Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key
Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside
of Embassies (10-MAY-05, GAO-05-688T).				 
                                                                 
U.S. government officials working overseas are at risk from	 
terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have been	 
attacked--23 fatally--by terrorists outside the embassy. As the  
State Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies,
terrorist groups are likely to focus on "soft" targets--such as  
homes, schools, and places of worship. GAO was asked to determine
whether State has a strategy for soft target protection; assess  
State's efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families	 
while traveling to and from work; assess State's efforts overseas
to improve security at schools attended by the children of U.S.  
officials; and describe issues related to protection at their	 
residences.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-688T					        
    ACCNO:   A23858						        
  TITLE:     Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully	      
Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist
Attacks Outside of Embassies					 
     DATE:   05/10/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Americans employed abroad				 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Dependents 					 
	     Embassies						 
	     Employee training					 
	     Facility security					 
	     Foreign policies					 
	     Schools						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 

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GAO-05-688T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT OVERSEAS SECURITY

Tuesday, May 10, 2005

    State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S.
             Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade

GAO-05-688T

[IMG]

May 10, 2005

OVERSEAS SECURITY

State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S.
Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies

  What GAO Found

State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S.
officials and their families outside the embassy, including security
briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance
detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that
clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed
to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats
outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of challenges related
to developing and implementing such a strategy. They also indicated that
they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft targets strategy.
As part of this effort, State officials said they will need to address and
resolve a number of legal and financial issues.

Three State initiated investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S.
officials outside of embassies found that the officials lacked the
necessary hands-on training to help counter the attack. The investigations
recommended that State provide hands-on counterterrorism training and
implement accountability measures to ensure compliance with personal
security procedures. After each of these investigations, State reported to
Congress that it planned to implement the recommendations, yet we found
that State's hands-on training course is not required, the accountability
procedures have not been effectively implemented, and key embassy
officials are not trained to implement State's counterterrorism
procedures.

State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but its
scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004,
Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security
vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools.
The multiphase program provides basic security hardware to protect U.S.
officials and their families at schools and some off-compound employee
association facilities from terrorist threats. However, during our visits
to posts, regional security officers were unclear about which schools
could qualify for security assistance under phase three of the program.

State's program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their
residences is primarily designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The
Residential Security program includes basic security hardware and local
guards, which State officials said provide effective deterrence against
crime, though only limited deterrence against a terrorist attack. To
minimize the risk and consequences of a residential terrorist attack, some
posts we visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific
apartment buildings. To provide greater protection against terrorist
attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance detection teams in
residential areas.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here to discuss the report we are releasing today on
State Department efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families from
terrorist attacks outside of embassies.1

U.S. government officials and their families living and working overseas
are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have
been attacked-23 fatally-by terrorists outside the embassy. As the State
Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies, concerns are
growing that terrorist groups are likely to focus on "soft" targets-such
as homes, schools, and places of worship. Recent terrorist attacks against
housing complexes in Saudi Arabia, a school in Russia, and places of
worship in Turkey illustrate this growing threat. State-initiated security
assessments have further documented this growing concern and recommended
that State develop better measures to protect U.S. officials and their
families in soft target areas.2

Our report addresses four issues: (1) whether State has a strategy for
soft target protection, (2) an assessment of State's efforts to protect
U.S. officials and their families against terrorist attacks while
traveling to and from work, (3) State's efforts to improve security at
schools overseas attended by the children of U.S. officials, and (4)
issues related to protection of U.S. officials and their families at
residences. I will also discuss our recommendations to State and State's
response.

For our work on this subject, we reviewed State documents and interviewed
State officials in Washington, D.C., and at five posts in four countries.
We also attended security trainings and briefings available to State
officials. Our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

1GAO, Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key
Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of
Embassies, GAO-05-642 (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2005).

