Chemical And Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to	 
Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat
Training Centers (28-JAN-05, GAO-05-8). 			 
                                                                 
The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that it is increasingly 
likely that an adversary will use nuclear, biological, or	 
chemical (NBC) weapons against U.S. forces. Consequently, DOD	 
doctrine calls for U.S. forces to be sufficiently trained to	 
continue their missions in an NBC-contaminated environment. Given
longstanding concerns about the preparedness of DOD's		 
servicemembers in this critical area, GAO has undertaken a body  
of work covering NBC protective equipment and training. For this 
review, GAO was asked to determine the following: (1) To what	 
extent do Army and Marine Corps units and personnel attending	 
combat training centers participate in NBC training, and to what 
extent do these units and personnel perform NBC tasks at the	 
centers to service standards? (2) Do the Army and the Marine	 
Corps report NBC training at the centers in a standardized format
that allows the services to identify lessons learned and to do	 
cross-unit and cross-center comparisons?			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-8						        
    ACCNO:   A16437						        
  TITLE:     Chemical And Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps   
Need to Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting	 
for Combat Training Centers					 
     DATE:   01/28/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Biological warfare 				 
	     Chemical and biological agents			 
	     Chemical warfare					 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Lessons learned					 
	     Military training					 
	     Nuclear weapons					 
	     Reporting requirements				 

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GAO-05-8

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO	Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
     and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
                                Representatives

January 2005

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Army and Marine Corps Need to Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve
                     Reporting for Combat Training Centers

                                       a

GAO-05-8

Highlights of GAO-05-8, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives

The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that it is increasingly likely
that an adversary will use nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons
against U.S. forces. Consequently, DOD doctrine calls for U.S. forces to
be sufficiently trained to continue their missions in an NBC-contaminated
environment. Given longstanding concerns about the preparedness of DOD's
servicemembers in this critical area, GAO has undertaken a body of work
covering NBC protective equipment and training. For this review, GAO was
asked to determine the following: (1) To what extent do Army and Marine
Corps units and personnel attending combat training centers participate in
NBC training, and to what extent do these units and personnel perform NBC
tasks at the centers to service standards? (2) Do the Army and the Marine
Corps report NBC training at the centers in a standardized format that
allows the services to identify lessons learned and to do crossunit and
cross-center comparisons?

GAO is recommending that DOD direct the services to (1) establish minimum
NBC tasks for units participating in training exercises at the centers and
(2) standardize reporting formats on NBC training that occurs at the
centers. DOD agreed with the report's findings and recommendations and is
now taking the necessary actions for implementation when operating
conditions permit.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-8.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202)
512-9619 or [email protected].

January 2005

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Army and Marine Corps Need to Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve
Reporting for Combat Training Centers

Army and Marine Corps combat training centers provide a unique opportunity
for units to perform advanced training under conditions that approximate
actual combat, thereby enabling units to assess and build upon skills
learned at home stations. Although DOD and both services have stressed the
importance of including NBC defense in all types of training, they have
not established minimum NBC-related tasks for units attending the centers.
Commanders sometimes reduce NBC training to focus on other priority areas.
As a result, the extent of NBC training actually conducted at these
centers varies widely, and some units receive little or none at all. For
example, officials at two Army training centers estimated that during
fiscal years 2002 and 2003, a typical unit training rotation for a
brigade-sized unit- which may include up to 4,000 soldiers-experienced NBC
events that required only about 5 percent of these troops to train in full
NBC protective clothing for a total of 18 hours or more. For the Marine
Corps, no NBC training was conducted during combined arms exercises at its
training center for at least 5 years prior to January 2004. The Marine
Corps began to introduce NBC training into its combined arms exercises in
two rotations that occurred in January and February 2004 but suspended it
because of other priorities related to preparing units for ongoing
operations. Without minimum NBC tasks, the services often miss the
opportunity to use the centers' unique environment to improve units'
proficiency in NBC defense.

When Army units did undergo NBC training, observers noted that many units
did not perform basic NBC tasks to Army standards. For example, during
fiscal years 2002 and 2003, most brigades attending one center did not
meet standards for basic NBC tasks such as donning protective gear,
seeking overhead shelter, and conducting unmasking procedures. Observers
at the Army centers often cited inadequate home-station training as the
reason units were not performing basic NBC tasks to standards. Skills in
these basic tasks are normally acquired during training at home stations
and lay the foundation for acquiring more complex skills associated with
large-unit NBC training. When units arrive at the centers with inadequate
basic NBC skills, they may not be able to take full advantage of the
unique and more complex large-unit NBC training opportunities offered at
these centers.

The Army and the Marine Corps do not always report lessons learned on NBC
training at the centers in a way that can be used to identify trends over
time and allow for cross-unit and cross-center comparisons. Army and
Marine Corps doctrine stresses the importance of identifying lessons
learned during training to enable tailored training at home stations and
elsewhere to reduce the likelihood that similar problems will occur during
operations. Because service guidance does not require standardized
reporting formats, the training centers submit different types of
after-action reports that might or might not mention NBC training. This
lack of standardized reporting represents opportunities lost to the
services to collect comparable data to identify NBC training trends and
lessons learned.

Contents

Letter

Results in Brief
Background
NBC Training at Army and Marine Corps CTCs Varies, and Units

Often Do Not Perform to Acceptable Proficiency Standards Army and Marine
Corps After-Action Reporting at the CTCs Does

Not Fully Facilitate the Identification of NBC Training Trends Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

                                       1

                                      2 5

                                       9

19 24 25 26

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix IIEURNBC Tasks Defined As Essential by the Army and the Marine
Corps

Appendix IIIEURNBC Classroom Courses Introduced into the Marine Corps
Combined Arms Exercise Program in January 2004

Appendix IVEURDifferent Regulations Suggesting Different Formats for
After-Action Reporting for the Army's CTCs

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense

              Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 40

Table

Table 1: NTC's Assessment of Brigades' Performance of NBC Tasks during
Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 14

Figure

Figure 1: Soldiers at CMTC Undergoing NBC Training 6

Abbreviations ~

CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned
CMTC Combat Maneuver Training Center
CTC Combat Training Center
DOD Department of Defense
GAO Government Accountability Office
JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NTC National Training Center
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
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copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

January 28, 2005

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that it is increasingly likely
that an adversary will use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (NBC)
against U.S. forces as a means of offsetting superior conventional warfare
capabilities, for gaining an asymmetrical advantage, or as an act of
terrorism. Consequently, DOD policies require U.S. forces to be provided
with NBC protective equipment and to be sufficiently trained not only to
survive an NBC attack but also to continue to perform their missions in a
contaminated environment. Given long-standing concerns about the
preparedness of DOD's servicemembers in this critical area, you requested
that we undertake a body of work covering DOD's management of its NBC
protective equipment and training. This report is one of a series on this
subject that we have issued at your request.

For this review, you asked that we examine the contribution of the Army's
and Marine Corps' combat training centers (CTCs) in preparing
servicemembers for surviving and accomplishing their missions under NBC
conditions. For the Army, these centers include the National Training
Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Combat
Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). The Marine Corps' combat training center
is located at Twentynine Palms, California. These two military services
introduce NBC training to their servicemembers in basic training and
continue with formal and on-the-job training at NBC schools and home
stations and during collective training field exercises, such as those
offered at the CTCs. The CTCs are large ground-combat training sites where
units can train collectively in a realistic battlefield environment,
including live fire.1 The centers represent an opportunity for units to
train on their mission-essential tasks and to discover-through

1 At the NTC, brigades conduct live-fire offense and defense missions. At
the JRTC and CMTC, live-fire training is focused at the company level.

training lessons learned provided by expert observers/controllers-areas
requiring additional training at their home stations or elsewhere that
could improve their ability to perform on an actual battlefield.
Specifically, you asked that we answer the following questions: (1) To
what extent do Army and Marine Corps units and their personnel attending
CTCs participate in NBC training, and to what extent do these units and
personnel perform NBC tasks to service standards while at the CTCs? (2) Do
the Army and the Marine Corps report NBC training at the CTCs in a
standardized format that allows the services to identify trends and
lessons learned and to do cross-unit and cross-center comparisons?

To obtain information on NBC training that occurred at the Army's and
Marine Corps' CTCs during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, we interviewed
officials and analyzed relevant documents at each of the centers and other
Army and Marine Corps organizations related to NBC and CTC training. We
determined that the data and documents we reviewed were sufficiently
reliable for answering the above questions. We performed our review from
March 2003 through October 2004 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. A more thorough description of our scope
and methodology is included in appendix I.

The Army's and the Marine Corps' CTCs provide a unique opportunity for
brigade-sized units to perform advanced training under a variety of
conditions that are designed to approximate actual combat as closely as
possible, thereby enabling units to assess and build upon skills learned
at home station. Despite the unique opportunities offered by these
centers, the amount of NBC training that Army and Marine Corps personnel
and units experienced at the centers varied widely during fiscal years
2002 and 2003. When units did undergo NBC training at the centers, they
often did not perform to the level of proficiency defined by the services
as acceptable. Furthermore, neither service has identified the minimum NBC
tasks for units attending CTCs. Neither do the services always report
their lessons learned on NBC training in a useful manner.

