Southeast Asia: Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic	 
Planning Needed for U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces	 
(29-JUL-05, GAO-05-793).					 
                                                                 
The executive branch has bolstered assistance to the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Thailand to contribute to U.S. foreign policy and 
security goals. To further human rights goals, Congress restricts
certain security assistance funds from being provided to any	 
units of foreign security forces when credible evidence exists	 
that units have committed gross violations of human rights. GAO  
(1) describes the nature and extent of U.S. assistance to foreign
security forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, (2) 
assesses the controls used to achieve compliance with human	 
rights restrictions on U.S. funding to foreign security forces in
these countries, and (3) assesses the U.S. government's national 
security assistance strategy.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-793 					        
    ACCNO:   A31581						        
  TITLE:     Southeast Asia: Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic
Planning Needed for U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces	 
     DATE:   07/29/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Foreign aid programs				 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Foreign military assistance			 
	     Foreign military training				 
	     Foreign policies					 
	     International relations				 
	     Police training					 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Human rights					 
	     Indonesia						 
	     Philippines					 
	     Thailand						 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-05-793

                 United States Government Accountability Office

                     GAO Report to Congressional Committees

July 2005

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning Needed for U.S. Assistance to
                            Foreign Security Forces

                                       a

GAO-05-793

[IMG]

July 2005

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning Needed for Assistance to
Foreign Security Forces

                                 What GAO Found

The United States allocated about $265.7 million in assistance from fiscal
years 2001 to 2004 to equip and train security forces in the Philippines,
Thailand, and Indonesia.

U.S. law restricts the provision of funds to units of foreign security
forces when the Department of State has credible evidence that the unit
has committed gross violations of human rights. Agency guidance extends
these restrictions to individuals of foreign security forces and requires
posts to establish procedures to vet candidates for U.S. sponsored
training for possible violations. However, we found no evidence that U.S.
officials vetted an estimated 6,900 foreign security trainees-about 4,000
Indonesian, 1,200 Filipino, and 1,700 Thai police-trained by Justice with
State law enforcement assistance between fiscal years 2001 through 2004.
These candidates included a total of 32 Indonesian individuals trained
over time from a notorious special-forces police unit previously
prohibited under State policy from receiving U.S. training funds because
of the unit's prior human rights abuses. We found better evidence of
vetting in training programs managed by DOD. State issued new guidance in
February 2005 intended to improve the human rights vetting process and
establish a database of human rights abuse allegations.

Foreign Police in U.S. Law Enforcement Training

Source: GAO.

State has not produced a clear and coherent national security assistance
strategy that meets objectives that Congress urged State to address in
2000 legislation. As a result, State and Congress may be deprived of the
information needed to make future decisions about these programs. State's
2003 strategy met only two of nine objectives in the law. Among other
shortfalls, the strategy did not identify how programs would be combined
at the country level to achieve objectives or be coordinated with other
U.S. government agencies. Several State and DOD planning documents, while
not collectively providing a complete national security assistance
strategy, address some of the legislation's objectives.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
Assistance to Train and Equip Security Forces in the Philippines,

Indonesia, and Thailand Provided through Three Agencies under at Least 12
Programs

Weak Management Controls on U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces
Allowed Violations of State's Policy on Human Rights Restrictions to Occur

U.S. Government Lacks an Integrated National Security Assistance Strategy
Covering All U.S. Training and Assistance Provided to Foreign Security
Forces

Conclusion
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

1 2 5

9

18

28 35 36 37

Appendixes                                                              
                Appendix I:             Scope and Methodology              42 
                            Descriptions of Assistance Programs to Foreign 
               Appendix II:                    Security                    
                                                Forces                     45 
                            State Department National Security Assistance  
              Appendix III:                    Strategy                    
                                               Briefing                    52 
                              Other State and DOD Documents Address Some   
               Appendix IV:                   Objectives                   
                                of the Security Assistance Act of 2000     68 
                Appendix V:    Comments from the Department of Defense     69 
              Appendix VI:      Comments from the Department of State      70 
                                             GAO Comments                  79 
              Appendix VII:     GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments      84 

Tables Table 1: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in the Philippines, 
                               Fiscal Years 2001-2004                      14 
                Table 2: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Indonesia, 
                                                                    Fiscal 
                                  Years 2001-2004                          16 
          Table 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Thailand, Fiscal 
                                  Years 2001-2004                          17 
             Table 4: Estimated Number of Foreign Law Enforcement Trainees 
                         Not Vetted, Fiscal Years 2001-2004                21 

                                    Contents

Table 5: GAO Sample of Trainees for Vetting at Three Posts, Fiscal

Years 2001-2004 21 Table 6: Objectives of the Security Assistance Act of
2000

Addressed by State's National Security Assistance

Strategy 29 Table 7: Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) 45 Table 8: Drawdown
46 Table 9: Excess Defense Articles (EDA) 46 Table 10: Economic Support
Fund (ESF) 47 Table 11: Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 47 Table 12:
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

(INCLE) 48 Table 13: International Military Education and Training (IMET)
48 Table 14: Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) 49 Table 15:
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 49 Table 16: Regional Defense
Counterterrorism Fellowship Program

(CTFP) 50 Table 17: DEA Training 50 Table 18: FBI Training 51

Figures Figure 1:

Figure 2:

Figure 3: Figure 4:

U.S. Allocations to Train and Equip Security Forces in the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, Fiscal Years 2001
2004 10
State, DOD, and Justice Allocations to Security Forces in
the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, Fiscal Years
2001-2004 11
U.S. Allocations to Security Forces by Program, Fiscal
Years 2001-2004 13
State and DOD Strategic Planning Documents 34

Contents

Abbreviations

ATA Antiterrorism Assistance
CTFP Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DOD Department of Defense
DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency
E-IMET Expanded-IMET
EDA Excess Defense Articles
ESF Economic Support Fund
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FMF Foreign Military Financing
ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance

Program IMET International Military Education and Training INCLE
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement JCET Joint Combined
Exchange Training OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense PACOM U. S.
Pacific Command PKO Peacekeeping Operations

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

A

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548

July 29, 2005

Congressional Committees

The executive branch has considered Southeast Asia as the "second front"
in the war on terrorism and has thus bolstered security assistance1 to
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand to help deal with this threat.
This assistance contributes to several U.S. foreign policy and security
goals, such as supporting the global war on terror, promoting stronger
bilateral relationships, strengthening self-defense capabilities, and
promoting greater respect for democracy and human rights. However, to
further human rights goals, Congress restricts certain security assistance
funds from being provided to any units of foreign security forces when
credible evidence exists that units have committed gross violations of
human rights.2

To address congressional concerns about the coordination, planning, and
impact of security assistance programs, Congress passed the Security
Assistance Act of 2000.3 The Act encourages the Department of State
(State), in consultation with other agencies, to establish an annual
multiyear plan identifying overarching security assistance objectives, the
way programs will be combined at the country level to achieve objectives,
and the coordination of security assistance programs with other U.S.
government agencies.

This report, completed under the Comptroller General's Authority is being
addressed to you because of your committee's interest and jurisdiction.
The report (1) describes the nature and extent of U.S. assistance to
foreign security forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand; (2)
assesses the

1For the purposes of this report, we defined security assistance as U.S.
government assistance aimed at training or equipping foreign security
forces (military and police).

2This restriction, commonly referred to as the "Leahy amendment," first
appeared in the 1997 Foreign Operations Export Financing and Related
Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-208) and only applied to funds appropriated
to State's International Narcotics Control program. It was broadened in
fiscal year 1998 to apply to all funds appropriated under the 1998 Foreign
Operations Export Financing and Related Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-118).
In fiscal year 1999, a similar provision appeared in the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (P.L. 105-262), which applied to funds
appropriated under the act. The two provisions have appeared each year
since in the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts and the
Department of Defense Appropriations Acts, respectively.

3See P.L. 106-280, 22 S:USC 2305.

management controls used to achieve U.S. agency compliance with the human
rights restrictions on funding provided to foreign security forces in the
three countries; and (3) assesses the U.S. government's national security
assistance strategy.

To address these objectives, we reviewed pertinent State, Defense, and
Justice planning, funding, and evaluation documents, and related policies
and procedures. We focused on State, DOD, and Justice programs or
activities providing assistance to foreign security forces in the absence
of an agreed-upon definition of security assistance within the U.S.
government. We also interviewed senior program officials from the
Departments of Defense (DOD), State, and Justice in Washington, D.C.;
Manila, the Philippines; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Bangkok, Thailand. We
discussed these programs with officials of foreign governments and
nongovernmental organizations. In addition, we interviewed DOD officials
at the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) in Honolulu, Hawaii. We reviewed
relevant statutes and implementing guidelines, including the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), as amended, the Arms Export Control
Act (P.L. 90-629), as amended, the Security Assistance Act of 2000, the
fiscal years 2001 to 2004 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and the
Department of Defense Appropriations Acts, and the DOD Security Assistance
Management Manual. To assess how the U.S. government provides funding in
compliance with human rights restrictions, we inspected program files
maintained at the U.S. embassies in Bangkok, Jakarta, and Manila. We
conducted this review from July 2004 to June 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief 	The United States allocated4 about $265.7 million in
assistance from fiscal years 2001 to 2004 to equip and train security
forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand through 12 programs and
activities managed by the Departments of State, Defense, or Justice. This
assistance comprises a mix of appropriated funds used for procuring
training and equipment as well as nonappropriated assistance, such as
transfers of excess military equipment taken from U.S. stocks. State, DOD,
and Justice collectively allocated $179.6 million (67.6 percent) to the
Philippines; $47.5 million (17.9 percent) to Indonesia; and $38.6 million
(14.5 percent) to Thailand. Among the three agencies, State provided most
(80.2 percent) of the

4We use this term to describe the broad mix of appropriated and
nonappropriated assistance being provided to foreign security forces in
these three countries.

assistance in the three countries from fiscal years 2001 to 2004. These
countries used U.S. assistance to acquire a variety of equipment,
training, and related services. For example, the Philippines acquired
C-130 aircraft and UH-1 helicopters to enhance the mobility of its armed
forces, and also used some U.S. assistance to support its defense reform
program; Thailand acquired UH-1s to enhance its ability to combat
terrorism; and Indonesia trained its security forces in civil-military
relations, civilian police authority, and human rights issues.

Weak management controls resulted in lapses in human rights vetting for
individual trainees at the three posts we visited and within headquarters
units. Recent foreign operations and DOD annual appropriations acts
restrict the provision of funds provided under the acts to units of
foreign security forces when there is "credible evidence" that the unit
has committed "gross violations" of human rights. Additionally, State and
DOD guidance extends these restrictions to individuals as well as to units
of foreign security forces, and requires posts to establish vetting
procedures to ensure compliance with these restrictions. However, we found
no evidence that the three posts we visited vetted an estimated 6,900 law
enforcement officials-approximately 4,000 Indonesian, 1,200 Filipino, and
1,700 Thai officials-trained as individuals with State's law enforcement
assistance between fiscal years 2001 through 2004.5 The trainees included
32 Indonesian individuals trained over time from a notorious
special-forces police unit that was previously prohibited from receiving
U.S. training funds under State policy because of the unit's prior human
rights abuses. We found better evidence of vetting in other training
programs managed by DOD. For example, in the Philippines, we randomly
sampled 107 DOD trainee files and estimated that 87 percent of the trainee
files would contain some evidence of vetting, while 13 percent would
contain no evidence of vetting. We also found evidence of vetting for all
35 DOD trainee files that we randomly sampled in the other two countries,
although these results are not projectable. Vetting did not occur because
of weaknesses in some agencies' management controls. First, State and
Justice headquarters units did not assign clear roles and responsibilities
for human rights vetting, nor did they clearly communicate these
responsibilities in writing to all employees, particularly law enforcement
officials. Second, two of the three posts did not establish written
policies and procedures covering all the agency representatives involved
in the vetting process prior to 2004, nor

5An estimated 9,470 foreign security officials were trained under State
and DOD programs during this period.

did they specify the documentation and records retention requirements for
these entities. Third, neither State headquarters nor the three posts
established systems to monitor compliance with vetting requirements. State
issued new guidance in February 2005 intended to improve the efficiency of
the human rights vetting process. State announced that it had established
a new human rights database to be a clearinghouse of information of
alleged human rights abuses.

