Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Comprehensive Master Plans
for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas (27-JUN-05,
GAO-05-680R).
The Senate Appropriations Committee has expressed concern about
the use of military construction budget authority for projects at
overseas bases that may soon be obsolete due to changes being
considered by DOD military services as well as the need for a
more complete picture of future requirements than is typically
available in annual budget requests. Accordingly, the conference
report accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction
appropriation bill directed DOD to prepare detailed comprehensive
master plans for changing infrastructure requirements for U.S.
military facilities in each of the overseas regional commands. In
that regard, DOD was required to provide a baseline report on
these plans with yearly updates on the status of those plans and
their implementation with annual military construction budget
submissions through 2009. Additionally, the fiscal year 2004
Senate military construction appropriation bill report required
those plans to identify precise facility requirements, the status
of properties being returned to host nations, and the funding
requirements as well as the division of funding responsibilities
between the United States and cognizant host nations. The Senate
report also directed us to monitor the master plans developed and
implemented for the overseas regional commands and to provide the
congressional defense committees with annual assessment reports
through fiscal year 2008. Our reports are to include an
assessment of the status of the plans; the associated costs; host
nation burden-sharing implications; and other relevant
information involving property returns to host nations, including
residual value and environmental remediation issues. This is our
second report that responds to the reporting requirements
contained in the fiscal year 2004 Senate military construction
appropriation bill report. In our prior work, we found that the
overseas regional commands we visited at that time were awaiting
decisions on the integrated global presence and basing strategy,
as well as final guidance from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) before completing their master plans for overseas
facilities. OSD provided initial guidance in February 2004 to aid
the commands in developing their plans. However, that guidance
did not include requirements to address environmental
remediation, multiple U.S. funding sources available to support
infrastructure changes, or residual property values--information
that others and we would need to track the commands' progress in
implementing overseas basing changes. Accordingly, we recommended
in our July 2004 report that OSD include these requirements in
its final guidance to the overseas regional commands. In issuing
further guidance in October 2004, OSD included requirements to
identify information on environmental remediation in accordance
with status-of-forces agreements9 and on multiple U.S. funding
sources available to support infrastructure changes, but not
residual property value issues. For this report, we completed a
more extensive assessment of that guidance and its use in
developing the overseas master plans DOD submitted to Congress on
March 2005. This report discusses the extent to which (1) OSD has
provided sufficient guidance to overseas regional commands to
meet the reporting requirements contained in congressional
mandates and as suggested by GAO; and (2) overseas regional
commands complied with the reporting requirements and in doing
so, provided information in a complete, clear, and consistent
manner, and whether improvements in guidance and reporting were
needed.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-680R
ACCNO: A28059
TITLE: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Comprehensive
Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas
DATE: 06/27/2005
SUBJECT: Armed forces abroad
Base closures
Reporting requirements
Base realignments
Military bases
Military facilities
Regional planning
Strategic planning
Strategic forces
DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-05-680R
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548
June 27, 2005
Congressional Committees
Subject: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Comprehensive Master Plans
for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas
After the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the
U.S. military's overseas presence began to change. Force structure was
reduced or relocated and the number of overseas military installations was
decreased, often dramatically. Much of the Department of Defense's (DOD)
remaining overseas infrastructure-installations and facilities used to
support U.S. forces overseas-remained organized around Cold War strategic
concepts, even though new threats, new deployment concepts, and new
geopolitical realities have emerged. Recently, DOD's Quadrennial Defense
Review Report1 addressed, among other issues, further reorienting the U.S.
military global posture. The report called for developing a permanent
overseas basing system that provides U.S. forces greater flexibility in
critical areas of the world, as well as providing temporary access to
facilities in foreign countries. In 2004, President Bush announced what
was described as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military
forces overseas since the end of the Korean War. Closely thereafter, DOD
issued a report entitled Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture,2 also
referred to as the integrated global presence and basing strategy, that
outlined adjustments in the various theaters overseas. While the strategy
is intended to enhance flexibility and achieve efficiencies, new
facilities totaling billions of dollars will be required according to DOD
plans.
The Senate Appropriations Committee has expressed concern about the use of
military construction budget authority for projects at overseas bases that
may soon be obsolete due to changes being considered by DOD military
services as well as the need for a more complete picture of future
requirements than is typically available in annual budget requests.
Accordingly, the conference report3 accompanying the fiscal year 2004
military construction appropriation bill directed DOD4 to prepare detailed
comprehensive master plans for changing infrastructure requirements for
U.S. military facilities in each of the overseas regional commands. In
that regard, DOD was required to provide a baseline report on these plans
with yearly updates on the status of those plans and their implementation
with annual military construction budget submissions through 2009.
Additionally, the fiscal year 2004
1 DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30,
2001).
2 DOD, Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
17, 2004).
3 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-342, at 17 (2003).
4 Although not specifically requested in the conference report, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense
asked the overseas regional commands to prepare comprehensive master plans
for their areas of
responsibility.
