    Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to Take Action to
    Safely Consolidate Plutonium (20-JUL-05, GAO-05-665).

    Plutonium is very hazardous to human health and the environment
    and requires extensive security because of its potential use in a
    nuclear weapon. The Department of Energy (DOE) stores about 50
    metric tons of plutonium that is no longer needed by the United
    States for nuclear weapons. Some of this plutonium is
    contaminated metal, oxides, solutions, and residues remaining
    from the nuclear weapons production process. To improve security
    and reduce plutonium storage costs, DOE plans to establish enough
    storage capacity at its Savannah River Site (SRS) in the event it
    decides to consolidate its plutonium at SRS until it can be
    permanently disposed of in a geologic repository at Yucca
    Mountain, Nevada. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to
    which DOE can consolidate this plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS's
    capacity to monitor plutonium storage containers.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-665
        ACCNO:   A30417
      TITLE:     Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to Take Action
    to Safely Consolidate Plutonium
         DATE:   07/20/2005
      SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism
    	     Hazardous substances
    	     Health hazards
    	     Homeland security
    	     Nuclear facility security
    	     Nuclear fuel plant security
    	     Nuclear waste management
    	     Nuclear waste storage
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Radiation safety
    	     Safety standards
    	     Nuclear radiation monitoring
    	     Nuclear materials
    	     Plutonium
    	     Hanford (WA)
    	     Los Alamos (NM)
    	     Rocky Flats (CO)
    	     Savannah River (SC)
    	     Yucca Mountain (NV)

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    GAO-05-665

         * Report to Congressional Committees
              * July 2005
         * SECURING U.S. NUCLEAR MATERIALS
              * DOE Needs to Take Action to Safety Consolidate Plutonium
         * Contents
              * Results in Brief
              * Background
              * DOE Cannot Consolidate Its Plutonium from Other DOE Sites at the
                Savannah River Site
                   * SRS Cannot Receive Additional Plutonium Until a Plan to
                     Process the Plutonium for Permanent Disposition Is Developed
                   * SRS Cannot Currently Receive Some of Hanford's Plutonium
                     Because Hanford's Accelerated Cleanup Plans and SRS's
                     Storage Plans Are Inconsistent with One Another
                   * Changes in Security Requirements Have Eliminated One
                     Facility at SRS That DOE Planned to Use for Plutonium
                     Storage
                   * DOE's Failure to Adequately Plan for Plutonium Consolidation
                     Will Lead to Additional Storage Costs and Threatens
                     Hanford's Cleanup Plans
              * DOE Lacks the Capability to Fully Monitor the Condition of Stored
                Plutonium at SRS
                   * SRS's Designated Storage Facility Lacks Sufficient Safety
                     Measures to Conduct Plutonium Monitoring
                   * Plutonium Monitoring in Another SRS Building Also Presented
                     Safety and Security Concerns
              * Conclusions
              * Recommendations for Executive Action
              * Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
         * Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
         * Comments from the Department of Energy
         * GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

                     United States Government Accountability Office

    Report to Congressional Committees

    GAO

    July 2005

    SECURING U.S. NUCLEAR MATERIALS

                DOE Needs to Take Action to Safely Consolidate Plutonium

                                           a

    GAO-05-665

    SECURING U.S. NUCLEAR MATERIALS

    DOE Needs to Take Action to Safely Consolidate Plutonium

      What GAO Found

    DOE cannot yet consolidate its excess plutonium at SRS for several
    reasons. First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium into
    a form for permanent disposition, as required by the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without such a plan, DOE cannot
    ship additional plutonium to SRS. Second, SRS cannot receive all of the
    plutonium from DOE's Hanford Site because it is not in a form SRS planned
    to store. Specifically, about one-fifth of Hanford's plutonium is in the
    form of 12-foot-long nuclear fuel rods, which Hanford had planned to ship
    intact to SRS as part of its efforts to accelerate the cleanup and
    demolition of its closed nuclear facilities. However, SRS's storage plan
    called for storing DOE's standard storage containers and not intact fuel
    rods. Recent changes in DOE's security requirements have complicated SRS's
    storage plans by eliminating one facility that DOE planned to use to store
    plutonium. Until DOE develops a permanent disposition plan, additional
    plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS and DOE will not achieve the cost
    savings and security improvements that consolidation could offer.
    Continued storage at Hanford will cost an additional approximately $85
    million annually and will threaten that site's achievement of the
    milestones in its accelerated cleanup plan.

    In addition, DOE lacks the capability to fully monitor the condition of
    the plutonium necessary to ensure continued safe storage. The facility at
    SRS that DOE plans to use to store plutonium lacks adequate safety systems
    to conduct monitoring of storage containers. Without a monitoring
    capability, DOE faces increased risks of an accidental plutonium release
    that could harm workers, the public, and/or the environment. DOE had
    planned to construct a monitoring capability in another building at SRS
    that already had the safety systems needed to work with plutonium.
    However, this building would not have had sufficient security to conduct
    all of the required monitoring activities. In addition, this building also
    has other serious safety problems. Faced with these challenges, DOE
    announced in April 2005 that it would have SRS's storage facility upgraded
    to conduct plutonium monitoring.

      Proposed Consolidation and Permanent Disposition of DOE's Unneeded Plutonium

                     United States Government Accountability Office

    Contents

      Letter 1

    Results in Brief 5 Background 7 DOE Cannot Consolidate Its Plutonium from
    Other DOE Sites at the Savannah River Site 10 DOE Lacks the Capability to
    Fully Monitor the Condition of Stored Plutonium at SRS 13 Conclusions 19
    Recommendations for Executive Action 19 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
    20

      Appendixes

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 23 Appendix II: Comments from
                 the Department of Energy 26 Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff
                                                              Acknowledgments 28

    Table 1: DOE's Estimate of the Number of Storage Containers by

      Tables

    Site after Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging Have

    Been Completed 9 Table 2: Storage Container Monitoring Categories 14 Table
    3: Annual Number of NDE and DE by Monitoring Category,

    Fiscal Years 2005-2016 15

    Figure 1: Proposed Consolidation and Permanent Disposition of

      Figures

    DOE's Unneeded Plutonium 2 Figure 2: Components of a DOE Standard Storage
    Container 8 Figure 3: Outer Packaging Used to Ship Storage Containers 16

    Contents

    Abbreviations
    DBT                    design basis threat
    DE                     destructive examination
    DOE                    Department of Energy
    HEPA                   High-Efficiency Particulate Air
    NDE                    nondestructive examination
    NNSA                   National Nuclear Security Administration
    Safety Board           Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
    SRS                    Savannah River Site

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    A

    United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548

    July 20, 2005

    The Honorable Joe Barton Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce House
    of Representatives

    The Honorable Ed Whitfield Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and
    Investigations Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives

    Plutonium-a man-made element produced by irradiating uranium in nuclear
    reactors and used in nuclear weapons-is very hazardous to human health and
    the environment and presents an attractive target for theft by a
    terrorist. When the United States stopped producing nuclear weapons in
    1989, it had plutonium inventories located in numerous Department of
    Energy (DOE) facilities throughout the United States. These facilities
    included the Hanford Site in Washington, the Rocky Flats Environmental
    Technology Site in Colorado, the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New
    Mexico, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, and the
    Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina.

