Defense Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and
Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform
Military Capabilities (17-DEC-04, GAO-05-70).
Because future threats the nation may face are uncertain, and
with many competing demands on its resources, the Department of
Defense (DOD) has begun to transform its military capabilities,
which will involve not only the acquisition of new weapon systems
but also how the armed forces think, train, and fight. In 2003,
DOD estimated $263 billion would be allocated from fiscal year
2004 through 2009 for transformation efforts. In this report GAO
(1) describes DOD's strategy to transform joint military
capabilities; (2) assesses the extent to which DOD has
established clear leadership, accountability, and a mechanism to
integrate transformation efforts; and (3) assesses the extent to
which DOD's framework incorporates results-oriented management
tools to guide transformation efforts.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-70
ACCNO: A14657
TITLE: Defense Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability,
and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to
Transform Military Capabilities
DATE: 12/17/2004
SUBJECT: Defense capabilities
Military forces
Military operations
Military training
Performance measures
Strategic planning
Weapons systems
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GAO-05-70
*
* Joint Transformation Strategy Includes Several Complex Components
* Joint Concepts Are Intended to Provide a Foundation for
Transformation
* Roadmaps Are Implementation Plans to Develop and Acquire
Capabilities fo\r Joint Concepts
* Strategic Appraisal Designed to Assess Transformation Progress
* DOD's Transformation Strategy Is In對tended to Link
* Key Practices for Successful Transformation Include Clear
Leadership, Ac\countability, and Crosscutting Implementation Team
* Clear Leadership and Accountability for Transformation of
Military Capab\ilities Have Not Been Established
* Formal Implementation Team Has Not Been Established to Integrate
Transfo\rmation Efforts
* Lack of Coordinating Authority Can Hinder Development of Joint
Capabilit\ies
* Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
* Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
* Related GAO Products
* Order by Mail or Phone
* d0570cover.pdf
* Report to Congressional Committees
* December 2004
* DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION
* Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management Tools Are
Needed to Enh\ance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military
Capabilities
* cover4.pdf
* http://www.gao.gov
* d0570cover.pdf
* Report to Congressional Committees
* December 2004
* DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION
* Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management Tools Are
Needed to Enh\ance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military
Capabilities
* cover4.pdf
* http://www.gao.gov
* d0570cover.pdf
* Report to Congressional Committees
* December 2004
* MILITARY TRANSFORMATION
* Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management Tools Are
Needed to Enh\ance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military
Capabilities
United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Committees
GAO
December 2004
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION
Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance
DOD's Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities
a
GAO-05-70
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION
Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to
Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities
What GAO Found
DOD has taken positive steps to design and implement a complex strategy to
transform U.S. military capabilities, but it has not established clear
leadership and accountability or fully adopted results-oriented management
tools to help guide and successfully implement this approach. The
responsibility for transforming military capabilities is currently spread
among various DOD organizations, with no one person or entity having the
overarching and ongoing leadership responsibilities or the accountability
for achieving transformation results. In addition, although DOD
established an informal crosscutting group that meets occasionally to
discuss transformation issues, this group has no charter, formal
responsibilities, or authority to direct changes. GAO has previously
reported that key practices for successful transformation include
leadership that sets the direction of transformation and assigns
accountability for results, and the use of crosscutting implementation
teams, which can provide the day-to-day management needed for success. In
recent testimony on DOD's business transformation, we underscored the
importance of these elements and stated that DOD has not routinely
assigned accountability for performance to specific organizations or
individuals who have sufficient authority to accomplish goals. DOD
officials believe that a single organization accountable for
transformation results and a formal implementation team are not necessary
because existing informal mechanisms involve key organizations that can
individually implement needed changes, and an annual assessment of
transformation roadmaps is prepared for the Secretary of Defense, who can
direct the transformation efforts of each organization. However, in the
absence of clear leadership, accountability, and a formal implementation
mechanism, DOD may have difficulty resolving differences among competing
priorities, directing resources to the highest priorities, and ensuring
progress should changes in senior personnel occur. In addition, informal
mechanisms are not sufficient to provide transparency to the process or
assurance to Congress that DOD is allocating resources to address needed
improvements rather than desired improvements.
While DOD's strategy to transform military capabilities is a good first
step, DOD has not fully developed results-oriented management tools that
can help managers effectively implement and manage major efforts, and
focus on achieving results. Specifically, DOD has not revised its initial
transformation goals, set in 2001, to reflect new joint concepts-thus, DOD
lacks a foundation for developing other tools such as performance goals
and measures and linking specific resources needed to achieve each goal.
DOD faces challenges in developing these tools because the joint concepts
are being developed concurrently with its plans to acquire new
capabilities. But without these results-oriented tools, it will be
difficult for DOD to determine the extent to which its transformation
efforts are achieving desired results, to measure its overall progress, or
to provide transparency for how billions of dollars in planned investments
are being applied.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 2 Background 5 DOD's Transformation Strategy Is Evolving
and Involves Complex
and Concurrent Components 7 Overall Transformation Leadership,
Accountability, and Integrating
Mechanism Have Not Been Established 15 Approach to Transform Military
Capabilities Lacks Important
Management Tools 23 Conclusions 30 Recommendations for Executive Action 31
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 32
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products
Tables
T able 1: Roles and Responsibilities of Key Offices 19 Table 2:
Results-Oriented Management Tools Used in Our Analysis 24 Table 3: DOD
Transformation Goals Presented in Different Defense Guidance Documents 25
Figures
Figure 1: Components of DOD's Strategy for Transforming Military
Capabilities
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense
OUSD Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
TPG Transformation Planning Guidance
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United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548
December 17, 2004
The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate
The Honorable Jim Saxton Chairman The Honorable Martin T. Meehan Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Committee on Armed Services House
of Representatives
Because of the uncertainties associated with the future threats the nation
may face, and with many competing demands on its resources, the Department
of Defense (DOD) has embarked on a major effort to transform its business
processes, human capital, and military capabilities. The transformation of
military capabilities, which is the focus of this report, will involve not
only the acquisition of new weapon systems, but also how the armed forces
think, train, and fight. Transformation is also seen as a process intended
to provide continuous improvements to military capabilities. In the words
of the Secretary of Defense "...DOD is building a culture of continual
transformation, so that our armed forces are always several steps ahead of
any potential adversaries." One of the fundamental objectives of
transformation is to enhance joint operations- the coordinated use of all
military forces that share information across traditional service
boundaries and levels of command.
This transformation effort will require a significant investment of
resources at a time when the nation faces a serious fiscal imbalance and
many competing demands. In 2003, DOD reported that it planned to spend
about $263 billion for transformation from fiscal year 2004 through 2009.
Concurrently, DOD must also balance resource demands for ongoing military
operations around the world and maintain existing weapon systems.
Because of the importance of successfully adapting U.S. military
capabilities to address changing threats and the significant investments
that this will require, we assessed the management framework DOD has
established to guide its transformation efforts. Specifically, in this
report we (1) describe DOD's strategy to transform joint military
capabilities;
(2) assess the extent to which DOD has clearly established leadership,
accountability for achieving transformation results, and a mechanism to
integrate transformation efforts; and (3) assess the extent to which DOD
is using results-oriented management tools to guide implementation of its
transformation strategy. We prepared this report at our own initiative,
and are providing a copy to you because of your oversight of defense
issues.
To describe DOD's strategy to transform military capabilities, we reviewed
the department's Transformation Planning Guidance and plans for
implementing major parts of the strategy. We corroborated and clarified
our understanding of how DOD intends to implement its strategy with
appropriate DOD officials. To assess the extent to which DOD has clearly
established leadership, accountability for achieving transformation
results, and a mechanism to integrate transformation efforts, we examined
DOD instructions governing the roles and responsibilities of various
defense organizations and reviewed relevant policy guidance and documents.
