Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Development Risks in the Army's  
Networked Communications Capabilities Is Key to Fielding Future  
Force (15-JUN-05, GAO-05-669).					 
                                                                 
The Army has embarked on a major transformation of its force.	 
Central to this transformation is the Future Combat Systems	 
(FCS), a $108 billion effort to provide warfighters with the	 
vehicles, weapons, and communications needed to identify and	 
respond to threats with speed, precision, and lethality.	 
Establishing reliable, robust communications and networking	 
capabilities is key to FCS's success. Each of the systems	 
integral to the FCS communications network--the Joint Tactical	 
Radio System (JTRS), the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 
(WIN-T), and the System of Systems Common Operating Environment  
(SOSCOE)--rely on significant advances in current technologies	 
and must be fully integrated to realize FCS. Given the complexity
and costs of this undertaking, GAO was asked to review each of	 
these key development efforts to identify any risks that may	 
jeopardize the successful fielding of FCS.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-669 					        
    ACCNO:   A26618						        
  TITLE:     Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Development Risks in the 
Army's Networked Communications Capabilities Is Key to Fielding  
Future Force							 
     DATE:   06/15/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Military communication				 
	     Military procurement				 
	     Military radio					 
	     Procurement planning				 
	     Systems design					 
	     Systems evaluation 				 
	     Telecommunication					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Army Future Combat Systems 			 
	     Army Warfighter Information Network		 
	     C-130 Aircraft					 
	     DOD Joint Tactical Radio System			 
	     Hercules Aircraft					 
	     Army System of Systems Common Operating		 
	     Environment					 
                                                                 

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GAO-05-669

                 United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

Report to the Chairman,

              Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives

June 2005

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Resolving Development Risks in the Army's Networked Communications Capabilities
                        Is Key to Fielding Future Force

GAO-05-669

[IMG]

June 2005

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Resolving Development Risks in the Army's Networked Communications Capabilities
Is Key to Fielding Future Force

  What GAO Found

Each of the programs for developing FCS's communications network is
struggling to meet ambitious sets of user requirements and steep technical
challenges within highly compressed schedules. As currently structured,
the programs are at risk of not delivering intended capabilities for the
first spiral of FCS, slated to start in fiscal year 2008.

The JTRS Cluster 1 program-a program to develop radios for ground vehicles
and helicopters-began development with an aggressive schedule, immature
technologies, and a lack of clearly defined and stable requirements. As
currently designed, the radio will only have a transmission range of only
3 kilometers-well short of the required 10 kilometers-and will not meet
security requirements for operating in an open networked environment. The
program's struggle to mature and integrate key technologies has
contributed to significant cost and schedule growth. A recent review of
the program concluded that the current program structure is not
executable, and in April 2005, DOD directed the Army to stop work and
notify the contractor that it was considering terminating the contract.

Meeting requirements for JTRS Cluster 5 radios-miniaturized radios,
including those that soldiers carry-is even more technically challenging
given their smaller size, weight, and power needs. The smallest of these
radios weighs only about 1 pound, compared with 84 pounds for Cluster 1
radios. Several programmatic changes and a contract award bid protest have
further slowed program progress. The Army is considering options for
restructuring the program to meet the needs of FCS and address the
technical issues encountered in the Cluster 1 program.

The Army does not expect to fully mature the technologies for WIN-T-
communications equipment that supports an expanded area of battlefield
operations and interfaces with JTRS radios-when production begins in March
2006. Moreover, the compressed schedule assumes nearly flawless execution
and does not allow sufficient time for correcting problems. Significant
interdependencies among the critical technologies further increase overall
program risk. The program was directed to deliver networking and
communications capabilities sooner to meet near-term warfighting needs and
synchronize with the restructured FCS program. A plan for how to develop
and field WIN-T capabilities sooner to address FCS needs remains
undetermined.

According to Army network system integration officials, SOSCOE-the
operating software to integrate the communications network-may not reach
the necessary technical maturity level required to meet program
milestones. In addition, top-level FCS requirements are still evolving and
have not been translated into more detailed specifications necessary for
writing SOSCOE software.

United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
JTRS Cluster 1 Began System Development without Requisite

Knowledge, Resulting in Cost and Schedule Problems Technical Challenges
and Program Changes Have Impeded Cluster 5 Progress Ambitious WIN-T
Acquisition Approach Puts Program At Risk of Cost and Schedule Growth
SOSCOE Development at Risk because of Software Maturity and

Evolving Requirements Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

                                       1

                                      3 4

11

19

26

30 31 32 33

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II JTRS Cluster 1 Cost and Schedule Variance

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense

  Tables

Table 1: Future Communications and Networking Capabilities

Compared with Current Capabilities 6 Table 2: A Comparison of Size,
Weight, Power, and the Number of Stored Waveforms for Selected Cluster 5
and Cluster 1 Radios 20

  Figures

Figure 1: FCS Network Components 8 Figure 2: FCS Spirals' Timeline 11
Figure 3: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with JTRS

Cluster 1 Development 14 Figure 4: JTRS Current Cluster 1 Size, Weight,
and Power Compared with Helicopter Requirements 16

Figure 5: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with JTRS

Cluster 5 Development 21 Figure 6: Interdependencies among Cluster 5
Critical Technologies 24 Figure 7: Knowledge-Based Development Compared
with WIN-T

Development 27 Figure 8: Cost Performance of JTRS Cluster 1 and Waveform
Development from August 2003 to January 2005 39 Figure 9: Schedule
Performance of JTRS Cluster 1 and Waveform Development from August 2003 to
January 2005 40

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
FCS Future Combat Systems
GHz gigahertz
JNTC-S Joint Network Transport Capability-Spiral
JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System
MHz megahertz
SOSCOE System of Systems Common Operating Environment
WIN-T Warfighter Information Network-Tactical

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United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

June 15, 2005

The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

To counter the complex set of battlefield threats that have emerged since
the Cold War, the Army has embarked on a major transformation of its
force. Central to this transformation is the Future Combat Systems (FCS)
program, a large and difficult effort to develop a suite of new manned and
unmanned ground and air vehicles, sensors, and munitions linked by a
new information network, with a total cost of at least $108 billion. FCS
will
depend on this network to provide Army warfighters and commanders
with the high-quality data and real-time communications needed to
identify and respond to threats with speed, precision, and lethality.
Indeed,
the network's performance is what makes the FCS concept work-
superior information enables the FCS vehicles to be lethal and survivable
despite weighing a fraction of what today's vehicles weigh. Continuously
providing the quality and volume of information necessary for the force to
operate seamlessly together places significant demands on the network
components. The components must generate high power, work at long
range, and be reliable while conforming to the tight physical constraints
of
the small FCS systems.

Four key systems are integral to the FCS communications network:

o  	Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1, which is developing
radios for ground vehicles and helicopters;

o  	JTRS Cluster 5, which is developing small radios, including those that
soldiers carry;

o  	Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), which is developing a
high-capacity communications network for higher-level command units; and

o  	System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE), which is
being developed as part of the FCS program and is the operating software
that integrates the communications network.

If JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE do not work as intended, battlefield
information will not be sufficient for FCS units to operate effectively.
JTRS

Cluster 1 and Cluster 5 radios and new advanced networking waveforms1 are
expected to provide the warfighter with a high-capacity, high-speed
information link to access maps and other visual data, communicate
onthe-move via voice and video with other units and levels of command, and
obtain data directly from battlefield sensors. WIN-T is expected to
provide military commanders access to intelligence, logistics, and other
data critical to making battlefield decisions and supporting battlefield
operations. Collectively, JTRS and WIN-T are estimated to cost over $34
billion to develop and produce, above the $108 billion cost of FCS. SOSCOE
is the interface that allows all the systems to communicate with one
another. The Army plans to begin fielding the full set of FCS systems to
brigade-size units in 2014. However, the Army also plans to field FCS
capabilities to the current force incrementally through spirals. The first
FCS spiral is scheduled for the 2008-2010 timeframe and emphasizes
enhanced communications and network capabilities.

Because JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE all rely on significant advances in
current technologies and capabilities and must be fully integrated to
realize FCS, there are substantial risks to this effort. Given the
complexity of this undertaking and the size of the investment, you asked
us to review each of these key development efforts to identify any risks
that may jeopardize the successful fielding of FCS's communications and
networking capabilities.

