Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders'	 
All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve (11-JUL-05, 	 
GAO-05-652).							 
                                                                 
The events of September 11, 2001, have resulted in a greater	 
focus on the role of first responders in carrying out the	 
nation's emergency management efforts. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is the primary federal entity responsible for	 
ensuring that first responders, such as police, fire, emergency  
medical, and public health personnel, have the capabilities	 
needed to provide a coordinated, comprehensive response to any	 
large-scale crisis. In the last 4 years DHS has awarded $11.3	 
billion to state and local governments to enhance capabilities,  
primarily to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from	 
acts of terrorism. Presidential directives instruct DHS to	 
develop a national all-hazards approach--preparing all sectors of
society for any emergency event including terrorist attacks and  
natural or accidental disasters. This report addresses the	 
following questions: (1) What actions has DHS taken to provide	 
policies and strategies that promote the development of the	 
all-hazards emergency management capabilities of first		 
responders? (2) How do first responders' emergency management	 
capabilities for terrorist attacks differ to capabilities needed 
for natural or accidental disasters? (3) What emphasis has DHS	 
placed on funding awarded to state and local first responders to 
enhance all-hazards emergency management capabilities?		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-652 					        
    ACCNO:   A29437						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First	      
Responders' All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve 	 
     DATE:   07/11/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Comparative analysis				 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Disaster planning					 
	     Disaster recovery					 
	     Disaster recovery plans				 
	     Emergency management				 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Federal aid to localities				 
	     Federal aid to states				 
	     Federal funds					 
	     First responders					 
	     Funds management					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Intergovernmental relations			 
	     National policies					 
	     Natural disasters					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Emergency response 				 
	     Emergency response plans				 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-05-652

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman and Ranking Democratic Member, Subcommittee on
Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management, Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

July 2005

HOMELAND SECURITY

 DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to
                                     Evolve

GAO-05-652

[IMG]

July 2005

HOMELAND SECURITY

DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to
Evolve

                                 What GAO Found

DHS has undertaken three major policy initiatives aimed at creating a
national, all-hazards coordinated and comprehensive response to
large-scale incidents: (1) a national response plan (what needs to be
done); (2) a command and management process (how it needs to be done); and
(3) a national preparedness goal (how well it should be done). GAO
reviewed these products and determined that each supports a national,
all-hazards approach. DHS has developed plans to implement three related
programs to enhance first responder capabilities: (1) to assess and report
on the status of first responders' capabilities; (2) to prioritize
national resource investments; and (3) to establish a national training
and exercise program. Implementing these programs will likely pose a
number of challenges for DHS including integrating internal and external
assessment approaches, assessing state and local risks in a national
context to effectively prioritize investments, and establishing common
training requirements across responder disciplines.

Because terrorist attacks share some common characteristics with natural
and accidental disasters, 30 of DHS' 36 capabilities first responders need
to support preparedness and response efforts are similar. GAO's analysis
found that the baseline capabilities required for terrorist attacks and
natural or accidental disasters are more similar for response and recovery
and differ most for prevention. Because terrorist attacks are planned,
intentional acts, all of DHS' prevention capabilities focus on terrorist
attacks, while almost all other baseline capabilities focus on all
hazards.

Legislation and presidential directives call for DHS to place special
emphasis on preparedness for terrorism and DHS has directed that the
majority of first responder grant funding be used to enhance first
responder capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and
recover from terrorist attacks. Nonetheless, grants funds can have
all-hazards applications.