Although DOD, the Army, and the Marine Corps have all stressed the
importance of including NBC defense as a condition under which units must
perform their missions in training exercises, they have not established
minimum NBC-related tasks for units attending the centers. Commanders are
given discretion to prioritize training needs, and sometimes they reduce
NBC training to allow time for units to focus on other priority areas. As
a result, the extent of NBC training actually conducted at Army and Marine
Corps CTCs varies widely, and some units

  Results in Brief

receive little or none at all. For example, officials at two Army CTCs
estimated that during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, on average, a typical
brigade-sized unit-which may include up to 4,000 soldiers-experienced NBC
events that required only about 5 percent of these troops to train in the
full NBC protective clothing for a total of 18 hours or more. For the
Marine Corps, no NBC training was conducted during combined arms exercises
at the Marine Corps' training center for at least 5 years prior to January
2004. The Marine Corps began to introduce NBC training into its combined
arms exercises in two training rotations that occurred in January and
February 2004, but this training was then suspended because of other
training priorities related to preparing units for ongoing operations. In
the absence of minimum NBC tasks, the services often miss the opportunity
to use the unique environment of the CTCs to improve the proficiency of
units in NBC defense.

When Army units did undergo NBC training, observers/controllers at the
CTCs noted that many units did not perform basic NBC tasks to Army
standards. For example, during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, most brigades
attending one center did not meet standards for basic NBC tasks, such as
donning protective gear, seeking overhead shelter, and conducting
unmasking procedures. Observers/controllers at the Army's CTCs often cited
inadequate home-station training as the reason that units did not perform
basic NBC tasks to these standards. Skills in these basic tasks are
normally maintained during training at home stations and lay the
foundation for acquiring the more complex skills associated with largeunit
NBC training. When units arrive at these CTCs with inadequate basic NBC
skills, they may not be able to take full advantage of the unique and more
complex large-unit NBC training opportunities available at these CTCs.

Army and Marine Corps policies and doctrine stress the importance of
capturing lessons learned during training, which enable units to tailor
training at home stations and elsewhere to reduce the likelihood that the
same problems will occur during operations. However, the services do not
always report lessons learned on NBC training at the CTCs in a way that
can be used to identify trends over time and allow for cross-unit and
cross-CTC comparisons. Because the services' policies do not require
standardized reporting formats to capture NBC training that occurs at the
CTCs, the training centers submit different types of after-action reports
and lessons learned that might or might not mention NBC training. For
example, while Army CTC observers/controllers produce extensive written
and recorded video material that is intended to help commanders identify
needs for subsequent training to address their units' training

needs, including training in NBC tasks, there is little consistency in the
Army's after-action reports in the structure, format, and content when NBC
training is described. The Marine Corps' after-action reporting system for
exercises at Twentynine Palms does not include any discussion of NBC
training because NBC training has been included only twice in combined
arms exercises during the last 5 years and because Marine Corps orders do
not require the discussion of NBC training even when it does occur. NBC
lessons learned during training rotations at the CTCs would be very useful
for the services in their attempts to anticipate, train for, and minimize
the occurrence of NBC problems during operations. Consequently, the lack
of standardized reporting to capture NBC training lessons learned at CTCs
represents opportunities lost to Army and Marine Corps units to benefit
from other units' training experiences and to better identify needs for
subsequent home-station and other NBC training to prepare units for
missions.

We are making recommendations to establish minimum NBC training tasks for
units attending training exercises at the CTCs and to standardize
reporting formats to capture NBC training that occurs at the CTCs. Our
recommendations are intended to help ensure that the NBC training
opportunities offered to Army and Marine Corps units attending their
combat training centers are maximized and that NBC lessons learned at
these centers are uniformly recorded and archived. DOD agreed with the
report's findings and recommendations and established programs to fully
implement the recommendations when operating conditions permit.

Background

The Army has three large combat training centers that train brigade-sized
units during exercises, referred to as "rotations," that last for 13 to 25
days: the National Training Center, located at Fort Irwin, California; the
Joint Readiness Training Center, located at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the
Combat Maneuver Training Center, located at Hohenfels, Germany.2 Figure 1
illustrates NBC training being conducted at the Army's Combat Maneuver
Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany. The Marine Corps has an Air Ground
Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California, where it trains
brigade-sized units in a combined arms exercise that similarly allows
Marine Corps units to train to perform their missions in large maneuver
areas and to fire their ground and air weapons.

2 The Army has a fourth primary CTC, called the Battle Command Training
Program, located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This report will concentrate
on the NTC, the JRTC, and the CMTC because the training at these
"maneuver" combat training centers consists principally of live training.
The Battle Command Training Program, which is called the "traveling CTC,"
conducts computer-assisted Command Post Exercises.

Figure 1: Soldiers at CMTC Undergoing NBC Training

Source: GAO.

Both the Army and the Marine Corps believe that it is important to leave
to commanders' discretion, on the basis of the approved wartime
missionessential task list, the decisions on what particular missions
require most of their units' time while at the CTCs and the extent to
which units need to train to perform their missions under NBC conditions.
At the same time, the Army and the Marine Corps also believe that the CTCs
provide a unique opportunity for units to conduct realistic training that
approximates actual combat and that complements units' home-station
training. This opportunity includes, among many other things, the
possibility for units to train to perform their mission-essential tasks
under NBC defense conditions, with the benefit of real-time feedback from

observers/controllers who are NBC training experts. In its regulation on
the CTC program, the Army states that the CTCs provide the "capstone
collective live training event in the combined arms training strategies."
The regulation stresses the importance of home-station training in
preparing units for their CTC rotations: "Homestation training," the
regulation states, "should prepare units to gain the maximum benefit from
their CTC experience."3 The Army's CTC plan states that

"A CTC experience is the closest thing to combat the Army's soldiers,
leaders, staffs and

units ever experience. It is a battlefield where soldiers can die, come
back to life, correct

their mistakes, and fight again. . . . the Army must look at harnessing
the role of the CTCs in

developing doctrine and collecting data so it can maximize their potential
and draw the right conclusions from lessons learned in a training
environment."4

During fiscal years 2002 and 2003, 57 active and reserve component
rotations took place at the three Army CTCs. Rotation costs are
significant: In 1999 we reported that the Army spent about $1 billion a
year to provide training at the NTC, the JRTC, and the CMTC.5 These
centers are equipped with instrumentation and simulators that allow the
units to have their battle effectiveness measured, recorded, and commented
on by observers/controllers, who are Army subject-matter experts for NBC
defense and other mission areas. During fiscal years 2002 and 2003,
approximately 12 active and reserve battalion-sized Marine units underwent
combined arms exercises at Twentynine Palms.

DOD, the Army, and the Marine Corps have all stressed the importance of
fully integrating NBC scenarios into their training exercises, whether
conducted at a unit's home station, at a CTC, or elsewhere. The U.S.
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction acknowledges that
NBC weapons in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent
one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States.6 At the
DOD level, Joint Publication 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments, states that "US

3 U.S. Army, "Combat Training Center Program," Army Regulation 350-50
(Jan. 24, 2003).

4 Department of the Army, Combat Training Center Master Plan (Aug. 30,
2003), p. 1-5.

5 See GAO, Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits from Army's Combat
Training Centers Are Not Being Realized, GAO/NSIAD-99-210 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 17, 1999). In fiscal year 2004 dollars, this amount would be
$1.1 billion.

6 NSPD-17/HSPD-4 [unclassified version], National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Dec. 2002), p. 1.

forces must be prepared to conduct and sustain operations in NBC
environments with minimal degradation" and urges that individuals and
organizations train often and realistically while wearing NBC protective
clothing so that they are better prepared for the constraints it imposes
on

                                       7

communication, vision, and movement.

Army and Marine Corps regulations, orders, and doctrine similarly stress
the importance of fully integrating NBC scenarios into training exercises.
For example, Army Regulation 350-1, "Army Training and Education," which
establishes Army-wide baseline NBC defense training policy, requires that
NBC defense tasks, such as contamination avoidance, protection, and
decontamination, be fully integrated into units' mission training,
including field training exercises. Specifically, Army Regulation 350-1
states that "The NBC defense training must be fully integrated into unit
exercises . . . for both offensive and defensive operations."8 This
integration is intended to develop and test the capability of commanders,
staffs, and units to perform their missions under extended NBC conditions.
In other words, NBC skills are not seen as isolated tasks, but NBC defense
is viewed as a condition under which units should be able to do their
mission-essential tasks. Similarly, Marine Corps Order 3400.3F, paragraph
6, establishes Marine Corps-wide baseline NBC defense training
requirements and states that "Every unit and commander will fully
integrate NBCD [NBC defense] training into every combat, combat support,
combat service support, and command and control exercise during offensive
and defensive operations, to include live fire evolutions." 9 Like the
Army, the Marine Corps intends to integrate NBC training into its
exercises in order to develop and test the ability of Marines at all
levels not only to survive an NBC attack but to perform their missions
under NBC conditions.

Army and Marine Corps regulations and orders also require after-action
reporting for unit training exercises, including those that occur at the
CTCs. The Army believes that it is important to capture lessons learned

7 DOD, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
(NBC) Environments, Joint Publication 3-11 (July 11, 2000), pp. III-6 and
III-7.