Senate military construction appropriation bill report5 required those
plans to identify precise facility requirements, the status of properties
being returned to host nations, and the funding requirements as well as
the division of funding responsibilities between the United States and
cognizant host nations. The Senate report also directed us to monitor the
master plans developed and implemented for the overseas regional commands
and to provide the congressional defense committees with annual assessment
reports through fiscal year 2008. Our reports are to include an assessment
of the status of the plans; the associated costs; host nation
burden-sharing implications; and other relevant information involving
property returns to host nations, including residual value6 and
environmental remediation issues.
This is our second report that responds to the reporting requirements
contained in the fiscal
7
year 2004 Senate military construction appropriation bill report. In our
prior work, we found that the overseas regional commands we visited at
that time were awaiting decisions on the integrated global presence and
basing strategy, as well as final guidance from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) before completing their master plans for
overseas facilities. OSD provided initial guidance in February 2004 to aid
the commands in developing their plans. However, that guidance did not
include requirements to address environmental remediation, multiple U.S.
funding sources available to support infrastructure changes, or residual
property values-information that others and we would need to track the
commands' progress in implementing overseas basing changes. Accordingly,
we recommended in our July 2004 report that OSD include these requirements
in its final guidance to the overseas regional commands. In issuing
further guidance in October 2004,8 OSD included requirements to identify
information on environmental remediation in accordance with
status-of-forces agreements9 and on multiple U.S. funding sources
available to support infrastructure changes, but not residual property
value issues.
For this report, we completed a more extensive assessment of that guidance
and its use in developing the overseas master plans DOD submitted to
Congress on March 2005. This report discusses the extent to which (1) OSD
has provided sufficient guidance to overseas regional commands to meet the
reporting requirements contained in congressional mandates and as
suggested by GAO; and (2) overseas regional commands complied with the
reporting requirements and in doing so, provided information in a
complete, clear, and consistent manner, and whether improvements in
guidance and reporting were needed.
To address our objectives, we met with OSD officials to discuss the level
of guidance available to the commands to facilitate consistent preparation
of overseas master plans and whether those plans meet the requirements for
information contained in congressional mandates and as suggested by GAO.
We also visited overseas regional commands-the Pacific Command (PACOM),
including U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan; European Command
(EUCOM); and Central Command (CENTCOM)-to see firsthand selected
installations and military construction projects and discuss OSD's
guidance and the various
5 S. Rep. No. 108-82, at 13-14 (2003).
6 Residual value is the negotiated dollar value of U.S.-constructed or
improved facilities that are turned
over to host nations. DOD policy is to obtain the maximum residual value
permissible.
7 GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure Costs
Overseas and the
Development of Comprehensive Master Plans, GAO-04-609 (Washington, D.C.:
July 15, 2004).
8 DOD, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, Overseas Master Plans
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 2004).
9 Status-of-forces agreements determine the legal status of U.S. armed
forces stationed abroad, often
including some provisions for environmental remediation of U.S.-generated
requirements.
factors that can affect U.S. infrastructure requirements and costs
overseas.10 Once the master plans were issued, we reviewed them to
determine the extent to which they complied with the reporting
requirements and provided information in a complete, clear, and consistent
manner, and discussed whether improvements in the guidance and reporting
were needed with OSD and command officials.
We conducted our review from October 2004 through May 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. (See encl. I for
more information on our scope and methodology.)
Results in Brief
The scope of OSD's guidance issued to date generally exceeded the
reporting requirements established by Congress for the comprehensive
master plans and included most additional reporting elements previously
recommended by us, except for residual value. We believe that where the
guidance requires overseas regional commands to provide greater
specificity than identified by the congressional mandates, doing so is
appropriate and adds value because this provides a more complete picture
of future infrastructure requirements and associated funding levels.
However, OSD did not include residual value in its guidance to the
commands because officials continue to believe that residual value-which
is based on the reuse of property being turned over to the host nation,
and often diminished by actual or anticipated environmental remediation
costs-cannot be readily predicted and therefore should not be assumed in
the master plans. We believe that, without fully explaining the challenges
commands experience in obtaining residual values for properties being
returned to host nations or the implications, if any, for U.S. funding
requirements, Congress and other users of the plans do not have a complete
understanding of the potential impacts and limitations of residual value
on future funding levels.
The overseas regional commands generally complied with the reporting
requirements defined by OSD, and by extension of Congress, but varied in
the extent to which they provided complete, clear, and consistent
information in their master plans. This is due, in part, to the
limitations in information that could be provided because of three key
factors we identified: ongoing negotiations with host nations, continuing
evolution of U.S. overseas basing strategy, and differences in
interpretation of OSD guidance by commands. Opportunities exist to improve
the completeness, clarity, and consistency of the commands' reporting of
various items-host nation agreements and funding levels; U.S. funding
levels and sources; environmental remediation and restoration issues;
population levels; and facility requirements and funding levels for
Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and insular areas in the Pacific.11 Also,
the plans do not yet provide a definitive picture of future U.S. funding
requirements, particularly for new locations. Specifically, the master
plans did not provide information on U.S. funding sources in addition to
military construction appropriations that may be used for ongoing and
future infrastructure changes. An OSD official explained that though some
of these data were initially collected, they were too voluminous and too
detailed to be included. Still, master plans that provided a greater
degree of information
10 For the purposes of this report, we did not include Southern Command in
our analysis because this
command has significantly fewer facilities overseas than the other
regional commands in the Pacific,
Europe, and Central Asia.