In examining the U.S. government's assistance to foreign security forces
in these countries, we found that State has not produced a coherent
national security assistance strategy that meets the objectives that
Congress encouraged State to include in this strategy. The national
security assistance strategy that State issued in 2003 addressed only two
of the nine objectives included in the Security Assistance Act of 2000.
Among other shortfalls, the plan does not identify the allocation of
resources to accomplish objectives, the ways in which programs would be
combined at the country level to achieve objectives, or the coordination
of these programs with other U.S. government agencies. State and DOD
annually develop various country, regional, and national strategy and
planning documents that address many of the Acts' objectives; these could
be used as the basis for developing an annual national security assistance
strategy. As a result of these strategic planning weaknesses, it may be
difficult for State and Congress to assess the contribution the U.S.
assistance makes to broader U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as
stemming terrorism, promoting regional stability, and demonstrating
respect for human rights. In addition, the lack of a clear and coherent
strategy may inhibit Congress' ability to effectively allocate resources
and deprive it of the information it needs for future decisionmaking on
these programs.

We are recommending that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, strengthen management
controls on vetting security forces by issuing consolidated written
guidance to posts and headquarters offices. This guidance should assign
clear roles and responsibilities for post and headquarters offices and
establish monitoring systems to verify that required procedures are being
carried out. We also are recommending that the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General,
jointly develop an integrated strategic plan for all U.S. government
assistance programs that provide training and equipment for foreign
security forces (military and police).

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and
State, and to the Attorney General for their review and comment. We
received written responses from the Secretaries of Defense and State. The
Secretary of Defense concurred with the report's findings in principle.
Neither the Secretaries of Defense nor State commented on the
recommendations. The Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Attorney
General also provided us technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate.

The Secretary of State acknowledged the need for continued improvement on
human rights vetting procedures but stated that it is operating its
assistance programs in full compliance with the law. State commented that
any vetting of individuals is done as a matter of State policy and
practice, not as a matter of law. We agree with State's comment. However,
in reviewing State's application of its policy on human rights vetting of
individuals, we found significant weaknesses that resulted in an estimated
6,900 individuals receiving U.S. training assistance without any evidence
that they had first been vetted for gross violations of human rights.
Therefore, we recommended in our report that State strengthen management
controls on vetting to meet its stated policy goal of not providing U.S.
assistance to suspected gross human rights violators.

State also asserted that it has fully complied with congressional intent
regarding a national security assistance strategy. State disagreed with
our finding that the national security assistance strategy met only two of
nine objectives of the law. It stated that our findings are based on
incomplete information because many of the objectives were met and
discussed in a May 2003 oral briefing to selected congressional committee
staff. State also commented that its briefing to congressional committees
fully satisfied the committees represented at the time, and that the
absence of further requests for a briefing relieved it of further
reporting responsibilities. We disagree with State's comments. The
briefing was a good first step, but a detailed written plan is needed for
wider distribution, and for providing documentation for tracking progress
in moving forward.

Background 	As a foreign policy tool, the U.S. government provides
assistance to security forces (military and police) in more than 150
countries around the world, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Thailand. State provides assistance to foreign security forces through at
least six programs and activities. Appendix II provides additional details
on these programs.

o 	Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) is used to train foreign security forces
in anti-terrorism and terrorism response tactics.

o 	Economic Support Fund (ESF) is used primarily for economic assistance
to promote political or economic stability; however, some ESF is allocated
for training foreign security forces.

o 	Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is used to provide grants and loans
for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training by
foreign governments. This assistance is aimed at improving defense
capabilities and fostering stronger military relationships between the
United States and recipient nations.

o 	International Military Education and Training (IMET) is used to train
and educate foreign military forces and related civilian personnel.
Expanded-IMET (E-IMET), a variant of the regular IMET program, focuses on
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights training and education.

o 	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) is used
primarily to support counter-narcotics, intelligence, border patrol, and
interdiction activities.

o 	Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) supports multilateral peacekeeping and
regional stability operations that are not funded through the United
Nations.

DOD provides a mix of appropriated and nonappropriated assistance to
foreign security forces through at least four programs or activities.
Appendix III provides additional details on these programs.

o 	Excess Defense Articles (EDA) are nonappropriated assistance in the
form of excess U.S. defense articles drawn from DOD stocks. The President
is authorized to transfer, with limitations, defense articles declared as
excess by the military departments to foreign governments in support of
U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.

o 	Drawdown is nonappropriated assistance that the President is authorized
to draw down from the stocks of any U.S. government agency for
emergencies, disasters, counternarcotics, refugee assistance,
peacekeeping, anti-terrorist activities, and nonproliferation.

o 	Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) is a DOD
program used to provide funding to foreign military and related civilian
officials to attend U.S. military education institutions and selected
regional centers for nonlethal training.

o 	Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) permits U.S. special operations
forces to train with foreign military forces, provided that the training
primarily benefits U.S. forces. The host nation's security forces also
derive a benefit.

The Department of Justice provides assistance to foreign security forces
through at least two Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) training activities in foreign countries.
DEA trains law enforcement officials and police to carry out special
counternarcotics operations. The FBI also trains law enforcement officials
and police in these countries.

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Philippines and
Indonesia became central to the U.S. government's antiterrorism efforts in
Southeast Asia due to their strategic importance, Muslim populations, and
insurgency movements that use terrorist tactics. The U.S. government has
been concerned with radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia,
particularly those in Indonesia, the Philippines, and other countries that
are known to have ties to the Al Qaeda terrorist network. For more than a
decade, Al Qaeda has penetrated the region by establishing local cells,
training Southeast Asians in its camps in Afghanistan, and by financing
and cooperating with indigenous radical Islamist groups. According to the
Congressional Research Service,6 Indonesia and the southern Philippines
have been particularly vulnerable to anti-American Islamic terrorist
groups. A spate of violence in Thailand's Muslim provinces in early 2004
intensified the focus on Islamic extremism in southern Thailand. The
violence has forced Thai authorities to publicly re-evaluate the threat of
a Muslim separatist insurgency with financial and operational ties to
international Islamic terrorist groups.

6Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, CRS Report for
Congress, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, RL31672 (Washington, D.C.: May 5,
2004).

According to the State Department's 2004 Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices, the three countries we reviewed face several human rights
challenges.7

o 	The Philippines. According to State's human rights report for the
Philippines, the government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens. However, some elements of the country's security forces were
responsible for arbitrary, unlawful and, in some cases, extrajudicial
killings, disappearances, and torture, and arbitrary arrest and detention.

o 	Indonesia. State's human rights report for Indonesia stated that the
Indonesian government made progress in its transition from three decades
of repressive and authoritarian rule to a more pluralistic and
representative democracy. The government's human rights record remained
poor, however, and it continued to commit serious abuses. For example, the
report stated that "[S]ecurity force members murdered, tortured, raped,
beat, and arbitrarily detained civilians and members of separatist
movements, especially in Aceh and to a lesser extent in Papua. Some police
officers occasionally used excessive and sometimes deadly force in
arresting suspects and in attempting to obtain information or a
confession. Retired and active duty military officers known to have
committed serious human rights violations occupied or were promoted to
senior positions in the Government and the (military)."

o 	Thailand. According to State's human rights report, the government of
Thailand generally respected the rights of its citizens, but there were
significant problems in some areas. For example, separatist violence in
southern Thailand resulted in the deaths of more than 180 persons at the
hands of security forces. In addition, no progress was reported in
investigations into the extrajudicial killings of approximately 1,300
suspected drug traffickers during the Thai government's 3-month "War on
Drugs" campaign from February through April 2003. However, the Thai
government maintains that the deaths were the result of disputes between
those involved in the drug trade.

7For Indonesia, see http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41643.htm.
For the Philippines, see
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41657.htm. For Thailand, see
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41661.htm.

Assistance to Train and Equip Security Forces in the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Thailand Provided through Three Agencies under at Least 12
Programs

U.S. assistance to security forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Thailand was provided through at least 12 programs and activities managed
by State, DOD, and Justice. This assistance comprises a mix of
appropriated funds used for procuring training and equipment, as well as
nonappropriated assistance such as transfers of excess military equipment
taken from U.S. stocks. The Philippines was the largest beneficiary of
this assistance from fiscal years 2001 to 2004. U.S. assistance to
security forces in the Philippines largely supported the Philippines
Defense Reform-a comprehensive defense assessment to develop a multi-year
defense strategy, enhance mobility, and build defense capacity.
Restrictions on Indonesia prohibited it from receiving military equipment;
however, Indonesia received funding to train its security forces. U.S.
assistance to Thailand is used for procuring equipment and training for
such activities as counter narcotics and antiterrorism.

State, DOD, and Justice State, DOD, and Justice allocated8 a total of
approximately $265.7 million to Provide Assistance to train and equip
security forces in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia Security
Forces in the in fiscal years 2001 to 2004. This amounted to $179.6
million for the

Philippines, $47.5 million for Indonesia, and $38.6 million for
Thailand.Philippines, Indonesia, and Figure 1 shows a comparison of U.S.
assistance for each of the three Thailand countries and illustrates that
the United States provided the Philippines

with significantly more assistance than Indonesia and Thailand.

8We use the term "allocations" to describe the broad mix of appropriated
and nonappropriated assistance being provided to foreign security forces
in these three countries. State and DOD appropriations accounted for 83.8
percent of the total; nonappropriated assistance in the form of Excess
Defense Articles and drawdowns from DOD stocks accounted for 13.4 percent
of the total; and DOD and Justice expenditures accounted for 3.9 percent
of the total. Expenditures data were used for DOD's JCET program and
Justice's DEA and FBI training activities because separate appropriations
and country allocation data do not exist.

Figure 1: U.S. Allocations to Train and Equip Security Forces in the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, Fiscal Years 2001- 2004

Dollars in millions 200

150

100

50

0 Philippines Indonesia Thailand

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Note: See footnote 8.

State allocated most of the assistance, $212.9 million (80.2 percent),
while DOD allocated $52.2 million (19.6 percent), and Justice allocated
$518,000 (less than 1 percent). Figure 2 shows a comparison of assistance
by agency, illustrating that State allocated most of the assistance to
train and equip security forces in the Philippines, Thailand, and
Indonesia.

Figure 2: State, DOD, and Justice Allocations to Security Forces in the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, Fiscal Years 2001- 2004

                              Dollars in millions

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0 State DOD Justice

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Note: See footnote 8.

This assistance was provided through at least 12 programs and was used for
procuring a variety of equipment, training, and services within each
country. Figure 3 shows a comparison of U.S. assistance by program for

each of the three countries. The FMF allocation for the Philippines
represented the largest single program across all three countries.

Figure 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces by Program, Fiscal Years
2001-2004 Dollars in millions

10

8

6

4

2

0 FMF INCLE IMET ESF ATA PKO EDA CTFP Drawdowns JCET FBI DEA training
training

                                  Philippines

Indonesia

Thailand Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

                             Note: See footnote 8.