    DOE stores about 50 metric tons of plutonium that is no longer needed by
    the United States for nuclear weapons. The majority is in the form of pits
    (the spherical core of a nuclear weapon), clean metal, and oxides while
    the remainder is in nonpit forms such as contaminated metal, oxides,
    solutions, and residues remaining from the nuclear weapons production
    process.1 To improve security and reduce costs, DOE plans to establish
    enough storage capacity at SRS in the event it decides to consolidate its
    nonpit plutonium for interim storage until it can be permanently disposed
    of in a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. (See fig. 1.)

    1The exact amounts of plutonium that are in pit and nonpit forms is
    considered classified information.

      Figure 1: Proposed Consolidation and Permanent Disposition of DOE's Unneeded
                                       Plutonium

    Sources: GAO (data); MapArt (images).

    Nonpit plutonium has particularly dangerous characteristics that demand
    special storage conditions. Unlike pits, nonpit plutonium is in forms that
    can be easily dispersed. If not safely contained, plutonium can be
    dangerous to human health, even in extremely small quantities. Because it
    can be highly radioactive, inhaling a few micrograms of plutonium creates
    a long-term risk of lung, liver, and bone cancer. Inhaling larger doses
    can cause immediate lung injuries and death. In certain forms, plutonium
    can spontaneously combust in the presence of oxygen at temperatures above
    room temperature. Because of these hazards, nonpit plutonium must be
    stabilized and packaged appropriately to minimize the risk of accidental
    release. In addition, facilities storing plutonium must be properly
    equipped with safety systems that prevent it from escaping into the
    surrounding air, land, or water in the event a container is breached. This
    report addresses the storage and monitoring of nonpit plutonium (hereafter
    referred to as plutonium) at SRS.

    In 2003, DOE issued a technical standard for plutonium stabilization and
    storage that it believes will allow it to safely store plutonium for a
    minimum of 50 years. DOE is nearing completion of a multiyear effort to
    stabilize and package plutonium at its sites across the United States into
    5-inch-wide, 10-inch-long storage containers. Under DOE's standard, once
    the plutonium is safely packaged, DOE must periodically monitor the
    storage containers for changes in the plutonium's condition, particularly
    any pressurization or corrosion of the containers. Such monitoring
    includes annually x-raying a sample of storage containers to evaluate
    potential pressurization. Storage containers may also be cut open to
    evaluate the plutonium inside and the container itself for potential
    corrosion. An effective monitoring program is intended to detect damaged
    storage containers or inadequately stabilized plutonium and will help DOE
    ensure the continued safe storage of the material.

    DOE must also provide security against potential terrorists interested in
    the plutonium's value for constructing a nuclear weapon, an improvised
    nuclear device, or even a "dirty bomb."2 For many years, a key component
    of DOE security has been the development of the design basis threat (DBT),
    a classified document that identifies the potential size and capabilities
    of terrorist forces. Since September 11, 2001, the size of the potential
    threat has increased significantly.3

    DOE has cancelled two proposed construction projects at SRS that would
    have provided plutonium storage and monitoring and would have

    2A dirty bomb, also known as a radiological dispersion device, uses
    conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material. While a dirty
    bomb would have few short-term health effects on exposed individuals, it
    could potentially increase the long-term risks of cancer for those
    contaminated. In addition, the evacuation and cleanup of contaminated
    areas after such an explosion could lead to panic and serious economic
    costs.

    3See GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before
    It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-623 (Washington, D.C.:
    Apr. 27, 2004).

    processed the plutonium for permanent disposition. In 2001, DOE cancelled
    a project initiated in 1995 to build a new facility at SRS, called the
    Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility, that would have provided
    long-term storage and monitoring of standard plutonium containers in a
    secure environment. DOE cancelled the project because it expected to store
    the plutonium for only a few years until a facility to process the
    plutonium for permanent disposition was available. Instead, DOE decided to
    use existing buildings at SRS to package and store the plutonium until
    construction of the processing facility was completed. In addition, in
    2002, citing budgetary constraints, DOE cancelled its plans to construct
    the facility that would have processed its most heavily contaminated
    plutonium into a form for permanent disposition by a method known as
    immobilization. Immobilization involves mixing the plutonium with
    ceramics, placing the mixture in large canisters, and then filling the
    canisters with high-level radioactive waste that has been turned into
    molten glass that then hardens. These canisters would have then been
    shipped to a geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste that DOE
    plans to construct at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. As a result of the
    cancellation of the immobilization facility, DOE has no means for
    processing its most heavily contaminated plutonium into a form suitable
    for permanent disposition.

    In December 2003, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Safety
    Board), an independent federal agency established by the Congress in 1988
    to oversee the safety of DOE's nuclear weapons complex, reported that
    although the facilities DOE plans to use for plutonium storage can do so
    safely for a limited time, the facilities do not meet modern safety
    standards for long-term plutonium storage. The Safety Board concluded that
    DOE's lack of planning for plutonium storage forced SRS to focus on what
    can be done with existing facilities, foreclosing options that may have
    been both cost-effective and safe. The Safety Board proposed that DOE
    conduct a new study of the options for storing plutonium at SRS. In
    addition, it advocated the development of a complete, well-considered plan
    for permanently disposing of all of DOE's excess plutonium.

    In this context and as agreed with your offices, we examined (1) the
    extent to which DOE can consolidate its plutonium at SRS and (2) SRS's
    capacity to monitor plutonium storage containers. A forthcoming classified
    report will discuss SRS's plans for upgrading security to meet the 2004
    DBT.