11 Although Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular areas
technically were not considered
overseas locations for this year's master plans, in this case several of
these locations nevertheless are
important components and factor significantly into future strategic
considerations within PACOM's
area of responsibility.
encompassing the various sources of U.S. funding or, at a minimum, total
funding levels by type, would better assist users in monitoring changes in
U.S. funding levels due to changing infrastructure requirements. In
several other instances, the lack of supplementary narrative to better
explain the assumptions used or reasons data were omitted diminished the
usefulness of the plans. Also, examples of better reporting by individual
overseas regional commands on selected data elements provided insights
into how collective reporting among all commands could be enhanced to
provide more complete, clear, and consistent information. Specifically,
the detailed reporting by EUCOM of individual construction projects
according to military service, country, and base category12 at the
installation level provided a more complete and consistent basis for
tracking progress and annual changes in its master plan. Also, CENTCOM
provided a more concise depiction of the anticipated strategic end state
in terms of the expected sites and capabilities to support its objectives
as of 2010. Without more complete, clear, and consistent reporting by
individual overseas commands in the master plans, Congress and other users
lack the best available data on which to track infrastructure requirements
and changes from year to year and between commands.
We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that are
intended to make future comprehensive master plans more complete, clear,
and consistent to facilitate annual review and oversight by Congress and
other users of the plans. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD
agreed with four of our recommendations and disagreed with three.
Specifically, it disagreed with our recommendations that (1) overseas
regional commands briefly explain the status and challenges for host
nation negotiations and results pertaining to host nation funding levels,
including those for special bilateral agreements; (2) overseas regional
commands report voluntary environmental remediation and restoration
initiatives that support planned infrastructure requirements; and (3)
PACOM provide information on facility requirements and funding levels for
Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular areas in the Pacific in
future comprehensive master plans and updates. We continue to believe
these latter recommendations have merit and have added a matter for
congressional consideration regarding them.
Background
In recent years, DOD has been undergoing a transformation to develop a
defense strategy and force structure capable of meeting changing global
threats. As part of its transformation, DOD has been reexamining overseas
basing requirements to allow for greater U.S. military flexibility to
combat the conventional and asymmetric threats worldwide. U.S. military
presence overseas has been converting from a posture established on
familiar terrain to counter a known threat to one that is intended to be
capable of projecting forces from strategic locations into relatively
unknown areas in an uncertain threat environment. In September 2001, DOD
issued a Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which addressed, among other
issues, reorienting the U.S. military global posture. The report called
for developing a permanent basing system that provides greater flexibility
for U.S. forces in critical areas of the world as well as providing
temporary access to facilities in foreign
12 DOD's Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture provided new base
category definitions-main operating bases, forward operating sites, and
cooperative security locations. Main operating bases, with permanently
stationed combat forces and robust infrastructure, are characterized by
command and control structures and family support facilities. Forward
operating sites are expandable "warm facilities" maintained with a limited
rotational U.S. military support presence and possibly prepositioned
equipment. Cooperative security locations are facilities with little or no
permanent U.S. presence and will provide contingency access while being a
focal point for security cooperation activities.
countries that enable U.S. forces to train and operate in the absence of
permanent ranges and bases.
In August 2004, President Bush announced what was described as the most
comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the end
of the Korean War. The initiative is intended to close bases no longer
needed to meet Cold War threats, as well as bring home many U.S. forces
while stationing more flexible, deployable capabilities in strategic
locations around the world. Closely thereafter, DOD issued a report
entitled Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture, also referred to as
the integrated global presence and basing strategy. This strategy is the
culmination of various DOD studies including the overseas basing and
requirements study, the overseas presence study, and the U.S. global
posture study. The most recent military construction appropriation request
for fiscal year 2006 included approximately $5.9 billion for military
construction and family housing, nearly $1 billion (16.9 percent) of which
is designated for specific overseas locations, mostly comprising enduring
installations, and not for new and emerging requirements outside existing
basing structures.
For several years, the Senate Appropriations Committee has expressed
concern regarding the progress DOD has made in updating the overseas
basing structure to reflect the new realities of an uncertain threat
environment. The committee also expressed concern about the use of
military construction budget authority for projects at installations that
may soon be obsolete due to overseas presence and basing changes under
consideration, as well as a history of changing requirements that
sometimes occurred following changes in command leadership. Consequently,
in the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military
construction appropriation bill, the Senate Appropriations Committee
directed DOD to prepare comprehensive master plans identifying the
infrastructure requirements for U.S. military facilities in each of its
overseas regional commands. Subsequently, similar action was directed by
the conference report accompanying the 2004 military construction
appropriation bill. The conference report also required DOD to provide a
report on the status and implementation of those plans with each yearly
military construction budget submission through fiscal year 2009.