Assistance to the Philippines State, DOD, and Justice assistance to train
and equip security forces in the

Helped Support Defense Reform	Philippines in fiscal years 2001 to 2004
totaled about $179.6 million and helped support the Philippines Defense
Reform--a comprehensive defense assessment to develop a multi-year defense
strategy, enhance mobility, and build defense capacity. Table 1 shows the
U.S. agency, program or activity, allocations, and some examples of how
the assistance was used.

Table 1: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in the Philippines, Fiscal
Years 20012004

Dollars in millions

Agency Program/activity Allocations Examples of how assistance was used

State FMF $115.8	Maintenance support for C-130s, UH-1s, fast patrol craft,
M-35 trucks; counterterrorism training for maritime, ground, and air
forces; support for Philippine Defense Reform in fiscal year 2004.

PKO $15.0	Refurbish UH-1 helicopters, procure spare parts for UH-1s and
combat engineering spares and support.

IMET $8.6	Train in amphibious warfare, combat strategies and intelligence,
security assistance management, defense resources management, and
logistics held at U.S. military bases and other institutions, such as the
U.S. Army War College.

INCLE $2.0	Support training to develop an effective civilian police force
in the autonomous Muslim Region of Mindanao. Some INCLE funding was used
for an FBI assessment of the Philippines fingerprint and processing system
as part of a worldwide effort to develop an international terrorist
database.

ATA $1.9	Train in terrorist crime scene investigation, hostage
negotiation, and mass casualty medical issues.

DOD EDA $19.5	Provide cargo trucks and UH-IH helicopters, armored
personnel carriers, rifles, and magazine cartridges--to be drawn from DOD
stocks.

Drawdown $10.0	Provide defense articles and services from U.S. Navy stocks
for delivery to the Philippines Ministry of Defense.

                         (Continued From Previous Page)

Dollars in millions

Agency Program/activity Allocations Examples of how assistance was used

JCET $4.7	Provide joint training for U.S. Special Operations Forces and
the Philippines' security forces.

CTFP $2.0	Provide courses in combating terrorism and preparedness and
consequence management to train military forces in counterterrorism
techniques and to work with other relevant agencies.

Justice DEA & FBI $0.1	Train law enforcement and police in counter
narcotics, money laundering, and other criminal activities and assets
forfeiture techniques.

                                 Total $179.7a

Source: GAO analysis of State, DOD, and Justice data.

aTotal may not correspond to the sum of the column due to rounding.

Note: See footnote 8.

Assistance to Indonesia State, DOD, and Justice allocated a total of about
$47.5 million in

Supported Training for Police assistance to train Indonesian security
forces in fiscal years 2001 to 2004;

Forces	however, various congressional funding restrictions limited
Indonesia's eligibility for U.S. military assistance and training over
this period. State provided $43.3 million (91 percent of the country
total), including $23.2 million (49 percent) of the country total in
police training through the Economic Support Fund. DOD provided military
training through its Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program
(CTFP). Indonesia is the single largest recipient of this assistance
worldwide. Table 2 shows the U.S. agency, program or activity,
allocations, and some examples of how the assistance was used.

Table 2: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Indonesia, Fiscal Years
2001-2004

Dollars in millions

Agency Program/activity Allocations Examples of how assistance was used

State ESF $23.2 Train Indonesia's police forces in management initiatives,
administrative justice and maritime enforcement, seaport and waterway
security, human rights issues and the rule of law, anticorruption, and in
reconstituting civilian police authority.

ATA $14.8	Support counterterrorism training facilities in Megamendung;
conduct training courses in crisis response and explosive incidents
countermeasures; and support the formation of the National-Level
Counterterrorism Task Force known as "Task Force 88."

INCLE $4.0	Assist with the transition of the Indonesia police to a
civilian-led police force since the separation of the police forces from
the national military, including technical assistance and human rights
training.

Expanded-IMET $1.3	Train in civil-military relations, resources
management, and international defense management to Indonesia's military
forces (variant of the regular IMET program).

DOD CTFP $4.2	Train to educate military forces about combating terrorism,
the laws of war, resource management and budgeting, international defense
management, and preparedness and consequence management.

                                  Total $47.5

Source: GAO analysis of State, DOD, and Justice data.

Note: See footnote 8.

Assistance to Thailand Largely State, DOD, and Justice allocated a total
of about $38.6 million in Supported Law Enforcement and assistance for
Thai security forces to procure a variety of defense articles, Military
Training services, and training supporting activities such as counter
narcotics,

military training, antiterrorism, and force modernization. The largest
share of the money was used for training law enforcement officials in
counter narcotics operations and for providing the Thai military with
advanced training. Table 3 shows the U.S. agency, program or activity,
allocations, and some examples of how assistance was used.

Table 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Thailand, Fiscal Years
2001-2004

Dollars in millions

Agency Program/activity Allocations Examples of how assistance was used

State INCLE $13.8	Supports law enforcement investigations and prosecution
of narcotics traffickers as well as efforts to suppress illicit drug
trafficking and retail sales.

IMET $7.9	Trains military forces in courses such as advanced supply
management, amphibious planning, combat strategies and intelligence
training, international defense management, joint combined war fighting,
and military police training.

FMF $4.2	Used toward the procurement of military equipment such as
communications equipment and small arms.

PKO $0.5	To purchase equipment for Thai military peacekeeping and
counterterrorism units.

              DOD         EDA   $6.0        Approved and to be drawn from DOD 
                                       stocks including Cobra helicopters and 
                                                         utility helicopters. 
                         JCET   $5.0     Training for U.S. Special Operations 
                                             Forces and Thai security forces. 
                         CTFP   $0.8 Combating terrorism training courses for 
                                                        Thai military forces. 
          Justice DEA and FBI   $0.4          Training for security forces in 
                                           counternarcotics and anti-criminal 
                                                                     tactics. 
            Total             $38.6a 

Source: GAO analysis of State, DOD, and Justice data. aTotal may not
correspond to the sum of the column due to rounding. Note: See footnote 8.

Weak Management Controls on U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces
Allowed Violations of State's Policy on Human Rights Restrictions to Occur

We found no evidence that the three posts we visited vetted an estimated
6,935 law enforcement officials trained with State assistance between
fiscal years 2001 and 2004.9 The trainees included 32 Indonesian police
from a notorious special-forces police unit that was prohibited from
receiving U.S. training funds under State policy because of the unit's
prior human rights abuses. We found better evidence10 of vetting in
DOD-implemented training programs. For example, in the Philippines, we
randomly sampled 107 DOD trainee files and estimated that 87 percent of
the trainee files contained some evidence of vetting, while 13 percent
contained no evidence of vetting. We also found evidence of vetting for
all 35 DOD trainee files that we randomly sampled in the other two
countries, although these results are not projectable. Vetting did not
occur because of weaknesses in some agencies' management controls. First,
State and Justice headquarters units did not assign clear roles and
responsibilities for vetting foreign security forces, nor did they clearly
communicate these responsibilities to all employees involved in the
process, especially to law enforcement officials at posts. Second, prior
to 2004, two of the three posts did not establish written policies and
procedures for all of the offices involved in the vetting process, or
specify the documentation and records retention requirements for these
units. Third, neither State headquarters nor the three posts established
systems to periodically monitor compliance with vetting requirements.

Laws and State Policy Restrict U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces

Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts since 1998 has
included a provision, commonly referred to as the "Leahy Amendment," that
restricts the provision of assistance appropriated in these acts to any
foreign security unit for which State has determined there is credible

9This number includes approximately 4,000 Indonesian, 1,175 Filipino, and
1,760 Thai law enforcement officials out of an estimated 9,470 total
foreign security forces at the three posts.

10For purposes of our review, we said that we found "some evidence" of
vetting when we found documents indicating that the political affairs
office was involved in the post vetting process.

evidence11 that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights,
unless certain conditions have been met.12 DOD's appropriations acts have
contained a similar restriction on DOD-funded training since fiscal year
1999.13

To implement these legislative restrictions, in June 1999 and February
2003, State directed all posts involved in providing security assistance
to foreign security forces to have procedures in place to ensure
compliance with the restrictions. Between 1999 and 2004, DOD and State
issued specific instructions to the posts on implementing these
restrictions for DODmanaged training programs. While the provisions
restrict funding to "any unit of the security forces of a foreign
country," State policy applies the restrictions to individual members of
security forces, as well. State and DOD guidance reflects this policy.

11"Credible evidence" was not defined in the appropriations provisions.
However, with regard to the meaning of "evidence," State directed the
posts to report language accompanying the fiscal year 1999 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act that indicated that the conferees do not
intend that the evidence must be admissible in a court of law. As to the
definition of "credible," while State retains authority for all final
decisions, State directed that posts should apply a rule of reason and
that State seeks information deserving of confidence as a basis for
decisionmaking.

12Specifically, the most recent provision in the Foreign Operations Export
Financing and Related Appropriations Act for 2005 (P.L. 108-447, S:553)
states that: "None of the funds made available by this Act may be provided
to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary
of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross
violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and reports to
the Committees on Appropriations that the government of such country is
taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security
forces unit to justice." The provision has also appeared in prior Foreign
Operations Appropriations Acts. See P.L. 105-118, S:570 (FY98); P.L.
105-277, S:568 (FY99); P.L. 106-113, S: 564 (FY2000); P.L. 106-429, S:563
(FY2001); P.L. 107115, S:556 (FY2002); P.L. 108-7, S: 553 (FY2003); P.L.
108-199, S: 553 (FY2004)).

13The most recent provision in the DOD Appropriations Act for 2005 states
that: "None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to support
any training program involving a unit of the security forces of a foreign
country if the Secretary of Defense has received credible information from
the Department of State that the unit has committed a gross violation of
human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken."
(P.L. 108287 S:8076) Similar provisions have also appeared in prior DOD
appropriations acts. See P.L. 105-262, S:8130 (FY1999); P.L. 106-79,
S:8098 (FY2000); P.L. 106-259, S:8092 (FY2001); P.L. 107117, S:8093
(FY2003); P.L. 107-248, S:8080 (FY2003); P.L. 108087, S:8077 (FY2004).

Vetting candidates for human rights concerns commonly would include the
following steps, according to post officials, State headquarters
officials, and State guidance.14 First, the office at the post sponsoring
the training reviews biographical and service information provided by the
host government to determine if the individual or unit has been involved
in gross violations of human rights. Second, the sponsoring office
forwards the name to the political affairs office at the post for its
independent review. The political affairs office or sponsoring office also
circulates the candidate's name to other relevant offices within the
post.15 As part of this second step, the human rights officer or a foreign
service national assigned to the political office typically searches
newspaper articles or the Internet for evidence of the candidate's
involvement in gross violations of human rights. The political office may
also consult human rights nongovernmental organizations in-country or
national commissions on human rights for any information they have on the
candidate. Other offices at the post to whom the candidate's name is sent
are expected to review any information they have and report the results of
their search to the political office. Finally, the post sends the
candidate's name to State headquarters to be distributed to relevant
bureaus for final review and approval.

Foreign Security Officials Not Always Vetted for Possible Human Rights
Violations

At the three posts we visited, we found lapses in human rights vetting for
foreign security forces, particularly in law enforcement training
programs. Table 4 shows the estimated number of law enforcement personnel
that U.S. officials estimated had received training but for whom no
vetting had occurred. U.S. officials based these estimates on the sizes of
the groups trained in each country for particular programs.

14This describes the general process of human rights vetting. There are
slight differences in details depending on whether the assistance involves
units or individuals and on whether funding is from the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act or DOD Appropriations Act for DOD training.