We conducted our review from January 2004 through May 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. To assess the
development risks of each system, we obtained and reviewed relevant
documents, including program acquisition reports, technology readiness
assessments, test and evaluation plans, cost performance reports, and
other information. We also met with various program and agency officials
and obtained in-depth briefings on the system development efforts. More
details about our scope and methodology are in appendix I.

1A waveform is the representation of a signal that includes the frequency,
modulation type, message format, and/or transmission system. In general
usage, the term waveform refers to a known set of characteristics, for
example, frequency bands (VHF, HF, UHF), modulation techniques (FM, AM),
message standards, and transmission systems. In JTRS usage, the term
waveform is used to describe the entire set of radio functions that occur
from the user input to the RF output and vice versa. A JTRS waveform is
implemented as a reusable, portable, executable software application that
is independent of the JTRS operating system, middleware, and hardware.

  Results in Brief

The JTRS Cluster 1 program began development several years ago with an
aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and a lack of clearly defined
and stable requirements. Since then, the program has continued to struggle
to mature and integrate key technologies and has been forced to make major
design changes. For example, the Cluster 1 design does not generate
sufficient power or meet size and weight constraints. Consequently, the
radio's projected range is only 3 kilometers-well short of the 10
kilometer range required. In addition, the radio design is not sufficient
to meet security requirements for operating in an open networked
environment. These factors have contributed to significant cost and
schedule problems that led the Army in December 2004 to propose
restructuring the program by adding $458 million and 24 months to the
development effort. However, recently the Department of Defense (DOD)
directed that work on the Cluster 1 radios be stopped while an assessment
is conducted to determine the future of the program. In addition, the Army
is concerned about the contractor's ability to develop the radios and
notified the contractor that it was considering a contract termination. At
this point it is not clear what the outcome will be and what impact this
will have on the future of the program. Consequently, it is unlikely the
Cluster 1 radios will be available for the start of the first spiral of
the FCS network, slated for fiscal year 2008. This is especially critical
for FCS, as Cluster 1 is to provide what has been called the backbone of
the FCS network-a Wideband Networking Waveform that will serve as the main
conduit of information to and from Army tactical units.

The JTRS Cluster 5 program has also experienced technical challenges and
program changes that have impeded progress. Meeting requirements for JTRS
Cluster 5 radios is even more challenging than for Cluster 1, given
Cluster 5 radios' smaller size, weight, and power needs. For example, the
smallest of these radios, which weigh only about 1 pound each, compared
with 84 pounds for Cluster 1, are not going to be able to provide the
power and cooling needed for the Wideband Networking Waveform. In
addition, the program will require a new networking waveform, the Soldier
Radio Waveform. Several programmatic changes and a contract award bid
protest have also slowed progress of the Cluster 5 program. Furthermore,
in light of unresolved technical issues with the Cluster 1 program, DOD
has initiated an assessment to restructure the Cluster 5 program.
Consequently, Cluster 5 small form radios needed for the first spiral of
FCS may not be available in time. The Army is seeking ways to accelerate
program deliveries.

The WIN-T program also began with an aggressive schedule and immature
technologies. None of the critical technologies will be fully mature at
the

time production begins in March 2006. The tightly compressed schedule
assumes nearly flawless execution and may not allow sufficient time for
correcting problems. In addition, significant interdependencies among
critical technologies further increase overall program risk. Any delay in
maturing an individual technology may hinder the program's ability to
achieve its performance objectives-specifically, on-the-move
communications. Other critical program issues, such as deciding on a
suitable airborne platform to achieve on-the-move communications, remain
unresolved. More recently, the program shifted its focus to deliver
networking and communications capabilities sooner to meet near-term
warfighting needs while continuing to support the restructured FCS
program. A plan for how to develop and field WIN-T capabilities sooner to
address FCS needs remains undetermined.

SOSCOE faces the dual challenge of a software development that is highrisk
and evolving requirements. According to Army program officials, SOSCOE
software may not reach the necessary technical maturity level required to
meet program milestones. In addition, top-level FCS requirements are still
evolving and have not been translated into more detailed specifications
necessary for writing SOSCOE software. As a result, it is unclear whether
SOSCOE will be sufficiently developed to support the first spiral of FCS
beginning in fiscal year 2008.

Given the criticality of these four systems to the performance of the FCS
network, this report makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
aimed at reducing their development risks so that they provide the first
spiral of FCS with enabling communications and networking capabilities. In
commenting on a draft of our report, DOD generally concurred with our
findings and recommendations. As part of its comments, DOD provided some
information on actions it has begun to take to address each of our
recommendations. While these actions should help strengthen the management
of JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE, we remain concerned that a demonstration of
FCS's communications and networking capabilities will not be known for
some time. Until these capabilities are demonstrated, investment in FCS
platforms and systems carries substantial risk.

Background 	Over the last decade, the Army has begun to transform its
warfighting capabilities to more effectively counter a broad and complex
set of potential threats. According to Army officials, the transformation
is the most comprehensive change in the Army in over a century, and will
affect all aspects of its organizations, training, doctrine, leadership,
and strategic plans as well as its acquisitions. Through this
transformation, the Army

expects to establish a force that provides both the lethality and
survivability of today's heavily armored units and the deployability and
responsiveness of today's lighter combat units. As envisioned, the future
force will operate very differently than forces have in the past. It will
function in smaller, more agile and deployable modular brigade combat
teams (composed of roughly 3,000 to 4,000 personnel) that can react
quickly to changing missions and circumstances. To be effective, force
components-soldiers, platforms, weapons, and sensors-must be "netcentric,"
that is, closely linked and able to operate seamlessly together.

The transformation involves two major, interrelated acquisitions: (1)
development of new advanced communications and networking systems-
computers, software, and a wireless tactical internet-to acquire,
exchange, and employ timely information throughout the battlespace and (2)
development of a new generation of battlefield vehicles, weapons, and
sensors. The Army has taken initial steps toward transformation through
its Digitization and Stryker programs. Under the Digitization program, the
Army installed computers, software, and interfaces to communications
systems on Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and other vehicles in
selected units that enable both in-theater and higher commands to share
battlefield data with lower-level units. The Stryker program introduced a
new family of vehicles expected to make units more lethal, mobile, and
survivable than today's light forces. In addition, the Army has initiated
a major restructuring of its force into modular brigade combat teams-
brigade-sized units that will have a common organizational design.

FCS is the culminating stage in the Army's ongoing transformation to a
lighter, more agile and capable force. It is a large and complex
development effort to provide a networked family of weapons and other
systems for the future force. Establishing reliable, robust communications
and networking capabilities is essential to FCS. Without these
capabilities, the lighter, more decentralized units would be vulnerable to
enemy attack.

Currently, the armed forces have limited communications and networking
capabilities on the battlefield, making it necessary to patch together or
reroute information through multiple radio, data terminal, and network
systems to get critical information to the warfighter and commanders.
Current "dial-up speed" data rates further delay forces' ability to
identify, assess, and respond to time-critical targets. FCS's networked
on-the-move communications for voice, data, video, and imagery are
expected to be a revolutionary improvement over current communications
capabilities (see table 1).

Table 1: Future Communications and Networking Capabilities Compared with
Current Capabilities

      Capability               Current                   Future force         
Interoperability Numerous unique systems,       Small number of systems,   
                    noninteroperable                     interoperable        
       Mobility     Point-to-point, with limited     Mobile and integrated    
                              mobility                network operations      
      Data rate                                   High data rate-voice, data, 
                     Low data rate-mostly voice       video, imagery that can 
                                                  communicate simultaneously  
                    Mostly line-of-sight,         Expanded to include beyond  
        Range       limiting performance in urban        line-of-sight        
                    settings, mountainous         
                    terrain, and other complex    
                            environments          

Links Single network thread to fixed/relocatable operations Network
integrated warfighting platforms with mobile centers operations centers
and seamless connectivity from foxhole to the Pentagon

      Speed           Dial-up speed                 Broadband speed           
               Susceptible to interception   Multiple levels of security with 
    Security        and detection by                   reduced probability of 
                       adversaries             interception and detection     
Efficiency  Circuit-switched, spectrum      Packet-switched, spectrum      
                       inefficient                     efficient              
                Defense unique/proprietary Open-systems architecture-drawing  
Flexibility       technology-inflexible on universal                       
                                           Internet-Protocol-based commercial 
                                           technology,                        
                                               flexible, standards-based      

Source: GAO analysis.

