Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to Take Action to
Safely Consolidate Plutonium (20-JUL-05, GAO-05-665).
Plutonium is very hazardous to human health and the environment
and requires extensive security because of its potential use in a
nuclear weapon. The Department of Energy (DOE) stores about 50
metric tons of plutonium that is no longer needed by the United
States for nuclear weapons. Some of this plutonium is
contaminated metal, oxides, solutions, and residues remaining
from the nuclear weapons production process. To improve security
and reduce plutonium storage costs, DOE plans to establish enough
storage capacity at its Savannah River Site (SRS) in the event it
decides to consolidate its plutonium at SRS until it can be
permanently disposed of in a geologic repository at Yucca
Mountain, Nevada. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to
which DOE can consolidate this plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS's
capacity to monitor plutonium storage containers.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-665
ACCNO: A30417
TITLE: Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to Take Action
to Safely Consolidate Plutonium
DATE: 07/20/2005
SUBJECT: Counterterrorism
Hazardous substances
Health hazards
Homeland security
Nuclear facility security
Nuclear fuel plant security
Nuclear waste management
Nuclear waste storage
Strategic planning
Radiation safety
Safety standards
Nuclear radiation monitoring
Nuclear materials
Plutonium
Hanford (WA)
Los Alamos (NM)
Rocky Flats (CO)
Savannah River (SC)
Yucca Mountain (NV)
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GAO-05-665
* Report to Congressional Committees
* July 2005
* SECURING U.S. NUCLEAR MATERIALS
* DOE Needs to Take Action to Safety Consolidate Plutonium
* Contents
* Results in Brief
* Background
* DOE Cannot Consolidate Its Plutonium from Other DOE Sites at the
Savannah River Site
* SRS Cannot Receive Additional Plutonium Until a Plan to
Process the Plutonium for Permanent Disposition Is Developed
* SRS Cannot Currently Receive Some of Hanford's Plutonium
Because Hanford's Accelerated Cleanup Plans and SRS's
Storage Plans Are Inconsistent with One Another
* Changes in Security Requirements Have Eliminated One
Facility at SRS That DOE Planned to Use for Plutonium
Storage
* DOE's Failure to Adequately Plan for Plutonium Consolidation
Will Lead to Additional Storage Costs and Threatens
Hanford's Cleanup Plans
* DOE Lacks the Capability to Fully Monitor the Condition of Stored
Plutonium at SRS
* SRS's Designated Storage Facility Lacks Sufficient Safety
Measures to Conduct Plutonium Monitoring
* Plutonium Monitoring in Another SRS Building Also Presented
Safety and Security Concerns
* Conclusions
* Recommendations for Executive Action
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
* Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
* Comments from the Department of Energy
* GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Committees
GAO
July 2005
SECURING U.S. NUCLEAR MATERIALS
DOE Needs to Take Action to Safely Consolidate Plutonium
a
GAO-05-665
SECURING U.S. NUCLEAR MATERIALS
DOE Needs to Take Action to Safely Consolidate Plutonium
What GAO Found
DOE cannot yet consolidate its excess plutonium at SRS for several
reasons. First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium into
a form for permanent disposition, as required by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without such a plan, DOE cannot
ship additional plutonium to SRS. Second, SRS cannot receive all of the
plutonium from DOE's Hanford Site because it is not in a form SRS planned
to store. Specifically, about one-fifth of Hanford's plutonium is in the
form of 12-foot-long nuclear fuel rods, which Hanford had planned to ship
intact to SRS as part of its efforts to accelerate the cleanup and
demolition of its closed nuclear facilities. However, SRS's storage plan
called for storing DOE's standard storage containers and not intact fuel
rods. Recent changes in DOE's security requirements have complicated SRS's
storage plans by eliminating one facility that DOE planned to use to store
plutonium. Until DOE develops a permanent disposition plan, additional
plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS and DOE will not achieve the cost
savings and security improvements that consolidation could offer.
Continued storage at Hanford will cost an additional approximately $85
million annually and will threaten that site's achievement of the
milestones in its accelerated cleanup plan.
In addition, DOE lacks the capability to fully monitor the condition of
the plutonium necessary to ensure continued safe storage. The facility at
SRS that DOE plans to use to store plutonium lacks adequate safety systems
to conduct monitoring of storage containers. Without a monitoring
capability, DOE faces increased risks of an accidental plutonium release
that could harm workers, the public, and/or the environment. DOE had
planned to construct a monitoring capability in another building at SRS
that already had the safety systems needed to work with plutonium.
However, this building would not have had sufficient security to conduct
all of the required monitoring activities. In addition, this building also
has other serious safety problems. Faced with these challenges, DOE
announced in April 2005 that it would have SRS's storage facility upgraded
to conduct plutonium monitoring.
Proposed Consolidation and Permanent Disposition of DOE's Unneeded Plutonium
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 5 Background 7 DOE Cannot Consolidate Its Plutonium from
Other DOE Sites at the Savannah River Site 10 DOE Lacks the Capability to
Fully Monitor the Condition of Stored Plutonium at SRS 13 Conclusions 19
Recommendations for Executive Action 19 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
20
Appendixes
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 23 Appendix II: Comments from
the Department of Energy 26 Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments 28
Table 1: DOE's Estimate of the Number of Storage Containers by
Tables
Site after Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging Have
Been Completed 9 Table 2: Storage Container Monitoring Categories 14 Table
3: Annual Number of NDE and DE by Monitoring Category,
Fiscal Years 2005-2016 15
Figure 1: Proposed Consolidation and Permanent Disposition of
Figures
DOE's Unneeded Plutonium 2 Figure 2: Components of a DOE Standard Storage
Container 8 Figure 3: Outer Packaging Used to Ship Storage Containers 16
Contents
Abbreviations
DBT design basis threat
DE destructive examination
DOE Department of Energy
HEPA High-Efficiency Particulate Air
NDE nondestructive examination
NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration
Safety Board Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
SRS Savannah River Site
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separately.