8U.S. Army, "Army Training and Education," Army Regulation 350-1 (Apr. 9,
2003), paragraph 4-11.

9U.S. Marine Corps, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense (NBCD)
Training," Marine Corps Order 3400.3F (Mar. 1, 2004). See also U.S. Marine
Corps, "Marine Corps Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) Program," Marine Corps
Order 3500.11E (Nov. 21, 2001).

  NBC Training at Army and Marine Corps CTCs Varies, and Units Often Do Not
  Perform to Acceptable Proficiency Standards

during training in order to identify combat-relevant lessons learned that
will enhance the Army's ability to perform its missions and that will
support tailored training for anticipated conditions of combat. Army
regulations for the JRTC and the CMTC state that NBC defense training
should be addressed in every training unit commander's after-action
report, but guidance for the NTC and the overall Army lessons learned
program does not. Like Army regulations, Marine Corps orders state that
after-action reports should be prepared for all training exercises and
maintained in a central lessons learned facility. The Marine Corps uses
training lessons learned to identify unit strengths and weaknesses that
must be addressed for the overall benefit of the Marine Corps.10

Although the Army and the Marine Corps stress in their doctrine,
regulations, or orders the need to fully integrate NBC training into
training exercises and both have defined what they consider to be
essential NBC skills, neither has established minimum NBC tasks for units
to perform while they are training at the CTCs. They believe that it is
important to leave decisions on the amount and type of training that occur
at the CTCs to commanders. Consequently, during fiscal years 2002 and
2003, Army and Marine Corps units and personnel attending the CTCs
received widely varying amounts of NBC training, with some receiving
little or none. Furthermore, Army units that do undergo NBC training at
the CTCs often do not perform to the proficiency levels defined by the
Army as acceptable. Based on commanders' discretion, both services' CTC
exercises currently are oriented toward preparing units for operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan and do not emphasize NBC defense training. Because of
this variation in NBC training at the CTCs, the Army and the Marine Corps
often miss the unique opportunity offered by the CTCs to be assured
through objective observer/controller assessments that every servicemember
who trains at a CTC has training in a minimum number of

10Army regulations and Marine Corps orders containing provisions on
preparing lessons learned at the CTCs include U.S. Army, "Army Lessons
Learned Program: System Development and Application," Army Regulation
11-33 (Oct. 10, 1989); U.S. Army, "Training at the National Training
Center," Forces Command Regulation 350-50-1 (July 1, 2002); U.S. Army,
"Training at the Joint Readiness Training Center," Forces Command
Regulation 35050-2 (June 15, 1998); U.S. Army, "Training: Combat Maneuver
Training Center," U.S. Army Europe Regulation 350-50 (Aug. 4, 1994); U.S.
Marine Corps, "Marine Corps Lessons Learned System," Marine Corps Order
5000.17A (Apr. 25, 1994); and U.S. Marine Corps, "Marine Corps Combined
Arms Exercise Program," Marine Corps Order 3500.11E (Nov. 21, 2001).

NBC tasks essential to survive and perform in an NBC-contaminated
environment.

    Army and Marine Corps Have Defined Essential NBC Skills but Do Not Specify
    That Minimum Tasks Must Be Trained at the CTCs

Both the Army and the Marine Corps have defined in various publications
what they believe are the essential NBC skills that all soldiers and
Marines should have. Also, as described in the background section of this
report, both services stress in their doctrine, regulations, or orders the
need to fully integrate NBC defense training into their exercises.

The Army has defined what it considers are the NBC skills essential for
soldiers to know in its Army Universal Task List.11 Army commanders select
training tasks, including NBC training tasks, from this and other task
lists. For each task, the Army provides an extended definition, along with
suggested ways to measure a soldier's proficiency in doing the task. For
example, for the task of using individual and collective NBC protective
equipment, one measure a commander may select to evaluate a soldier's
competence includes the time it takes a soldier to don chemical protective
gear in response to enemy use of NBC weapons. In addition, the Army
requires that units conduct weapons qualifications on individual and
crewserved weapons with personnel wearing chemical protective equipment.12
Neither the task list nor the regulation specifies where such training is
to be conducted.

U.S. Forces Command, which oversees the training and readiness of
U.S.based Army operational forces, has issued a list of predeployment NBC
tasks, but it also does not specify where training for these tasks must
take place. Forces Command directs that soldiers spend approximately 8
hours per quarter under NBC defense conditions. These tasks are all in the
Army's most basic NBC skill level category and include wearing and
maintaining chemical protective equipment and identifying chemical agents.

Like the Army, the Marine Corps has defined what it considers to be NBC
tasks essential for Marines to know, both to survive an NBC attack and to
continue performing the unit's mission. In Marine Corps Order 3400.3F,
"Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense (NBCD) Training," the Marine
Corps lists essential individual survival standards, such as maintaining
and

11 U.S. Army, The Army Universal Task List, Field Manual 7-15, Section 5.3
(Oct. 4, 2002).

12 Army Regulation 350-1, paragraph 4-11(c)5.

wearing protective chemical equipment, detecting chemical agents, and
decontaminating one's skin and equipment. It also lists essential "basic
operating standards," such as using crew and personal weapons while
wearing NBC protective gear, maintaining NBC equipment, avoiding
contamination while continuing the mission, and decontaminating units if
necessary.13 The order does not state that any of these tasks must be
included in exercises such as the combined arms exercise at Twentynine
Palms.

Appendix II provides a listing of Army and Marine Corps definitions of
essential NBC skills.

    NBC Training at Army CTCs Varies Widely

Many Army Subunits Receive Little NBC Training at the CTCs

NBC training at the Army's CTCs varies widely, and many Army subunits
receive little NBC training at the CTCs. For example, in fiscal years 2002
and 2003, observers/controllers from the NTC and the JRTC estimated that
only about 5 percent of soldiers underwent NBC training during a brigade
rotation that required them to wear their full protective gear for at
least 18 hours.14 This is because Army regulations do not mandate that NBC
training must occur at the CTCs, leaving commanders to decide what skills
training to include in the unit's CTC rotation. For the NBC training that
did occur at the CTCs, observers/controllers frequently reported that the
units did not perform even basic NBC tasks to the level of proficiency
defined as acceptable by the Army.

During our review of Army CTC training that occurred during fiscal years
2002 and 2003, we found that, while most units were exposed to some NBC
training at the CTCs, the overall percentage of Army battalion-or
brigade-sized units that received extensive NBC training during a rotation
was small. One measure of intensive unit training under NBC defense
conditions is the extent to which soldiers are required to dress and
operate for extended periods of time in their individual protective
clothing, including their masks and gloves. NTC training officials
estimated that, on average since fiscal year 2002, a typical 20-to 25-day
brigade rotation-which may include up to 4,000 soldiers-includes NBC
events that cause the entire unit to don the full chemical protective suit
for a total of 2 to 3 hours and about 150 to 200 soldiers to train in full

13 Marine Corps Order 3400.3F, enclosure 1.

14 The rotation period is 24 hours per day times about 25 days, for a
total of about 600 hours.

Army Unit Commanders Determine Units' Training at the CTCs

protective gear for a total of 18 to 24 hours. In other words, only about
5 percent of the brigade is affected by NBC training that requires wearing
full protective gear for more than 2 to 3 hours. Similarly, an Army JRTC
training official reported that during a typical brigade rotation, an
average of only 200 soldiers operate in full protective gear for a total
of 16 to 20 hours. The number of personnel who receive this training at
the JRTC ranges from as few as 50 soldiers up to 400 or more, depending on
the type of contamination and the location of the attack, and the time
that a soldier spends in protective gear can range from as little as 1
hour to as much as 48 hours.15

Because Army regulations do not state what NBC training must occur at the
CTCs, the commander of the unit to be trained may choose not to emphasize
it during the unit's CTC rotation. Typically, up to 180 days before the
rotation is to start, the brigade commander, in coordination with the
division or other senior commander, begins to coordinate with the CTC to
specify what training objectives will be included in the unit's training
rotation. A unit rotation traditionally emphasizes the warfighting skills
a unit requires to perform its mission and combat operations. Because
training to survive and operate under potential NBC conditions is
generally treated as a condition of training for all mission-essential
tasks for units, rather than as a separate mission task, the CTCs, which
develop the training scenarios, generally propose some types of NBC
conditions in all rotations. However, unit commanders may specify that a
CTC include more or fewer NBC conditions in training scenarios.

During fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the Army's CTCs generally included
three to seven chemical events in each standard rotation's training
scenarios. A particular chemical attack by an "enemy" is generally
targeted at a specific area of the simulated battlefield and thus involves
those units that may be affected by a chemical attack in that area.
Chemical events

15 In 2001 an Army-directed study conducted by the RAND Corporation found
that a brigade's subunits did not always experience intensive NBC training
while at the NTC in fiscal years 1999 to 2001. This study showed that, on
average, units faced an NBC event on only about half of their training
missions; almost 40 percent of the units never encountered NBC conditions
during their entire rotation; and one-third of the battalions never
conducted decontamination. The RAND study also showed that NBC events at
the NTC varied widely in their scope and intensity, ranging from something
as simple as avoiding a contaminated area to a full-scale attack with a
persistent chemical agent that required a unit to decontaminate its
equipment. (See the RAND Corporation article, "NBC at the NTC: Distraction
or Necessity?" [2001]. This article is a summary of a longer RAND report
that the Army has not yet released.)