The FCS communications and networking capabilities are being designed
around five components:

o  	Platforms and sensors: Under FCS, the Army is developing new
warfighting systems, including manned and unmanned aerial and ground
vehicles that will provide and use intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance information.

o  	Applications: Software applications will support battlefield command
functions, including command and control, logistics support, training, and
modeling and simulation.

o  	Network services: SOSCOE will be the network-centric operating system,
or middleware, that enables the integration of separate FCS communications
software packages, independent of their location and the technology used
to develop them. The Army likens the SOSCOE architecture to Microsoft
Windows, but many times larger. SOSCOE represents about 10 percent of the
more than 30 million lines of FCS software code.

o  	Transport systems: Transport systems-primarily JTRS and WIN-T- will
provide wireless communication capabilities to transport

information within the FCS network and the broader DOD-wide network.

o  	Standards: Standards implement DOD-wide policies and doctrine
developed by offices such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Networks and Information Integration, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Two
critical objectives of these standards are net-centric operations and
inter-service interoperability.

Figure 1 shows a representation of the five FCS network components.

                        Figure 1: FCS Network Components

                               Source: U.S. Army.

JTRS is a software-reprogrammable radio that is intended to operate with
many different legacy radio systems and provide the warfighter with
additional communications and networking capabilities-including seamless
interoperability and increased data throughput-to simultaneously access
maps and other visual data, communicate via voice and video with other
units and levels of command, and obtain information directly from
battlefield sensors. A key component of JTRS is developing waveforms to
operate with legacy radios as well as new waveforms to provide advanced
networking capabilities, such as the Wideband Networking Waveform. The
Wideband Networking Waveform represents a new, critical capability for
DOD. The development of the Wideband Networking Waveform is intended to
address many of the current limitations associated with DOD tactical
wireless networking, including line-of-sight limitations that cause many
network partitions, unique network monitoring systems, and predefined
security enclaves that require hardware for each security level. The
waveform is expected to provide data rates of 5 megabits per second or
more--hundreds of times faster than existing communications systems--and
facilitate the routing of large amounts of information among users
anywhere in the battlespace.

DOD has structured the JTRS development effort into several programs
clustered by requirements. The JTRS Cluster 1 program is developing radios
for ground vehicles and helicopters to equip the current force as well as
FCS. The program is expected to cost $15.6 billion to develop and acquire
over 100,000 Cluster 1 radios. The JTRS Cluster 5 program is developing
handheld and manpack radios for soldiers as well as several smaller
varieties of radios for use in weight- and power-constrained
platforms-such as Unattended Ground Sensors and Intelligent Munitions
Systems. The program is expected to cost $8.5 billion to develop and
acquire over 300,000 Cluster 5 radios.

The WIN-T program is developing communications equipment that supports an
expanded area of battlefield operations and interfaces with JTRS radios to
connect warfighters and command centers, including joint, allied, and
coalition forces, providing commanders with access to on-themove
communications-that is, continuously updated, real-time multimedia
information from dispersed locations throughout the theater. It will
replace existing communications networks that have limited capacity to
support on-the-move communications. Leveraging advanced commercial
technologies that enable mobile communications, the WIN-T system includes
data routing and switching hardware, computers, video and teleconferencing
equipment, high-capacity line-of-sight radios and satellite terminals-all
of which make up a tactical operation center's

communications element. WIN-T is being developed in three blocks, with
each block adding capabilities. Based on current plans, Block 1 is
projected to cost approximately $10 billion; Blocks 2 and 3 have yet to be
funded.

The SOSCOE software will reside within each FCS platform's integrated
computer system and provide a number of services for the users of the
integrated computer system. These services include interoperability
services, information assurance services, and communications services.
SOSCOE will enable integrated management of the network and will allow
systems within the network to access sources of information. The Army
estimates that SOSCOE software development will be completed in 2011. The
Army plans to field the SOSCOE software in increments to align with the
overall FCS software builds and planned FCS spirals.

When FCS began system development in May 2003, the JTRS and WIN-T programs
were under way with schedules that aligned with FCS planned fielding.
However, the Army restructured the FCS program in July 2004 to address
development risks. The restructuring added 4 years to develop the platform
systems and established an evaluation unit to demonstrate FCS
capabilities. Even though the restructuring provided additional time to
the program, it also emphasized developing FCS capabilities in spirals and
accelerating the development of the network into the current force. The
Army now plans to test and field its FCS capabilities incrementally
between 2008 and 2014 through four spirals. A 2-year period of testing
will precede the actual fielding of capabilities in each spiral. The Army
has defined the initial spiral of FCS around the capabilities needed by
the current force, to include the main components of the communications
network--JTRS Cluster 1 and 5 radios and the wideband waveforms, some form
of WIN-T communications capability, and SOSCOE. The capabilities for the
other FCS spirals will be defined over time. Figure 2 shows the FCS
spirals' timeline.

Figure 2: FCS Spirals' Timeline

                     Source: Unit of Action Program Office.

  JTRS Cluster 1 Began System Development without Requisite Knowledge, Resulting
  in Cost and Schedule Problems

The JTRS Cluster 1 program began system development and demonstration in
2002 with an aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and a lack of
clearly defined and stable requirements. These factors have contributed to
significant cost and schedule problems that the program has not recovered
from. The program has not been able to mature the technologies needed to
produce radios that generate sufficient power as well as meet platform
size and weight constraints and has been forced to make design changes to
accommodate evolving security requirements. Because of cost, schedule, and
performance problems, in December 2004, the Army proposed restructuring
the program by adding $458 million and 24 months to the development
schedule. However, recently DOD directed that work on the Cluster 1 radios
be stopped while an assessment is completed to determine the future of the
program. In addition, because of increased concern about the contractor's
ability to develop the radios, the Army notified the contractor that it
was considering contract termination. At this point it is not clear what
the outcome will be and what impact this will have on the future of the
program. As a result, it is unlikely JTRS Cluster 1 radios will be
available for the first FCS network spiral, slated to begin in fiscal year
2008. FCS and other users dependent on Cluster 1 radios, such as Army
helicopters, will have to rely on legacy radios to fill the gap.

Accelerated Schedule Prior to the start of system development in 2002, the
JTRS Cluster 1 Incompatible with System schedule was accelerated 27 months
to meet the Army's plan to modernize Immaturity its helicopters with
various technological upgrades including advanced

communications. Cluster 1 proceeded into the system development and
demonstration phase with none of the program's 20 critical technologies
sufficiently matured and with requirements not clearly defined-contrary to
best practices and DOD guidance.2 Although many of the technologies had
been used in other radio applications, significant technical advances were
nonetheless required for developing key components of the radio. The
program's acquisition strategy, for example, highlighted technology risks
associated with the following requirements:

o  	Wideband Networking Waveform: As the core of the JTRS networking
capability, the Wideband Networking Waveform is to operate across a wide
range of radio frequency spectrum, 2 megahertz (MHz) to 2 gigahertz (GHz),
and provide increased routing and networking capabilities. The Wideband
Networking Waveform must also be compliant with the Software
Communications Architecture, which demands a modular approach to waveform
design, imposing much greater processing and memory requirements. This is
especially critical for FCS, as the waveform is to provide what has been
called the backbone or main conduit of the FCS network.

o  	Security: The JTRS radio set is intended to operate applications at
multiple levels of security. For it to do so, developers not only have to
be concerned with traditional radio security issues but also must be
prepared to implement the features required for network and computer
security. This will require development of new technologies, obtaining
certification through a rigorous process by the National Security Agency,
and accommodating an expected growth in security requirements.

o  	Interference mitigation: Prior to JTRS, tactical radios were largely
designed for single channel and single band operations. Because JTRS radio
sets will operate multiple channels--as many as eight
channels--simultaneously within the same radio set, developers must ensure
that communications over one channel do not interfere with communications
over another, because such interference would degrade the quality of
service and limit the radio's high data rate capability.

2To help avoid cost and schedule overruns, best practices and DOD guidance
call for achieving a high level of technological maturity before allowing
new technologies into product development.

The accelerated acquisition strategy compressed the development cycle and
allowed little time for testing prior to key development decisions. For
example, the schedule called for making the initial production decision
for selected platforms immediately following an early operational
assessment of a partially functioning prototype of the JTRS radio in
surrogate vehicles (see fig. 3). This is in contrast to the
knowledge-based approach captured in best practices, which advocates
making production decisions based on an assessment of
production-representative prototypes in a realistic environment.
Historically, programs that must define requirements, develop technology,
and design products concurrently have experienced cost increases and
schedule delays. While the Army recognized the risk of moving forward with
immature technologies, it expected that emerging technologies in radio
software technology would enable it to develop the critical technologies
and integrate them into the product quickly.