A
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548
July 20, 2005
The Honorable Joe Barton Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce House
of Representatives
The Honorable Ed Whitfield Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives
Plutonium-a man-made element produced by irradiating uranium in nuclear
reactors and used in nuclear weapons-is very hazardous to human health and
the environment and presents an attractive target for theft by a
terrorist. When the United States stopped producing nuclear weapons in
1989, it had plutonium inventories located in numerous Department of
Energy (DOE) facilities throughout the United States. These facilities
included the Hanford Site in Washington, the Rocky Flats Environmental
Technology Site in Colorado, the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New
Mexico, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, and the
Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina.
DOE stores about 50 metric tons of plutonium that is no longer needed by
the United States for nuclear weapons. The majority is in the form of pits
(the spherical core of a nuclear weapon), clean metal, and oxides while
the remainder is in nonpit forms such as contaminated metal, oxides,
solutions, and residues remaining from the nuclear weapons production
process.1 To improve security and reduce costs, DOE plans to establish
enough storage capacity at SRS in the event it decides to consolidate its
nonpit plutonium for interim storage until it can be permanently disposed
of in a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. (See fig. 1.)
1The exact amounts of plutonium that are in pit and nonpit forms is
considered classified information.
Figure 1: Proposed Consolidation and Permanent Disposition of DOE's Unneeded
Plutonium
Sources: GAO (data); MapArt (images).
Nonpit plutonium has particularly dangerous characteristics that demand
special storage conditions. Unlike pits, nonpit plutonium is in forms that
can be easily dispersed. If not safely contained, plutonium can be
dangerous to human health, even in extremely small quantities. Because it
can be highly radioactive, inhaling a few micrograms of plutonium creates
a long-term risk of lung, liver, and bone cancer. Inhaling larger doses
can cause immediate lung injuries and death. In certain forms, plutonium
can spontaneously combust in the presence of oxygen at temperatures above
room temperature. Because of these hazards, nonpit plutonium must be
stabilized and packaged appropriately to minimize the risk of accidental
release. In addition, facilities storing plutonium must be properly
equipped with safety systems that prevent it from escaping into the
surrounding air, land, or water in the event a container is breached. This
report addresses the storage and monitoring of nonpit plutonium (hereafter
referred to as plutonium) at SRS.
In 2003, DOE issued a technical standard for plutonium stabilization and
storage that it believes will allow it to safely store plutonium for a
minimum of 50 years. DOE is nearing completion of a multiyear effort to
stabilize and package plutonium at its sites across the United States into
5-inch-wide, 10-inch-long storage containers. Under DOE's standard, once
the plutonium is safely packaged, DOE must periodically monitor the
storage containers for changes in the plutonium's condition, particularly
any pressurization or corrosion of the containers. Such monitoring
includes annually x-raying a sample of storage containers to evaluate
potential pressurization. Storage containers may also be cut open to
evaluate the plutonium inside and the container itself for potential
corrosion. An effective monitoring program is intended to detect damaged
storage containers or inadequately stabilized plutonium and will help DOE
ensure the continued safe storage of the material.
DOE must also provide security against potential terrorists interested in
the plutonium's value for constructing a nuclear weapon, an improvised
nuclear device, or even a "dirty bomb."2 For many years, a key component
of DOE security has been the development of the design basis threat (DBT),
a classified document that identifies the potential size and capabilities
of terrorist forces. Since September 11, 2001, the size of the potential
threat has increased significantly.3
DOE has cancelled two proposed construction projects at SRS that would
have provided plutonium storage and monitoring and would have
2A dirty bomb, also known as a radiological dispersion device, uses
conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material. While a dirty
bomb would have few short-term health effects on exposed individuals, it
could potentially increase the long-term risks of cancer for those
contaminated. In addition, the evacuation and cleanup of contaminated
areas after such an explosion could lead to panic and serious economic
costs.
3See GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before
It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-623 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 27, 2004).
processed the plutonium for permanent disposition. In 2001, DOE cancelled
a project initiated in 1995 to build a new facility at SRS, called the
Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility, that would have provided
long-term storage and monitoring of standard plutonium containers in a
secure environment. DOE cancelled the project because it expected to store
the plutonium for only a few years until a facility to process the
plutonium for permanent disposition was available. Instead, DOE decided to
use existing buildings at SRS to package and store the plutonium until
construction of the processing facility was completed. In addition, in
2002, citing budgetary constraints, DOE cancelled its plans to construct
the facility that would have processed its most heavily contaminated
plutonium into a form for permanent disposition by a method known as
immobilization. Immobilization involves mixing the plutonium with
ceramics, placing the mixture in large canisters, and then filling the
canisters with high-level radioactive waste that has been turned into
molten glass that then hardens. These canisters would have then been
shipped to a geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste that DOE
plans to construct at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. As a result of the
cancellation of the immobilization facility, DOE has no means for
processing its most heavily contaminated plutonium into a form suitable
for permanent disposition.
In December 2003, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Safety
Board), an independent federal agency established by the Congress in 1988
to oversee the safety of DOE's nuclear weapons complex, reported that
although the facilities DOE plans to use for plutonium storage can do so
safely for a limited time, the facilities do not meet modern safety
standards for long-term plutonium storage. The Safety Board concluded that
DOE's lack of planning for plutonium storage forced SRS to focus on what
can be done with existing facilities, foreclosing options that may have
been both cost-effective and safe. The Safety Board proposed that DOE
conduct a new study of the options for storing plutonium at SRS. In
addition, it advocated the development of a complete, well-considered plan
for permanently disposing of all of DOE's excess plutonium.
In this context and as agreed with your offices, we examined (1) the
extent to which DOE can consolidate its plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS's
capacity to monitor plutonium storage containers. A forthcoming classified
report will discuss SRS's plans for upgrading security to meet the 2004
DBT.
To evaluate DOE's plans for consolidating plutonium, monitoring stored
plutonium, and providing security, we reviewed plutonium storage,
monitoring, and security plans and reports prepared by DOE's Office of
Environmental Management, DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance
Assurance, DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), DOE's
operating contractor for SRS (Westinghouse Savannah River Company), and
DOE's security contractor for SRS (Wackenhut Services, Inc.). In addition,
we reviewed studies on plutonium storage at SRS produced by the Safety
Board. Over the course of our work, we toured plutonium storage facilities
at SRS. During these visits, we interviewed and received briefings from
DOE Savannah River Operations, Westinghouse, and Wackenhut officials. We
also visited plutonium storage facilities at DOE's Hanford Site,
specifically Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant. Hanford currently stores
the majority of the plutonium that could eventually be shipped to SRS.