                           First Responders in Action

Source: FEMA News Photo.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

      Letter                                                                1 
                                     Results in Brief                       4 
                                        Background                          7 
                DHS Has All-Hazards Policy Initiatives and National        
                Strategies                                                 
                 Under Development and Faces Challenges in Enhancing First 
                      Responders' Emergency Management Capabilities        10 
                Most Preparedness Capabilities Apply to All Emergency      
                Events,                                                    
                       but Prevention of Terrorist Attacks Requires Unique 26 
                                                              Capabilities 
                Federal Funding For Enhancing First Responders'            
                Preparedness                                               
                   Capabilities Emphasizes Terrorism but Can Be Applied To 
                                                                       All 
                                         Hazards                           34 
                                 Concluding Observations                   43 
                                     Agency Comments                       45 
    Appendix I          Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5         
Appendix II          Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8         
Appendix III             Objectives, Scope and Methodology              
Appendix IV            GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments            

Tables

Table 1: DHS Suite of National Planning Scenarios 16 Table 2: Natural and
Accidental Disasters and Terrorist Attacks

That Have Similar Effects 27 Table 3: Homeland Security Mission Areas 28
Table 4: Arrangement of DHS's 36 Target Capabilities by Homeland

Security Mission Area and the Relative Emphasis on Terrorism Preparedness
for Each 29

Figures

Figure 1: First Responders in Action 8

Figure 2: Homeland Security Policy Initiative Timeline 11

Figure 3: Three Stages of DHS Capabilities-Based Planning Process Model
for Development of the National Preparedness Goal 15

Figure 4: Scenarios, Tasks, and Capabilities for the National Preparedness
Goal 18

Figure 5: Example of Target Capability Development: Pandemic Influenza
Scenario and Resulting Universal Tasks, Critical Tasks, and Target
Capability 19

Figure 6: Most Fiscal Year 2005 DHS First Responder Grant Funding Is for
Three Programs that Focus On Terrorism 37

Figure 7: DHS Grant Funding for Terrorism versus All Hazards, Fiscal Years
2001 to 2005 and Projected for Fiscal Year 2006 (dollars in millions) 38

Abbreviations

CBRNE Chemical, biological, radiological nuclear, explosive
DHS Department of Homeland Security
HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive
NIMS National Incident Management System
NRP National Response Plan
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

July 11, 2005

The Honorable William Shuster Chairman

The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton Ranking Democratic Member Subcommittee
on Economic Development,

Public Buildings and Emergency Management, House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been concern among
senior federal officials that another terrorist attack on U.S. soil could
occur. According to testimony by the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, it may be only a matter of time before a terrorist group tries to
use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons in the United
States. Concerns like these have prompted increased federal attention on
national emergency preparedness-that is, the nation's ability to prevent,
protect against, respond to, and recover from large-scale emergency
events. Through legislation and Presidential directives, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has become the primary federal entity responsible
for ensuring that first responders, such as police, fire, emergency
medical, and public health personnel, have the capabilities needed to
provide a coordinated, comprehensive response to any largescale crisis and
to mount a swift and effective recovery effort.1 In the last 4 years, DHS
agencies have awarded $11.3 billion to state and local governments to
enhance their national emergency preparedness capabilities, primarily for
terrorist attacks.

Long before the events of September 11, 2001, terrorism preparedness was
included in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's planning approach to
prepare for all types of emergency events, commonly referred

1A capability provides the means to accomplish one or more tasks under
specific conditions and to specific performance standards through proper
planning, organization, equipment, training, exercises, and personnel.

to as an all-hazards approach.2 Since the attacks, the intensified federal
attention and federal spending for national preparedness has largely
emphasized preparedness for terrorist attacks. However, the nation's
recent experience with large-scale natural disasters, for example,
wildfires in California in 2003, hurricanes in Florida in 2004, and floods
in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York in 2005 provides a justification
for taking an all-hazards approach to national preparedness that considers
the risks of natural and accidental disasters, as well as terrorism.

Consistent with this approach, two Homeland Security Presidential
Directives (HSPD) issued in 2003 require DHS to take an all-hazards focus
in implementing the directives. HSPD-5, issued in February 2003, required
DHS to establish a single, comprehensive approach to and plans for the
management of emergency events whether the result of terrorist attacks or
large-scale natural or accidental disasters. Appendix I contains the text
of HSPD-5. HSPD-8, issued in December 2003, established policies to
strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to
threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks and large-scale natural or
accidental disasters. Among other things, it required DHS to coordinate
the development of a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal that
would establish measurable readiness priorities and targets that
appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist
attacks and large-scale natural or accidental disasters with the resources
required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them. The directive also
designated the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal federal
official for coordinating the implementation of all-hazards preparedness
in the United States. Appendix II contains the text of HSPD-8.