We also identified similar crosscutting initiatives within DOD and
examined how it established the authority and accountability for those
initiatives. We compared this information to selected key practices
consistently found to be at the center of successful mergers and
organizational transformations and discussed the results with relevant DOD
officials. To assess the extent to which DOD is using results-oriented
management tools to guide transformation efforts, we compared DOD's
current management framework with management principles embodied by the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and discussed our results
with appropriate DOD officials. We assessed the reliability of the cost
data we obtained from DOD reports by corroborating the data with
knowledgeable agency officials and determined that it was sufficiently
reliable for our purposes. See appendix I for a more complete description
of our scope and methodology. We conducted our work between May 2003 and
October 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
DOD has taken positive steps to design and implement a complex strategy
Results in Brief
to transform U.S. military capabilities. The foundation of the strategy is
joint concepts, which are intended to depict how U.S. military forces will
be integrated to conduct future operations. For example, DOD is
Page 2 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation
developing a joint concept called force application that will describe how
the Joint Force Commander will integrate and rapidly maneuver forces
across the range of military operations. DOD plans to develop and refine
these concepts through experimentation efforts led by the Joint Forces
Command. These concepts are intended to evolve as DOD's transformation
efforts progress. As DOD defines and develops these joint concepts, it has
also required each military department and the Joint Forces Command to
prepare individual plans (called roadmaps) to acquire the capabilities to
implement these new joint concepts. The roadmaps are prepared annually and
reflect ongoing initiatives, such as the Army's Future Combat System, and
also recognize that science and technology are expected to yield new
capabilities in the future. The strategy also calls for an annual
assessment of the progress made in implementing transformation of military
capabilities, the results of which are intended to influence future
defense guidance and, ultimately, investment decisions.
Although the Secretary of Defense has assigned responsibility for managing
key aspects of transformation, DOD has not established clear leadership
and accountability for achieving transformation results, nor has it
established a formal mechanism to coordinate and integrate the various
transformation efforts within the department. As we have previously
reported, key practices for successful transformation include leadership
that sets the direction of transformation, assigns accountability for
results, and is supported by crosscutting implementation teams, which, in
turn, can provide the focused, day-to-day management needed for success. 1
In recent testimony on DOD's business transformation, we underscored the
importance of these elements and stated that DOD has not routinely
assigned accountability for performance to specific organizations or
individuals who have sufficient authority to accomplish goals. 2 Although
the Secretary of Defense has provided the vision for transformation and
set the tone for accomplishing it, the responsibility for various parts of
the transformation strategy for military capabilities is spread among
several organizations, including the Office of Force Transformation, the
Joint Staff, each of the services, and the Joint Forces Command; and no
single individual or organization has been given the overarching
leadership
1
GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and
Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).
2
GAO, Department of Defense: Further Actions Needed to Establish and
Implement a Framework for Successful Financial and Business Management
Transformation, GAO-04-551T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2004).
Page 3 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation
responsibilities, authority, or the accountability for achieving
transformation results. In addition, although DOD has established an
informal crosscutting group that meets occasionally to discuss
transformation issues, this group has no formal charter, meets on an
irregular basis, and has no directive authority. DOD officials stated that
they believe that the current assignment of responsibilities among various
department organizations is adequate and that a formal crosscutting group
is not needed because existing informal mechanisms involve key
organizations that can implement needed changes, and the annual assessment
of the progress made in transformation efforts is prepared for the
Secretary of Defense, who can direct the transformation efforts of each
military department. However, in the absence of clear leadership,
accountability, and a formal implementation mechanism, DOD may have
difficulty in resolving differences among competing priorities, directing
resources to the highest priorities, and ensuring progress if changes in
senior personnel occur. In addition, informal mechanisms are not
sufficient to provide transparency to the process or provide Congress with
assurance that DOD is allocating resources to address needed improvements
rather than desired improvements.
While the strategy designed by DOD to transform military capabilities is a
good first step toward establishing a framework to guide and monitor the
results of its transformation efforts, DOD has not fully developed
resultsoriented management tools that provide a means to set clear and
specific goals and measure progress in achieving them. For example, DOD
initially established six long-term goals for transformation in the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review, and it subsequently articulated additional
transformation goals in other department documents. DOD has not, however,
revised these goals to reflect the new joint concepts, which, as
previously discussed, are now intended to be the foundation of the
transformation strategy. Without clear and consistent long-term goals
grounded in the joint concepts, DOD lacks a foundation for developing
other important tools such as performance goals and measures, and it is
limited in its ability to link resource needs to specific goals. DOD faces
challenges in developing these management tools because of the inherently
concurrent nature of the transformation process-the joint concepts are
being defined and developed at the same time the services and the Joint
Forces Command are developing their plans to acquire new capabilities. But
without tools such as clear long-term goals, performance goals and
measures, and specific resource requirements that are linked to these
goals, it will be difficult for DOD to determine the extent to which its
transformation efforts are achieving desired results, measure its overall
Background
progress, or provide transparency for how billions of dollars in planned
investments are being applied.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense establish clear
leadership and accountability for achieving the transformation of military
capabilities, establish a formal group to integrate departmentwide
efforts, and direct this group and the Joint Forces Command to more fully
incorporate results-oriented management tools to help DOD guide the
transformation efforts and report on results achieved. In official oral
comments on a draft of this report provided by the Office of Force
Transformation, DOD officials generally disagreed with our
recommendations. In general, their comments indicated that they believe
the current transformation leadership, organizational structures,
strategy, and oversight mechanisms are adequate and appropriate; therefore
the recommendations we make in this report are unwarranted. DOD's comments
did not, however, address the weaknesses we describe in the report, and
the additional points they raised did not provide convincing evidence that
our recommendations were unnecessary. Accordingly, we continue to believe
our recommendations, if implemented, could enhance the department's
efforts to transform military capabilities and provide Congress with
greater visibility over how billions of dollars are being applied to
achieve this goal. DOD's comments and our evaluation are discussed in
detail at the end of this report.
DOD defines transformation as "a process that shapes the changing nature
of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of
concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our
nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities." 3
It describes the outcome of transformation as "fundamentally joint,
networkcentric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority
and massed effects across the battlespace"-that is, transformation should
result in maximum collaboration among the services and between levels of
command, all of them having access to the same, integrated computer
network, geographically dispersed but effectively interconnected, to
enable quick, real-time decision making and achieve widespread effects.
DOD's transformation efforts are not limited to military capabilities; DOD
is also undertaking efforts to transform its business practices, human
3
Transformation Planning Guidance, Washington, D.C.: April 2003.
capital, 4 and its relationships with interagency and multinational
partners. The focus of this report is on DOD's efforts to transform
military capabilities to meet the changing and uncertain nature of future
threats.
The transformation of joint military capabilities began with DOD's 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review, a congressionally mandated but DOD-led study,
which concluded that transformation of U.S. forces is needed to extend
America's military advantages into the future. DOD published its strategy
for transforming military capabilities in the April 2003 Transformation
Planning Guidance (TPG). The TPG stated that new joint concepts are needed
to describe how U.S. forces will conduct operations in the next 15 to 20
years and that changes in new weapons systems, organizations, doctrine,
training, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities will be
needed to provide these capabilities. According to a recent DOD report, 5
the performance of U.S. forces in the successful conduct of Operations
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom has provided a glimpse of the future
potential of emerging concepts, such as sharing information among
dispersed forces and using existing weapon systems in new ways. In fact,
the Deputy Commander, Joint Forces Command, testified in February 2004
that these operations sharpened DOD's transformation focus by showing the
effectiveness of integrating forces, such as merging special operations
and conventional forces.
Implementations of large-scale changes, such as transformations, are not
simple endeavors and require concentrated efforts to accomplish goals.
Experience shows that successful changes can take years to accomplish and,
in the federal government, can be difficult to sustain given frequent
turnover in leadership. We have reported that DOD's force transformation
will also require cultural changes and business process reengineering that
will take years to accomplish. 6
In our past work, we have reported on the advantages of using
resultsoriented management tools to help organizations successfully manage
major efforts such as transformation. Our work on transforming
organizations highlighted the need for leadership to drive the
4
GAO, Human Capital: Building on DOD's Reform Effort to Foster
Governmentwide Improvements, GAO-03-851T (Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2003).
5
Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, Office of Force
Transformation, (Washington, D.C.: 2003).
6 GAO-03-669.
Page 6 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation
DOD's Transformation Strategy Is Evolving and Involves Complex and Concurrent
Components
transformation with integrated strategic goals, dedicating a crosscutting
team to implement the strategy, and the use of performance management
principles to assign responsibility and ensure accountability for the
change. 7 Similarly, we have reported that management principles (or
tools) embodied by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
provide agencies with a framework to effectively implement and manage
programs and shift the management focus from measuring the program
activities and processes to measuring outcomes. 8 Such a shift in focus is
especially important for efforts such as the transformation of military
capabilities, which will involve billions of dollars in spending.
DOD has designed a complex strategy focused on developing and fielding
improved joint military capabilities and, in fiscal year 2003, it began to
implement this strategy for the first time. The foundation of DOD's
strategy is the joint concepts, which are intended to depict how U.S.
military forces will be integrated to conduct future operations. The
strategy also requires the Joint Forces Command and each military
department to prepare roadmaps-that is, implementation plans-for
developing and acquiring the capabilities needed to implement the joint
concepts. The roadmaps reflect some programs that are ongoing, such as the
Army's Future Combat System, and also recognize that science and
technology are expected to yield new capabilities in the future. DOD also
performs an annual assessment of the roadmaps, the results of which are
intended to influence future defense guidance and, ultimately, investment
decisions.
