Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army
Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages (12-JUL-05,
GAO-05-660).
The Department of Defense (DOD) cannot meet its global
commitments without continued reserve participation. The Army
Reserve provides critical combat support and combat service
support units, such as medical and transportation units, to the
Army. While Army Reserve members historically could expect to
train one weekend a month and 2 weeks a year with activations for
limited deployments, since September 11 some have been called
upon to support ongoing military operations for a year or more.
GAO (1) identified the challenges the Army Reserve faces in
continuing to support overseas operations and (2) assessed the
extent to which the Army and Army Reserve have taken steps to
improve the Army Reserve's readiness for future missions.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-660
ACCNO: A29538
TITLE: Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address
Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages
DATE: 07/12/2005
SUBJECT: Armed forces abroad
Armed forces reserve training
Army reservists
Combat readiness
Defense capabilities
Defense contingency planning
Military operations
Military training
Staff utilization
Military reserve personnel
Equipment management
Strategic planning
Support services
DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom
Operation Enduring Freedom
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GAO-05-660
United States Government Accountability Office
GAO Report to Congressional Committees
July 2005
RESERVE FORCES
An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment
Shortages
a
GAO-05-660
[IMG]
July 2005
RESERVE FORCES
An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment
Shortages
What GAO Found
While the Army Reserve has provided ready forces to support military
operations since September 11, 2001, GAO found that it is becoming
increasingly difficult for the Army Reserve to continue to provide these
forces due to personnel and equipment shortages. The three primary causes
of these shortages are (1) the practice of not maintaining Army Reserve
units with all of the personnel and equipment they need to deploy, (2)
current DOD and Army personnel policies that limit the number of
reservists and length of time reservists may be deployed, and (3) a
shortage of full-time support staff to develop and maintain unit
readiness. These challenges are compounded by emerging recruiting
shortfalls.
The Army and Army Reserve have recently begun several initiatives to
improve the Army Reserve's readiness and provide more deployment
predictability for its soldiers; however, the Army lacks a comprehensive
management strategy for integrating the initiatives to ensure that each
initiative most efficiently contributes to the achievement of its overall
readiness and predictability goals. One of the Army Reserve's major
initiatives has been to develop a rotational force model. However, the
model cannot be fully implemented until the Army determines the types and
number of Army Reserve units it will need to carry out its plans to
restructure into a more modular and flexible force. Because the Army has
not defined what personnel, units, and equipment the Army Reserve will
need under the new modular and rotational models, it cannot be assured
that its initiatives are most efficiently working together to meet
readiness goals and that funding is appropriately targeted to meet those
goals. Until plans that integrate the initiatives are completed and
approved and adequate resources are provided to implement them, the
Secretary of Defense and the Congress will continue to lack assurance that
DOD has an effective and efficient plan for resolving the Army Reserve's
growing challenges.
Army Reserve Personnel Still Eligible for Overseas Deployment, Ineligible
to Deploy Again under Personnel Policies, and Ineligible/Not Available to
Deploy for Other Reasons as of March 28, 2005
Previously mobilized (ineligible) Eligible
Untrained
Medical and administrative reasons (e.g., pregnancy or pending separation)
Alerted for future missions
Performing critical duties (e.g., recruiting and retention or training
support)
Eligible Ineligible or nonavailable Previously mobilized (ineligible)
Source: GAO analysis of Army Reserve data.
Note: Based on 196,219 soldiers in the Selected Reserve.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
Personnel and Equipment Shortages Will Make It Increasingly
Difficult for the Army Reserve to Continue to Support Overseas Operations
The Army and the Army Reserve Have Initiatives to Improve Readiness and
Deployment Predictability, but Full Implementation Depends on Detailed
Coordination and Funding Decisions
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments
1 3 5
10
20 28 29 30
Appendixes
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 32
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 34
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 37
Table 1: Mobilization Authorities for Reserve
Tables Forces 8
Table 2: Army Reserve Enlisted Occupations
with over 70 Percent
of Personnel Mobilized since September 11, 14
2001
Figure 1: Composition of the Army Reserve by
Figures Category Figure 2: Equipment Items Most 7
Transferred from Nonmobilized
Units to Mobilizing Units from September 2001
to April
2005 15
Figure 3: Percentage of Army Reserve Personnel
Eligible,
Previously Mobilized, or Ineligible/Not
Available for
Mobilization as of March 2005 18
Figure 4: The Army Reserve Expeditionary Force 22
Model
Contents
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A
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548
July 12, 2005
The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives
The Army Reserve is a citizen-soldier force that is trained and organized
to complement the combat forces of the active Army by providing
specialized combat service and combat service support skills. For example,
the Army Reserve provides over 95 percent of the Army's internment
brigades, railway units, Judge Advocate General units, training and
exercise divisions, and civil affairs units. It also provides over
two-thirds of the Army's psychological operations units, chemical units,
hospitals, and medical groups. As of March 2005, the Army Reserve had
about 196,000 readily accessible members who participated in drills and
training.
Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Army Reserve's
primary role was to provide support forces for major combat operations and
limited support to operations around the world, such as those in the
Balkans and Kosovo. However, since September 11, the Army Reserve has
provided large numbers of soldiers and units on an ongoing basis to meet
requirements for ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some
skills, such as civil affairs specialists, that have been in particularly
high demand reside heavily in the Army Reserve. Moreover, while Army
Reserve soldiers historically could expect their military service to be
part time-including attending training for 2 weeks each year and attending
drills one weekend each month with potential activations for limited
deployments-many reservists have been on active duty for over a year to
support current operations.
The challenges in mobilizing large numbers of reservists on an ongoing
basis have led to questions about whether changes are needed in the way
the Army Reserve is structured and resourced. In light of new security
threats and increased operational demands, the Army has recently embarked
on several new initiatives to increase its flexibility and responsiveness.
For example, as outlined in 2004 in the Army Campaign Plan, the Army,
including its reserve components, is in the midst of a major
transformation to a more flexible modular force based on brigades rather
than divisions. In addition, the Army plans to implement a force rotation
model that would enable it to better predict when soldiers might be
mobilized. 1
We have previously reported on issues related to how the reserve
components have been mobilized and used for recent operations and made
recommendations on actions the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
services need to take to improve the efficiency of mobilization for
reserve forces. In August 2003 and September 2004, we reported on several
reserve mobilization issues, including the mobilization approval process,
DOD's limited use of the Individual Ready Reserve, and long-term reserve
force availability issues.2 We also reported on the effect of the
continuing high use of National Guard forces and challenges to prepare the
National Guard for future overseas and domestic missions.3 In addition, we
recently provided observations on the Army's plans to convert to a modular
force.4
We prepared this report focused on the Army Reserve under the Comptroller
General's statutory authority and are sending it to you because it
contains information that will be useful for your oversight
responsibilities for reserve personnel and readiness issues. The
objectives of this report are to (1) identify the challenges the Army
Reserve faces in continuing to support overseas operations and (2) assess
the extent to
1 Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing personnel and
equipment, activating units and members of the reserves for active duty,
and bringing the armed forces to a state of readiness for war or other
national emergency.
2 GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of
Mobilizations for Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 21,
2003) and Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force
Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues,
GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004).
3 GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard
for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions, GAO-05-21 (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 10, 2004).
4 GAO, Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to
Implement and Fund Modular Forces, GAO-05-443T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16,
2005).
which the Army and Army Reserve have taken steps to improve the Army
Reserve's readiness for future missions.