Because of the nation's increased focus on preparedness for terrorist
attacks as a result of the events of September 11, 2001, you requested
that we examine the extent to which DHS has considered all types of
emergency events, including both terrorist attacks and natural or
accidental disasters, in developing and implementing its approach to
enhance and sustain first responder capabilities. This report explores the
following questions:

2All-hazards emergency preparedness efforts seek to prepare all sectors of
American society-business, industry and nonprofit, state, territorial,
local and tribal governments, and the general public-for all hazards the
nation may face, i.e., any large scale emergency event including terrorist
attacks and natural or accidental disasters. For the purpose of this
report, territorial and American Indian tribal governments are included
when we refer to state and local governments.

1. 	What actions has DHS taken to provide policies and strategies that
promote the development of all-hazards emergency management capabilities
of first responders?

2. 	How do first responders' emergency management capabilities for
terrorist attacks differ from capabilities needed for natural or
accidental disasters?

3. 	What emphasis has DHS placed on funding awarded to state and local
first responders to enhance all-hazards emergency management capabilities?

The scope of our work was focused on the extent to which the actions taken
by DHS to enhance first responder skills and abilities encompassed all
hazards, whether the result of nature, accident, or terrorist action. To
address these objectives, we analyzed DHS's efforts to implement HSPD-5
and HSPD-8, including the process used to develop national preparedness
policies and the plans, goals, and standards resulting from the process,
as well as grant programs to enhance the preparedness of first responders.
We interviewed DHS officials from the Emergency Preparedness and Response
Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Office for Domestic
Preparedness, and the Office of State and Local Government Coordination
and Preparedness to obtain their views regarding the process and its
products, along with information on DHS assistance programs. To obtain the
views of first responders, we interviewed officials from professional
organizations that represent first responders on a national level and
reviewed relevant reports and studies on homeland security and domestic
preparedness. Finally, we conducted structured interviews with 69 first
responder departments3 and state level emergency management officials in
ten states, selected by non-probability sampling to include metropolitan
areas that crossed state boundaries, tribal governments, states that face
a variety of hazards, sparsely and densely populated states, and states
with townships and city government structures, among other criteria. These
first responder departments responded to the questions in our structure
interview guide and provided additional observations during the course of
our interviews. The results of

3"First responders," as defined in HSPD-8, refers to those individuals who
in the early stages of an emergency event are responsible for the
protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the
environment, including emergency response providers. For the purposes of
this report, we typically met with officials representing police, fire,
emergency medical services, public works, and public health departments.

  Results in Brief

these interviews cannot be generalized to first responders not
participating in the interviews. An expanded discussion of our scope and
methodology is presented in appendix III. We conducted our work from May
2004 through May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

DHS has undertaken three major policy initiatives to promote the further
development of the emergency preparedness capabilities of first
responders-development of (1) a national response plan (what needs to be
done to manage a major emergency event); (2) a command and management
process to be used during any emergency event nation-wide (how to do what
needs to be done); and (3) a national preparedness goal (how well it
should be done). Each initiative reflects an all-hazards approach since
each addresses emergency events that are the result of terrorist attacks
and large-scale natural and accidental disasters. To develop a national
preparedness goal, DHS is using an approach known as capabilities-based
planning that, according to DHS, provides capabilities suitable for a wide
range of threats and hazards, in an environment of uncertainty and within
an economic framework that necessitates prioritization for allocation of
finite resources. DHS began this process using 15 emergency scenarios
developed by the President's Homeland Security Council, 12 of which are
terrorist events. The scenarios were not ranked according to relative risk
because, according to DHS, their purpose was to form the basis for
identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide-range of major
emergency events. These 15 scenarios, which include an attack by
improvised explosive device and a pandemic flu outbreak as two examples,
were developed to identify a range of tasks, critical tasks, and target
capabilities, all of which would need to be performed at various levels of
government to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from
large-scale emergency events. DHS's planning process resulted in a Target
Capabilities List that identified 36 capabilities that together encompass
all critical tasks-what first responders must be able to do, in terms of
planning, training, equipment, and exercises to achieve desired outcomes
for all hazards. For example, for the scenario based on a pandemic flu
outbreak, critical tasks include the ability to coordinate public health
and medical services, provide immunizations, and direct and control public
information releases. In March and April 2005, DHS published an interim
national preparedness goal and guidance that first responders can use to
develop, implement and maintain these target capabilities. Because no
single jurisdiction or agency would be expected to perform every task,
possession of a target capability could involve enhancing and maintaining
local resources, ensuring access