7 GAO-03-669.
8
Congress enacted this legislation to provide for, among other things, the
establishment of strategic planning and performance measurement in the
federal government. See Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993).
Page 7 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation
Joint Transformation DOD has developed a complex strategy to transform
joint military Strategy Includes Several capabilities that involves
several complex components. Figure 1 provides Complex Components a general
portrayal of the relationship between these components. Fiscal year 2003
was the first year that DOD implemented this overall strategy.
Figure 1: Components of DOD's Strategy for Transforming Military Capabilities
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.
Joint Concepts Are Intended to Provide a Foundation for Transformation
As illustrated in figure 1, the strategy is based on general defense
guidance reflected in documents such as the National Military Strategy and
the Quadrennial Defense Review. From this general guidance, DOD is
developing a "family" of joint operating, functional, and integrating
concepts, which collectively depict how transformed forces will operate in
the future. DOD intends to continually develop and evolve each of these
joint concepts over the next several years through experimentation
conducted by each service and the Joint Forces Command. Each military
department and the Joint Forces Command also prepare annual roadmaps,
which are intended to provide more specific information on plans to
acquire the capabilities to achieve the joint concepts. The strategy also
calls for the Director, Office of Force Transformation, 9 to conduct an
annual evaluation of the progress made in achieving transformation goals
(called a strategic assessment) by reviewing the annual roadmaps. DOD
officials stated that the results of the strategic assessment are
incorporated into defense guidance that provides direction for budget
development. We discuss each of these components in more detail below.
DOD has reported that the key to its transformation strategy is a family
of joint concepts, which includes an overarching vision (articulated in
the Joint Operations Concepts) and interrelated operating, functional, and
integrating concepts. DOD created the Joint Operations Concepts to
articulate the overarching description of how the military will conduct
all types of joint operations in the next 15 to 20 years. It focuses more
on how the United States can defeat a broad array of capabilities that any
adversary may employ rather than who the adversaries are and where they
may engage U.S. forces or interests. The Secretary of Defense signed the
Joint Operations Concepts in November 2003.
The Joint Operations Concepts calls for the creation of subordinate Joint
Operating Concepts (hereinafter called operating concepts) that
collectively describe how the military will operate across the range of
military operations. According to a Joint Staff official, although DOD has
drafted the four operating concepts, as of October 2004, the Secretary of
Defense had not approved them. These four Joint Operating Concepts and a
general description of each are as follows:
9
The Director, Office of Force Transformation, advises the Secretary of
Defense on transformation issues.
Page 9 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation
o Major Combat Operations - conduct large-scale military actions.
o Stability Operations - conducted before, during, and after major
combat operations to provide security, initial humanitarian
assistance, limited governance, restoration of essential public
services, and other reconstruction assistance.
o Strategic Deterrence - discourage aggression or any form of coercion
against the United States or its interests and alter a nation's or
group's will and ability to attack the homeland, U.S. allies, or
development of democracies throughout the world.
* Homeland Security - detect, deter, prevent, and defeat attacks
against the homeland to provide military forces in support of
civilian authority, and plan for emergencies.
* Complementing the four operating concepts are eight functional
concepts. These functional concepts as described in DOD documents
are:
o Command and Control - describes how joint forces will collaborate,
communicate, and implement commanders' decisions while conducting
operations as described in the operating concepts.
o Force Application - describes how the Joint Force Commander will
integrate and rapidly maneuver forces to engage adversaries and defeat
them across the range of military operations outlined collectively in
the operating concepts.
o Battlespace Awareness - describes the information about an operational
environment-including status of friendly, adversary, and nonaligned
forces and the impacts of physical, cultural, social, political, and
economic factors on military operations-and how the Joint Force
Commander can use this information to plan operations.
o Force Protection - describes how the joint force will use active and
passive capabilities to protect personnel, physical assets, and
information to prevent adversaries from restricting or preventing U.S.
forces from conducting operations as described in the operating
concepts.
o Focused Logistics - describes how DOD will provide the Joint Force
Commander with equipment and other support on time for simultaneous
operations conducted over geographically dispersed areas.
o Network-Centric Warfare - currently in development.
o Force Management - currently in development.
o Joint Training - currently in development.
Functional concepts are intended, collectively, to describe the
capabilities and attributes that will be needed to implement the operating
concepts. As forces shift from one type of operation to another, such as
from stability operations to major combat operations, the functional
capabilities they need may change as well. For example, a stability
operation may require nonlethal force application capabilities, but if the
operation shifts to major combat, then lethal capabilities may be
emphasized. DOD approved the battlespace awareness, joint command and
control, force application, force protection, and focused logistics
concepts in February 2004. According to a Joint Staff official, as of
October 2004, the other three were in development.
The integrating concepts, which crosscut through the operating and
functional concepts, have the narrowest focus of all the concepts. As of
October 2004, DOD had begun drafting seven integrating concepts, although
none were completed and more may be added. The seven concepts being
drafted are
o Joint Command and Control,
o Joint Logistics,
o Joint Forcible Entry Operations,
o Integrating Air and Missile Defense,
o Global Strike,
o Seabasing, and
o Undersea Superiority.
The integrating concepts describe how the capabilities derived from the
joint and functional concepts are meant to work together. For example,
according to Office of Force Transformation and Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (hereafter referred to as OUSD Policy)
officials, the seabasing concept may describe how the capabilities derived
from the focused logistics functional concept would be applied in a major
combat operation. The March 2004 defense guidance directed that the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop a comprehensive, prioritized list
of integrating concepts required to support the operating concepts before
fiscal year 2005 and assign them to specific DOD components for
development. This guidance also directs that undersea superiority
Roadmaps Are Implementation Plans to Develop and Acquire Capabilities for
Joint Concepts
operations, seabasing operations, and global strike operations be
developed prior to the next Quadrennial Defense Review. We did not
evaluate the status of these concepts during our review.
DOD plans to use experimentation 10 to help define and develop each
concept and identify the specific capabilities needed to implement them.
The Joint Forces Command is responsible for joint experimentation on the
concepts and integrating results from other combatant commanders'
experiments. Based on the results, the Joint Forces Command will recommend
modifications to existing joint concepts as well as recommend changes
needed in doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership,
personnel, and facilities to achieve the capabilities needed to implement
the joint concepts. According to the Joint Forces Command's
experimentation plan, these recommendations should help DOD senior
leadership make informed decisions about future investments.
Experimentation is ongoing-the Joint Forces Command's experimentation plan
outlines the Command's approach from fiscal year 2004 through 2011, and it
presents in detail events scheduled throughout fiscal years 2004 and 2005.
The Office of Force Transformation is responsible for managing the roadmap
process. The 2003 transformation roadmaps were the first ones to be
prepared under DOD's transformation strategy, and they were submitted in
November 2003 to the Office of Force Transformation for review. They are
intended to be implementation plans outlining the concrete steps DOD must
take to develop and acquire the capabilities necessary for implementing
the joint concepts. Specifically, the Transformation Planning Guidance
requires the roadmaps to include information such as
o when and how desired capabilities will be fielded;
o which critical capabilities from other services and agencies are
required for success;
o changes to the organizational structure, operating concepts, doctrine,
and skill sets of personnel;
o initiatives intended to improve interoperability;
10
Experimentation uses various types of assessments to develop, refine, and
validate joint concepts and their associated capabilities. These
activities vary in scale but are designed to identify areas to explore
(that is, develop hypotheses) and then use simulated or live experiments
to confirm, refute, or modify the ideas.
Page 12 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation
Strategic Appraisal Designed to Assess Transformation Progress
o measures intended to assess DOD's six transformational goals
identified in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and joint operating
concepts; and
o funding information that includes appropriation breakouts through the
Future Years Defense Program 11 for the desired capabilities.
The military department roadmaps (Army, Naval, 12 and Air Force) are
developed by the services. They provide a broad overview of the service
capabilities under development to support the joint concepts. As the
concepts develop over time and specify more precisely what capabilities
are required, the roadmaps can, in turn, specify more precisely how those
capabilities will be acquired. The roadmaps also reflect some ongoing
programs, such as the Army's Future Combat System and the Air Force's
Space-Based Radar, and recognize that science and technology investments
are expected to yield new capabilities. The Joint Forces Command is
responsible for developing the joint roadmap using input from the combat
support defense agencies. 13 The purpose of the joint roadmap is to
document planned activities to achieve transformational improvements in
joint capabilities, such as joint command and control and joint
intelligence, and to facilitate the coordination of transformational
activities across DOD.