During this visit, we interviewed and received briefings from DOE Richland
Operations officials. We also spoke with officials from DOE's operating
contractor for Hanford (Fluor Hanford) and Fluor's security subcontractor
for the Hanford Site (Protection Technology Hanford). In addition, we
interviewed officials from the Safety Board, DOE's Office of Environmental
Management, and DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and Performance
Assurance. Additional information on our objectives, scope, and
methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our work from June
2004 through June 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
DOE cannot consolidate all of its plutonium at the Savannah River Site for
Results in Brief
several reasons. First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the
plutonium into a form for permanent disposition, as required by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without such a
plan, DOE cannot ship additional plutonium to SRS. Second, even if this
plan was in place, SRS cannot currently receive all of Hanford's plutonium
because it is in a form that SRS had not planned on storing. Specifically,
Hanford was preparing to ship plutonium to SRS as part of its efforts to
accelerate the cleanup and demolition of its closed nuclear facilities.
About one-fifth of Hanford's plutonium is in the form of 12-foot-long
nuclear fuel rods. Because disassembling the fuel rods would delay cleanup
activities, Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan calls for shipping these
rods intact to SRS inside special shipping containers. However, SRS's
storage plans called for storing Hanford's plutonium in DOE's standard
5-inch-wide, 10-inch-long storage containers. SRS's storage plan assumed
Hanford would disassemble the fuel rods and package the plutonium in
storage containers. Despite these inconsistencies, DOE approved both
Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan and SRS's plutonium storage plans.
Instead of developing an integrated plan for plutonium consolidation, DOE
relied upon its individual sites to independently develop plans to achieve
their own goals. Although SRS's storage facility has sufficient space to
store the fuel rods, several steps are necessary before DOE would be able
to ship the fuel rods to SRS. These include obtaining Department of
Transportation- certified shipping containers for the fuel rods and
completing the appropriate safety analyses and documentation for SRS's
storage facility. Changes to DOE's security requirements have complicated
SRS's storage plans by eliminating one facility that DOE planned to use to
store plutonium. Originally, DOE had planned to use two SRS facilities to
store its excess plutonium. However, both facilities would need extensive
and expensive upgrades to comply with the new 2004 DBT requirements. In
order to save money, DOE has, therefore, decided to use only one facility
to store plutonium. Until DOE develops a plan to process the plutonium for
permanent disposition, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS and
DOE will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that
plutonium consolidation could offer. In particular, continued plutonium
storage at Hanford will cost approximately an additional $85 million
annually and will threaten that site's achievement of the milestones in
its accelerated cleanup plan.
In addition, DOE lacks the capability at SRS to fully monitor the
condition of the plutonium that is in storage containers as required by
DOE's storage standard. According to the Safety Board, the facility at SRS
that DOE plans to use to store the plutonium is not equipped to conduct
the needed monitoring of storage containers. In fact, because this storage
facility lacks adequate fire protection, ventilation, and filtration,
DOE's standard storage containers cannot be removed from their outer
packaging-35-gallon steel drums used to ship the containers to SRS. The
only facility at SRS that can be used to safely remove the storage
containers from their outer packaging, monitor them, and, if necessary,
restabilize and repackage the plutonium, has closed in preparation for
decommissioning. Without a monitoring capability that would detect whether
the stored plutonium is becoming unstable and damaging the storage
containers, DOE faces increased risks of an accidental plutonium release
at SRS that could harm workers, the public, and/or the environment.
Because SRS's storage facility lacks the capability to monitor stored
plutonium, DOE had planned to construct a monitoring capability in another
building at SRS that already had the ventilation and filtration systems
needed to work with plutonium. However, this building would not have had
sufficient security to conduct all of the monitoring activities required
by DOE's storage standard. In addition, the Safety Board has reported
that, like the storage facility, this
Background
building lacks adequate fire protection as well as having other serious
safety concerns. Given these challenges, DOE announced in April 2005 that
it would have SRS's storage facility upgraded to allow storage and
monitoring activities to be centralized in one facility.
We are making recommendations to ensure that DOE develops a comprehensive
strategy for plutonium consolidation, storage, and disposition and that
its facilities' cleanup plans are consistent with this strategy.
We presented a draft of this report to DOE for comment. In its comments,
DOE generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that its recently
created Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordination
Committee will develop a strategic plan for the consolidation and
disposition of special nuclear material. Upon completion of this plan, DOE
stated that it will ensure that its sites' cleanup plans are revised
accordingly. DOE also provided technical comments that we incorporated
into the report as appropriate.
SRS was constructed in the early 1950s by the DuPont Company under
contract to the Atomic Energy Commission (a predecessor agency to DOE) to
produce tritium and plutonium-239 for use in nuclear weapons. Covering 310
square miles along the Savannah River and encompassing land across several
counties in South Carolina, the site historically has supported five
nuclear reactors, two chemical separation plants, a heavy water extraction
plant, a nuclear fuel and target fabrication facility, a tritium
extraction facility, and waste management facilities. During the cold war,
SRS was the only source of tritium in the United States and supplemented
the production of weapons-grade plutonium at DOE's Hanford Site. Although
SRS no longer produces plutonium, some of its missions continue, such as
the extraction of tritium for nuclear warheads. SRS is currently managed
under contract to DOE by Westinghouse Savannah River Company.
To address the problems associated with unstable forms of plutonium and
inadequate packaging for long-term storage, DOE established a standard for
the safe storage of plutonium for a minimum of 50 years.4 This standard
establishes the stabilization and packaging requirements for plutonium.
4U.S. Department of Energy, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of
Plutonium-Bearing Materials, DOE-STD-3013-2003 (Washington, D.C.: December
2003).
Page 7 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage
Stabilization occurs by heating the material to remove moisture that could
lead to a buildup of pressure. This buildup of pressure increases the risk
of rupturing a container. Plutonium containers designed to meet this
standard consist of an inner and outer container, each welded shut. (See
fig. 2.)
Figure 2: Components of a DOE Standard Storage Container
Source: SRS.