15In technical comments on this report, DOD stated that at Embassy
Jakarta, the sponsoring office, not the political affairs office,
circulates candidate information to other offices at post for their
review. However, DOD also offered contradictory information when it stated
that there is no difference in the details of the process whether the
funding source is Foreign Operations Appropriations Act or DOD
Appropriations Act for DOD training. In fact, DOD has additional
procedures to cable candidate information for DOD-funded training programs
(e.g., JCETS and CTFP) to State headquarters, DOD headquarters, and the
Pacific Command.

Table 4: Estimated Number of Foreign Law Enforcement Trainees Not Vetted,
Fiscal Years 2001-2004

Estimated number of law Country enforcement trainees not vetted

                               Philippinesa 1,175

                                Indonesiaa 4,000

                                Thailandb 1,760

                                  Total 6,935

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

aTrainees were trained under Justice's International Criminal
Investigative Training and Assistance program.

bThis number was derived by adding an estimated 1,439 trainees under
State's Narcotics Affairs Section and about 300 in-country trainees under
State's ATA program.

In addition, table 5 shows the results of a sample of trainee names that
we reviewed at each post to identify evidence of human rights vetting.

 Table 5: GAO Sample of Trainees for Vetting at Three Posts, Fiscal Years 2001-
                              2004 Sample Results

Implementing agency/country

    Number of trainees identified by post GAO sample size by program/ country

Some vetting documented

No vetting documented

DOD

Philippinesa 787 107 93

Indonesiab 353 10 10

Thailandc 795 25 25

State

                               Indonesiad  297    7             2             
                                Thailande  144   15                      13 2 
                              Philippines           
                                 Subtotal  787  107                     93 14 
                                Indonesia           
                                 Subtotal  650   17                      12 5 
                                 Thailand           
                                 Subtotal  939   40                      38 2 
                              Grand total 2,376 164                    143 21 
           Source: GAO analysis of agency           
                                    data.           
                                  Page 21           GAO-05-793 Southeast Asia 

aWe selected only DOD-managed programs and activities (IMET and FMF) for
our sample because the number of law enforcement trainees was not
available at the time of our visit to the post.

bThis number is composed of trainees for CTFP, E-IMET, Asia-Pacific
Center, and other miscellaneous DOD-managed programs and activities.

cThis number is composed of trainees for DOD-managed, IMET, FMS, CTFP, and
other miscellaneous programs.

dThis number is composed of trainees for State's ATA program.

e Total number of trainees under State's Thailand ATA program was 708,
which included 144 trainees sent to the United States for training. We
removed the 243 trainees from the ATA total that were not security forces
and thus not subject to human rights vetting. We also removed 321
in-country trainees from the total. These 321 are accounted for in table
4.

The Philippines. We found no evidence that any of the estimated 1,175
Filipino police forces receiving training under Justice's International
Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP)16 in
fiscal year 2004 were vetted for evidence of gross violations of human
rights. A post official said that a foreign service national in his office
responsible for ICITAP performed some vetting on these candidates, but
could not document the important step of coordinating with the political
affairs office as required by State guidance until late 2004. In addition,
we reviewed 107 randomly selected trainee files from an estimated total of
787 trainees in the DOD-implemented programs17 and found some evidence of
vetting in most instances (93 files). The remaining 14 files contained no
evidence that vetting had occurred.

Indonesia. We found no evidence that an estimated 4,000 Indonesian law
enforcement officials who received training under Justice's ICITAP were
vetted for possible human rights violations prior to October 2004. These
trainees include 32 police from a notorious unit ineligible for such
training under the ICITAP, according to State officials. In addition, our
review of 10 randomly selected DOD trainee files from an estimated total
of 353 trainees showed some evidence of vetting in all instances. Files
for DODimplemented training generally included evidence that the Political
Affairs Office was included in the vetting process, indicating a more
inclusive and independent post-wide review. Post officials said that they
had implemented new post-wide procedures in late 2004 to improve the
vetting process, and now vet candidates for all post programs in
accordance with earlier State guidance.

16ICITAP is funded by State's International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement program, but implemented by Justice.

17These programs all involved training under IMET, FMF, or CTFP.

Thailand. We found no evidence that the approximately 1,760 Thai law
enforcement officials who received training under the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act-funded law enforcement training programs were vetted
for possible human rights violations. In contrast, our review of 25
randomly selected DOD trainee files from an estimated total of 795
trainees in the DOD-implemented programs18 showed some evidence of
vetting. For example, DOD training files generally included an initialed
and dated checklist returned from the Political Affairs Office, indicating
the status of the post-wide review.

However, the DOD official in Thailand responsible for IMET training said
that his office did not submit names of individuals to receive in-country
IMET training to the country team for vetting because officials were not
aware of this responsibility. According to 1999 DOD guidelines, all
individuals and units scheduled for in-country DOD-implemented training
should be vetted. Officials and post estimates indicated that about half
of the 795 trainees were trained in-country between fiscal years 2001 and
2004. In technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the
post is now vetting all in-country military training, but provided no
evidence to support this.

Agencies Do Not Have Controls in Place to Help Ensure Compliance with
Human Rights Funding Restrictions

Lapses in vetting occurred because the agencies did not assign clear roles
and responsibilities for vetting foreign officials; departments and posts
lacked clear and consistent vetting procedures; and State and posts did
not establish a system to monitor compliance with these procedures. GAO's
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government prescribes basic
standards for management controls19 in the federal government. Internal
control is an integral part of an organization's management that provides
reasonable assurance that an entity achieves (1) effectiveness and
efficiency of operations, (2) reliability of financial reporting, and (3)

18The programs included FMF, IMET, and CTFP.

19See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government
(GAO/AIMD-0021.3.1, Nov. 1999).

compliance with applicable laws and regulations.20 As a result, U.S.
agencies did not always vet foreign security forces for derogatory human
rights information before providing them with U.S.-funded training
opportunities.

Vetting Process Lacks Clearly Neither State headquarters nor the three
posts we visited had clear roles

Defined Roles and Responsibilities

and responsibilities established for vetting foreign security forces
receiving State funding from fiscal years 2001 and 2004 or for monitoring
posts' or State headquarters' compliance with vetting procedures. As a
result, officials at the posts we visited expressed confusion over their
vetting roles and responsibilities, especially those related to law
enforcement training programs.

According to GAO's internal control standards, an organization should
establish a positive control environment, including an organizational
structure and clearly defined roles and responsibilities conducive to
sound management controls. However, State guidance did not establish a
single bureau to be responsible for implementing the vetting process or
for monitoring posts' compliance with vetting procedures. This was an
important omission because four State bureaus are involved in either
establishing policy or managing State-funded training programs: Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; and the Bureau
of East Asia and Pacific Affairs.

20Under these standards, management control is defined as consisting of
five interrelated components: (1) Control environment. Management should
establish a supportive environment for internal control and assign
authority and responsibility clearly throughout the organization and
clearly communicate this to all employees. (2) Risk Assessment. Management
needs to formulate an approach for assessing risk and decide upon the
internal control activities required to mitigate those risks and achieve
efficient and effective operations, reliable financial reporting, and
compliance with laws and regulations. (3) Control activities. Policies and
procedures are needed to help ensure that management's directives to
mitigate risks are carried out. These activities include accurate and
timely recording of transactions and events. (4) Information and
communication. Relevant and reliable information should be recorded and
communicated to management and others within the agency who need it and in
a form and within a time frame that enables them to carry out their
responsibilities. (5) Monitoring. Internal control monitoring assesses the
quality of performance over time and ensures that the findings of audits
and other reviews are promptly resolved.

State Lacks Clear Policies and Procedures for Vetting Foreign Security
Forces

State lacked clear policies and procedures for human rights vetting in
several areas: (1) only the Manila post established postwide procedures,
as required, prior to 2004; (2) State established no documentation and
record retention requirements regarding vetting documents; (3) the posts
did not conduct a comprehensive review of all candidates for assistance
through a central focal point, such as the political affairs office,
before 2004; (4) State headquarters did not specify whether posts needed
to submit candidates' names to State headquarters for additional review
and approval. According to GAO's internal control standards, policies and
procedures help enforce management directives and are integral to
achieving effective results.

State's June 1999 and 2003 guidance directed all posts to establish
procedures to implement the human rights restrictions for all Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act-funded aid to security forces and DODfunded
training. According to our internal control standards, policies and
procedures help enforce management directives and are integral to
achieving effective results. However, only Embassy Manila established
written procedures for human rights vetting as required prior to 2004.
Guidance issued in 1999 directed that posts report their procedures to the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor by a certain date, but a
Bureau official believed that posts had not done so. Nonetheless, prior to
2004, two of the three posts did not establish written policies and
procedures for the vetting process. Two of the three posts we visited-
Manila and Jakarta-established new written procedures for human rights
vetting in the fall 2004; the Bangkok post had not yet established written
procedures at the time of our visit in March 2005. In contrast, DOD and
State issued more detailed supplemental guidance to DOD officials at posts
for DOD-funded training, including criteria to apply in screening
candidates and checklists to track vetting processes.

State's 1999 and 2003 guidance also did not specify documentation and
record retention requirements for the documents used at posts or
headquarters in the human rights vetting process for Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act-funded assistance. As a result, the Jakarta post was
unable to provide us with any documentation of post vetting conducted for
ICITAP between fiscal years 2001 and 2004. By contrast, documentation for
vetting candidates for DOD-implemented training generally was more
complete, and included check-lists, approving signatures, and biographical
information on nominees in separate folders. DOD documentation was
generally better because DOD had established criteria and procedures for
screening candidates in the programs it manages. These procedures

Monitoring System Not Established to Assess Posts' Compliance with State
Policies

include a records retention requirement of at least 10 years for specific
programs.

State's guidance to the posts also stated that each post should designate
an embassy point of contact, such as political counselor, to coordinate a
comprehensive review of candidates for assistance by relevant members of
the country team. However, we found that such coordination had not
occurred before 2004 for Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-funded law
enforcement training. For example, post officials in Manila and Jakarta
stated that designated embassy points of contact began receiving names of
candidates for law enforcement training only in early 2004.

We found that the three posts did not consistently cable names of all
candidates for Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-funded training to
State headquarters for vetting by bureaus because State had not yet
written this procedure into guidance. Officials at State headquarters said
this procedure was required. During our efforts to clarify whether this
was a requirement, we asked State officials to identify the written
guidance specifically requiring posts to cable candidate names back to
Washington for further vetting. However, these officials could not
identify any specific language prior to February 2005 when State
headquarters issued new instructions to the posts. Officials at the
Embassy in Jakarta said they were not aware of this procedure, did not
cable names of candidates for Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-funded
training back to State headquarters, and wrote to State criticizing this
as a burdensome new procedure in 2005.

We found that no headquarters office within State currently is charged
with the responsibility of monitoring the posts' compliance with State's
human rights vetting procedures. However, our internal control standards
state that an organization should continually monitor as part of ongoing
operations to assess the quality of performance over time.

State and post officials are uncertain which office has the overall
responsibility for monitoring human rights vetting activities. Some
officials said that the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor had
this responsibility, while others cited the Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs or the Bureau for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Officials in
each bureau were unaware of which office had this responsibility. We found
that State's guidance to the posts between 1997 through 2005 contained no
provision that accorded this role and responsibility to any office. State
provided no evidence that any unit at State headquarters was fulfilling
this function.