    To evaluate DOE's plans for consolidating plutonium, monitoring stored
    plutonium, and providing security, we reviewed plutonium storage,
    monitoring, and security plans and reports prepared by DOE's Office of
    Environmental Management, DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance
    Assurance, DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), DOE's
    operating contractor for SRS (Westinghouse Savannah River Company), and
    DOE's security contractor for SRS (Wackenhut Services, Inc.). In addition,
    we reviewed studies on plutonium storage at SRS produced by the Safety
    Board. Over the course of our work, we toured plutonium storage facilities
    at SRS. During these visits, we interviewed and received briefings from
    DOE Savannah River Operations, Westinghouse, and Wackenhut officials. We
    also visited plutonium storage facilities at DOE's Hanford Site,
    specifically Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant. Hanford currently stores
    the majority of the plutonium that could eventually be shipped to SRS.
    During this visit, we interviewed and received briefings from DOE Richland
    Operations officials. We also spoke with officials from DOE's operating
    contractor for Hanford (Fluor Hanford) and Fluor's security subcontractor
    for the Hanford Site (Protection Technology Hanford). In addition, we
    interviewed officials from the Safety Board, DOE's Office of Environmental
    Management, and DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and Performance
    Assurance. Additional information on our objectives, scope, and
    methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our work from June
    2004 through June 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
    auditing standards.

    DOE cannot consolidate all of its plutonium at the Savannah River Site for

      Results in Brief

    several reasons. First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the
    plutonium into a form for permanent disposition, as required by the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Without such a
    plan, DOE cannot ship additional plutonium to SRS. Second, even if this
    plan was in place, SRS cannot currently receive all of Hanford's plutonium
    because it is in a form that SRS had not planned on storing. Specifically,
    Hanford was preparing to ship plutonium to SRS as part of its efforts to
    accelerate the cleanup and demolition of its closed nuclear facilities.
    About one-fifth of Hanford's plutonium is in the form of 12-foot-long
    nuclear fuel rods. Because disassembling the fuel rods would delay cleanup
    activities, Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan calls for shipping these
    rods intact to SRS inside special shipping containers. However, SRS's
    storage plans called for storing Hanford's plutonium in DOE's standard
    5-inch-wide, 10-inch-long storage containers. SRS's storage plan assumed
    Hanford would disassemble the fuel rods and package the plutonium in
    storage containers. Despite these inconsistencies, DOE approved both
    Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan and SRS's plutonium storage plans.
    Instead of developing an integrated plan for plutonium consolidation, DOE
    relied upon its individual sites to independently develop plans to achieve
    their own goals. Although SRS's storage facility has sufficient space to
    store the fuel rods, several steps are necessary before DOE would be able
    to ship the fuel rods to SRS. These include obtaining Department of
    Transportation- certified shipping containers for the fuel rods and
    completing the appropriate safety analyses and documentation for SRS's
    storage facility. Changes to DOE's security requirements have complicated
    SRS's storage plans by eliminating one facility that DOE planned to use to
    store plutonium. Originally, DOE had planned to use two SRS facilities to
    store its excess plutonium. However, both facilities would need extensive
    and expensive upgrades to comply with the new 2004 DBT requirements. In
    order to save money, DOE has, therefore, decided to use only one facility
    to store plutonium. Until DOE develops a plan to process the plutonium for
    permanent disposition, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS and
    DOE will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that
    plutonium consolidation could offer. In particular, continued plutonium
    storage at Hanford will cost approximately an additional $85 million
    annually and will threaten that site's achievement of the milestones in
    its accelerated cleanup plan.

    In addition, DOE lacks the capability at SRS to fully monitor the
    condition of the plutonium that is in storage containers as required by
    DOE's storage standard. According to the Safety Board, the facility at SRS
    that DOE plans to use to store the plutonium is not equipped to conduct
    the needed monitoring of storage containers. In fact, because this storage
    facility lacks adequate fire protection, ventilation, and filtration,
    DOE's standard storage containers cannot be removed from their outer
    packaging-35-gallon steel drums used to ship the containers to SRS. The
    only facility at SRS that can be used to safely remove the storage
    containers from their outer packaging, monitor them, and, if necessary,
    restabilize and repackage the plutonium, has closed in preparation for
    decommissioning. Without a monitoring capability that would detect whether
    the stored plutonium is becoming unstable and damaging the storage
    containers, DOE faces increased risks of an accidental plutonium release
    at SRS that could harm workers, the public, and/or the environment.
    Because SRS's storage facility lacks the capability to monitor stored
    plutonium, DOE had planned to construct a monitoring capability in another
    building at SRS that already had the ventilation and filtration systems
    needed to work with plutonium. However, this building would not have had
    sufficient security to conduct all of the monitoring activities required
    by DOE's storage standard. In addition, the Safety Board has reported
    that, like the storage facility, this

                                       Background

    building lacks adequate fire protection as well as having other serious
    safety concerns. Given these challenges, DOE announced in April 2005 that
    it would have SRS's storage facility upgraded to allow storage and
    monitoring activities to be centralized in one facility.

    We are making recommendations to ensure that DOE develops a comprehensive
    strategy for plutonium consolidation, storage, and disposition and that
    its facilities' cleanup plans are consistent with this strategy.

    We presented a draft of this report to DOE for comment. In its comments,
    DOE generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that its recently
    created Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordination
    Committee will develop a strategic plan for the consolidation and
    disposition of special nuclear material. Upon completion of this plan, DOE
    stated that it will ensure that its sites' cleanup plans are revised
    accordingly. DOE also provided technical comments that we incorporated
    into the report as appropriate.

    SRS was constructed in the early 1950s by the DuPont Company under
    contract to the Atomic Energy Commission (a predecessor agency to DOE) to
    produce tritium and plutonium-239 for use in nuclear weapons. Covering 310
    square miles along the Savannah River and encompassing land across several
    counties in South Carolina, the site historically has supported five
    nuclear reactors, two chemical separation plants, a heavy water extraction
    plant, a nuclear fuel and target fabrication facility, a tritium
    extraction facility, and waste management facilities. During the cold war,
    SRS was the only source of tritium in the United States and supplemented
    the production of weapons-grade plutonium at DOE's Hanford Site. Although
    SRS no longer produces plutonium, some of its missions continue, such as
    the extraction of tritium for nuclear warheads. SRS is currently managed
    under contract to DOE by Westinghouse Savannah River Company.

    To address the problems associated with unstable forms of plutonium and
    inadequate packaging for long-term storage, DOE established a standard for
    the safe storage of plutonium for a minimum of 50 years.4 This standard
    establishes the stabilization and packaging requirements for plutonium.

    4U.S. Department of Energy, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of
    Plutonium-Bearing Materials, DOE-STD-3013-2003 (Washington, D.C.: December
    2003).

    Page 7 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

    Stabilization occurs by heating the material to remove moisture that could
    lead to a buildup of pressure. This buildup of pressure increases the risk
    of rupturing a container. Plutonium containers designed to meet this
    standard consist of an inner and outer container, each welded shut. (See
    fig. 2.)

                Figure 2: Components of a DOE Standard Storage Container

    Source: SRS.