The TPG requires the Office of Force Transformation to conduct an annual
strategic appraisal to assist the Secretary of Defense in evaluating
progress in implementing transformation. The TPG requires that the
strategic appraisal process include an evaluation of transformation
progress using specific measures; that barriers to transformation be
identified; and that recommendations are developed to improve
transformation for the next TPG or other defense guidance. That guidance,
in turn, is intended to provide the services with instructions for budget
development.
11
The Future Years Defense Program is a DOD centralized report that provides
information on DOD's current and planned outyear budget requests.
12
The Naval Transformation Roadmap represents the Navy and Marine Corps
plan.
13
Defense Agencies that are assigned wartime support missions are designated
as Combat Support Agencies and include agencies such as the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Information Systems Agency, the Defense
Logistics Agency, and the National Security Agency.
DOD's Transformation Strategy Is Intended to Link to the Acquisition
Process
According to Office of Force Transformation and OUSD Policy officials, the
Office of Force Transformation conducted its first strategic appraisal of
the roadmaps between December 2003 and February 2004, the results of which
were briefed to the Secretary of Defense in April 2004. According to
Office of Force Transformation officials, information provided from the
strategic appraisal was incorporated into 2004 defense guidance issued by
the Secretary of Defense. For example, the 2004 defense guidance required
the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, to prepare a roadmap for
the development of directed-energy capabilities through 2020. Other
results, according to Office of Force Transformation and OUSD Policy
officials, were incorporated into informal guidance that the Office of
Force Transformation provided to the services and the Joint Forces Command
for updating the roadmaps that were due to be submitted in July 2004.
Neither the strategic appraisal's results nor the defense guidance is
published outside DOD. According to these officials, the 2004 roadmaps
were submitted for review in July 2004, and the second strategic appraisal
process is now under way.
According to the TPG, the strategic appraisal process should include input
from the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, which evaluates the
transformational value of the service budget requests in light of the
services' roadmaps. Although this evaluation was not completed in the
first strategic appraisal, officials from this office said that they
intend to require the services to show how their proposed budgets support
their roadmaps, and the services' input will become the basis for the
evaluation. Furthermore, officials said that in cases where the services'
budget requests deviate from resource requirements articulated in each
roadmap, the services are required to show how any increases in funding
for one program will be offset by decreases in other areas.
The transformation strategy is designed to link with the acquisition
process through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.
This system is DOD's capabilities-based process intended to identify,
evaluate, and prioritize capabilities needed to implement the joint
concepts. According to a Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, 14
this process is complex but includes the following basic steps. In the
first step, a variety of defense organizations, including the military
services and
14 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01D: Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System. March 12, 2004.
Page 14 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation
Overall Transformation Leadership, Accountability, and Integrating Mechanism
Have Not Been Established
the combatant commands, identifies, analyzes, and prioritizes the gaps
between current capabilities and those needed to implement the joint
concepts. Second, these same organizations develop solutions to address
these gaps through a combination of materiel changes (that is, developing
and buying new weapon systems) and nonmateriel changes (that is, changes
in doctrine, organizations, training, leadership, personnel, and
facilities). Finally, several review boards within the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council 15 review the recommended solutions. Approved solutions
are then funded as part of DOD's budget process. For example, the approved
solution to providing capability X for implementing the force application
functional concept may be to develop and buy a new weapon system. This new
weapon system then becomes an acquisition requirement that is funded as
part of DOD's budget process.
Although the Secretary of Defense has taken some positive steps to begin
the transformation of military capabilities and assigned responsibility
for various components of this effort, DOD has not established clear
leadership and accountability for achieving transformation results, nor
has it established a formal mechanism to coordinate and integrate the
various transformation efforts within the department. As we have reported,
key practices and implementation steps for a successful transformation
include leadership that sets the direction of transformation, assigns
accountability for results, and is supported by crosscutting
implementation teams, which, in turn, can provide the focused, day-to-day
management needed for success. 16 According to OUSD Policy and Office of
Force Transformation officials, an informal group consisting of
representatives from key organizations meets periodically to discuss
transformation issues. But this group has no official charter designating
specific responsibilities; it prepares no minutes of its proceedings, and
it has no directive authority to implement the decisions it makes. Without
formally designating responsibility and accountability for results,
sustaining transformation over the long term, choosing among competing
demands for scarce resources, and resolving differences in priorities
15
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is an advisory council to assist
the Chariman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying and assessing the
priority of joint military capabilities to meet the national military and
defense strategies. Chariman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
5123.01B: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. April 15,
2004.
16 GAO-03-669.
Page 15 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation
Key Practices for Successful Transformation Include Clear Leadership,
Accountability, and Crosscutting Implementation Team
between various DOD organizations may be difficult and could impede DOD's
ability to transform in an efficient and timely manner.
We reported in 2003 that key practices and implementation steps for
successful transformations include clear leadership and accountability,
and that a dedicated implementation team should be responsible for the
transformation's day-to-day management, which is important to ensuring
that various initiatives are integrated. 17 Such an implementation team,
vested with the necessary authority, would ensure that transformation
receives the focused, full-time attention necessary to be sustained and
effective by establishing clearly defined roles and responsibilities,
helping to reach agreement on work priorities, and keeping efforts
coordinated. We recently emphasized the importance of these elements in
our March 2004 testimony on DOD's business transformation efforts before
the Senate Committee on Armed Services. 18 In that testimony, the
Comptroller General stated that, given the importance of DOD's business
transformation effort, it is imperative that it receives the sustained
leadership needed to improve DOD's business operations over a number of
years and various administrations. Our testimony highlighted that DOD has
not routinely assigned accountability for performance to specific
organizations or individuals who have sufficient authority to accomplish
goals. While DOD's leadership has demonstrated the commitment to reforming
the department, the day-to-day demands placed on the Secretary, the Deputy
Secretary, and others make it difficult for these leaders to maintain the
oversight, focus, and momentum needed to resolve the weaknesses in DOD's
business operations. The lack of adequate transparency and appropriate
accountability across all of DOD's major business areas results in
billions of dollars in annual wasted resources in a time of increasing
fiscal constraint. As a result, DOD does not have timely, reliable
information for management to use in making informed decisions. The
Comptroller General also stated that one way to ensure sustained
leadership over DOD's business transformation efforts would be to create a
position for a chief operating officer or chief management official who
would serve as the Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Management.
In some cases, DOD has taken steps to establish clear accountability and
authority for other significant transformation efforts. For example, DOD
17 GAO-03-669. 18 GAO-04-551T.
Page 16 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation
has designated the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
with overall responsibility for training transformation and named the
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness as Executive Agent. 19
Supporting the Executive Agent are oversight and implementation groups
whose members crosscut DOD, that is, the Joint Staff, the military
services, and representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
that include Program Analysis and Evaluation; Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics; Comptroller; and Policy. The implementation group is
responsible for providing overall daily management, while the oversight
groups are to resolve issues, manage funding, and ensure collaboration
across DOD.
For efforts related to the transformation of military capabilities, the
Joint Forces Command has recognized the importance of using crosscutting
groups and assigning overall responsibility and accountability for
results. First, the Command developed an Integrated Interoperability Plan
that recommends a crosscutting governance group be established to
implement and monitor the achievement of interoperability objectives,
which are key to transformation. According to the plan, the purpose of the
crosscutting group would be to provide oversight and coordination of
capability development, synchronizing all key DOD processes, and ensuring
"holistic" implementation of the requirements/acquisition process, from
conception to fielding. The plan recommended that this group be led by a
senior DOD official and include participation from the Joint Staff, Joint
Forces Command, Special Operations Command, Strategic Command, services,
and defense agencies to serve as the senior resolution body for capability
and interoperability issues cutting across DOD components, and to approve
joint capability and interoperability measures. According to OUSD Policy
and Office of Force Transformation officials, however, this group has not
been established because it was believed to be a layer of bureaucracy that
was not needed. Second, the Joint Roadmap 20 prepared by the Joint Forces
Command concluded that "[f]ailure to successfully integrate the emerging
... systems will imperil the transformation of DOD military capabilities."
The roadmap recommended that a coordination
19
DOD defines "Executive Agent" as the Head of a DOD Component to whom the
Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned
specific responsibilities, functions and authorities to provide
support...for designated activities that involve two or more DOD
Components. DOD Directive 5101.1, DOD Executive Agent, Sec. 3.1, September
3, 2002.
20
U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Transformation Roadmap (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 21, 2004).