Without a monitoring system in place, State could not identify instances
where a post was not complying with required procedures or instances where
confusion about requirements existed.

o 	In Indonesia, 32 members from a brigade associated with prior human
rights abuses were trained on six separate occasions under ICITAP between
July 2002 and March 2003. However, in testimony to the House International
Relations Committee in March 2003, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs said that no such brigade members
"currently participate in the ICITAP police program," at the time when
such individuals were participating in this training. State sought to
correct this situation by issuing written guidance to the post in November
2003.

o 	No one at State headquarters was aware that the three posts did not
consistently cable names of all candidates for Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act-funded training to State headquarters for vetting by
bureaus, although officials at headquarters said this was required. In
reviewing cable traffic related to human rights vetting from the three
posts, we found that the Jakarta Embassy had not cabled State headquarters
with names of any candidates for further vetting.

State Issued New Guidance to Improve Vetting Practices in February 2005

State issued new guidance in February 2005 intended to improve the
efficiency of the human rights vetting process. State announced that it
had established a new human rights database, the Abuse Case Evaluation
System (ACES), to be a clearinghouse for information on alleged human
rights abuses. According to the guidance, data will come from sources
currently used for human rights vetting, such as post reporting, press,
nongovernmental organizations, national human rights commissions, and
other sources. Users at posts and at State headquarters will be able to
enter a comment on allegations, and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor will check information for completeness and accuracy. As ACES
becomes populated with data, it could become an important tool for posts
and State to make human rights vetting more efficient and effective, as
well as to facilitate human rights monitoring and reporting in general,
according to the guidance. The guidance stated that posts will enter
incidents of alleged human rights abuses into ACES whenever they occur or
are reported to post. This step will replace the requirement that posts
report alleged abuses via cable and keep track of allegations at post.
Finally, the guidance established some roles and responsibilities for
offices at main

State, particularly when differences arise over credibility of evidence or
the response to such evidence.

However, this new system does not address all the deficiencies that we
found at the three posts and adds an additional resource concern. For
example, the guidance does not assign a monitoring role to any main State
office or procedures to ensure posts' compliance with vetting procedures.
In addition, because ACES will be a classified system, foreign national
employees at posts will not be allowed access to it. Foreign nationals
currently play an important role in entering and maintaining the available
human rights vetting data at posts but would not be allowed to do so using
the ACES database. Consequently, the new system might require cleared U.S.
post officials to assume database duties that could not be conducted by
foreign nationals. To date, State guidance has not addressed the potential
for either shifting responsibilities from foreign to U.S. employees at
posts or adding more U.S. personnel for this task.

U.S. Government Lacks an Integrated National Security Assistance Strategy
Covering All U.S. Training and Assistance Provided to Foreign Security
Forces

The U.S. government lacks a clear and coherent multiyear national security
assistance strategy, making it difficult to assess progress in achieving
stated U.S. foreign policy goals, such as stemming terrorism, promoting
regional stability, and demonstrating respect for human rights. State's
National Security Assistance Strategy, provided to Congress in May 2003,
meets two of nine objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000. The
strategy does not, however, identify how resources will be allocated to
accomplish objectives, how programs will be combined at the country level
to achieve objectives, or how security assistance programs will be
coordinated with other U.S. government agencies. In addition, the strategy
fails to discuss performance measures that are necessary to track the
achievement of goals and objectives. State and DOD have produced a variety
of other national, regional, and country-level strategic planning
documents, but these documents do not collectively satisfy the act's
objectives.

State's National Security State's National Security Assistance Strategy
meets two objectives of the Assistance Strategy Security Assistance Act of
2000; it is consistent with the U.S. National Addresses Two of Nine
Security Strategy21 and identifies overarching security assistance
objectives

(see table 6). State's strategy, however, does not cover the other
sevenObjectives of the Security objectives of the act. Assistance Act of
2000

Table 6: Objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 Addressed by
State's National Security Assistance Strategy

                   Security Assistance Act of 2000 Objectives

Addressed by State's 2003 National Security Assistance Strategy

Multiyear plan for security assistance programs? No

Consistent with the National Security Strategy of the U.S.? Yes

Coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint No Chiefs of
Staff?

Prepared in consultation with appropriate agencies? No

Identifies overarching security assistance objectives and how Yes programs
will contribute to achieving these objectives?

Identifies primary and secondary security assistance No objectives for
individual countries?

Identifies how resources (time, employees, funds) will be No allocated to
accomplish primary and secondary objectives?

Addresses how security assistance programs will be No combined at the
country level to achieve objectives?

Details how security assistance programs will be coordinated No with other
U.S. government assistance programs managed by DOD and other agencies?

Source: GAO analysis of State document.

21The U.S. National Security Strategy is prepared by the President,
through the National Security Council. Its purpose is to define a strategy
for maintaining U.S. security. It centers on the core national security
objectives of preserving peaceful relations with other states, political
and economic freedom, and respect for human dignity.

The Security Assistance Act of 2000 was designed to address previous
shortcomings22 in security assistance planning by providing Congress with
a clear and coherent multiyear plan for security assistance programs, on a
country-by-country basis. The act urged State to submit to Congress a
plan, prepared in consultation with other agencies, that identified
overarching security assistance objectives, the role specific programs
would play in achieving them, and resource allocations for each country.
Further, the Security Assistance Act of 200223 required State to brief
Congress on its plans and progress in formulating and implementing the
strategy, and to provide a description on the actions taken to include
such programs as IMET, FMF, and EDA, as well as other assistance programs
to foreign security forces in the strategy.

In response to the acts of 2000 and 2002, State prepared a 16-page
PowerPoint document entitled, "National Security Assistance Strategy
Briefing" and used it to brief selected congressional committees in May
2003 (see app. III for the briefing). State officials in the Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs said that the briefing constitutes State's
current National Security Assistance Strategy and that, through
negotiations with congressional committee staff, State was exempted from
annually updating the strategy, as urged in the law. We reviewed the
briefing to determine the extent to which the strategy addresses the nine
objectives of the acts and found the following.

o 	The strategy is not a multiyear plan since it was prepared only once
and does not discuss outyear program plans.

o 	The strategy was not prepared in coordination with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A State official
reported that the briefing was given together with representatives from
DSCA and OSD and provided us with OSD's six-page briefing on "DOD Security
Cooperation." However, in reviewing State's strategy, we did

22The Conference Report attached to the 2000 Security Assistance Act
expressed concern that the prior planning process had been "entirely
insufficient and...run on an ad hoc basis," without a "clearly articulated
organizing principle" or a "coherent set of benchmarks or measurements
against which the success of individual programs with various countries
can be measured." See House Conference Report No. 106-868, accompanying
the Security Assistance Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-280).

23P.L. 107-228, S:1501.

not find evidence that it was coordinated with OSD or the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

o 	Despite congressional direction, the strategy was not prepared in
consultation with other appropriate agencies. The briefing indicates that
the coordination process begins at the country level, includes DOD
priorities, occurs through State roundtables and an excess defense
articles coordinating committee, and through "day-to-day coordination."
However, State does not further detail whether it coordinates with other
appropriate agencies that provide assistance to foreign security forces,
such as Justice.

o 	The strategy does not discuss specific security assistance objectives
for each program on a country-by-country basis. Key countries such as
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand (among others) are identified but
the strategy does not identify which programs and security assistance
tools are being implemented in those countries.

o 	The strategy does not discuss the resources needed or used for the
various programs and how they will be combined at the country level to
achieve objectives. The outline accompanying the briefing asserts that
State's bureau and mission performance plans discuss how military
assistance tools contribute to achieving U.S. foreign policy goals at the
regional and country level, respectively. However, the strategy does not
incorporate key activity and resource information from these documents;

o 	Although the strategy lists key countries, it does not address how the
various programs are to be combined within each country to achieve
objectives. As mentioned, we identified at least 12 programs that provide
assistance to foreign security forces in Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Thailand. However, the strategy does not discuss how programs funded by
State's Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement in
Thailand, for example, are combined with DOD's in-country counternarcotics
activities.

o 	Finally, the strategy does not detail how security assistance programs
will be coordinated with other U.S. government assistance programs managed
by DOD and other agencies. Specifically, it does not identify all other
forms of assistance provided to foreign security forces under at least
three different funding sources-State, Defense, and Justice. State
officials said they are aware of related programs funded by DOD and

Justice that provide assistance to foreign security forces, but that they
do not consider those programs "security assistance" and would not include
them in a National Security Assistance Strategy.

In addition, the strategy fails to discuss the performance measures24 that
can be used to assess progress towards achieving goals. Our prior work has
emphasized that agencies should link strategic planning to performance
measures, and that performance measures can better inform-or justify- how
resources should be allocated to accomplish program objectives. Officials
in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand acknowledged that it is
difficult to generate quantitative performance measures for some security
assistance programs, but highlighted several qualitative measures, or "big
wins" in the region that help illustrate the effectiveness of U.S.
security assistance programs. For example, a senior U.S. official in
Thailand stated that Thai security forces are very supportive of the U.S.
government's war on terrorism and of reducing the demand for drugs. In the
Philippines, U.S. government officials highlighted the positive impact
U.S. government security assistance programs have had on the Philippine
Defense Reform effort.

Although not reflected in State's strategy, some efforts have been made to
develop more quantifiable measures. For example, State's Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs includes quantitative
measures for programs in its official interagency or intergovernmental
agreements with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Also, the Office
of Management and Budget's (OMB) Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART)25
uses performance measures to evaluate some of State's programs that
provide assistance to foreign security forces (and other federal
government programs). As part of the executive budget formulation process,
PART evaluators assess programs by applying 25 questions under four broad
topics: (1) program purpose and design, (2) strategic planning, (3)
program management, and (4) program results (i.e., whether a program

24Performance measures provide a succinct and concrete statement of
expected performance for subsequent comparison with actual performance. In
general, performance measures are a tabulation, calculation, recording of
activity or effort, or assessment of results compared with intended
purpose, that can be expressed quantitatively or in another way that
indicates a level or degree of performance.

25PART was developed as a key element of the President's Management Agenda
and is intended to assess and improve program performance so that the
federal government can achieve better results.

is meeting its long-term and annual goals).26 The 2004 PART reviews of
State's ATA program and Security Assistance Programs to the Western
Hemisphere were rated as "effective" and "moderately effective,"
respectively.27 However, we found that the latter review has limitations
because it identifies multiple programs, but rates them as one unit of
analysis. We reported in January 2004 that inherent challenges exist in
assigning a single rating to programs that have multiple purposes and
goals. In addition, the report cited that PART has merit but remains "a
work in progress that needs considerable revisions to be an objective,
evidencebased assessment tool."28

DOD's unified commands operate a Theater Security Cooperation Management
Information System (TSCMIS) to track training and other activities with
foreign security forces in their regional areas of responsibility.
Officials can use the system to assess the effect of DOD events on
country-level goals and objectives. U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) officials
reported that TSCMIS captures and stores key program data, but due to
resource constraints, they are uncertain whether information is
consistently entered into the system or maintained. In addition, the
assessments are conducted by activity managers and country directors and
are therefore not independent reviews of programs.

Related State and DOD Documents Address Selected Objectives of the
Security Assistance Act of 2000

State and DOD annually develop various country, regional, and national
strategy and planning documents that address some objectives of the
Security Assistance Act of 2000. Figure 4 illustrates how these documents
relate to each other. Appendix IV contains a detailed analysis of how
other State and DOD planning documents address objectives of the act.
Although none of these documents constitute a single, multiyear national
security assistance strategy that covers all agency programs, we found
that they offer the potential for developing the comprehensive assistance
strategy called for in the act.

26Additional questions are unique depending on the type of program (e.g.,
competitive grant, regulatory based, direct federal, etc.).

27PART uses five rating categories to assess programs: (1) effective, (2)
moderately effective, (3) adequate, (4) ineffective, and (5) results not
demonstrated.