The inner container is designed so that it can be monitored for a buildup
of pressure using analytical techniques, such as radiography, that do not
damage the container. Containers must also be resistant to fire, leakage,
and corrosion. Each storage container can hold a total of 5 kilograms of
material, but a maximum of 4.4 kilograms of the 5 kilograms can be pure
plutonium. The remaining material is chemical impurities such as chlorides
and fluorides that are mixed with the plutonium.
Plutonium stabilization and packaging is completed at Rocky Flats,
Hanford, and SRS, and SRS has already received nearly 1,900 containers
from Rocky Flats. Stabilization and packaging is still ongoing at Lawrence
Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories. Once completed, DOE
estimates that it will have nearly 5,700 plutonium storage containers
being stored at locations across the United States that could eventually
be shipped to SRS. (See table 1.)
Table 1: DOE's Estimate of the Number of Storage Containers by Site after
Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging Have Been Completed
Site Number of storage containers
SRS 2,935
Hanford 2,275
Los Alamos National Laboratory 342
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 135
Total 5,687
Source: SRS.
Notes: 1,895 of the storage containers now stored at SRS were originally
packaged and shipped from the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site in
Colorado.
In addition to 2,275 storage containers, Hanford has additional plutonium
in the form of fuel rods that were to be used in the now-closed Fast Flux
Test Facility nuclear reactor. These fuel rods contain enough plutonium
that, if they were cut apart and the material packaged, would require
approximately 1,000 additional storage containers. See pages 11 and 12 for
additional discussion of Hanford's fuel rods.
Until April 2005, SRS's plutonium storage plans called for using two
buildings at the site for plutonium storage and monitoring operations:
Building 105-K and Building 235-F. Building 105-K was originally a nuclear
reactor built in the early 1950s and produced plutonium and tritium until
1988. The reactor was then placed in a cold standby condition until its
complete shutdown in 1996. The major reactor components were removed and
the facility is now primarily used to store plutonium and highly enriched
uranium.
Building 235-F was also constructed in the 1950s and was used until the
mid-1980s to produce plutonium heat sources that were used to power space
probes for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the
Department of Defense. The building is currently used to store plutonium.
DOE must provide extensive security for plutonium storage facilities at
SRS because they contain Category I quantities of plutonium. Category I
material includes specified quantities of plutonium or highly enriched
uranium in the following forms: (1) assembled nuclear weapons and test
devices; (2) pure products containing higher concentrations of plutonium
or highly enriched uranium, such as major nuclear components and
recastable metal; and (3) high-grade materials, such as carbides, oxides,
solutions, and nitrates. The risks associated with Category I special
nuclear materials vary but include the nuclear detonation of a weapon or
test
DOE Cannot Consolidate Its Plutonium from Other DOE Sites at the Savannah
River Site
device at or near design yield, the creation of improvised nuclear devices
capable of producing a nuclear yield, theft for use in a nuclear weapon,
and the potential for sabotage in the form of radioactive dispersal.
To manage potential security risks, DOE has developed the DBT, a
classified document that identifies the potential size and capabilities of
terrorist forces. DOE requires the contractors operating its sites to
develop security measures designed to defend against the threat contained
in the DBT. While specific measures vary from site to site, SRS's security
measures include
o a variety of integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting
intruders;
o physical barriers, such as fences and antivehicle obstacles;
o numerous access control points, such as turnstiles, badge readers,
vehicle inspection stations, special nuclear material detectors, and
metal detectors;
o operational security procedures, such as a "two person" rule that
prevents only one person from having access to special nuclear
material;
o hardened facilities and vaults; and
o a heavily armed paramilitary protective force equipped with such items
as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor, and chemical
protective gear.
DOE cannot consolidate its excess plutonium at SRS for several reasons.
First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium into a form
for permanent disposition, as required by the FY 2002 defense
authorization act. Without such a plan, DOE cannot ship additional
plutonium to SRS. Second, SRS cannot currently receive all of Hanford's
plutonium because it is in a form that SRS had not planned on storing.
Changes to the DBT have complicated SRS's storage plans by eliminating one
facility that DOE had planned to use for plutonium storage. DOE is facing
these storage challenges because of its failure to adequately plan for
plutonium consolidation and disposition. Until DOE develops a permanent
disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS and DOE
SRS Cannot Receive Additional Plutonium Until a Plan to Process the
Plutonium for Permanent Disposition Is Developed
will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that plutonium
consolidation could offer. For example, continued plutonium storage at
Hanford will cost approximately an additional $85 million annually and
will threaten that site's achievement of the milestones in its accelerated
cleanup plan.
Section 3155 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
20025 provides that if DOE decides not to construct either of two proposed
plutonium disposition facilities at SRS,6 DOE is prohibited from shipping
plutonium to SRS until a plan to process the material for permanent
disposition is developed and submitted to the Congress. In 2002, DOE
cancelled the plutonium immobilization plant and, to date, DOE has not
developed a plan for the plutonium that would have been processed in that
plant for permanent disposition. In its fiscal year 2006 budget, DOE has
requested $10 million to initiate conceptual design of a facility that
would process this plutonium. However, it is uncertain when this design
work would be completed and a plan prepared.
SRS Cannot Currently Receive Some of Hanford's Plutonium Because Hanford's
Accelerated Cleanup Plans and SRS's Storage Plans Are Inconsistent with One
Another
Even if a plan to process this plutonium for permanent disposition had
been developed and DOE were able to ship the plutonium, SRS cannot
currently accommodate some of Hanford's plutonium because Hanford's
accelerated cleanup plans and SRS's storage plans are inconsistent with
one another. DOE approved both plans even though Hanford's accelerated
cleanup plan called for shipping some of its plutonium to SRS in a form
that SRS had not planned on storing.
Hanford stores nearly one-fifth of its plutonium in the form of
12-foot-long nuclear fuel rods, with the remainder in about 2,300 DOE
standard 5-inch-wide, 10-inch-long storage containers. The fuel rods were
to be used in Hanford's Fast Flux Test Facility reactor. The reactor has
been closed, and the fuel rods were never used. Hanford's plutonium is
currently being stored at the site's Plutonium Finishing Plant-the storage
containers in vaults and the nuclear fuel rods in large casks inside a
fenced area. Hanford was preparing to ship plutonium to SRS as part of its
efforts to accelerate
5Pub. L. No. 107-107, S: 3155, 115 Stat. 1378 (2001).