 Figure 3: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with JTRS Cluster 1 Development

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Despite the Army's expectations to leverage current and emerging radio
technologies, the critical technologies for the JTRS Cluster 1 radio have
generally not matured. The program is also struggling to derive detailed
specifications for Cluster 1 requirements. Despite the lack of mature
technologies and detailed specifications, the Army held the program's
critical design review-the point at which design stability is to be
achieved and demonstrated-in December 2003. However, with the requirements
still evolving, the program expects to make several costly hardware and
software design modifications. For example:

o  	The current processing and memory capacity of the Network INFOSEC
Unit, which contains the operating software, is insufficient to support
full systems operation, including waveform processing, enhanced security,
and power management. The program plans to double the Network INFOSEC
Unit's capacity from 256 megabytes of memory to 512 megabytes, which will
require changes to the hardware design.

o  	The National Security Agency has recently determined that the current
design is not sufficient to meet security requirements to operate in an
open networked environment. Specifically, particular versions of JTRS
radios will be used by allied and coalition forces, requiring the Army to
release specific source code of the software architecture to these forces.
To address the release, the National Security Agency has required changes
to the security architecture. While the program has not finalized or
funded the changes, the current plan is to separate the networking and
radio functions into two separate processors.

    Size, Weight, and Power Requirements for Key Platform Users Have Presented a
    Significant Challenge for Cluster 1

A key technical challenge in developing the Cluster 1 radio is meeting the
size, weight, and power requirements for ground vehicles and helicopters.
To realize the full capabilities of the Wideband Networking Waveform,
including transmission range, the Cluster 1 radio requires significant
amounts of memory and processing power, which add to the size, weight, and
power consumption of the radio. The added size and weight are the result
of efforts to ensure electronic parts in the radio are not overheated by
the electricity needed to power the additional memory and processing. Thus
far, the program has not been able to develop radios that meet size,
weight, and power requirements, and the current projected transmission
range is only 3 kilometers-well short of the 10-kilometer range required
for the Wideband Networking Waveform. As a consequence, more unmanned
aerial vehicles may be needed to relay information. Intended ground
vehicle users have accepted a deviation in the design-to have some of the
radio's hardware mounted separately outside the vehicle- with the
expectation that the contractor will develop a better solution later on.
However, deviations were not accepted for the helicopters because it would
necessitate major design changes to the aircraft and adversely affect the
aircraft modernization schedules. Unlike ground vehicles, aviation
platforms are limited in their ability to compromise on size, weight, and
power issues because of the difficulty in maintaining equilibrium while
airborne. The Cluster 1 radio's size, weight, and peak power consumption
exceeds helicopter platform requirements by as much as 80 percent (see
fig. 4).

Figure 4: JTRS Current Cluster 1 Size, Weight, and Power Compared with
Helicopter Requirements

Cubic inches Pounds Watts

7,000 250 3,000

6,000 5,826 207 2,500 2,444 200

5,000 2,000

150 4,000

1,500

3,000 100

1,000 2,000

50 5001,000

0 00

JTRS size JTRS weight JTRS peak power consumption

Performance requirements for aviation

Size, weight, power (September 2004)

Source: Department of Defense.

To meet the JTRS size, weight, and power requirements and realize the full
capabilities of the Wideband Networking Waveform, significant technology
advances in power amplification and cooling are essential. The Army has
initiated science and technology development efforts to address these
issues, but it will take time to evolve the technologies to an acceptable
level of maturity. In addition to conducting other research, the Army is
evaluating technologies associated with a communications and navigation
system that was being developed as part of the Comanche helicopter
program. The Army approved further development of this system and plans to
integrate it into the JTRS system and conduct a demonstration of its
capabilities later this year. However, the Army will not be able to
deliver Cluster 1 radios to support the helicopter fielding schedules and
will have to purchase legacy radios instead.

The FCS program is exploring solutions to meet a key transportability
requirement that FCS vehicles must be limited to 19 tons in order to be
airlifted by a C-130 transport aircraft. To meet this transportability
requirement, the program recently proposed significant size and weight

reductions for vehicle components, including communications equipment.
While Cluster 1 currently has no size, weight, and power requirements for
the systems to be fielded in FCS, the JTRS radios may require further
redesign to meet FCS's aggressive weight requirements. Such a reduction
would likely have a significant impact on the design of JTRS radios for
the FCS vehicles.

Cluster 1 Has Experienced Significant Cost and Schedule Growth

Since the program entered systems development, in 2002, the contractor has
overrun cost estimates by $93 million--nearly 28 percent above what was
planned (see app. II). Although the program attempted to stabilize costs
by adding approximately $200 million to the contract in January 2004,
costs continued to grow steadily thereafter. In addition, the contractor
has increasingly fallen behind schedule and has had to devote more
resources than originally planned. In January 2005, the prime contractor
estimated that the total costs for the Cluster 1 radio and waveform
development would be $531 million more than what was originally budgeted,
reaching about $898 million at completion. However, according to program
officials, since contract award, the prime contractor has not demonstrated
strong cost estimating and cost management techniques, and it is difficult
to estimate with any confidence what the overall program is likely to
cost. Key issues driving the cost growth are unanticipated complexity
associated with developing the hardware, Wideband Networking Waveform, and
other software. As a result, the unit costs for early prototypes have
increased from the prime contractor's original proposal. According to one
DOD official, until the requirements' specifications are stabilized, cost
and schedule problems are likely to continue. For example, according to
the Defense Contract Management Agency, meeting the design changes for
security requirements is expected to cost an estimated $80 million.

Future of Cluster 1 is In light of the technical problems and cost growth,
the Army in December

Uncertain	2004 delayed the initial production decision, which was
scheduled for the third quarter of fiscal year 2005, and proposed to add
$458 million and 24 months to the program. Before carrying out this
restructure, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Army in
January 2005 to stop work on portions of the Cluster 1 development and
focus on preparing for an early operational assessment of the radio, which
was intended to test the

basic functionality of pre-engineering development models of the radio.3
In April 2005, however, the Army suspended the operational assessment and
notified the contractor that it was considering contract termination. This
action was taken based on initial findings of an assessment of the Cluster
1 program conducted by a newly established JTRS Joint Program Executive
Office, which concluded that the current program structure is not
executable and the contractor's ability to develop the radio is
questionable.

At this point it is not clear whether the contract will be terminated and
what impact a termination would have on the future of the program. The
Joint Program Executive Office is expected to complete its assessment of
the program, and a Defense Acquisition Board review will be held at the
end of fiscal year 2005 to determine the future of the program. Program
officials anticipate a new program acquisition strategy will evolve, with
greater emphasis on developing the radio in blocks. If development
resumes, it is anticipated that there will be start-up delays-3 to 12
months, according to agency officials-associated with restaffing the
contractor's development team and bringing the team up the learning curve.

Adding to the program's uncertainty is the impact of pending requirements
on program cost and schedule. According to agency officials, the program
will likely be tasked with new requirements from key stakeholders. For
example:

o  	To meet FCS requirements for accessing intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance data on the battlefield, FCS will need a new network data
link operating in the radio frequency range above 2 GHz. According to the
Army, developing the new network data link is expected to cost
approximately $170 million. Furthermore, additional costs are likely
because the new network data link may require changes to the already
challenging JTRS Cluster 1 radio design-which operates over a large 2 MHz
to 2 GHz range-to operate at an even higher frequency. An analysis of
alternatives is currently under way to determine how best to meet this
requirement. According to FCS officials, a decision on the new network
data link is needed by the end of the year to keep the FCS program on
track.

3The early operational assessment was originally scheduled for August 2004
but was rescheduled for December 2004 as a result of the Over Target
Baseline in January 2004. Because of further technical challenges, the
assessment was postponed to April 2005.

o  	To comply with the standards of the Global Information Grid, DOD has
directed all systems to transition to the use of Internet Protocol Version
6 in the future. Cluster 1, which has been designed with Version 4, not
only will need to upgrade but will need additional hardware and software
to ensure Version 4 and Version 6 systems can interoperate. Reconciling
security requirements for Version 6 is also expected to be a challenge.