Units Often Did Not Perform NBC Tasks to Army Standards

during fiscal years 2002 and 2003 included the simulated use of chemicals
that were categorized as "persistent" (defined as lasting for 24 hours or
more) and "nonpersistent" (defined as lasting for 24 hours or less) and
that were delivered by "enemy" artillery, rockets, aircraft bombs, truck
bombs, rucksack bombs, and spray. At the NTC and the CMTC,
observers/controllers use CS (tear) gas to simulate chemical agents.
Flares, ground-burst simulators, air-burst simulators, or spray tanks
mounted on helicopters may also be used to simulate enemy chemical
weapons. At the JRTC and the NTC, observers/controllers also frequently
simulate a biological event by such means as simulating that the "enemy"
has sabotaged the water supply by poisoning it with a biological
contaminant.

The CTCs have increasingly emphasized training rotations specifically
tailored to preparing units for expected deployments. These rotations
might or might not include chemical or biological events. Many of the
units completing the tailored rotations at the Army's CTCs in fiscal years
2002 and 2003 later deployed for combat operations in Afghanistan or Iraq.
NBC defense training at CTCs has been emphasized less for units training
for Bosnia and Kosovo or for Afghanistan and Iraq after NBC weapons were
not found there. Because the NBC defensive training for each soldier
varies so widely at the CTCs, the Army continues to have no assurance that
all servicemembers attending a CTC have trained on a minimum number of
essential NBC tasks.

Our review of after-action reports from the three Army CTCs for fiscal
years 2002 and 2003 indicated that units frequently arrived at the CTCs at
the beginning of their training periods without having mastered basic NBC
skills. Observers/controllers frequently comment on units' NBC skills when
they first arrive at training at the NTC to assess the units' needed level
of NBC training and note that, often, units do not perform even basic NBC
tasks to the level of proficiency that the Army defines as acceptable.
Observers/controllers at all three CTCs noted that because units had not
adequately prepared for basic NBC training at their home stations, they
were not able to fully train on the more sophisticated collective and
mission tasks under NBC conditions that could be practiced at the CTCs. Of
the three CTCs, the NTC had the most complete information on the NBC
skills of the units being trained during fiscal years 2002 and 2003.
Unlike the other CTCs, the NTC often uses a standard format to assess
incoming units on six basic NBC tasks while they are receiving their
equipment and assembling to begin training. For example, one of these
early NTC training scenarios subjects a brigade arriving at a deployment
destination to an attack by a chemical weapon. Table 1 summarizes the

assessments made by NTC observers/controllers of the NBC skills of
brigades that arrived for training during fiscal years 2002 and 2003. The
table lists the six NBC tasks assessed at the NTC and shows whether the
brigades did or did not perform the tasks to the level of proficiency
defined as acceptable by the Army. Most brigades failed to perform to
standard NBC tasks 3, 4, and 6, which are ranked at the most basic skill
level, called skill level 1.

Table 1: NTC's Assessment of Brigades' Performance of NBC Tasks during
Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003

NBC task Performance standard

1. Employ NBC warning and Army tasks, skill levels 3 and 4: The unit must
plot and

reporting system. disseminate appropriate NBC warnings. Higher-level
headquarters staff must execute effective command and control.

2. Employ chemical alarms and Each task force must have at least one M-8
chemical

detectors. agent detector paper/M-22 alarm operational and properly
positioned around the perimeter, personnel, vehicles, and equipment. M-9
chemical agent detector paper must be checked in each unit after the
chemical weapon attack.

3. Go to Mission-Oriented Protective Army common tasks, skill level 1: 100
percent of soldiers

Posture level 4 within 8 minutes. must don complete Mission-Oriented
Protective Posture level 4 in 8 minutes. All zippers, buttons, and ties
must be correctly fastened. Boots and gloves must be tucked into chemical
protective equipment. No simulated gear is authorized.

4. Seek overhead shelter. Army common tasks, skill level 1: 100 percent of
soldiers must seek the best available overhead cover when appropriate.

5. Perform NBC reconnaissance The NBC reconnaissance unit must reach the
objective,

mission. conduct appropriate NBC reconnaissance, maintain communication
with higher headquarters staff throughout the operations, and have a team
providing security.

6. Conduct unmasking procedures Army common tasks, skill level 1: Soldiers
must confirm using M256 kits. the presence or absence of an agent. At
least one M256

Number of Number of brigades that brigades that performed to did not
perform

standard to standard

0 5

1 9

2 7

0 10

4 1

2 5

                     kit should be assigned per task force.

                                  Source: NTC.

Notes: Each number in the table represents an entire brigade that was
assessed in its performance of the listed task during its NTC rotation.
The numbers do not total 10 because not all brigades were tested on all
tasks. An entire brigade is assessed as performing a task "to standard" or
"not to standard." In some cases, supplementary notes indicate what
percentage of the entire brigade succeeded in the task and what percentage
failed. Or supplementary notes might indicate which battalions in the
brigade failed a particular task. An entire brigade would be described as
not going to Mission-Oriented Protective Posture level 4 (or the highest
level of protection) within 8 minutes when some of its battalions failed
to do so. In some cases, a battalion failed to go to this level of
protection within 8 minutes because some personnel did not have complete
chemical protective suits. For other tasks, the unit of measure differs.
For example, for the task of employing chemical alarms and detectors,
supplementary notes generally state how many of the total chemical alarms
that were placed were operational. For the task of performing NBC
reconnaissance, the brigade is judged on the performance of its NBC
reconnaissance unit.

We were unable to compile summaries, such as the NTC summary in table 1,
of how well brigades did in basic NBC tasks at the JRTC and the CMTC
because these centers did not routinely assess and collect this
information. However, JRTC and CMTC after-action reports frequently noted
deficiencies in units' NBC training attributable to their incomplete
preparation at home stations. For example, for several rotations for
fiscal years 2002 and 2003, JRTC observers/controllers reported that
soldiers and leaders lacked training and knowledge of critical NBC tasks.
Observers/controllers recommended that units "Develop an NBC training plan
at home station that addresses the individual, leader, and collective
soldier skills necessary to sustain operations in an NBC environment." A
similar CMTC recommendation called for "more emphasis on NBC training and
integration at home station."

The observation that units do not get adequate NBC training at their home
stations is not new and has been repeatedly reported by DOD and the Army.
In 1998, for example, the DOD Office of the Inspector General reported
that unit commanders generally were not fully integrating chemical and
biological defense into their units' collective mission training
exercises. The report noted that "units rarely trained for their
missionessential tasks under [chemical/biological] conditions."16 In 2002,
the Army Audit Agency reported that it had evaluated training for chemical
and biological defense provided to soldiers at the unit level and found
that this training needed to be more effectively integrated and
supplemented.17 In DOD's 2002 report to Congress on its Chemical and
Biological Defense Program, the department stated that the Army's CTCs
continued to see

16 Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Unit Chemical
and Biological Defense Readiness Training, Report No. 98-174 (Arlington,
Va.: July 17, 1998).

17 U.S. Army Audit Agency, Unit-Level Training for Chemical and Biological
Defense, A-2002-0486-IME (Alexandria, Va.: July 10, 2002).

units at the company, battalion, and brigade levels that were unable to
perform all NBC tasks to standard.18 The report concluded that this
less-than-satisfactory performance at the CTCs was directly attributable
to a lack of home-station NBC training. The report stated the need for
increased emphasis in educating senior leaders on the necessity for NBC
training and expressed concern that NBC training consist not only of NBC
survival but also of continuous operations in an NBC environment.

We have also reported for more than a decade on problems with Army units'
inadequate home-station training. In 1991, we reported that Army
home-station training lacked realism and often did not include NBC
training.19 In 1996, we reported that officials from Army major commands,
corps, divisions, and individual units said that chemical and biological
defense skills not only tended to be difficult to attain and were highly
perishable but were also often given a lower priority because of, among
other things, too many other higher priority taskings.20 In 1999, we noted
that training units lacked proficiency when they arrived at the training
centers, and as a result, the content of the CTC training was frequently
modified to provide less challenging scenarios than would normally be
expected.21 We also reported that, although units should have been
proficient at battalion-level tasks when they arrived at the CTCs, many
had trained only up to company level, and the units' leaders struggled
with the more complicated planning and synchronization tasks required for
the battalion-and brigade-level exercises conducted at the centers.22

18 Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program, Annual
Report to Congress, Volume I (Apr. 2002) p. 120.

19 GAO, Army Training: Evaluations of Units' Proficiency Are Not Always
Reliable, GAO/NSIAD-91-72 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 1991).

20 GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to
Resolve Continuing Problems, GAO/NSIAD-96-103 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29,
1996).

21 GAO, Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits from Army's Combat
Training Centers Are Not Being Realized, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-92 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 26, 1999).

22 GAO, Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits from Army's Combat
Training Centers Are Not Being Realized, GAO/NSIAD-99-210 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 17, 1999).