28GAO. Performance Budgeting: Observations on the Use of OMB's Program
Assessment Rating Tool for the Fiscal Year 2004 Budget, GAO-04-174
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2004).

Figure 4: State and DOD Strategic Planning Documents

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD documents.

Note: The U.S. National Military Strategy is guided by the goals and
objectives contained in the President's "National Security Strategy" and
serves to implement the Secretary of Defense's 2004 "National Defense
Strategy of the United States of America."

We found that some State planning documents address certain objectives of
the act. For example, State develops annual Mission Performance Plans
(MPP) for each of its overseas posts. The 2006 MPPs for Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Thailand address some objectives of the Security
Assistance Act because they contain information on some programs that
provide assistance to foreign security forces, are generally consistent
with the National Security Strategy of the United States, and are prepared
in consultation with appropriate agencies at each post. State also
prepares annual regional level Bureau Performance Plans (BPPs) that are
consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States, and
to some extent, address how combining resources and programs will achieve
regional objectives.

DOD also produces annual country and regional planning documents that
address some objectives of the Security Assistance Act. For example, DOD's
annual country-specific security assistance plans for the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Thailand meet some objectives of the act because they are
consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States,
include some discussion of DOD-implemented assistance to foreign security
forces and how the assistance will be combined and contribute to achieving
certain "end states." Similarly, DOD's Theater Security Cooperation Plans
(TSCP) are prepared by DOD's unified commands and include regional
security assistance and other activities for the current year, plus the
next 2 fiscal years.29 PACOM's fiscal year 2004 TSCP addresses selected
objectives of the act. It is consistent with the U.S. National Security
Strategy, is coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and includes discussion of certain security cooperation
activities.

In commenting on a draft of this report, State observed that our report
does not include information about the Global Affairs Dashboard pilot
project, which State said has the potential to become a useful tool for
security assistance strategic planning. We were not informed in the course
of our review of the Global Dashboard, which has yet to be developed and
deployed.

Conclusion	U.S. agencies do not have adequate assurance that U.S. training
funds are being used to train and equip only foreign security forces with
good human rights backgrounds. Because they have weak internal controls,
the agencies inconsistently apply human rights vetting requirements.
Improved internal controls would provide greater assurance that all
individuals are properly vetted for human rights issues before receiving
U.S. assistance. State has not produced a clear and coherent national
security assistance strategy meeting the objectives of the Security
Assistance Act of 2000. As a result, it may be difficult for Congress to
assess the contributions that U.S. security assistance programs make to
broader U.S. foreign policy objectives and to have assurance that the
programs' objectives are being met. Without an integrated strategy for
U.S. security assistance that, at a minimum, addresses the nine elements
of the Security Assistance Act of 2000, the potential exists for
uncoordinated approaches, duplication of efforts, or gaps in coverage. As
a result, State and Congress will be

29We reviewed TSCP's for four of DOD's nine unified commands-U.S. Central
Command, European Command, Joint Forces Command, and Pacific Command.

deprived of an important source of information for making future resource
allocations and program decisions. Since a number of related State and DOD
strategic planning processes are already in place, the agencies could use
the plans produced under these related processes as the basis for
producing a new strategy that fully meets the objectives of the Security
Assistance Act of 2000.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To help provide assurance that foreign candidates of U.S. security
assistance programs comply with existing legislative restrictions and
State policies on human rights, we recommend that the Secretary of State,
in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Justice take the
following three actions to strengthen management controls by issuing new
consolidated guidance for vetting foreign security units. As part of these
new controls, posts and headquarters units should establish

o 	the roles and responsibilities of posts and headquarters units for
vetting foreign candidates for human rights consideration;

o 	written policies and procedures covering all entities involved in the
vetting process at posts, including documentation and record retention
policies specifying what documentation is needed and where and how long
vetting files should be maintained; and

o 	monitoring mechanisms and a central focal point to verify that these
procedures are being carried out properly.

To help provide both State and Congress with the information needed on how
U.S. security assistance programs help support U.S. foreign policy and
security objectives, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the
following actions using existing plans and strategies within State and DOD
as the basis for developing an integrated strategic plan for all U.S.
government assistance programs that provide training, equipment, or
technical assistance to foreign security forces (military and police).
This multiyear plan should be periodically reported to Congress in
response to the Security Assistance Act of 2000, which urged the Secretary
of State to develop a multiyear security assistance plan. In addition, the
strategy should

o 	be coordinated with the Departments of Defense and Justice and any
other agencies providing assistance to foreign security forces;

o 	identify all federal agency programs providing assistance to foreign
security forces, regardless of their funding source;

o 	describe all related resource allocations used to support program
goals, and;

o 	incorporate quantitative and qualitative performance measures designed
to determine the extent to which country programs contribute to broader
U.S. foreign policy and security objectives.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and State
and to the Attorney General for their review and comment. We received
written responses from the Secretaries of Defense and State that are
reprinted in appendixes V and VI. The Secretaries of Defense and State and
the Attorney General also provided us with technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate.

The Secretary of Defense concurred with our report in principle. However,
in technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD asserted that our
report states that DOD assistance programs in Indonesia and Thailand are
"100 percent compliant" with human rights vetting requirements. We
disagree with DOD's comment because our report did not conclude that DOD
programs in Indonesia and Thailand were "100 percent compliant." Instead,
our draft report stated that all 35 of the limited sample of trainee files
we reviewed in these two countries showed some evidence of human rights
vetting. The small sample size of the DOD-sponsored trainees relative to
the much larger sample of law enforcement trainees precluded us from
projecting our findings to the entire universe of DOD-sponsored trainees.
Furthermore, DOD later acknowledged in its comments on the draft report
that in-country trainees in Thailand-about half of the 795 trainees for
fiscal years 2001 to 2004-were not vetted during the period we reviewed.

The Secretary of State acknowledged the need for continued improvement on
human rights vetting procedures but stated that it is operating its
assistance programs in full compliance with the law. State commented that
any vetting of individuals is done as a matter of State policy and
practice, not as a matter of law. We agree with State's comment. However,
in reviewing State's application of its policy on human rights vetting of
individuals, we found significant weaknesses that resulted in an estimated
6,900 individuals receiving U.S. training assistance without any evidence

that they had first been vetted for gross violations of human rights.
Therefore, we recommended in our report that State strengthen its
management controls on vetting to meet its stated policy goal of not
providing U.S. assistance to suspected gross human rights violators.

State also commented that it has fully complied with congressional intent
regarding a national security assistance strategy. State disagreed with
our finding that the national security assistance strategy met only two of
nine objectives of the law. It said that our findings are based on
incomplete information because many of the objectives were met and
discussed in a May 2003 oral briefing with selected Congressional staff,
and that the absence of further requests for a briefing on the national
security assistance strategy or additional requirements relieved it of
further obligations. We disagree with State's comments. The documents,
which State identified as representing a national security assistance
strategy, met only two of nine objectives that the law urged State to
address in crafting this strategy. The briefing was a good first step, but
a detailed written plan is needed for wider distribution, and for
providing documentation for tracking progress in moving forward.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, and the Secretaries of Defense, Justice, and State. We will
also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8979 or at [email protected]. Contact points for
our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this
report are listed in appendix VII.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph A. Christoff
Director, International Affairs and Trade

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Chairman
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

The Honorable Mitch McConnell
Chairman
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations,

and Related Programs Committee on Appropriations United States Senate

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
Chairman
The Honorable Tom Lantos
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Charles H. Smith
Chairman
The Honorable Donald M. Payne
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights,

and International Operations Committee on International Relations House of
Representatives

The Honorable Jim Leach
Chairman
The Honorable Eni F. H. Faleomavaega
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Jim Kolbe
Chairman
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing,

and Related Programs Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

To identify the nature and extent of U.S. assistance to foreign security
forces in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, we met with officials
of the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice in Washington, D.C.,
responsible for administering various aspects of U.S. assistance programs
to foreign security forces. We also met with U.S. Pacific Command
officials in Honolulu, Hawaii; and U.S. Embassy and foreign government
officials in Manila, the Philippines; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Bangkok,
Thailand. We also obtained the statutory authorizations for these programs
from program officials and from our independent legal searches. We
obtained data on the nature and extent of the activities funded by these
programs in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand from program
officials and State and DOD Web sites. We reviewed the reliability of
funding data provided by State and DOD by comparing it with similar data
obtained from other sources to check for completeness, consistency, and
reasonableness. We also interviewed program officials responsible for
managing the data to assess how it was developed and maintained. We found
the data sufficiently reliable for representing the nature and extent of
program funding.

To assess the extent to which the three posts included in our review
complied with human rights vetting requirements from 2001 to 2004, we
reviewed program policy and procedures issued by State and DOD officials
in Washington, D.C., and at the three posts, and how these procedures were
implemented at each post. We also interviewed relevant officials in
Washington, PACOM, and the three posts, and discussed vetting requirements
and processes. At each post, we asked the relevant post officials to
identify the total number of foreign security officials trained under all
programs provided under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and DOD
appropriations act subject to the Leahy restrictions from 2001 to 2004. We
then randomly selected and reviewed program files for those officials. We
reviewed the files for compliance with human rights vetting requirements
as set forth in legislation and State policy guidance. To conduct the file
review, we used a data collection instrument to systematically capture
whether key steps in the post's human rights vetting process occurred,
such as whether the political affairs office at each post was involved.

We were able to estimate that 87 percent of files for DOD trainees in the
Philippines had some documentation subject to a sampling error of plus or
minus 10 percent. The 95 percent confidence interval surrounding this
estimate ranges from 80 percent to 92 percent. However, due to small
sample sizes for the other agencies in the other countries, we were unable
to make other reliable estimates about the percentage of files for which

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

some vetting occurred. The small sample sizes occurred because, after we
had drawn our sample, U.S. officials told us that no files existed for
several large groups of trainees, including approximately 4,000 trainees
under the ICITAP program in Indonesia and 1,439 trainees from the
Narcotics Affairs Section in Thailand. In addition, after we had drawn our
sample, we were told about other groups of trainees that had not been
vetted. As a result, our estimates for the numbers of trainees for which
no vetting occurred are based on officials' estimates of the numbers of
trainees that had taken the training that should have been vetted, not the
file review we conducted. To assess the reliability of the estimates on
trainees that had not received training, we interviewed officials, and
compared the estimates they provided with other available information.
While we found that some of the components in the estimates were less
precise than others, we determined that these estimates were sufficiently
reliable to indicate that many thousands of trainees had not been vetted.

In addition, to obtain a general understanding of the human rights
situation in each country, we also met with State human rights officers,
national commissions on human rights in each country, as well as
representatives of nongovernmental organizations involved with human
rights issues. Specifically, in the Philippines we met with Task Force
Detainees; in Indonesia, we met with The Commission for Involuntary
Disappearance and Victims of Violence, Voice of Human Rights in Indonesia,
and the National Forum for the Commission on Human Rights in Papua; and in
Thailand we met with Forum Asia and Human Rights Watch. In addition, we
met with nongovernmental organizations in Washington, D.C., to understand
the general human rights situation on countries included in our review:
Amnesty International, East Timor Action Network, Human Rights Watch, and
the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights.

