DOD Business Transformation: Sustained Leadership Needed to
Address Long-standing Financial and Business Management Problems
(08-JUN-06, GAO-05-723T).
In July 2004, GAO testified before Congress on the impact and
causes of financial and related business weaknesses on the
Department of Defense's (DOD) operations and the status of DOD
reform efforts. The report released today highlights that DOD
still does not have management controls to ensure that its
business systems investments are directed towards integrated
corporate system solutions. GAO's reports continue to show that
fundamental problems with DOD's financial management and related
business operations result in substantial waste and inefficiency,
adversely impact mission performance, and result in a lack of
adequate accountability across all major business areas. Over the
years, DOD leaders attempted to address these weaknesses and
transform the department. For years, GAO has reported that DOD is
challenged in its efforts to effect fundamental financial and
business management reform and GAO's ongoing work continues to
raise serious questions about DOD's chances of success. Congress
asked GAO to provide information on the (1) pervasive
long-standing financial and business management weaknesses that
affect DOD's efficiency, (2) cost of and control over the
department's business systems investments, and (3) legislative
actions needed to enhance the success of DOD's business
transformation efforts.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-723T
ACCNO: A26077
TITLE: DOD Business Transformation: Sustained Leadership Needed
to Address Long-standing Financial and Business Management
Problems
DATE: 06/08/2006
SUBJECT: Accountability
Agency missions
Budget functions
Cost analysis
Cost effectiveness analysis
Decision making
Defense cost control
Defense economic analysis
Federal agency reorganization
Financial management
Internal controls
Human capital management
Business operations
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-05-723T
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Finance, and
Accountability, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT June 8, 2005
DOD BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION
Sustained Leadership Needed to Address Long-standing Financial and Business
Management Problems
Statement of Gregory D. Kutz
Managing Director
Forensic Audits and Special Investigations
Randolph C. Hite
Director, Information Technology Architecture
and Systems Issues
a
GAO-05-723T
[IMG]
June 8, 2005
DOD BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION
Sustained Leadership Needed to Address Long-standing Financial and Business
Management Problems
What GAO Found
Overhauling the financial management and business operations of one of the
largest and most complex organizations in the world represents a daunting
challenge. Eight DOD program areas, representing key business functions,
are on GAO's high-risk list, and the department shares responsibility for
six other governmentwide high-risk areas, meaning that DOD is fully or
partially responsible for 14 of the 25 high-risk areas in the federal
government. DOD's substantial financial and business management weaknesses
adversely affect not only its ability to produce auditable financial
information, but also to provide accurate, complete, and timely
information for management and Congress to use in making informed
decisions. Further, the lack of adequate accountability across all of
DOD's major business areas results in billions of dollars in annual wasted
resources in a time of increasing fiscal constraint and has a negative
impact on mission performance.
Impact of Weaknesses in Human Capital Management, Internal Control, and
Systems Business area affected Problem identified
Military pay Injured and ill reserve component soldiers-who are entitled
to extend their active duty service to receive medical treatment-have been
inappropriately removed from active duty status causing significant gaps
in their pay and medical benefits. The current stovepiped, nonintegrated
personnel and pay systems are labor intensive and require extensive
error-prone manual entry and reentry of data.
Logistics DOD does not have the ability to provide timely, complete, or
accurate information on the location, movement, status, or identity of its
supplies, even though total asset visibility has been a departmentwide
goal for over 30 years.
Systems DOD lacks the management structure to effectively control billions
of dollars being spent each year to operate, maintain, and modernize its
reported 4,150 duplicative, nonintegrated business systems.
Source: GAO.
The department has recently taken several steps to address provisions of
the fiscal year 2005 defense authorization act which are aimed at
improving DOD's business systems management practices. For example, DOD
has established the Defense Business Systems Management Committee to
oversee its business systems modernization efforts. However, DOD's overall
transformation efforts have not adequately addressed the key causes of
past reform failures. Lessons learned from these previous reform attempts
include the need for sustained leadership at the highest level and a
strategic and integrated plan. The seriousness of DOD's weaknesses
underscores the importance of no longer condoning the "status quo."
To improve the likelihood that DOD's transformation efforts will succeed,
GAO proposes that business systems funding be appropriated to the approval
authorities responsible for business systems investments. Additionally,
GAO suggests that a senior management position be established to provide
sustained leadership for DOD's overall business transformation. Absent
this unified responsibility, authority, accountability, and control of
funding, DOD's transformation efforts are likely to fail.
United States Government Accountability Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
It is a pleasure to be back before this Subcommittee to discuss business
transformation efforts at the Department of Defense (DOD). At the outset,
I would like to thank the Subcommittee for having this hearing and
acknowledge the important role hearings such as this one serve in
addressing DOD's business transformation challenges. DOD spends billions
of dollars each year to sustain key business operations that support our
forces, including systems and processes related to acquisition and
contract management, financial management, supply chain management,
support infrastructure management, human capital management, and other key
areas. Recent and ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and
new homeland defense missions have led to higher demands on our forces in
a time of growing fiscal challenges for our nation. In an effort to better
manage DOD's resources, the Secretary of Defense has appropriately placed
a high priority on transforming key business processes to improve their
efficiency and effectiveness in supporting the department's military
mission.
However, as discussed in the report1 being released at this hearing and
previous reports and testimonies, fundamental problems with DOD's
financial management and related business operations continue to cause
substantial waste and inefficiency, have an adverse impact on mission
performance, and result in the lack of adequate transparency and
appropriate accountability across all major business areas. Of the 25
areas on GAO's governmentwide high-risk list, 8 are DOD specific program
areas related to key business functions, and the department shares
responsibility for 6 other high-risk areas that are governmentwide in
scope.2 These problems preclude the department from producing reliable and
timely information to make sound decisions and to accurately report on its
trillions of dollars of assets and liabilities.
1GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Billions Being Invested without
Adequate Oversight, GAO-05-381 (Washington, D.C: Apr. 29, 2005).
2GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January
2005). The eight specific DOD high-risk areas are (1) approach to business
transformation, (2) business systems modernization, (3) contract
management, (4) financial management, (5) personnel security clearance
program, (6) supply chain management, (7) support infrastructure
management, and (8) weapon systems acquisition. The six governmentwide
high risk areas that include DOD are: (1) disability programs, (2)
interagency contracting, (3) information systems and critical
infrastructure, (4) information sharing for homeland security, (5) human
capital, and (6) real property.
Today, my testimony will focus on two of the high-risk areas-financial
management and business systems modernization. Both of these areas have
been designated as high-risk since 1995-a decade ago. In this regard, my
testimony will provide our perspectives on the (1) pervasive longstanding
financial and business management weaknesses that affect DOD's efficiency,
(2) cost of and control over the department's business systems
investments, and (3) legislative actions needed to enhance the success of
DOD's business transformation efforts-specifically, the central control of
business systems investment funding and establishment of a chief
management official. Implementation of these two suggestions would provide
the sustained top-level leadership and accountability needed and thereby
increase the likelihood of successful business transformation.
My statement is based upon the report3 released today, as well as our
previous reports and testimonies. Our work was performed in accordance
with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary DOD's substantial long-standing management problems related to
business operations and systems have adversely affected the economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness of its operations; and, in some cases,
impacted the morale of our fighting forces that are in harms way. These
problems have left the department vulnerable to billions of dollars of
fraud, waste, and abuse annually, at a time of increasing fiscal
constraint and have resulted in a lack of adequate accountability across
all major business areas. Additionally, our report released today
describes other indicators of the department's limited progress in
transforming its business operations and systems. This year, we added
DOD's overall approach to business transformation to our high-risk list4
because DOD lacks a strategic and integrated business transformation plan
and because we have concerns over DOD's lack of adequate management
responsibility and accountability to achieve and sustain business reform
on a broad, strategic, departmentwide, and integrated basis. The following
examples indicate the magnitude and severity of the resulting problems.
3GAO-05-381. 4GAO-05-207.
o As we testified5 before this Subcommittee on March 16, 2005, mobilized
Army National Guard soldiers have experienced significant problems getting
accurate, timely, and consistent reimbursement for out-of-pocket travel
expenses. One of the primary causes for these problems is rooted in the
paper-intensive process used by DOD to reimburse Army National Guard
soldiers for their travel expenses.
o DOD does not have the ability to provide timely or accurate information
on the location, movement, status, or identity of its supplies. Although
total asset visibility has been a departmentwide goal for over 30 years,
DOD currently estimates that it will not achieve this goal until the year
2010.6
o DOD's continued supply chain problems resulted in shortages of items in
Iraq. As discussed in our April 2005, report, demands for items like
vehicle track shoes, batteries, and tires exceeded their availability
because the department did not have accurate or adequately funded Army war
reserve requirements and had inaccurate forecasts of supply demands for
the operation. Furthermore, the Army's funding approval process delayed
the flow of funds to buy them. In addition, numerous problems, such as
insufficient transportation, personnel, and equipment, as well as
inadequate information systems, hindered DOD's ability to deliver the
right items to the right place at the right time for the warfighter. Among
the items the department had problems delivering were generators for
assault amphibian vehicles, tires, and Meals Readyto-Eat.7
o DOD's stovepiped, duplicative, and nonintegrated systems environment
contributes to these operational problems and costs the American taxpayers
billions of dollars each year. For fiscal year 2005, the department
requested approximately $13 billion to operate, maintain,
5GAO, Army National Guard: Inefficient, Error-Prone Process Results in
Travel Reimbursement Problems for Mobilized Soldiers, GAO-05-400T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005).
6GAO, Defense Inventory: Improvements Needed in DOD's Implementation of
Its Long-Term Strategy for Total Asset Visibility of Its Inventory,
GAO-05-15 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2004).
7GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of
Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).
and modernize its reported 4,150 business systems-an increase of about
1,900 in the number of reported systems since last year.
Because of the department's flawed processes, we found that DOD is not in
compliance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003, which requires the DOD Comptroller to determine that system
improvements with obligations exceeding $1 million meet the criteria
specified in the act. Based upon DOD's reported data, system improvements
totaling about $651 million of obligations over $1 million were not
reviewed by the DOD Comptroller before obligations were made since passage
of the 2003 act. Further evidence of DOD's problems is the long-standing
inability of any military service or major defense component to pass the
test of an independent financial audit or provide timely reliable and
complete information for DOD decision makers because of pervasive
weaknesses in the department's financial management systems, operations,
and controls.
The seriousness of DOD's business management weaknesses underscores the
importance of no longer condoning "status quo" business operations at DOD.
To improve the likelihood that the department's current business
transformation efforts will be successful, we propose that those who are
responsible for business systems modernization control the allocation and
execution of funds for DOD business systems. Investments in the
modernization of the department's business systems need to be directed
towards integrated corporate system solutions to common DOD-wide problems,
and not the perpetuation of the stovepiped, duplicative systems
environment that exists today.
Additionally, due to the complexity and long-term nature of these
transformation efforts, strong and sustained executive leadership is
needed if DOD is to succeed. We believe one way to ensure this strong and
sustained leadership over DOD's business management reform efforts would
be to create a full-time, executive-level II position for a chief
management official (CMO), who would serve as the Deputy Secretary of
Defense for Management.8 We believe that the new CMO position should be
filled by an individual appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, for a set term of 7 years. Articulating the role and
responsibilities of the position in statute and establishing a term that
spans administrations
8GAO, Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform
DOD Business Operations, GAO-05-629T (Washington, D.C.: Apr.28, 2005).
underscores the importance of a professional, nonpartisan approach to this
business management-oriented position. This position would serve as a
strategic integrator to elevate and institutionalize the attention
essential for addressing key stewardship responsibilities, such as
strategic planning, enterprise architecture development and
implementation, information technology (IT), and financial management,
while facilitating the overall business management transformation within
DOD. The CMO would not conduct the day-to-day management functions of the
department; therefore, creating this position would not add an additional
hierarchical layer to the department. Day-to-day management functions of
the department would continue to be the responsibility of the
undersecretaries of defense, the service secretaries, and others. Just as
the CMO would need to focus full-time on business transformation, we
believe that the day-today management functions are so demanding that it
is difficult for these officials to maintain the oversight, focus, and
momentum needed to implement and sustain needed reforms of DOD's overall
business operations.