    The inner container is designed so that it can be monitored for a buildup
    of pressure using analytical techniques, such as radiography, that do not
    damage the container. Containers must also be resistant to fire, leakage,
    and corrosion. Each storage container can hold a total of 5 kilograms of
    material, but a maximum of 4.4 kilograms of the 5 kilograms can be pure
    plutonium. The remaining material is chemical impurities such as chlorides
    and fluorides that are mixed with the plutonium.

    Plutonium stabilization and packaging is completed at Rocky Flats,
    Hanford, and SRS, and SRS has already received nearly 1,900 containers
    from Rocky Flats. Stabilization and packaging is still ongoing at Lawrence
    Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories. Once completed, DOE
    estimates that it will have nearly 5,700 plutonium storage containers
    being stored at locations across the United States that could eventually
    be shipped to SRS. (See table 1.)

    Table 1: DOE's Estimate of the Number of Storage Containers by Site after
    Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging Have Been Completed

    Site                                          Number of storage containers
    SRS                                                                  2,935
    Hanford                                                              2,275
    Los Alamos National Laboratory                                         342
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory                                 135
    Total                                                                5,687

    Source: SRS.

    Notes: 1,895 of the storage containers now stored at SRS were originally
    packaged and shipped from the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site in
    Colorado.

    In addition to 2,275 storage containers, Hanford has additional plutonium
    in the form of fuel rods that were to be used in the now-closed Fast Flux
    Test Facility nuclear reactor. These fuel rods contain enough plutonium
    that, if they were cut apart and the material packaged, would require
    approximately 1,000 additional storage containers. See pages 11 and 12 for
    additional discussion of Hanford's fuel rods.

    Until April 2005, SRS's plutonium storage plans called for using two
    buildings at the site for plutonium storage and monitoring operations:
    Building 105-K and Building 235-F. Building 105-K was originally a nuclear
    reactor built in the early 1950s and produced plutonium and tritium until
    1988. The reactor was then placed in a cold standby condition until its
    complete shutdown in 1996. The major reactor components were removed and
    the facility is now primarily used to store plutonium and highly enriched
    uranium.

    Building 235-F was also constructed in the 1950s and was used until the
    mid-1980s to produce plutonium heat sources that were used to power space
    probes for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the
    Department of Defense. The building is currently used to store plutonium.

    DOE must provide extensive security for plutonium storage facilities at
    SRS because they contain Category I quantities of plutonium. Category I
    material includes specified quantities of plutonium or highly enriched
    uranium in the following forms: (1) assembled nuclear weapons and test
    devices; (2) pure products containing higher concentrations of plutonium
    or highly enriched uranium, such as major nuclear components and
    recastable metal; and (3) high-grade materials, such as carbides, oxides,
    solutions, and nitrates. The risks associated with Category I special
    nuclear materials vary but include the nuclear detonation of a weapon or
    test

      DOE Cannot Consolidate Its Plutonium from Other DOE Sites at the Savannah
      River Site

    device at or near design yield, the creation of improvised nuclear devices
    capable of producing a nuclear yield, theft for use in a nuclear weapon,
    and the potential for sabotage in the form of radioactive dispersal.

    To manage potential security risks, DOE has developed the DBT, a
    classified document that identifies the potential size and capabilities of
    terrorist forces. DOE requires the contractors operating its sites to
    develop security measures designed to defend against the threat contained
    in the DBT. While specific measures vary from site to site, SRS's security
    measures include

         o a variety of integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting
           intruders;
         o physical barriers, such as fences and antivehicle obstacles;
         o numerous access control points, such as turnstiles, badge readers,
           vehicle inspection stations, special nuclear material detectors, and
           metal detectors;

    o  operational security procedures, such as a "two person" rule that

    prevents only one person from having access to special nuclear

    material;

         o hardened facilities and vaults; and
         o a heavily armed paramilitary protective force equipped with such items
           as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor, and chemical
           protective gear.

    DOE cannot consolidate its excess plutonium at SRS for several reasons.
    First, DOE has not completed a plan to process the plutonium into a form
    for permanent disposition, as required by the FY 2002 defense
    authorization act. Without such a plan, DOE cannot ship additional
    plutonium to SRS. Second, SRS cannot currently receive all of Hanford's
    plutonium because it is in a form that SRS had not planned on storing.
    Changes to the DBT have complicated SRS's storage plans by eliminating one
    facility that DOE had planned to use for plutonium storage. DOE is facing
    these storage challenges because of its failure to adequately plan for
    plutonium consolidation and disposition. Until DOE develops a permanent
    disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS and DOE

        SRS Cannot Receive Additional Plutonium Until a Plan to Process the
        Plutonium for Permanent Disposition Is Developed

    will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that plutonium
    consolidation could offer. For example, continued plutonium storage at
    Hanford will cost approximately an additional $85 million annually and
    will threaten that site's achievement of the milestones in its accelerated
    cleanup plan.

    Section 3155 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    20025 provides that if DOE decides not to construct either of two proposed
    plutonium disposition facilities at SRS,6 DOE is prohibited from shipping
    plutonium to SRS until a plan to process the material for permanent
    disposition is developed and submitted to the Congress. In 2002, DOE
    cancelled the plutonium immobilization plant and, to date, DOE has not
    developed a plan for the plutonium that would have been processed in that
    plant for permanent disposition. In its fiscal year 2006 budget, DOE has
    requested $10 million to initiate conceptual design of a facility that
    would process this plutonium. However, it is uncertain when this design
    work would be completed and a plan prepared.

        SRS Cannot Currently Receive Some of Hanford's Plutonium Because Hanford's
        Accelerated Cleanup Plans and SRS's Storage Plans Are Inconsistent with One
        Another

    Even if a plan to process this plutonium for permanent disposition had
    been developed and DOE were able to ship the plutonium, SRS cannot
    currently accommodate some of Hanford's plutonium because Hanford's
    accelerated cleanup plans and SRS's storage plans are inconsistent with
    one another. DOE approved both plans even though Hanford's accelerated
    cleanup plan called for shipping some of its plutonium to SRS in a form
    that SRS had not planned on storing.

    Hanford stores nearly one-fifth of its plutonium in the form of
    12-foot-long nuclear fuel rods, with the remainder in about 2,300 DOE
    standard 5-inch-wide, 10-inch-long storage containers. The fuel rods were
    to be used in Hanford's Fast Flux Test Facility reactor. The reactor has
    been closed, and the fuel rods were never used. Hanford's plutonium is
    currently being stored at the site's Plutonium Finishing Plant-the storage
    containers in vaults and the nuclear fuel rods in large casks inside a
    fenced area. Hanford was preparing to ship plutonium to SRS as part of its
    efforts to accelerate

    5Pub. L. No. 107-107, S: 3155, 115 Stat. 1378 (2001).

