs investigators in ICE, and (3) administrative
services and systems used following the transition into DHS. We did not
assess program performance or DHS's overall response to long-standing
problems in this review. Additionally, our analysis was based on a
snapshot in time, primarily during the first half of fiscal year 2004, and
it is possible our results may be different if our interviews were
conducted today.
In assessing the integration of immigration and customs investigators in
ICE, we briefly discuss the former U.S. Customs Service (Customs), which
transferred from the Department of the Treasury. Customs was responsible
for enforcing customs laws in regulating legitimate commercial activity
and for safeguarding U.S. borders against the illegal entry of goods.
Before September 11, 2001, Customs' enforcement activities focused
primarily on preventing the smuggling of drugs into the United States.
To address the objectives, we reviewed laws; CBP, CIS, and ICE transition
documents; policies; and other relevant documents. We also interviewed
officials at headquarters who were responsible for managing ICE's
detention and removal, intelligence, and investigations programs; CIS's
adjudications program; and CBP's Border Patrol and inspections programs
between September 2003 and August 2004. We interviewed ICE, CIS, and CBP
officials responsible for developing plans for the transition in September
2003. We interviewed officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE field offices between
December 2003 and March 2004 in the following cities: Arlington, Virginia;
Baltimore, Maryland; New York, New York; Miami, Florida; Detroit,
Michigan; and San Diego, California, and with the U.S.
3P.L. 107-296, Sec. 477(d)(1).
Results in Brief
Border Patrol field offices in Miami, Detroit, and San Diego. We selected
these locations because of their geographic dispersion, their proximity to
major ports of entry, and the relative proximity of ICE, CBP, and CIS
offices to one another. In these locations, we talked with officials
responsible for inspections, the Border Patrol, and inspectors in CBP;
officials responsible for adjudications and adjudicators in CIS; and
managers, supervisory investigators, and investigators in ICE. Baltimore
and Arlington were used as preliminary site visits to form our interview
questions. In the remaining four cities and all remaining ICE field
offices, we used a structured interview to obtain information and opinions
relevant to our objectives from the two most senior ICE officials.4 In
total, this meant interviewing 49 SACs and ASACs in ICE's field offices.
Many of these officials provided specific examples to help explain their
arguments, which we did not verify.
We conducted our review between August 2003 and August 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. A more detailed
discussion of our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
Most of the field officials in the CBP, CIS, and ICE offices with whom we
spoke generally characterized communication and coordination with other
DHS immigration programs in their geographic area as good or excellent.
They attributed their positive views mainly to working relationships that
existed before the transition of INS to DHS-particularly with inspections
(in CBP), adjudications (in CIS), and detention and removal (in ICE).
While CBP, CIS, and ICE headquarters offices have issued guidance on the
various programs' roles and responsibilities, some field officials in all
three bureaus said they would like additional guidance to provide a
clearer understanding of such roles and responsibilities. Officials noted
that in some cases, unresolved disagreements and confusion regarding the
roles and responsibilities of the DHS immigration bureaus related to
various investigative techniques and other operational issues has the
potential for serious consequences. As one example, field officials told
us that
4Special agents in charge (commonly referred to as SACs) are law
enforcement officers responsible for directing ICE investigation
operations and resources in a specific geographic area. SACs are the most
senior managers in the field offices of ICE's investigations program.
Associate special agents in charge (commonly referred to as ASACs) are the
second most senior managers in the field offices of ICE's investigations
program. During our review the title ASAC was changed to deputy special
agent in charge.
conflicting positions by ICE and the Border Patrol over an investigative
technique known as controlled deliveries has hampered communication and
coordination and can not only hinder the accomplishment of ICE's mission
but potentially put ICE investigators at risk.5 According to headquarters
and field officials, there are plans to issue more guidance on operational
roles and responsibilities. Specifically, CBP and ICE plan to issue more
guidance clarifying the roles and responsibilities of Border Patrol agents
and investigators (in such areas as investigative techniques used in
border operations, asset forfeiture, and information sharing), although
they could not provide a specific date when the guidance would be issued
to the field.
Top officials in ICE's special agent in charge (SAC) offices said that,
although they had taken initial steps toward integrating the former
immigration and customs investigative workforces at the time of our
review, additional important steps remained to be completed at many
offices to fully integrate investigators. The initial steps most SACs said
their offices have taken include (1) assigning investigators from the
former INS and Customs offices to work in new investigative groups that
are in the same physical location, (2) providing classroom-based
cross-training and on-the-job-training so former INS investigators know
the laws and perform the functions of legacy Customs investigators and
vice versa; and (3) resolving the pay disparity between former INS and
Customs investigators. However, many of these officials reported that the
continuation of former INS and Customs investigators working in separate
locations has been an obstacle to integration. A headquarters official
told us that ICE has begun to co-locate some SAC offices and that other
offices would be co-located as existing leases expire. ICE officials
currently estimate that it would cost $150 million to co-locate all SAC
offices immediately. Field officials also reported that the lack of
uniform policies and procedures for some ICE operations has caused
confusion and hindered the creation of a new integrated culture. ICE
headquarters officials told us that they are prioritizing the
establishment of uniform policies and that until a new ICE policy is
established, SAC offices are required to use the policies of the former
agencies. In addition, many field officials said that the lack of unique
public identifiers such as badges, credentials, and uniforms has held up
creation of a unified ICE agency and
5Controlled delivery is an ICE investigative method that involves allowing
a known group of illegal aliens or contraband to enter the country so they
can be followed to their destination and arrested by ICE investigators.
caused frustration and embarrassment. In August 2004, ICE headquarters
officials confirmed there had been a delay in issuing symbols such as
badges and raid jackets and that such symbols were either already
available or were in the final stages of development.
In an attempt to provide more efficient administrative mission support
services, DHS is in the process of developing and implementing systems and
processes called "shared services." In December 2003, DHS instituted a
shared service system in which certain mission support services-such as
human resources-are provided by one bureau to the other bureaus. Certain
mission support services were not incorporated into the shared services
system. Officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE expressed confusion about shared
services when we interviewed them 3 to 4 months after the system was
instituted. Many field officials said they did not know what constitutes
shared services, what processes they should use for receiving assistance
from a shared service provider, or how many of their staff administrative
positions would be reassigned to positions in other offices as shared
service providers. DHS headquarters officials acknowledged in June 2004 (6
months after the initiation of shared services) that although a
communication strategy was in place, communicating information about
shared services was a "work in progress" and that it was the
responsibility of the individual bureaus (both those providing and those
receiving services) to communicate to their field staff about how the
shared services process worked. CBP, CIS, and ICE officials also expressed
frustration with problems they have encountered with travel, budget, and
payroll- which are administrative systems managed within the agencies and
not a part of shared services. At least in part because of problems with
funding codes in the travel software, some ICE staff have waited for
months to be reimbursed for government travel. Some ICE field officials
also expressed concern about their ability to manage their budgets and
payroll problems, because of the systems used for these functions. Some
mission staff in CBP, CIS, and ICE field offices also told us that
inspectors, investigators, and adjudicators have been assigned
administrative functions full-time or as a collateral duty because (1)
some administrative staff from their office were reassigned to other
offices to serve as shared service providers, (2) the increase in staff
because of mergers in inspections and investigations and, (3) hiring
freezes. One effect of assigning mission staff to administrative work is
that because they are not spending all of their time on duties needed to
accomplish the program's mission, they are not reaching the full potential
of the program position.
Carrying out this transformation will not be an easy or quickly realized
task, so it is understandable that challenges have arisen. In July 2003,
to
help agencies like DHS in such transformations, we reported on nine key
practices that have been found at the center of successful mergers and
transformations.6 While all nine key practices are important in this
transformation, we believe two would be particularly helpful to DHS in
addressing the longstanding and new challenges identified in this report
relating to the transformation of immigration programs in DHS: (1)
establishing a communication strategy to create shared expectations and
report related progress and (2) involving employees to obtain their ideas
and gain their ownership of the transformation. While we did not assess in
this review the degree to which these practices are being used, we did
identify certain parts of the key practices that have not been fully
integrated into immigration strategies, such as establishing a feedback
mechanism to identify and address employee concerns.
To help DHS address the challenges to the overall transformation of
immigration programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security
help ensure that all parts of the key practices we identified are used to
address the new and pre-existing challenges related to immigration
enforcement and services. In particular, DHS should create a mechanism to
periodically obtain employee feedback, clarify roles and responsibilities
for field staff in the three bureaus with immigration responsibilities,
and provide additional detailed guidance on processes and procedures to
follow for the provision of shared administrative services.
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for comment. In its response,
DHS generally agreed with our overall findings and recommendations and
requested that we add more context in some areas, such as the department's
communication and employee feedback efforts. We discuss some of these
efforts in the relevant portions of this report but note that many of
these efforts were ongoing at the time the concerns were raised during our
fieldwork. DHS also said that our fieldwork coincided with the
implementation of the shared services initiative and, as such, it did not
believe the field managers views expressed in this report accurately
portray the initiative or the current level of comprehension of the
initiative. While things change over time, we believe that the views
expressed at the time of our interviews indicate a need in the field for
6GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers
and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).
Background
additional detailed guidance on the shared administrative services
initiative.
The primary mission of DHS is, among other things, to prevent terrorist
attacks within the United States in the aftermath of the September 11,
2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The creation of
DHS brought together 22 agencies with responsibility for securing the
borders and coastal waters, transportation sector, ports, and critical
infrastructure (such as telecommunications systems), among other things.
In addition, DHS consolidated some nonsecurity agencies such as the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's natural disaster response functions
and maritime safety and drug interdiction by the Coast Guard. The creation
of DHS was also intended to coordinate the sharing of homeland security
information and foster closer coordination with federal agencies that were
not incorporated into DHS, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and the Department of State.
Under INS, and now within DHS, immigration enforcement and service are
complex, multifaceted functions. Immigration enforcement includes, among
other things, patrolling 8,000 miles of international boundaries to
prevent illegal entry into the United States; inspecting over 500 million
travelers each year to determine their admissibility; apprehending,
detaining, and removing criminal and illegal aliens; disrupting and
dismantling organized smuggling of humans and contraband as well as human
trafficking; investigating and prosecuting those who engage in benefit and
document fraud; and enforcing compliance with programs such as the Student
and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and the United States
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication Technology (US-VISIT). Immigration
service includes providing services or benefits to facilitate entry,
residence, employment, and naturalization of legal immigrants; processing
millions of applications each year; making the right adjudicative decision
in approving or denying the applications; and rendering decisions in a
timely manner.