To address our objectives, we analyzed data generated by the Total Army
Personnel Data Base -Reserves and provided by the U.S. Army Reserve
Command on the numbers of reservists that were mobilized for operations
since September 11, 2001, and their military occupations and numbers of
personnel that had not been mobilized. We assessed the reliability of data
from the Total Army Personnel Data Base - Reserves and the Reserve End
Item Management System by 1) reviewing existing information about the data
and the systems that produced them; 2) performing electronic testing of
the relevant data elements; and 3) interviewing Army Reserve officials
knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data used were
sufficiently reliable to address our objectives. We analyzed DOD
publications and reports on equipment shortages to identify trends in the
status of equipment the Army Reserve has on hand. We supplemented this
information with visits to Army and Army Reserve commands and units,
including training units and an Army mobilization station. We reviewed
documentation on the status of initiatives to improve long-term readiness
and predictability. We also discussed the challenges the Army Reserve
faced in providing ready forces and initiatives to improve readiness and
deployment predictability with officials in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Army, and the Army Reserve. We conducted our review from
April 2004 through June 2005 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Details on the scope and methodology used
in our review are described in further detail in appendix I.
Results in Brief While the Army Reserve has provided ready forces to
support military operations since September 11, 2001, we found that it is
becoming increasingly difficult for the Army Reserve to continue to
provide ready forces in the near term due to worsening personnel and
equipment shortages. There are three primary causes of these shortages:
(1) the practice of not maintaining Army Reserve units with all of the
personnel and equipment they need to deploy, (2) current DOD and Army
personnel policies that limit the number of reservists and length of time
reservists may be deployed, and (3) a shortage of full time support staff
to develop and maintain unit readiness. First, because Army Reserve units
are not generally maintained with all the required personnel and
equipment, based on the expectation that there would be time to supplement
personnel and equipment after mobilization, the Army Reserve has had to
transfer personnel and equipment from nonmobilizing units to mobilizing
units so
that when these units deployed overseas they would meet combatant
commanders' requirements for fully manned and equipped units. From
September 2001 through March 2005, the Army Reserve transferred about
53,000 soldiers from nonmobilizing units to mobilizing units. Similarly,
from September 2001 to April 2005, the Army transferred about 235,900
pieces of equipment among units. While these actions met immediate
requirements, transfers continue to decrease the capabilities of the units
from which the personnel and equipment were transferred, which hampers
their ability to prepare for potential future missions. Second, the Army
Reserve also faces challenges in continuing to provide ready forces
because so many of its personnel have already been mobilized and cannot be
mobilized again under current DOD and Army policies regarding the length
of time reservists may serve overall and in the theater of operations. As
of March 2005, the number of Army Reserve personnel eligible for
mobilization under current policies had decreased to about 31,000
soldiers, or about 16 percent of Army Reserve personnel, and all of these
personnel may not have the required skills and ranks needed to support
ongoing operations. Senior Army Reserve officials have expressed concern
that without change in personnel policies the Army Reserve will soon be
unable to continue to provide forces with the necessary skills and grades
to support Army operations. Recent recruiting and retention problems have
further reduced the available pool of reservists. Finally, the Army
Reserve has been authorized only about 68 percent (26,354) of the 38,846
full-time staff it required during peacetime to perform the critical
readiness tasks, such as training and maintenance. Collectively, personnel
and equipment problems have hampered the Army Reserve's ability to train
and effectively support ongoing operations efficiently and predictably in
the near term, and emerging recruiting challenges could exacerbate these
problems in the future.
The Army and Army Reserve have recently begun several initiatives to
improve the Army Reserve's readiness and provide more deployment
predictability for its soldiers; however, the Army lacks a comprehensive
description of how the Army Reserve will be structured, manned, and
equipped after the transformation and a detailed plan for funding priority
initiatives and integrating the independently developed initiatives to
ensure that each most efficiently contributes to the achievement of its
goals of improved readiness and predictable deployments. One of the Army
Reserve's major initiatives has been to develop a rotational force
proposal designed to train and equip units over a 5-year cycle for
possible deployment in the sixth year. The rotational force model cannot
be fully implemented, however, until the Army determines the types and
number of
Army Reserve units it will need to support its reorganized, modular combat
forces and identifies the resources it will need to implement the plan.
Meanwhile the Army Reserve is implementing another initiative designed to
increase the percentage of required personnel that units are authorized by
eliminating units in low-demand skills and moving personnel to highdemand
skills. But, without the final determination of the Army's requirement for
modular support units, the Army Reserve cannot be sure that it is not
closing units with the skills the Army will need under its modular
structure. Furthermore, the Army and Army Reserve have not yet developed
detailed estimates for the Reserve's reorganization to a rotational and
modular force. Another initiative, begun in fiscal year 2001, will
increase the number of full-time personnel assigned to support the Army
Reserve performing day-to-day administrative, training, and maintenance
activities. However, despite increases in these tasks due to ongoing
operations, the initiative is not planned to increase full-time support to
meet even peacetime requirements and may not provide the level of support
needed under the new rotational model. Until more detailed plans are
completed and approved that integrate the initiatives and adequate
resources are provided to implement them, the Congress will continue to
lack assurance that DOD has an effective and efficient plan for resolving
the Army Reserve's growing personnel and equipment challenges.
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
the Army, in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army and the
Chief, Army Reserve, to develop a detailed plan that addresses how the
Army will integrate and manage the initiatives it has developed and is
implementing to improve readiness and mobilization predictability for Army
Reserve personnel. In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed
with GAO's recommendations.
Background The Army Reserve is composed primarily of citizen soldiers who
balance the demands of a civilian career with military service on a
part-time basis. During the Cold War, it was expected that the Army
Reserve would be a force to supplement active forces in the event of
extended conflict. However, since the mid-1990s, the Army Reserve's
citizen soldiers have been continuously mobilized to support operations
worldwide, including those in Bosnia and Kosovo. In today's strategic
environment, the Army Reserve's role has evolved to a complementary force,
continuously supplying specialized skills for combat support and combat
service support for Operations Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Iraqi
Freedom. Rather than the historical part-time employment in the Army
Reserve,
some Army Reserve personnel have now been involuntarily activated for over
a year.
The members of the Army Reserve fall into three major categories: the
Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. (See fig. 1.)
Members of all three categories are subject to mobilization in the event
of national emergency.
o The Army's Ready Reserve includes about 310,000 members and is made up
of two subcategories: the Selected Reserve, which has about 197,500
members, and the Individual Ready Reserve, which comprises about 112,500
members. The Selected Reserve includes soldiers who are assigned to units
and participate in at least 48 scheduled drills or training periods each
year and serve on active duty for training at least 14 days each year;
soldiers who voluntarily serve on extended tours of active duty; and
soldiers assigned on an individual basis to various headquarters where
they would serve if mobilized and train on a parttime basis to prepare for
mobilization. Members of the Individual Ready Reserve include individuals
who were previously trained during periods of active service, but have not
completed their service obligations5; individuals who have completed their
service obligation and voluntarily retain their reserve status; and
personnel who have not completed basic training. Most of these members are
not assigned to organized units, do not attend weekend or annual training,
and do not receive pay unless they are called to active duty.
o The Army's Standby Reserve represents about 1,030 personnel who
maintain their Army affiliation without being in the Ready Reserve.
Standby Reserve personnel have been designated key civilian employees who
have responsibilities that would keep them from being mobilized, such as
members of the Congress, or have temporary hardships or disabilities that
prevent them from participating in reserve activities. These personnel can
be mobilized if necessary to fill manpower needs in specific skills.
o The Army Retired Reserve comprises all reserve officers and enlisted
personnel who receive retired pay on the basis of active or reserve
5 While enlistment contracts can vary, a typical enlistee would incur an
8-year military service obligation, which could consist of a 4-year active
duty obligation followed by a 4-year Individual Ready Reserve obligation.
service and may be ordered to active duty in emergency situations.
Currently, about 747,000 personnel6 are in the Retired Reserve.