    NBC Training Was Not Conducted at the Marine Corps' Combined Arms Exercises
    at Twentynine Palms

No NBC training was conducted during combined arms exercises at the Marine
Corps' training center at Twentynine Palms for at least 5 years prior to
our review.23 While Marine Corps orders and doctrine emphasize the need to
include NBC defense training in combined arms exercises, they do not
provide any clearly articulated NBC defense training tasks or requirements
that must be accomplished in conjunction with these exercises. In the
absence of specific training requirements, NBC defense training has
historically been left up to the discretionary control of the unit
commander, and Marine Corps commanders decided to remove it to make room
for other training. According to a Marine Corps training official, unit
commanders gave several reasons that NBC defense training at the combined
arms exercise was given a lower priority, including that it was difficult
to perform tasks in cumbersome and uncomfortable protective gear, chemical
training was time-consuming, and the likelihood of NBC warfare was
perceived as low.

In November 2001, the Naval Audit Service issued a report on infantry and
armor readiness in the Marine Corps.24 One of its findings was that the
Marine Corps was not fully integrating chemical and biological training
into its collective unit exercises in a consistent manner. The Naval Audit
Service attributed this condition to the fact that Marine Corps officers
did not consider chemical and biological training a high priority, even
though they considered it important. One of the Naval Audit Service's
recommendations was for the Marine Corps to "integrate [chemical and
biological defense] training into unit field exercises under realistic
conditions, and insure that [chemical and biological defense] training is
appropriately integrated into such major events as Combined Armed
Exercises . . . ." In a February 2004 memorandum to the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, the Commanding General of the Marine Corps Training and
Education Command stated that in response to the Naval Audit Service's
recommendation, NBC training and assessment had been added to the formal
schedule at the combined arms exercise program in January 2004. The
memorandum stated that "Due to world events, it continues to

23 Twentynine Palms normally conducts 10 combined arms exercise rotations
per fiscal year, lasting 22 days for active duty forces and 15 days for
reserve component forces. These exercises emphasize warfighting skills
required for a unit's mission-essential tasks. However, in recent years,
training at Twentynine Palms has emphasized preparation for "real-world"
missions, such as stability and support operations and combat and
counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

24 Naval Audit Service, Marine Corps Infantry/Armor Readiness Reporting,
N2002-0011 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2001).

be a challenge concerning the `full integration' of Nuclear, Biological,
Chemical Defense [NBCD] training into unit exercise programs."

In 2003, in response to the Naval Audit Service's recommendation, the
Marine Corps began its planning for introducing NBC training into the
combined arms exercises at Twentynine Palms. In that year, the Marine
Corps assigned two NBC staff specialists to Twentynine Palms to begin
devising a training plan for the combined arms exercise program. Also,
chemical protective equipment was obtained for use at Twentynine Palms by
rotating Marine Corps units. In January 2004, the Marine Corps introduced
NBC defense classroom courses and one field exercise into the combined
arms exercise program. Appendix III provides a listing of the classroom
NBC courses that were introduced in the first week of rotations in fiscal
year 2004 and were conducted at the platoon to company levels.

According to a Marine Corps official, eight combined arms exercise
rotations were conducted in fiscal year 2004. NBC training was introduced
into the third and fourth rotations in January and February, respectively.
Rotations five and six concentrated on stability and support operations
but did include NBC classroom training. Rotations seven and eight, for
reserve units, also received the NBC classroom training but no NBC field
exercises. Planned rotations 9 and 10 were canceled. The Marine Corps is
introducing a shortened, revised combined arms exercise scenario that is
more oriented to current operational requirements. Exercise revisions
include an emphasis on small-unit leadership and stability and support
operations, which encompass asymmetric and counterinsurgency operations. A
Marine Corps official told us that the current design of the revised
combined arms exercise scenario does not include NBC training. However, an
extensive home-station training period for units precedes attendance at
the revised combined arms exercise, and Marine Corps units are required to
accomplish NBC training required for their units' missionessential tasks.
According to the Marine Corps, when it resumes its standard combined arms
exercise rotations, units will participate in whatever NBC task training
the combined arms exercise scenarios include at that time.

NBC Lessons Learned For both the Army and the Marine Corps, lessons
learned during from Iraq and Afghanistan Operation Iraqi Freedom
identified many NBC skill deficiencies that were Reflect Problems
highlighted earlier by observers/controllers during individual brigade

rotations through the Army's CTCs during fiscal years 2002 and
2003.Identified at Training These continuing deficiencies illustrate the
importance of requiring ArmyCenters and Marine Corps units to establish
minimal NBC defense training tasks

for units training at their respective CTCs. Problems identified by both
the Marine Corps and the Army during this operation included

o  units arriving without appropriate NBC equipment and suits,

o  units arriving without necessary individual and collective NBC skills,

o  	units unable to properly set up and operate their NBC detection
equipment,

o  chemical personnel not included in battlefield decisions, and

o  units unable to properly decontaminate their equipment.

Many of these problems were also noted in the Army's lessons learned
reporting from earlier conflicts, including those in the Balkans, Somalia,
and Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Establishing minimal NBC tasks for
units attending CTCs could provide an opportunity for units' NBC defense
capabilities to be objectively assessed and for CTC observers/controllers
to identify units' NBC equipment shortfalls. This information may aid
commanders in decisions on units' training needs.

The Army and the Marine Corps do not always report lessons learned on NBC
training at the CTCs in a way that can be used to identify trends over
time and allow for cross-unit and cross-center comparisons. Army and
Marine Corps regulations and orders strongly encourage after-action
reporting for all training exercises, including those that occur at the
CTCs. However, Army and Marine Corps after-action reviews of CTC training
do not always discuss NBC training and, when they do, the reporting is not
standardized to allow for uniform reporting to fully support the
identification of NBC trends.

  Army and Marine Corps After-Action Reporting at the CTCs Does Not Fully
  Facilitate the Identification of NBC Training Trends

    Army and Marine Corps Regulations and Orders State That Lessons Learned
    Should Be Reported for CTC Training

Army and Marine Corps regulations and orders state that after-action
reports and lessons learned should be prepared to capture the results of
training that occurs at the CTCs, but they do not always state that NBC
training must be covered in these documents or encourage NBC training
results to be presented in a standardized format. As a result, different
types of after-action reports and lessons learned are prepared for CTC
training, and these documents might or might not mention NBC training.

The Army's regulation that establishes the purpose and objectives of its
CTC program states that as part of their mission to provide realistic
joint combined arms training, the CTCs will provide the Army and joint
participants with feedback to improve warfighting, to increase units'

readiness for deployment and warfighting, and to provide a data source for
lessons learned.25 This regulation also requires that each CTC conduct
doctrinally based after-action reviews for each unit that undergoes a
rotation at a CTC.26 The Army regulation on the Army's lessons learned
system requires that these after-action reports be submitted to the Center
for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) no later than 120 days from the end of an
exercise.27 Each of the Army's CTC regulations describes a general format
to be used in the after-action reports and lists specific topics to be
included. Though the CTC and lessons learned regulations agree on some
general points, they differ on what should be covered specifically in
afteraction reports. For example, the JRTC and CMTC regulations indicate
that NBC defense training should be addressed in the training unit
commander's after-action report, but the CTC, NTC, and overall Army
lessons learned program regulations do not. Appendix IV includes specific
details of how the various Army regulations differ in recommended formats
for after-action reports.

Like the Army regulations, the Marine Corps order on its lessons learned
system states that after-action reports should be prepared for all
training exercises.28 However, the Marine Corps order for the combined
arms exercise program at Twentynine Palms does not specify that written
afteraction reports must be prepared, only that a structured debrief be
conducted upon the conclusion of each event or exercise. Though not
required by Marine Corps order, Twentynine Palms does prepare a Microsoft
PowerPoint (computer software) presentation describing events that took
place during the final 3 days of the exercise.29 For the two rotations in
2004 in which NBC field training was included in the combined arms
exercise, NBC training was not included in after-action

25 Army Regulation 350-50, paragraph 1-5(b).

26 Individual CTC regulations also contemplate the preparation and
dissemination within command channels of extensive after-action reports.
(See Forces Command Regulation 350-50-1, Forces Command Regulation
350-50-2, and U.S. Army Europe Regulation 350-50.)

27 U.S. Army, "Army Programs: Army Lessons Learned Program: System
Development and Application," Army Regulation 11-33 (Oct. 10, 1989). The
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, as executive agent for the Army
Lessons Learned Program, is responsible for establishing a facility that
has the resources to "receive, process, archive, analyze, and disseminate
information from the combat training centers and major training." This
facility is the Center for Army Lessons Learned, located at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.

28 Marine Corps Order 5000.17A.

29 Marine Corps Order 3500.11E.

reporting because it did not occur during the 3 training days covered by
the reporting.

    Army's CTC Reports Might or Might Not Contain Information on NBC Training

All Army regulations do not require that NBC training completed at a CTC
be discussed in the written after-action reports that are prepared for
each training rotation at the three Army CTCs, and thus the reports do not
always include information on NBC training. These reports are primarily
intended to be feedback for the units being trained to help them assess
their own training levels and craft home-station training plans to address
identified deficiencies. The after-action reporting and supplementary
materials provided to the units that are trained, such as videos of
training, are called "take-home packages" and may include as many as five
or six compact discs containing Microsoft PowerPoint presentations and
summaries of observers/controllers. The structure, format, and content of
the after-action reporting vary by center.