    6The two proposed plutonium disposition facilities are the plutonium
    immobilization plant and a mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility for
    surplus plutonium pits and nonpit plutonium.

    Page 11 GAO-05-665 Plutonium Storage

        Changes in Security Requirements Have Eliminated One Facility at SRS That
        DOE Planned to Use for Plutonium Storage

    the cleanup and demolition of its closed nuclear facilities. Although
    Hanford's original cleanup plan called for demolishing the Plutonium
    Finishing Plant by 2038, the plan was modified in 2002 to accelerate the
    site's cleanup. Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan that was approved by
    DOE's Office of Environmental Management now calls for shipping the
    storage containers and nuclear fuel rods to SRS by the end of fiscal year
    2006 so that Hanford can demolish the Plutonium Finishing Plant by the end
    of fiscal year 2008. To meet the new deadline, Hanford planned to ship the
    fuel rods intact to SRS.

    Nevertheless, SRS's July 2004 plutonium storage plan stated that Hanford
    would cut the fuel rods and package the plutonium in approximately 1,000
    DOE standard storage containers before shipping the material to SRS. At
    the time the plan was issued, SRS planned to use Building 105-K and
    Building 235-F to store plutonium in standard storage containers and not
    intact fuel rods. Although Building 105-K is capable of storing the fuel
    rods intact, several steps are necessary before DOE would be able to ship
    the fuel rods from Hanford to SRS. First, there is currently no Department
    of Transportation-certified shipping container that could be used to
    package and ship the fuel rods. In addition, SRS would be required, among
    other things, to prepare the appropriate analyses and documentation under
    the National Environmental Policy Act and update Building 105-K's safety
    documentation to include storage of the fuel rods. Wherever the fuel rods
    are stored, they would have to be disassembled prior to processing the
    plutonium for permanent disposition. Hanford and SRS currently lack the
    capability to disassemble the fuel rods, but DOE plans to study
    establishing that capability at SRS as part of its conceptual design of a
    facility to process the plutonium for disposition.

    SRS originally planned to use both Building 105-K and Building 235-F to
    store plutonium storage containers. After the DBT was changed in October
    2004, SRS was forced to reevaluate its storage plans. Because the DBT
    substantially increases the potential threat that SRS must defend against,
    significant additional security will be required for SRS facilities
    storing plutonium. SRS projected the total cost of this additional
    security at over $300 million. SRS estimated that it could save more than
    $120 million by consolidating plutonium in Building 105-K and not using
    Building 235-F for storage. Building 235-F was originally planned to store
    approximately 1,900 storage containers. Although SRS officials believe
    that Building 105-K has sufficient space to store all of DOE's plutonium
    storage containers from other DOE sites in the event that DOE decides to
    ship additional plutonium

        DOE's Failure to Adequately Plan for Plutonium Consolidation Will Lead to
        Additional Storage Costs and Threatens Hanford's Cleanup Plans

    to SRS, DOE's estimates of the total number of containers have varied over
    time and may continue to change as Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos
    conduct plutonium stabilization and packaging operations.

    The challenges DOE faces storing its plutonium stem from the department's
    failure to adequately plan for plutonium consolidation. DOE has not
    developed a complexwide, comprehensive strategy for plutonium
    consolidation and disposition that accounts for each of its facilities'
    requirements and capabilities. Until DOE is able to develop a permanent
    disposition plan, additional plutonium cannot be shipped to SRS, and DOE
    will not achieve the cost savings and security improvements that plutonium
    consolidation could offer. According to DOE officials, the impact of
    continued storage at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore will be relatively
    minor because both laboratories had already planned to maintain plutonium
    storage facilities for other laboratory missions. However, according to
    Hanford officials, continued storage at the site could cost approximately
    an additional $85 million annually and will threaten the achievement of
    the goals in the site's accelerated cleanup plan. Specifically,
    maintaining storage vaults at Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant will
    prevent the site from demolishing the plant as scheduled by September
    2008.

      DOE Lacks the Capability to Fully Monitor the Condition of Stored Plutonium at
      SRS

    DOE lacks the capability at SRS to fully monitor the condition of the
    plutonium that is in storage containers as required by DOE's storage
    standard. According to the Safety Board, Building 105-K does not have
    adequate safety measures to monitor the containers. Therefore, DOE had
    planned to construct a monitoring capability in Building 235-F at SRS,
    which already had the safety systems needed to work with plutonium.
    However, Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security to conduct
    all of the required monitoring. In addition, the Safety Board identified
    serious safety concerns with Building 235-F. Because of these concerns,
    DOE changed its plans again in April 2005 and announced that it would
    install monitoring equipment and the necessary safety systems in Building
    105-K.

        SRS's Designated Storage Facility Lacks Sufficient Safety Measures to
        Conduct Plutonium Monitoring

    Under DOE's plutonium storage standard, storage containers must be
    periodically monitored to ensure continued safe storage. Without a
    monitoring capability that would detect whether storage containers are at
    risk of rupturing, there is an increased risk of an accidental plutonium
    release that could harm workers, the public, and/or the environment. The
    following two types of monitoring activities are to be performed:

         o Nondestructive examination (NDE): Between 13 and 41 storage containers
           are to be tested annually for leaks or contamination and x-rayed to
           detect any increase in internal pressure that could rupture a
           container.
         o Destructive examination (DE): Between 13 and 15 storage containers are
           to be punctured and cut open annually. Samples of the gases inside the
           container are to be taken and analyzed and the containers themselves
           examined for indications of corrosion. In addition, the material
           inside is to be analyzed to detect any changes in the plutonium's
           condition.

    DOE has categorized the plutonium storage containers into three groups
    based on their risk of rupturing because of pressurization or corrosion.
    (See table 2.)

                    Table 2: Storage Container Monitoring Categories

                                                                      Number of
                    Type of                                           storage
    Category     monitoring  Characteristics                       containers
    Pressure and NDE and DE  Containers with impure plutonium            1,597
    corrosion                oxides contaminated with chlorides.
                                The chlorides make the containers at
                                risk for rupture due to both pressure
                                and corrosion. Plutonium in these
                                containers may also contain other
                                impurities such as calcium, iron,
                                magnesium, silicon, sodium, and
                                potassium, among others.
    Pressure     NDE and DE  Containers with impure plutonium            1,386
                                oxides without chlorides, but still
                                at risk of rupture due to
                                pressurization.
    Innocuous    NDE         Containers with relatively pure             2,704
                                plutonium metal and oxides with
                                little risk for rupture due to
                                pressure or corrosion.
    Total                                                                5,687
                    Source: SRS.

