Space Shuttle: Status of NASA's Efforts to Address Workforce	 
Issues Related to the Space Shuttle's Retirement (18-MAY-05,	 
GAO-05-718T).							 
                                                                 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space 
shuttle program is key to implementing the President's vision for
space exploration, which calls for completing the assembly of the
International Space Station (ISS) by the end of the decade.	 
Currently, the space shuttle, which is to be retired after ISS	 
assembly is completed, is the only launch system capable of	 
transporting ISS components. To meet the goals of the President's
vision and satisfy ISS's international partners, NASA is	 
examining alternative launch vehicles and ISS configurations.	 
Retiring the space shuttle and, in the larger context,		 
implementing the President's vision, will require NASA to rely on
its most important asset--its workforce. Because maintaining a	 
skilled workforce through retirement will be challenging, GAO was
asked to discuss the actions NASA has taken to sustain a skilled 
space shuttle workforce and the challenges it faces in doing	 
so--findings reported on in March 2005 (see GAO, Space Shuttle:  
Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to Sustain Its Workforce  
through Retirement, GAO-05-230).				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-718T					        
    ACCNO:   A24319						        
  TITLE:     Space Shuttle: Status of NASA's Efforts to Address       
Workforce Issues Related to the Space Shuttle's Retirement	 
     DATE:   05/18/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Human capital					 
	     Human capital management				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Space exploration					 
	     Staff utilization					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Skilled labor					 
	     Space shuttles					 
	     International Space Station			 
	     NASA Space Shuttle Program 			 
	     Space Shuttle					 
	     Titan IV Rocket					 

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GAO-05-718T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Science and Space, Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, United States Senate

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:30 a.m. EDT SPACE SHUTTLE

Wednesday, May 18, 2005

Status of NASA's Efforts to Address Workforce Issues Related to the Space
                              Shuttle's Retirement

Statement of Allen Li, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management

GAO-05-718T

[IMG]

May 18, 2005

SPACE SHUTTLE

Status of NASA's Efforts to Address Workforce Issues Related to the Space
Shuttle's Retirement

                                 What GAO Found

While NASA recognizes the importance of sustaining a critically skilled
workforce to support space shuttle operations, it has made limited
progress toward developing a detailed long-term strategy to do so. At the
time of our March 2005 review, the Space Shuttle Program had identified
lessons learned from the retirement of comparable programs, and United
Space Alliance- NASA's prime contractor for space shuttle operations-had
begun to prepare for the impact of the space shuttle's retirement on its
workforce. However, timely action to address workforce issues is critical
given their potential impact on NASA-wide goals. Significant delays in
implementing a strategy to sustain the space shuttle workforce would
likely lead to larger problems, such as overstretched funding and failure
to meet NASA program schedules. NASA and United Space Alliance acknowledge
that sustaining their workforces will be difficult, particularly if a
career path beyond the space shuttle's retirement is not apparent. Fiscal
challenges facing the federal government also make it unclear whether
funding for retention tools, such as bonuses, will be available.

Our March 2005 report identified several factors that have hampered the
Space Shuttle Program's workforce planning efforts. For example, the
program's near-term focus on returning the space shuttle safely to flight
has delayed other efforts that will help the program determine its
workforce requirements, such as assessing hardware and facility needs.
Program officials also noted that due to uncertainties in implementing the
President's vision for space exploration, requirements on which to base
workforce planning efforts have yet to be defined. Despite these factors,
our work on strategic workforce planning has shown that even when faced
with uncertainty, successful organizations take steps, such as scenario
planning, to better position themselves to meet future workforce
requirements.

Since we issued our report and made our recommendation, NASA has publicly
recognized, at its Integrated Space Operations Summit, that human capital
management and critical skills retention will be a major challenge for the
agency as it progresses toward retirement of the space shuttle.