Figure 1: Composition of the Army Reserve by Category
Ready Reserve
310,024
Note: Data as of February 28, 2005.
The majority of the reserve forces mobilized for current operations have
been members of the Selected Reserve, who are members of units and attend
monthly drills. Some members of the Individual Ready Reserve and Retired
Reserve have also been mobilized to provide specialized skills.
In addition to personnel in these categories, the Army Reserve relies on a
small number of full-time personnel to provide the day-to-day
administrative, training, and maintenance tasks that units need to be able
to attain readiness for their missions and deploy. The Army Reserve
fulltime support personnel are equal to about 13 percent of the authorized
number of reservists.
The Army Reserve is headed by the Chief, Army Reserve who is the principal
advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army for all Army Reserve matters.
Among other duties, the Chief, Army Reserve provides reports to the
Secretary of Defense and the Congress, through the Secretary of the
6 The Army Retired Reserve includes retirees from both the active and
reserve components.
Army, on the state of the Army Reserve and the ability of the Army Reserve
to meet its missions; manages the full-time support program; justifies and
executes the personnel, operation and maintenance, and construction
budgets for the Army Reserve; and participates in formulation and
development of Army policies.
The Army Reserve is a part of the total Army, which also includes the
active Army and the Army National Guard. The Chief of Staff of the Army is
charged with integrating reserve component matters into Army activities
and provides strategic guidance to the Army Reserve on transformation. The
Chief of Staff of the Army, as senior military leader of the Army,
participates in the development of Army plans, policies, programs, and
activities and supervises their execution. The Secretary of the Army, as
the senior official of the Department of the Army, is responsible for its
effective and efficient functioning.
Reserve forces may be called to active duty under a number of mobilization
authorities. As shown in table 1, two authorities enable the President to
mobilize forces, but with size and time limitations. Full mobilization,
which would enable the mobilization of forces for as long as they are
needed, requires a declaration by the Congress.
Table 1: Mobilization Authorities for Reserve Forces
Statute Provisions
10 U.S.C. 12301(a) Declared by Congress:
"Full Mobilization" In time of war or national emergency No limit on
numbers of soldiers called to active duty For duration of war plus 6
months
10 U.S.C. 12302 Declared by the President:
"Partial Mobilization" In time of national emergency No more than
1,000,000 reservists can be on active duty No more than 24 consecutive
months
10 U.S.C. 12304 Determined by the President: "Presidential Reserve To
augment the active duty force for operational missions Call-up" No more
than 200,000 reservists can be on active duty
No more than 270 days
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Code provisions.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense implements the activation of
reservists under mobilization authority. The Assistant Secretary of
Defense
for Reserve Affairs, who reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness, is responsible for providing policy, programs,
and guidance for the mobilization and demobilization of the reserve
components.
On September 14, 2001, President Bush declared that a national emergency
existed as a result of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York
and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and he invoked the partial
mobilization authority. On September 20, 2001, DOD issued mobilization
guidance that among other things directed the services as a matter of
policy to specify in initial orders to Ready Reserve members that the
period of active duty service would not exceed 12 months. However, the
guidance allowed the service secretaries to extend orders for an
additional 12 months or remobilize reserve component members under the
partial mobilization authority as long as an individual member's
cumulative service did not exceed 24 months under the President's partial
mobilization authority.
Since September 11, there have been six separate rotations of troops to
support Operation Enduring Freedom and four rotations of troops to support
Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began in 2001. The Army has identified the
personnel and units that are expected to deploy in 2005 in the seventh
rotation of forces for Operation Enduring Freedom and the fifth rotation
for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
To address the continuing demand for ground forces, in 2004, the Army
extended the time that reservists must be deployed overseas for missions
related to Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq or Operation Enduring Freedom
in Afghanistan. The Army's current guidance is that soldiers should serve
12 months with their "boots on the ground" in the theater of operations,
not including the time spent in mobilization and demobilization
activities, which could add several more months to the time a Reserve
member spends on active duty. The Army's Forces Command identifies the
Army units and personnel to be deployed to meet the requirements of the
combatant commanders.
Personnel and Equipment Shortages Will Make It Increasingly Difficult for the
Army Reserve to Continue to Support Overseas Operations
The Army Reserve has provided ready forces for ongoing military operations
since September 11, 2001, by transferring personnel and equipment to
deploying units; however, it is running out of personnel who can be
mobilized under current policies and equipment that meets deployment
standards for three key reasons. First, the Army Reserve is having
difficulty continuing to support ongoing operations because its units are
not routinely resourced with all the personnel and equipment needed to
deploy. Therefore, to meet combatant commanders' requirements that
deploying units have all the personnel they require for their missions and
have equipment that is compatible with other units in the theater of
operations, the Army Reserve has had to transfer uniformed personnel and
equipment from nonmobilized units to prepare mobilized units. This has
left nondeploying units with shortages in personnel and equipment, which
hampers their ability to train for future missions. Second, based on data
provided by the Army Reserve, about 40 percent of Army Reserve personnel
have already been mobilized once and under personnel policies cannot be
mobilized again. This, in addition to emerging recruiting issues that
contribute to the availability of personnel, has led to a smaller pool of
reservists eligible for deployment and is making it more difficult for the
Army Reserve to provide trained and ready personnel with the specific
grades and skills needed for future operations. Third, the Army Reserve
has been experiencing increasing shortages of the full-time support staff
who maintain equipment, train personnel, and conduct the day-to-day
administration of nonmobilized and returning units. This hampers the Army
Reserve's ability to maintain unit readiness. These challenges, when
viewed collectively and in view of emerging recruiting challenges,
threaten the Army Reserve's ability to provide ready units for ongoing
operations and prepare units for future missions.
The Army Reserve Has Prepared Mobilized Units by Transferring Personnel and
Equipment from Nonmobilizing Units, but It Faces Shortages of Personnel and
Equipment in the Near Term
To provide the ready forces required to meet mission requirements since
September 11, 2001, the Army Reserve has had to transfer personnel and
equipment from nonmobilized units to mobilized units-a practice that has
left nonmobilized units with shortages of resources and challenges the
Army Reserve to continue to support near-term operations. The Army
Reserve, like the National Guard, has been structured according to a
"tiered resourcing" approach. Under tiered resourcing, the Army has
accepted some operational risks to save money by funding Army Reserve
units to maintain fewer personnel and less equipment than they would need
in the event of a deployment. Instead, units train at lower states of
readiness with the expectation that there would be sufficient time to add
the required
Personnel Transfers Have Enabled the Army Reserve to Mobilize Ready Units,
but the Pool of Deployable Units and Personnel Is Declining
personnel and equipment prior to a deployment. Units anticipated to be
needed earlier in an operation are provided a larger portion of their
required personnel and equipment, while units that are not likely to be
needed until later during an operation, if at all, are given lower levels
of resources. This strategy effectively supported the types of operations
that were anticipated before September 11, 2001, but in the current
environment combatant commanders have required that Army Reserve units
deploy with all the personnel and equipment they needed for their
missions. While the Army Reserve has met these requirements, it has done
so by transferring resources from nonmobilized units, which has impaired
its ability to train for future missions. It has used this approach
because its personnel and equipment levels have not increased
significantly since September 11, 2001, despite the high pace of
operations. In addition, the overall number of personnel in the Army's
Selected Reserve has declined as recruiting and retention issues have
emerged.7 Senior Army Reserve officials have expressed concern that
without change in the policies, the Army Reserve will soon be unable to
continue to provide forces with the necessary skills and grades to support
Army operations.