Given the many program uncertainties, it is unlikely that JTRS radios will
be available to support intended users: the first increment of the FCS
network slated for fiscal year 2008, Stryker Brigade Combat Team ground
vehicles, and helicopters. The Army plans to purchase legacy radios, which
have limited capabilities, for the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams and
helicopters. According to Army officials, FCS is planning to experiment
with early prototypes of JTRS radios and the Wideband Networking Waveform,
but they will not know when the fully capable Cluster 1 radios would be
available until after the program is restructured at the end of fiscal
year 2005. In addition, because of ongoing military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army has purchased a large number of legacy
radios over the past few years. The fielding of so many new radios to the
current force may call into question the affordability of replacing them
prematurely with JTRS sets. The Army is assessing JTRS fielding plans in
light of the additional investments in legacy radios and JTRS Cluster 1
cost, schedule, and technical problems.

As with the Cluster 1 program, radio size, weight, power, and
dataprocessing requirements have presented significant technical
challenges for the JTRS Cluster 5 program, which is developing a series of
radios much smaller than those for the Cluster 1 program. Several
programmatic changes and a contract award bid protest have contributed to
disruptions in the progress of the Cluster 5 program. As a result, the
Cluster 5 program is no longer synchronized with the FCS program. The Army
is currently assessing the feasibility of accelerating the development of
selected small form Cluster 5 radios. However, in light of the unresolved
technical issues with the Cluster 1 program, the JTRS Joint Program
Executive Office has initiated an assessment to restructure the Cluster 5
program into increments. In the event that Cluster 5 radios are not
available, the Army plans to use surrogate radios for the initial spiral
of FCS. In addition, users depending on the Cluster 5 radios, such as the
Army's Land Warrior program, have decided to move forward with surrogate
radios.

  Technical Challenges and Program Changes Have Impeded Cluster 5 Progress

    Technical Challenges Have Impeded Cluster 5 Program Progress

Meeting requirements for Cluster 5 radios is even more challenging than
for Cluster 1 because of their smaller size, weight, power, and large
dataprocessing requirements. For example, a one-channel handheld version
of the Cluster 5 radios has a maximum weight specification of 2 pounds and
a volume of 40 cubic inches (see table 2). A two-channel manpack radio has
weight and volume of 9 pounds and 400 cubic inches, respectively. A
onechannel small form radio weighs about 1 pound and occupies 40 cubic
inches. In comparison, a Cluster 1 two-channel radio weighs 84 pounds and
occupies 1,732 cubic inches. Despite their extreme size and weight
limitations, Cluster 5 radios are still required to store multiple
waveforms. For instance, manpack radios will be required to store at least
10 waveforms, handheld sets 6 waveforms, and the small form sets 2
waveforms.

Table 2: A Comparison of Size, Weight, Power, and the Number of Stored
Waveforms for Selected Cluster 5 and Cluster 1 Radios

                                  Size in      Weight      Number of    Power 
                                   cubic                             
    Cluster      Radio type          inches in pounds     stored     in watts 
                                                        waveforms    
Cluster 5 two-channel manpack        400         9             10 
Cluster 5     one-channel             40         2              6 
                  handheld                                           
Cluster 5  one-channel small          40       1.2              2      N/A 
                    form                                             
Cluster 1     two-channel          1,732        84             10 

Source: Army documents. Note: N/A = not available.

The Cluster 5 program began system development and demonstration with
immature technologies, especially those related to the handheld and
smaller variants because of the limited size, weight, and power allowances
(see fig. 5). According to the Army, the requirements for two-channel
small form radios-wideband radio frequency capabilities up to 2500 MHz,
thermal management and packaging, and complex security architecture- all
introduce unique technological challenges. Cluster 5 program officials had
expected to leverage technology from the Cluster 1 program. However, the
Cluster 1 technologies have not matured as anticipated. Program officials
stated that backup technology will be identified as a part of a risk
mitigation plan.

 Figure 5: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with JTRS Cluster 5 Development

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

The JTRS Cluster 5 program has identified six critical technologies as
follows:

o  	Microelectronics: Microelectronics addresses the processes for
producing and packaging the electronic circuits and systems that make up
the Cluster 5 radios. Miniaturization technology and microelectronics
components are critical to the feasibility of Cluster 5 radios because of
their extremely small size.

o  	Environmental protection: Environmental protection describes the
technologies, tools, or design considerations necessary to protect the
radios from potentially harsh effects of the operational environment,
including, for example, lightning, short-duration force impacts, or
radioactive contaminants.

o  	Power management: One of the greatest challenges in designing and
implementing the Cluster 5 radios is the management and conservation of
the limited amount of available battery power. Power management refers to
the set of technologies that facilitate a reduction in energy consumption
or an increase in battery capacity with the goal of obtaining longer
operating time and a reduced battery size and weight.

o  	Multichannel architecture: Multichannel JTRS radios are required to
provide multiple, independent channels to simultaneously transmit and
receive information using different waveforms. The compact size of the
Cluster 5 radios and requirement for simultaneous multichannel operation
present a co-site interference mitigation challenge.

o  	Antennas: Cluster 5 JTRS radios are required to transmit and receive
multiple waveforms over the large frequency range 2 MHz to 2.5 GHz and are
further required to transmit and receive two separate waveforms
simultaneously with a maximum of three antennas. The requirements impose
unique technical challenges for both antenna and radio designs.

o  	Security: Cluster 5 security framework must support Multiple Single
Levels of Security to allow the processing of information with different
classifications and categories. It also must support an over-the-air
download capability of waveforms, which will entail large software files.
It has yet to be demonstrated in a relevant environment.

The Cluster 5 radios are required to store and operate the Wideband
Networking Waveform. This will provide high data rates and networking
capabilities for mobile forces. The full Wideband Networking Waveform
requires significant amounts of memory and processing power, which may not
be available for the Cluster 5 radios. According to the program office,
the principal challenge in operating the Wideband Networking Waveform on
Cluster 5 radios stems from the significantly smaller size, weight, and
power requirements when compared with those for Cluster 1, as well as
safety and heat considerations for the soldier. Because of the
difficulties in overcoming these challenges, the Cluster 5 program is
seeking to ease the waveform's requirements and reduce the power demands
of the software.

The Cluster 5 program is also developing another new, wideband waveform
called the Soldier Radio Waveform. Although less powerful than the
Wideband Networking Waveform, it is expected to provide the needed network
services for battery-powered radios with limited power and antenna size
such as the handheld and the small form varieties. Cluster 5 radios with
the Soldier Radio Waveform will enable squad-level communications and
interoperability with other radios and work on a network based on the
Wideband Networking Waveform. The Soldier Radio Waveform is expected to be
available in 2008. However, the development of this waveform is being
managed as a science and technology effort by the Army's
Communications-Electronics Research Development and Engineering Center
until it is matured and can be transitioned into the JTRS program. To
support the first FCS spiral in the 2008-2010 timeframe, the Army has
acknowledged that it may have to use an early version of the Soldier Radio
Waveform and a surrogate radio to operate the waveform. Compounding the
challenges in developing the waveform is the Army's assessment that
developing the Soldier Radio Waveform's network manager is high risk and
has yet to be funded.4 Without the network manager functionality, the
Soldier Radio Waveform will not be able to interface with the Wideband
Networking Waveform.

A number of JTRS Cluster 5 technologies are interdependent (see fig. 6)
that, in our opinion, can exacerbate the technical and program risks of
moving forward with immature technologies. For example, power management
is dependent upon microelectronics, multichannel architecture, antennas,
and security. A lag in the development of any of these technologies could
result in a lag in the development of power management.

4Network management is execution of a set of functions required for
controlling, planning, allocating, deploying, coordinating, and monitoring
the resources of a telecommunications network.

Figure 6: Interdependencies among Cluster 5 Critical Technologies

Several programmatic changes have significantly affected the Cluster 5
schedule, and the program has focused on delivering manpack radios for the
near term and handheld and small form radios later. However, the
availability of small form JTRS radios is of greater importance to FCS
because they are needed for the planned fielding of three core systems in
FCS spiral 1. The Army has concluded that the small form radios may not be
able to meet the FCS schedule and may need to use surrogate radios to
support the first FCS spiral.

In May 2003, the responsibility for developing the JTRS handheld and
manpack radios was shifted from the Special Operations Command to the Army
because of difficulties in resolving differences over requirements and
funding among the services. At the same time, the Acting Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics noted that the
Cluster 5 capabilities would have to be delivered in at least two spirals
and set an expectation that the Army would deliver prototype handheld and
manpack radios in the third quarter of fiscal year 2005 and low rate
initial production would begin by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2006.

                               Source: U.S. Army.