Estimated Timeline for the Process of Retiring NASA's Space Shuttle

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss how the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) is positioning itself to sustain the
critically skilled space shuttle workforce through the retirement of the
Space Shuttle Program. NASA is in the midst of one of the most challenging
periods in its history. It must demonstrate that the space shuttle can
safely fly again, begin the process of retiring its largest program, and
at the same time prepare for the uncertain future of space exploration.
These challenges are further exacerbated by the complex task of
maintaining the right workforce to support the space shuttle program while
ensuring that the skills needed for future programs are not lost. Over the
next several years, thousands of NASA civil service and contractor
employees who support the Space Shuttle Program will be impacted by
decisions made about the remaining life of the program and implementation
of exploration goals. These include decisions about the final number of
space shuttle flights and about future programs, such as the Crew
Exploration Vehicle (CEV). As requested, my testimony today will discuss
the actions that NASA is taking to position itself to sustain its
critically skilled space shuttle workforce and the challenges that the
agency faces in doing so- issues we reported on to Senators Inouye and
McCain in March 2005.1

In summary, we found that NASA had made limited progress in its planning
efforts for sustaining the space shuttle workforce through the program's
retirement. At the time of our March 2005 report, the Space Shuttle
Program had taken preliminary steps, including identifying the lessons
learned from the retirement of comparable programs, such as the Air Force
Titan IV Rocket Program. Further NASA's prime contractor for space shuttle
operations-United Space Alliance (USA)-had taken some initial steps to
prepare for the impact of the space shuttle's retirement on its own
workforce. However, its progress depends on NASA making decisions that
impact contractor requirements through the remainder of the program.
Timely action to address workforce issues, however, is critical given the
potential impact that they could have on NASA-wide goals. Unaddressed,
such issues would likely lead to schedule delays and overstretched funding
for both the Space Shuttle Program and the agency. Both NASA and USA have
acknowledged that sustaining their workforces will be difficult as the
space shuttle nears retirement, particularly if a

1GAO, Space Shuttle: Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to Sustain Its
Workforce through Retirement, GAO-05-230 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2005).

career path beyond the space shuttle's retirement is not apparent to their
employees. In addition, the federal government is facing fiscal
challenges. Such challenges call into question whether funding for tools,
such as retention bonuses, will be available for the agency to use to aid
in retaining the space shuttle workforce.

In our report we identified several factors that have hampered the Space
Shuttle Program's planning efforts. For example, because of the program's
near-term focus on returning the space shuttle to flight, other efforts
that will ultimately aid in determining workforce requirements, such as
assessing hardware and facility needs, are being delayed. In addition,
program officials indicated that they face uncertainties regarding the
implementation of future aspects of the President's vision for space
exploration (Vision) and have yet to define requirements on which
workforce planning efforts would be based. Despite these factors, our
prior work on strategic workforce planning has shown that, even when faced
with uncertainty, successful organizations take steps, such as scenario
planning, to better position themselves to meet future workforce
requirements.

In our March 2005 report, we recommended that the agency begin identifying
the Space Shuttle Program's future workforce needs based upon various
future scenarios the program could face. The program can use the
information provided by scenario planning to develop strategies for
meeting the needs of its potential future scenarios. NASA concurred with
our recommendation, and NASA's Assistant Associate Administrator for the
Space Shuttle program is leading an effort to address the recommendation.
Since we issued our report and made our recommendation, NASA has taken
action and publicly recognized, through its Integrated Space Operations
Summit, that human capital management and critical skills retention will
be a major challenge for the agency as it progresses toward retirement of
the space shuttle.

On January 14, 2004, the President articulated a new vision for space
exploration for NASA. Part of the Vision includes the goal of retiring the
space shuttle following completion of the International Space Station
(ISS), planned for the end of the decade. In addition, NASA plans to begin
developing a new manned exploration vehicle, or CEV, to replace the space
shuttle and return humans to the moon as early as 2015, but no later than
2020, in preparation for more ambitious future missions. As this
Subcommittee is aware, NASA's Administrator has recently expressed his
desire to accelerate the CEV development to eliminate the gap between

  Background

the end of the Space Shuttle Program, currently scheduled for 2010, and
the first manned operational flight of the CEV, currently scheduled for
2014. If the CEV development cannot be accelerated, NASA will not be able
to launch astronauts into space for several years and will likely have to
rely on Russia for transportation to and from the ISS. A 1996 "Balance
Agreement" between NASA and the Russian space agency, obligated Russia to
provide 11 Soyuz spacecraft for crew rotation of U.S. and Russia crews.
After April 2006, this agreement will be fulfilled and Russia no longer
must allocate any of the seats on its Soyuzes for U.S. astronauts. Russian
officials have indicated that they will no longer provide crew return
services to NASA at no cost at that time. However, NASA may face
challenges to compensating Russia for seats on its Soyuzes after the
agreement is fulfilled due to restrictions in the Iran Nonproliferation
Act.2

The space shuttle, NASA's largest individual program,3 is an essential
element of NASA's ability to implement the Vision because it is the only
launch system presently capable of transporting the remaining components
necessary to complete assembly of the ISS. NASA projects that it will need
to conduct an estimated 28 flights over the next 5 to 6 years to complete
assembly of and provide logistical support to the ISS. However, NASA is
currently examining alternative ISS configurations to meet the goals of
the Vision and satisfy NASA's international partners, while requiring as
few space shuttle flights as possible to complete assembly.