Some background about the long-standing management problems at INS is
useful to set the stage for the transformation task DHS inherited. In this
respect, over the years, we have written numerous reports that identified
management challenges INS experienced in its efforts to achieve both
effective immigration law enforcement and service delivery. In assuming
the responsibility for immigration enforcement and services, DHS inherits
many of these management challenges. For example, in 1997 we reported that
INS lacked clearly defined priorities and goals and that its
organizational structure was fragmented both programmatically and
geographically. Additionally, after a reorganization in 1994, field
managers still had difficulty determining whom to coordinate with, when to
coordinate, and how to communicate with one another because they were
unclear about headquarters offices' responsibilities and authority. We
also reported that INS had not adequately defined the roles of its two key
enforcement programs-Border Patrol and investigations-which resulted in
overlapping responsibilities, inconsistent program implementation, and
ineffective use of resources. INS's poor communication led to weaknesses
in policies and procedures. In later reports, we reported that broader
management challenges affected efforts to implement programs to control
the border, deter alien smuggling, reduce immigration benefit fraud,
reduce unauthorized alien employment, remove criminal aliens, and manage
the immigration benefit application workload and reduce the backlog.7
INS was abolished, effective in 2003, by the Homeland Security Act of
2002,8 and its functions were transferred to three agencies within the
Department of Homeland Security. INS's Immigration Services Division,
responsible for processing applications for immigration benefits, was
placed in CIS, which reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of DHS.
INS's interior enforcement programs-investigations, intelligence, and
detention and removal-were placed in ICE. Within ICE, investigators and
intelligence analysts from former INS and the U.S. Customs Service were
merged into the investigations and intelligence offices, while staff from
former INS's detention and removal program were placed in the detention
7GAO, INS's Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain
after Seven Years, GAO-01-842 (Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2001); GAO,
Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational Improvements Needed to Address
Growing Problem, GAO/GGD-00-103 (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2000); GAO; GAO,
Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach Is Needed to Address Problems,
GAO-02-66 (Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2002); GAO, Immigration
Enforcement: Challenges to Implementing the INS Interior Enforcement
Strategy, GAO-02-861T (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2002); GAO, Criminal
Aliens: INS' Efforts to Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Need to be
Improved, GAO/T-GGD-97-154 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 1997) and Criminal
Aliens: INS's Efforts to Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue to
Need Improvement, GAO/T-GGD-99-47 (Washington, D.C.: Feb., 25, 1999); GAO,
Immigration Benefits: Several Factors Impede Timeliness of Application
Processing, GAO-01-488 (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001).
8P.L. 107-296, Sec. 471(a).
and removal office. CBP incorporated inspectors from former INS, Customs,
and Agriculture and Plant Health Inspection Service, as well as former
INS's Border Patrol agents. CBP and ICE both report to the Undersecretary
for Border and Transportation Security, who in turn reports to the Deputy
Secretary of the DHS. See figure 1 for the organizational position of
immigration programs in DHS.
Figure 1: Immigration Programs in DHS
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
Services Investigations, Intelligence, Detention and
Removal Inspections and Border Patrol
Source: GAO analysis of President's fiscal year budget, PL. 107-286.
CBP, CIS, and ICE each have a separate chain of command and field
structure. Under former INS, there were 33 district offices, each headed
by a district director, who had responsibility for adjudications,
detention and removal, inspections, intelligence, and investigations. In
DHS, the responsibilities of the 33 district offices under the former INS
were distributed among 33 CIS district offices, 27 Special Agent in Charge
investigations field offices, 22 detention and removal field offices, 20
CBP offices for field operations (that oversee about 300 land, sea, and
air ports of entry), and 6 field intelligence units. The former INS's 20
border patrol
9
sectors remained intact.
CBP brought together INS and Customs inspections programs that, prior to
the transition, largely worked side by side in many land ports of entry
around the country and that shared similar missions. CIS was a direct
transfer of the Immigration Services Division within INS, and the program
remained largely intact. In contrast, ICE is a patchwork of agencies and
programs that includes INS's investigations and intelligence programs,
Customs' investigations and intelligence programs, Customs' air and marine
interdiction division, the Federal Protective Service, and the Federal Air
Marshals. In combining the investigations programs, ICE has been tasked
with merging INS investigators who specialized in immigration enforcement
(e.g., criminal aliens) with Customs investigators who specialized in
customs enforcement (e.g., drug smuggling). The integration of INS and
Customs investigators into a single investigative program has involved
blending of two vastly different workforces, each with its own culture,
policies, procedures, and mission priorities. Both programs were in
agencies with dual missions that prior to the merger had differences in
investigative priorities. For example, INS primarily looked for illegal
aliens and Customs primarily looked for illegal drugs. In addition, INS
investigators typically pursued administrative violations, while Customs
investigators typically pursued criminal violations.
9In addition to the 33 district offices, CIS also runs four Service
Centers, three regional offices, eight asylum offices, and a number of
application support centers, and sub-offices. The SAC offices also have
subordinate and smaller Resident Agent in Charge (RAC) offices that report
to them. Each of the 20 Border Patrol sectors has subsector stations
within its geographical area.
Communication and Coordination Generally Considered Good or Excellent by
Program Officials, yet Some Cite a Need for Clearer Guidance on Roles and
Responsibilities
Most field officials with whom we spoke in CBP, CIS, and ICE characterized
communication and coordination with their local counterparts as good or
excellent. Officials also said that positive relationships were primarily
based on previous working relationships built while the programs-
particularly inspections, detention and removal, and adjudications-were
all within one agency, INS or Customs. About a quarter of the officials we
interviewed across the immigration programs in CBP, CIS, and ICE also said
that they would like a clearer understanding of the roles and
responsibilities of each program. Those ICE officials who characterized
communication and coordination as fair to poor attributed the inability to
resolve their problems to various reasons, depending on the program; these
included a lack of communication or conflicts in roles with the Border
Patrol and the intelligence program's distance from, and production of
useful work for, the SAC offices. Near the end of our work, some
headquarters and field officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE told us efforts were
under way, and agreed upon, to clarify issues related to roles and
responsibilities that have arisen.
Most Officials Reported Positive Communication and Coordination among
Programs
Communication among CBP, CIS, and ICE occurs at the headquarters and field
level in different ways. All three bureaus have liaisons at the
headquarters level. For example, ICE has liaisons to CBP and CIS that
serve as points of contact and facilitators in convening the appropriate
officials for discussions on cross-cutting issues, and ICE's liaisons are
to contact those agencies' liaisons should ICE initiate discussions. In
the field, officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE said they typically used
meetings to maintain contact with one another, although the frequency of
meetings varied-from not at all to bimonthly-and there are no requirements
for field officials to meet regularly. Officials who said that they met
regularly also said that they found these meetings to be useful in sharing
information and addressing issues that cut across programs.
Overall, most field officials we contacted who responded to this question
in CBP, CIS, and ICE characterized communication and coordination among
their programs as good or excellent. Most SACs and ASACs said that
communication and coordination with CBP's inspections, CIS's
adjudications, and ICE's detention and removal programs were good or
excellent. On the other hand, about one-third of SACs and ASACs who
responded to this question believed that communication and coordination
with CBP's Border Patrol and ICE's intelligence programs were fair to
poor. Some officials said they expressed this view concerning
communication and coordination with the Border Patrol because there were
conflicts or overlaps in roles and responsibilities or a lack of
communication. SACs and ASACs who characterized communication and
coordination with ICE's intelligence program as fair or poor said they did
so for such reasons as the intelligence office was not in close proximity
to the SAC office or they did not feel that intelligence analysts were
producing analyses useful to the SAC office. Table 1 presents the
responses by ICE's SACs and ASACs regarding communication and coordination
with CBP, CIS, and other ICE programs.
Table 1: Summary of Interview Responses by ICE's SACs and ASACs Regarding
Communication and Coordination with CBP, CIS, and other ICE Programs
Communication between ICE field offices and
ICE:
CIS: Detention
and
Rating CBP: Border CBP: Adjudications removal ICE:
Patrol Inspections Intelligence
Good or
excellent 21 (70%) 41 (91%) 36 (88%) 35 (83%) 28 (68%)
Fair or 9 (30%) 4 (9%) 5 (12%) 7 (17%) 13 (32%)
poor
Total 30 (100%) 45 (100%) 41 (100%) 42 (100%) 41 (100%)
Source: GAO survey.
Note: Data are based on 40 telephone interviews and 9 face-to-face
interviews with SACs and ASACs. We did not include responses from the 2
SACs and 2 ASACs in the Baltimore and Arlington SAC offices, as our
interviews with them were preliminary and the questions were not close
ended. The total number of SAC and ASAC interview responses varies for
several reasons: (1) One SAC office had two ASACs; (2) we did not
interview one SAC who was new to his position; and we did not interview an
ASAC who was also new to his position. Additionally, the total responses
for each category varied because not all SACs and ASACs responded to all
of our questions.
Many SACs and ASACs indicated that their positive views of communication
and coordination with staff from other programs were primarily based on
previous working relationships built while the programs were all in INS or
Customs. In addition, officials we contacted in CIS and CBP, and other
officials in ICE, said that they also relied on working relationships that
existed before the transfer to facilitate communication and coordination
on cross-cutting issues. Those SACs and ASACs who responded that they
relied to a little or no extent on preexisting working relationships said
that they provided such a response because they did not have a prior
relationship to rely upon. In addition, such informal means of maintaining
communication and coordination among program officials, while helpful, can
be short-lived as personnel retire or resign. For the long term, processes
that provide a systematic way of building and maintaining such
relationships among program staff provide better assurance of effective
communication and coordination.
Providing guidance that outlines roles and responsibilities among the
programs is one way of helping to achieve systematic maintenance of such
relationships. In this respect, the headquarters offices for CBP, CIS, and
ICE have issued some guidance on roles and responsibilities of certain
aspects of the immigration programs. For example,
o CBP and ICE issued general guidelines on each bureau's roles and
responsibilities regarding how they would transfer the assets of
antismuggling investigators from the Border Patrol to ICE, and how they
would handle antismuggling investigations after the transfer of these
investigators to ICE. A memorandum jointly issued by CBP and ICE in April
2004 for SACs and Border Patrol sector chiefs in field locations outlined
each program's basic responsibilities. ICE would assume responsibility for
administrative support; funding of the antismuggling investigators; and
all investigations and complex cases such as international in nature or
related to organizations or national security. The Border Patrol would
have lead responsibility for cross-border and borderrelated interdiction
activities, such as surveillance to interdict illegal border crossings.