Because of the criticality of the size, weight, and power challenge faced
by all variants of the JTRS radios, the program office is pursuing various
solutions to the problem. The program, for example, hopes to benefit from
the Army's science and technology research on developing wideband power
amplifiers and advanced passive cooling technology.

Cluster 5 Schedule No Longer Synchronized with FCS Schedule

In May 2004, the Army Acquisition Executive approved the Cluster 5 program
for the system development and demonstration phase of acquisition. The
Army Acquisition Executive moved the Cluster 5 handheld radios to spiral
2, and it delayed the delivery of the spiral 1 prototype manpack radios to
the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005 and the low-rate initial production
manpack radios to the first quarter of fiscal year 2007. The Army awarded
the Cluster 5 contract in the middle of July 2004, but had to issue a
stop-work order to the contractor by the end of July because of the filing
of a bid protest by the losing contractor. The bid protest was not upheld,
but the program was delayed another 3 months while the protest was
decided.

In authorizing the May 2004 Cluster 5 program's entry into the system
development and demonstration phase, the Army Acquisition Executive noted
the criticality of the JTRS Cluster 5 radio and directed that a review be
conducted to assess the plans for the spiral 2 portion of the program. At
a minimum, the review was to assess development schedule synchronization,
technical performance expectations, integration and performance risks,
waveform development, maturity, baseline, and program affordability. The
review was scheduled for the spring of 2005. However, because of the
ongoing cost, schedule, and technical problems with the Cluster 1 program,
the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office has begun a broader assessment of
the Cluster 5 program. On the basis of the initial findings of the
assessment, development work on the Cluster 5 spiral 1 radios has been
suspended because the office determined that key waveforms being developed
as part of the Cluster 1 program would not be delivered to Cluster 5 when
needed. According to the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office, a
restructuring of Cluster 5 spiral 1 and 2 is being developed, and it will
identify more well defined and executable increments.

While the Cluster 5 manpack and handheld radios are important
deliverables, of greater urgency for the first spiral of FCS is the
availability of the small form Cluster 5 radios. These radios will be
embedded in a variety of sensors and weapons systems. In fact, three FCS
core systems- Unattended Ground Sensors, Intelligent Munitions Systems,
and the Non Line of Sight Launch System-need Cluster 5 small form radios
to support their planned inclusion in the first FCS spiral scheduled for
the 2008-2010 timeframe. The Army has concluded that the schedule for the
small form radios is not synchronized with the FCS schedule and has asked
the contractor for a plan to accelerate deliveries. The Army has
acknowledged that it may have to use surrogate radios, which have limited
capabilities, if the Cluster 5 small form radios are not available to
support the initial

  Ambitious WIN-T Acquisition Approach Puts Program At Risk of Cost and Schedule
  Growth

fielding of the three FCS core systems. In addition, other users depending
on the Cluster 5 radios, such as the Army's Land Warrior program, have
decided to move forward with surrogate radios.

The WIN-T program entered the system development and demonstration phase
with only 3 of its 12 critical technologies close to full maturity. None
of the critical technologies will be fully mature at the time production
begins in March 2006. Because there are significant interdependencies
among critical technologies, any delay in maturing an individual
technology further increases overall program risk. WIN-T has gone through
a number of program changes, including shifts in the program's focus. In
the fall of 2004, the Office of the Secretary of Defense approved the
Army's proposal to combine the work of two contractors to facilitate early
delivery of WIN-T capabilities to the warfighter while continuing to focus
on the restructured FCS program. A decision has recently been made not to
accelerate the program or develop capabilities sooner. It remains unclear
what WIN-T capabilities will be provided to the first FCS spiral. The
changes, along with existing technical challenges, put the program at risk
of cost and schedule overruns and failure to achieve performance
objectives.

    Uncertainties about Technology Development Persist

During WIN-T's 32-month systems development and demonstration schedule,
the program must mature 9 of its 12 critical technologies. Although risk
mitigation plans were developed in mid-2003 for the 9 immature
technologies, a program review sponsored by the Army in July 2004
concluded that the plans lacked sufficient detail. Eight backup
technologies have been identified, but they are less robust and only 3 are
close to full maturity. Relying on these substitutes may degrade network
performance resulting in reduced operational capability.

Contrary to best practices under knowledge-based development, the program
will continue technology development concurrently with the product
development and demonstration phase (see fig.7). The tightly compressed
schedule also assumes nearly flawless execution and may not allow
sufficient time for correcting problems. For example, the combined testing
to demonstrate system performance and operational functionality is slated
to occur just 1 month after critical design review. With immature
technologies, it will be difficult, at best, to demonstrate the system's
design stability and determine whether the system can be produced
affordably and work reliably. In fact, WIN-T program officials may be
unable to conclude a reliable operational capability of on-the-move

 communications until the system is demonstrated in an operational environment
            early in fiscal year 2009-long after production begins.

Figure 7: Knowledge-Based Development Compared with WIN-T Development

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

The significant interdependencies among WIN-T's critical technologies
exacerbate the technical and program risks of moving forward with immature
technologies. For example, the on-the-move satellite communications
technologies rely on wideband waveforms, antennas, and other technologies
to achieve their performance objectives. Therefore, a lag in the
development of any of these technologies may result in a lag in

the overall development of mobile communications technologies-a critical
component of the operational concept for WIN-T.

    Dependence on External Programs May Hinder the System's Performance

Not only is the program faced with technical challenges, but its
dependence on other programs puts the WIN-T program at risk. WIN-T's
ability to significantly improve upon current communications capabilities
relies on demonstrating integrated network operations and the ability to
work on the move. The WIN-T system depends on other programs to provide
needed capabilities. Although separate from the WIN-T program, changes or
delays in these external programs may impair WIN-T's ability to perform.

For WIN-T, unmanned aerial vehicles are fundamental to the program as they
route information and extend transmission range that ground systems are
constrained by-preserving network reliability, connectivity, and mobile
throughput. Citing their capacity to fly at high altitudes, program
officials have identified two platforms to support WIN-T, the Extended
Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle or the High Altitude Airship.
However, one is not adequately funded for a dedicated communications
capability, and the other is still in the concept development phase.
Therefore, a study is under way to assess the consequence of not having
unmanned aerial vehicles and its resulting effect on the network. It is
unclear whether the issue will be resolved in time for the upcoming
development test/operational test event. The program plans to use a
surrogate plane, but it is unknown whether this will adequately assess
network reliability and critical on-the-move communications.

Central to the WIN-T operational effectiveness is the development of a
software-programmable radio and wideband waveforms. Together, the radio
and waveforms are expected to allow warfighters to receive large volumes
of data while moving around the battlefield at increasing speeds. However,
given the uncertainty of whether a JTRS radio would be available to
support WIN-T, the program plans to develop its own highcapacity radio,
operating above the 2 GHz radio frequency range. To meet FCS requirements,
the WIN-T radio is expected to run above 2 GHz with two new waveforms-a
net-centric waveform and a high-capacity waveform--and the existing Global
Broadcast Service waveform. In particular, these waveforms enable
distribution of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data to
provide a more detailed picture of the battlefield. To address the need
for waveforms operating above 2 GHz, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense is conducting an assessment to

identify solutions. However, the results of the study may not be available
by the critical design review.

                             Program Has Undergone
                            Several Strategy Changes

Since the WIN-T program was conceived nearly 5 years ago, the program
strategy has shifted several times. Originally, the program focused on
designing a network that would meet current force needs. In 2002, the
program was realigned to focus on a network that would support future
force needs. Two contractors were to work independently on designing the
future force network architecture, and the program office would select the
better of the two. The contractors were given significant flexibility in
designing the network architecture and developing system performance
specifications. Two years later, with the global war on terrorism and
military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, WIN-T was directed to focus
on developing and fielding network capabilities to meet both current and
future force needs. To expedite completion of the architecture's design,
the Army eliminated competition between the two contractors in September
2004. Army officials believe that the combined team provides a stronger
technical solution by taking the best elements of each contractor's
proposed architecture and maintains some competition because over 50
percent of the work will still be competed among sub-contractors. In fact,
the contractors working together completed the network architecture by
January 2005-a year earlier than previously planned. According to Army
officials, the early completion of the network architecture allows other
Army programs, particularly FCS, to stabilize their network designs
earlier than planned.