We are confident that transforming DOD's business operations and making
them more efficient would free up resources that could be used to support
the department's core mission, enhance readiness, and improve the quality
of life for our troops and their families. It is worth noting that on
April 14, 2005, a bill was introduced in the Senate that would require the
establishment of a CMO that would be appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, for a set term of 7 years.9
In written comments on a draft of the report released today, DOD agreed
with our four recommendations and briefly outlined its actions for
addressing them.
Background Because DOD is one of the largest and most complex
organizations in the world, overhauling its business operations represents
a huge management challenge. In fiscal year 2004, DOD reported that its
operations involved $1.2 trillion in assets, $1.7 trillion in liabilities,
over 3.3 million in military and civilian personnel, and over $605 billion
in net cost of operations. For fiscal year 2005, the department received
an annual appropriation of about $417 billion and was appropriated about
$76 billion for the global war on
9S. 780, 109th Cong. (2005).
terrorism. Execution of DOD's operations spans a wide range of defense
organizations, including the military services and their respective major
commands and functional activities, numerous large defense agencies and
field activities, and various combatant and joint operational commands
that are responsible for military operations for specific geographic
regions or theaters of operation. To support DOD's operations, the
department performs an assortment of interrelated and interdependent
business processes, including logistics, procurement, health care, and
financial management.
Transformation of DOD's business systems and operations is critical to the
department providing Congress and DOD management with accurate and timely
information for use in the decision-making process. This effort is an
essential part of the Secretary of Defense's broad initiative to
"transform the way the department works and what it works on." The
Secretary of Defense has estimated that improving business operations of
the department could save 5 percent of DOD's annual budget, which based on
fiscal year 2005 appropriations, represents a savings of about $25
billion.
Pervasive Financial and Business Management Problems Affect DOD's Efficiency
and Effectiveness
For several years, we have reported that DOD faces a range of financial
management and related business process challenges that are complex,
long-standing, pervasive, and deeply rooted in virtually all business
operations throughout the department. As the Comptroller General testified
in April 2005,10 DOD's financial management deficiencies, taken together,
continue to represent a major impediment to achieving an unqualified
opinion on the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements. To
date, none of the military services has passed the test of an independent
financial audit because of pervasive weaknesses in internal controls and
processes and fundamentally flawed business systems.
In identifying improved financial performance as one of its five
governmentwide initiatives, the President's Management Agenda recognized
that without sound internal controls and accurate and timely financial and
performance information, it is not possible to accomplish the President's
agenda and secure the best performance and highest measure of
accountability for the American people.
10GAO-05-629T.
Pervasive Weaknesses Impact DOD Operations
Long-standing weaknesses in DOD's financial management and related
business processes and systems have (1) resulted in a lack of reliable
information needed to make sound decisions and report on the status of DOD
activities, including accountability of assets, through financial and
other reports to Congress and DOD decision makers; (2) hindered its
operational efficiency; (3) adversely affected mission performance; and
(4) left the department vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse, as the
following examples illustrate.
o The current inefficient, paper-intensive, error-prone travel
reimbursement process has resulted in inaccurate, delayed, and denied
travel payments for mobilized Army Guard soldiers. We found a broad range
of reimbursement problems that included disputed amounts for meals that we
estimated to be as high as about $6,000 for each of 76 soldiers in one
case study that remained unpaid by the end of our review. Until DOD
improves the antiquated process that requires Army Guard soldiers to
accumulate, retain, and submit numerous paper documents, reimbursement
problems and inefficiencies will likely continue. Of approximately 930,000
travel vouchers received between fiscal years 2002 and 2004, the Defense
Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Contingency Travel Operations Office
rejected and returned about 139,000 vouchers to soldiers for additional
paper documentation or to correct other processing deficiencies. This
repeated churning of vouchers frustrated soldiers and added to the volume
of claims to be processed.11
o Injured and ill reserve component soldiers-who are entitled to extend
their active duty service to receive medical treatment-have been
inappropriately removed from active duty status in the automated systems
that control pay and access to medical care. The current stovepiped,
nonintegrated systems are labor-intensive and require extensive
error-prone manual entry and reentry. Inadequate controls resulted in some
soldiers experiencing significant gaps in their pay and medical benefits,
causing hardships for the soldiers and their families. In addition,
because these soldiers no longer had valid active duty orders, they did
not have access to the commissary and post exchange-which allows soldiers
and their families to purchase groceries and other goods at a discount. In
one case we reviewed,
11GAO-05-400T.
during a 12-month period, while attempting to obtain care for injuries
sustained from a helicopter crash in Afghanistan, one Special Forces
soldier fell out of active duty status four times. During the times he was
not recorded in the system as being on active duty, he was not paid and he
and his family experienced delays in receiving medical treatment. In all,
he missed payments for 10 pay periods-totaling $11,924.12
o Ninety-four percent of mobilized Army National Guard and Reserve
soldiers we investigated during two audits13 had pay problems. These
problems distracted soldiers from their missions, imposed financial
hardships on their families, and may have a negative impact on retention.