According to CBP officials, the intent of the memorandum was in part to
provide each program with a basic framework for working together.
o CBP and CIS convened a working group to decide who would correct
mistakes on aliens' arrival and departure forms. Several advocacy groups
argued in the months following the transfer that as a result of the
dispersal of immigration programs across DHS agencies, aliens entering the
country did not know who to go to if an error was made on their
arrival/departure form. The two bureaus agreed that an alien must seek an
official in CBP to correct a CBP mistake, and a CIS official to correct a
CIS mistake. Additionally, CBP and CIS agreed that if an alien seeking a
correction inquires at the wrong office, then that person is to be
directed to the appropriate authorities for making the correction. CBP and
CIS officials provided us with this policy in written memos dated March
31, 2004, and March 30, 2004, respectively, that they said each bureau
provided to its staff.
o CIS issued guidance to its field offices in December 2003 stating that
its Office of Fraud Detection and National Security is to serve as the
focal point and clearinghouse for requests from law enforcement agencies
for benefits or "cover" documents.10 The guidance outlined the procedures
that CIS is to use in responding to law enforcement agencies outside DHS
10"Cover" immigration documents are those used by law enforcement
confidential informants or cooperating witnesses, for example, in
furtherance of a particular investigation or intelligence collection
effort. These documents are not actual benefits.
(for example, the FBI and Drug Enforcement Agency) that want to provide
benefits for aliens they have brought into the country as witnesses in a
criminal case or as informants.
Some Field Officials Expressed a Need for Additional Guidance on Roles and
Responsibilities
Notwithstanding the above guidance, some officials we contacted across
CBP, CIS, and ICE said that they would like a clearer understanding of the
roles and responsibilities of each program. In addition, some difficulties
with coordination cannot be resolved locally or by pre-existing working
relationships because they reflect a lack of clarity in the programs'
roles and responsibilities and impede communication and coordination
between them. For example, four SAC officials were unsure how the role of
the senior inspector, inherited from INS and now in CBP, would affect ICE
investigators' roles in conducting investigations in the ports of entry.
11
CBP has stated that cases are not always referred to ICE by the senior
inspectors, and there is no CBP policy to refer such cases to ICE. This is
because some cases concern immigration violations related only to
attempted illegal entry at a port of entry and as such are CBP matters
regarding admissibility, not ICE interior enforcement matters. According
to CBP headquarters officials responsible for inspections, the bureau is
exploring the concept of expanding the senior inspector position to
address broader types of investigations rather than only immigration
matters, but the role of the senior inspector in relation to the role of
ICE investigators has not yet been determined.
Additional examples included problems (1) between ICE investigations and
CBP's Border Patrol in negotiating controlled deliveries, (2) between ICE
investigations and CIS in the area of benefit fraud, and (3) among CBP,
CIS, and ICE in the area of issuing paroles to aliens.12
11The senior inspectors, in addition to performing the duties of the CBP
officer, present criminal cases to the United States Attorney regarding
certain potential criminal immigration violations that occur at ports of
entry. Such criminal violations are, for example, re-entry after removal
and alien smuggling and involve an administrative removal action and a
potential criminal case.
12Benefit fraud includes the willful misrepresentation of a material fact
to gain an immigration benefit in the absence of lawful entitlement.
Benefit fraud includes such schemes as marriage fraud and non-immigrant
visa fraud.
Controlled Deliveries Have Reportedly Been Hampered by Communication and
Coordination between Border Patrol and ICE
According to some of the field officials we contacted, how the Border
Patrol and ICE should communicate and coordinate with each other on
controlled deliveries had not been fully defined. An ICE official told us
that prior to the transition, this technique was used by both INS and
Customs agents and, while INS typically coordinated with the Border
Patrol, Customs agents, because they were often dealing with narcotics,
did not necessarily coordinate with INS unless the controlled delivery was
going through Border Patrol checkpoints. Based on what we were told, since
the transition, ICE and the Border Patrol have had conflicting positions
that hamper communication and coordination about controlled deliveries.
Border Patrol officials we contacted stated that their mission is to
prevent and detect illegal entry of persons or contraband between ports of
entry. Some ICE investigators we contacted said that they believe, on the
other hand, that in order to dismantle smuggling organizations-one of
ICE's priorities-they need to do more than arrest the individual drivers
or couriers. We talked with ICE officials in one field office who told us
that there have been occasions when the Border Patrol deployed additional
agents to an area after learning that ICE intended to conduct a controlled
delivery. ICE investigators stated that this not only can hinder the
accomplishment of their mission but potentially puts ICE investigators at
risk. This is because Border Patrol agents can unsuspectingly encounter an
undercover ICE agent in the course of interdicting persons attempting to
cross the border, and if a gunfight ensues, the undercover ICE agent risks
revealing his or her identity to the smugglers, or the ICE and Border
Patrol agents risk injuring each other. A Border Patrol chief and deputy
chief we interviewed stated that if CBP headquarters issued a formal
memorandum stating that controlled deliveries by ICE were allowed, they
would be willing to coordinate with local ICE managers.
A Border Patrol official in headquarters told us that after the terrorist
attacks on September 11, former Customs investigators began to lead
operations on the border and between ports of entry, and saw their program
as having authority to conduct operations on the border. When these
investigators transitioned to ICE in March 2003, both agencies eventually
sought to clarify their roles and responsibilities concerning controlled
deliveries. The two bureaus formed a working group to do this in April
2004.
An outcome of the working group discussions, according to CBP headquarters
officials, is that Border Patrol and ICE plan to issue guidance
in the form of a memorandum of understanding concerning the general roles
and responsibilities of their respective staffs for controlled
deliveries.13 This new guidance, according to the Border Patrol official
in headquarters who chaired the working group, is to state that all
controlled deliveries between ports of entry have to be approved by the
local Border Patrol chief, who will make a decision based on guidance from
headquarters. Additionally, according to this same official, the guidance
will state that the Border Patrol will have the responsibility, during
controlled deliveries, for inspections to ensure that there are no weapons
of mass destruction, for example, in vehicles or on persons in addition to
the known smuggled goods or persons. Officials told us the guidance will
also outline a process for grievances when local managers cannot agree.
Border Patrol officials said they did not have a date when the guidance
would be finalized, but that as of August 2004, a final draft was sent to
CBP's Commissioner to be signed, after which ICE's Assistant Secretary
would be given the draft for signature.
At the time of our site visits, how ICE and CIS should communicate and
coordinate with each other in cases of suspected benefit fraud has not
been formally defined by either CIS or ICE headquarters, and the field
officials we contacted said that this has caused disagreement among CIS
and ICE field officials. The difficulty between CIS and ICE investigations
regarding benefit fraud is not new. We have noted in a past report that
INS had numerous problems related to its enforcement of benefit fraud,
including a lack of protocols for adjudicators and others in coordinating
benefit fraud and a lack of criteria for investigators in prioritizing
benefit fraud cases.14 Prior to the transition, INS had begun to place a
priority on investigating benefit fraud perpetrated by large-scale
organizations or persons of special interest, and this priority has
continued under ICE. As a result, some CIS field officials told us that
ICE would not pursue single cases of benefit fraud. ICE field officials
who spoke on this issue cited a lack of investigative resources as to why
they could not respond in the manner CIS wanted. For example, one ASAC
acknowledged that CIS depended on ICE to go forward with leads on benefit
fraud but said that
Focus of Benefit Fraud Investigations Reported as a Source of Disagreement
among CIS and ICE Field Officials
13The guidance is also to cover other issues, such as Title 21 authority
(covers the importation, distribution, manufacture, and possession of
illegal narcotics), asset forfeiture, and sharing of intelligence and
information.
14Investigators in both INS's service centers and district offices
investigated possible benefit fraud on the basis of information that they
received from staff who processed benefit applications (adjudication
officers), other INS investigative units, INS regional units, the public,
and other federal and local law enforcement agencies.
his office could not commit large numbers of investigators to benefit
fraud until more investigators were cross-trained. An ASAC and group
supervisor in another office also cited the lack of investigators to
address benefit fraud and acknowledged that the vast majority of the CIS
cases referred to that ICE office we not investigated because of this lack
of resources.
According to CIS officials, adjudicators refer single cases of benefit
fraud to ICE, in part because they rely on ICE to conduct database checks
on systems CIS adjudicators cannot access. For example, ICE's Treasury
Enforcement Communications System (TECS) may have information on
individuals that could help adjudicators determine whether to approve or
deny an application for benefits.15 However, CIS officials in three cities
we visited stated that the applicants' files they send over to ICE are
sometimes kept without notification of whether an investigation was
initiated or not by ICE investigators for long periods of time. An ICE
official in headquarters responsible for managing benefit fraud explained
that SAC offices may investigate single cases of alleged fraud but the
extent to which that is done depends on the assessment of the SAC office's
staff resources and the priorities of the local U.S. Attorney's Office.16
Without having information from ICE that might form the basis for denying
an application, CIS still has the responsibility to adjudicate the
application and instead may even approve applications or take other
temporary action when fraud is suspected. For example, in one office we
visited, CIS officials said that they had 154 cases of alleged benefit
fraud that they had referred to ICE since June 2003. They said they had
not received responses from ICE on the status of these cases or whether
ICE intended to investigate them. In the interim, CIS officials said,
their office could not close the cases and instead had been granting the
suspect
15TECS was developed and maintained by the Customs Service (U.S.
Department of the Treasury), and is a mainframe-based enforcement and
inspection support system that prior to the transition was used by
Customs, INS inspectors and intelligence analysts, and other federal
agencies. The system was developed to store information about people who
are of interest to law enforcement agencies so that their entry into the
United States may be monitored or, if necessary, prevented.
16We previously reported in GAO, Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused
Approach Is Needed to Address Problems, GAO-02-66, (Washington, D.C.,
January 2002) that U.S. attorneys accept fraud cases under established
prosecutorial priorities and resource availability and that the priority
on fraud varies among the U.S. attorney's offices around the country.
applicants temporary employment authorization or advance parole.17 One CIS
manager and one ICE manager in the field indicated that while dismantling
large-scale smuggling rings is important, single cases of benefit fraud
can have national security implications. For example, a person who is
allowed to remain in the country as a result of committing marriage fraud
can become a naturalized citizen in 3 years and facilitate the entry of
other persons into the United States who could possibly pose security
risks. CIS and ICE officials in headquarters agreed that benefit fraud was
important to national security as well as the integrity of the immigration
process. CIS officials in three cities told us that ICE's lack of
responsiveness to some CIS referrals for benefit fraud investigations
hindered their ability to meet their district and bureau goals for
reducing the backlog of applications.