To meet combatant commander requirements for fully manned units, the Army
Reserve has had to transfer large numbers of personnel from nonmobilizing
units to provide specifically required capabilities and to prepare
mobilizing units for deployment. From September 11, 2001, through March
2005, the Army Reserve mobilized about 118,270 soldiers from the Selected
Reserve.8 Of the total number of soldiers mobilized, approximately 53,000
(45 percent) were transferred from nonmobilized units to fill shortages in
mobilized units and to provide personnel to fill specialized requirements,
such as medical teams, that did not require an entire unit. Over 50
percent of the requests for Army Reserve personnel have been for groups of
six soldiers or less. As a result of these personnel transfers, existing
shortages in nonmobilized units are growing, which limit these units'
ability to conduct training and require them to receive significant
infusions of personnel from other units if they are alerted for
mobilization. Additionally, the pool of reservists from which to fill
requirements for certain skills and grades is decreasing.
7 GAO, Military Personnel: Preliminary Observations on Recruiting and
Retention Issues within the U.S. Armed Forces, GAO-05-419T (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005).
8According to the U.S. Army Human Resources Command as of May 2, 2005,
10,361 members of the Individual Ready Reserve, individual mobilization
augmentees, and members of the Retired Reserve have been ordered to active
duty.
Under tiered resourcing, Army Reserve units have generally been assigned
about 80 to 85 percent of the personnel they require to perform their
assigned missions, under the assumption that the shortages could be filled
before the units would deploy. Additionally, some personnel assigned to
units may not be deployable for personal reasons, such as unfulfilled
training requirements, health problems, or family situations. However, for
Operation Iraqi Freedom, combatant commanders requested that the Army
mobilize Army Reserve units with 100 percent of the required personnel.
Therefore, to support the first rotation of Army Reserve troops for
Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, the Army Reserve had to transfer
about 20 percent of the required personnel from nonmobilized units. These
initial transfers worsened existing personnel shortages in nonmobilized
units and increased the numbers of personnel that had to be transferred
when these units were subsequently mobilized. To meet the combatant
commander's personnel requirements during the second rotation of troops
for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2004, about 40 percent of the required
personnel were transferred from other units. Beginning in fall 2004,
combatant commanders have required that Army Reserve units mobilize with
102 percent of their required personnel so that casualties or other
personnel losses during the mobilization process or during deployment can
be replaced from within the unit. This requirement means that units will
require even more personnel to be transferred to them before they deploy
and will increase personnel shortages in remaining units even further.
According to Army Reserve officials, units mobilizing in the near future
may have to receive over half of their required personnel from outside the
units.
As current conflicts have continued, the Army Reserve has experienced
recruitment shortfalls and lost personnel from resignations and
retirement. Although the Army Reserve is authorized to have 205,000
personnel in its Selected Reserve, the number of participating members was
about 197,000 in February 2005. The number of members had decreased to
about 196,000 in March 2005.
As the number of Army Reserve personnel available for mobilization
continues to decrease, the personnel who remain do not necessarily have
the ranks or skills needed to fulfill combatant commander requirements.
For example, captains are the Army Reserve's unit-level leaders,
responsible for filling key command and staff positions. In 2001, the Army
Reserve lacked about 42 percent of the 14,996 captains it required, and as
of January 2005, this percentage had increased to about 52 percent. The
Army Reserve attributes the shortage of captains to fewer officers
transferring to the Army Reserve from the active Army. Similarly, the
number of warrant officers-the Army Reserve's technical experts and
pilots-has also been decreasing. In September 2003, the Army Reserve
lacked 28 percent of its required 2,730 warrant officers, and as of
February 2005, it lacked 37 percent. In order to meet requirements with
these shortages, the Army Reserve has had to fill requirements by
assigning personnel in other grades who may not have as much training and
experience as these officers.
Furthermore, the Army Reserve is experiencing increasing shortages of
personnel who have certain skills that have been in high demand since
September 11, 2001. For example, there has been a large requirement for
truck drivers to support current military operations. Of the over 11,200
truck drivers assigned to the Army Reserve, over 8,690 have already been
mobilized since September 11, 2001, leaving only about 2,510 (or 22
percent) still available for deployment. As table 2 shows, over 70 percent
of enlisted personnel in some occupations have already been deployed and
are no longer eligible for deployment. While some of these skills have
been in high demand across the Army, some, such as civil affairs, reside
primarily in the Army Reserve and sometimes in small numbers of critical
personnel. While new recruits are constantly entering the Army Reserve,
training them with specialized skills, such as intelligence analysis,
takes time.
Table 2: Army Reserve Enlisted Occupations with over 70 Percent of
Personnel Mobilized since September 11, 2001
Military occupation
Number of soldiers assigned
Percentage of soldiers mobilized since September 11, 2001
Construction manager 891
Supervisor of construction equipment 683 operators
Concrete and asphalt equipment operator 194
Truck driver 11,226
Supervisor of general engineers 313
Civil affairs specialist (emergency 2,439 management specialist)
Carpenter and mason 1,999
Transportation manager 578
Mortuary affairs specialist 228
Ammunition specialist 1,774
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army Reserve Command data.
Note: Data as of March 2005.
As the pool of Army Reserve personnel considered available for deployment
continues to decrease, the Army Reserve is becoming increasingly
challenged to find qualified soldiers to perform key functions needed to
support ongoing operations.
The Army Reserve Has Since September 11, 2001, the Army Reserve has
mobilized its units with Transferred Equipment between the most modern and
highest quantity of equipment it has had available, Units to Prepare
Mobilized Units but increasing shortages threaten the Army Reserve's
ability to continue to
but Is Experiencing Increasing Equipment Shortages
meet equipment requirements in the near term. As with personnel, Army
Reserve units are not generally allotted all of the equipment they need to
deploy; they receive a percentage based on the mobilization sequence of
war plans, with those units expected to deploy first receiving priority
for equipment. Since September 11, combatant commanders have required
deploying units to have 90 percent of their required equipment, even
though Army Reserve units are typically maintained with less than 80
percent of their equipment requirement. In order to meet equipment
requirements, the Army Reserve has had to fill shortages from other
sources within the Army Reserve. According to our analysis, the Army
Reserve transferred 235,900 pieces of equipment worth about $765 million
from September 13, 2001 through April 5, 2005. As figure 2 shows,
individual (49 percent) and unit (23 percent) equipment represented the
two largest categories of equipment transferred.
Figure 2: Equipment Items Most Transferred from Nonmobilized Units to
Mobilizing Units from September 2001 to April 2005Quantity
140,000
120,000 116,107
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
Individual Unit equipment Weapons Nuclear, Other
biological,
equipment (tents, (machine guns, and miscellaneous
generators, chemical items
(clothing, tool kits, etc.) grenade launchers, items
and (protective masks,
boots, etc.) communications rifles, etc.)
decontamination
equipment kits, etc.)
(radios,
switchboards,
etc.)
Equipment type
Source: GAO analysis of Army Reserve data.
In the fiscal year 2006 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report,9 the
Army Reserve reported that in February 2005 it had about 76 percent of the
equipment it requires. However, this estimate includes equipment items
that are older than those used by the active component, such as previous
generations of trucks and older models of night vision goggles, rifles,
and generators. The Army Reserve does not generally receive new equipment
at the same time as the active Army. When the active Army receives newer,
modern equipment items, it often passes the older equipment to the Army
Reserve. While these items are considered substitutes for newer items for
some purposes, such as training, combatant
9 Department of Defense, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for
Fiscal Year 2006 (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
commanders barred many of them from current operations because the Army
cannot provide logistics support for the older items in theater.