2These reviews include (1) the 1985 Report of the Secretary of State's
Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (The Inman Report); (2) Accountability
Review Board reports that followed assassinations of U.S. officials in
1988, 1989, 1995, 2002, and 2003; and (3) the 1999 Report by the Overseas
Presence Advisory Panel (The Crowe Commission).

  Summary

State has a number of programs and activities to protect U.S. officials
and their families outside the embassy, including security briefings,
protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection. However,
State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies
safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S.
officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats outside the
embassy. State officials raised a number of legal, management, and
resources challenges related to developing and implementing such a
strategy, but agreed a strategy was needed. The department is now in the
process of developing a soft target strategy.

State has not fully implemented one of the most important safeguards
against terrorist attacks while traveling to and from work-
counterterrorism training. Three State-initiated investigations into
terrorist attacks against U.S. officials outside of embassies found
officials lacked the necessary training that could have saved their lives,
including surveillance detection and avoidance and defensive and evasive
driving techniques. The investigations recommended that State provide
hands-on counterterrorism training and implement accountability measures
to ensure compliance with personal security procedures. However, we found
that State has not fully implemented these recommendations. For example,
State's hands-on counterterrorism training course is still not required,
and ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and regional security officers
are not trained to implement State's counterterrorism procedures. In
addition, the accountability procedures, monitoring, and checklists
developed in 2003 designed to promote personal security were not being
followed at any of the five posts we visited.

In response to congressional directives, State instituted a program in
2003 designed to improve the protection of U.S. officials and their
families at schools and some off-compound employee associations from
terrorist threats. The multiphase program provides basic security
hardware, such as shatter-resistant window film, alarms, and radios, and
additional protective measures based on threat levels and vulnerabilities.
The first two phases are focused on department-sponsored schools that have
previously received grant funding from the State Department. The third and
fourth phases, which are similar to the first and second phases, focus on
the nondepartment-sponsored schools with American students.3 During

3Department-sponsored schools receive direct financial grants from State's
Office of Overseas Schools. There are over 185 department-sponsored
schools worldwide.

our visits to five posts, Regional Security Officers were unclear about
which schools qualified for security assistance under phase three of the
program. Some Regional Security Officers raised questions about whether to
fund schools in which just a few American children were enrolled.

State's program to protect U.S. officials and their families at residences
is largely designed to deter crime. The Residential Security program
includes basic security hardware, such as alarms, shatter-resistant window
film, limited access control measures, and local guards. To reduce the
terrorist threat, some posts limit the number of U.S. officials living in
specific apartment buildings. Moreover, at most of the posts we visited,
surveillance detection teams were used to help protect schools and
residential areas. Several Regional Security Officers told us that use of
surveillance detection teams could provide greater deterrence to potential
terrorist attacks.

We are recommending that State, as it develops its soft targets strategy,
determine the full scope of its responsibilities and the legal and
financial ramifications of securing U.S. officials and their families
outside the embassy; develop corresponding protection programs and
activities; and integrate elements of the soft targets strategy into
embassy emergency action plans. We are also recommending that State
bolster its training and compliance procedures, including by making
counterterrorism training mandatory and delivered on a prioritized basis,
and by fully implementing the personal security accountability system that
State agreed to implement in response to the 2003 Accountability Review
Board for all embassy officials.

State said it was in general agreement with most of our recommendations
and said that it would examine the others.

Background 	Although State has not yet formally defined what constitutes a
soft target, State Department travel warnings and security officers
generally consider soft targets to be places where Americans and other
westerners live, congregate, shop, or visit, such as hotels, clubs,
restaurants, shopping centers, housing compounds, places of worship,
schools, or public recreation events. Travel routes of U.S. government
employees are also considered soft targets, based on their history of
terrorist attacks.

The State Department is responsible for protecting more than 60,000
government employees, and their family members, who work in embassies and
consulates abroad in 180 countries. Although the host nation is

responsible for providing protection to diplomatic personnel and missions
under the 1961 Vienna Convention, State has a variety of programs and
activities to further protect U.S. officials and family members both
inside and outside of the embassy.