The processes and automated systems relied on to provide active duty
payments to mobilized Army Guard and Reserve soldiers are so error-prone,
cumbersome, and complex that neither DOD nor, more importantly, the
soldiers themselves could be reasonably assured of timely and accurate
payments. Some of the pay problems soldiers experienced often lingered
unresolved for considerable lengths of time, some for over a year.
o DOD continues to lack visibility and control over the supplies and
spare parts it owns. Therefore, it cannot monitor the responsiveness and
effectiveness of the supply system to identify and eliminate choke
points.14 Currently, DOD does not have the ability to provide timely or
accurate information on the location, movement, status, or identity of its
supplies. Although total asset visibility has been a departmentwide goal
for over 30 years, DOD estimates that it will not achieve this visibility
until the year 2010. DOD may not meet this goal by 2010, however, unless
it overcomes three significant impediments: (1) developing a comprehensive
plan for achieving visibility, (2) building the necessary integration
among its many inventory management information systems, and (3)
correcting long-standing data accuracy and reliability problems within
existing inventory management systems. A key to successful implementation
of a comprehensive logistics strategy will be addressing
12GAO, Military Pay: Gaps in Pay and Benefits Create Financial Hardships
for Injured Army National Guard and Reserve Soldiers, GAO-05-125
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 17, 2005).
13GAO, Military Pay: Army Reserve Soldiers Mobilized to Active Duty
Experienced Significant Pay Problems, GAO-04-911 (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
20, 2004) and Military Pay: Army National Guard Personnel Mobilized to
Active Duty Experienced Significant Pay Problems, GAO-04-89 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 13, 2003).
14GAO-05-629T.
these initiatives as part of a comprehensive, integrated business
transformation.
o The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and each of the military services
experienced significant shortages of critical spare parts, even though
more than half of DOD's reported inventory-about $35 billion- exceeded
current operating requirements. In many cases, these shortages contributed
directly to equipment downtime, maintenance problems, and the services'
failure to meet their supply availability goals. DOD, DLA, and the
military services each lack strategic approaches and detailed plans that
could help mitigate these critical spare parts shortages and guide their
many initiatives aimed at improving inventory management.15
o The Navy did not know how much it spent on telecommunications and did
not have detailed cost and inventory data needed to evaluate spending
patterns and to leverage its buying power. At the four case study sites we
audited, management oversight of telecommunication purchases did not
provide reasonable assurance that requirements were met in the most
cost-effective manner. For example, cell phone usage at three sites was
not monitored to determine whether plan minutes met users' needs,
resulting in overpayment for cell phone services. In addition, the Navy
lacks specific policies and processes addressing the administration and
management of calling cards. On one card alone, in a 3-month period, the
Navy paid over $17,000. Not until the vendor's fraud unit raised questions
about more than $11,000 in charges in a 6-day period was the card
suspended.16
o Over the years, DOD recorded billions of dollars of disbursements and
collections in suspense accounts because the proper appropriation accounts
could not be identified and charged. Because documentation needed to
resolve these payment recording problems could not be found after so many
years, DOD requested and received authority to write-off certain aged
suspense transactions. While DOD reported that it wrote off an absolute
value of $35 billion or a net value of $629 million using the legislative
authority, neither of these amounts accurately represents
15GAO-05-207
16GAO, Vendor Payments: Inadequate Management Oversight Hampers the Navy's
Ability to Effectively Manage Its Telecommunication Program, GAO-04-671
(Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2004).
the true value of all the individual transactions that DOD had not
correctly recorded in its financial records. Many of DOD's accounting
systems and processes routinely offset individual disbursements,
collections, adjustments, and correction entries against each other and,
over time, amounts might even have been netted more than once. This
netting and summarizing misstated the total value of the write-offs and
made it impossible for DOD to identify what appropriations may have been
under-or overcharged or to determine whether individual transactions were
valid. At December 31, 2004, DOD reports showed that, even after the
write-offs, more than $1.3 billion (absolute value) remained in suspense
accounts for longer than 60 days; however, DOD has acknowledged that its
suspense reports are incomplete and inaccurate. In addition, DOD is still
not performing effective reconciliations of its disbursement and
collection activity. Similar to checkbook reconciliations, DOD needs to
compare its records of monthly activity to Treasury's records and promptly
research and correct any differences.17
Financial Improvement Initiative Lacks a Comprehensive and Integrated Plan
and Effective Oversight and Monitoring Capabilities
In September 2004, we reported18 that DOD had begun implementing a
financial improvement initiative that included the goal of obtaining an
unqualified audit opinion on its fiscal year 2007 consolidated financial
statements but that the initiative lacked a clearly defined, integrated,
welldocumented, and realistic plan for improving DOD's financial
management and thus achieving that goal. We also reported that DOD lacked
effective oversight and accountability mechanisms to ensure that the
mid-range financial improvement plans being developed by the military
services and defense agencies in support of the initiative were adequately
planned, implemented, and sustainable. Our report expressed concern that
DOD's emphasis on obtaining a clean audit opinion for fiscal year 2007
could divert limited resources away from ongoing efforts to develop and
implement the long-term systems and process changes needed to improve
financial information and to efficiently and effectively manage DOD's
business operations.
17GAO, DOD Problem Disbursements: Long-standing Accounting Weaknesses
Result in Inaccurate Records and Substantial Write-offs, GAO-05-521
(Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2005).
18GAO, Financial Management: Further Actions Are Needed to Establish
Framework to Guide Audit Opinion and Business Management Improvement
Efforts at DOD, GAO-04910R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2004).
In the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2005,19 Congress placed a limitation on the use of operations and
maintenance funds for continued preparation or implementation of DOD's
mid-range financial improvement plan. Use of such funds for the mid-range
plan is prohibited until the Secretary of Defense submits to the
congressional defense committees a report containing the following: (1) a
determination that DOD's business enterprise architecture (BEA) and the
transition plan for implementing the BEA have been developed, (2) an
explanation of the manner in which fiscal year 2005 operations and
maintenance funds will be used by DOD components to prepare or implement
the mid-range financial improvement plan, and (3) an estimate of future
year costs for each of the military services and defense agencies to
prepare and implement the mid-range financial improvement plan. As of the
end of May 2005, DOD has not yet provided the defense committees with the
required report.