The NTC typically includes Microsoft PowerPoint briefings and written
after-action reports for the units training during each rotation. When
subunits of a brigade experience NBC "events," or NBC training scenarios,
during their rotations, observers/controllers generally include a
description of the units' performance in an "NBC executive summary," which
cites areas in which subunits need to improve proficiency, along with
specific recommendations for home-station training and citations of
applicable NBC-related field manuals. When subunits do not experience NBC
events, this section is absent from after-action reporting for the overall
unit. Nowhere in the report does the NTC include an overall brigade
summary for the entire rotation period of 20 to 25 days that indicates the
number of NBC events that occurred during a single rotation, the
percentage of subunits that conducted NBC tasks, the type of tasks
performed, or how well all individual subunits did. The NTC does include,
in many cases, an assessment of a brigade's NBC skills in its first week
of training. Out of the 21 rotations conducted by the NTC during fiscal
years 2002 and 2003, take-home packages for 12 brigades contained such
scorecards, which assessed units' ability to perform six essential NBC
tasks when they first arrived for training.

Like a take-home package for the NTC, a take-home package prepared by the
JRTC contains multiple types of documents and after-action reporting. One
document lists the types of NBC events planned for the rotation and their
timing. When NBC events are not planned for the rotation, this document is
absent, and when planned NBC events are canceled, there is no
documentation stating that these scenario events did not occur or why.

Neither is there a document that contains an overall summary of how many
NBC events occurred during a single rotation, the percentage of subunits
performing NBC tasks and the type of tasks performed, or how well all
individual subunits did. Unlike the NTC, the JRTC includes no "scorecard"
for assessing units' ability to perform basic NBC tasks. When subunits do
experience NBC events, JRTC observers/controllers cite areas in which
subunits need to "sustain" or "improve" proficiency, along with specific
recommendations for home-station training and citations of applicable NBC
field manuals.

A CMTC take-home package also contains multiple Microsoft PowerPoint
briefings, written after-action reporting, and videotapes. However, a
package might or might not mention NBC training that occurred during a
rotation, as this is not a mandatory reporting section. When a subunit
experiences an NBC event, an observer/controller may mention how the unit
performed if the subunit's performance was considered to be notable. When
NBC events are discussed in an after-action report, CMTC, like NTC and
JRTC, includes general observations of a unit's performance, comments on
what it did well, and recommendations for improvement. Because there is no
overall NBC summary document, however, CMTC's take-home packages seldom
provide information on how many NBC events occurred during a rotation,
what these events were, what percentage of the overall rotating unit
participated, and how well they did on particular NBC tasks. Because no
NBC section is required, it is not possible to calculate what percentage
of CMTC rotations experience NBC events.

Twice a year, CALL publishes "trends" documents for each Army CTC. These
publications cover all rotations that occurred during a 6-month period and
expunge any information from the reporting that would identify a
particular unit. The trends documents are compiled from afteraction
reports prepared for CTC training. They are prepared by
observers/controllers and given to CALL representatives at each CTC, who
then forward these reports to CALL analysts at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
When NBC training is determined to reveal a "trend" to report, it is
included in the trends publications. Individual take-home packages and
after-action reports that identify particular units are not generally made
available. Rather, they are protected to prevent them from becoming public
"report cards." CALL is now limited in its ability to identify NBC trends
in its trends reports because NBC training completed at CTCs is not now
uniformly reported in a standardized format that can reliably provide
comparable data to support the identification of NBC trends.

The Army has a large portion of CTC after-action reports located in a
database at CALL. However, because each CTC sends different or no
information on NBC training, CALL does not have information available that
would make it possible to do cross-unit or cross-center comparisons. CALL
also stores compact discs and videotapes, some of which are entered into
the electronic database. The CALL representative at each CTC maintains
some portions of the take-home packages on site. However, at least in part
because the take-home packages are considered the property of the units
being trained, they are not made widely available. Also, many of the
Army's after-action reports for NBC training at the CTCs for fiscal years
2002 to 2003 were not received, not locatable, or never loaded into the
database located at CALL for archiving and subsequent research. We found
during our visit to CALL that its researchers were very skilled in
performing database analysis, but they were limited by incomplete and
nonstandard reporting for NBC training data.

    Marine Corps' Written After-Action Reports Do Not Include NBC Training
    Information

The Marine Corps' written after-action reporting system does not address
NBC training conducted in the combined arms exercise primarily because NBC
training has not been included in that training. At Twentynine Palms, a
final written exercise report containing lessons learned is prepared by
the Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command for the last 3 days of
the combined arms exercise. However, the command does not prepare written
after-action reports for the other major segments of the exercise.
After-action feedback is primarily given orally throughout the exercise
period. This oral feedback is based on observations by
observers/controllers assigned to each unit being trained. In the combined
arms exercises that included NBC training in 2004, the written final
exercise reports did not include any lessons learned on NBC operations
because this training did not occur during the final 3 days. At that time,
NBC exercise scenarios had not been fully integrated into the combined
arms exercises.

The Marine Corps has no formal evaluation requirements for the combined
arms exercise. The applicable Marine Corps order states that "A structured
debrief will be conducted upon conclusion of each event or exercise." A
Microsoft PowerPoint briefing on the final 3 days of the exercise does
identify training objectives that the participant forces used to guide
them through their training exercises, and in a sample briefing we
reviewed, we found an assessment of the unit's performance for each
training objective. However, NBC operations were not identified as a
training objective, and the briefing included no lessons learned or
recommendations for NBC defense training. NBC content is being added to
the standard combined

arms exercise scenario. However, the standard combined arms exercises have
recently been replaced by revised combined arms exercises oriented toward
current operations, and the revised combined arms exercise scenarios for
Twentynine Palms contain no NBC defense training.

In addition, the Marine Corps has not been archiving at any central
location its reporting on any unit training-NBC or otherwise-completed at
Twentynine Palms or submitting related training issues to its lessons
learned system. Therefore, no after-action reports on the combined arms
exercises that occur at Twentynine Palms are being placed into the Marine
Corps Lessons Learned System's database. The Marine Corps recently
determined that its overall lessons learned system was not functioning
well. In December 2003, a working group that studied the Marine Corps
Lessons Learned System found that problems with reporting and maintaining
lessons learned were Marine Corps-wide. A Marine Corps information paper
reported that throughout the Marine Corps, only eight reports had been
submitted to the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System in 2002. The
information paper also stated that the Marine Corps plans to implement an
improved Web-based lessons learned system in the future. It also plans to
establish a permanent organization to collect, review, and maintain this
improved lessons learned system. Separately, an Enduring Freedom Combat
Assessment Team was formed in 2001 to collect lessons learned in
Afghanistan. In 2003, the team was restructured to support Operation Iraqi
Freedom.

The CTCs represent a rare opportunity for Army and Marine Corps units to
perform advanced training under conditions that are designed to
approximate actual combat as closely as possible, thereby enabling units
to assess and build upon skills learned at home stations. The services
stress the importance of including NBC defense training in their
exercises. Yet only a small percentage of the servicemembers passing
through the CTCs encounter NBC defense training tasks because an Army or
Marine Corps regulation or order requiring it is lacking. We recognize
that commanders' discretion in determining unit training plans for CTC
rotations is, and should continue to be, a central part of Army and Marine
Corps training doctrine. However, until units are required to perform at
least minimum NBC tasks while attending the CTCs, the services will
continue to risk missing a unique opportunity to (1) uniformly assess
these units' proficiency while they are operating in a field environment
and (2) leverage the benefits of an objective assessment by an expert
staff of units' NBC skills.

  Conclusions

NBC lessons learned during training rotations at the combat training
centers would be very useful for the services in their attempts to
anticipate and train for NBC problems that may occur later during
operations. Service regulations or orders specify that (1) all units at
CTCs should conduct doctrinally based after-action reviews of events
supported by observers/controllers, (2) lessons learned should be entered
into an archived database, and (3) training unit commanders' after-action
reports should be analyzed for trends and lessons learned. However,
service regulations or orders do not now state that NBC training at the
CTCs must be captured in a standardized format. In the absence of such a
requirement, the Army's archived NBC data on training at the CTCs will
remain incomplete or noncomparable and thus will not fully support
research and reporting on NBC trends and lessons learned. The Marine Corps
also does not employ a standard method of reporting NBC training at
Twentynine Palms or providing the Marine Corps' trend and lessons learned
reporting systems with NBC training information. Until the Marine Corps
standardizes the reporting formats to capture service-defined NBC training
at Twentynine Palms, it will be unable to analyze, over time, the units'
NBC skills at these exercises, the effectiveness of NBC training at
Twentynine Palms, or NBC trends and lessons learned. Overall, improvements
to collecting, archiving, and using NBC training data could help the
services capitalize on their substantial investment in maintaining CTCs
and in sending units to train there, as well as to monitor the quality of
NBC training and units' NBC skill levels.