Following a terrorist attack that involves serious injury or loss of life
or significant destruction of a U.S. government mission, State is required
to convene an Accountability Review Board (ARB). ARBs investigate the
attack and issue a report with recommendations to improve security
programs and practices. State is required to report to Congress on actions
it has taken in response to ARB recommendations. As of March 2005, there
have been 11 ARBs convened since the board's establishment in 1986.

Concerned that State was not providing adequate security for U.S.
officials and their families outside the embassy, the American Foreign
Service Association testified on a number of occasions before the Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary
on the need for State to expand its security measures. The subcommittee,
in its 2002 and subsequent reports, urged State to formulate a strategy
for addressing threats to locales abroad that are frequented by U.S.
officials and their families. It focused its concern about soft targets on
schools, residences, places of worship, and other popular gathering
places. In fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005, Congress earmarked a total
of $15 million for soft target protection each year, particularly to
address security vulnerabilities at overseas schools.4 Moreover, in 2005,
the Senate appropriations report directed State to develop a comprehensive
strategy for addressing the threats posed to soft targets no later than
June 1, 2005.

  State Lacks a Strategy to Cover Soft Target Areas; Key Issues Need to Be
  Resolved

State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S.
officials and their families outside the embassy, including security
briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance
detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that
clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed
to protect U.S. official and their families.

4For fiscal year 2003, Congress earmarked "up to" $15 million in the
Overseas Buildings Operations appropriations to address security
vulnerabilities of soft targets. State set aside $5 million to undertake a
review of the security of all overseas schools attended by children of
nonmilitary U.S. government employees. Of the fiscal year 2005 earmark,
$10 million is for security at overseas schools attended by dependents of
U.S. government employees.

State officials cited several complex issues involved with protecting soft
targets. As the terrorist threat grows, State is being asked to provide
ever greater levels of protection to more people in more dangerous
locations, and they questioned how far State's protection of soft targets
should extend. They said that providing U.S. government funds to protect
U.S. officials and their families at private sector locations or places of
worship was unprecedented and raised a number of legal and financial
challenges-including sovereignty and separation of church and state- that
have not been resolved by the department. State officials also indicated
they have not yet fully defined the universe of soft targets- including
taking an inventory of potentially vulnerable facilities and areas where
U.S. officials and their families congregate-that would be necessary to
complete a strategy.

Although State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy,
some State officials told us that several existing programs could help
protect soft targets. However, they agreed that these existing programs
are not tied together in an overall strategy. State officials agreed that
they should undertake a formal evaluation of how existing programs can be
more effectively integrated as part of a soft target strategy, and whether
new programs might be needed to fill any potential gaps.

A senior official with State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) told us
that in January 2005, DS formed a working group to develop a comprehensive
soft targets strategy to address the appropriate level of protection of
U.S. officials and their families at schools, residences, and other areas
outside the embassy. According to State, the strategy should be completed
by June 1, 2005.

To identify vulnerabilities in State's soft target protection, and
determine if State had corrected these vulnerabilities, we reviewed the
ARB reports conducted after U.S. officials were assassinated outside the
embassy. Of the 11 ARBs conducted since 1986, the majority (5) have
focused on soft target attacks, compared with attacks against embassies
(2) or other U.S. facilities (4). We found that, 17 years after the first
soft target ARB, State has still not addressed the vulnerabilities and
recommendations identified in that and more recent reports: specifically,
the need for hands-on counterterrorism training and accountability
mechanisms to promote compliance with personal security procedures.
Despite State's assurances to Congress that it would implement
recommendations aimed at reducing these vulnerabilities, we found that
State's hands-on training course is still not mandatory, and procedures to
monitor compliance with security

  State Has Not Fully Implemented ARB Training and Accountability
  Recommendations to Improve Security for Embassy Personnel

requirements have not been fully implemented. We also found that
ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and regional security officers were
not trained in how to implement embassy procedures intended to protect
U.S. officials outside the embassies.