Therefore, the equipment Army Reserve units have that is acceptable for
deployment is lower than the overall figure indicates. For example, Army
Reserve units often train with older less capable versions of radios than
their active duty counterparts have, so deploying Army Reserve units have
had to be supplied with the new radios after they deployed. In addition,
Army Reserve units have far fewer than the overall average for some
equipment items. For example, the Army Reserve has less than half of its
requirement of night vision goggles, and a portion of the goggles it has
are not the most modern type. While units can be provided additional
equipment from the Army after they deploy, these units do not have much
time to train with new equipment prior to conducting actual operations.
Moreover, continuing equipment shortages in nondeploying units also result
in loss of training opportunities and increase the number of equipment
items that must be transferred to prepare units for mobilization.
As the Army Reserve struggles to continue to provide the required
equipment to its mobilized units, its existing equipment inventory is
aging more quickly than originally planned due to high use and a harsh
operational environment. According to the 2006 National Guard and Reserve
Equipment Report, equipment is being used in theater at rates five times
higher than under peacetime conditions, and several major equipment items,
including some light and light-medium truck fleets and engineering
equipment, are nearing or past their anticipated lifetime use. The report
noted that higher use is resulting in increased costs for parts and
maintenance as well as a reduction in overall unit readiness.
Additionally, according to the report, the Army Reserve estimates that
currently as much as 44 percent of its equipment needs servicing. This
includes equipment returned from the first rotation of troops in support
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, about one-fourth of which still requires
maintenance before it can be reused. Moreover, returning Army Reserve
units are being required to leave certain equipment items, such as
vehicles that have had armor added to them, in theater for continuing use
by other forces, which further reduces the equipment available for
training and limits the Army Reserve's ability to prepare units for
mobilizations in the near term.
The Army Reserve's Ability to Provide Ready Forces Is Affected by Current
Personnel Policies
The Army Reserve's ability to continue to provide ready forces in support
of ongoing operations is further affected by current DOD and Army
personnel policies, which affect the number of reserve personnel eligible
for deployment. As we have reported previously, the availability of
reserve component forces to meet future requirements is greatly influenced
by DOD's implementation of the partial mobilization authority under which
personnel serving in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom were
mobilized and by the department's personnel policies. Specifically, we
reported that the policies that affect mobilized reserve component
personnel were focused on the short-term needs of the services and reserve
component members rather than on long-term requirements and predictability
of deployment.10
Army Reserve personnel serving in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring
Freedom have been activated under a partial mobilization authority, which
enables the secretary of a military department, in a time of national
emergency declared by the President or when otherwise authorized by law,
to involuntarily mobilize reservists for up to 24 consecutive months.11
However, DOD's policy implementing the mobilization authority is that any
soldier who has served 24 cumulative months during the current conflicts
is ineligible for any further activation unless the President signs an
additional executive order or that soldier volunteers for additional duty.
Time for pre-and postmobilization activities and accrued leave days are
also counted toward time served on a reservist's "24-month clock" under
this policy. While the DOD policy limits the time a reservist can serve on
active duty to 24 months, Army policy12 states that reservists who have
been mobilized for Operations Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom will serve
no more than 12 months in the theater of operations. Thus, under this
policy, an Army reservist who completes an in-theater rotation of 12
months, along with pre-and postmobilization activities (adding an average
of 6 months to mobilization), serves about 18 months of the 24 months
allowed under the DOD policy. In addition, because these deployments
cannot be less than 12 months under Army policies, the Army Reserve
considers these reservists ineligible to deploy again.
10GAO-04-1031.
11 10 U.S.C. S: 12302.
12 Department of the Army, Department of the Army Personnel Planning
Guidance (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2005).
As figure 3 shows, as of March 2005, about 43 percent of Army Selected
Reserve personnel have been mobilized since September 11, 2001, and are
not eligible to be remobilized under current DOD and Army policies. Only
about 16 percent, or 31,300 personnel, are considered eligible for
mobilization. The other 41 percent are ineligible or not available at this
time for a variety of reasons, including the nature of their current
assignments-such as providing recruiting and retention support, training
for mobilizing units, and other critical duties; lack of required
training; or various medical and administrative issues, such as pregnancy
or pending separations. Those soldiers who complete the required training
or resolve medical and family issues may become available for mobilization
in the future.
Figure 3: Percentage of Army Reserve Personnel Eligible, Previously
Mobilized, or Ineligible/Not Available for Mobilization as of March 2005
Previously mobilized (ineligible)
Eligible
Untrained
Medical and administrative reasons (e.g., pregnancy or pending separation)
Alerted for future missions
Performing critical duties (e.g., recruiting and retention or training
support)
Eligible
Ineligible or nonavailable
Previously mobilized (ineligible)
Source: GAO analysis of Army Reserve data.
Note: Based on 196,219 soldiers in the Selected Reserve as of March 28,
2005.
In a December 2004 memorandum, the Chief, Army Reserve reported to the
Chief of Staff of the Army that the Army Reserve's ability to provide
ready personnel was impaired by the DOD's implementation of mobilization
authorities and the Army's deployment policies, among other issues. He
noted that the overall ability of the Army Reserve to continue to provide
ready forces was declining quickly. He reiterated similar concerns during
testimony to the House Committee on Armed Services' Subcommittee on
Military Personnel, in February 2005. Senior DOD officials maintained that
the military services have enough personnel available to meet
requirements, and the policies have not changed since then.
The Army Reserve Lacks Required Full-time Support Staff
Another significant challenge the Army Reserve faces in continuing to
provide support for near-term operations is that it has not been
authorized all of the full-time support staff it needs to perform critical
readiness duties at home. These personnel play a key role in maintaining
Army Reserve unit readiness and participating in mobilization/deployment
planning and preparation by performing the day-to-day equipment
maintenance, administrative, recruiting and retention, and training tasks
for the Army Reserve force. These staff fall into three categories:
reservists who have been selected to serve on extended active duty,
civilian employees, and active Army personnel.
Based on a pre-September 11, 2001, analysis, the Army Reserve identified a
requirement for about 38,000 full-time support personnel during peacetime,
which equates to about 18.5 percent of the 205,000 members it is
authorized by law. These personnel are needed to perform ongoing equipment
maintenance, administrative, recruiting and retention, and training tasks.
However, the Army Reserve is only authorized about 26,350 full-time
support personnel, or about 68 percent of its full-time requirement and
12.8 percent of the authorized number of reservists. The Army Reserve's
fulltime staffing is the lowest proportion of all the reserve components.
By comparison, in 2004, the Army National Guard was authorized full-time
support equal to 15 percent of its end strength, and the Air Force Reserve
was authorized full-time support equal to about 22 percent of its end
strength. Moreover, the Army Reserve's authorized full-time support does
not take into consideration recent increases in the pace of operations.
The Army Reserve has not been authorized all of the full-time support
staff it requires because, under the tiered resourcing planning strategy,
it was assumed that Army Reserve units would not need to deploy quickly,
and thus the risk associated with lowered unit readiness was acceptable.
While the Army Reserve has not been authorized the full-time personnel
necessary to meet its requirements, the number of full-time personnel
available for day-to-day activities is being further reduced because of
the ongoing requirements for active duty and reserve personnel. First,
some full-time civilian employees, called military technicians, must as a
condition of employment be members of Army Reserve units. According to
Army Reserve data, as of May 2005, about 1,100 (14 percent) of the Army
Reserve's military technicians were deployed in support of current
operations, in some instances resulting in a gap in support for day-to-day
operations in nonmobilized units. In addition, in March 2005, the Army
announced its decision to reassign 223 (about 88 percent) of the 254
active Army staff who perform critical training and readiness support
positions in the Army Reserve because these soldiers are needed in the
active component. In announcing the planned reduction, the Army noted that
the planned decrease will reduce premobilization training; threaten the
Army Reserve's ability to activate units at required levels of capability;
and reduce or limit support for approval of training plans, oversight of
readiness reports, and annual assessments of personnel, equipment, and
training. The Army Reserve is in the process of determining ways to
mitigate the loss of the active Army personnel.