to regional and federal resources, or some combination of the two. In
October 2005, DHS plans to issue a final version of the goal that would
include assigning jurisdictions to tiers based on their population
density, critical infrastructure, and other risk factors and also include
performance metrics for those in each tier. To achieve the goal, DHS
prepared implementation requirements for national programs to assess and
report the status of first responders' capabilities, to prioritize
resource allocation, and to integrate training and exercise programs.
DHS's goal is to achieve full implementation of these programs by October
1, 2008. Implementation of each of the three systems may pose challenges
for DHS-for example, a key challenge will be establishing a standardized
approach for measuring and reporting the risks faced by diverse states and
localities in order to effectively prioritize and allocate federal
resources.

Our analysis of the target capabilities established by DHS showed that
most of DHS's targeted capabilities-30 of 36-are common to both terrorist
attacks and natural or accidental disasters. Capabilities common to all
hazards, for example, are on-site emergency management, and search and
rescue. DHS officials reviewed our analysis and agreed with our assessment
of the relative applicability of the 36 target capabilities to all
hazards. During our interviews with first responders and other emergency
management officials and experts, they affirmed the idea that preparedness
for natural and accidental disasters is similar to preparedness for
terrorist attacks. DHS categorizes the capabilities in terms of 4 mission
areas: prevention, protection, response and recovery.4 Our analysis
further revealed that the preparedness capabilities required for terrorist
attacks and natural or accidental disasters are more similar for
protection, response, and recovery, and differ most for prevention.
Terrorist attacks differ from natural or accidental disasters principally
because it is possible that terrorist attacks could be prevented through
actionable intelligence (i.e., information that can lead to stopping or
apprehending terrorists), but there is no known way to prevent natural

4DHS defines prevention as activities intended to deter all potential
terrorists from attacking America, detect terrorists before they strike,
prevent them and their instruments of terror from entering our country,
and take decisive action to eliminate the threat they pose. Protection is
defined as activities intended to reduce the likelihood of attack on
assets or systems and limit the impact should an attack occur. Response is
defined as activities intended to implement immediate actions to save
lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs. Recovery is defined
as activities to develop, coordinate, and execute service- and
site-restoration plans and reconstitute government operations and services
through individual, private-sector, nongovernmental, and public assistance
programs.

disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and tornadoes. Therefore,
prevention requires specific capabilities related to intelligence and
counterterrorism that are not normally used for other hazards, such as the
terrorism investigation and apprehension capability.