Clear Leadership and Accountability for Transformation of Military
Capabilities Have Not Been Established
group be established to help identify synergies between activities and to
direct limited resources where they would be the most beneficial. The
roadmap also recommended that four DOD organizations work together to
ensure that science and technology efforts will be linked to developing
the new joint concepts. The Joint Forces Command official we spoke with
indicated that they were unaware of any actions taken to respond to these
recommendations.
As table 1 shows, there are many DOD organizations tasked with specific
responsibilities for implementing parts of the transformation strategy,
but none of these organizations have been given the leadership
responsibilities or the overarching authority and accountability for
achieving transformation results. According to Office of Force
Transformation and OUSD Policy officials, the Secretary of Defense is
ultimately responsible and accountable for all DOD activities, and
therefore is inherently responsible and accountable for the successful
transformation of military capabilities. We believe that while DOD
leadership has demonstrated the commitment to transforming military
capabilities, as previously stated, the day-to-day demands placed on the
Secretary make it difficult for him to personally maintain the oversight,
focus, and momentum needed to sustain transformation efforts.
Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities of Key Offices
Organization Responsibilities
Secretary of Defense Sets transformation policies and objectives
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Oversees joint concept development and
validates joint requirements
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Prepares Transformation Planning
Policy Guidance and other defense guidance
Office of Force Transformation Monitors and evaluates implementation of
the transformation strategy; advises the Secretary of Defense; assesses
the roadmaps during the strategic appraisal process
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Analyzes service budgets to see
that Program Analysis and Evaluation initiatives in transformation
roadmaps are funded in budget requests
Joint Forces Command (and other Conduct joint concept development and
combatant commands) experimentation
Military services Build plans (called roadmaps) and budgets to achieve
transformational capabilities needed to implement the joint concepts
Source: GAO analysis of DOD guidance.
Two organizations (Office of Force Transformation and the Joint Forces
Command) have central roles in the transformation strategy but no
overarching authority or accountability for achieving transformation
results. First, the Director, Office of Force Transformation, is to advise
the Secretary of Defense, monitor and evaluate the transformation
strategy, and assess the roadmaps during the strategic appraisal process.
The Director does not have the overall authority, responsibility, and
accountability for implementing DOD's transformation strategy. In fact,
the Director testified before Congress that he "is a catalyst for" and
"encourages" but does not "direct" transformation. 21 Although the Office
of Force Transformation was created in November 2001, its charter, as of
September 2004, had not been approved. Second, as previously discussed,
the Joint Forces Command is responsible for annually preparing the joint
roadmap. However, Joint Forces Command officials told us the Command does
not have the overall authority and responsibility to implement the
Hearings on Defense Transformation Before the House Committee on Armed
Services: Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and
Capabilities, 108th Cong. 5,33 (2004) (statement of Arthur Cebrowski,
Director, Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of
Defense).
Page 19 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation
Formal Implementation Team Has Not Been Established to Integrate
Transformation Efforts
roadmap because the Command does not have the authority to direct the
services' and defense agencies' programs described in the roadmap.
According to OUSD Policy and Office of Force Transformation officials, DOD
established an informal crosscutting group that meets occasionally to
discuss transformation issues. But, according to these officials, it has
no charter designating specific responsibilities for achieving
transformation goals, assessing transformation performance measures, or
linking resources to goals. In addition, the group has no specified
authority to direct changes across various DOD offices, and no minutes are
kept of its meetings. Therefore, we were unable to determine what specific
topics were discussed by the group, or the frequency, nature, or results
of its efforts. Participants in this group are invited as needed, but the
group generally includes representatives from the Office of Force
Transformation and others from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Policy; Program Analysis and Evaluation; Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics; and Office of Net Assessment), the Joint Staff (Force
Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate), and the Joint Forces
Command.
Lack of Coordinating Authority Can Hinder Development of Joint
Capabilities
Concerns have been raised in several forums about the lack of adequate
authority to coordinate transformation efforts. For example, the House
Committee on Armed Services report on the National Defense Authorization
Act for fiscal year 2005 stated that while the services have embraced
transformation as an objective, the committee remained concerned that each
military service has embarked on its own transformational campaign without
an enforceable, integrated joint roadmap to ensure that service plans are
mutually supportive and overlap where necessary. 22 For example, in
discussing a proposed joint program office to improve interoperability
among systems, the report notes that the services and the defense agencies
acquire systems to meet their own requirements, not necessarily joint
concepts. 23
22
H.R.
Rept. No. 108-491, pt.1, at Title X, p.355 (2004).
H.R.
Rept. No. 108-491, pt.1, at Title X, p.302 (2004).
23
In addition, a June 2004 DOD Inspector General report 24 recommended that
DOD formalize roles, responsibilities, and processes for the overall
development, coordination, and oversight of DOD network-centric warfare
efforts. 25 The report found that the lack of formalized roles and
responsibilities resulted in confusion on who had decision-making
authority. Further, the report states that the absence of formalized roles
and processes for the overall development, coordination, and oversight of
network-centric warfare efforts does not ensure that ongoing or planned
initiatives are properly focused and complement each other. According to
the report, DOD management agreed with the need for leadership
improvements.
Likewise, we have issued several reports dealing with the challenges DOD
faces in fielding joint capabilities:
o We reported in July 2004 that no single office is in charge of the
Global Information Grid (a key transformation initiative intended to
be the foundation for implementing all joint concepts), making it more
difficult to make and enforce trade-off decisions. 26 Previous DOD
efforts to foster interoperability have had limited success because
management tools and leadership attention were not strong enough to
provide sufficient oversight and overcome resistance by the military
services to forgo their unique requirements in favor of requirements
that would benefit DOD.
o We reported in June 2004 that one of the key factors undermining DOD's
progress in implementing its capabilities-based strategy is the lack
of standardized, interoperable equipment and systems in joint
operations. 27 The report noted that although DOD recognizes improved
interoperability is central to transformation, resolving this problem
is difficult because military acquisition has traditionally focused on
24
Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Joint Warfighting
and Readiness: Management of Network Centric Warfare Within the Department
of Defense, D-2004-091 (Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2004).
25
Network-centric warfare is collaborative information sharing linking
sensors, decision makers, and shooters, which is intended to result in
increased mission effectiveness.
26
GAO, Defense Acquisitions: The Global Information Grid and Challenges
Facing Its Implementation, GAO-04-858 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2004).
27
GAO, Military Operations: Recent Campaigns Benefited from Improved
Communications and Technology, but Barriers to Continued Progress Remain,
GAO-04-547 (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004).
service-specific platforms, not joint operations with interoperable
equipment.
o In a March 2004 report, we recommended that DOD establish an
appropriate organization to implement a strategic plan for unmanned
aerial vehicles, ensuring that sufficient authority is provided to
enforce the plan's direction, promote joint operations, and expend
funds efficiently. 28
o We reported in December 2002 that the military services and the
defense agencies have been reluctant to fund acquisition of advanced
concept technology-proven technologies, especially those focusing on
joint requirements, because of their competing priorities. 29
Likewise, a Center for Strategic and International Studies 2004 study
stated that DOD continues to struggle with insufficient jointness. 30
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom underscore
interoperability shortcomings in equipment fielded by the services.
Managing resources along service lines has not achieved real
interoperability in joint command and control. The study team believes
that true interoperability in joint command and control will not be
achieved until it is bought jointly.
A 2003 study chartered by the Secretary of Defense stated that current
processes do not optimize investment in joint capabilities to meet current
and future security challenges because the services and the defense
agencies define their needs at the component level and joint needs are
forced into the process after each service has developed its program. 31
The report further states that improving interoperability is key, which
requires greater coordination at the department level.
28
GAO, Force Structure: Enhanced Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's UAV
Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004).
29
GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Factors Affecting Outcomes of Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstrations, GAO-03-52 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2, 2002).
30
C.A. Murdock et al, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New
Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Mar. 2004).
31
Joint Defense Capabilities Study Team, Joint Defense Capabilities Study:
Final Report (Washington, D.C.: December, 2003).
Approach to Transform Military Capabilities Lacks Important Management Tools
DOD officials stated that they believe that the Director, Office of Force
Transformation, has the authority he needs to be effective. The Director
can persuade others to take action and influence defense guidance using
results of the strategic appraisal. These officials stated that the only
benefit to having directive authority is some things may happen faster
than they would without this authority. DOD officials also stated that DOD
has not formally established a crosscutting group responsible for
implementing the transformation strategy because, in their opinion,
setting up a bureaucratic layer to administer DOD's transformation
strategy is not needed.