The Army and the Army Reserve Have Initiatives to Improve Readiness and
Deployment Predictability, but Full Implementation Depends on Detailed
Coordination and Funding Decisions
The Army and Army Reserve have taken several steps to plan and implement a
number of initiatives to address the readiness challenges described above
and improve deployment predictability for soldiers, but they have not yet
made decisions on the numbers and types of units the Army Reserve will
need in the future and several key decisions about the Army Reserve's
structure and funding have not yet been finalized. One of the Army
Reserve's primary initiatives is to transition to a rotational force
model, which would enable reservists to know in advance when they might be
expected to deploy to overseas operations and would break the cycle of
unanticipated and ad hoc transfers of personnel from nondeploying units to
deploying units. While the Army Reserve plans to begin implementing its
rotational force model with the return of currently deployed units, it is
awaiting several Army decisions concerning the structure, number, and
types of Army Reserve support units the Army will require for its new
modular force and how the Army Reserve's rotational force model will be
funded. The Army Reserve is also undertaking a number of other initiatives
designed to make the most efficient and effective use of its personnel-
including reducing its force structure to provide remaining units with all
the personnel they are authorized, increasing full-time support,
establishing a process for centrally managing soldiers who are ineligible
for
deployment, and changing the command and control of some units-but these
initiatives are not all linked by a detailed management plan. While the
Army's Campaign Plan defines overall goals to improve readiness of Army
units, including Army Reserve units, it does not describe the personnel,
units, and equipment the Army Reserve will need under the Army's modular
structure and rotational force generating model. Until the Army determines
these future requirements for the Army Reserve and integrates the various
initiatives under way in a detailed plan, the Army and Army Reserve will
not be in a position to determine their needs, so the Secretary of Defense
and the Congress will not have assurance that the current problems of
degrading readiness and unpredictable deployments will be fully and
efficiently addressed.
Implementation of the Army Reserve's Rotational Force Model Awaits Critical
Funding and Structure Decisions
The initiative to transform the Army Reserve into a rotational force,
within which units are provided a predictable cycle for conducting
individual and unit training followed by potential mobilization, involves
a major change in the way the Army planned to train and use Army Reserve
forces in the past. The Army Reserve has completed significant planning on
its rotational force model, and its plan appears to address the critical
issue of providing forces continuously without undue stress on reservists.
However, the Army Reserve is awaiting several key decisions by the
Department of the Army before it can implement the model, and full
implementation could take several years.
At present, Army Reserve units are assigned to missions based on war plans
and, under tiered resourcing, are maintained at varying levels of
readiness based on when they are expected to be needed to deploy in
accordance with war plans. Units that are not expected to be needed early
in existing war plans are not expected to be ready to deploy without
significant time following the outbreak of a war to improve their
readiness with additional personnel and equipment. However, current
military operations associated with the Global War on Terrorism have
called for units and personnel earlier and for longer periods than
anticipated in previous war plans and have raised issues about the impact
of unforeseen deployments of Army Reserve forces on reservists, their
families, and their employers.
In July 2003, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum to the Army
directing it to develop a plan that would enable the service to better
predict when personnel and units might expect to be mobilized. The
Secretary's objective was to limit a reservist's involuntary call-up to
active duty to 1
year in every 6 years. The Army's 2004 Campaign Plan assigned
responsibility to the Army Reserve for developing a method to meet this
objective.13 When the plan was issued in April 2004, the Army Reserve had
already begun developing a proposal for a new rotational force generation
model based on cyclical readiness, called the Army Reserve Expeditionary
Force model. As shown in figure 4, under the Army Reserve Expeditionary
Force model, reserve forces would be divided into 10 groups called
packages, each containing several units with the range of capabilities
that might be needed to conduct military operations. Army Reserve units
would move through the phases of the cycle and be ready to serve as a
standby deployable force during the fifth year of the 5-year cycle.14
Figure 4: The Army Reserve Expeditionary Force Model
Source: GAO analysis of Army Reserve data.
The Army Reserve designed the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force model with
the intention of keeping units and packages intact and on a predictable
schedule. In addition, unlike the tiered resourcing strategy based on when
units would be needed for combat operations under existing war plans, the
plan assigns priority based on when units will be ready and available for
deployment. It also reflects an assumption that in the future the United
States will be less able to predict and plan for specific
13 In October 2004, the Army issued Change 1 to the Army Campaign Plan
which assigned the Army Forces Command responsibility for implementing a
rotational force for the total Army.
14 Army Reserve officials estimate that about 60 percent of Army Reserve
forces could be available to meet demands-40 percent at any given time and
an additional 20 percent by accelerating the process.
threats, so the services will have to maintain a certain portion of their
active and reserve forces ready at all times to conduct a range of
potential military operations should the need arise. The Army has included
the rotational concept in the Army Campaign Plan and intends to implement
it across the Army. We believe that the concept is a step toward balancing
the need for a continuing supply of ready units with the need for more
predictability of deployments, but plans are in the preliminary stages and
implementation issues, such as training standards and funding needs, have
yet to be decided.
Under the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force model, Army Reserve units would
not be expected to have all the personnel and equipment they would need to
complete their missions until they were in the later phases of the model.
During the beginning phases of the cycle, units would begin to receive new
or replacement equipment and additional personnel and begin other
administrative, logistical, or personnel activities necessary to increase
their level of readiness. During the next phases, individuals would
receive training to develop the skills needed for their specific
occupations, and units would train together on unit tasks. For example,
truck drivers would be initially expected to improve their individual
ability to drive a particular truck. After achieving a specific level of
driving proficiency, they would train with the other drivers and learn how
to drive in a truck convoy. Over the training period, units would have
access to all the modern equipment they would need to deploy, so there
would be no need for large-scale, unscheduled transfers of equipment to
ready mobilizing units. At the end of the training phase, units would
undergo a validation process to determine whether they would be capable of
mobilizing in support of Army operations. Units in the final phase of the
Army Reserve Expeditionary Force model would be trained, manned, and
equipped to perform their missions, so the time needed to mobilize these
units would be significantly reduced compared to current operations.
In addition to the improved ability to provide ready forces, the Army
Reserve expects the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force model to improve the
quality of life for its members by enabling soldiers, their families, and
thier employers to better predict when a reservist could be mobilized. The
planned rotational model is intended to meet the Secretary of Defense's
goal of limiting involuntary mobilizations, although under the model
proposed by the Army Reserve, units could be mobilized once every 5 years
rather than every 6 years, the Secretary's original goal. The Army
Reserve's current force rotational planning model would enable it to
inform
reservists of their deployment eligibility schedules several years ahead
of a possible deployment so they could make family and career plans.
According to the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force plans, if requests for
forces exceed those that are within their deployment time frame, the Army
Reserve could accelerate training for forces nearing the final phases of
the model. This would mean earlier deployment than anticipated for some
forces. However, according to Army Reserve analysis, no historical
deployments since World War II have required more forces than would be
contained in 4 of the planned 10 Army Reserve Expeditionary Force
packages.