6The two proposed plutonium disposition facilities are the plutonium
immobilization plant and a mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility for
surplus plutonium pits and nonpit plutonium.
Page 11 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage
Changes in Security Requirements Have Eliminated One Facility at SRS That
DOE Planned to Use for Plutonium Storage
the cleanup and demolition of its closed nuclear facilities. Although
Hanford's original cleanup plan called for demolishing the Plutonium
Finishing Plant by 2038, the plan was modified in 2002 to accelerate the
site's cleanup. Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan that was approved by
DOE's Office of Environmental Management now calls for shipping the
storage containers and nuclear fuel rods to SRS by the end of fiscal year
2006 so that Hanford can demolish the Plutonium Finishing Plant by the end
of fiscal year 2008. To meet the new deadline, Hanford planned to ship the
fuel rods intact to SRS.
Nevertheless, SRS's July 2004 plutonium storage plan stated that Hanford
would cut the fuel rods and package the plutonium in approximately 1,000
DOE standard storage containers before shipping the material to SRS. At
the time the plan was issued, SRS planned to use Building 105-K and
Building 235-F to store plutonium in standard storage containers and not
intact fuel rods. Although Building 105-K is capable of storing the fuel
rods intact, several steps are necessary before DOE would be able to ship
the fuel rods from Hanford to SRS. First, there is currently no Department
of Transportation-certified shipping container that could be used to
package and ship the fuel rods. In addition, SRS would be required, among
other things, to prepare the appropriate analyses and documentation under
the National Environmental Policy Act and update Building 105-K's safety
documentation to include storage of the fuel rods. Wherever the fuel rods
are stored, they would have to be disassembled prior to processing the
plutonium for permanent disposition. Hanford and SRS currently lack the
capability to disassemble the fuel rods, but DOE plans to study
establishing that capability at SRS as part of its conceptual design of a
facility to process the plutonium for disposition.
SRS originally planned to use both Building 105-K and Building 235-F to
store plutonium storage containers. After the DBT was changed in October
2004, SRS was forced to reevaluate its storage plans. Because the DBT
substantially increases the potential threat that SRS must defend against,
significant additional security will be required for SRS facilities
storing plutonium. SRS projected the total cost of this additional
security at over $300 million. SRS estimated that it could save more than
$120 million by consolidating plutonium in Building 105-K and not using
Building 235-F for storage. Building 235-F was originally planned to store
approximately 1,900 storage containers. Although SRS officials believe
that Building 105-K has sufficient space to store all of DOE's plutonium
storage containers from other DOE sites in the event that DOE decides to
ship additional plutonium
DOE's Failure to Adequately Plan for Plutonium Consolidation Will Lead to
Additional Storage Costs and Threatens Hanford's Cleanup Plans
to SRS, DOE's estimates of the total number of containers have varied over
time and may continue to change as Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos
conduct plutonium stabilization and packaging operations.
The challenges DOE faces storing its plutonium stem from the department's
failure to adequately plan for plutonium consolidation. DOE has not
developed a complexwide, comprehensive strategy for plutonium
consolidation and disposition that accounts for each of its facilities'
requirements and capabilities. Until DOE is able to develop a permanent
disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS, and DOE
will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that plutonium
consolidation could offer. According to DOE officials, the impact of
continued storage at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore will be relatively
minor because both laboratories had already planned to maintain plutonium
storage facilities for other laboratory missions. However, according to
Hanford officials, continued storage at the site could cost approximately
an additional $85 million annually and will threaten the achievement of
the goals in the site's accelerated cleanup plan. Specifically,
maintaining storage vaults at Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant will
prevent the site from demolishing the plant as scheduled by September
2008.
DOE Lacks the Capability to Fully Monitor the Condition of Stored Plutonium at
SRS
DOE lacks the capability at SRS to fully monitor the condition of the
plutonium that is in storage containers as required by DOE's storage
standard. According to the Safety Board, Building 105-K does not have
adequate safety measures to monitor the containers. Therefore, DOE had
planned to construct a monitoring capability in Building 235-F at SRS,
which already had the safety systems needed to work with plutonium.
However, Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security to conduct
all of the required monitoring. In addition, the Safety Board identified
serious safety concerns with Building 235-F. Because of these concerns,
DOE changed its plans again in April 2005 and announced that it would
install monitoring equipment and the necessary safety systems in Building
105-K.
SRS's Designated Storage Facility Lacks Sufficient Safety Measures to
Conduct Plutonium Monitoring
Under DOE's plutonium storage standard, storage containers must be
periodically monitored to ensure continued safe storage. Without a
monitoring capability that would detect whether storage containers are at
risk of rupturing, there is an increased risk of an accidental plutonium
release that could harm workers, the public, and/or the environment. The
following two types of monitoring activities are to be performed:
o Nondestructive examination (NDE): Between 13 and 41 storage containers
are to be tested annually for leaks or contamination and x-rayed to
detect any increase in internal pressure that could rupture a
container.
o Destructive examination (DE): Between 13 and 15 storage containers are
to be punctured and cut open annually. Samples of the gases inside the
container are to be taken and analyzed and the containers themselves
examined for indications of corrosion. In addition, the material
inside is to be analyzed to detect any changes in the plutonium's
condition.
DOE has categorized the plutonium storage containers into three groups
based on their risk of rupturing because of pressurization or corrosion.
(See table 2.)
Table 2: Storage Container Monitoring Categories
Number of
Type of storage
Category monitoring Characteristics containers
Pressure and NDE and DE Containers with impure plutonium 1,597
corrosion oxides contaminated with chlorides.
The chlorides make the containers at
risk for rupture due to both pressure
and corrosion. Plutonium in these
containers may also contain other
impurities such as calcium, iron,
magnesium, silicon, sodium, and
potassium, among others.
Pressure NDE and DE Containers with impure plutonium 1,386
oxides without chlorides, but still
at risk of rupture due to
pressurization.
Innocuous NDE Containers with relatively pure 2,704
plutonium metal and oxides with
little risk for rupture due to
pressure or corrosion.
Total 5,687
Source: SRS.