Despite State's Agreement That Counterterrorism Training Is Needed, It Is
Still Not Required

Since 1988, State has reported to Congress that it agreed with ARB
recommendations to provide counterterrorism training. For example, in
1995, State reported that it "re-established the Diplomatic Security
Antiterrorism Course (DSAC) for those going to critical-threat posts to
teach surveillance detection and avoidance, and defensive and evasive
driving techniques." In 2003, State reported it agreed with the
recommendations that employees from all agencies should receive security
briefings and indicated that it would review the adequacy of its training
and other personal security measures.

Although State implemented the board's recommendation to require security
briefings for all staff, hands-on counterterrorism training is still not
mandatory, and few officials or family members have taken DSAC. Senior DS
officials said they recognize that security briefings are no longer
adequate to protect against current terrorist threats. In June 2004, DS
developed a proposal to make DSAC training mandatory. DS officials said
that DSAC training should be required for all officials, but that issues
such as costs and adequacy of training facilities were constraining
factors. As of April 18, 2005, the proposal had not been approved.

Although State has agreed on the need to implement an accountability
system to promote compliance with personal security procedures since 1988,
there is still no such system in place. Beginning in 2003, State has tried
to incorporate some limited accountability to promote compliance. However,
based on our work at five posts, we found that post officials are
following few, if any, of these new procedures.

In response to a 2003 ARB, State took a number of steps to improve
compliance with State's personal security procedures for officials outside
the embassy. In June 2003, State revised its annual assessment criteria to
take personal security into account when preparing performance appraisals,
and in December 2003, State revised its Foreign Affairs Manual to mandate
and improve implementation of personal security practices. In May 2004,
State notified posts worldwide on use of a Personal Security
Self-Assessment Checklist to improve security outside the embassy.
However, none of the posts we visited were even aware of these and other
key policy changes. For example, none of the officials we met with,

including ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, regional security
officers, or staff, were aware that the annual ratings process now
includes an assessment of whether staff are following the personal
security measures or that managers are now responsible for the reasonable
oversight of subordinates' personal security activities. Furthermore, none
of the supervisors were aware of the checklist, and we found no one was
using the checklists to improve their personal security practices.

In explaining why posts were not aware of the new personal security
regulations, DS officials noted that posts were often overwhelmed by work
and may have simply missed the cables and changes in the Foreign Affairs
Manual. They also noted that changes like this take time to be implemented
globally.

Furthermore, State's original plan, to use the checklist as an
accountability mechanism, was dropped before it was implemented. In its
June 2003 report to Congress on implementation of the 2003 ARB
recommendations, State stipulated that staff would be required to use the
checklist periodically and that managers would review the checklists to
ensure compliance. However, State never implemented this accountability
mechanism out of concern it would consume too much staff time.

We also found that key officials receive no training on how to promote
personal security outside the embassy. According to a number of State
officials, improvements in this area must start with the ambassador and
the deputy chief of mission. Yet no ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission,
or regional security officers receive any training in how to maximize soft
target protection at embassies. DS officials agreed that this critical
component should be added to their training curriculum.

  State Develops Soft Targets Program for Schools, but Scope Is Not Yet Fully
  Defined

In response to several congressional committee reports, State began
developing a "Soft Targets" program in 2003 to help protect overseas
schools against terrorism. The program has four proposed phases. The first
two phases are focused on department-sponsored schools that have
previously received grant funding from the State Department, and the third
and fourth phases focus on the nondepartment-sponsored schools with
American students.

In phase one, department-sponsored schools were offered funding for basic
security hardware such as shatter-resistant window film, two-way radios
for communication between the school and the embassy, and public address
systems. As of November 19, 2004, 189 department-sponsored

schools had received $10.5 million in funding for security equipment in
phase one of the program. The second phase provided additional security
enhancements, such as perimeter fencing, walls, lighting, gates, and guard
booths. As of November 2004, State has obligated over $15 million for
phase two security upgrades. For phases three and four, State plans to
provide similar types of security upgrades to eligible
nondepartmentsponsored schools.