While the Army agrees with the Army Reserve's concept of the rotational
force model and intends to implement the concept for the active forces as
well as Army Reserve and Army National Guard forces, Army and Army Reserve
officials have not come to agreement on the specifics of how the Army
Reserve model will be implemented. Key issues currently under discussion
are the number of packages that should be created and the duration of the
rotational cycle. Although the Army Reserve proposal would create 10 force
packages and establish a rotational cycle of between 5 and 6 years, some
Army officials advocate creating 12 force packages and a 6-year cycle that
would comply with the Secretary of Defense's initial guidance. Army
Reserve officials noted that the model could be adjusted to accommodate a
deployment cycle of 6 years. However, the Army Reserve proposal advocates
creating 10 packages rather than 12 packages because each package could
contain a larger percentage of the force. Likewise, Army and Army Reserve
officials have not agreed on a plan for how the Army Reserve would provide
additional forces if the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force model cannot
provide enough deployable forces to meet operational requirements. Army
officials anticipate that final plans for the Army Reserve's rotational
model will be approved in midsummer 2005 and will detail the rotational
cycle and the number of expeditionary packages the Army Reserve will need
to build. However, even if all the planning decisions were finalized in
the near future and the Army Reserve could begin implementation
immediately, full implementation will likely take several years to
complete because the rotational concept is based on the sequential flow of
units through the model, and the first units would not reach readiness
until at least 2010.
While the Army Reserve intends to implement its Army Reserve Expeditionary
Force model with troops returning in 2005 from military operations
overseas, continued demands for units and individuals may
make it difficult for the Army Reserve to adhere to the model and avoid
having to take deployment-eligible reservists out of their units'
rotational cycles to meet immediate needs for personnel. Further, the Army
and Army Reserve have not fully estimated the costs associated with the
Army Reserve's rotational model and programmed funding to begin the
process of resetting and reconstituting returning forces as they enter the
rotational model. As of May 2005, Army Reserve planning officials were
still in the process of reviewing what equipment, training, and personnel
will be required for both the units rotating through the model and the
support structure that will be required for those units once the model is
implemented. Army Reserve officials explained that they cannot begin to
develop funding requirements until the Army determines the units the Army
Reserve will need. If funding requirements are not carefully estimated and
included in the Army's budget, the model's eventual effectiveness in
providing a more orderly and predictable process for supporting overseas
operations may be diminished.
The Army Is Reorganizing Its Forces, but Plans Detailing the Numbers and
Types of Army Reserve Support Units It Needs Are Not Completed
The Army has recognized that it needs to become more flexible and capable
of achieving a wide range of missions. To this end, in fiscal year 2004,
the Army began to reorganize its active duty combat forces from a force
structure organized around divisions to one that is based on more flexible
modular brigades. However, as we have previously reported, the design of
the modular units is still evolving and not all the equipment required is
fully known or funded.15 The Army has not completed planning for how
active and Army Reserve component combat support and combat service
support units will be organized to support the new modular brigade combat
teams.
The Army is currently completing a review of its force structure-called
the Total Army Analysis-to determine the number and type of units it needs
to meet the goals of the National Defense Strategy. Previously conducted
Total Army analyses did not include an assessment of the support forces
that would be needed under the Army's modularity initiative. In 2004, the
Army began another review to determine what active and reserve support
units it will need to support its new multifunctional modular brigades.
The Army plans to use the results of the analysis to compile a detailed
list of the numbers and types of units the Army Reserve
15GAO-05-443T.
will need to provide in support of the modular combat forces. As of March
2005, the Army was still analyzing the results of the process and was
continuing to assess the requirements for support forces. Until the
results are released, the Army Reserve cannot identify the numbers and
types of units that it will need to support the Army requirements in each
of the rotational packages.
In addition, the Army and Army Reserve have not yet developed detailed
estimates for the Army Reserve's reorganization into modular units. The
Army Campaign Plan assumes that supplemental resources the Congress
provides to the Army to fund the Global War on Terrorism will be available
to pay some of the costs of the modular conversion for reserve component
support units. However, until the Army completes all of its force
structure designs for support brigades, the Army Reserve will not have a
total picture of its personnel and equipment requirements and will not
have all the information it needs to evaluate funding requests for
modularity.
The Army and the Army Reserve Have Several Other Initiatives Currently Under
Way to Improve Capabilities, but Stages of Implementation Vary
The Army and the Army Reserve have other initiatives under way for the
purposes of improving readiness and capability. However, these initiatives
are in varying stages of planning and implementation. While all the
transformational initiatives seek to improve the Army Reserve's ability to
provide ready forces, they have not been coordinated as part of a
comprehensive plan that would establish goals for initiatives, coordinate
their objectives and time frames, and set funding priorities. Moreover,
the Army has not determined the personnel, units, and equipment the Army
Reserve will need to transform to a modular, rotational force and
effectively support Army operations in the future.
In July 2003, the Secretary of Defense directed the services to begin to
rebalance the capabilities that reside in the active and reserve forces to
better meet the continued high demand for personnel with certain skills in
support of ongoing operations. Key objectives of this initiative are to
improve unit readiness and increase services' ability to meet the
requirements of continuous operations by eliminating units with lowdemand
skills and moving personnel into units with high-demand skills. It also
aims to provide units with more of the required personnel by ensuring that
all personnel assigned to units are eligible to deploy. When the
initiative is fully implemented in 2009, the rebalancing will result in
force structure changes affecting about 34,000 Army Reserve positions and
236 Army Reserve units. Although intended to increase the Army Reserve's
readiness and capability, this rebalancing effort was begun before the
Army
began its modular restructuring effort. The two initiatives-rebalancing
and modular restructuring-have not been coordinated within a management
framework that is needed in light of the potential impact of major
organization changes. Senior Army Reserve leaders have raised concerns
that because the initiatives are not well integrated, the Army Reserve may
be eliminating some of the types of units that it will eventually need to
supplement the modular support brigades.
To increase units' readiness by assigning only deployable personnel, the
Army Reserve is also establishing a process to centrally manage soldiers
who are not eligible for deployment because they are untrained, awaiting
administrative discharge, pending medical evaluations for continued
service, or in the process of voluntarily moving between units. Until this
initiative is fully implemented some soldiers will remain assigned to
units where they occupy positions, but because they are not eligible for
mobilization, they do not contribute to unit readiness. By accounting for
these soldiers centrally in a separate "Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and
Students" account, as exists in the active Army, the Army Reserve
anticipates that it can relieve units of a major administrative
responsibility and enhance overall unit readiness. The Army Reserve has
begun implementing this initiative and estimated that at the end of June
2004 about 12.8 percent of its assigned strength met the requirements for
assignment to one of the four categories. The Army Reserve expects the
number of personnel in this account to eventually level off at about 10
percent of the number of soldiers it is authorized, or about 20,000
soldiers.
Recognizing the need for more full-time support staff, in fiscal year
2001, the Army started to implement an initiative to increase the number
of fulltime support positions for reservists on active duty and civilians
by 4,551 positions by the end of fiscal year 2011. When complete, the
planned increase would bring the number of full-time support staff for the
Army Reserve to 28,806 personnel, about 14 percent of the Army Reserve's
end strength. However, planned increases would not provide the Army
Reserve's peacetime requirement for full-time support, even as the high
pace of current operations has increased demands for the training,
administrative, and maintenance skills full-time staff provide. Moreover,
the Army Reserve will lose the full-time support of about 223 active duty
Army soldiers because they are needed in the active component, which will
offset some of the benefit of increases in reservist and civilian
full-time support. The Army Reserve has not yet developed a management
plan to offset these risks in the near term or address the increasing
shortage of fulltime support staff due to deployments.
Another initiative is designed to address the readiness problem that is
created when personnel are transferred out of some units to provide
capabilities to other units in the active or reserve component. The Army
Reserve's Individual Augmentee initiative is designed to provide a pool of
volunteer soldiers, trained in high-demand specialties, who are ready to
mobilize quickly as individuals rather than units. According to the Army
Reserve, it is currently working to implement this initiative and has
established a goal of 3,000 to 9,000 Individual Augmentee positions by the
end of 2007.