The Senate Appropriations Committee also directed GAO to monitor the
comprehensive master plans being developed and implemented for the
overseas regional commands and to provide the congressional defense
committees with a report each year through fiscal year 2008 giving an
assessment of the status of the plans; associated costs; burden-sharing
implications; and other relevant information involving property returns to
host nations, including environmental remediation issues and residual
values. In July 2004, we reported the overseas regional commands were
awaiting decisions on the integrated global presence and basing strategy
and final OSD guidance regarding the development of detailed,
comprehensive master plans, and that they continued to develop and
implement plans for installations they believe will have an enduring
presence in future years.14 Additionally, we reported various factors,
such as residual property value, environmental remediation, and the
availability of multiple U.S. funding sources, that affect the cost of
U.S. infrastructure overseas as well as the development of comprehensive
master plans. We recommended the overseas regional commands address these
factors in their comprehensive master plans and the extent to which they
may affect implementation of the plans.
13 These figures exclude the amounts requested by DOD for the base
realignment and closure process
and unspecified sites, which include funding for minor construction,
planning and design, operating
expenses, and other construction-related activities.
14 GAO-04-609.
Within the department, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics was tasked with fulfilling the reporting
requirement of these congressional mandates. In turn, the Under Secretary
assigned the overseas regional commands responsibility for preparing
detailed, comprehensive master plans for their area of responsibility. The
guidance instructed the overseas regional commands to draft plans
identifying precise facility requirements, status of properties being
returned to host nations, funding requirements, the division of funding
responsibilities between the United States and cognizant host nations,
multiple U.S. funding sources, and environmental remediation.
OSD Guidance Generally Exceeded Congressional Reporting Requirements
To its credit, the scope of OSD's guidance generally exceeded the
reporting requirements mandated by Congress and included most additional
reporting elements suggested by us, except for residual value information.
(See table 1.) However, we continue to believe OSD should require commands
to report on residual value or, at a minimum, the issues associated with
obtaining residual value returned to the control of each host nation,
because of the potential implications for U.S. funding requirements.
Table 1: Comparison of OSD's Guidance with the Reporting Requirements
Contained in Congressional Mandates and as Suggested by GAO
Mandated requirements OSD guidance
Report on:
Precise facility requirements Precise facility requirements (on a regional
basis)a
--Broad purpose and planned capability
--Equipment and aircraft --Estimated U.S. military population (permanent
and rotational capacity-specifically surge) Status of property returns
Status of property returns
Funding requirements
Funding requirements:
--Projects and costs proposed for fiscal year 2006 military construction
bill
--Projects and costs proposed for fiscal years 2007-2011 (cumulative)
Division of funding responsibilities Projects funded by host
nationsbetween U.S. and host nations
Prior GAO recommendations
Report on: Multiple U.S. funding sources Funding requirements (breakdown
by military available construction, operation and maintenance, etc.)
Environmental remediation issues Environmental remediation issuesb
Residual value issues Not included
Source: GAO analysis of OSD's guidance, the fiscal year 2004 Senate
Military Construction Appropriation Bill Report, and our
prior recommendations.
a Commands have the flexibility to define regional as installation, town,
country, and geographic area or in a way that is most
effective and applicable to communicate their situation.
b To the extent there are any environmental remediation issues in
accordance with requirements of status-of-forces
agreements, they should be addressed.
OSD's guidance generally exceeded the reporting requirements mandated by
Congress, and we believe that those instances when it requires overseas
regional commands to provide
greater specificity than identified by the congressional mandates are
appropriate and have the potential to provide a more complete picture of
changing infrastructure requirements overseas. For example, the guidance
requires the overseas regional commands to provide greater specificity in
precise facility requirements in terms of reporting details on military
capabilities and population changes than identified by the mandates.
Similarly, the guidance requires the commands to provide greater
specificity in funding requirements for military construction projects
proposed for the fiscal year 2006 military construction budget submission,
than identified by the mandates. In addition, the scope of OSD's guidance
included most reporting elements recommended by us in our prior report,15
except for information on residual value issues. According to an OSD
official, residual value, typically received in the form of construction
services, was excluded from the guidance because it is based on the reuse
of property being turned over to the host nation, which is limited for
most categories of military facilities, and is often reduced by actual or
anticipated environmental remediation costs. Consequently, it cannot be
readily predicted and therefore should not be assumed in the master plans.
However, since these issues vary by host nation and may not be clear to
all users of the plans, we continue to believe OSD should require
commands, at a minimum, to explain the issues with obtaining residual
value in each host nation and report the implications for U.S. funding
requirements.