While challenges were reported, there have been efforts by ICE and CIS to
address benefit fraud. After the transition, CIS created a Fraud Detection
and National Security office devoted to deterring fraud. ICE has
established Benefit Fraud Units composed of investigative assistants and
intelligence analysts who were working in CIS's three regional offices and
in the three of the four CIS service centers (who were working in these
offices prior to the transition).18 CIS has Fraud Detection Units composed
of adjudications staff in its four service centers who process
applications, analyze applications to identify trends in fraud, and refer
potential benefit fraud cases to ICE. ICE investigative assistants and
intelligence analysts, in turn, are to refer cases to the local SAC
investigations offices. Two CIS offices we visited were referring
potential benefit fraud cases through this new process. Alternatively, in
the other four offices we visited, CIS adjudicators were directly
referring benefit fraud cases to local ICE investigators, who must
determine whether to reject, postpone, or pursue the cases.
17Advance parole is a benefit that allows an alien residing in the United
States (in other than lawful permanent resident status) to gain permission
to travel out of and return into the United States when the conditions of
the alien's stay do not otherwise allow for readmission after departing
the Untied States.
18ICE has Benefit Fraud Units in the Texas, Vermont, and California
Service Centers. Now under CIS, the former INS's four Service
Centers-California, Nebraska, Texas, and Vermont-were created in 1990 to
help reduce application backlogs in the district offices. Service Centers
process 35 types of applications, including petitions for permanent and
temporary workers, petitions for admission of spouses, and applications
for employmentbased adjustment of status to permanent resident. The
Service centers also share responsibility with the District offices for
processing naturalization applications.
CBP, CIS, and ICE Lack Formal Guidance for Addressing Overlapping
Responsibilities for Parole
Headquarters officials from CIS and ICE told us that the two bureaus were
planning to do more to address benefit fraud. These officials told us that
CIS and ICE are working on a memorandum of understanding that will
document the creation of standard protocols for adjudicators to refer and
investigators to accept, alleged cases of benefit fraud (including time
frames for ICE in responding to CIS) and for CIS and ICE to communicate
and coordinate in matters involving benefit fraud. Additionally, CIS
created a new fraud position description to address single cases of fraud,
and a CIS official told us that as of August 2004, the agency has hired 95
of 100 newly funded staff positions to work on benefit fraud and some of
these staff have completed one training course at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC).19 In addition, while neither official
knew when the memo of understanding would be final, in the interim, CIS
and ICE have established time frames for SAC offices to review fraud
referrals for criminal investigation.
CBP, CIS, and ICE have the authority to grant aliens parole-temporary
admission into the United States for such reasons as humanitarian
purposes, public benefit (e.g., participating in a legal proceeding for
the U.S. government), or for further inspection. A CIS official told us
that the authority to make decisions regarding parole, under former INS,
rested with the district director, who had responsibility for all of the
immigration programs. However, since the transition, CBP, CIS, and ICE had
yet to make formal the roles and responsibilities for each program
regarding who has authority to grant parole and when it is most
appropriate for one agency rather than the other to make decisions about a
parole application. Without this guidance on roles and responsibilities,
CBP, CIS, and ICE officials in local areas were making determinations as
to how the parole process will work. For example, in one city we visited,
as a result of monthly meetings, ICE investigations, CBP inspections, and
CIS coordinated a panel of representatives from their local offices to
review the applications or requests for parole and, depending on the facts
of each case, decided what program would make the decision for granting
parole to aliens. By contrast, in another city we visited, CBP and CIS
were unsure as to who had the authority to make decisions about parole.
CBP officials in headquarters who are responsible for inspections told us
that the current practice is that the bureau that has possession of the
person
19According to a CIS official, every district office, service center, and
asylum office will receive at least one of these positions, and large
district offices will receive several positions.
Some Steps Taken and Some Steps Remain to be Completed in Integrating
Immigration and Customs Investigators into ICE
makes the decision about parole, and while there are ongoing discussions
among managers in the three bureaus regarding authority, there have not
been final decisions. In August 2004, CBP and ICE headquarters told us
that the two bureaus have now drafted protocols regarding parole and that
the completion of the protocols is contingent upon a decision by DHS on
the placement and funding of the Parole and Humanitarian Assistance
Branch. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS said that the issues
regarding parole operations have now been resolved.
SAC offices have taken initial steps toward integrating the former INS and
Customs investigative workforces. However, most SAC officials and
investigators we spoke with said that one or more steps that are important
for full integration remain to be completed. While officials in some SAC
offices said they have not received enough specific guidance, such as
performance measures from ICE headquarters on how to gauge their progress
in merging INS and Customs investigators, many of the ones we contacted
said there are some common initial steps SAC offices have completed in
integrating investigators.20 These include (1) assigning former INS and
Customs investigators to work together in mixed investigative groups, (2)
providing formal and on-the-job cross-training to investigators so that
former INS investigators can perform the functions of former Customs
investigators and vice versa, and (3) establishing pay parity for all
former INS investigators and supervising investigators. Many SAC officials
with whom we spoke also noted that several important steps to fully
integrate former INS and Customs investigators remain to be taken. These
include (1) co-locating former INS and Customs investigators so their
offices are in the same building, (2) establishing uniform ICE policies
and procedures, and (3) issuing symbols for ICE's Office of Investigations
that identify all ICE investigators as being part of one agency. ICE
headquarters officials told us in August 2004 that efforts are under way
to address all of these steps.
20In an interview with ICE headquarters officials in July 2004, we were
told they are just starting to provide guidance to SAC offices on
integration and only doing so on a case-bycase basis.
Mixing Investigative Groups, Classroom-Based Cross-Training, and Pay Parity
Are among the Initial Steps Reported in Integrating INS and Customs
Investigators
Of the 49 SACs and ASACs who responded to our question, 27 stated that
investigators in their offices had been integrated to a great or moderate
extent; 15 said they had been integrated to some extent, and 3 said they
had been integrated to a little extent. SACs and ASACs who responded to
our question indicated they had generally maintained the investigative
focus that existed before the merger (e.g., groups continued focusing on
money laundering, strategic investigations, and benefit fraud) but had
mixed or intended to mix some of the former INS and Customs investigators
into these investigative groups. An ICE official in headquarters said that
the extent to which investigative groups would be integrated has been left
up to individual SACs, and the characteristics of some geographic
locations may make integration more difficult. Eleven SACs said they were
working toward having former INS and Customs investigators work within
mixed investigative groups. One SAC noted that he did not want to
integrate investigators and group supervisors until they were formally
cross-trained-training where former INS and Customs investigators learn
the laws and regulations of each other's discipline from experienced
lawyers and trainers.21
Ten of 49 SACs and ASACs we spoke with indicated that former INS and
Customs investigators in their offices were being assigned to work with
one another on a case-by-case basis, and two of these said mixing of
investigators in this way provided the investigators with opportunities to
learn each other's discipline through on-the-job-training. Such
opportunities included having a joint duty roster where investigators from
each former discipline responded to a call for an investigation together
and having some investigators from former INS and Customs work in the same
investigative groups.22 Eleven of 49 SACs and ASACs we contacted told us
their offices had a joint duty roster such that investigators from
different former agencies responded to cases together and learned from one
another on the job. In one of the SAC offices, we were told that
investigators from the former INS and Customs respond together to calls
for investigations, but former Customs investigators process
immigrationrelated cases and customs-related cases are processed by former
INS
21Group supervisors are senior special agents responsible for overseeing
an investigative group of 8 to 12 special agents in a particular
investigative field, such as benefit fraud, antismuggling, or money
laundering.
22Before the transfer, both INS and Customs investigations programs
rotated agents on a roster to serve 24-hour shifts to respond to issues
that arose, for example, at the ports of entry or after regular business
hours.
investigators so they can learn the policies and procedures of the other
discipline in a real-life setting.
SACs and ASACs we spoke with said that in addition to on-the-job training,
formal cross-training is key to eventually creating a unified workforce.
ICE headquarters issued a cross-training curriculum to all SAC offices in
January 2004 with a deadline for all investigators to complete
crosstraining by September 30, 2004. ICE headquarters officials did not
set a deadline for the completion of training for group supervisors or
senior managers, although these persons could choose to participate in the
investigator training.
ICE officials responsible for developing the cross-training curriculum
indicated that the intent of the cross-training was to ensure that all
investigators from the former agencies were prepared to address all
components of ICE's mission. The investigators are to participate in 8
days of classroom training, taught by investigators and attorneys,
covering both legal and operational issues of the other discipline. For
example, former INS investigators receive training in areas such as
commercial fraud investigations, financial investigations, trade
compliance, and drug smuggling, while former Customs investigators receive
training in areas such as determining citizenship, benefit and document
fraud, initiation of removals, and alien detention. Investigators must
pass, with a score of 70 percent or higher, a series of nine written tests
in order to be certified as cross-trained. As of late August 2004, ICE
headquarters reported that 2,175 out of approximately 5,400 former INS and
Customs investigators had taken and passed at least one of the nine exams,
including 1,210 former INS and Customs investigators who had fully
completed cross-training. In August 2004, ICE headquarters said that they
still expected most investigators to complete the cross-training and nine
examinations by the September 30, 2004, deadline.23
ICE officials cited the achievement of pay parity between former INS and
Customs investigators as one of the successes of the merger. Prior to the
merger and for approximately a little more than a year after the transfer,
former INS investigators and their supervisors were paid at a lower grade
level than their counterparts from former Customs. Specifically, most
23There are a limited number of agents who are unable to complete
cross-training as they are on detail assisting the United States Secret
Service in carrying out protective duties during this election year or are
assisting in training the Federal Air Marshal Service.
former INS investigators were paid at the GS-12 pay grade and most former
INS group supervisors were paid at the GS-13 grade; most former Customs
investigators were paid at the GS-13 grade and most former Customs group
supervisors were paid at the GS-14 grade. In our site visits and during
telephone interviews, many ICE officials, including most former INS
investigators, said that the lack of pay parity had affected morale, made
former INS investigators feel as if they were second class, and made
integrating the investigative groups more difficult as the former INS
investigators were doing the same work for less pay. In April 2004, DHS
approved an upgrade from GS-12 to GS-13 for the majority of former INS
investigators, and in June 2004 approved an upgrade from GS-13 to GS-14
for the majority of former INS group supervisors. Investigators and group
supervisors we spoke with after pay parity went into effect said they
believed morale had increased since pay parity was implemented, and former
INS investigators felt they are now equal to their former Customs
counterparts.