The program also funds security enhancements for off-compound embassy
employee association facilities, such as recreation centers. Security
upgrades include funding for perimeter walls and shatter-resistant window
film. In fiscal year 2004, almost $1 million was obligated for these
enhancements.

Full Scope of School Program Not Yet Determined

Regional Security Officers (RSO) said that identifying and funding for
security enhancements at department-sponsored schools were straightforward
because of the department's pre-existing relationship with these schools.
However, they said it has been difficult to identify eligible
nondepartment-sponsored schools for phase three because of the vast number
of schools that might qualify, the lack of any pre-existing relationship,
and limited guidance on eligibility criteria. For example, some RSOs
questioned how many American students should attend a school for it to be
eligible for security upgrades. Some RSOs were considering funding schools
with just a few American students. Moreover, one RSO was considering
providing security upgrades to informal educational facilities, such as
those attended by children of U.S. missionaries.

State is trying to determine the appropriate scope of the program, and
sent cables to posts in the summer of 2004 asking RSOs to gather data on
nondepartment-sponsored schools attended by American students,
particularly U.S. government dependents. State officials acknowledged that
the process of gathering data has been difficult since there are hundreds
of such schools worldwide. According to an Overseas Buildings Operations
(OBO) official, as of December 2004, only about 81 out of the more than
250 posts have provided responses regarding such schools. OBO plans to use
the data to develop criteria for which schools might be eligible for
funding under phase three and, eventually, phase four of the program.

In anticipation of any future phases of the Soft Targets program, RSOs
have been asked to identify other facilities and areas that Americans

  Issues Related to the Protection of U.S. Officials and Their Families at
  Residences against Terrorist Threats

frequent, beyond schools and off-compound employee association facilities,
that may be vulnerable to a terrorist attack. State Department officials
were concerned about the large number of sites RSOs could identify as
potential soft target sites, and the department's ability to protect them.

State has a responsibility for providing a secure housing environment for
U.S. officials and their families overseas. However, we found that State's
primary program in place to protect U.S. officials and their families at
residences, the Residential Security program, is principally designed to
deter crime, not terrorism. The program includes basic security hardware
and guard service; and as the crime threat increases, the hardware and
guard services can be correspondingly increased at the residences. State
officials said that while the Residential Security program, augmented by
the local guard program, provides effective deterrence against crime, it
could provide limited or no deterrence to minimize the risk and
consequences of a residential terrorist attack. State officials told us
that the best residential scenario for posts is to have a variety of
housing options, including apartments and single-family homes, to reduce
the potential for a catastrophic attack.

To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, most posts we
visited used surveillance detection teams in the residential areas. The
program is intended to enhance the embassies' ability to detect
preoperational terrorist surveillance and stop the attack. According to
State's guidance, surveillance detection units are primarily designed to
protect embassies, and their use in residential areas is discouraged.5
However, we found RSOs at some of the posts we visited were routinely
utilizing surveillance detection units to cover areas outside the
embassies, such as residences, school bus stops and routes, and schools
attended by U.S. embassy dependents. RSOs told us that the Surveillance
Detection program is instrumental in providing deterrence against
potential terrorist attacks, and argued that the current program
guidelines are too restrictive.6 Senior State officials agreed that the
use of the surveillance detection in soft target areas could be
beneficial, but noted that the

5Department of State, Surveillance Detection Management and Operations
Field Guide Version 2.0, FY 2002 and 12 FAH-7 H-530.

6The guidelines allow posts to use surveillance detection to observe other
areas besides the embassy and key residences, but only if there are
specific threats present at these locations.

program is labor intensive and expensive, and any expansion of the program
could require significant funding.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared
statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Contact and Staff 	For questions regarding this testimony, please call
Diana Glod at (202) 512-8945. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony

Acknowledgments included Edward George and Andrea Miller.

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