A storage container's placement in one of the three groups-pressure and
corrosion, pressure, or innocuous-determines the type of monitoring a
container will be subjected to and how many containers will be monitored
annually. Table 3 shows the number of examinations DOE plans to conduct
beginning in fiscal year 2005.
Table 3: Annual Number of NDE and DE by Monitoring Category, Fiscal Years
2005-2016
Fiscal year
Category 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Pressure 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 14
NDE NDE NDE NDE NDE NDE NDE NDE NDE NDE
and 13 DE 13 DE 13 DE 13 13 13 13 13 13 14
DE DE DE DE DE DE DE
corrosion
Pressure 25 25 25 26 26
NDE NDE NDE NDE NDE
2 DE 2 DE 2 DE
Innocuous 2 NDE 2 NDE 2 NDE 2 NDE 2 NDE
Total 27 27 13 13 13 13 13 13 14
NDE NDE 40 41 41 NDE NDE NDE NDE NDE NDE NDE
NDE NDE NDE 13 13 13 13 13 13 14
15 DE 15 DE 15 DE DE DE DE DE DE DE DE
Source: SRS.
Note: According to SRS's plutonium surveillance and monitoring plan, gas
pressurization and corrosion have been identified as the only mechanisms
that could cause the failure of a storage container. Gas pressurization
would likely be discovered early because gas generation decreases over
time. Therefore, monitoring of the pressure category will stop after 5
years. Since corrosion is a slower phenomenon and is considered to have a
longer term potential to cause failure, monitoring on the pressure and
corrosion category will continue for 10 years. The innocuous category has
little potential for pressurization or corrosion, therefore monitoring
will stop after 5 years.
Since an accidental release of plutonium would present an extreme hazard
to workers, the public, and the environment, monitoring activities must
occur in a facility that, among other things, is equipped to confine
accidentally released plutonium through effective ventilation and
appropriate filters. In addition, the facility must have a fire protection
system to protect storage containers and prevent their contents from being
released in a major fire. According to the Safety Board, Building 105-K is
not currently equipped with adequate ventilation or fire protection.
Specifically, SRS removed the High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA)
filters that were used when the building was a nuclear reactor. Such
filters could prevent plutonium from escaping the building in the event of
a release from the storage containers. In addition, Building 105-K lacks
automatic fire detection or suppression systems. As a result, plutonium
storage containers cannot be removed from inside the outer packaging used
to ship the containers to SRS. The outer package-a 35-gallon steel drum-is
used to ship a single storage container and is designed to resist damage
during transportation and handling. The outer package confines the
plutonium in the event the storage container inside is breached. In
addition, the outer package provides an additional layer of protection
from fire for the storage container inside. (See fig. 3.)
Figure 3: Outer Packaging Used to Ship Storage Containers
Source: SRS.
Because monitoring requires x-raying individual storage containers and, in
some cases, puncturing and cutting storage containers to analyze the
condition of the container and the plutonium within, the storage
containers must be removed from their outer packaging. In addition, SRS
plans to establish a capability to restabilize the plutonium by heating it
in a specialized furnace in the event monitoring determines that the
stored plutonium is becoming unstable (i.e., increasing the risk of
rupturing a storage container). The restablized plutonium would then be
packaged into new storage containers. The only facility at SRS currently
capable of
Plutonium Monitoring in Another SRS Building Also Presented Safety and
Security Concerns
restabilizing and repackaging the plutonium has closed in preparation for
decommissioning.7
Because Building 105-K does not have the capability to monitor storage
containers, DOE had planned to install monitoring equipment in Building
235-F at SRS. Building 235-F was chosen primarily because it was already
equipped with filtered ventilation systems appropriate to handling
plutonium-multiple and redundant air supply and exhaust fan systems that
use HEPA filters. Exhaust from the ventilation system is further filtered
through a sand filter before entering the outside atmosphere.8 Currently,
Building 235-F is limited to removing storage containers from their outer
packaging and performing nondestructive examinations. If nondestructive
examination indicates pressurization in a storage container, DOE has
installed equipment in Building 235-F that could puncture the storage
container to relieve pressure.
Although Building 235-F has the appropriate ventilation and filtration, it
faced several challenges that would have affected its ability to monitor
plutonium. Building 235-F is not currently equipped to conduct destructive
examinations or to restabilize and package the plutonium in new storage
containers if necessary. In addition, because of changes in the DBT,
Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security to store Category I
quantities of plutonium. According to SRS officials, 972 storage
containers contain Category I quantities of plutonium. These storage
containers are in the innocuous monitoring category and are at low enough
risk for rupture that only two randomly sampled containers are subject
annually to nondestructive examination. However, SRS would have been
unable to remove those containers from Building 105-K to monitor their
condition, leaving these 972 storage containers unmonitored. According to
SRS
7This facility-FB Line-was constructed in the early 1960s at SRS to
convert plutonium solutions into solid forms to be used in nuclear weapons
components. In recent years, its primary mission has been the
stabilization of scrap plutonium from cleanup operations at SRS and
packaging the stabilized plutonium into storage containers. It ceased
operations and transferred its remaining plutonium to Building 105-K in
March 2005.
8Sand filters are large, deep beds installed in underground concrete
enclosures and filled with up to 10 feet of rock, gravel, and sand. As air
flows upward through the bed, the rock, gravel, and sand filter out
plutonium and other chemicals. The decontaminated air can then flow into
the outside atmosphere. Sand filters have been used in U.S. nuclear
facilities since 1948. Although initially expensive, sand filters can
remove a large amount of radioactive material, are relatively low
maintenance, and are fire resistant.
officials, security measures could have been established in Building 235-F
should a safety issue have arisen that required opening a Category I
container.
Furthermore, the Safety Board identified a number of serious safety
concerns with Building 235-F. Specifically, the Safety Board reported the
following:
o The building lacks fire suppression systems, and many areas of the
building lack fire detection and alarm systems.
o The building's nuclear criticality accident alarm system has been
removed. A nuclear criticality accident occurs when enough fissile
material, such as plutonium, is brought together to cause a sustained
nuclear chain reaction. The immediate result of a nuclear criticality
accident is the production of an uncontrolled and unpredictable
radiation source that can be lethal to people who are nearby.
o A number of the building's safety systems depend upon electrical
cables that are approximately 50 years old and have exceeded their
estimated life. When electrical cables age, they become brittle and
may crack, increasing the potential for failure.
o SRS has discovered two areas in the soil near the building that could
present a hazard in the event of an earthquake.
o The building's ventilation system still contains plutonium from its
previous mission of producing plutonium heat sources to power space
probes. This highly radioactive plutonium could be released, for
example, during a fire or earthquake and could pose a hazard to
workers in the building.