Prior to retiring the space shuttle, NASA will need to first return the
space shuttle safely to flight4 and execute whatever number of remaining
missions are needed to complete assembly of and provide support for the
ISS. At the same time, NASA will begin the process of closing out or

2The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178). The Iran Nonproliferation
Act bans the United States from making extraordinary payments to Russia in
connection with the International Space Station, unless the President
determines, among other things, that Russia demonstrated a commitment to
prevent the transfer to Iran of goods, services, and technology that could
materially contribute to developing nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons, or of ballistic or cruise missile systems.

3The Space Shuttle Program accounted for 27 percent of NASA's fiscal year
2005 budget request.

4To return the space shuttle to flight, NASA will conduct two flights,
which are intended to test and evaluate new procedures for flight safety
implemented as a result of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. The
planning window for the first flight is July 13 through July 31, 2005.

transitioning its space shuttle assets that are no longer needed to
support the program -such as its workforce, hardware, and facilities-to
other NASA programs. The process of closing out or transitioning the
program's assets will extend well beyond the space shuttle's final flight
(see fig. 1).

aThe planning window for the first flight is July 13 through July 31,
2005.

Retiring the space shuttle and, in the larger context, implementing the
Vision, will require that the Space Shuttle Program rely on its most
important asset-its workforce. The space shuttle workforce consists of
about 2,000 civil service5 and 15,600 contractor6 personnel, including a

5Number is based on a full-time equivalent calculation. Full-time
equivalent is a measure of staff hours equal to those of an employee who
works 40 hours per week in 1 year; therefore, the actual number of
employees who work part-time or full-time on the Shuttle Program is
greater than 2,000. The number was calculated by averaging the number of
civil service employees over fiscal year 2004.

large number of engineers and scientists. While each of the NASA centers
support the Space Shuttle Program to some degree, the vast majority of
this workforce is located at three of NASA's Space Operations Centers:
Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, and Marshall Space Flight
Center. Data provided by NASA shows that approximately one quarter of the
workforce at its Space Operations centers is 51 years or older and about
33 percent will be eligible for retirement by fiscal year 2012.7

The space shuttle workforce and NASA's human capital management have been
the subject of many GAO8 and other reviews9 in the past that have
highlighted various challenges to maintaining NASA's science and
engineering workforce. In addition, over the past few years, GAO and
others in the federal government have underscored the importance of

6The number was calculated by averaging the number of contractor employees
over fiscal year 2004. This number includes data from NASA's prime
contractor for space shuttle operations, United Space Alliance, and other
NASA contractors. United Space Alliance, established in 1996 as a joint
venture between Lockheed Martin and Boeing to consolidate NASA's various
Space Shuttle Program contracts under a single entity, and its
approximately 10,400 employees are responsible for conducting the space
shuttle's ground and flight operations under the Space Flight Operations
Contract. The remaining contractor personnel are associated with other
space shuttle components, such as its propulsion systems.

7Data provided by NASA is as of September 30, 2004. GAO did not perform a
reliability assessment of the data.

8GAO, Space Shuttle: Human Capital Challenges Require Management
Attention, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-133 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2000) and GAO,
Space Shuttle: Human Capital and Safety Upgrade Challenges Require
Continued Attention, GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15,
2000).

9Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume I (Washington, D.C.:
August 2003); Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Annual Report for 2001
(Washington, D.C.: March 2002); Behavioral Sciences Technology, Inc.,
Assessment and Plan for Organizational Culture Change at NASA (Ojai,
Calif.: March 15, 2004).

  Progress toward Developing a Strategy to Sustain the Space Shuttle Workforce
  Is Limited

human capital management and strategic workforce planning.10 In response
to an increased governmentwide focus on strategic human capital
management, NASA has taken several steps to improve its human capital
management. These include steps such as devising an agencywide strategic
human capital plan, developing workforce analysis tools to assist in
identifying critical skills needs, and requesting and receiving additional
human capital flexibilities.11

NASA has made only limited progress toward developing a detailed longterm
strategy for sustaining its workforce through the space shuttle's
retirement. While NASA recognizes the importance of having in place a
strategy for sustaining a critically skilled workforce to support space
shuttle operations, it has only taken preliminary steps to do so. For
example, the program identified lessons-learned from the retirement of
programs comparable to the space shuttle, such as the Air Force Titan IV
Rocket Program. Among other things, the lessons learned reports highlight
the practices used by other programs when making personnel decisions, such
as the importance of developing transition strategies and early retention
planning.