To ensure that the NBC training opportunities offered to Army and Marine
Corps units from training at their combat training centers are maximized
and that NBC lessons learned at these centers are uniformly recorded and
archived, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary
of the Army to take the following two actions:

o  	Establish the minimum NBC tasks for units attending training exercises
at CTCs.

o  	Standardize reporting formats to capture NBC training that occurs at
the CTCs.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
the Navy to direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to take the
following two actions:

  Recommendations for Executive Action

  Agency Comments
  and Our Evaluation

o  	Establish the minimum NBC tasks for units attending the combined arms
exercise at Twentynine Palms.

o  	Standardize reporting formats to capture NBC training that occurs
during a combined arms exercise at Twentynine Palms.

In written comments, DOD stated that it agreed with the findings and
recommendations of the report and that the Army and Marine Corps have
established programs to implement the recommendations. Army and Marine
Corps officials indicated that they are currently taking those actions
necessary to develop the NBC content to be included in future CTC
rotations and modify their after-action reporting systems and regulations
to ensure that NBC training completed at CTCs is appropriately reported.
However, because of current operational requirements, full implementation
of NBC training at CTCs will be delayed. DOD's comments are printed in
their entirety in appendix V.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army,
and the Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office
of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-9619 or e-mail me at [email protected]. Additional contact
and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix VI.

Sincerely yours,

Sharon L. Pickup Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which Army and Marine Corps units participate
in nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) training at the combat training
centers (CTC) and the extent to which these units and personnel perform
NBC tasks at the centers to service standards, we interviewed appropriate
officials and reviewed pertinent documents and after-action reports at the
following locations:

o  	Office of the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3,
Washington, D.C.;

o  	Center for Army Lessons Learned, Battle Command Training Program,
Combined Arms Center-Training, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas;

o  	U.S. Army Chemical School, Maneuver Support Center, and the Army
Maneuver Support Center Academic Library, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri;

o  	Training Division, Headquarters, U.S. Forces Command, Fort McPherson,
Georgia;

o  	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training,
Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia;

o  Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California;

o  Army Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana;

o  Army Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany;

o  Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; and

o  Marine Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California.

To compile a collection of planning documents and after-action reports for
the Army CTC rotations that occurred during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, we
visited and obtained documents from various locations. The largest
collection of planning documents and after-action reports was located at
the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), though we also obtained some
documents from other locations, including the CTCs. We were able to obtain
at least some parts of after-action reporting for 41 of the 57 rotations
that occurred at the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness
Training Center (JRTC), and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in
fiscal years 2002 and 2003. The following organizations provided us with
the planning documents and after-action reports for units attending the
CTCs:

o  Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas;

o  National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California;

o  Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana; and

o  Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent of NBC training completed at the Army CTCs during
fiscal years 2002 and 2003, we analyzed all available planning and
after-action reports. As mentioned in our report, we found that NBC
training that occurred was not always discussed in after-action reports;
that subunits of an entire brigade experienced chemical or biological
events that did not affect the overall brigade; and that
observers/controllers frequently noted deficiencies in units' basic NBC
skills, often attributing them to inadequate home-station training.
Because the CTCs' formatting of NBC reporting differed and none contained
an overall summary document of all the NBC training that occurred during a
single rotation, we were not able to definitively determine whether we had
been able to collect all pertinent documents, though we did examine all of
the reporting that the CTCs and CALL said was available.

The Marine Corps provided us with only two after-action reports for
combined arms exercises at Twentynine Palms. It told us that there was no
central repository for these after-action reports and that only two
reports were located. However, because NBC training had not been
introduced to the combined arms exercise until January 2004 and was
suspended thereafter, we were able to determine that no after-action
reports on NBC training would have been submitted. The one after-action
report that the Marine Corps provided us with, for the January 2004
combined arms rotation, did not mention NBC training because this training
did not occur during the last 3 days of the exercise-the only time period
captured in the after-action report.

To determine whether the Army and the Marine Corps report NBC training at
the CTCs in a standardized format that allows the services to identify
trends and lessons learned and to do cross-unit and cross-center
comparisons, we collected all available after-action reports from the
above-listed locations. These reports were all part of the after-action
reporting contained in "take-home packages"-that is, the materials
prepared for the units to take with them to document training completed
and to aid in units' development of home-station training plans. Because
these reports contained particular names of units and comments on unit
performance, they are not made generally available, which required us to
obtain these reports from lessons learned repositories and the CTCs. We
also compared these reports with general trends documents prepared by the
Army and the Marine Corps, which expunge units' identification and
summarize the results of groups of rotations, and learned that not all NBC
training at CTCs was reported because of the lack of standardized
reporting formats.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

We conducted our review from March 2003 through October 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: NBC Tasks Defined As Essential by the Army and the Marine Corps

  Army Universal Task List

NBC Tasks Required by Army Forces Command

Both the Army and the Marine Corps have defined in various publications
what they believe are the essential nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) skills that all soldiers and Marines should have. In no case,
however, do service regulations or orders prescribe where the training
must take place. Specifically, applicable documents do not state that any
particular NBC tasks must be included in training that units receive while
they are at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs), but they do state that NBC
training should be incorporated into all types of exercises. The services'
guidance and policy have left it to the discretion of commanders to
determine where their units should train in the required NBC skills. The
following is a listing of Army and Marine Corps definitions of essential
NBC skills.

In Field Manual 7-15, The Army Universal Task List, the Army provides a
common, doctrinal foundation and catalog of the Army's tactical missions,
operations, and collective tasks. A commander can use this list as a menu
in developing the unit's mission-essential task list. The NBC tasks cited
in the Army's Universal Task List are

o  	take measures to avoid or minimize the effects of NBC attacks and
reduce the effects of NBC hazards,

o  identify NBC hazards,

o  warn personnel/units of contaminated areas,

o  report NBC hazards throughout the area of operations,

o  use individual/collective NBC protective equipment,

o  perform immediate decontamination,

o  perform operational decontamination,

o  perform thorough decontamination,

o  perform area decontamination, and

o  perform patient decontamination.

The tasks listed by U.S. Army Forces Command,1 which are all skill level-1
NBC survival-oriented tasks, are

o  	protect yourself from chemical and biological injury/contamination
using your M40-series protective mask with hood,

o  replace the canister on your M40-series protective mask,

1 The Forces Command list of NBC tasks is contained in its message dated
July 17, 2003, "Training Guidance for Follow-on Forces Deploying ISO
Operation Iraqi Freedom."

                Page 30 GAO-05-8 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix II: NBC Tasks Defined As Essential by the Army and the Marine
Corps

o  maintain your M40-series protective mask with hood,

o  react to chemical or biological hazard/attack,

o  	protect yourself from NBC injury/contamination with chemical
protective equipment,

o  identify chemical agents using M8 detector paper,

o  	protect yourself from NBC injury/contamination when drinking from your
canteen while wearing your protective mask,

o  administer first aid to a nerve agent casualty,

o  administer nerve agent antidote to self (self-aid),

o  decontaminate your skin using the M291 skin decontaminating kit,

o  	decontaminate your skin and personal equipment using an M258A1
decontamination kit, and

o  	decontaminate your individual equipment using the M295 individual
equipment decontamination kit.

In addition, the Army requires that "Units will conduct weapons
qualification on individual and crew-served weapons with personnel wearing
protective equipment."2

The Marine Corps lists NBC "survival standards" for each individual in
Marine Corps Order 3400.3F, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense
Training." They are as follows:

1. Identify North Atlantic Treaty Organization NBC markers.

2. Properly maintain Individual Protective Equipment.

3. 	Properly don, clear, and check their field protective mask within 9
seconds of an NBC alarm or attack.

4. 	Properly don the appropriate individual protective clothing and
assigned field protective mask to Mission-Oriented Protective Posture
Level 4.

5. 	Perform basic functions (e.g., drinking, waste removal, sleep) while
in Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Level 4.

  Marine Corps' NBC
  Survival Standards

2 U.S. Army, "Army Training and Education," Army Regulation 350-1 (Apr. 9,
2003).

Page 31 GAO-05-8 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix II: NBC Tasks Defined As Essential by the Army and the Marine
Corps

6. 	Perform NBC detection measures with issued detection equipment, i.e.,
M256A1 Chemical Detection Kit, M8 detection paper, M9 detection tape, and
DT 236 radiac detector.

7. 	Decontaminate skin and personal equipment using M291 skin
decontamination kit or other appropriate decontaminants.

8. 	Perform individual (emergency) Mission-Oriented Protective Posture
equipment exchange.

9. React to a nuclear attack.

10. React to a chemical attack.

11. React to a biological attack.

12. Take the specific actions required to operate efficiently before,
during, and after NBC attacks to reduce the effects of NBC contamination.

13. Recognize or detect chemical agent contamination and perform immediate
decontamination techniques: e.g., person, weapon, clothing, equipment,
position, vehicle, and crew-served weapons.

14. Treat a chemical agent casualty.

15. Be able to drink water from a canteen or other water container while
masked.

16. Be able to properly format and send an NBC 1 report.

The Marine Corps lists NBC "basic operating standards" for units in Marine
Corps Order 3400.3F, "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Training."
They are as follows:

o  	The unit will maintain its collective nuclear, biological, and
chemical defense equipment in a high state of serviceability at all times.

o  	The unit must be proficient in taking the specific actions required to
operate efficiently before, during, and after NBC attacks to reduce the
effects of NBC contamination.