In conjunction with the WIN-T program's shift in focus to address both
current and future force needs, the Army fielded a separate program, in
2004, a beyond-line-of-sight communications network to units deployed in
Iraq: the Joint Network Transport Capability-Spiral (JNTC-S). Although an
improvement over past capabilities, JNTC-S is stationary -units must come
to a standstill and set up their satellite equipment to communicate. In
contrast, WIN-T is expected to maintain satellite connection- regardless
of distance, weather conditions, or terrain--while units are in motion.
Currently, the Army is assessing how best to transition JNTC-S to WIN-T.
In addition, the Army is assessing whether the WIN-T program can be
modified to address the restructured FCS plan to field communications and
networking capabilities in spirals. Army officials concede that, based on
available technologies and resources, WIN-T block 1 performance
requirements may need to be scaled back to meet the FCS spiral 1 time
frame. For example, the data rate requirements for block 1 WIN-T-which
calls for an unprecedented data throughput rate of 256 kilobits per second
while units are moving at 25 miles per hour-may need to be reduced.

  SOSCOE Development at Risk because of Software Maturity and Evolving
  Requirements

Although the Army has decided not to accelerate development of WIN-T, it
is unclear when plans to migrate from the JNTC-S program and address FCS
needs will be completed.

The Army assesses SOSCOE as high-risk. SOSCOE software may not reach the
necessary technical maturity level required to meet FCS milestones. In
addition, FCS system-level requirements are still being defined, which
could affect the SOSCOE design. Consequently, it is unclear whether SOSCOE
will be sufficiently developed to support the initial fielding of FCS
beginning in fiscal year 2008.

    SOSCOE Software Availability and Maturity are High-Risk

Because SOSCOE software will tie together FCS systems, support battle
command applications, and enable interoperability with current and future
forces, it is the fundamental building block upon which a substantial
portion of FCS will be built. Thus, delays in SOSCOE software development
could affect FCS' ability to meet production and fielding milestones.
Since the start of system development, the Army has assessed SOSCOE
software availability and maturity as high-risk. According to program
officials, SOSCOE development does not require "cutting edge" software
technology. However, there are some aspects of particular service families
that are more challenging than others and result in an overall SOSCOE
development effort that varies in complexity. The key to SOSCOE
development is the "threading model," which is intended to allow an
interface between different subsystem operating systems. The high risk is
derived from the fact that SOSCOE may not reach the necessary technical
maturity level required to meet program milestones.

The SOSCOE risk mitigation strategy is to develop and deliver the software
in increments to provide the functionality required by SOSCOE users when
they need it. Specifically, the SOSCOE software is scheduled for delivery
in a series of seven software builds between the end of 2005 and 2011. FCS
functionality will increase with each successive software build. The Army
will need about one-half of the SOSCOE software in time for the fielding
of the initial FCS capability in fiscal year 2008. If the software risks
materialize, the SOSCOE build plan may have to be modified, deferring some
functionality to later software builds.

    FCS Program Requirements Are Still Evolving

Higher-level FCS specifications are still evolving nearly 2 years after
the program started development. As in most engineering efforts, FCS
requirements are first defined at a general or high level. Once these are
defined, more detailed specifications that flow down to the subsystem
level are derived. It is the specifications that provide the details
necessary to design subsystems like SOSCOE. In the case of FCS, very few
specifications have flowed to SOSCOE, as higher-level specifications are
still being defined. The lack of specific requirements flow-down could
affect the SOSCOE software build needed to support the first FCS spiral.

In addition, program officials are concerned that SOSCOE will have
difficulty meeting emerging requirements without significant cost and
schedule impacts. Costs are likely to grow as SOSCOE is reworked to meet
new requirements, or applications software is reworked to accommodate the
limitations of SOSCOE. Further, if design assumptions underlying SOCOE
during the spiral 1 and 2 builds are wrong, because of incomplete
technical information, requirements for future software builds might not
be met or the software could require extensive rework, resulting in cost
and schedule problems.

    FCS Restructuring Reduced SOSCOE Development Concurrency

Conclusions

As part of the original FCS schedule, a DOD-level Network Maturity
Milestone Decision was scheduled for 2008 to assess demonstrated
communications and networked functions. The demonstration was to verify
the performance of FCS software, including SOSCOE. The purpose of the
demonstration would have been to provide confidence that all networked
operations software would meet initial operational capability objectives
and to use the results of the milestone decision to initiate longlead
production for the network equipment. However, the restructuring of the
overall FCS program allowed the reduction of the high concurrency in the
SOSCOE development and fielding schedule. The development schedule has now
been extended to 2011. The DOD-level assessment of demonstrated network
capabilities will be deferred until the formal FCS production milestone
decision in 2012.

Although DOD and the military services have produced the best armed forces
in the world, their effectiveness in carrying out military operations has
been hampered by communications and networking systems that lack
interoperability and have limited capacity to transfer information where
and when it is needed. The Army's efforts to develop JTRS, WIN-T, and the
SOSCOE as components of the network are essential to overcoming these
limitations. However, to achieve the desired capabilities, not only must

each program be successfully executed, but because the programs are
interdependent, they must be closely synchronized. In particular, the
successful fielding of FCS capabilities is critically dependent on the
outcome of the JTRS and WIN-T programs. If they do not work as intended,
there will not be sufficient battlefield information for the future force
to operate effectively.

As currently structured, the JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE programs are at risk
of not delivering intended capabilities when needed, particularly for the
first spiral of FCS. They continue to struggle to meet an ambitious set of
user requirements, steep technical challenges, and stringent timeframes.
While the Army's restructuring of the FCS program last year into spiral
increments was a positive step, the first spiral may not demonstrate key
networking capabilities. The first spiral of FCS should provide a
meaningful demonstration of the networking capabilities that can then
serve as a basis to support further development of the future force. In
particular, demonstrating the capability of the Wideband Networking
Waveform is important, given that the design of FCS vehicles and systems
in later spirals is predicated on this capability. It is reasonable that
such a demonstration should include JTRS with the Wideband Networking
Waveform, WIN-T, and basic capability from SOSCOE.

Since (1) an enhanced Army communications network is critical for a
successful transformation to FCS and (2) JTRS, including the advanced
wideband waveforms, WIN-T, and SOSCOE are the key pillars of the
communications network, the timing of the first FCS spiral should be based
on when the pacing capabilities to be provided by JTRS and WIN-T will be
demonstrated. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense:

o  	establish low-risk schedules for demonstrating JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE
capabilities;

o  	synchronize the FCS spiral schedule with such schedules for JTRS,
WIN-T, and SOSCOE; and

o  	develop an operational test and evaluation strategy that supports an
evaluation of network maturity as part of FCS spiral production decisions.

In addition, in light of the delays in JTRS Cluster 1 and the criticality
of the Wideband Networking Waveform for FCS, we recommend the Secretary of
Defense assess whether a greater priority should be placed on
demonstrating the Wideband Networking Waveform on a JTRS radio

  Recommendations for Executive Action

  Agency Comments
  and Our Evaluation

prototype over other Cluster 1 capabilities in the remainder of the
Cluster 1 development program.

In its letter commenting on a draft of our report, DOD concurred with our
findings and three of our recommendations and partially concurred with a
fourth recommendation. (DOD's letter is reprinted in app III.) As part of
its comments, DOD provided some information on actions it has begun to
take to address each of our recommendations. While these actions should
help strengthen the management of JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE, we remain
concerned that a demonstration of FCS's communications and networking
capabilities will not be known for some time. Until these capabilities are
demonstrated, investment in FCS platforms and systems carries substantial
risk. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated where
appropriate.

Regarding our first recommendation-that the Secretary of Defense establish
low-risk schedules for demonstrating JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE
capabilities-DOD concurred, noting (1) that its newly established JTRS
Joint Program Executive Office is evaluating the condition of each JTRS
product line and will make recommendations to ensure effective control of
cost, schedule, and performance and (2) that the Army is managing risks
associated with WIN-T and SOSCOE and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense is applying the appropriate level of oversight. While the actions
being taken by DOD and the Army will help, it remains unclear whether they
will be sufficient to ensure JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE-the critical
components of the enhanced communications network-are successfully
executed. We remain concerned that the requisite knowledge needed to
effectively manage program development risks has not been sufficiently
developed. A low-risk fielding schedule for each of the components should
set the pace for the Army's transformation to FCS.