Since September 11, 2001, funding appropriated by Congress for DHS
programs to enhance first responders' capabilities has largely emphasized
enhancing capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks. The Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and HSPD-8 directs DHS to take an all-hazards
approach to national emergency preparedness with a special emphasis on
terrorism. As a result, DHS grant guidance for the State Homeland Security
Grant and the Urban Area Security Initiative grant programs, the two
largest sources of DHS grants funds available to states and local first
responders have largely focused on enhancing first responders'
preparedness for terrorist attacks. State preparedness officials and local
first responders we interviewed said that DHS's emphasis for grant funding
was too heavily focused on terrorism and they sought to acquire dual use
equipment and training that might be used for emergency event that occur
more regularly in their jurisdictions in addition to supporting terrorism
preparedness. In response, DHS promoted flexibility to allow such dual
usage within the grant program requirements for fiscal year 2005,
according to DHS officials, although officials stated that, prior to
fiscal year 2005, grant requirements allowed for dual usage and state
grantees are responsible for contacting DHS when questions regarding
application of grant guidelines arise. To ensure grant funds are used for
their designated purpose, the states and localities we visited reported
they have financial controls and monitoring procedures in place designed
to ensure that whatever flexibilities for dual uses exist, they remain
within DHS's program guidelines. In February 2005, we reported that in
fiscal year 2004, DHS completed site visits to 44 of 56 states and
territories that received grants as part of DHS's monitoring of states'
grant reporting and state homeland security strategy implementation. We
also reported that in fiscal year 2004 DHS revised its method of reporting
on grant expenditures, moving away from requiring itemized lists of
expenditures toward a more results-based approach where grant managers
must demonstrate how grant expenditures link to larger projects that
support one or more goals in the states' homeland security strategies.5
Finally, in

the absence of some basic, comparable standards for first responder
performance, it has been difficult to assess the effect of grant
expenditures on first responder capabilities and performance.

5GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs Has
Improved, but Challenges Remain, GAO-05-121 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2,
2005).

Background 	Prior to September 11, 2001, the federal government's role in
supporting emergency preparedness and management was limited primarily to
providing resources before large-scale disasters like floods, hurricanes,
and earthquakes, and response and recovery assistance after such
disasters. Historically, FEMA developed mitigation programs designed to
minimize risk to property or individuals from natural or manmade hazards.
These mitigation programs included the post-disaster Hazard Mitigation
Grant Program and the pre-disaster Project Impact program. In addition,
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as
amended, established the process for states to request a presidential
disaster declaration in order to respond and recover from a large-scale
emergency event. However, in response to the events of September 11, 2001,
the federal government has provided billions of dollars to state and local
governments for planning, equipment, and training to enhance the
capabilities of first responders to respond to terrorist attacks and, to a
lesser extent, natural and accidental disasters. These extensive resources
reflect a growing federal role in promoting emergency preparedness.

First Responders are Responsible for Carrying out Emergency Management
Efforts

The nation's first responders have the lead responsibilities for carrying
out emergency management efforts.6 The role of first responders is to
prevent, protect against, respond to, and assist in the recovery from
emergency events. Traditionally, first responders have been trained and
equipped, in the event of an emergency-natural or accidental disasters and
terrorist attacks-to arrive on the scene and take action immediately. In
the first hours of an event, first responders from various disciplines,
which could include police, fire, emergency medical personnel and public
works, must attempt to enter the scene, set up a command center, establish
a safe and

6First responders have traditionally been thought of as local fire,
police, and emergency medical personnel who respond to events such as
fires, floods, traffic or rail accidents, and hazardous materials spills.
As a result of the increased concerns about bioterrorism and other
potential terrorist attacks, the definition of first responder has been
broadened. Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act defined emergency
response providers as including "Federal, State, and local emergency
public safety, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical
(including hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel,
agencies, and authorities." Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-296 S:2(6), 116 Stat. 2135, 2140 (codified at 6 U.S.C. S:101(6)).
HSPD-8 defined the term first responder as "individuals who in the early
stages of an incident are responsible for the protection and preservation
of life, property, evidence, and the environment, including emergency
response providers as defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as well as emergency management, public health,
clinical care, public works, and other skilled support personnel (such as
equipment operators) that provide immediate support services during
prevention, response, and recovery operations."

secure perimeter around the site in order to save lives and protect
property, evacuate those within or near the site, tend to the injured and
dead and transport them to care centers or morgues, restrict and redirect
traffic and pedestrians, reroute and restore public utilities, remove
debris, and begin the process of recovery.