Commands Generally Complied with OSD Guidance and Congressional Reporting
Requirements, but Varied in Completeness, Clarity, and Consistency
The overseas regional commands generally complied with the reporting
requirements defined by OSD, and by extension the congressional mandates
for reporting, where information was provided.16 However, the plans do not
yet provide a definitive picture of future funding requirements,
particularly for new locations, because they varied in the extent to which
they included complete, clear, and consistent information. This is due, in
part, to the limitations in information that could be provided because of
ongoing negotiations with host governments, the continuing evolution of
U.S. overseas basing strategy, and differences commands had in
interpreting OSD guidance-which provides the commands flexibility to
define regional as installation, town, country, geographic area (e.g.,
southern Europe), or in a way that is most effective and applicable to
communicate their situation. Also, reporting by some commands was better
than others for selected areas and offered insights into how overall
reporting can be improved.
More complete, clear, and consistent reporting by individual overseas
commands on selected data elements could further enhance future
comprehensive master plans and their implementation. For example:
o While several of the planned infrastructure requirements reported are
not based on finalized, negotiated agreements with host nations, none of
the commands fully explained the status of negotiations or challenges for
finalizing these agreements, or provided complete data for host nation
funding levels presented in the plans. These agreements depend largely on
the political environment and economic conditions in host nations. Such
arrangements can impact the extent of host nation support- access or
funding levels-to U.S. forces, and accordingly, may increase or decrease
U.S.-funded costs for future infrastructure changes. This year, the EUCOM
master
15 GAO-04-609.
16 While CENTCOM generally complied with the reporting requirements
defined by OSD guidance, it
excluded any discussion of Iraq.
plan referenced locations that have not been fully negotiated with host
nations. While this type of information was useful in presenting a picture
of potential infrastructure sites in the future, EUCOM did not provide
explanatory information regarding the status of negotiations or challenges
for finalizing these host nation agreements. Another command referenced a
multilateral project, but did not identify any host nation funding in its
plan or fully explain the reasons for this omission. Also, the magnitude
of expected host nation funding identified in another command's plan
appeared questionable, absent any narrative explanation regarding status
of negotiations given the historically low host nation funding levels in
the region compared with the projected funding requirements identified in
the plan. Lastly, PACOM's schedule of host nation funding did not fully
incorporate projects and funding levels initiated through special
bilateral agreements negotiated with host nations, such as those that
established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa and Yongsan relocation
plan, or fully explain the reasons for these omissions. Without explaining
the status of negotiations and challenges for obtaining host nation
agreements and fully reporting host nation funding levels using common
time frames, it is difficult for users to determine the extent to which
reported infrastructure changes and associated costs are likely to occur
and whether reported host nation funding levels are realistic or complete
where funding amounts were provided. Until all planned infrastructure
requirements are agreed to by the affected host nation or nations,
overseas regional commands will remain uncertain of total future
infrastructure requirements and associated costs.
o Although required by OSD guidance, the regional commands did not
provide information on U.S. funding sources in addition to military
construction appropriations that may be used to finance current and future
infrastructure requirements. An OSD official explained that some of these
data were initially collected and judged to be too voluminous and detailed
to include in the master plans. Still, inclusion of these types of funding
data in future master plans or, at a minimum, reporting totals by funding
type, would provide users a more complete baseline to better monitor all
U.S. funding sources that may be used to finance current and future
infrastructure requirements.
o Although required by OSD guidance, none of the regional commands
identified environmental remediation and restoration issues in their
master plans. While we recognize OSD guidance limited the reporting
requirement to those matters in accordance with the requirements of the
status-of-forces agreements, command officials told us during subsequent
discussions about a number of voluntary environmental remediation and
restoration initiatives that will entail substantial funding-some may
total more than $1 million-in support of planned infrastructure
requirements outlined in the master plans. Without their inclusion or an
explanation for their exclusion, it is difficult for users to compare and
comprehend how environmental remediation and restoration activities and
costs have varied by location and from year to year, and how these costs
may impact planned U.S. funding levels.
o Several of the reported actual or projected population levels at
specific locations appear questionable when compared to the applicable
base categories and funding requirements identified in the plans.
Specifically, CENTCOM's plan did not provide an explanation of how its
seemingly smaller bases could accommodate large numbers of people without
a corresponding increase in facilities. During subsequent discussions,
CENTCOM officials were able to explain that many of its reported
population and
funding requirements are based on real-time conditions at the
installations and on the seeming different interpretations of identified
base categories, such as forward operating sites and cooperative security
locations. Still, without an adequate explanation of these conditions,
users are unable to determine whether facilities and facility funding can
adequately support the reported population-stationed or surge. Given the
seemingly differences in interpretation and usage of terminology related
to forward operating sites and cooperative security locations, additional
narrative information regarding how each command is interpreting and
applying these basing concepts would provide users a clearer picture of
the infrastructure requirements at these sites.
o In compliance with OSD's guidance defining overseas locations, the
commands reported on requirements and funding for U.S. facilities in
foreign countries and, thus, excluded the 50 states and U.S. territories.