Because of its concerns about Building 235-F's safety, the Safety Board
reported in December 2003 that DOE should not plan extended storage of
plutonium in this building and that it may be preferable from safety and
cost perspectives to pursue plutonium storage elsewhere at SRS. The Safety
Board suggested that DOE consider several options for plutonium storage,
including constructing a new facility or installing safety systems such as
fire protection and filtered ventilation in Building 105-K.
Similar to the problems that DOE faces with plutonium storage, the
department's monitoring challenges are illustrative of its failure to
Conclusions
adequately plan for plutonium consolidation. Instead of a comprehensive
strategy that assessed the monitoring capabilities needed to meet its
storage standard, DOE's plans went from constructing a state-of-the-art
storage and monitoring facility to using a building that the Safety Board
had significant concerns with. Moreover, DOE's plans have subsequently
changed again. In April 2005, after spending over $15 million to begin
modifications to Building 235-F, DOE announced that it would only use the
building to monitor plutonium temporarily. Now, DOE plans to install the
necessary safety systems and monitoring equipment in Building 105-K.
DOE has not yet developed a comprehensive plan that is necessary to
consolidate and eventually dispose of its excess plutonium. Instead, it
has changed its consolidation, storage, and disposition plans numerous
times. Furthermore, DOE has relied on its individual offices, sites, and
facilities to independently develop plans to achieve their own goals
rather than developing an integrated plan for the consolidation and
permanent disposition of all of its excess plutonium. Specifically, DOE
headquarters approved both Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan and SRS's
plutonium storage plans without resolving conflicts between them.
Moreover, we agree with the Safety Board that DOE's lack of careful
planning has forced SRS to focus on what can be done with existing
facilities, eliminating options that may have been both more
cost-effective and safer than current plans. DOE has instead pushed
forward with plans to use a 50-year-old building at SRS to perform
functions it was not designed for. As a result, DOE is currently not able
to consolidate all of its plutonium at SRS. Because it is unable to
consolidate its plutonium, DOE faces additional costs in excess of $85
million annually to securely store plutonium at its current locations, and
its cleanup goals for Hanford are in jeopardy.
To ensure the continued safe and secure storage of DOE's excess
Recommendations for
plutonium inventories, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the
following two actions:
o Develop a comprehensive strategy for the consolidation, storage, and
disposition of DOE's excess plutonium. In particular, this strategy should
assess the storage, monitoring, and security capabilities of all of DOE's
sites currently storing plutonium. Furthermore, the strategy should
analyze the environmental impact, national security implications, costs,
and schedules to safely consolidate, store, and
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
eventually dispose of DOE's plutonium at existing facilities and/or at a
new storage facility constructed at one of its sites.
o When this comprehensive strategy is completed, we further recommend
that the Secretary of Energy ensure that each of DOE's facilities' cleanup
plans are reviewed to ensure that each site's cleanup goals and time
frames are consistent with the department's comprehensive strategy for
plutonium consolidation, storage, and disposition.
We provided DOE with a draft of this report for its review and comment.
DOE's letter is presented as appendix II. DOE generally agreed with our
recommendations and stated that a Nuclear Materials Disposition and
Consolidation Coordination Committee was formed earlier this year to
provide a forum to perform nuclear materials disposition and consolidation
planning. The objectives of this committee are to develop a plan that
would provide the necessary security for DOE's nuclear material, identify
paths for disposition, and reduce security and program costs. DOE stated
that this committee would produce a strategic plan that would encompass
the comprehensive strategy called for in our first recommendation. DOE
also stated that the cleanup plans for its sites would be revised
accordingly following completion of the committee's strategic plan.
DOE also provided detailed technical comments that we incorporated into
the report as appropriate. These technical comments focused primarily on
DOE's plans for consolidating plutonium at SRS, the availability of
sufficient storage space at SRS, and DOE's ability to monitor stored
plutonium. Specifically, DOE emphasized in its technical comments that it
has no plans at this time to further consolidate any plutonium at SRS. We
recognize that a final decision to consolidate plutonium has not been
made. However, it is important to note, as was stated in our draft report,
that both Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan and SRS's storage plan
assumed that DOE's surplus plutonium would be consolidated at SRS and that
both plans were approved by DOE headquarters without resolving conflicts
between them. We believe DOE's comments that it has no plans to further
consolidate any plutonium at SRS reinforce our recommendation for a
comprehensive strategy for the consolidation, storage, and disposition of
DOE's excess plutonium.
Regarding the availability of sufficient storage space at SRS, DOE stated
in its technical comments that, even without Building 235-F, Building
105-K has adequate storage capacity for all of its excess plutonium,
including the Hanford fuel rods. However, it is important to note that DOE
was proceeding with its plans to store plutonium in Building 235-F until
changes to the DBT forced DOE to reevaluate its plans. Our draft report
recognized that SRS officials believe Building 105-K has sufficient space
to store all of DOE's plutonium storage containers from its sites across
the United States. Nevertheless, DOE's estimates of the total number of
containers have varied over time and may continue to change because
plutonium stabilization and packaging is still ongoing at Lawrence
Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories. Furthermore, as our draft
report noted, additional safety analyses and documentation are necessary
before Building 105-K would be able to store the Hanford fuel rods.
Regarding DOE's ability to monitor stored plutonium, DOE stated in its
technical comments that it has the capability in Building 235-F to monitor
the condition of stored plutonium and that the building will not be shut
down until a monitoring capability is established in Building 105-K.
However, as our draft report noted, monitoring at Building 235-F is
currently limited to removing storage containers from their outer
packaging and performing nondestructive examinations of the containers.