To assess the U.S. government's national security assistance strategy, we
met with State, DOD, and Justice officials in Washington, D.C.,
responsible for managing and administering U.S. assistance to foreign
security forces. We also met with U.S. Pacific Command officials in
Honolulu, Hawaii; and U.S. Embassy officials in Manila, the Philippines;
Jakarta, Indonesia; and Bangkok, Thailand. We analyzed key planning
documents from State and DOD to determine the extent to which they
addressed the nine strategic objectives of the Security Assistance Act of
2000, that urged State to develop a multiyear National Security Assistance
Strategy. As part of this assessment, we analyzed State's Strategic Plan,
Mission Performance Plans for each post we visited, and the Bureau
Performance Plan for the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs. We also
assessed PACOM's Theater

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Security Cooperation Plan, reviewed three other unified command's theater
security cooperation plans, and assessed security assistance plans for the
three countries included in our review. To address the extent to which
State and DOD have performance measures for programs that train and equip
foreign security forces, we interviewed agency officials, reviewed OMB's
2004 and 2005 Performance Assessment Rating Tool assessments, DOD's
Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System, and Justice's
Letters of Agreement with other agencies and with the three countries
included in our review.

We conducted this review from June 2004 to June 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II

Descriptions of Assistance Programs to Foreign Security Forces

We use the term "allocations" to describe the broad mix of appropriated
and nonappropriated assistance being provided to foreign security forces
in these three countries. State and DOD appropriations accounted for 83
percent of the total; nonappropriated assistance in the form of Excess
Defense Articles and drawdowns from DOD stocks accounted for 13 percent of
the total; and DOD and Justice expenditures accounted for 4 percent of the
total. Expenditures data were used for the DOD's JCET program and
Justice's DEA and FBI training activities because separate appropriations
and country allocation data does not exist.

                    Table 7: Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA)

Managing unit(s)	The Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security,
Office of Antiterrorism Assistance implements and manages ATA with policy
guidance from the State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

Description of The ATA program supports a variety of activities to help
fight terrorism

activities	by building the capacity of key countries abroad to fight
terrorism; establishing security relationships between U.S. and foreign
officials to strengthen cooperative anti-terrorism efforts; sharing modern
effective anti-terrorism techniques; and leading training courses covering
such areas as law enforcement, protection of national leadership, control
of borders, protection of critical infrastructure, crisis management.

ATA by country Indonesia: $14,786,000 (fiscal years Philippines:
$1,939,000 2001 to 2004) Thailand: $0

Legal authority Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, P.L. 87-195, as amended,
22 USC for the program S:2349a.

                      Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Appendix II Descriptions of Assistance Programs to Foreign Security Forces

                               Table 8: Drawdown

Managing unit(s)	The Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA) is the agency tasked to execute DOD drawdown. DSCA
coordinates Defense, State, the National Security Council, and others to
develop drawdown packages. DSCA works with the military services to
identify available defense articles and services and monitors the progress
of deliveries.

Description of Drawdown is the transfer of in-stock defense articles and
services from

activities	the inventory of the DOD, as well as any agency of the U.S.
government, to foreign countries and international organizations in
response to unforeseen military emergencies, humanitarian catastrophes,
peacekeeping needs, or counternarcotics requirements.

Drawdown by Philippines: $10,000,000
country (fiscal Indonesia: $0
years 2001 to Thailand: $0
2004)a

Legal authority Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 USC
S:S:2318 and for the program 2348a

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

aFunds are not appropriated for drawdown.

                     Table 9: Excess Defense Articles (EDA)

Managing unit(s)	The military departments determine excess defense
articles and recommend an allocation of excess assets to the Excess
Defense Articles Coordinating Committee. The Committee is co-chaired by
the DOD's DSCA and State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of
Regional Security and Arms Transfers. The Coordinating Committee approves
allocation of EDA and the military departments work with the foreign
government to execute the transfer.

Description of EDAs are nonappropriated assistance in the form of excess
U.S.

activities	defense articles drawn from DOD stocks. Defense articles
declared as excess by the military departments can be offered to foreign
governments.

EDA by country Philippines: $19,504,000 (fiscal years Thailand: $5,972,000
2001 to 2004)a Indonesia: $0

Legal authority Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 USC S:2321j
for the program

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

aFunds are not appropriated for drawdown.

Appendix II Descriptions of Assistance Programs to Foreign Security Forces

                     Table 10: Economic Support Fund (ESF)

Managing unit(s)	U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
administers the program in foreign countries. USAID transfers some ESF
funds to State for administering certain activities.

Description of The ESF promotes economic and political stability in
strategically

activities	important regions where the U.S. has special security
interests. The funds are generally provided as grants or loans provided on
a grant basis and are available for a variety of economic purposes, such
as infrastructure and development projects.

ESF by country Indonesia: $23,200,000 (fiscal years Philippines: $0 2001
to 2004) Thailand: $0

Legal authority Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 USC S:2346
et. seq. for the program

                      Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

                   Table 11: Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

Managing unit(s)	Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs, Defense Security Cooperation Agency is the implementing agency.

Description of FMF provides grants and loans to foreign governments and

activities	international organizations for the acquisition of U.S. defense
equipment, services, and training. FMF assists the militaries of friendly
countries to promote bilateral, regional, and multilateral coalition
efforts, notably in the global war on terrorism; improve military
capabilities to contribute to international crisis response operations,
including peacekeeping and humanitarian crises; contribute to the
professionalism of military forces to include the rule of law and military
subordination to civilian control; enhance interoperability of military
forces, maintain support for democratically elected governments; and to
support the U.S. industrial base by promoting the export of U.S.
defense-related goods and services.

FMF by country Philippines: $115,745,000 (fiscal years Thailand:
$4,171,000 2001 to 2004) Indonesia: $0

Legal authority Arms Export Control Act of 1976, P.L. 90-629, as amended,
22 USC for the program S:2763.

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Appendix II Descriptions of Assistance Programs to Foreign Security Forces

Table 12: International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INCLE)

Managing unit(s)	Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) administers the program. INL uses
interagency agreements with 16 other U.S. government agencies, including
USAID, Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, Defense, DEA, FBI, and the
Coast Guard, to carry out INCLE activities.

Description of Development and coordination of U.S. international drug and
crime

activities	policies and programs through bilateral, regional, and global
initiatives that build law enforcement capabilities of foreign
governments. These efforts center on two primary goals: (1) ensuring that
international trafficking in drugs, persons, and other illicit goods are
disrupted and criminal organizations dismantled; and (2) encouraging
states to cooperate internationally to set up and implement antidrug and
anticrime standards.

INCLE by Thailand: $13,795,000 country (fiscal Indonesia: $4,000,000 years
2001 to Philippines: $2,000,000 2004)

Legal authority Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 USC S:2291.
for the program

                      Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Table 13: International Military Education and Training (IMET)

Managing unit(s)	Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
has authority over the program; DSCA is the implementing agency.

Description of The IMET program provides training to military and related
civilian

activities	personnel. IMET training exposes foreign students to U.S.
military organizations and procedures and the manner in which military
organizations function under civilian control. IMET aims to strengthen
democratic and civilian control of foreign militaries, improve their
understanding of U.S. military doctrine and operational procedures, and to
enhance interoperability. IMET facilitates the development of professional
and personal relationships, which aim to provide U.S. access and influence
to foreign governments.

IMET by country Philippines: $8,561,000 (fiscal years Thailand: $7,940,000
2001 to 2004) Indonesia: $1,275,000

Legal authority Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 USC S:2347.
for the program

                      Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Appendix II Descriptions of Assistance Programs to Foreign Security Forces

Table 14: Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)

Managing unit(s) Department of Defense, Special Operations Command

Description of JCET activities involve training U.S. Special Operations
Forces with

activities	foreign forces to ensure readiness regarding language, culture,
knowledge of foreign environments, combat and combat support, and
instructor skills. Training ranges from land navigation, first aid, basic
rifle marksmanship, leadership techniques, and special operations
techniques and tactics. The primary purpose of JCET is to train U.S.
Special Operations Forces. Benefits to the host nation forces are
incidental.

JCET by country Thailand: $5,040,000 (fiscal years Philippines: $4,730,00
2001 to 2004) Indonesia: $0 Legal authority for the program

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, as
amended, (P.L. 102-190), 10 U.S.C. S:2011.

                      Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Table 15: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

Managing unit(s)	Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
has authority over the program and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
is the implementing agency.

Description of PKO funding supports multilateral peacekeeping and regional
stability

activities	operations that are not funded through the UN. PKO funding
enhances the ability of other countries to participate in voluntary
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations and supports regional
peacekeeping operations for which neighboring countries take primary
responsibility.

PKO by country Philippines: $15,000,000 (fiscal years Thailand: $500,000
2001 to 2004) Indonesia: $0

Legal authority Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 USC S:2348.
for the program

                      Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Appendix II Descriptions of Assistance Programs to Foreign Security Forces

Table 16: Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)

Managing unit(s) 	Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low-intensity Conflict

Description of The CTFP provides education and training to foreign
military officers,

activities	ministry of defense civilians, and other foreign security
officials involved in combating terrorism. Foreign students attend U.S.
military educational institutions and selected regional centers for
non-lethal training. CTFP is used to bolster the capacity of friendly
foreign nations to detect, monitor, and interdict or disrupt the
activities of terrorist networks ranging from weapons trafficking and
terrorist-related financing to actual operational planning by terror
groups.

CTFP by country Indonesia: $4,200,00 (fiscal years Philippines: $2,000,000
2001 to 2004) Thailand: $769,000 Legal authority Defense Appropriations
Acts of 2002 (P.L. 107-117) and 2004, (P.L. for the program 108-87).

                      Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

                             Table 17: DEA Training

Managing unit(s) Drug Enforcement Administration, International Training
Section

Description of DEA's International Training Section offers basic and
advanced drug

activities	enforcement seminars, International Narcotics Enforcement
Managers Seminars, specialized training including training for Special
Investigations Units, and offers instruction at the International Law
Enforcement Academies. These activities aim to improve law enforcement
capabilities of foreign law enforcement agencies to encourage and assist
them in developing self-sufficient counter narcotics programs.

DEA training by Thailand: $398,000 country (fiscal Indonesia: $61,000
years 2001 to Philippines: $51,000 2004) Legal authority Department of
Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,

for the program	2002 (P.L. 107-77. Consolidated Appropriation Resolution,
2003 (P.L. 108-7). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-199).

                      Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Appendix II Descriptions of Assistance Programs to Foreign Security Forces

                             Table 18: FBI Training

Managing unit(s) Federal Bureau of Investigation International Training
Assistance

Description of The FBI's international training assistance includes
several activities:

activities	country capabilities/needs assessments; training of foreign
officials carried out in foreign countries; training of foreign officials
conducted in the United States; FBI instructor development; training at
International Law Enforcement Academies in Budapest, Hungary and Bangkok,
Thailand; and through the Mexican/American Law Enforcement Training
Initiative and the Pacific Rim Training Initiative.

FBI training by Philippines: $109,000
country (fiscal Thailand: $11,000
years 2001 to Indonesia: $0
2004)

                      Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

Appendix III

State Department National Security Assistance Strategy Briefing

Appendix III
State Department National Security
Assistance Strategy Briefing

Appendix III
State Department National Security
Assistance Strategy Briefing

Appendix III
State Department National Security
Assistance Strategy Briefing

Appendix III
State Department National Security
Assistance Strategy Briefing

Appendix III
State Department National Security
Assistance Strategy Briefing

Appendix III
State Department National Security
Assistance Strategy Briefing

Appendix III
State Department National Security
Assistance Strategy Briefing

Appendix III
State Department National Security
Assistance Strategy Briefing

Appendix III
State Department National Security
Assistance Strategy Briefing

Appendix III
State Department National Security
Assistance Strategy Briefing

Appendix III
State Department National Security
Assistance Strategy Briefing

Appendix III
State Department National Security
Assistance Strategy Briefing

Appendix III
State Department National Security
Assistance Strategy Briefing

Appendix III
State Department National Security
Assistance Strategy Briefing

Appendix III
State Department National Security
Assistance Strategy Briefing

Appendix IV

Other State and DOD Documents Address Some Objectives of the Security
Assistance Act of 2000

                         State documents DOD documents

Objectives

State strategic plan Bureau performance plans Mission performance plans Theater
  security cooperation plans Security assistance/ country implementation plans

1.	Multiyear plan (for security assistance programs)

2. Must be consistent with the

U.S. National Security

Strategy XX X X X

3. Coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff X X

4. Coordinated with all appropriate agencies X X

5. Identify overarching objectives and how programs will meet them X X

6. Identify primary and secondary objectives for each country

7. Identify how resources will be allocated to meet objectives

8. Address how combining resources and programs will achieve objectives in
each country X X

9. Details how State security assistance programs are coordinated with DOD
and other agencies' security assistance programs

                   Source: GAO analysis of agency documents.