Other efforts have been initiated or are planned; examples include the
following:

10GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-01-263 (Washington, D.C.: January
2001); GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2003); GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2005); GAO, Performance Accountability Series--Major
Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective,
GAO-01-241 (Washington, D.C.: January 2001); GAO, Major Management
Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective, GAO-03-95
(Washington, D.C.: January 2003); GAO, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, GAO-01-258
(Washington, D.C.: January 2001); and GAO, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, GAO-03-114
(Washington, D.C.: January 2003); GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for
Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.
11, 2003); GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management,
GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002); and GAO, Human Capital: A
Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders, GAO/OCG-00-14G (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 1, 2000). See also www.gao.gov/pas/2005.

11Enacted in February 2004, the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004 (P.L.
108-201) amends title 5, United States Code, by inserting a new chapter 98
in that title, which provides new authorities to NASA. On March 26, 2004,
NASA submitted a written workforce plan for using its new authorities to
Congress.

o  	contracted with the National Academy of Public Administration to
assist it in planning for the space shuttle's retirement and transitioning
to future programs and

o  	began devising an acquisition strategy for updating propulsion system
prime contracts at MSFC to take into account the Vision's goal of retiring
the space shuttle following completion of the ISS.

NASA's prime contractor for space shuttle operations, USA, has also taken
some preliminary steps, but its progress with these efforts depends on
NASA making decisions that impact contractor requirements through the
remainder of the program. For example, USA has begun to define its
critical skills needs to continue supporting the Space Shuttle Program,
devised a communication plan, contracted with a human capital consulting
firm to conduct a comprehensive study of its workforce; and continued to
monitor indicators of employee morale and workforce stability. Contractor
officials said that further efforts to prepare for the space shuttle's
retirement and its impact on their workforce are on hold until NASA first
makes decisions that impact the space shuttle's remaining number of
flights and thus the time frames for retiring the program and
transitioning its assets.

The Potential Impact of Workforce Problems and Other Challenges the Space
Shuttle Program Faces Highlight the Need for Workforce Planning

Making progress toward developing a detailed strategy for sustaining a
critically skilled space shuttle workforce through the program's
retirement is important given the impact that workforce problems could
have on NASA-wide goals. According to NASA officials, if the Space Shuttle
Program faces difficulties in sustaining the necessary workforce, NASAwide
goals, such as implementing the Vision and proceeding with space
exploration activities, could be impacted. For example, workforce problems
could lead to a delay in flight certification for the space shuttle, which
could result in a delay to the program's overall flight schedule, thus
compromising the goal of completing assembly of the ISS by 2010. In
addition, officials said that space exploration activities could slip as
much as 1 year for each year that the space shuttle's operations are
extended because NASA's progress with these activities relies on funding
and assets that are expected to be transferred from the Space Shuttle
Program to other NASA programs.

NASA officials told us they expect to face various challenges in
sustaining the critically skilled space shuttle workforce. These
challenges include the following:

o  	Retaining the current workforce. Because many in the current workforce
will want to participate in or will be needed to support future phases of
implementing the Vision, it may be difficult to retain them in the Space
Shuttle Program. In addition, it may be difficult to provide certain
employees with a transition path from the Space Shuttle Program to future
programs following retirement.

o  	Impact on the prime contractor for space shuttle operations. Because
USA was established specifically to perform ground and flight operations
for the Space Shuttle Program, its future following the space shuttle's
retirement is uncertain. Contractor officials stated that a lack of
long-term job security would cause difficulties in recruiting and
retaining employees to continue supporting the space shuttle as it nears
retirement. In addition, steps that the contractor may have to take to
retain its workforce, such as paying retention bonuses, are likely to
require funding above normal levels.

o  	Governmentwide budgetary constraints. Throughout the process of
retiring the space shuttle, NASA, like other federal agencies, will have
to contend with urgent challenges facing the federal budget that will put
pressure on discretionary spending-such as investments in space
programs-and require NASA to do more with fewer resources.