Many Officials Stated That Important Steps to Fully Integrate Investigators
Remain to Be Completed
Complete Co-Location Has Not Yet Been Achieved
Twenty-one SACs and ASACs we spoke with stated that other efforts
important to integration - such as co-locating all ICE investigators in a
given field location so they are in one building, establishing uniform
operational policies and procedures, and "branding" ICE's Office of
Investigations with symbols that identify investigators as belonging to
one agency - have been delayed.
According to 19 of 49 SACs and ASACs we contacted, one of the obstacles to
integration has been the fact that numerous investigators from former INS
and Customs have continued to work in separate locations. Although INS's
and Customs' investigations programs were merged into ICE, former INS
investigators generally continued to work in former INS buildings, and
former Customs investigators generally continued to work in former Customs
buildings. Eight SACs and ASACs with whom we spoke noted that the lack of
co-location of former INS and Customs investigators perpetuated the view
among investigators that ICE is not yet integrated. For example, 3
officials said that creating a unified organization is difficult when
members of a work group-8 to 12 investigators-are dispersed in different
offices, sometimes miles apart. Some SAC officials reported they have
moved some investigative groups, such as the benefit fraud and criminal
aliens, to the same buildings in an effort to better co-mingle former INS
and Customs investigators. Officials in some other locations told us this
has not been possible because of lack of space. Fourteen of 20 SACs we
spoke with by phone noted that their offices have been unable to co-locate
former INS and Customs investigators because space in their
Lack of Uniform Policies and Procedures for Some Operations Reportedly
Causes Confusion and Hinders the Creation of a New Culture
current buildings was limited and building leases were signed before the
transfer or because they could not secure additional funding from DHS to
lease new buildings before existing leases expire. An ICE headquarters
official said there are a few SAC offices that are completely co-located
and there are additional SAC offices that have submitted co-location plans
to ICE headquarters and requested additional space. This official also
said that ICE will begin to co-locate offices that have had Occupational
Safety and Health Administration violations or where leases will soon
expire, and the goal is to have all SAC offices co-located in the next 5
to 7 years. ICE headquarters officials recently estimated that complete
co-location immediately would cost about $150 million.
Some officials told us that ICE has been slow to establish uniform
operational policies and procedures, causing confusion and some delay in
the creation of a new unified ICE culture. Policies and procedures on such
things as the use of firearms or the steps to take when investigators are
involved in car accidents while working in an official capacity vary
between former INS and Customs investigators. In the absence of uniform
policies and procedures, ICE headquarters officials said they directed SAC
offices to continue to use former policies from both INS and Customs,
applying the policy from the former agency to the agent from that agency.
SAC officials from some offices said they have created new local office
policies for all ICE investigators.
One SAC official said that a lack of unified operational policies and
procedures has in some cases resulted in confusion or the establishment of
local policies. Other SAC officials told us this can be problematic if
investigators working together are relying upon different policies and
procedures to carry out their investigative work. In one city, we were
told that two investigators-one from the former INS and one from the
former Customs-were involved in an auto accident. The former agencies had
different procedures for filing paperwork on an accident, and no one knew
which policy to follow. The SAC made a local decision to use the policy of
the driver's former agency. In another city, the SAC decided to adopt a
former Customs policy concerning making an arrest at a residence. Customs
policy had called for a minimum of four investigators in making an arrest,
while INS did not have a policy on the minimum number of investigators
required for an arrest. The former INS investigators and supervisors said
they did not understand the rationale for this policy, given the volume of
arrests they typically had in a day. Officials in ICE headquarters
explained the rationale to us, stating that under INS investigators often
engaged in administrative arrests of individuals for administrative
crimes, such as visa overstays or document fraud. Under
Pending Name Change Caused Delay in Creating a Unified ICE
ICE, they said investigators are often engaging in criminal law
enforcement arrests and possibly arresting more dangerous suspects. As a
matter of officer safety, ICE requires that investigators work in groups
of four when making an arrest. Knowing this rationale may have helped the
former INS staff avoid confusion over this change. Additionally, ICE
headquarters officials told us that the investigations program prioritized
the establishment of uniform policies, for example, focusing on a unified
policy for undercover operations. These headquarters officials also said
that, in the interim, SAC offices were instructed by ICE headquarters to
use the policy of the former agencies.
After more than a year as ICE, field officials said that investigators and
managers were continuing to use their former agency badges and
credentials, and ICE headquarters officials had spent months waiting on a
request for a name change.24 Some SACs we spoke with said that at the time
we contacted them, ICE still did not have the public identifiers that
separate it from the former agencies of which it is composed. We were told
that incomplete branding of the agency with a unique logo has at times
contributed to frustration and embarrassment.25 Some of the former INS
investigators and managers we spoke with said that the delay in branding
ICE has held up the creation of a unified ICE agency.
According to officials at ICE headquarters, one element in the process of
establishing ICE is to brand it with a unique identity by creating badges,
raid jackets, business cards, and other identifying materials or symbols.
When DHS was created, INS staff were directed to retire all emblems and
paraphernalia. However, Customs was not given the same orders. In some ICE
offices, we observed Customs emblems and paraphernalia on display. In
another example of the divide between INS and Customs, in one city we
visited, former Customs investigators had created a mock-up of the new
24For a number of months ICE delayed issuing new badges, credentials, name
signs, business cards, and other printed material because of a pending
request for a name change. ICE formally requested a name change-to
Investigations and Criminal Enforcement-to more accurately reflect the
work of all ICE divisions, as well as to further remove the agency from
the legacy immigration and customs brands. In late June 2004, the
Assistant Secretary for ICE announced that it was clear the name change
would not be approved in the near future and ICE would go forward with the
procurement of new badges and credentials.
25DHS defines branding as all the things and symbols that create the
recognition for an agency. Branding provides an organization with an
identity and provides information to others about what that agency is.
ICE badge that they said was for former INS investigators, which referred
to the INS investigators as "Junior Officers" of the U.S. Customs Service.
During one site visit, a group of former INS investigators we spoke with
questioned why headquarters had been so slow to implement branding, and
one investigators said the branding should have been completed prior to
the transition or shortly thereafter. In another site visit, one
investigator said this lack of an identity has proven to be frustrating
and embarrassing when acting in an official capacity, such as testifying
in court. One ASAC we spoke with said that he tried to board a plane with
his weapon and was questioned by airline officials when he showed his INS
badge to verify that he was law enforcement. Airline officials said that
INS had been abolished, and the ASAC had to explain that ICE did not yet
have its own badges. The ASAC was eventually allowed to proceed but said
he knew this problem had plagued other investigators as well. In another
example, an agent in one city said that he went out and purchased his own
ICE raid jacket because he did not like having his authority questioned
when he wore an INS raid jacket.
Most of the decisions about branding were made at the DHS level, and there
are written guidelines for the use of the DHS seal and agency signatures
for such things as business cards, letterhead, and flags.26 According to
an official in ICE headquarters who is responsible for branding, certain
branding activities that are particular to ICE are in the final stages. At
the time of our interview in July 2004 and confirmed in August 2004, ICE
headquarters officials acknowledged the delay and said that raid jackets
were made available for purchase locally in January 2004, badges will be
issued beginning in September 2004, and uniforms were in the final stages
of production.
Many See Positive Aspects Many of those we spoke with from both the former
INS and Customs
of the Transition noted that there have been benefits to merging the INS
and Customs investigations programs. They noted that combining the
expertise of former INS and Customs investigators has provided expanded
authority in conducting investigations and could contribute to more
thorough investigations. Other SAC officials said that expanded authority
has been beneficial in investigating money laundering in alien smuggling
cases and
26All agencies, with the exception of the U.S. Coast Guard and the Secret
Service, are required to use the DHS seal and the agency's name as their
logos.
Many Officials Expressed Difficulty Understanding Administrative Services
going after the assets of foreign-born persons running prostitution rings
as they can now prosecute someone for multiple offenses. Four SACs and
ASACs said they expect the benefits to increase as cross-training is
completed and investigators more fully learn the expertise of the other
former agency.
Former INS investigators we spoke with also noted beneficial aspects of
the merger. Many of the former INS investigators we spoke with in our site
visits said they are now able to concentrate on investigative work rather
than services and they have received a pay increase to bring them up to
par with the former Customs investigators. In one location, former INS
investigators said that prior to the merger, the District Director would
task investigators to assist with naturalization exams or to fill guard
duties at district offices or ports of entry. In another location, former
INS investigators said they now have more employees to carry out missions.
Although DHS has issued guidance via Email on how administrative support
shared services would function, several CBP, CIS, and ICE field officials
told us that they were confused about what constitutes shared services,
the processes for receiving services from a shared service provider, and
how many of the administrative staff in their offices would be transferred
to other offices. One official in headquarters told us in July 2004 that
decisions about shared services were not completely resolved.
Additionally, officials in all three agencies cited problems with
administrative computer systems for travel, budget, and payroll-
administrative functions that are handled by the individual bureaus and
are not a part of shared services. As a result of several problems and
changes that have occurred, according to officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE,
some field offices have assigned administrative duties to inspectors,
adjudicators or senior adjudications managers, or investigative staff
because the office needed additional administrative support.
In an attempt to provide more efficient administrative mission support
services, DHS is in the process of developing and implementing systems and
processes called "shared services." DHS initiated the shared services
system in December 2003, making determinations about the realignment of
approximately 6,100 administrative positions. In January 2004, the
Undersecretaries for Management and Border and Transportation Security and
the heads of CBP, CIS, and ICE signed an agreement finalizing the
interbureau governance of shared services. In commenting on a draft of
this report, DHS said that the Department encountered delays in the
execution of service level agreement and resource allocation.
Consequently, the implementation phase did not begin until late in the
spring/summer of 2004. According a to DHS official, shared services is
intended to represent a new model for government on delivering and
managing administrative services.