Based on the guidance, PACOM included Japan, South Korea, Diego Garcia,
and several other countries located in its area of responsibility and
excluded any detailed discussion of facility requirements and funding
levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular areas in the
Pacific-strategic basing locations in the theater. Officials explained
that Hawaii and Guam were excluded in part because they were included in
DOD's ongoing base closure and realignment process. However, the omission
of these locations does not provide users full representation of U.S.
military presence, infrastructure requirements, and associated U.S.
funding levels in the Pacific. Given that they are increasingly integral
to achieving PACOM's strategic objectives and that the base closure and
realignment decisions will be finalized later this year, their inclusion
in future PACOM master plans would provide users more complete information
so they can comprehend the full magnitude of facility requirements and
associated costs in the Pacific.
Further, instances of better reporting by individual overseas commands on
selected data elements provided insights into how collective reporting
among all commands could be enhanced to provide more complete, clear, and
consistent information. For example:
o The detailed reporting by EUCOM of precise facility requirements
regarding planned construction projects provided a clearer and more
complete basis for identifying requirements for fiscal years 2006 through
2011 and tracking progress and changes from year to year than did the
other commands. Specifically, EUCOM listed projects by military service
and base category17 at the installation level, while PACOM rolled up
projects into three broad regions-Japan, South Korea, and Diego Garcia-or
by base category. As a result, we could readily identify estimated costs
for EUCOM's construction projects at specific localities, to the extent
information was available and provided, but could not complete a similar
analysis for PACOM's projects.
o The detailed reporting by CENTCOM of an anticipated strategic end
state of its overseas basing infrastructure as of 2010, although not
specifically required by OSD guidance, provided a clearer and more
complete basis for tracking progress in meeting its infrastructure
objectives for the region than did the other commands. Specifically,
CENTCOM provided a concise depiction of expected locations and
capabilities to support its objectives as of 2010, while EUCOM highlighted
infrastructure consolidations and troop movements and PACOM limited this
type of
17 See note 12.
analysis to South Korea. Such information would have been useful from each
command, but would require additional guidance on this issue from DOD to
ensure consistency in reporting.
Conclusions
To its credit, DOD's completion of this year's overseas master plans
provides a more complete picture of future facility and funding
requirements for changing U.S. defense infrastructure overseas than is
available in other DOD reports, documents, and annual budget requests. It
is obvious that the preparation of the master plans required significant
effort on the part of OSD and the overseas regional commands. Still,
opportunities exist to improve the guidance and term definitions to help
overseas regional commands provide more complete, clear, and consistent
information and present a more definitive picture of infrastructure and
funding requirements, particularly for new locations, in the future. The
less than definitive picture in this year's plans was due, in part, to the
limitations in information that could be provided because of three key
factors we identified: ongoing negotiations with host nations, continuing
evolution of U.S. overseas basing strategy, and differences commands had
in interpretation of OSD guidance. Since we have previously recommended
that overseas regional commands address the extent to which residual value
issues could affect U.S. funding requirements in our prior report, we are
not including it again in this report. However, since residual value
issues vary by host nation and may not be clear to all users of the plans,
we consider it an open and continuing recommendation from our prior
report. Additionally, without more complete, clear, and consistent
reporting of various items-host nation agreements and funding levels,
including special bilateral agreements; U.S. funding levels and sources in
addition to military construction funds; environmental remediation and
restoration issues; population levels; and facility requirements and
funding levels for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular areas
in the Pacific-across future master plans, users do not have the best data
available to facilitate their annual review and oversight. Also,
individual master plans provide examples of how selected data elements
could be reported to enhance future plans and their implementation.
Specifically, without the detailed reporting of individual construction
projects as EUCOM did in its plan and the anticipated strategic end state
of the command's overseas basing infrastructure as of 2010 as CENTCOM did
in its plan, Congress and other users do not have the best available and
consistent data on which to track progress and changes from year to year
and between commands. In many of these instances, providing supplementary
narrative explanation of the assumptions used or reasons data were omitted
could improve the usefulness of the comprehensive master plans.
Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve reporting of and make future comprehensive master plans and
updates more complete, clear, and consistent to facilitate annual review
and oversight by Congress and other users, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics to revise OSD's guidance to require that
o overseas regional commands (1) briefly explain the status of
negotiations and challenges for reported host nation agreements and (2)
fully report host nation funding levels, including those for special
bilateral agreements;
o overseas regional commands report information on U.S. funding sources
in addition to military construction appropriations that may be used to
finance current and future
infrastructure requirements or, at a minimum, the totals for these other
U.S. funding sources;
o overseas regional commands report environmental remediation and
restoration initiatives that support planned infrastructure requirements
outlined in the master plans;
o overseas regional commands briefly explain any significant variances
in population levels and usage of terminology related to the three base
categories-main operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative
security locations;
o PACOM provide information on facility requirements and funding levels
for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular areas in the
Pacific;
o overseas regional commands follow the presentation of individual
construction projects as EUCOM did in its plan; and
o overseas regional commands follow the presentation of the strategic
end state of their overseas basing infrastructure using a common date as
CENTCOM did in its plan.