  Marine Corps' NBC Basic Operating Standards

Page 32 GAO-05-8 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix II: NBC Tasks Defined As Essential by the Army and the Marine
Corps

o  	The unit must be able to recognize or detect chemical agent
decontamination and perform immediate individual and operational
decontamination techniques: e.g., person, weapon, clothing, equipment,
position, vehicle, and crew-served weapons.

o  	The unit must demonstrate proficiency in contamination avoidance
procedures when crossing NBC-contaminated areas.

o  	The unit must demonstrate proficiency in performing primary military
duties, to include the use of crew/personal weapons and minimum/basic
combat skills, while wearing Individual Protective Equipment for extended
periods.

o  	The unit must demonstrate proficiency in operational and thorough
decontamination procedures.

o  	The unit must demonstrate proficiency in the principles of collective
protection, including passage through contamination control areas, where
applicable.

o  	The unit must demonstrate proficiency in the use of dosimetric
devices; chemical and biological detection; and monitoring equipment,
where applicable.

o  	The unit must be able to send and receive NBC-1 reports and plot NBC3
reports.

o  	The unit must be able to properly conduct monitor/survey missions as
directed by higher headquarters personnel.

o  The unit must be able to conduct unmasking procedures.

                Page 33 GAO-05-8 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix III: NBC Classroom Courses Introduced into the Marine Corps Combined
Arms Exercise Program in January 2004

NBC training objective Course title and description

o  Perform unit actions before, during, and Command Brief (1 hour): All
NBC personnel will receive this instruction as a one-time

after a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attack.

o  	Exercise the NBC warning and reporting system.

o  Conduct thorough decontamination.

o  	Monitor and survey decontamination operations.

prerequisite to nuclear, biological, and chemical defense instruction.

Vulnerability Analysis (2 hours): Students learn to source, develop, and
contribute to unit intelligence preparation of the battlefield; conduct
hazard assessments; and finally develop and recommend courses of action
from NBC.

Control Center (Nuclear) (3 hours): Students rehearse the use of the NBC
warning and reporting procedures for nuclear detonations. Includes manual
plotting methods, communication protocols, and operational aspects. Time
of stay/exit, shielding, and decay problems are illustrated.

Control Center (Chem-Bio) (2 hours): This course instructs and rehearses
the student in the use of the NBC warning and reporting procedures for
chemical and biological attack. Includes manual plotting methods,
communication protocols, and operational aspects. Incident response
through consequence management.

Joint Warning and Reporting Network (3 hours): This is the prescribed
automated platform for integration of NBC warning and reporting to command
and control systems and networks.

Radiation Safety/Depleted Uranium (1 hour): Designed to be refresher
instruction for the unit. Addresses types and characteristics of ionizing
radiation, medical effects, and protection standards/tasks. Reviews the
current inventory of radioactive sources in the Department of Defense's
use and the handling of accidents.

Unit Sustainment (3 hours): Formerly referred to as "decontamination,"
sustainment is the units' effort to recover personnel and equipment for
continued use on the battlefield. This period of instruction develops the
principles of decontamination and updates the NBC specialist/officer on
the latest equipment and decontaminants.

Special Sustainment (1 hour): The special requirements for decontamination
of casualties and aircraft are instructed per current doctrine.
Instruction covers site reconnaissance and the development of best
practices in areas that every unit may not encounter.

Biodefense and Medical Management (2 hours): Designed for both NBC and
medical personnel, the lecture covers casualty identification, triage, and
decontamination requirements. Part 2 of this instruction highlights the
biological sampling and modeling of the battlefield; how to collect,
escort, and ship etiologic agents; laboratory protocols; reporting
requirements; and fundamentals of epidemiology.

Joint Mission Essential Task List (1 hour): Class begins with a review of
missionessential task development and NBC tasks at the strategic national,
strategic theater, and operational levels. Lecture then details the Marine
Corps' Task List and the seven mission-essential task areas for the Marine
Air Ground Task Force, focusing on sense, shape, shield, and sustain. Puts
Marine Air Ground Task Force requirements into perspective and sets the
stage for joint and combined operations.

                           Source: U.S. Marine Corps.

                Page 34 GAO-05-8 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix IV: Different Regulations Suggesting Different Formats for After-Action
Reporting for the Army's CTCs

Army Regulation 11-33
(Army Lessons U.S. Army, Europe, Regulation Forces Command Regulation 350-
Learned) 350-50 (CMTC Training) 50-1 (NTC Training)

After Action Report, Part  o  After Action Report, Part I: (No
corresponding required report

I: Executive Summary Executive overview. section.)

(completed by  o  Mission objectives.

commander).  o  General description.

o  Mission objectives.  o  Participating units (including

o  General description. specific information) such as

o  	Dates, locations, and troop list, number of major participants.
personnel who participated,

o  	Significant issues. and number and type of vehicles used.

o  Limitations.

o  	Required task organization (must coincide with the current
modification table of organization and equipment, broken down by vehicle
type, unit requirement, and unit shipped).

o  	Optional and added units (broken down by vehicle type, unit
requirement, and unit shipped).

o  Significant issues.

o  Limitations.

o  	Funding (including personnel, transportation type and cost, total
vehicle transportation cost, and total cost reimbursed to the Combat
Maneuver Training Center [CMTC]).

After Action Report, Part After Action Report, Part II: (No corresponding
required report

II: Lessons Learned. Lessons Learned. section.)

o  Observation.  o  Observation.

o  Discussion.  o  Discussion.

o  Lessons learned.  o  Lessons learned.

o  Recommended action.  o  Recommended action.

o  Comments.  o  Comments.

Forces Command Regulation 350-50-2 (JRTC Training)

(No corresponding required report section.)

(No corresponding required report section.)

                Page 35 GAO-05-8 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix IV: Different Regulations Suggesting Different Formats for
After-Action Reporting for the Army's CTCs

Army Regulation 11-33
(Army Lessons U.S. Army, Europe, Regulation Forces Command Regulation 350-
Learned) 350-50 (CMTC Training) 50-1 (NTC Training)

After Action Report, Part (No corresponding required (No corresponding
required report

III: Optional. report section.) section.)

o  	Chronology of events.

o  	Operation (plans/orders).

o  	Standing operating procedures.

Forces Command Regulation 350-50-2 (JRTC Training)

(No corresponding required report section.)

(No corresponding required report section.)

          Tactical lessons learned, to      Tactical lessons learned. Address 
                                            Tactical lessons learned. Address 
          include command and control; the Battle Functions. the battlefield  
                                       operating system;                      
                                       Administrative lessons learned,        
                                       including deployment, redeployment,    
                                       equipment draw, and regeneration.  o   
                                       Benefits of training at the National   
                                       Training Center (NTC).  o              
                                       Recommendations for doctrinal          
      maneuver (offense/defense); fire improvement. nuclear, biological, and  
support; intelligence; air defense; chemical defense; electronic warfare;  
             mobility/countermobility; deployment; and any other pertinent    
          electronic warfare; nuclear, topics. Administrative lessons         
     biological, chemical defense; and learned, including deployment,         
               combat service support. redeployment, and any other pertinent  
          Administrative and logistics topics.                                
                                        o  Recommendations/lessons learned on 
                                              preparatory training, including 
                                            comments on usability of the Army 
            lessons learned (including Training and Evaluation Program or any 
        deploying to, training at, and    other training and training support 
redeploying from the CMTC). General  product developed by the Training and 
    narrative comments, to include the       Doctrine Command  o  Benefits of 
following:  o  Benefits of training        training at the Joint Readiness 
                          at the CMTC.            Training Center (JRTC).  o  
                                       Recommendations for improving existing 
                                            doctrine.  o  Recommendations for 
                                              improving preparatory training, 
                o  Recommendations for (TRADOC). including comments on the    
                                          o  Recommendations for usability of 
                doctrinal improvement.                                 TRADOC 
                                       improvement of the NTC experience.     
        o  Recommendations and lessons publications or other training support 
                            learned on products.                              
             preparatory training.  o     o  Logistics or Resource Management 
     Recommendations for improving the   lessons learned.  o  Recommendations 
                              training     for improving the JRTC experience. 
                             exercise. 

Sources: U.S. Army, "Army Lessons Learned Program: System Development and
Application," Army Regulation 11-33 (Oct. 10, 1989); "Training: Combat
Maneuver Training Center," U.S. Army Europe Regulation 350-50 (Aug. 4,
1994); "Training at the National Training Center," Forces Command
Regulation 350-50-1 (July 1, 2002); and "Training at the Joint Readiness
Training Center," Forces Command Regulation 350-50-2 (June 15, 1998).

Note: CTC = Combat Training Center.

                Page 36 GAO-05-8 Chemical and Biological Defense

                Page 37 GAO-05-8 Chemical and Biological Defense

                Page 38 GAO-05-8 Chemical and Biological Defense

                Page 39 GAO-05-8 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

  GAO Contact Acknowledgments

(350328)

William W. Cawood, Jr., (202) 512-3959

In addition to the contact named above, Beverly Schladt, Mike Avenick,
Matthew Sakrekoff, James Lawson, Leslie Bharadwaja, Gerald Winterlin, Jim
Melton, R.K. Wild, Dave Mayfield, and Jay Smale made key contributions to
this report.

Page 40 GAO-05-8 Chemical and Biological Defense

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