DHS's shared services system utilizes four different approaches in
providing and receiving services for CBP, CIS, and ICE staff. The shared
services system's approaches are (1) each bureau provides its staff some
of its own services itself, (2) one bureau provides a certain service to
staff in all three bureaus, (3) one bureau provides a service to its own
workforce and staff in one other agency while the third bureau provides
that service for its own staff, and (4) each bureau provides selected
services to its own workforce as well as to selected staff in other
bureaus. For example, CBP is providing human resource management to its
workforce, in addition to workforces in CIS and ICE~. ICE is providing
training for supervisors in ICE, CIS, and CBP but handles equal employment
opportunity issues for only its own workforce, and CIS. CBP, CIS, and ICE
are each providing their own workforces with procurement, budget, labor
and employment relations, and professional development training, among
other services. According to DHS officials, the decisions about which
bureau would provide a certain service were made on the basis of an
assessment of such factors as each bureau's adaptability to an increased
workload, level of modernization, and historical expertise with each
shared service. See figure 2 for a description of the services each bureau
is to provide under shared services.
Figure 2: Division of CBP, CIS, and ICE Roles Under DHS's Shared Services
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
Despite Communication about Recently Implemented Shared Services System,
Officials Say Confusion Persists
A DHS briefing document and communication strategy indicated that through
such means as the bureau's intranet, chain of command, memorandums, fact
sheets, and video broadcasts, DHS would communicate the roles and
responsibilities of CBP, CIS, and ICE for providing shared services. DHS
provided us evidence that it has used some of these communication methods.
However, a senior official at DHS told us in June 2004 (6 months after the
initiation of shared services) that although a communication strategy was
in place, communicating about shared services to the field is a work in
progress. This official also said
that it is the responsibility of the bureaus both receiving and providing
services to communicate information about shared services to the field
offices and staff. DHS officials also stated that the responsibilities of
CBP, CIS, and ICE under shared services are still under development. One
official who was involved in the formation of shared services told us that
DHS would like to change some administrative functions that the bureaus
currently handle for themselves-for example, procurement-into shared
services. Further, even though CBP was designated as the provider of
personnel services to CIS, the extent of that service is still in
negotiation.27
Field officials told us that numerous officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE were
uncertain about what constitutes shared services, the process for
receiving services from a shared service provider, and which
administrative staff would be re-aligned from their positions in local
offices to work for providers of shared services. In our telephone
interviews with SACs and ASACs, 33 of 40 said that their offices were
experiencing problems with shared services to a moderate or great
extent.28 The 4 SACs and ASACs who said they were experiencing problems to
little or no extent provided such reasons as not interacting with shared
services providers or relying on the staff who assisted them prior to the
initiation of shared services in December 2003.29
Our meetings with field officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE indicated that
despite communication from DHS, field office officials varied in their
understanding about what constitutes shared services. For example, one
ASAC believed that shared services consisted of sharing resources, such as
buildings and computer technology, rather than having one bureau provide a
certain administrative service for the other two. Additionally, in April
2004, approximately 3 to 4 months after the initiation of shared services,
four ICE officials and one CBP inspections official were not aware that
this occurred.
Officials in four of the six sites we visited were unsure about who
specifically to call or the process they were to use in obtaining a shared
27CBP stated in September 2004 that the two bureaus finalized the
agreement for shared services on July 2, 2004.
28The 9 SACs and ASACs we visited face-to-face were not asked the same
question.
29Three SACs and ASACs said that they were experiencing problems with
shared services to "some extent."
service from CBP, CIS, or ICE.30 For example, after the person responsible
for facilities was transferred to ICE, an official in a CIS district
office did not know who to call for assistance with setting up vacant
office space for CIS staff who were being moved to that location. This
official ultimately learned that the process was not a shared service but
was instead handled within CIS. A SAC official in another office we
visited said he and administrative staff did not know how to obtain an
authorization to repair a vehicle that had been damaged in an accident in
October 2003. The officials initiated a purchase order request in November
2003 for services to repair the vehicle and submitted it to ICE. However,
under the shared services system, CBP was designated responsibility for
authorizing fleet repairs for CBP, CIS, and ICE. The SAC official said
that he and administrative staff spent several months contacting multiple
officials at CBP offices and ICE headquarters about approval for the
repair and how to pay for it. In March 2004 the car was scheduled to be
sold at an auction.31 In late June 2004, CBP issued an informal policy, by
Email to the SAC office, for receiving approval for repairs and invited
the SAC office to resubmit a request (as it had been previously denied) if
it had not already sold the car. Before SAC officials were informed of
this process, we were told that the office paid approximately $1,000 for
storage of the vehicle and stopped saving the funds initially set aside
for the repair.
In five of the six sites we visited, officials expressed uncertainty and
unmet expectations about which administrative staff in their offices would
be reassigned to shared services positions and transferred to other
programs or agencies. The decision about the reassignment of
administrative staff for shared services was made at the headquarters
level by a working group of CBP, CIS, and ICE officials and led by DHS.
For example, in one SAC office that we visited, approximately 50
administrative staff from former INS had been supporting CBP and CIS in
addition to ICE, and all but 1 were moved because of the realignment of
staff for shared services. Because the SAC had expected to retain 3 rather
than 1 of the 50 administrative staff, he assigned administrative work to
several investigators as a collateral duty. Administrative staff in one
CBP office for field operations that we visited had received e-mail
messages from CBP headquarters notifying them that, within a few days,
they would be transferred to another program or bureau. We were told that
some
30We visited two sites before the official initiation of shared services
in December 2003.
31The vehicle registered approximately 4,000 miles on the odometer at the
time of the accident, and the repairs were valued at approximately $6,500.
reassignments came as a surprise and involved moving from one office
building to another, but usually they were in the same general geographic
location.
ICE provided us with a written statement explaining that it, along with
CBP and CIS, could not begin delivering administrative services to one
another under shared services until "reimbursable agreements"-the
arrangement of costs and funding for a particular administrative service-
were finalized. As such, this delayed notifications to administrative
staff about reassignments and affected the agencies' ability to provide
information to the field.
Travel, Budget, and Other Computer System Problems Seen as Significant
Many officials we contacted in CBP, CIS, and ICE said that problems with
travel and budget, and computer systems have at times adversely affected
office operations. For example, because of problems with travel computer
systems, many officials in ICE's SAC offices said that staff are not
receiving reimbursements. Thirty-two of 49 SACs and ASACs responding to
our question about shared services cited Travel Manager-ICE's off-theshelf
computer system for processing travel requests and vouchers- and/or the
Federal Financial Management System (FFMS)-the computer system ICE SAC
offices use to track their budgets-as significant administrative problems.
Additionally, CBP officials identified such problems as cumbersome
procedures for accessing data systems and the lack of computer program
updates to reflect changes on time and attendance cards. In August 2004,
headquarters officials told us they were making efforts to resolve the
problems by providing training, reducing funding strings for Travel
Manager, and reprogramming FFMS.
Twenty-six of 49 SACs and ASACs responding to our question about shared
services also discussed the problems they were having with Travel Manager.
ICE headquarters officials told us that Travel Manager is a new system to
the former Customs field staff in ICE's investigations program. It was
used in the former INS's headquarters and in some field offices prior to
the transfer. ICE headquarters officials told us that Travel Manager was
chosen because it could interface with ICE's accounting system and
automate the process for managing travel documents. ICE investigations
officials in the field and headquarters told us that with Travel Manager,
the funding strings (codes that tell the system what account to charge and
to what program to attribute travel) have caused problems for staff in the
field and headquarters. ICE headquarters investigations officials
estimated that there are approximately 80,000 separate funding strings,
each approximately 48 characters long, from which field staff have to
choose in
carrying out a transaction such as completing a travel voucher. They
explained that because the system is new to many staff and the funding
strings are not labeled so that the user can select words rather than a
string of numerical characters, some ICE staff may choose incorrect
funding strings, causing their vouchers to "disappear" in the system or be
routed to the wrong approving official. When this occurs, ICE headquarters
officials for investigations told us, neither the traveler nor the
approving official receives a notice that the voucher has failed to be
processed. Additionally, because ICE's Travel Manager interfaces with its
Federal Financial Management System, if staff choose the wrong funding
string, the voucher may be routed to an account that does not have the
funds. If this happens, ICE officials said the system would reject the
voucher. As a result, they said that some ICE investigators and managers
have not received timely or accurate reimbursements for their travel.
According to some ICE field officials we contacted, when staff
inadvertently select the wrong funding string, it takes from several weeks
to months to process the voucher. A few officials said that when staff do
not receive timely reimbursements, they sometimes use their personal funds
to pay their government credit card bills. For example, one SAC said that
an agent in his office used personal funds to pay $15,000 for bills
incurred from business travel. Another SAC official said that not all
investigators are able to use their personal funds to pay for their
business travel expenses. One SAC said that he was waiting to be
reimbursed for $11,000 in travel bills that he had accrued on his
government credit card. Because he had not been reimbursed, he felt he was
in danger of having his government credit card revoked. These examples are
to illustrate the types of concerns reported to us. We did not verify the
facts reported to us or the circumstances surrounding these specific
examples, e.g., whether the problems were caused by the travel system, the
individual, or both.
ICE headquarters investigations officials responsible for Travel Manager
said that they have made some changes to Travel Manager to aid ICE staff.
For example, they reduced the number of funding strings from the initial
800,000 to about 80,000, and added alphabetical codes to help facilitate
the use of the software. They also said they have suggested to an ICE
group working on finance issues that either the system or a staff member
should send notification to the approving official and traveler when
vouchers
cannot be successfully processed.32 Officials responsible for all of ICE's
financial management told us that the office responsible for mission
support for all of ICE had provided over 200 contacts in the field to
assist with Travel Manager, held a training conference, and provided
training opportunities in the field and in headquarters for staff
regarding Travel Manager. However, they recognized that 48-character
numerical funding strings are difficult to use. They also discussed
additional reasons why staff in the field were having problems with Travel
Manager. First, because ICE did not have a full accounting of its staff,
33 Travel Manager did not recognize all of the staff and was unable to
route all of the vouchers. Second, many staff were unfamiliar with Travel
Manager, so they did not know how to determine whether their vouchers have
been approved or rejected. Third, in situations where staff did not travel
for their home program office, e.g., if an investigator was traveling on
behalf of the Federal Air Marshals, the travel documents could not be
managed through Travel Manager.