Regarding our second recommendation-that the Secretary of Defense
synchronize the FCS spiral schedule with the fielding schedules for JTRS,
WIN-T, and SOSCOE-DOD partially concurred, but stated that "the Army's
strategy for spiraling out FCS technology is not constrained to any one
particular element of the program. The strategy aims to make available
mature and military useful system capability in increments, leveraging
opportunities to integrate new and mature technology with current force
capability." DOD further stated that "the FCS spirals will make use of
technologies as they become available or leverage the use of surrogate
applications where they apply." DOD also noted that the Army did not
define the first FCS spiral around the main components of the

communications network, but around the capabilities needed by the current
force. While we agree with DOD that mature and military useful
capabilities should be fielded as expeditiously as possible, we believe
that the first spiral should demonstrate meaningful capabilities for FCS.
In particular, we believe that the first spiral of FCS should demonstrate
critical networking capabilities, and that its schedule be predicated on
demonstrating core capabilities, such as the JTRS Wideband Networking
Waveform. Progress made on these capabilities should guide the future
investments, such as on ground vehicles that depend on network
performance. In addition, reliance on surrogate applications has the
potential to result in costly replacement of the surrogate applications
once the target applications are fully mature.

Regarding our third recommendation-that the Secretary of Defense develop
an operational test and evaluation strategy that supports an evaluation of
network maturity as part of FCS spiral production decisions-DOD concurred,
stating that FCS will initially field a mix of both new and legacy
communications and network capabilities, and that iterative operational
test and evaluation will be stressed to ensure strong capability
verification and validation. DOD also noted that network maturity will be
assessed at each spiral's production decision. While it is appropriate to
assess network maturity at each spiral's production decision, to measure
progress in developing the FCS communications network, these assessments
will need to culminate in a full demonstration that the network will
perform as intended before committing to produce equipment for FCS units
of action.

Finally, regarding our fourth recommendation-that the Secretary of Defense
assess whether a greater priority should be placed on demonstrating the
Wideband Networking Waveform on a JTRS radio prototype over other Cluster
1 capabilities in the remainder of the Cluster 1 development program-DOD
concurred, noting that the newly established JTRS Joint Program Executive
Office is assessing the JTRS Cluster 1 development path and that the
development of the Wideband Networking Waveform will be included in the
assessment.

As agreed with your office, unless you announce its contents, we will not
distribute this report further until 30 days after the date of this
letter. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees
that have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for DOD. We will
also send copies to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army,
and the

Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be available
at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff
have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2811,
or Assistant Director John Oppenheim at (202) 512-3111. Major
contributors to this report were Ridge Bowman, Subrata Ghoshroy, Karen
Sloan, Hai Tran, Paul Williams, and Candice Wright.

Sincerely yours,

Paul L. Francis, Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the development risks associated with the Joint Tactical
Radio System-Tactical (JTRS) Cluster 1, JTRS Cluster 5, and WIN-T
programs, we obtained briefings on acquisition plans, analyzed documents
describing the maturity of critical technologies, and interviewed project
and product officials from the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical
(WIN-T) Program Management Office, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. To determine
the status of JTRS waveforms, we obtained briefings on wideband waveform
development efforts and interviewed officials from the JTRS Joint Program
Office, Arlington, Virginia. We also reviewed selected acquisition
reports, technology readiness assessments, test and evaluation plans,
defense acquisition executive summaries, and acquisition decision
memorandums for individual programs. To obtain information related to the
planned use of JTRS Cluster 1 radios in rotary wing platforms, we
interviewed officials from the Program Executive Office, Aviation,
Arlington, Virginia. To obtain information related to JTRS Cluster 1
contract performance data, we interviewed Defense Contract Management
Agency officials in Anaheim, California, and obtained cost performance
reports and other cost analysis documentation.

To assess cost and schedule performance for JTRS Cluster 1 and waveform
development for the period between August 2003 and January 2005, we used
cost and schedule variances reported in contractor cost performance
reports. Results were presented in graphical form to determine the
period's trends. We also obtained likely cost at the completion of the
prime contract from the reports. We confirmed that the prime contractor's
earned value management system had been validated by the Defense Contract
Management Agency. The cost and schedule results include both prime and
subcontractors. The development of the waveforms was included in our
analysis of Cluster 1 because, although the effort is managed separately
under the Joint Program Office, it is being executed under the same
contract.

To determine the development risks associated with the System of Systems
Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE), we obtained briefings on fielding
plans, analyzed documents describing SOSCOE software availability and
maturity, and interviewed project officials from the Project Manager for
FCS Network Systems Integration, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. We also
attended FCS in-process reviews and a board of directors meeting in St.
Louis, Missouri, organized by the Program Manager, Unit of Action.

To obtain the perspective of organizations that provide policy guidance,
oversight, and technology support for the JTRS, WIN-T, and Future

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Combat Systems (FCS) programs, we interviewed officials from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration, Arlington,
Virginia; Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology, Arlington, Virginia; and, the Army's
Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center,
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

Our review was conducted from January 2004 through May 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: JTRS Cluster 1 Cost and Schedule Variance

Since Cluster 1 entered systems development, in 2002, the contractor has
overrun cost estimates by almost $93 million--nearly 28 percent above what
was planned. We used contractor cost performance reports to assess the
prime contractor's progress toward meeting the Army's cost and schedule
goals during the period August 2003-January 2005. The government routinely
uses such reports to independently evaluate the prime contractor's
performance. Generally, the reports detail deviations in cost and schedule
relative to expectations established under the contract. Deviations are
referred to as variances. Positive variances-activities costing less or
completed ahead of schedule-are considered as good news, and negative
variances-activities costing more or falling behind schedule-as bad news.

Although the program attempted to stabilize cost growth by adding
approximately $200 million to the contract in January 2004, the cost
variance continued to decline steadily thereafter.1 Key issues driving the
cost growth are unanticipated complexity associated with developing the
hardware, Wideband Networking Waveform, and other software. As a result,
the unit costs for early prototypes have increased from the prime
contractor's original proposal. In January 2005, the prime contractor
estimated that the total costs for the Cluster 1 radio and waveform
development would be $531 million more than was originally budgeted,
reaching about $898 million at completion (see fig. 8). However, the
program office noted that, since contract award, the prime contractor has
not demonstrated strong cost estimating and cost management techniques.

1The program attempted to stabilize the contractor cost variance by
initiating an over-thetarget baseline (OTB) in January 2004. An OTB is a
reprogramming effort or "recovery plan" that adds budget to a contract for
either future work or in-process work when the original objectives cannot
be met. The primary purpose of an OTB is to improve managerial control
over the execution of the remaining work in a project. A project manager
may conclude that the baseline is no longer adequate to provide valid
performance measurement information relative to the remaining work and
therefore consider initiating an OTB.

Appendix II: JTRS Cluster 1 Cost and Schedule Variance

Figure 8: Cost Performance of JTRS Cluster 1 and Waveform Development from
August 2003 to January 2005

Dollars in thousands 0 -10,000

-20,000

-30,000

-40,000

-50,000

-60,000

-70,000

-80,000

-90,000

-100,000

ug.A

Sept.

                                      Oct.

.No

                                 Dec. Jan. Feb.

.Mar

.Apr

yMa

uneJ

yl

Ju

.gAu

                                   Sept. Oct.

.No

                                   Dec. Jan.

2003 2004 2005

Over target baseline

Source: GAO analysis based on data provided by Defense Contract Management
                                    Agency.

Cluster 1 has also experienced unfavorable schedule variance. Figure 9
indicates that the contractor increasingly fell behind schedule during the
period August 2003-January 2005. If a program is not only overrun in
costs, but is also behind schedule, additional costs can be expected
because of potential schedule slippage or from acceleration of the effort
to finish on time. The schedule variance stabilized briefly after the
program rebaselined in January 2004, but then it continued to increase
again. 2 By

January 2005, the value of planned work that the contractor was behind
schedule was about $25 million. Delays in software build completions,
software/hardware integration, and the delivery of key technologies to the
waveform developers have contributed to schedule problems.

2The OTB added 4 months to the acquisition schedule.

Appendix II: JTRS Cluster 1 Cost and Schedule Variance

Figure 9: Schedule Performance of JTRS Cluster 1 and Waveform Development
from August 2003 to January 2005

Dollars in thousands 10,000 0 -10,000

-20,000

-30,000

-40,000

-50,000

-60,000

-70,000

-80,000

-90,000

-100,000 .gAuSept.

                                      Oct.

.No

                                 Dec. Jan. Feb.

.Mar

.Apr

yMa

enJu

yl

Ju

.gAu

                                   Sept. Oct.

.vNo

                            Dec. Jan. 2003 2004 2005

Over target baseline Source: GAO analysis based on data provided by
Defense Contract Management Agency.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

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