Since September 11, 2001, the roles and responsibilities for first
responders to prevent emergency events and protect the public and property
have expanded. In July 2002, prior to the creation of DHS, the President
developed a National Strategy for Homeland Security which recommended
steps that federal, state and local governments, private companies and
organizations, and individual Americans should take to improve homeland
security. The National Strategy identified the need to improve tactical
counterterrorist capabilities of the various federal, state, and local
response assets that can intercede and prevent terrorists from carrying
out attacks. These assets include state and local law enforcement and
emergency response personnel which the National Strategy considers crucial
to preemption of terrorists, no matter if they are part of the local SWAT
team or the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team.

Figure 1: First Responders in Action

Source: FEMA News Photo.

First responder organizations across the county are to various degrees,
trained, staffed, and equipped to prepare for and respond to various
events. These organizations may differ in governmental role, size,
structure, and capabilities. For example, activities of local law
enforcement departments in smaller communities may be limited to day-

to-day law enforcement while, in larger communities, departments may
include specialized teams such as bomb squads or special weapons and
tactics units. Likewise, local fire departments may be volunteer
operations with basic firefighting capabilities or, in larger communities,
may include teams specializing in hazardous materials response, search and
rescue, or structural collapse. The local public health system can consist
of public or private emergency medical services that provide immediate
victim care and transport victims to the area's public or private
hospitals to receive patient care, along with the state and local medical
staff that monitor and detect disease outbreaks. Supporting the response
and recovery efforts of first responders are other state and local
officials who provide preparedness planning, administration, and the
communications systems needed to command and control activities on the
scene.

Natural and accidental disasters have provided all levels of government in
many locations with experience in preparing for different types of
emergency events. However, terrorist attacks potentially impose a
relatively new level of fiscal, economic, and social disruption within
this nation's boundaries. Today's threat environment includes not only the
traditional spectrum of large-scale manmade and natural hazards-
wilderness and urban fires, floods, oil spills, hazardous materials
releases, transportation accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes,
pandemics, and accidental or natural disruptions to the nation's energy
and information technology infrastructure-but also the deadly and
devastating arsenal of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
highyield explosive weapons as exemplified by the attacks on New York City
and Oklahoma City. These attacks have resulted in greater public and
governmental focus on the role of first responders and their capabilities
to respond to large-scale emergency events.

DHS Is Responsible for Leading National Emergency Preparedness Efforts

Two DHS organizational units have the primary responsibilities for leading
national emergency preparedness efforts-the Emergency Preparedness and
Response Directorate and the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness. The Homeland Security Act assigned
responsibility to the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate,
which includes the Federal Emergency Management Agency, for building a
comprehensive national incident management system that defines the roles
and responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments, and the
various first responder disciplines at each level during an emergency
event. The Act also charged the directorate with consolidating existing
federal government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated
national response plan, as called for by HSPD-5. DHS assigned

  DHS Has All-Hazards Policy Initiatives and National Strategies Under
  Development and Faces Challenges in Enhancing First Responders' Emergency
  Management Capabilities

responsibility for developing a national preparedness goal to its Office
of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, which
includes the Office for Domestic Preparedness. The Office of State and
Local Government Coordination and Preparedness also awards and administers
the majority of DHS's first responder preparedness federal grant
programs.7 In large part these grants are directed to the governor of each
state, who in turn makes these funds available to local jurisdictions
within the state.

To comply with HSPD-5 and HSPD-8, DHS has established a national plan for
emergency event response, a national management system to be used during
emergency events, and an interim national preparedness goal. DHS also
plans to develop national strategies for assessing and reporting the
status of first responders' capabilities, prioritizing federal, state, and
local resource investments to enhance these capabilities, and
standardizing training and exercise programs for first responders to
practice and improve emergency response capabilities. The presidential
directives on which these efforts are based correspond to the major
initiatives first developed in the National Strategy for Homeland
Security. Our analysis of the documents resulting from, and plans for,
these efforts showed that DHS has taken an all-hazards approach to promote
first responders' emergency management capabilities. Figure 2 illustrates
the timeline of DHS's efforts to develop these national initiatives and
identifies the anticipated results.