Ineffective Management Oversight and Control over Business System Investments
Until DOD has complete, reliable information on the costs and number of
business systems operating within the department, its ability to
effectively control the money it spends on these systems will be limited.
DOD's fiscal year 2005 budget request for its business systems was $13.3
billion, which, on its face, is about $6 billion, or 29 percent, less than
its fiscal year 2004 budget request. However, we found that this decrease
can be attributed to DOD's reclassification of some business systems to
national security systems, not to a reduction in spending on its systems.
While some of the reclassifications appeared reasonable, our analysis
showed that others were questionable or inconsistencies exist, which
hinder DOD's ability to develop a definitive business systems inventory.
At the same time the amount of requested business system funding declined,
the reported number of business systems increased by about 1,900-from
2,274 in April 2003 to 4,150 in February 2005.
Furthermore, given that DOD does not know how many business systems it
has, it is not surprising that the department continues to lack effective
management oversight and control over business systems investments. Since
February 2003, the domains have been given the responsibility to oversee
the department's business systems investments, yet the billions of dollars
spent each year continue to be spread among the military services
19Pub. L. No. 108-375, S: 352.
and defense agencies, enabling the numerous DOD components to continue to
develop stovepiped, parochial solutions to the department's long-standing
financial management and business operation challenges. Additionally,
based upon data reported to us by the military services and DOD
components, obligations totaling at least $243 million were made for
systems modernizations in fiscal year 2004 that were not referred to the
DOD Comptroller for the required review, as specified in the fiscal year
2003 defense authorization act.20
Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Request for DOD's Business Systems Environment Is
$13.3 Billion
For fiscal year 2005, DOD requested approximately $28.7 billion21 in IT
funding to support a wide range of military operations as well as DOD
business systems operations. Of the $28.7 billion, our analysis showed
that about $13.3 billion was for business applications and related
infrastructure. Of the $13.3 billion, our analysis of the budget request
disclosed that about $8.4 billion was for infrastructure and related
costs. Business applications include activities that support the business
functions of the department, such as personnel, health, travel,
acquisition, finance and accounting, and logistics. The remaining $15.4
billion was classified as being for national security systems. Of that
amount, our analysis ascertained that about $7.5 billion was for
infrastructure and related costs.
Of the $13.3 billion, $10.7 billion was for the operation and maintenance
of the existing systems and $2.6 billion was for the modernization of
existing systems, the development of new systems,22 or both. Table 1 shows
the distribution, by DOD component, of the reported $13.3 billion between
current services and modernization funding.
20Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub.
L. No. 107-314, S: 1004(d), 116 Stat. 2458, 2629 (Dec. 2, 2002).
21DOD categorizes its funding request as follows: business systems-$5
billion; national security systems-$7.8 billion; shared infrastructure and
information assurance activities- $14.8 billion; and related technical
activities-$1.1 billion.
22According to the department's definition in its Financial Management
Regulation, development/ modernization/enhancement include (1) new
applications and infrastructure capabilities that are planned and under
development; (2) any change or modification to existing applications and
infrastructure capabilities which is intended to result in improved
capabilities or performance of the activity, including (a) all
modifications to existing operational software (other than corrective
software maintenance) and (b) expansion of capabilities to new users; (3)
changes mandated by Congress or the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
and (4) personnel costs for project management.
Table 1: Distribution of DOD's $13.3 Billion IT Budget Request for Fiscal
Year 2005 for Business Systems and Related Infrastructure
Dollars in millions
Development/
Component Current services modernization Total
Navy $3,278 $206 $3,484
Air Force 2,630 726 $3,356
Army 1,780 607 $2,387
TRICARE Management 803 255 $1,058
Agency (TRICARE)
DLA 602 179 $781
DFAS 407 59 $466
Defense Information Systems 157 34 $191
Agency
Other DOD components 1,074 566 $1,640
Total $10,731 $2,632 $13,363
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.
Note: Based on information DOD reported in its fiscal year 2005 IT budget
request.
Reclassification Limits Oversight of Business Systems
Incorrect system classification hinders the department's efforts to
improve its control and accountability over its business systems
investments. Our comparison of the fiscal years 2004 and 2005 budget
requests disclosed that DOD reclassified 56 systems in the fiscal year
2005 budget request from business systems to national security systems,
which are not subject to the same level of investment control. The net
effect of the reclassifications was a decrease of approximately $6 billion
in the fiscal year 2005 budget request for business systems and related
infrastructure. The reported amount declined from about $19 billion in
fiscal year 2004 to over $13 billion in fiscal year 2005.
In some cases, we found that the reclassification appeared reasonable. The
reclassification of the Defense Information System Network initiative as a
national security system appeared reasonable since it provides a secure
telecommunication network-voice, data, and video-to the President, the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military personnel in
the field. However, our analysis of the 56 systems also identified
instances for which reclassification was questionable. For example, Base
Level Communication Infrastructure-initiative number 254-for several DOD
entities was shown as a national security system in the fiscal year 2005
budget request. Our review of the fiscal year 2005 budget found that
within the Air Force, there were numerous other initiatives entitled Base
Level Communication Infrastructure that were classified as business
systems, not national security systems. The nomenclature describing these
different initiatives was the same. Therefore, it was difficult to
ascertain why certain initiatives were classified as national security
systems while others, with the same name, were classified as business
systems.
In another example, this is the first year in which the Navy enterprise
resource planning (ERP) effort was listed in the budget and incorrectly
classified as a national security system. Its forerunners, four pilot ERP
projects, have been classified as business systems since their inception.
DOD officials were not able to provide a valid explanation as to why the
program was classified as a national security program. For the fiscal year
2006 budget request, the Navy has requested that the DOD CIO reclassify
the program from a national security system to a business system. Improper
classification diminishes Congress's ability to effectively monitor and
oversee the billions of dollars spent annually to maintain, operate, and
modernize the department's business systems environment.