    A storage container's placement in one of the three groups-pressure and
    corrosion, pressure, or innocuous-determines the type of monitoring a
    container will be subjected to and how many containers will be monitored
    annually. Table 3 shows the number of examinations DOE plans to conduct
    beginning in fiscal year 2005.

    Table 3: Annual Number of NDE and DE by Monitoring Category, Fiscal Years
                                       2005-2016

                                      Fiscal year

    Category   2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
    Pressure              13    13    13    13   13   13   13   13   13     14
                             NDE   NDE   NDE   NDE  NDE  NDE  NDE  NDE  NDE   NDE
    and                   13 DE 13 DE 13 DE   13   13   13   13   13   13   14
                                                 DE   DE   DE   DE   DE   DE   DE
    corrosion
    Pressure     25 25    25    26    26
                   NDE NDE   NDE   NDE   NDE
                              2 DE  2 DE  2 DE
    Innocuous 2 NDE 2 NDE 2 NDE 2 NDE 2 NDE
    Total        27 27                      13   13   13   13   13   13   14
                   NDE NDE   40    41    41    NDE  NDE  NDE  NDE  NDE  NDE  NDE
                             NDE   NDE   NDE   13   13   13   13   13   13   14
                             15 DE 15 DE 15 DE DE   DE   DE   DE   DE   DE   DE

    Source: SRS.

    Note: According to SRS's plutonium surveillance and monitoring plan, gas
    pressurization and corrosion have been identified as the only mechanisms
    that could cause the failure of a storage container. Gas pressurization
    would likely be discovered early because gas generation decreases over
    time. Therefore, monitoring of the pressure category will stop after 5
    years. Since corrosion is a slower phenomenon and is considered to have a
    longer term potential to cause failure, monitoring on the pressure and
    corrosion category will continue for 10 years. The innocuous category has
    little potential for pressurization or corrosion, therefore monitoring
    will stop after 5 years.

    Since an accidental release of plutonium would present an extreme hazard
    to workers, the public, and the environment, monitoring activities must
    occur in a facility that, among other things, is equipped to confine
    accidentally released plutonium through effective ventilation and
    appropriate filters. In addition, the facility must have a fire protection
    system to protect storage containers and prevent their contents from being
    released in a major fire. According to the Safety Board, Building 105-K is
    not currently equipped with adequate ventilation or fire protection.
    Specifically, SRS removed the High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA)
    filters that were used when the building was a nuclear reactor. Such
    filters could prevent plutonium from escaping the building in the event of
    a release from the storage containers. In addition, Building 105-K lacks
    automatic fire detection or suppression systems. As a result, plutonium
    storage containers cannot be removed from inside the outer packaging used
    to ship the containers to SRS. The outer package-a 35-gallon steel drum-is
    used to ship a single storage container and is designed to resist damage
    during transportation and handling. The outer package confines the
    plutonium in the event the storage container inside is breached. In
    addition, the outer package provides an additional layer of protection
    from fire for the storage container inside. (See fig. 3.)

               Figure 3: Outer Packaging Used to Ship Storage Containers

    Source: SRS.

    Because monitoring requires x-raying individual storage containers and, in
    some cases, puncturing and cutting storage containers to analyze the
    condition of the container and the plutonium within, the storage
    containers must be removed from their outer packaging. In addition, SRS
    plans to establish a capability to restabilize the plutonium by heating it
    in a specialized furnace in the event monitoring determines that the
    stored plutonium is becoming unstable (i.e., increasing the risk of
    rupturing a storage container). The restablized plutonium would then be
    packaged into new storage containers. The only facility at SRS currently
    capable of

        Plutonium Monitoring in Another SRS Building Also Presented Safety and
        Security Concerns

    restabilizing and repackaging the plutonium has closed in preparation for
    decommissioning.7

    Because Building 105-K does not have the capability to monitor storage
    containers, DOE had planned to install monitoring equipment in Building
    235-F at SRS. Building 235-F was chosen primarily because it was already
    equipped with filtered ventilation systems appropriate to handling
    plutonium-multiple and redundant air supply and exhaust fan systems that
    use HEPA filters. Exhaust from the ventilation system is further filtered
    through a sand filter before entering the outside atmosphere.8 Currently,
    Building 235-F is limited to removing storage containers from their outer
    packaging and performing nondestructive examinations. If nondestructive
    examination indicates pressurization in a storage container, DOE has
    installed equipment in Building 235-F that could puncture the storage
    container to relieve pressure.

    Although Building 235-F has the appropriate ventilation and filtration, it
    faced several challenges that would have affected its ability to monitor
    plutonium. Building 235-F is not currently equipped to conduct destructive
    examinations or to restabilize and package the plutonium in new storage
    containers if necessary. In addition, because of changes in the DBT,
    Building 235-F would not have had sufficient security to store Category I
    quantities of plutonium. According to SRS officials, 972 storage
    containers contain Category I quantities of plutonium. These storage
    containers are in the innocuous monitoring category and are at low enough
    risk for rupture that only two randomly sampled containers are subject
    annually to nondestructive examination. However, SRS would have been
    unable to remove those containers from Building 105-K to monitor their
    condition, leaving these 972 storage containers unmonitored. According to
    SRS

    7This facility-FB Line-was constructed in the early 1960s at SRS to
    convert plutonium solutions into solid forms to be used in nuclear weapons
    components. In recent years, its primary mission has been the
    stabilization of scrap plutonium from cleanup operations at SRS and
    packaging the stabilized plutonium into storage containers. It ceased
    operations and transferred its remaining plutonium to Building 105-K in
    March 2005.

    8Sand filters are large, deep beds installed in underground concrete
    enclosures and filled with up to 10 feet of rock, gravel, and sand. As air
    flows upward through the bed, the rock, gravel, and sand filter out
    plutonium and other chemicals. The decontaminated air can then flow into
    the outside atmosphere. Sand filters have been used in U.S. nuclear
    facilities since 1948. Although initially expensive, sand filters can
    remove a large amount of radioactive material, are relatively low
    maintenance, and are fire resistant.

    officials, security measures could have been established in Building 235-F
    should a safety issue have arisen that required opening a Category I
    container.

    Furthermore, the Safety Board identified a number of serious safety
    concerns with Building 235-F. Specifically, the Safety Board reported the
    following:

         o The building lacks fire suppression systems, and many areas of the
           building lack fire detection and alarm systems.
         o The building's nuclear criticality accident alarm system has been
           removed. A nuclear criticality accident occurs when enough fissile
           material, such as plutonium, is brought together to cause a sustained
           nuclear chain reaction. The immediate result of a nuclear criticality
           accident is the production of an uncontrolled and unpredictable
           radiation source that can be lethal to people who are nearby.
         o A number of the building's safety systems depend upon electrical
           cables that are approximately 50 years old and have exceeded their
           estimated life. When electrical cables age, they become brittle and
           may crack, increasing the potential for failure.
         o SRS has discovered two areas in the soil near the building that could
           present a hazard in the event of an earthquake.
         o The building's ventilation system still contains plutonium from its
           previous mission of producing plutonium heat sources to power space
           probes. This highly radioactive plutonium could be released, for
           example, during a fire or earthquake and could pose a hazard to
           workers in the building.