This reasoning, however, is contradictory to the advice and experiences of
other organizations involved in major transformation efforts that
considered clearly defined accountability and crosscutting implementation
teams essential for successful transformations. It is also inconsistent
with the approach taken by DOD in other cases. Without formally
designating responsibility and accountability for results, choosing among
competing demands for scarce resources and resolving differences in
priorities between various DOD organizations may be difficult and could
impede DOD's ability to transform in an efficient manner. In addition, it
may be particularly difficult for DOD to sustain transformation progress
when key personnel changes occur. As we discussed these points and the
results of our analysis with DOD officials, they recognized that
leadership and accountability for transformation results may not be
clearly identified and DOD is considering what, if any, actions need to be
taken to address this issue.
DOD has not fully developed critical components of a management framework
to guide and monitor the results of its transformation efforts. DOD has
made progress in adopting some tools-specifically, establishing a
transformation strategy based on joint concepts, using mechanisms to
identify and mitigate external factors, and initiating a process for
reviewing roadmaps. However, it has not (1) revised its 2001
transformation goals to reflect the new joint concepts, (2) established
performance goals and performance measures, (3) fully identified resources
needed to achieve its goals, and (4) established a process to assess
progress in achieving long-term and performance goals. Without fully
utilizing these tools, it is difficult for DOD to determine the extent to
which its transformation efforts are achieving the desired results,
measure its overall progress, or provide transparency for how billions of
dollars programmed for transformation are being applied.
Studies by several organizations, including us, have shown that successful
organizations in both the public and private sectors use results-oriented
management tools to help achieve desired program outcomes. These tools, or
principles, embodied by the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993, provide agencies with a management framework for effectively
implementing and managing programs and shift program management focus from
measuring program activities and processes to measuring program outcomes.
The framework can include various management tools, such as long-term
goals, performance goals, and performance measures, which can assist
agencies in measuring performance and reporting results. Table 2 lists the
results-oriented management framework tools we used in our analysis.
Table 2: Results-Oriented Management Tools Used in Our Analysis
Long-term goals Identify expected results expressed in terms of outcomes
and when to expect such results
Strategies to be used General methods the agency plans to use to
accomplish long-term goals
External factors Factors beyond the agency's control that could affect the
agency's ability to achieve desired results
Performance goals Derived from long-term goals, should establish intended
performance and focus on results required
Performance measures Specific means of gauging performance
Resources Identification of the resources needed to achieve each goal
Evaluation plan An objective and formal assessment of results
Source: GAO guidelines.
These management tools can provide DOD and Congress ways to measure
progress and determine whether initiatives are achieving their desired
results. The following is our assessment of the extent to which DOD is
using these tools in implementing its strategy for transforming military
capabilities:
o Long-term goals: Long-term goals should identify expected results,
should be results-oriented, and should be expressed in a way that allows
them to be assessed in terms of achievement. DOD initially established six
long-term goals for transformation in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review,
and it subsequently articulated transformation goals in other department
documents (see table 3). According to Office of Force Transformation and
OUSD Policy officials, the differences in these goals reflect evolution in
DOD's vision for transformation outcomes. For example, some goals
expressed in the 2004 National Military Strategy are not reflected in the
2003 Transformation Planning Guidance. Further, these goals have not been
updated to reflect the joint concepts emerging from current transformation
efforts. An Office of Force Transformation official said that DOD's
initial goals were a good start, but they do not cover the full range of
military operations that the joint concepts will cover. Although the
official agreed that these goals would and should change, DOD has not
begun a process to revise them.
Table 3: DOD Transformation Goals Presented in Different Defense Guidance
Documents
2001 Quadrennial 2004 National Defense
Defense Review and Military Guidance
2003 Transformation Strategy
Planning Guidance
Protect critical bases of
operations
Project and sustain U.S.
forces in distant anti-access
or area-denial environments
and defeat anti-access threats
Deny enemies sanctuary through
persistent surveillance,
tracking and rapid engagement
with high-volume precision
strikes
Operate from the commons:
space, international waters
and airspace, and cyberspace
Strengthen intelligence
Conduct network-centric
operations
Improve proficiency for
irregular warfare
Increase capabilities of
partners-international and
domestic
Assure information systems in
the face of attack and
conducting effective and
discriminate offensive
information operations
Enhance the capability and
survivability of space systems
and supporting infrastructure
Leverage information
technology and innovative
concepts to develop an
interoperable, joint
communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance
architecture and capability
that includes a tailorable
joint operational picture
Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents.
o Strategy: A strategy should describe the general methods an agency
plans to use to accomplish long-term goals. As we described in the
previous section of this report, DOD has made significant progress in
developing its strategy to transform military capabilities. The
strategy is linked to the overall defense guidance and is based on
joint concepts, and many of the strategy's components have been
initiated. The strategy is also flexible and adaptable to new concepts
as they are developed through experimentation.
o External factors: Agencies should identify factors beyond their
control that could affect their ability to achieve desired results and
develop mitigation plans to address these factors. According to OUSD
Policy and Office of Force Transformation officials, DOD does have
mechanisms for examining and mitigating factors beyond its control
that could affect the achievement of desired results. One of these
mechanisms is the strategic appraisal process discussed earlier in
this report. Another is DOD's Risk Management Framework, developed to
ensure that current defense needs are balanced against future
requirements and consider trade-offs among four risk areas-force
management, operational, institutional, and future challenges (that
is, transformation). According to Office of the Secretary of Defense
for Program Analysis and Evaluation officials, if resource needs in
one risk area increase, then resources available for other areas may
decrease. For example, if demands for current operations increase,
then fewer resources may be available for transformation.
o Performance goals: Performance goals should establish intended
performance, should be results-oriented, and should be linked to
longterm goals. Since the joint roadmap is DOD's implementation plan
for joint military capabilities, we looked for performance goals in
the 2003 joint roadmap. In some parts of the roadmap, goals are not
included at all; in others, goals are unclear, and references are made
to goals presented in other documents. For example, the roadmap
includes several sets of goals for joint intelligence and refers to
other goals in DOD's Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Capstone Strategic Plan. As a result, it is not clear whether or how
these goals support each other, how they relate to the joint concepts,
or how the various programs described in this section of the roadmap
will support achievement of these goals. Clearly articulated,
results-oriented performance goals would help DOD explain how the
myriad of programs described in the roadmap will result in the
improved joint capabilities necessary to implement each joint concept.
o Performance measures: Performance measures are the specific means of
gauging performance and should include a baseline and target; should
be objective, measurable, and quantifiable, and should include a time
frame. DOD has not developed performance measures to assess progress
in the following three areas: implementation of the transformation
strategy across DOD; achievement of joint capabilities through the
programs described in the joint roadmap; and assessment of the
contribution of experimentation to transformation.
First, DOD has not developed measures to assess transformation progress
across DOD. DOD reports departmentwide performance measures in its Annual
Defense Report, and defense guidance states that DOD must develop
performance measures based on joint capabilities. The Program Analysis and
Evaluation Office has begun developing performance measures for DOD's
balanced scorecard, which will be included in future Annual Defense
Reports. DOD officials stated that, as part of this effort, they plan to
develop measures to assess the progress of transformation DOD-wide. But to
date, no such measures have been developed. Further, the few
transformation measures included in the 2003 Annual Defense Report are
process rather than results-oriented. For example, the measures for
"experiment[ing] with new warfare concepts" are processoriented, such as
providing a briefing and drafting an experimentation plan.
Second, DOD has not developed measures to assess the achievement of joint
capabilities through the programs described in the 2003 joint roadmap. The
TPG requires the roadmaps to include performance measures to address the
joint concepts, but the joint roadmap does not include performance
measures and does not describe any ongoing efforts to develop them. Joint
Forces Command officials stated that performance measures were not
developed because the joint concepts were not drafted at the time the
roadmap was prepared and that they do not expect to include performance
measures until the July 2005 joint roadmap, at the earliest.
Third, DOD has not developed measures to assess the contribution of
experimentation to transformation. In 2002, we recommended that the
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, develop strategic planning tools to
use in managing and periodically assessing the progress of joint
experimentation. 32 At that time, a Joint Forces Command official stated
that the Command was developing such measures. DOD agreed with this
recommendation and stated that subsequent guidance would address this
issue. Although the Joint Forces Command has drafted measures to assess
the contribution of experimentation to transformation, as of September
2004 it had not approved or implemented these measures.
* Resources: Agencies should identify the resources needed to achieve
each goal and should provide a rationale for how these resources
will contribute to achieving the expected level of performance. The
TPG also requires the roadmaps to include the funding necessary to
develop the desired capabilities. However, we found that DOD has
not clearly linked resources-either throughout the department or in
the joint roadmap-with the development of capabilities needed to
implement the joint concepts.