DOD Reports Significant The department's reported number of business
systems continues to rise, Increase in the Number of and DOD does not yet
have reasonable assurance that the currently Existing Business Systems
reported number of business systems is complete. As of February 2005,
DOD reported that its business systems inventory consisted of 4,150
systems, which is an increase of approximately 1,900 reported business
systems since April 2003. Table 2 presents a comparison of the April 2003
and February 2005 reported business systems inventories by domain.
Table 2: Comparison of DOD Business Systems Inventories by Domain
Domain April 2003 February 2005 Difference
Acquisition 143 179
Financial management 752 600 (152)
Human resources 665 713
Installations and environment 128 473 345
Logistics 565 2,005 1,440
Enterprise information 21 40
environment
No domaina 0 140 140
Total 2,274 4,150 1,876
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Based on analysis of Business Management Modernization Program
(BMMP) reported inventory of business systems as of April 2003 and
February 2005.
aA specific domain was not assigned to these systems.
The largest increase is due to the logistics domain increasing its
reported inventory of business systems from 565 in April 2003 to the
current 2,005. We reported23 in May 2004 that the logistics domain had
validated about 1,900 business systems but had not yet entered most of
them into the BMMP systems inventory. Logistics domain officials informed
us that they completed that process and this increase was the result.
Table 3 shows the distribution of the 4,150 business systems among the
components and domains.
23GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Billions Continue to Be
Invested with Inadequate Management Oversight and Accountability,
GAO-04-615 (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2004).
Table 3: Reported DOD Business Systems by Domain and Component
Other
Air defense Multiple
Domain Force Army Navy DFAS agencies owner Not Total
determined
Acquisition 20 16 122 2 15 2 2 179
Financial 41 88 233 93 59 15 71 600
management
Human resources 84 332 151 30 65 26 25 713
Installations and 36 63 259 1 12 6 96 473
environment
Logistics 166 193 1,512 4 76 39 15 2,005
Enterprise 4 17 10 0 8 0 1
information
environment
No domain 18 18 66 13 18 2 5 140
Total 369 727 2,353 143 253 90 215 4,150
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Based on analysis of BMMP reported business system inventory as of
February 2005.
The table shows the stovepiped, duplicative nature of DOD's business
systems. For example, there are 713 human resources systems across all
components whose reported funding for fiscal year 2005 includes
approximately $223 million for modernization and over $656 million for
operation and maintenance. According to DOD officials, the Defense
Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS)24 is intended to
totally or partially replace 113 of these systems. We were informed that
the remaining 600 human resources systems are to be reviewed in the
context of DOD's BEA, as it is developed.
In discussing the increase in the number of reported systems, some of the
domains stated that funding for many of the systems are not included in
the IT budget request. They said that some of these systems were likely
developed at the local level and financed by the operation and maintenance
funds received at that location and therefore were not captured and
reported as part of the department's annual IT budget request. Financing
business systems in this manner rather than within the IT budget results
in Congress and DOD management not being aware of the total amount being
24DIMHRS is a major IT program that is to provide an integrated personnel
and pay system for all components of the military services.
spent to operate, maintain, and modernize the department's business
systems.
DOD Lacks Reasonable Assurance That It Is in Compliance with Statutory
Investment Management Controls
We found that DOD is not in compliance with the fiscal year 2003 defense
authorization act, which requires that all financial system improvements
with obligations exceeding $1 million be reviewed by the DOD Comptroller.
Based upon the reported obligational data provided to us by the military
services and the defense agencies for fiscal year 2004, we identified 30
modernizations with obligations totaling about $243 million that were not
submitted for the required review. Because DOD lacks a systematic means to
identify the systems that were subject to the requirements of the fiscal
year 2003 defense authorization act, there is no certainty that the
information provided to us accurately identified all systems improvements
with obligations greater than $1 million during the fiscal year. BMMP
officials stated that the domains were responsible for working with the
components to make sure that business systems with obligations for
modernizations greater than $1 million were submitted for review as
required. In essence, compliance was achieved via the "honor system,"
which relied on systems owners coming forward and requesting approval.
However, the approach did not work. During fiscal year 2004, the number of
systems reviewed was small when compared to the potential number of
systems that appeared to meet the obligation threshold identified in the
fiscal year 2004 budget request. We analyzed the DOD IT budget request for
fiscal year 2004 and identified over 200 systems in the budget that could
involve modernizations with obligations of funds that exceed the $1
million threshold. However, BMMP officials confirmed that only 46 systems
were reviewed, of which 38 were approved as of September 30, 2004. The
remaining 8 systems were either withdrawn by the component/domain or were
returned to the component/domain because the system package submitted for
review lacked some of the required supporting documentation, such as the
review by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, if necessary.
In an attempt to substantiate that financial system improvements with over
$1 million in obligations had in fact been reviewed by the DOD
Comptroller, as provided for in the fiscal year 2003 act, we requested
that DOD entities provide us with a list of obligations (by system)
greater than $1 million for modernizations for fiscal year 2004. We
compared the reported obligational data to the system approval data
reported to us by BMMP officials. Based upon this comparison and as shown
in table 4, DOD provided data showed that 30 business systems with
obligations totaling
about $243 million in fiscal year 2004 for modernizations were not
reviewed by the DOD Comptroller.
Table 4: Identification of Business Systems Modernizations by DOD
Component That Did Not Have DOD Comptroller Review as Required by the
Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act
Dollars in millions
Component
Number of systems not reviewed
Fiscal year 2004 obligations
Army 2 $40.5
Navy 10 92.8
Air Force 11 79.1
DLA 3
U.S. Transportation Command 1
DFAS 1
TRICARE 2 16.6
Total 30 $242.5
Source: GAO analysis of DOD reported information.