    Because of its concerns about Building 235-F's safety, the Safety Board
    reported in December 2003 that DOE should not plan extended storage of
    plutonium in this building and that it may be preferable from safety and
    cost perspectives to pursue plutonium storage elsewhere at SRS. The Safety
    Board suggested that DOE consider several options for plutonium storage,
    including constructing a new facility or installing safety systems such as
    fire protection and filtered ventilation in Building 105-K.

    Similar to the problems that DOE faces with plutonium storage, the
    department's monitoring challenges are illustrative of its failure to

                                      Conclusions

    adequately plan for plutonium consolidation. Instead of a comprehensive
    strategy that assessed the monitoring capabilities needed to meet its
    storage standard, DOE's plans went from constructing a state-of-the-art
    storage and monitoring facility to using a building that the Safety Board
    had significant concerns with. Moreover, DOE's plans have subsequently
    changed again. In April 2005, after spending over $15 million to begin
    modifications to Building 235-F, DOE announced that it would only use the
    building to monitor plutonium temporarily. Now, DOE plans to install the
    necessary safety systems and monitoring equipment in Building 105-K.

    DOE has not yet developed a comprehensive plan that is necessary to
    consolidate and eventually dispose of its excess plutonium. Instead, it
    has changed its consolidation, storage, and disposition plans numerous
    times. Furthermore, DOE has relied on its individual offices, sites, and
    facilities to independently develop plans to achieve their own goals
    rather than developing an integrated plan for the consolidation and
    permanent disposition of all of its excess plutonium. Specifically, DOE
    headquarters approved both Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan and SRS's
    plutonium storage plans without resolving conflicts between them.
    Moreover, we agree with the Safety Board that DOE's lack of careful
    planning has forced SRS to focus on what can be done with existing
    facilities, eliminating options that may have been both more
    cost-effective and safer than current plans. DOE has instead pushed
    forward with plans to use a 50-year-old building at SRS to perform
    functions it was not designed for. As a result, DOE is currently not able
    to consolidate all of its plutonium at SRS. Because it is unable to
    consolidate its plutonium, DOE faces additional costs in excess of $85
    million annually to securely store plutonium at its current locations, and
    its cleanup goals for Hanford are in jeopardy.

    To ensure the continued safe and secure storage of DOE's excess

      Recommendations for

    plutonium inventories, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the
    following two actions:

    o  Develop a comprehensive strategy for the consolidation, storage, and
    disposition of DOE's excess plutonium. In particular, this strategy should
    assess the storage, monitoring, and security capabilities of all of DOE's
    sites currently storing plutonium. Furthermore, the strategy should
    analyze the environmental impact, national security implications, costs,
    and schedules to safely consolidate, store, and

      Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    eventually dispose of DOE's plutonium at existing facilities and/or at a
    new storage facility constructed at one of its sites.

    o  When this comprehensive strategy is completed, we further recommend
    that the Secretary of Energy ensure that each of DOE's facilities' cleanup
    plans are reviewed to ensure that each site's cleanup goals and time
    frames are consistent with the department's comprehensive strategy for
    plutonium consolidation, storage, and disposition.

    We provided DOE with a draft of this report for its review and comment.
    DOE's letter is presented as appendix II. DOE generally agreed with our
    recommendations and stated that a Nuclear Materials Disposition and
    Consolidation Coordination Committee was formed earlier this year to
    provide a forum to perform nuclear materials disposition and consolidation
    planning. The objectives of this committee are to develop a plan that
    would provide the necessary security for DOE's nuclear material, identify
    paths for disposition, and reduce security and program costs. DOE stated
    that this committee would produce a strategic plan that would encompass
    the comprehensive strategy called for in our first recommendation. DOE
    also stated that the cleanup plans for its sites would be revised
    accordingly following completion of the committee's strategic plan.

    DOE also provided detailed technical comments that we incorporated into
    the report as appropriate. These technical comments focused primarily on
    DOE's plans for consolidating plutonium at SRS, the availability of
    sufficient storage space at SRS, and DOE's ability to monitor stored
    plutonium. Specifically, DOE emphasized in its technical comments that it
    has no plans at this time to further consolidate any plutonium at SRS. We
    recognize that a final decision to consolidate plutonium has not been
    made. However, it is important to note, as was stated in our draft report,
    that both Hanford's accelerated cleanup plan and SRS's storage plan
    assumed that DOE's surplus plutonium would be consolidated at SRS and that
    both plans were approved by DOE headquarters without resolving conflicts
    between them. We believe DOE's comments that it has no plans to further
    consolidate any plutonium at SRS reinforce our recommendation for a
    comprehensive strategy for the consolidation, storage, and disposition of
    DOE's excess plutonium.

    Regarding the availability of sufficient storage space at SRS, DOE stated
    in its technical comments that, even without Building 235-F, Building
    105-K has adequate storage capacity for all of its excess plutonium,
    including the Hanford fuel rods. However, it is important to note that DOE
    was proceeding with its plans to store plutonium in Building 235-F until
    changes to the DBT forced DOE to reevaluate its plans. Our draft report
    recognized that SRS officials believe Building 105-K has sufficient space
    to store all of DOE's plutonium storage containers from its sites across
    the United States. Nevertheless, DOE's estimates of the total number of
    containers have varied over time and may continue to change because
    plutonium stabilization and packaging is still ongoing at Lawrence
    Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories. Furthermore, as our draft
    report noted, additional safety analyses and documentation are necessary
    before Building 105-K would be able to store the Hanford fuel rods.

    Regarding DOE's ability to monitor stored plutonium, DOE stated in its
    technical comments that it has the capability in Building 235-F to monitor
    the condition of stored plutonium and that the building will not be shut
    down until a monitoring capability is established in Building 105-K.
    However, as our draft report noted, monitoring at Building 235-F is
    currently limited to removing storage containers from their outer
    packaging and performing nondestructive examinations of the containers.
    Building 235-F also has equipment that can puncture storage containers to
    relieve pressure if needed. However, Building 235-F does not have the
    capability to perform destructive examinations of the storage containers,
    which, according to SRS's plutonium surveillance and monitoring plan, must
    be conducted beginning in fiscal year 2007. In addition, SRS lacks the
    capability to restabilize and repackage plutonium if necessary. Until
    nondestructive examination, destructive examination, stabilization, and
    repackaging equipment is installed in Building 105-K, we believe that
    DOE's capability to monitor the condition of stored plutonium at SRS is
    incomplete. We modified our draft report to further clarify DOE's current
    monitoring capabilities.