                                   Appendix V

                    Comments from the Department of Defense

                                  Appendix VI

                     Comments from the Department of State

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

Appendix VI
Comments from the Department of State

                                 See comment 1.

Appendix VI
Comments from the Department of State

                                 See comment 2.

                                 See comment 3.

Appendix VI
Comments from the Department of State

                                 See comment 4.

                                 See comment 5.

Appendix VI
Comments from the Department of State

                                 See comment 6.

                                 See comment 7.

                                 See comment 8.

                                 See comment 9.

Appendix VI
Comments from the Department of State

                                See comment 10.

                                See comment 11.

                                See comment 12.

                                See comment 13.

                        See comment 14. See comment 15.

Appendix VI
Comments from the Department of State

                                See comment 15.

                                See comment 15.

                                See comment 16.

                                See comment 17.

                                See comment 18.

Appendix VI
Comments from the Department of State

                                See comment 19.

                                See comment 20.

                                See comment 21.

                                See comment 15.

                                 See comment 7.

Appendix VI
Comments from the Department of State

                                See comment 22.

                                See comment 23.

                                 See comment 6.

                                  Appendix VI
                     Comments from the Department of State

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State letter dated
July 12, 2005.

GAO Comments 1.

2.

State commented that the Leahy provisions apply only to units, not
individuals, of foreign security forces, and said that applying human
rights restrictions at the individual level is a matter of policy. State
also asserted that it takes additional measures to avoid the provision of
U.S. assistance to individuals suspected of gross human rights violations,
whether inside or outside the security unit setting. However, our work
showed that State's policy is not being effectively implemented. We found
that an estimated 6,900 individuals received U.S. training assistance
without any evidence that they had first been vetted for gross violations
of human rights. Therefore, we recommended in the report that State
strengthen its management controls to meet its stated policy goal of not
providing U.S. assistance to suspected gross human rights violators.

State said that U.S. embassies in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand
reviewed their human rights vetting procedures and brought them into
compliance with Department guidance. We agree that embassies in Manila and
Jakarta wrote their human rights vetting procedures during the course of
our review to bring them into compliance with State guidance. However,
Embassy Bangkok does not have written procedures and is not in compliance
with State guidelines. More importantly, State lacks a system for
monitoring compliance with its guidelines. As discussed in our report, we
found that no headquarters office within State is currently charged with
the responsibility of monitoring the posts' compliance with State's human
rights vetting procedures and recommended that such a monitoring mechanism
be established to verify that these procedures are being carried out
properly. Such a system would help eliminate the major gaps in vetting we
found at the three posts we visited.

State further commented that the State-run International Law Enforcement
Academies and Philippines ATA programs have been fully incorporated in
human rights vetting procedures since 1999. However, this comment is not
relevant to our main finding that we found no evidence that about 6,900
foreign security forces were vetted for human rights concerns before
receiving U.S. law enforcement training under ICITAP.

Appendix VI
Comments from the Department of State

3.	State acknowledged the need for continued improvement, especially
concerning better oversight of the implementation of posts' procedures. It
noted that some oversight is provided through the periodic Inspector
General inspections. State said that it purposely allows the posts
flexibility in deciding vetting guidelines. We contacted the State
Inspector General and found that their periodic post inspections have not
included assessments of State's human rights vetting process at any of the
three posts. We found that State had conducted an inspection at only one
post--Embassy Bangkok--between fiscal years 2001 through 2004.

4.	We disagree with State's comments that (1) central oversight of posts'
compliance with vetting requirements in a single office is not needed, and
(2) its new database system will mitigate the need for centralization in
one bureau. As stated in our report, no office within State is charged
with the overall responsibility of monitoring posts' compliance with human
rights vetting requirements, which has led to lapses in the vetting
process across all three posts. Currently, four different bureaus within
State share some responsibility for implementing these requirements. This
has resulted in confusion in the field and gaps in implementing
departmental vetting policies. State's guidance issued to the posts
between 1997 through 2005 did not assign this role and responsibility to
any one office. A central focal point would help identify instances where
a post was not complying with required procedures or instances where
confusion about requirements existed. The new database, alone, will not
solve the vetting problems we identified or replace the need for
designating an office with the express responsibility of monitoring how
posts implement their human rights vetting requirements.

5.	We disagree with State's statement that our decision to include a full
range of programs and activities supporting foreign military and police
forces within the scope of our review undermined our assessment of State's
compliance with the Security Assistance Act. As officials with State's
Bureau of Legal Affairs repeatedly stated, there is no statutory
definition of "security assistance," or even a commonly agreed-upon
definition within the federal government. In the absence of a legal
definition, and for the purposes of our report, we defined security
assistance as U.S. government assistance to train and equip foreign
security forces (military and police). Although State officials indicated
that it traditionally considers security assistance to include FMF, IMET,
EDA, and PKO programs, the Security Assistance Act of 2002 states

Appendix VI
Comments from the Department of State

that FMF, IMET and EDA as well as other similar training programs to
foreign security forces shall be included in State's briefing on the
strategy. It will be difficult for State to craft a comprehensive security
assistance strategy, as called for in our report, without including at
least the 12 related programs and activities described in our report.

6.	We disagree that the absence of further requests for a briefing on the
national security assistance strategy somehow changed the intention of the
Security Assistance Act of 2000 to have an annual report to Congress. The
Security Assistance Act of 2000 urged State to provide an annual strategy
while the 2002 act mandated a status briefing on the development of that
strategy. We understand that State fulfilled its requirement to brief the
committees on the progress of the strategy, as called for in the 2002 act,
but we disagree that a lack of request for additional briefings altered
the intention of the 2000 act, which urged State to provide an annual
National Security Assistance Strategy to Congress.

7.	The briefing was a good first step, but a detailed written plan is
needed for wider distribution, and for providing documentation for
tracking progress in moving forward.

8.	We agree with State's observation that our report does not include
information about the Global Affairs Dashboard pilot project, which State
said has the potential to become a useful tool for security assistance
strategic planning. Although we were not informed in the course of our
review of the Global Dashboard, which has yet to be developed and
deployed, we support all State efforts to develop better strategic
planning tools for U.S. security assistance programs. We have revised the
report to reflect this new information.

9.	We have made changes in the body of the report to reflect State's
comment that the draft incorrectly referred to IMET and FMF as DOD
programs, when they are Foreign Operations Appropriations Actfunded
programs.

10. The draft report already reflected the distinction between State
policy and the law.

11. We have updated the report to reflect State's comment.

Appendix VI
Comments from the Department of State

12. We agree with State's comment that Embassy Manila had written
procedures for human rights vetting prior to 2004 and made changes in the
report to reflect this comment. However, we disagree with State's comment
that Embassy Manila provided us with all relevant documents during our
visit in March 2005, including an October 2000 cable outlining post human
rights vetting procedures. In fact, the post provided us only with the
procedures in effect since late 2004.

13. We have revised the graphic to reflect State's comment that no EDA
articles were transferred to Indonesia.

14. We have revised the graphic to correct the value for CTFP.

15. State commented that ATA allocations should be $7.8 million, rather
than $1.9 million, for the Philippines; $19.1 million, rather than $14.8
million, for Indonesia; and $4.2 million, rather than zero, for Thailand.
In subsequent discussions with State officials, they said that these
figures represent "either obligations or expenditures," and not
allocations, as we requested. We could not verify the numbers that they
provided through agency comments and State was not able to provide us with
corrected values for the allocations. As a result, we made no changes to
the report and reported the available ATA country allocations as presented
in State's Congressional Budget Justifications.

16. We revised our report language to reflect State's comment.

17. State misinterpreted our generic description of the human rights
vetting process, which was not intended to imply that all State officials
share a common understanding of vetting policies and procedures. During
our fieldwork at the three posts, we found major gaps in the
implementation of State's vetting procedures.

18. We have changed the report to reflect State's comment that it is the
responsibility of the initiating office in Jakarta, not the political
section, to obtain clearances from all other sections.

19. State asserts that some of the 300 ATA in-country trainees in Thailand
who were not vetted were not members of the security forces and thus
should be excluded from the table. However, we carefully separated out
non-security forces from our review before assessing compliance with human
rights vetting procedures. Our numbers were based on our file review in
Embassy Bangkok and discussion with the ATA Program

Appendix VI
Comments from the Department of State

Director. This analysis showed that of 708 ATA trainees between 2001 and
2004; 144 were security forces sent to the United States, 321 were
security forces trained in Thailand, but not vetted; and 243 were
nonsecurity forces trained in Thailand for whom vetting was not required.

20. We disagree with State's comment that the number of Indonesian
trainees from 2001 through 2004 is 705. We revised the incorrect figure
(210) in our report to reflect the number (297) provided by the post in
its "DS/ATA Indonesia Summary Sheet."

21. We disagree with State's comment that we may be implying a
relationship between the ATA program and all security assistance programs
to the western hemisphere, based on our discussion of PART ratings in our
draft report. We did not intend to imply a relationship between the two
programs. As stated in our draft report, the 2004 PART conducted two
separate reviews. One review was for the ATA program, which it rated as
"effective." The other review was for all security assistance programs to
the Western Hemisphere, which were rated as "moderately effective."

22. State contends that the National Security Assistance Strategy is a
multiyear plan because the Bureau Performance Plans are multiyear
documents. The Bureau Performance Plans are different documents and serve
a different purpose as indicated in our report. We acknowledge in the
report that the Bureau Performance Plans are consistent with the National
Security Strategy of the United States, and to some extent address how
combining resources and programs will achieve regional goals as called for
in the act. However, the Bureau Performance Plans do not constitute a
National Security Assistance Strategy.

23. State said that it coordinated development of the National Security
Assistance Strategy with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and other appropriate agencies. We acknowledge that State's annual
roundtables and other communications are useful in developing and
"fine-tuning" security assistance goals and objectives. However, we did
not find anyone in those offices who participated in developing the
National Security Assistance Strategy -the briefing slides, outline, and
oral presentation. One State official earlier had said that DOD officials
were involved only in presenting a briefing on EDA as part of State's
Strategy briefing and a separate briefing on DOD's security cooperation
efforts.

Appendix VII

                     GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact Joseph A. Christoff (202) 512-8979

Staff 	In addition to the individual named above, Stephen M. Lord,
Assistant Director; Jeffrey D. Phillips; Ann M. Ulrich; Jonathan Ban;
Matthew Helm;

Acknowledgments	Lynn Cothern; Mary Moutsos; and Sidney Schwartz made key
contributions to this report.

GAO's Mission

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts newly
released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To have
GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."

Order by Mail or Phone 	The first copy of each printed report is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out
to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25
percent. Orders should be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: 	Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061

To Report Fraud, Contact:

Waste, and Abuse in Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: [email protected] Programs Automated answering system: (800)
424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4400Congressional U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street
NW, Room 7125 Relations Washington, D.C. 20548

Public Affairs 	Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548

                           PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
*** End of document. ***