Building 235-F also has equipment that can puncture storage containers to
relieve pressure if needed. However, Building 235-F does not have the
capability to perform destructive examinations of the storage containers,
which, according to SRS's plutonium surveillance and monitoring plan, must
be conducted beginning in fiscal year 2007. In addition, SRS lacks the
capability to restabilize and repackage plutonium if necessary. Until
nondestructive examination, destructive examination, stabilization, and
repackaging equipment is installed in Building 105-K, we believe that
DOE's capability to monitor the condition of stored plutonium at SRS is
incomplete. We modified our draft report to further clarify DOE's current
monitoring capabilities.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, NNSA; the Chairman of the Safety
Board; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; appropriate
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If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Gene Aloise
Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
At the request of the Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of
Representatives, and the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of
Representatives, we examined (1) the extent to which the Department of
Energy (DOE) can consolidate its nonpit plutonium at the Savannah River
Site (SRS) and (2) SRS's capacity to monitor plutonium storage containers.
A forthcoming classified report discusses SRS's plans for upgrading
security to meet the 2004 design basis threat (DBT).
To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed independent studies of storage
conditions at SRS performed by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(Safety Board), an independent federal agency established by the Congress
in 1988 to oversee the safety of DOE's nuclear weapons complex.
Specifically, we reviewed the Safety Board's December 2003 report entitled
Plutonium Storage at the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site:
Report to Congress and its June 2004 report entitled Plutonium Storage at
the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site: First Annual Report to
Congress. In addition, we interviewed subject matter experts with the
Safety Board. We also obtained and reviewed several SRS studies of
plutonium storage options: 1999 Savannah River Plutonium Storage Study,
2000 Evaluation of Savannah River Plutonium Storage and Stabilization
Options, and 2004 Savannah River Site Storage of Surplus Plutonium Study:
2004 Update. A GAO analyst with subject matter expertise and a GAO senior
methodologist with training and experience in evaluation research and
methodology reviewed all of these studies to evaluate their methodological
soundness and determine the reliability of their conclusions. These
reviews entailed an evaluation of each study's research methodology,
including its data quality, research design, and key assumptions, as well
as a summary of its major findings and conclusions. We also assessed the
extent to which each study's data and methods support its findings and
conclusions. We determined that these studies were methodologically sound
enough for the purposes of this report.
In cooperation with a GAO economist, we attempted to determine the cost of
plutonium storage at SRS by developing a model that evaluated costs under
various storage scenarios, such as constructing a new consolidated storage
facility or upgrading an existing facility to store plutonium. This model
also attempted to determine the cost of continued storage of plutonium at
Hanford for comparative purposes. However, we were unable to complete our
model because we were unable to obtain complete cost data from DOE.
Security costs are a major component of the total cost of storing
plutonium, but security cost data were not available at the time of
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
our review because neither SRS nor Hanford had yet determined how they
will enhance security to meet the 2004 DBT.
To determine the extent to which DOE can consolidate its plutonium at SRS,
we reviewed DOE's Records of Decision published in the Federal Register
for plutonium storage and disposition activities at SRS, such as plans to
construct an Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility and subsequent
postponement and then cancellation of those plans, and relevant DOE
orders, policies, and standards, such as DOE-STD-3013-2003, Stabilization,
Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials. We visited SRS and
inspected plutonium storage areas in Building 105-K and facilities in
Building 235-F originally intended for plutonium storage and monitoring.
We interviewed and received briefings from DOE's operating contractor for
SRS (Westinghouse Savannah River Company); DOE's security contractor for
SRS (Wackenhut Services, Inc.); SRS's Office of Safeguards, Security, and
Emergency Services; and SRS's Nuclear Materials Programs Division. We also
spoke with officials responsible for the management of Building 105-K and
Building 235-F.
We also visited the Hanford Site and toured the Plutonium Finishing Plant,
where we observed plutonium storage containers that are currently stored
inside the plant and nuclear fuel rods that are stored inside and outside
the facility. We spoke with officials from DOE's Richland Operations
Office, DOE's operating contractor for Hanford (Fluor Hanford), and
Fluor's security subcontractor for the Hanford Site (Protection Technology
Hanford). From these officials, we received briefings on Hanford's plans
for plutonium storage and shipment. We also discussed the deactivation of
the Plutonium Finishing Plant.
In Washington, D.C., we met with DOE's acting Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management to discuss DOE's planned consolidation of
plutonium at SRS and how SRS will store the material. We also discussed
issues related to storage, monitoring, and security with officials from
DOE's Office of Environmental Management, DOE's Office of Independent
Oversight and Performance Assurance, and DOE's National Nuclear Security
Administration.
To evaluate DOE's ability to monitor plutonium storage containers, we
first examined the reliability of SRS's database for tracking inventory
and for SRS's plutonium surveillance and monitoring project. We obtained
responses to a series of data reliability questions covering issues such
as data entry access, internal control procedures, and the accuracy and
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
completeness of the data. We asked follow-up questions whenever necessary.
We also obtained and reviewed related documents, including
Users Manual for the DOE Complex Integrated Surveillance Program Working
Database and other manuals and data dictionaries. We determined that these
data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
To evaluate the safety of conducting monitoring activities in Building
105-K and Building 235-F, we reviewed the Safety Board's 2003 and 2004
reports described earlier, and discussed the safety conditions of the
facilities with subject matter experts on the Safety Board. We observed
the facilities where SRS plans to conduct monitoring activities and
reviewed documents pertaining to SRS's monitoring plans. We received
briefings from Westinghouse Savannah River Company personnel responsible
for plutonium monitoring and discussed the planned monitoring activities
with officials responsible for managing Building 105-K and Building 235-F.
We also discussed monitoring with officials from the Safety Board;
Westinghouse Savannah River Company; Wackenhut Services, Inc.; SRS's
Office of Safeguards, Security, and Emergency Services; and SRS's Nuclear
Materials Programs Division. At the Hanford Site, we observed facilities
and equipment for surveillance and monitoring of its plutonium and
received a briefing on Hanford's use of that facility.
We conducted our work from June 2004 through June 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Energy
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Energy
Appendix III
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Gene Aloise (202) 512-3841
GAO Contact
In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T. Coles, Robin Eddington,
Staff
Doreen S. Feldman, Jonathan M. Gill, Sherry L. McDonald, Mehrzad Nadji,
James D. Noel, Judy K. Pagano, Keith A. Rhodes, Paul Rhodes, and
Carol Herrnstadt Shulman made key contributions to this report.
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