Matters for Congressional Consideration
On the basis of DOD's comments on our recommendations, as discussed below,
Congress may wish to consider requiring DOD in future comprehensive master
plans and updates to (1) briefly explain the status of negotiations and
challenges for reported host nation agreements and fully report host
nation funding levels, including those for special bilateral agreements;
(2) report environmental remediation and restoration initiatives that
support planned infrastructure requirements outlined in the master plans;
and (3) provide information on facility requirements and funding levels
for Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular areas in the
Pacific.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Installations and Environment concurred with four of our
recommendations dealing with the presentation of U.S. funding levels and
sources in addition to military construction funds; population levels and
usage of terminology related to the three base categories; individual
construction projects; and strategic end state using a common date. The
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense did not concur with three of our
recommendations that (1) overseas regional commands briefly explain the
status and challenges for host nation negotiations and results pertaining
to host nation funding levels, including those for special bilateral
agreements; (2) overseas regional commands report voluntary environmental
remediation and restoration initiatives that support planned
infrastructure requirements outlined in the master plans; and (3) PACOM
provide information on facility requirements and funding levels for
Hawaii, Guam, U.S. territories, and other insular areas in the Pacific. We
disagree and believe implementation of our recommendations would improve
the reporting of and make future comprehensive master plans and updates
more complete, clear, and consistent to facilitate annual review and
oversight by Congress and other users.
DOD stated that the master plans are not the appropriate vehicle to report
the status of negotiations and the results of agreements pertaining to
host nation funding, including those for special bilateral agreements, and
noted that these types of data are maintained at the Departments of State
and Defense levels. We disagree. Since the status of negotiations and the
results of agreements pertaining to host nation funding, including those
for special bilateral agreements, directly affect overseas regional
commands and their plans for changing their infrastructure, we believe the
master plans are an appropriate vehicle to report these types of data. In
addition, the master plans are classified documents whose distribution is
limited to U.S. officials with a need to know the status of ongoing
negotiations and the results of agreements pertaining to host nation
funding. Also, while this information may be maintained at the Departments
of State and Defense levels, in practice overseas regional commands
monitor the status of these negotiations as indicated by several of the
planned infrastructure changes being reported in the current master
plans-some of which are not based on finalized, negotiated agreements with
host nations. Since none of the commands fully explained the status or
challenges for finalizing these agreements, or provided complete data for
host nation funding levels, these omissions make it difficult, if not
impossible, for Congress and other users of the plans to determine the
extent to which reported infrastructure changes and associated costs are
likely to occur and whether reported host nation funding levels are
realistic or complete.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics revise OSD's guidance to require
overseas regional commands report voluntary environmental remediation and
restoration initiatives that support planned infrastructure requirements
outlined in their master plans. DOD stated that its environmental policy
overseas allows for remediation efforts only to eliminate known, imminent,
and substantial endangerment to human health or the environment and does
not authorize voluntary remediation initiatives. However, as recognized in
our draft report, what actually occurs overseas is not reflected by DOD's
comments. In reality, command officials told us about a number of
voluntary environmental remediation and restoration initiatives they plan
to implement that will entail substantial funding in support of planned
infrastructure requirements. Indeed, DOD policy grants overseas regional
commanders discretion to perform additional remediation to protect human
health and safety. In any event, since these actions affect overall costs
in these rebasing efforts, we continue to believe it is important to
reflect these costs in the master plans. In addition, as we previously
noted in this report, OSD guidance requested overseas regional commands to
report information on environmental remediation and restoration activities
taken in accordance with the status-offorces agreements. Because none of
the regional commands identified environmental remediation and restoration
initiatives or costs in their master plans, it may lead Congress and other
users of the plans to conclude incorrectly that regional commands do not
incur any environmental-related costs even though they have voluntarily
undertaken such initiatives in the past and may plan do so again in the
future. Accordingly, we believe that a narrative explanation of these
initiatives and associated costs would provide a more complete picture of
all activities associated with the U.S. defense infrastructure overseas.
Therefore, we are amending our recommendation to state that the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should
revise OSD guidance to require overseas regional commands to report all
environmental remediation and restoration initiatives that support planned
infrastructure requirements outlined in their master plans whether they
are required by DOD policy, international agreement, or are performed
under the authority granted to overseas regional commanders under DOD
policy.
DOD disagreed with our recommendation to require that PACOM provide
information on facility requirements and funding levels for Hawaii, Guam,
U.S. territories, and other insular areas in the Pacific. It stated that
Hawaii and U.S. territories in the Pacific were no different
from other U.S. facilities within the continental United States and that
it was inappropriate to include them in overseas master plans. We continue
to believe it is important to include this information, as the omission of
these locations from PACOM's master plan provides Congress and other users
an incomplete picture of the changing U.S. military presence in the
Pacific and only a portion of the infrastructure and funding requirements
associated with these changes. For example, in September 2004, the
Commander, PACOM, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee
that the command was collocating the Stryker with high-speed vessels and
airlift in Hawaii, deploying rotational bomber elements to Guam,
stationing submarines in Guam, and had proposed moving an additional
carrier strike group forward somewhere in the Pacific. Both Hawaii and
Guam have been discussed as the potential site for this additional carrier
strike group. In light of this, and because these locations are
increasingly integral to achieving U.S. security objectives in the region,
we believe that the inclusion of Hawaii, Guam, and other insular areas
will provide a more complete picture of PACOM's infrastructure
requirements and associated costs in the Pacific.