The Army Reserve is also in the process of changing the command and
control of some of its units to better focus on soldier and unit
readiness. For example, the Army Reserve plans to reduce the number of
commands charged with readiness activities and establish a training
command in order to clarify responsibilities and standardize training. In
addition, the Army Reserve is implementing plans to transfer some
installation and facility support activities to the Army so that Army
Reserve readiness personnel can focus on training programs. Furthermore,
the Army Reserve is in the process of establishing a consolidated medical
command and a consolidated intelligence command to more effectively manage
these specialized skills. While the Army Reserve expects these actions to
support the goals of the Army Campaign Plan, the details of how that will
be accomplished are not specified in that plan.
Conclusions While the Army's acceptance of military risk in maintaining
the Army Reserve in peacetime with fewer people and less equipment than it
needed for its mission was an effective strategy for containing costs
during the Cold War, the security environment has changed dramatically
since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and that strategy is no
longer viable. Threats are no longer as predictable, so the services will
need to maintain more forces ready to deploy as needed. In addition,
operations related to the Global War on Terrorism are expected to last a
long time and require the continuing support of the Army Reserve. The Army
and Army Reserve's previous tiered readiness policy has created the need
for wholesale transfers of personnel among units to meet wartime
requirements and degraded the Army Reserve's ability to continue to
provide forces for ongoing operations. In particular, the Army Reserve is
running out of personnel who are eligible to mobilize under current
personnel policies and who have the grades and skills required for current
operation. The current operations are not expected to end soon, and
without change, the Army Reserve will not be able to provide the personnel
and units needed for
future rotations of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, or
other needs.
The Army's Campaign Plan sets out overall goals for improved readiness of
Army units, including Army Reserve units, but it does not describe the
personnel, units, and equipment the Army Reserve will need under the
Army's modular structure and rotational force generating model. Without a
clear indication of what the Army Reserve will look like in the future,
the Army and Army Reserve cannot be sure that the changes they are
undertaking in the short term will enable it to achieve the desired end
state of a flexible and ready force and ensure that funding is targeted to
priority activities. While the Army and Army Reserve have various
initiatives under way to improve Army Reserve readiness over time, not all
of these initiatives are being integrated and coordinated to ensure they
most efficiently achieve overall goals. Lacking a mechanism that
coordinates and synchronizes initiatives that are in various stages of
implementation, the Army and Army Reserve cannot be sure that all of the
separately developed initiatives work together in timing and scope to
achieve readiness goals efficiently and set funding priorities for various
activities. For example, without information on the types of units that
the Army Reserve will need under modularity, the Army Reserve cannot be
sure that its other rebalancing efforts are not eliminating the types of
units that will be needed in the future when additional costs would be
generated and delays incurred to re-create them.
The Army Reserve's key initiative of establishing a rotational force
cannot be fully implemented until the Army finalizes decisions concerning
how the Army Reserve will fit into the Army's planned transformation to a
modular force and funding needs and sources have been determined. Until
these decisions are finalized and an implementation plan is agreed upon
that details how the Army Reserve can ready units and individuals to meet
requirements on an ongoing basis, the Army Reserve will have to continue
transfers from its dwindling levels of personnel and equipment.
Recommendations for We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretary of the Army, in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the
Army; the Chief, Army
Executive Action Reserve; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness, to define the end state of the units, personnel, skills,
and equipment the Army Reserve will need to fit into the Army's modular
force and develop a detailed plan to ensure that the ongoing diverse
initiatives collectively support the desired outcome of improved readiness
and predictable
deployments within current and expected resource levels. The plan should,
at a minimum, include
o an assessment of the types and numbers of units that the Reserve needs
in its force structure to support future Army and joint missions,
o a process for coordinating the implementation steps and time frames of
the different initiatives,
o a method of assessing the progress and effectiveness of the
initiatives,
o a reassessment of the Army Reserve's requirement for full-time staffing
support given its new operational role, and
o identification of resources needed to implement each of the Army's and
the Army Reserve's initiatives to improve the Army Reserve's readiness.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army, in conjunction with the Chief of Staff of the Army; the Chief, Army
Reserve; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
to develop an implementation plan for a force rotation model for the Army
Reserve that describes
o the types and numbers of units that should be available for deployment
during each year,
o the funding the Army Reserve will need to support its transition to a
rotational force, and
o the readiness levels for each phase of the rotation, including a
description of the associated levels of personnel and equipment and the
strategy for providing them, and how readiness will be evaluated.
Agency Comments The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
provided written comments on a draft of this report. The department agreed
with our recommendations. The department's comments are reprinted in their
entirety in appendix II. In addition, the department provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority
Members, House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, and other
interested committees. We are also sending a copy to the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of
Staff of the Army, and the Chief, U.S. Army Reserve, and we will make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions, please contact me on (202) 512-4402
or
by e-mail at [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. Major contributors to this report are included in
appendix III.
Janet A. St. Laurent
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I
Scope and Methodology
To assess whether the Army Reserve has provided forces required by the
combatant commanders since September 11, 2001, and the challenges it faces
in sustaining near-term operations, we analyzed the Department of the
Army's Manpower and Reserve Employment of Reserve Component Forces &
Effect of Usage report data for fiscal years 1986 through 2003 and
discussed the sources and uses of the information with officials from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. We obtained
information on personnel mobilized and remaining from the Army Reserve's
Personnel Division. We analyzed data generated by the Total Army Personnel
Data Base - Reserves and provided by the U.S. Army Reserve Command on the
numbers of reservists that were mobilized for operations since September
11, 2001, and their military occupations and numbers of personnel that had
not been mobilized. We obtained and analyzed data detailing the amounts,
types, and costs of completed equipment transfers by the Army Reserve from
September 13, 2001 through April 5, 2005, from the Reserve End Item
Management System. We assessed the reliability of data from the Total Army
Personnel Data Base -Reserves and the Reserve End Item Management System
by 1) reviewing existing information about the data and the systems that
produced them; 2) performing electronic testing of the relevant data
elements; and 3) interviewing Army Reserve officials knowledgeable about
the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our
purposes. We analyzed Department of Defense publications and reports
information on equipment shortages, including the 2004, 2005, and 2006
National Guard and Reserve Equipment reports to analyze trends in the
status of the equipment the Army Reserve has on hand. We obtained and
analyzed data on the numbers and types of full-time staff assigned to Army
Reserve units and the metrics used in identifying full-time staff
requirements from the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Force Programs
Office. We also discussed full-time support issues with readiness and
training officials. To understand how current personnel and equipment
policies affect the Army Reserves' capability to provide support for
near-term operations, we gathered and reviewed copies of relevant
documents, including presidential executive orders and the Army's
personnel planning guidance.
To assess the extent to which the Army Reserve is planning and
implementing initiatives designed to improve its readiness and provide
predictability of deployment for its members, we reviewed and analyzed
policy guidance; instructions; documents; and implementation plans related
to Army and Army Reserve initiatives, including the Total Army Plan; the
2004 Army Campaign Plan with change 1; the 2003 and 2004 Army
Transformation Roadmap; the Army's 2004 and 2005 posture statements;
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
the Army Reserve's 2005 posture statement; the Army's 2004 and 2005
modernization plans; the Army Reserve's expeditionary force planning
documents; and other Army Reserve planning and budget documents. We also
discussed the status of planning for the Army Reserve's conversion to a
rotational force and a modular structure with Army and Army Reserve
officials. To assess ongoing initiatives to improve readiness and force
management, we reviewed status reports and discussed implementation
challenges with Army Reserve officials managing the initiatives.
We conducted our review from April 2004 through July 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix II
Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix III
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402
Acknowledgements In addition to the contact named above, the following
individuals also made major contributions to the report: Margaret Morgan,
Timothy A. Burke, Alissa Czyz, Ronald La Due Lake, Kenneth Patton, Rebecca
Medina, and Eileen Peguero.
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