Twenty-two of 49 SACs and ASACs also discussed problems with FFMS, but the
problems were not as numerous as those with Travel Manager. FFMS is a
financial accounting system that allows the tracking of budget
expenditures and balances. It was previously used by INS and ICE chose to
adopt it, although DHS plans to transition to a new departmentwide
financial system. The problems with FFMS are new to former Customs
managers and administrative staff, but not necessarily new to former INS
staff who began using the software shortly before the transition. The SACs
and ASACs who stated that they had problems with FFMS said that it mostly
affected their ability to manage the office budgets. In response to this
problem, five SACs we contacted told us that they are tracking their
budgets manually, with some using Excel spreadsheets so they can know how
much they are spending from each budget area. One SAC said he is using
over 20 Excel spreadsheets to track the office budget, and another
32In August 2004, ICE provided a statement that indicated that if staff
chose an incorrect accounting string, the system would indicate an error
before routing the document to the approving official.
33According to ICE officials responsible for finance, when the Office of
Management and Budget allocated staffing and funding to the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate and CIS, the funding for several
programs such as general counsel and information technology went to CBP
and CIS but the staff went to ICE. These ICE officials told us that
because ICE was funding additional support staff, the agency did not have
an accurate account of staff funded by ICE and staff in ICE whose funding
was with CBP and CIS.
bought an off-the-shelf budget software system to supplement FFMS. The
officials in ICE headquarters responsible for finance told us that the
limitations of FFMS were known, but FFMS was chosen after three studies
were conducted by independent consultants approving its use by ICE and it
was certified to meet auditing standards. Additionally, ICE officials in
headquarters responsible for finance said in June 2004 that they have
attempted to address field concerns by reprogramming FFMS to allow SAC
offices to track their budgets in the manner they were used to doing in
Customs and by providing weekly training to program officers in
headquarters.
CBP officials in inspections and Border Patrol in four of the six sites we
visited also told us they were having problems with administrative
computer systems and applications, mostly in the area of time and
attendance. Inspections officials cited problems with CBP's computerized
time and attendance system, Customs Overtime Scheduling System (COSS), and
in some cases, inspections officials said they were not accurately paid
overtime. Officials we spoke with in CBP's Border Patrol also cited
problems with COSS and overtime payments and added that in some cases,
staff were maintaining a manual record of actual time and attendance but
inputting into COSS only the 40 hours per week recognized by COSS. CBP
officials in Border Patrol headquarters acknowledged the problems with
COSS when we talked with them in June 2004. However, in August 2004, CBP
headquarters officials responsible for program management of COSS told us
that there were initial problems with overtime payments for former INS
staff that were attributed to errors in the calculation of pay after
transmission from COSS to the Department of Agriculture for processing and
the method the Border Patrol had used to schedule hours worked, while
under former INS.34 They said that all problems with COSS had been
resolved by January 1, 2004. We did not verify whether or when specific
problems were addressed or the actual causes of the problems reported to
us by Border Patrol and inspections officials but did note a difference in
the causes field officials mentioned and the reasons provided by CBP
headquarters officials.
34The National Finance Center, an office within the Department of
Agriculture, handles payroll and other administrative services for some
government agencies.
Mission Staff Sometimes Assigned Administrative Work Full-Time or as
Collateral Duty
One criticism we had of the former INS was that because of staffing
shortages, mission staff often had to assume administrative or other
functions as a collateral duty. One effect of assigning mission staff to
administrative work is that they are not spending all of their time on
duties needed to accomplish the program's mission and thus are not
reaching the full potential of the program position. In our site visits,
we found that this continues to be a problem in some offices. Some
officials we contacted in CBP, CIS, and ICE said they had to use mission
staff in this way because they did not have enough administrative support
to compensate for the realignment of administrative staff to shared
services, the addition of mission personnel that have come as a result of
mergers of some programs in the transition, and hiring freezes. As a
result, inspectors, adjudicators, and investigators in some field offices
were taking on administrative work full-time or as a collateral duty:
o In three of the six sites we visited, we found examples where CBP
inspectors were assigned to handle various administrative functions as a
collateral duty. For example, an inspector in one city was detailed to
resolving problems related to time and attendance and payroll for former
INS inspectors. In another city, supervisory inspectors were detailed to
perform scheduling duties normally performed by administrative staff.
o In three of the six CIS district offices we visited, we found examples
of adjudicators or senior managers taking on administrative functions in
addition to their work as a collateral duty. In two district offices,
adjudicators were taking on such functions as managing office space and
monitoring the budget. In another city, the third highest manager in a
district office was assigned to handle personnel, procurement, and
vacancies rather than duties related specifically to managing the
adjudication of applications. Because these mission staff were spending
time on administrative functions, they were spending less time addressing
program missions such as reducing the backlog of applications.
o In two of our six site visits and in telephone interviews, we learned
that ICE investigators are also taking on administrative functions as a
collateral duty. In one SAC office we visited, the SAC assigned 10 special
investigators, including 1 associate special agent in charge, 1 assistant
special agent in charge, 2 group supervisors, and 6 junior investigators,
to administrative duties. In our telephone interviews, we found examples
consistent with our site visits. For example, we were told that special
investigators in a subordinate office of one SAC office were assigned all
of the clerical work in addition to their normal duties when the office
lost its administrative support staff. Rather than assign administrative
duties to investigators, other SAC offices said they are converting
unfilled agent
Key Practices for Successful Mergers and Transformations
positions to administrative positions. For example, an official in one
office said he would have to convert unfilled agent positions to
administrative positions, and an official in another office gained an
administrative staff member from CBP by transferring (through a personnel
action) one of its staff vacancies to CBP.
The challenges we identify in this report highlight the importance of
using the transition of immigration functions into DHS as an opportunity
for further addressing long-standing and new challenges through positive
transformation. We realize that carrying out this transformation will be
no easy or quickly realized task. In this regard, we and others have
studied the experiences of other public and private organizations that
have undergone successful mergers and transformations. In a July 2003
report, we identified nine key practices that have consistently been found
at the center of successful mergers and transformations, as shown in
figure 3.35 This report was done to help federal agencies implement
successful transformations of their cultures, as well as help the new DHS
merge its various originating components into a unified department.
Collectively, in our view, these key practices and related implementation
steps discussed in our July 2003 report can help transform the sometimes
diverse cultures of DHS legacy agencies into a cohesive unit that fulfills
its new mission, meets current and emerging needs, maximizes performance,
and ensures accountability.
35GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers
and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).
Figure 3: Key Practices for Successful Mergers and Organizational
Transformations
Sources: GAO (presentation); Photos: Photo Disc, Dynamic Graphics,
EyeWire, and Ingram Publishing.
We did not perform an in-depth analysis comparing these key practices with
the transfer of immigration functions into DHS. Nonetheless, we believe
that all nine are important for DHS in its transformation of immigration
programs and noted two key practices that we think would be particularly
helpful as it addresses the challenges we identified in this report. We
realize that DHS has started using many of these nine practices and, while
we did not assess how well each of the practices has been followed, we did
identify certain parts of the two practices that we believe would further
assist DHS in its transformation efforts.
Establish a Communication Strategy to Create Shared Expectations and Report
Related Progress
Creating an effective, ongoing communication strategy is essential to
implementing a merger or transformation. Communication is most effective
when done early, clearly, and often, and is downward, upward, and lateral.
Organizations must develop a comprehensive communication strategy that
reaches out to employees, customers, and stakeholders and seeks to
genuinely engage them in the merger and transformation process.
Implementation steps that accompany this key practice include
communicating early and often to build trust and understanding, ensuring
consistency of message, encouraging two-way communication, and providing
information to meet specific needs of employees.
DHS's office responsible for shared services provided us with a
communication strategy dated May 2004 and a briefing, dated February 2004,
outlining communication strategies, both with the objectives of raising
awareness and promoting understanding of shared services within and
outside of DHS. CBP told us that the agency has developed and implemented
a communications strategy and provided us with examples of communications
activities. Additionally, 22 of the 36 SACs and ASACs responding to our
question by telephone told us that concerning communication, they received
information from headquarters regarding transition goals and milestones.36
In addition, a few of the SACs and ASACs who responded that they had
received transition information said that the information was received
through such means as e-mail, broadcast messages, ICE's intranet, and SAC
conferences. These efforts, however, do not appear to have been completely
effective since, as previously discussed, about a quarter of the officials
we contacted in CBP, CIS, and ICE wanted a clearer understanding of their
roles and responsibilities with other immigration programs.
Involve Employees to Obtain Their Ideas and Gain Their Ownership for the
Transformation
A successful merger and transformation must involve employees and their
representatives from the beginning to gain their ownership of the changes
that are occurring in the organization. Employee involvement strengthens
the transformation process by including frontline perspectives and
experiences. Further, employee involvement helps to create the opportunity
to establish new networks and break down existing organizational silos,
increase employees' understanding and acceptance of organizational goals
and objectives, and gain ownership of new policies and procedures.
Implementation steps that accompany this key practice include using
employee teams, involving employees in planning and sharing performance
information, incorporating employee feedback into new policies and
procedures, and delegating authority to appropriate organizational levels.
In conducting our field work and in meetings with headquarters officials,
we did not identify any indication that the bureaus responsible for
immigration programs had formal mechanisms for obtaining periodic feedback
from field staff (other than the top manager in the office) about how well
the transition was occurring or their concerns or ideas for improvement.
In addition, several headquarters officials seemed
36Four of the 40 we contacted did not respond to our question.
Conclusions
somewhat surprised by the concerns reported to us by field officials when
we discussed them in August 2004. On the other hand, while we did not
conduct an exhaustive search of employee involvement by all field staff,
our work did identify examples of such involvement. For example, we found
two instances where field officials had participated in working groups
held at headquarters regarding issues related to roles and
responsibilities. That is, the working group to outline roles and
responsibilities between the Border Patrol and ICE investigations involved
field managers, two of whom we interviewed. Additionally, we were told
that a meeting held in July 2004 involved CIS and ICE headquarters
managers, field staff, investigators, and adjudicators in discussions
about benefit fraud. Without a formal mechanism for obtaining employee
feedback, however, the bureaus run the risk of missing opportunities for
improvement and of allowing field-related problems to arise and continue
without adequate responses.
With its critical roles in helping protect national security and enforcing
immigration laws, it is very important that INS's integration into DHS and
its related transformation successfully address longstanding and new
management challenges. To accomplish this, DHS's three immigration bureaus
are tasked with establishing clear communication and coordination among
one another and with the efficient and effective integration of the roles
and responsibilities of the former immigration and customs investigative
workforces, all while implementing a new system for providing
administrative services. In managing this transformation, DHS is faced
with not only the previous management challenges that beset INS for years,
but with new challenges that come with creating a new department and
managing diverse agencies. Notwithstanding this daunting endeavor, the
transformation provides DHS with a unique opportunity to successfully
address these inherited and new challenges and thus better accomplish its
important mission.