The Deputy Under Secretary's comments are included in enclosure II of this
report.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and members; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and Unified
Combatant Commanders. The report is also available at no charge on GAO's
Web Site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this
report, please contact me at (202) 512-5581 or [email protected]. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. Alissa Czyz, Mark Little,
Ricardo Marquez, Donna Rogers, and Nelson Torres were major contributors
to this report.
Barry W. Holman, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
List of Congressional Addressees
The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison
Chair
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Construction and
Veterans' Affairs Committee on Appropriations United States Senate
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable James T. Walsh
Chairman
The Honorable Chet Edwards
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and
Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Committee on Appropriations House
of Representatives
Enclosure I Enclosure I
Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which OSD provided sufficient guidance to
overseas regional commands to meet the reporting requirements contained in
congressional mandates and suggested by GAO, we compared and contrasted
OSD guidance to the reporting requirements provided in the congressional
mandates and suggested previously by GAO. We also met with officials from
OSD and each of the following commands and agencies: PACOM; EUCOM;
CENTCOM; U.S. Army, Pacific; U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Marine Corps Forces,
Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Force; U.S. Forces Korea; Eighth Army, South
Korea; Seventh Air Force, South Korea; Army Installation Management
Agency, South Korea Regional Office; Army Corps of Engineers, South Korea;
U.S. Forces Japan; U.S. Army, Japan; U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Japan; U.S.
Army, Europe; Commander, Naval Region Europe; U.S. Air Force, Europe; Army
Installation Management Agency, Europe Regional Office; and Special
Operations Command. In general, we discussed the reporting requirements
contained in OSD's guidance, host nation agreements and associated issues,
host nation funding levels, U.S. funding levels and sources, environmental
remediation and restoration issues, property returns to host nations, and
residual values likely to be obtained by the United States as a result of
these property returns. We also analyzed available reports, documents,
policies, directives, international agreements, and information and
guidance pertaining to these factors. In South Korea, we also met with an
official from the office of the Political Military Unit at the U.S.
Embassy South Korea to discuss the U.S. diplomatic perspective on
potential basing changes in South Korea, burdensharing implications, and
environmental remediation and restoration issues. We also met with an
official from the Republic of South Korea Ministry of National Defense to
obtain a host nation perspective on the status of implementation of master
plans and burden-sharing implications for relocation of U.S. facilities in
South Korea and to discuss funding and time frames for decisions by the
Republic of South Korea. To see firsthand the condition of facilities and
status of selected construction projects, we visited and toured the
facilities at Camp Butler, Camp Foster, Marine Corps Air Station Futenma,
and Yokota Air Base, Japan; Camp Humphreys, Osan Air Base, and Kunsan Air
Base, South Korea; Army Garrison Grafenwoehr, Germany; and Caserna Ederle
(including Dal Molin airfield, property of the Italian government), Naval
Air Station Sigonella, Naval Support Activity Capodichino, and Navy
Support Site Gricignano, Italy.
To determine the extent to which overseas regional commands complied with
OSD's reporting requirements and provided information in a complete,
clear, and consistent manner, we compared the comprehensive master plans
with the reporting requirements provided in OSD guidance and suggested
previously by us, and compared and contrasted the plans to each other. To
determine whether improvements in guidance and reporting were needed, we
assessed the plans to identify those elements and properties that provided
information in the most complete, clear, and consistent manner. Also, we
assessed the quantity and quality of one plan's responses for each of the
data elements and compared them to equivalent responses in other plans;
formed conclusions as to the completeness, clarity and consistency of one
plan's responses; and generated observations and recommendations for
improving other plans' responses. We also discussed our observations and
recommendations, specific reporting requirements, and whether improvements
in the guidance and reporting were needed with DOD officials.
While we met with Special Operations Command officials, its planning
efforts were not specifically included in the master plans provided in
response to the congressional mandates and detailed data were not
available for inclusion in this report. In addition, we did not
Enclosure I Enclosure I
include Southern Command in our analysis because this command has
significantly fewer facilities overseas than the other regional commands
in the Pacific, Europe, and Central Asia.
We conducted our review from October 2004 through May 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Enclosure II Enclosure II
Comments from the Department of Defense
Enclosure II Enclosure II Enclosure II Enclosure II
(350585)
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
GAO's Mission
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts newly
released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To have
GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out
to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25
percent. Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061
To Report Fraud, Contact:
Waste, and Abuse in Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: [email protected] Programs Automated answering system: (800)
424-5454 or (202) 512-7470
Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4400Congressional U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street
NW, Room 7125 Relations Washington, D.C. 20548
Public Affairs Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548
PRINTED ON
*** End of document. ***