7When the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness was created in January 2004, it combined the Office for
Domestic Preparedness with the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination. At that time, grant programs from multiple agencies within
DHS were transferred to the new office. The Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness provides grant funds to the 50
states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and the
Northern Marianas, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, Guam under the
State Homeland Security Grant program, and 50 urban areas selected for
funding under the Urban Area Security Initiative grant program.

Figure 2: Homeland Security Policy Initiative Timeline

2003 2004

                                      2005

         Source: GAO analysis of DHS homeland security policy guidance.

DHS Has Developed All-Hazards Policies to Guide Response to Emergency
Events

To comply with the initiatives of the National Strategy and the timeframes
and requirements established in HSPD-5, DHS implemented an integrated
all-hazards approach to emergency event management by establishing the
National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan
(NRP). NIMS is a policy document that defines roles and responsibilities
of federal, state and local first responders during emergency events. The
intent of this system described in the document is to establish a core set
of concepts, principles, terminology and organizational processes to
enable effective, efficient, and collaborative emergency event management
at all levels. These concepts, principles, and processes are designed to
improve the ability of different jurisdictions and first-responder
disciplines (e.g., fire and police) to work together in various
areas-command, resource management, training, and communications. The NRP
is designed to integrate federal government domestic prevention,
protection, response, and recovery plans into a

single operational plan for all hazards and all emergency response
disciplines. Using the framework provided by NIMS, the NRP describes
operational procedures for federal support to state, local, and tribal
emergency managers and defines situations where the federal authorities
are to provide support and situations where the federal authorities are to
assume control. The NRP organizes capabilities and staffing and equipment
resources in terms of functions that are most likely to be needed during
emergency events, describes common processes and specific administrative
requirements (e.g., public affairs, financial management, public health,
etc.), and outlines core procedures. The NRP also augments NIMS by
defining roles and responsibilities for specific types of emergencies.

To develop NIMS and NRP, DHS assembled a variety of stakeholders from
federal, state, and local levels such as national professional
associations, and state and local responders representing the full range
of response disciplines. During the development of NIMS, stakeholder
groups reacted to initial drafts developed by DHS. The final draft of NIMS
incorporated, in part, key elements of a widely-used, interdisciplinary
system of command-first used in conjunction with wildfires in California
during the 1960s-into a standardized, national system that would apply
across all emergency response disciplines and levels of government.
Similarly, the NRP was based on a consensus among stakeholders of best
practices to apply in integrating prevention, protection, response, and
recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan.

HSPD-5 requires all federal departments and agencies to adopt and use NIMS
in their individual preparedness efforts, as well as in support of all
actions taken to assist state and local governments. Further, the
directive requires federal departments and agencies to make adoption of
NIMS by states a condition, to the extent permitted by law, of federal
preparedness assistance beginning in fiscal year 2005. For fiscal year
2005 DHS required states and other jurisdictions that receive direct
funding to incorporate NIMS into existing training programs and exercises,
emergency operations plans, and intrastate mutual aid agreements; to
institutionalize the use of the Incident Command System; and will require
states and other jurisdictions to certify as part of their fiscal year
2006 grant applications that they have met the fiscal year 2005 NIMS
requirements. However, final requirements for fiscal year 2006 self
certification have not been formulated, according to DHS officials. DHS
encouraged, but did not require, local governments to implement these
activities to the maximum extent possible.

We assessed NIMS and NRP to determine the extent to which the policy
documents discuss and emphasize different types of emergency events. Our
analysis showed that both documents had been developed in a manner that
reflects an all-hazards approach. For example, both NIMS and NRP use the
generic term "incident management" rather than specifying the cause(s) of
events, such as a terrorist act, accident, or natural disaster. Moreover,
NIMS and NRP are designed to promote interdisciplinary efforts that
consider the involvement of multiple jurisdictions and multiple
responders. The common processes and specific administrative requirements
listed in NRP also are described in terms that are not specific to any
type of threat or emergency. For example, according to NRP, the plan is to
be implemented during "incidents of national significance."8

First responders we visited affirmed that NIMS and the NRP do take an all
hazards approach-that is, they apply to natural and accidental disasters,
as well as terrorist attacks. For example, 12 first responder officials we
interviewed told us that they have long used the incident command system
upon which NIMS was based for a variety of emergency events. Similarly,
one homeland security director in a large urban city said NIMS had only
had a moderate impact on their operations because the city has already
been using an incident command system in its all-hazards approach.