While the Space Shuttle Program is still in the early stages of planning
for the program's retirement, its development of a detailed long-term
strategy to sustain its future workforce is being hampered by several
factors:

o  	Near-term focus on returning the space shuttle to flight. Since the
Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the program has been focused on its
near-term goal of returning the space shuttle safely to flight. While this
focus is understandable given the importance of the space shuttle's role
in completing assembly of the ISS, it has led to the delay of efforts to
determine future workforce needs.

o  	Uncertainties with respect to implementing the Vision. While the
Vision has provided the Space Shuttle Program with the goal of retiring
the program by 2010 upon completion of the ISS, the program lacks
well-defined objectives or goals on which to base its workforce planning
efforts. For example, NASA has not yet determined the final configuration
of the ISS, the final number of flights for the space shuttle, how ISS
operations will be supported after the space shuttle is retired, or the
type of vehicle that will be used for space exploration. These
determinations are important because they impact decisions

  Several Factors Have Impeded Workforce Planning Efforts

about the transition of space shuttle assets. Lacking this information,
NASA officials have said that their ability to progress with detailed
long-term workforce planning is limited.

Despite Uncertainties, NASA Could Follow a Strategic Human Capital
Management Approach

Despite these uncertainties, the Space Shuttle Program could follow a
strategic human capital management approach to plan for sustaining its
critically skilled workforce. Studies by several organizations, including
GAO, have shown that successful organizations in both the public and
private sectors follow a strategic human capital management approach, even
when faced with an uncertain future environment.

In our March 2005 report, we made recommendations aimed at better
positioning NASA to sustain a critically skilled space shuttle workforce
through retirement. In particular, we recommended that the agency begin
identifying the Space Shuttle Program's future workforce needs based upon
various future scenarios the program could face. Scenario planning can
allow the agency to progress with workforce planning, even when faced with
uncertainties such as those surrounding the final number of space shuttle
flights, the final configuration of the ISS and the vehicle that will be
developed for exploration. The program can use the information provided by
scenario planning to develop strategies for meeting the needs of its
potential future scenarios. NASA concurred with our recommendation, and
NASA's Assistant Associate Administrator for the Space Shuttle program is
leading an effort to address the recommendation.

Since we issued our report and made our recommendation, NASA has taken
action and publicly recognized that human capital management and critical
skills retention will be a major challenge for the agency as it moves
toward retiring the space shuttle. This recognition was most apparent at
NASA's Integrated Space Operations Summit held in March 2005. As part of
the Summit process, NASA instituted panel teams to examine the Space
Shuttle Program's mission execution and transition needs from various
perspectives and make recommendations aimed at ensuring that the program
will execute its remaining missions safely as it transitions to supporting
emerging exploration mission needs. The reports that resulted from these
examinations are closely linked by a common theme-the importance of human
capital management and critical skills retention to ensure success. In
their reports, the panel teams highlighted similar challenges to those
that we highlighted in our report. The panels made various recommendations
to the Space Flight Leadership Council on steps that the program should
take now to address human capital concerns. These recommendations included
developing and implementing a critical skills retention plan, developing a
communication plan to ensure the

Conclusions

Contacts and Acknowledgments

workforce is informed, and developing a detailed budget that includes
funding for human capital retention and reductions, as well as
establishing an agencywide team to integrate human capital planning
efforts.

There is no question that NASA faces a challenging time ahead. Key
decisions have to be made regarding final configuration and support of the
ISS, the number of shuttle flights needed for those tasks, and the timing
for development of future programs, such as the CEV-all in a constrained
funding environment. In addition, any schedule slip in the completion of
the construction of the ISS or in the CEV falling short of its accelerated
initial availability (as soon as possible after space shuttle retirement)
may extend the time the space shuttle is needed. But whatever decisions
are made and courses of action taken, the need for sustaining a critically
skilled workforce is paramount to the success of these programs. Despite a
limited focus on human capital management in the past, NASA now
acknowledges that it faces significant challenges in sustaining a
critically skilled workforce and has taken steps to address these issues.
We are encouraged by these actions and the fact that human capital
management and critical skills retention was given such prominent
attention throughout the recent Integrated Space Operations Summit
process. The fact that our findings and conclusions were echoed by the
panel teams established to support the Integrated Space Operations Summit
is a persuasive reason for NASA leadership to begin addressing these human
capital issues early and aggressively.

Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee
may have.

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Allen Li
at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. Individuals making key contributions to
this testimony included Alison Heafitz, Jim Morrison, Shelby S. Oakley,
Karen Sloan, and T.J Thomson.

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