Examples of DOD business systems modernizations with obligations in excess
of $1 million included in table 4 that were not submitted to the DOD
Comptroller include the following.
o DFAS obligated about $3 million in fiscal year 2004 for the DFAS
Corporate Database/DFAS Corporate Warehouse (DCD/DCW). In fiscal year
2003, DFAS obligated approximately $19 million for DCD/DCW without
submitting it to the DOD Comptroller for review. Additionally, we reported
in May 200425 that DFAS had yet to complete an economic analysis
justifying that continued investment in DCD/DCW would result in tangible
improvements in the department's operations. The department has
acknowledged that DCD/DCW will not result in tangible savings to DOD.
Continued investment is being based upon intangible savings of man-hour
reductions by DFAS.
25GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Limited Progress in Development
of Business Enterprise Architecture and Oversight of Information
Technology Investments, GAO-04-731R (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004).
o The Army obligated over $34 million for its Logistics Modernization
Program (LMP) in fiscal year 2004. In fiscal year 2003, the Army obligated
over $52 million without the prerequisite review being performed by the
DOD Comptroller. We have previously reported26 that LMP experienced
significant problems once it became operational at the first deployment
site.
Cumulatively, since passage of the fiscal year 2003 defense authorization
act in December 2002 through the end of fiscal year 2004, based upon
information reported to us, the military services and defense components
obligated about $651 million for business systems modernizations without
the required review by the DOD Comptroller. While this amount is
significant, it is not complete or accurate because it does not include
any fiscal year 2005 obligations that occurred prior to the enactment of
the fiscal year 2005 defense authorization act on October 28, 2004.
Congress Acts to Improve DOD's Control and Accountability over Business
Systems Investments
The statutory requirements enacted as part of the Ronald W. Reagan
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 200527 are aimed at
improving the department's business systems management practices. The act
directs DOD to put in place a definite management structure that is
responsible for the control and accountability over business systems
investments by establishing a hierarchy of investment review boards from
across the department and directs that the boards use a standard set of
investment review and decision-making criteria to ensure compliance and
consistency with the BEA.
DOD has taken several steps to address provisions of the fiscal year 2005
defense authorization act. On March 19, 2005, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense delegated the authority for the review, approval, and oversight of
the planning, design, acquisition, development, operation, maintenance,
and modernization of defense business systems to the designated approval
26GAO-04-615.
27Pub. L. No. 108-375, S: 332.
authority for each business area.28 Additionally on March 24, 2005, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the transfer of program management,
oversight, and support responsibilities regarding DOD business
transformation efforts from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense,
(Comptroller), to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. According to the directive, this
transfer of functions and responsibilities will allow the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to
establish the level of activity necessary to support and coordinate
activities of the newly established Defense Business Systems Management
Committee (DBSMC). As required by the act, DBSMC, with representation
including the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the designated approval
authorities, secretaries of the military services, and heads of the
defense agencies, is the highest ranking governance body responsible for
overseeing DOD business systems modernization efforts.
Suggestions for Legislative Consideration
I would like to reiterate two suggestions for legislative consideration
that I discussed in my July 2004 testimony,29 which I believe could
further improve the likelihood of successful business transformation at
DOD. Most of the key elements necessary for successful transformation
could be achieved under the current legislative framework; however,
addressing sustained and focused leadership for DOD business
transformation and funding control will require additional legislation.
These suggestions include the appropriation of business system funding to
the approval authorities responsible and accountable for business systems
investments under provisions enacted by the Ronald W. Reagan National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005,30 and the creation of a
CMO.
28Approval authorities include the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller); the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness;
and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
Integration/Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense. These
approval authorities are responsible for the review, approval, and
oversight of business systems and must establish investment review
processes for systems under their cognizance.
29GAO, Department of Defense: Long-standing Problems Continue to Impede
Financial and Business Management Transformation, GAO-04-907T (Washington,
D.C.: July 7, 2004).
30See 10 U.S.C. S:2222(f).
Central Control over Business Systems Investment Funds Is Crucial
DOD's current business systems investment process, in which system funding
is controlled by DOD components, has contributed to the evolution of an
overly complex and error-prone information technology environment
containing duplicative, nonintegrated, and stovepiped systems. We have
made numerous recommendations to DOD to improve the management oversight
and control of its business systems investments. However, as previously
discussed, a provision of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, established specific management
oversight and accountability with the "owners" of the various core
business mission areas. This legislation defines the scope of the various
business areas (e.g., acquisition, finance, logistics, and etc.), and
established functional approval authority and responsibility for
management of the portfolio of business systems with the relevant under
secretary of defense for the departmental core business mission areas and
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
Integration (information technology infrastructure). For example, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is
now responsible and accountable for any defense business system intended
to support acquisition activities, logistics activities, or installations
and environment activities for DOD.
This legislation also requires that the responsible approval authorities
establish a hierarchy of investment review boards, the highest level being
DBSMC, with DOD-wide representation, including the military services and
defense agencies. The boards are responsible for reviewing and approving
investments to develop, operate, maintain, and modernize business systems
for their business-area portfolio, including ensuring that investments are
consistent with DOD's BEA.
Although this recently enacted legislation clearly defines the roles and
responsibilities of business systems investment approval authorities,
control over the budgeting for and execution of funding for business
systems investment activities remains at the DOD component level. As a
result, DOD continues to have little or no assurance that its business
systems investment money is being spent in an economical, efficient, and
effective manner. Given that DOD spends billions on business systems and
related infrastructure each year, we believe it is critical that those
responsible for business systems improvements control the allocation and
execution of funds for DOD business systems. However, implementation may
require review of the various statutory authorities for the military
services and other DOD components. Control over business systems
investment funds would improve the capacity of DOD's designated
approval authorities to fulfill their responsibilities and gain
transparency over DOD investments, and minimize the parochial approach to
systems development that exists today.
In addition, to improve coordination and integration activities, we
suggest that all approval authorities coordinate their business systems
modernization efforts with a CMO who would chair the DBSMC. Cognizant
business area approval authorities would also be required to report to
Congress through a CMO and the Secretary of Defense on applicable business
systems that are not compliant with review requirements and to include a
summary justification for noncompliance.