While DHS has started addressing many of the challenges and has
experienced some successes in its communication and coordination and other
efforts, the challenges and uncertainties reported by field officials and
discussed in this report show that these efforts have not been sufficient
to fully realize the potential benefits of this transformation. The
sentiment among the field officials within CBP, CIS, and ICE we contacted
demonstrates the importance of them having additional explanation and
guidance from DHS and the headquarters management of each of the
respective bureaus that delineates the (1) specific roles and
responsibilities for conducting uniform immigration program operations,
such as benefit fraud investigations, parole decisions, and controlled
deliveries and (2) processes and procedures for making the shared services
system work more efficiently. Without clear guidance, conflicts that the
programs have had prior to and after the transition will likely persist
and staff in the field will lack a complete road map for addressing
cross-cutting issues that may arise in the future, as well as the
necessary information to efficiently utilize the administrative services
they need to accomplish their mission.
Collectively, the nine key practices and related implementation steps that
we identified in our 2003 report can help DHS transform the diverse
cultures of former agencies into a cohesive unit that fulfills its new
mission, meets current and emerging needs, maximizes performance, and
ensures accountability. Specifically, while DHS efforts to incorporate the
key practices and implementation steps we discuss in this report into its
transformation plans should help address the challenges, in our view, a
communication strategy that obtains and considers employee feedback to
create shared expectations and gains their ownership in changes would
improve the likelihood of success in addressing the integration
challenges. We realize that carrying out a successful transformation is no
easy or quickly realized task and believe that this makes having a
strategy that fully incorporates these key practices all the more
important.
Recommendations
To assist DHS in successfully transforming its immigration related
programs and address the challenges discussed in this report, we recommend
that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the heads of CBP, CIS, and
ICE, as appropriate, in consultation with the Undersecretary for Border
and Transportation Security, to take the following three actions.
o First, the bureaus should create a mechanism for periodically
obtaining employee feedback on their ideas and concerns and consider this
feedback in its future transformation and communications strategies,
including assessing the challenges reported to us.
o Second, the bureaus should provide additional specific guidance to
field managers and staff that establishes uniform policies and procedures
on all cross-cutting integration issues that affect operational
effectiveness, including specific descriptions of the roles and
responsibilities of each bureau and its staff in investigative techniques
such as benefit fraud investigations, parole decisions, and controlled
deliveries.
o Finally, the bureaus should provide additional detailed written
guidance to field managers and staff on the processes and procedures to
follow for the provision of shared administrative services.
Agency Comments
DHS provided written comments on a draft of this report, and these
comments are reprinted in appendix II. DHS said that, while there are
instances where contextual clarification is needed, it generally agreed
with our overall findings and recommendations and that our analysis would
be beneficial to the department.
DHS agreed with our recommendation that the bureaus-CBP, CIS, and
ICE-should create a mechanism for periodically obtaining employee
feedback. DHS commented that there have been accomplishments in this area
and provided examples for each of the three bureaus. The examples include
both existing and new efforts started since our field work, including a
contract by CBP in September 2004 for a professional services firm to take
periodic surveys of randomly sampled employees to measure the
effectiveness of communications. If effectively implemented, the new
efforts should provide the bureaus with additional employee ideas and
concerns to consider in its transformation and communication efforts.
Concerning our recommendation that the bureaus provide additional specific
guidance to the field on cross-cutting issues, DHS said that it has
provided clear and thorough guidance and uniform policies and procedures
in critical cross-cutting integration issues. It also said that the
transition challenges it faced were compounded because the overarching
priority was to accomplish all of the department's missions. DHS said
there has been progress related to the consistency and delivery of
guidance on cross-cutting issues that should be acknowledged in the final
report. While we have not assessed the results of some of these examples
of progress, we considered them and added them to the report where needed
to add context. Further, we note that many of the examples DHS provided of
its progress were ongoing during our fieldwork and staff still raised the
concerns we report and said that more guidance on crosscutting immigration
issues is needed. Although these recent efforts, if properly implemented
could address some of the deficiencies we identified, we believe that this
feedback from field officials shows that more attention is needed in this
area to address uncertainties and confusion about cross-cutting issues.
DHS agreed with our recommendation that the bureaus provide additional
guidance on the processes and procedures in providing shared services
but noted its concern about our discussion of communication problems
during the transition to shared services. DHS said that it used best
practices to develop a communication strategy and plan to realign various
administrative or support services into a shared services environment. It
said that it experienced delays in rolling out the shared services
initiative, so it is understandable that field managers lacked familiarity
with certain issues at the time of our interviews. However, DHS did not
believe the field managers views expressed in this report accurately
portray the initiative or the level of comprehension of the initiative. We
commend DHS for developing a communication strategy and plan for this
initiative but believe that the views expressed in this report do portray
the level of comprehension of the initiative by those officials at the
time of our interviews. The concerns they raised, along with additional
feedback DHS obtains in future employee surveys, should assist DHS in
accomplishing the goals of this initiative.
DHS also offered technical comments, which we considered and incorporated
where appropriate.
We plan to provide copies of this report to other appropriate committees,
the Secretary of DHS, and other interested parties. We will also make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If your
or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-8777. Key
contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.
Richard M. Stana
Director, Homeland Security and Justice
List of Congressional Committees
The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch
Chairman
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
The Honorable Thad Cochran
Chairman
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Homeland Security
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives
The Honorable Harold Rodgers
Chairman
The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Homeland Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Homeland Security Act -(P.L. 107-296, Sec. 477(d)(1)-mandated us to
review the transfer of functions from the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and identify
issues associated with the transition. Our overall objectives were to
assess the status of (1) communication and coordination among immigration
programs in DHS field offices, (2) integration of immigration and customs
investigators in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) field
offices, and (3) administrative services and systems used by DHS's
immigration agencies' field offices. We did not assess program performance
or DHS's overall response to long-standing problems in this review.
Additionally, our analysis was based on a snapshot in time, primarily
during fiscal year 2004, and it is possible our results would have been
different if our interviews had been conducted today.
To obtain information on our objectives, we reviewed laws; U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) and ICE transition documents;
DHS, CIS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and ICE memos on
communicating and coordinating; DHS shared services implementation plans;
our past reports; and other relevant documents. We also spoke with
immigration experts in the public and private sectors, and with
representatives of pro-and anti-immigration advocacy groups in the
Washington, D.C., area. These included the American Immigration Lawyers'
Association, the Arab-American Antidiscrimination Committee, the Center
for Immigration Studies, Electronic Data Systems Corporation Inc., the
Institute for the Study of International Migration, the Migration Policy
Institute, the National Immigration Forum, and the National Council of La
Raza.
We interviewed officials at DHS headquarters who were responsible for
managing ICE's detention and removal, intelligence, and investigations
programs; CIS's adjudications program; and CBP's inspections and the
Border Patrol. We also interviewed ICE, CIS, and CBP officials responsible
for developing plans for the transition and officials in the former INS
Office of Statistics and Office for Policy and Planning.
We conducted structured interviews with officials in ICE's special agent
in charge (SAC) offices, CIS's district offices, and CBP's offices for
field operations in 6 of the 27 cities that have SAC offices and with U.S.
Border Patrol sector headquarter offices in 3 of those 6 cities. The 6
cities we visited were Arlington, Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; New York,
New York; Miami, Florida; Detroit, Michigan; and San Diego, California.
Our visits to Arlington and Baltimore were used as preliminary site visits
to
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
design our interview questions. We selected these locations because of
their geographic dispersion; their proximity to ports of entry; and the
relative proximity of ICE, CBP, and CIS offices to one another.
o In site visits to CBP's Offices for field operations, we met with
directors for field operations, assistant directors for field operations,
and, in some cases, inspectors. In these interviews, we collected
information and documentation on (1) communication and coordination with
ICE investigations and other DHS components, (2) the role of ICE
investigators at the ports of entry, and (3) administrative services.
o In site visits to CBP Border Patrol offices, we met with Border Patrol
sector chiefs, directors for administration, and administrative officers.
In these interviews, we collected information and documentation on (1)
communication and coordination with ICE investigations and other
immigration components, (2) the Border Patrol's work on antismuggling, and
(3) administrative services.
o In site visits to CIS offices, we met with district directors,
assistant district directors, as well as section chiefs. In these
interviews, we collected information and documentation on (1)
communication and coordination with ICE investigations and other
immigration components, (2) benefit fraud, and (3) administrative
services.
o In site visits to four ICE field offices, we used a structured
interview instrument to obtain information from the SAC and associate
special agents in charge (ASAC). In one location, we spoke with the two
ASACs. In all four visits, we also met with assistant special agents in
charge and administrative staff. In some locations, SACs and ASACs were in
interim positions until ICE made permanent appointments. In New York,
Miami, Detroit, and San Diego, we also conducted individual and group
interviews with investigators and supervising investigators from the
former INS. In these interviews, we collected information and
documentation on (1) ICE's investigative mission and performance measures
for the program, (2), communication and coordination with other
immigration components in DHS, (3) communication and coordination with
other federal agencies, (4) integrating immigration and customs
investigators, and (5) administrative services.
We used our structured interview instrument to obtain information from
ICE's SAC offices with telephone interviews with the two most senior
managers in the 21 ICE field offices we did not visit-20 SACs and 20
ASACs. We conducted these interviews between March and April of 2004 and
made some follow-up calls in June 2004. In our telephone interviews
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
we asked about (1) ICE's mission and performance measures; (2)
communication and coordination with CBP, CIS, and other ICE programs; (3)
communication and coordination with other federal agencies; (4)
integrating immigration and customs investigators; and (5) administrative
services. We did not speak with one SAC because he was new to the position
and did not believe he could provide us with useful information. We had
previously interviewed him as the ASAC in another city. We did not speak
with one ASAC because he, too, was new to the position. In total, we spoke
with 49 SACs and ASACs in person and by telephone.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contacts Evi Rezmovic (202) 512-2580 or [email protected]
Staff David Alexander, Gabrielle Anderson, Leo Barbour, Carole Cimitile,
Randall Cole, Patricia Dalton, Katherine Davis, Nancy Finley, Larry
Acknowledgments Harrell, Tahra Nichols, Rachel Seid, and Sarah Veale made
key contributions to this report.
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