* For example, the 2003 Annual Defense Report stated that DOD is
committed to making budget documents more transparent by clearly
aligning dollars to specific programs so that senior-level decision
makers can see directly how they support the defense strategy. This
report showed $263 billion (for fiscal years 2004-2009) for
transformation; however, it is difficult to independently verify
how much DOD plans to spend on transformation-we reported in May
2004 that DOD's Future Years Defense Program does not clearly
identify those programs DOD considers transformational. Further,
the Annual Defense Report did not fully reflect all the programs
planned to develop the capabilities needed for each joint concept.
Likewise, the joint roadmap did not provide a complete description
of the programs and resources needed to develop the desired
capabilities. For example, the roadmap states that the Global
Information Grid will require changes in doctrine, organizational
processes, cultures, and behaviors, but it does not explain what
changes are needed or the funding required for these changes.
o Evaluation and corrective action plan: An evaluation plan is an
objective and formal assessment of the results of a major effort; a
corrective action plan should describe how evaluation findings will be
used to improve performance or revise unmet goals. As previously
discussed, the strategic appraisal process is designed to provide DOD
GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed to Better Manage DOD's Joint
Experimentation Program, GAO-02-856 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 29, 2002).
Page 28 GAO-05-70 Military Transformation
with a mechanism for evaluating its transformation efforts and identifying
corrective actions. It calls for the use of evaluation findings to improve
performance and identify or implement needed actions. According to Office
of Force Transformation and OUSD Policy officials, any shortfalls
identified during the appraisal are corrected in one of two ways-either by
incorporating required actions into directive defense guidance issued by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense or by providing informal guidance
to the Joint Forces Command and the services regarding issues to be
addressed in the next roadmap iterations. In fiscal year 2004, the first
year a strategic appraisal was conducted, DOD reviewed each roadmap
prepared by the military departments and the Joint Forces Command to
determine if any significant gaps existed in the capabilities being
acquired. The assessment did not evaluate the progress achieved in
acquiring the capabilities needed to implement the joint concepts because
the concepts were still undefined and under development. In lieu of the
joint concepts, the first strategic appraisal used lessons learned from
Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Secretary of Defense's Top Ten priorities
as criteria to identify these capability gaps. In reviewing information on
the strategic appraisal's results, it was not clear what measures were
used in evaluating how well the roadmaps were addressing these gaps. The
strategic appraisal could attain more definitive results and more clearly
identify actions that need to be taken if future assessments are based on
clearly articulated goals and measures founded on the joint concepts.
When we discussed the weaknesses in the current framework guiding the
transformation effort, DOD officials explained that DOD's transformation
strategy is new and that many parts are being developed simultaneously and
continuously evolving. For example, the transformation strategy calls for
the joint roadmap to be based on the joint concepts, but both are being
developed at the same time. As the concepts mature, DOD officials expect
future versions of the roadmaps will explain in more detail how
capabilities will be developed to implement the concepts. DOD officials
also stated that the annual strategic appraisal is designed to identify
capability gaps that future roadmaps or defense guidance will address. In
their view, this process is equivalent to setting goals and measures.
Regarding directly linking resource requirements to long-term and
performance goals, the officials stated that the department allocates
resources in its budget process and did not address how these resources
link to long-term or performance goals.
Although we agree that the concurrent nature of the transformation
strategy has required many components to be developed simultaneously,
Conclusions
we do not believe that this precludes the development of results-oriented
management tools that can help the department manage this effort and
achieve the desired results. For example, DOD has made progress in
developing the joint concepts, and although they all are not fully
developed, they can still provide a basis for establishing long-term
goals, performance goals, and performance measures. As the concepts mature
through experimentation, DOD can periodically revise the management tools
to reflect these changes, possibly as part of the annual strategic
appraisal process. Without taking the steps to establish clear and
consistent long-term goals that are grounded in the joint concepts, the
department's transformation efforts may not fully support the desired
outcomes. Likewise, the absence of performance goals and performance
measures limits the department's ability to measure progress toward
achieving its goals. Finally, without a clear link between resource
requirements and transformation goals, it is unclear what resources will
be required to achieve transformation, when the funds will be required, or
how billions of dollars programmed for transformation are being applied.
The complexity, magnitude, and importance of transforming military
capabilities demand that an effective, results-oriented management
framework be established to guide DOD-wide transformation efforts and
monitor the billions of dollars that will be invested to achieve
transformation goals. This framework should include clear leadership and
accountability for achieving results, as well as management tools to guide
activities and measure outcomes. As discussed in this report, DOD has
taken significant, positive steps toward establishing this framework. The
Secretary of Defense has provided a transformation vision and instituted
some important elements of a results-oriented management framework. For
example, the overall strategy provides flexibility to adapt to new joint
operating concepts. Also, planned annual updates to each service's roadmap
are intended to detail how new capabilities may be acquired, and the
annual strategic appraisal is a mechanism to primarily assess the
transformation plans in the roadmaps. These positive steps were taken in a
relatively short period of time and they reflect the dedication of
department personnel to transform military capabilities and achieve the
vision set by the Secretary of Defense.
These steps also establish a foundation for DOD to take additional actions
that can enhance its transformation strategy and develop a more
comprehensive, results-oriented framework to guide its efforts and achieve
intended results. Specifically, the overall accountability and authority
for achieving transformation goals are unclear, and the existing working
group created to help integrate the multitude of transformation efforts
underway is informal, having no official charter and no directive
authority, and meets on an irregular basis. These weaknesses can limit
DOD's ability to promote an integrated approach to transformation, choose
between competing priorities, and institutionalize a transformation
process that will endure over time. In addition, the lack of a
comprehensive set of results-oriented management tools that reflect the
joint concepts under development limits DOD's ability to manage this
complex process with a focus on results and clouds the visibility over the
significant resources that have been expended and will be required to
transform military capabilities. These factors may ultimately impede
progress toward achieving the overarching transformation goal- maintaining
the preeminence of U.S. military capabilities and the ability of
U.S. forces to defeat all future threats-and the department may have
difficulty in garnering congressional support for transformation efforts
unless it adopts a stronger and more result-oriented management approach.
To clarify the accountability for achieving the transformation of military
Recommendations for
capabilities and to establish a mechanism to integrate the transformation
Executive Action efforts using results-oriented management tools, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:
o Assign clear leadership and accountability for achieving the
transformation of military capabilities.
* Establish a formal crosscutting transformation group, assign it
with the responsibility for overseeing and integrating DOD's
strategy, provide it with the necessary authority to perform
their responsibilities effectively, and hold it accountable for
results. The group should:
o Include representatives from the key offices deemed
necessary for successful implementation.
o Have clearly defined roles and responsibilities.
o Articulate and periodically revise long-term goals for the
transformation of military capabilities that reflect the
joint concepts. These long-term goals should identify what
transformation results are to be expected and when to expect
these results.
o Clearly identify the resources that DOD estimates it will
need to achieve each long-term goal.
o Use the goals and measures as a foundation for the annual
assessment of transformation progress.
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
o Prepare an annual report to Congress on the progress in achieving
transformation goals, including actions taken and outcomes achieved,
resources expended and programmed, measures used to assess progress
achieved, and actions planned to meet or revise unmet goals.
To further develop results-oriented management tools that can guide DOD's
transformation of joint military capabilities, measure progress, and
determine whether initiatives are achieving their desired results, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following action:
o direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to direct the Commander,
Joint Forces Command, to include in future updates to the Joint
Transformation Roadmap:
o a discussion of how the capabilities being developed will link with
and support accomplishment of the long-term goals;
o results-oriented performance goals linked to long-term goals, which
also reflect the joint concepts and gaps in current capabilities, that
establish intended performance, focus on outcomes or results expected
or required, and establish target dates for the achievement of these
results;
o performance measures based on the performance goals to assess
progress; and
o resources required (for nonmateriel as well as materiel efforts) to
obtain capabilities for each joint concept and linkage of resources
with each performance goal.
We requested DOD to provide written comments on a draft of this report.
However, DOD's Office of Force Transformation provided oral comments. In
official oral comments, DOD officials generally disagreed with our
recommendations. First, pertaining to our recommendation that the
Secretary of Defense assign clear leadership and accountability for
achieving the transformation of military capabilities, DOD stated that the
Secretary of Defense already provides clear leadership for transformation
within DOD, the services play a key role in implementing the Secretary's
priorities, and their roles and responsibilities are clearly delineated in
the Transformation Planning Guidance. DOD also stated that the
transformation roadmaps and the strategic appraisal process are used to
assess transformation progress and inform the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution system.