Chief Management Official Is Essential for Sustained Leadership of
Business Management Reform
As DOD embarks on large-scale business transformation efforts, we believe
that the complexity and long-term nature of these efforts requires the
development of an executive position capable of providing strong and
sustained change management leadership across the department-and over a
number of years and various administrations. One way to ensure such
leadership would be to create by legislation a full-time executive-level
II position for a CMO, who would serve as the Deputy Secretary of Defense
for Management. This position would elevate, integrate, and
institutionalize the high-level attention essential for ensuring that a
strategic business transformation plan-as well as the business policies,
procedures, systems, and processes that are necessary for successfully
implementing and sustaining overall business transformation efforts within
DOD-are implemented and sustained. An executive-level II position for a
CMO would provide this individual with the necessary institutional clout
to overcome service parochialism and entrenched organizational silos,
which in our opinion need to be streamlined below the service secretaries
and other levels.
The CMO would function as a change agent, while other DOD officials would
still be responsible for managing their daily business operations. The
position would divide and institutionalize the current functions of the
Deputy Secretary of Defense into a Deputy Secretary who, as the alter ego
of the Secretary, would focus on policy-related issues such as military
transformation, and a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management, the CMO,
who would be responsible and accountable for the overall business
transformation effort and would serve full-time as the strategic
integrator of DOD's business transformation efforts by, for example,
developing and implementing a strategic and integrated plan for business
transformation efforts. The CMO would not conduct the day-to-day
management functions
of the department; therefore, creating this position would not add an
additional hierarchical layer to the department. Day-to-day management
functions of the department would continue to be the responsibility of the
undersecretaries of defense, the service secretaries, and others. Just as
the CMO would need to focus full-time on business transformation, we
believe that the day-to-day management functions are so demanding that it
is difficult for these officials to maintain the oversight, focus, and
momentum needed to implement and sustain needed reforms of DOD's overall
business operations. This is particularly evident given the demands that
the Iraq and Afghanistan postwar reconstruction activities and the
continuing war on terrorism have placed on current leaders. Likewise, the
breadth and complexity of the problems and their overall level within the
department preclude the under secretaries, such as the DOD Comptroller,
from asserting the necessary authority over selected players and business
areas while continuing to fulfill their other responsibilities.
If created, we believe that the new CMO position could be filled by an
individual appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, for a
set term of 7 years. As prior GAO work examining the experiences of major
change management initiatives in large private and public sector
organizations has shown, it can often take at least 5 to 7 years until
such initiatives are fully implemented and the related cultures are
transformed in a sustainable way. Articulating the roles and
responsibilities of the position in statute would also help to create
unambiguous expectations and underscore Congress's desire to follow a
professional, nonpartisan, sustainable, and institutional approach to the
position. In that regard, an individual appointed to the CMO position
should have a proven track record as a business process change agent in
large, complex, and diverse organizations-experience necessary to
spearhead business process transformation across DOD.
Furthermore, to improve coordination and integration activities, we
suggest that all business systems modernization approval authorities
designated in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2005 coordinate their efforts with the CMO, who would chair
the DBSMC that DOD recently established to comply with the act. We also
suggest that cognizant business area approval authorities would also be
required to report to Congress through the CMO and the Secretary of
Defense on applicable business systems that are not compliant with review
requirements and include a summary justification for noncompliance. In
addition, the CMO would enter into an annual performance agreement with
the Secretary that sets forth measurable individual goals linked to
overall
organizational goals in connection with the department's business
transformation efforts. Measurable progress toward achieving agreed-upon
goals should be a basis for determining the level of compensation earned,
including any related bonus. In addition, the CMO's achievements and
compensation should be reported to Congress each year. As previously
noted, on April 14, 2005, a bill was introduced in the Senate that
requires the establishment of a CMO who would be appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, for a set term of 7 years.31
Conclusion DOD lacks the efficient and effective financial management and
related business operations, including processes and systems, to support
the war fighter, DOD management, and Congress. With a large and growing
fiscal imbalance facing our nation, achieving tens of billions of dollars
of annual savings through successful DOD transformation is increasingly
important. Recent legislation pertaining to defense business systems,
enterprise architecture, accountability, and modernization, if properly
implemented, should improve oversight and control over DOD's significant
system investment activities. However, DOD's transformation efforts to
date have not adequately addressed key underlying causes of past reform
failures. Reforming DOD's business operations is a monumental challenge
and many well-intentioned efforts have failed over the last several
decades. Lessons learned from these previous reform attempts include the
need for sustained and focused leadership at the highest level. This
leadership could be provided through the establishment of a CMO. Absent
this leadership, authority, and control of funding, the current
transformation efforts are likely to fail.
I commend the Subcommittee for holding this hearing and I encourage you to
use this vehicle, on an annual basis, as a catalyst for long overdue
business transformation at DOD. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement.
Contacts and For further information about this testimony, please contact
Gregory D. Kutz at (202) 512-9095 or [email protected]. The following
individuals
Acknowledgments contributed to the various reports and testimonies that
were the basis for the testimony: Beatrice Alff, Renee Brown, Donna Byers,
Molly Boyle, Mary
31S. 780, 109th Cong. (2005).
Ellen Chervenic, Francine DelVecchio, Francis Dymond, Geoff Frank, Gina
Flacco, Diane Handley, Cynthia Jackson, Evelyn Logue, John Martin,
Elizabeth Mead, Dave Moser, Mai Nguyen, Sharon Pickup, David Plocher, John
Ryan, and Darby Smith.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
GAO's Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation
and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO
documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO postsGAO
Reports and newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its
Web site. To Testimony have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products
every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out
to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25
percent. Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061
To Report Fraud, Contact:
Waste, and Abuse in Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: [email protected] Programs Automated answering system: (800)
424-5454 or (202) 512-7470
Congressional Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4400 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125
Relations Washington, D.C. 20548
Public Affairs Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548
*** End of document. ***