    As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of
    this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
    the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
    Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, NNSA; the Chairman of the Safety
    Board; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; appropriate
    congressional committees; and other interested parties. We also will make
    copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
    available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
    me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
    Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
    of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
    listed in appendix III.

    Gene Aloise

    Director, Natural Resources and Environment

    Appendix I

                           Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    At the request of the Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of
    Representatives, and the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and
    Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of
    Representatives, we examined (1) the extent to which the Department of
    Energy (DOE) can consolidate its nonpit plutonium at the Savannah River
    Site (SRS) and (2) SRS's capacity to monitor plutonium storage containers.
    A forthcoming classified report discusses SRS's plans for upgrading
    security to meet the 2004 design basis threat (DBT).

    To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed independent studies of storage
    conditions at SRS performed by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
    (Safety Board), an independent federal agency established by the Congress
    in 1988 to oversee the safety of DOE's nuclear weapons complex.
    Specifically, we reviewed the Safety Board's December 2003 report entitled

    Plutonium Storage at the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site:
    Report to Congress and its June 2004 report entitled Plutonium Storage at
    the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site: First Annual Report to
    Congress. In addition, we interviewed subject matter experts with the
    Safety Board. We also obtained and reviewed several SRS studies of
    plutonium storage options: 1999 Savannah River Plutonium Storage Study,
    2000 Evaluation of Savannah River Plutonium Storage and Stabilization
    Options, and 2004 Savannah River Site Storage of Surplus Plutonium Study:
    2004 Update. A GAO analyst with subject matter expertise and a GAO senior
    methodologist with training and experience in evaluation research and
    methodology reviewed all of these studies to evaluate their methodological
    soundness and determine the reliability of their conclusions. These
    reviews entailed an evaluation of each study's research methodology,
    including its data quality, research design, and key assumptions, as well
    as a summary of its major findings and conclusions. We also assessed the
    extent to which each study's data and methods support its findings and
    conclusions. We determined that these studies were methodologically sound
    enough for the purposes of this report.

    In cooperation with a GAO economist, we attempted to determine the cost of
    plutonium storage at SRS by developing a model that evaluated costs under
    various storage scenarios, such as constructing a new consolidated storage
    facility or upgrading an existing facility to store plutonium. This model
    also attempted to determine the cost of continued storage of plutonium at
    Hanford for comparative purposes. However, we were unable to complete our
    model because we were unable to obtain complete cost data from DOE.
    Security costs are a major component of the total cost of storing
    plutonium, but security cost data were not available at the time of

    Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    our review because neither SRS nor Hanford had yet determined how they
    will enhance security to meet the 2004 DBT.

    To determine the extent to which DOE can consolidate its plutonium at SRS,
    we reviewed DOE's Records of Decision published in the Federal Register
    for plutonium storage and disposition activities at SRS, such as plans to
    construct an Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility and subsequent
    postponement and then cancellation of those plans, and relevant DOE
    orders, policies, and standards, such as DOE-STD-3013-2003, Stabilization,
    Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials. We visited SRS and
    inspected plutonium storage areas in Building 105-K and facilities in
    Building 235-F originally intended for plutonium storage and monitoring.
    We interviewed and received briefings from DOE's operating contractor for
    SRS (Westinghouse Savannah River Company); DOE's security contractor for
    SRS (Wackenhut Services, Inc.); SRS's Office of Safeguards, Security, and
    Emergency Services; and SRS's Nuclear Materials Programs Division. We also
    spoke with officials responsible for the management of Building 105-K and
    Building 235-F.

    We also visited the Hanford Site and toured the Plutonium Finishing Plant,
    where we observed plutonium storage containers that are currently stored
    inside the plant and nuclear fuel rods that are stored inside and outside
    the facility. We spoke with officials from DOE's Richland Operations
    Office, DOE's operating contractor for Hanford (Fluor Hanford), and
    Fluor's security subcontractor for the Hanford Site (Protection Technology
    Hanford). From these officials, we received briefings on Hanford's plans
    for plutonium storage and shipment. We also discussed the deactivation of
    the Plutonium Finishing Plant.

    In Washington, D.C., we met with DOE's acting Assistant Secretary for
    Environmental Management to discuss DOE's planned consolidation of
    plutonium at SRS and how SRS will store the material. We also discussed
    issues related to storage, monitoring, and security with officials from
    DOE's Office of Environmental Management, DOE's Office of Independent
    Oversight and Performance Assurance, and DOE's National Nuclear Security
    Administration.

    To evaluate DOE's ability to monitor plutonium storage containers, we
    first examined the reliability of SRS's database for tracking inventory
    and for SRS's plutonium surveillance and monitoring project. We obtained
    responses to a series of data reliability questions covering issues such
    as data entry access, internal control procedures, and the accuracy and

    Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    completeness of the data. We asked follow-up questions whenever necessary.
    We also obtained and reviewed related documents, including

    Users Manual for the DOE Complex Integrated Surveillance Program Working
    Database and other manuals and data dictionaries. We determined that these
    data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

    To evaluate the safety of conducting monitoring activities in Building
    105-K and Building 235-F, we reviewed the Safety Board's 2003 and 2004
    reports described earlier, and discussed the safety conditions of the
    facilities with subject matter experts on the Safety Board. We observed
    the facilities where SRS plans to conduct monitoring activities and
    reviewed documents pertaining to SRS's monitoring plans. We received
    briefings from Westinghouse Savannah River Company personnel responsible
    for plutonium monitoring and discussed the planned monitoring activities
    with officials responsible for managing Building 105-K and Building 235-F.
    We also discussed monitoring with officials from the Safety Board;
    Westinghouse Savannah River Company; Wackenhut Services, Inc.; SRS's
    Office of Safeguards, Security, and Emergency Services; and SRS's Nuclear
    Materials Programs Division. At the Hanford Site, we observed facilities
    and equipment for surveillance and monitoring of its plutonium and
    received a briefing on Hanford's use of that facility.

    We conducted our work from June 2004 through June 2005 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards.

                                      Appendix II

                         Comments from the Department of Energy

    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Energy

    Appendix III

                         GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    Gene Aloise (202) 512-3841

      GAO Contact

    In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T. Coles, Robin Eddington,

      Staff

    Doreen S. Feldman, Jonathan M. Gill, Sherry L. McDonald, Mehrzad Nadji,
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