We agree that the Secretary of Defense has provided overall leadership and
a vision for the transformation of military capabilities, and have
highlighted this in our report, but as we also point out, the day-to-day
demands placed on the Secretary make it difficult for him to personally
maintain the oversight, focus, and momentum needed to sustain
transformation efforts. In addition, currently no individual has clear
accountability, such as the Deputy Secretary or another senior official,
to achieve transformation results, and the strategic appraisal process has
not provided an overall evaluation of the progress achieved in acquiring
transformational capabilities. Rather, the appraisal process has primarily
focused on identifying potential gaps in the capabilities being acquired
by each service. Accordingly, we still believe the recommendation to
assign clear leadership and accountability for transformation results is a
critical step needed to achieve the transformation of military
capabilities.
Second, in commenting on our recommendation to establish a formal
crosscutting transformation group, assign it the responsibility for
overseeing and integrating DOD's strategy, and hold it accountable for
results, DOD stated that this recommendation would result in a parallel
and overlapping structure that would compete with the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system. DOD also stated that our
recommended crosscutting group would represent another bureaucratic layer
and lines of authority would not become clearer, but would rather compete
for preeminence within DOD. In regard to our recommendation that this
group also prepare an annual report to Congress on the progress made in
achieving transformation goals, DOD pointed out that DOD's Annual Defense
Report includes the current progress of transformation.
We disagree that the establishment of a formal crosscutting group would
compete with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system,
or that it would confuse the lines of authority. Therefore, we believe our
recommendation is still warranted. As highlighted in this report, DOD has
chosen to appoint crosscutting implementation teams for other
transformation efforts, the Joint Forces Command has recognized the need
to better coordinate and integrate transformation efforts, and the advice
and experience of other organizations in other government agencies and in
the private sector argue that crosscutting integration teams are essential
for successful transformation efforts. Moreover, in the absence of such a
group, DOD has no routine vehicle for maintaining a continued focus on
transformation goals set by the Secretary, nor a mechanism for resolving
implementation issues that may arise. With regard to the Annual Defense
Report serving as a vehicle to report on the results of transformation
efforts, while we recognize that DOD has begun to develop transformation
performance measures that are intended to be included in future Annual
Defense Reports, to date, these measures have not been fully developed,
and the few measures included in the 2003 Annual Defense Report are
process, rather than results-oriented. Therefore, we continue to believe
that an additional reporting mechanism that describes the resources
devoted to transformation efforts and outcomes achieved is needed. Such a
reporting mechanism could help Congress determine whether the billions of
dollars being applied to transform military capabilities are providing an
adequate return on investment in light of the significant long-term
affordability challenges that DOD faces.
Third, in commenting on our recommendation that future updates to the
Joint Transformation Roadmap include specific results-oriented tools, DOD
stated that a combination of the existing strategic appraisal process,
joint concepts, service transformation roadmaps, Joint Transformation
Roadmap, and service, combatant command, Joint Staff, and Office of the
Secretary of Defense inputs to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
Execution system provide the results-oriented management tools we
recommended. We disagree with DOD's comments on this point, because, as we
discuss in this report, even when viewed collectively, these separate
elements still lack clearly defined goals linked to the joint concepts,
specific resource requirements to meet the goals, and performance measures
to evaluate the outcomes of the initiatives. Moreover, DOD's comments did
not specifically address the need for improvements to the Joint
Transformation Roadmap. We continue to believe our recommendation is
needed because of the deficiencies in the joint roadmap we discuss in this
report, which were also recognized by DOD officials as we conducted our
review.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, Office
of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy), and
the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4402 or my Assistant Director, Robert L. Repasky,
at (202) 512-9868. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix
III.
Janet St. Laurent, Director Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe the Department of Defense's (DOD) strategy to transform joint
military capabilities, we reviewed the April 2003 Transformation Planning
Guidance and discussed the tasks and time frames it established with
officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(OUSD Policy), the Office of Force Transformation, the Joint Staff, and
the Joint Forces Command. To describe the concept development process, we
reviewed the July 2004 Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan and
discussed the process with Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command officials
with responsibilities in that process. To determine how the joint
experimentation process fits into the strategy, we reviewed the January
2004 Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan and
discussed its relationship to transformation with officials from the
Office of Force Transformation, OUSD Policy, the Joint Forces Command, and
the Joint Staff. We discussed the role of the joint and service
transformation roadmaps in the transformation strategy with officials from
the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command, and the Office of Force
Transformation. We documented the strategic appraisal process and
discussed it with officials from OUSD Policy and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation, and
the Office of Force Transformation. To determine how the transformation
strategy links to the acquisition process, we reviewed relevant DOD
instructions governing these processes and discussed them with officials
from the Office of Force Transformation, OUSD Policy, the Joint Staff, and
the Joint Forces Command.
To assess the extent to which DOD has clearly established leadership,
accountability for achieving transformation results, and a mechanism to
integrate transformation efforts, we examined DOD instructions governing
the roles and responsibilities of the various defense organizations
outlined in the April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) and
assessed whether the TPG clearly designated responsibility for
implementing the transformation strategy or merely parts of the strategy.
We also gathered and reviewed relevant policy guidance, instructions, and
documents related to the transformation strategy, including the 2003 Joint
Transformation Roadmap issued in January 2004, the July 2004 Joint Concept
Development Revision Plan, the draft directive for the Director of Force
Transformation, and the January 2004 Joint Concept Development and
Experimentation Campaign Plan. We identified how DOD has implemented
similar large, crosscutting efforts such as training transformation and
studied DOD reports that recognized the importance of clearly designating
an entity responsible and accountable for transformation efforts and that
recommended that crosscutting groups be established to successfully
implement these efforts. We also reviewed
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
various reports that raised concerns about the lack of adequate authority
to coordinate programs DOD-wide issued by the House Committee on Armed
Services, us, DOD, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Next, we compared this information to selected key practices consistently
found to be at the center of successful mergers and organizational
transformations. These selected key practices were ensuring that top
leadership drives the transformation and dedicating an implementation team
to manage the transformation process. We discussed the results, with
officials from OUSD Policy, the Office of Force Transformation, the Joint
Staff, and the Joint Forces Command responsible for implementing parts of
the strategy.
To assess the extent to which DOD is using results-oriented management
tools in implementing its transformation strategy, we compared these tools
with the management principles embodied in the Government Results and
Performance Act of 1993 and further refined in the act's user guides and
our prior reports. After assessing the management tools and reviewing our
related guidelines, we discussed with DOD officials the management tools
that were relevant to the transformation strategy. To assess whether DOD
was using each management tool, we used relevant questions derived from
our guidelines in analyzing pertinent documents such as the April 2003
Transformation Planning Guidance, the 2003 Joint Transformation Roadmap
issued in January 2004, and the January 2004 Joint Concept Development and
Experimentation Campaign Plan. We did not assess the extent to which each
service's roadmap incorporated these management tools. We also discussed
our results with appropriate DOD officials including the Office of Force
Transformation, Joint Forces Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Director for Program, Analysis and Evaluation, and OUSD Policy. Finally,
to identify DOD estimates for transformation costs DOD-wide and costs for
the joint capabilities described in the 2003 Joint Transformation Roadmap,
we obtained cost estimates from official DOD reports. We assessed the
reliability of the data by corroborating the data with knowledgeable
agency officials and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for
our purposes.
Organizations Visited for this Assignment:
Office of the Secretary of Defense
o Office of Force Transformation
o Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
: Scope and Methodology
o Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics
o Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation
Joint Chiefs of Staff
o Joint Transformation Division, Operational Plans and Joint Force
Development, J-7
o Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, J-8
Joint Forces Command
o Joint Experimentation Directorate, J-9
o Joint Requirements and Integration and Division, J-8
o Office of Prototype Oversight, Joint Training Directorate and
Joint Warfighting Center, J-7
o Strategy and Analysis Directorate, J-5
We conducted our review from May 2003 through October 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Robert L. Repasky (202) 512-9868
GAO Contact
In addition to those named above, Brenda Waterfield, John Beauchamp,
Dawn Godfrey, Mary Jo LaCasse, Sarah E. Veale, Elizabeth H. Curda, Cheryl
A. Weissman, and David A. Mayfield made key contributions to this report.
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November 16, 2001.
Military Transformation: Navy Efforts Should Be More Integrated and
Focused. GAO-01-853. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2001.
Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapon Systems Challenges.
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The Results Act: An Evaluator's Guide to Assessing Agency Annual
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Agencies' Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate
Congressional Review (Version 1). GAO/GGD-10.1.16. Washington, D.C.: May
1, 1997.
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