8The Secretary of Homeland Security declares Incidents of National
Significance-in consultation with other departments and agencies as
appropriate-and provides coordination for federal operations, resources
and communications with Federal, State, local, tribal, private sector, and
nongovernmental organizations to maintain and coordinate threat or
incident response activities. Incidents of National Significance can be
declared based on one of the following:

1. A federal department or agency has requested the assistance of DHS,

2. The resources of state and local authorities are overwhelmed and
federal assistance has been requested,

3. More than one federal department or agency has become substantially
involved in responding to an incident,

4. DHS has been directed by the President to assume responsibility for
managing a domestic incident.

DHS Is Developing an All-Hazards National Preparedness Goal and Related
Products Using Capabilities-Based Planning

To comply with the requirements established in HSPD-8, DHS is developing a
National Preparedness Goal. While NIMS defines "how" to manage a
large-scale emergency event and NRP defines "what" needs to be done, the
National Preparedness Goal is intended to generally define "how well" it
needs to be done. DHS issued an interim version of the goal in March 2005.
The interim version will remain in effect until superseded by the Final
National Preparedness Goal, which DHS intends to issue in October 2005.9
According to officials from DHS's Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness, the final version is expected to remain
largely the same as the interim; however, the office is working with its
state and local government stakeholders to define appropriate
jurisdictional tiers, and plans to add this information to the final
version of the goal. According to the Interim National Preparedness Goal,
the primary purpose of establishing tiers is to account for reasonable
differences in target levels of capability (or system-specific elements of
capability) among groups of jurisdictions based on differences in risk
factors such as total population, population density, and critical
infrastructure. Our review of the interim goal indicates that it reflects
an all-hazards focus by consistently citing both natural and accidental
disasters and terrorist attacks as emergencies and the extent to which the
nation's first responders must develop their capabilities to address all
hazards.

To develop the goal and determine the tasks and capabilities needed by
first responders on a nation-wide basis, DHS is using an approach known as
capabilities-based planning. The purpose of this approach is to provide
capabilities suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards, in an
environment of uncertainty and within an economic framework that
necessitates prioritization for allocation of finite resources, according
to DHS. As figure 3 shows, DHS's application of the capabilities-based
planning process model to the development of the goal and related products
involves three stages: (1) defining target levels of capability; (2)
achieving target levels of capability; and (3) assessing preparedness.

9DHS has issued several products to support the National Preparedness
Goal, including a Target Capabilities List, a Universal Task List,
National Planning Scenarios, and National Preparedness Guidance, which DHS
has made available to state, and local first responders and other
emergency management professionals. DHS considers all of these products to
be drafts until the Department issues the Final National Preparedness
Goal.

Figure 3: Three Stages of DHS Capabilities-Based Planning Process Model
for Development of the National Preparedness Goal

Intelligence,

Stage 1: Defining target levels of capability Stage 2: Achieving target
levels of capability Stage 3: Assessing preparedness

Source:	GAO analysis of DHS documents related to the National Preparedness
Goal and capabilities-based planning process model adapted from P. Davis,
Rand.

DHS began the first stage of the capabilities-based planning process
identifying concerns using 15 National Planning Scenarios that were
developed by the Homeland Security Council, as illustrated in table 1.10

10The President's Homeland Security Advisory Council is composed of 21
members appointed by the President selected from the private sector,
academia, professional service associations, federally funded research and
development centers, nongovernmental organizations, State and local
governments, and other appropriate professions and communities. The
Council convened a working group to help develop the scenarios with
officials who represented the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy,
Health & Human Services, Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation
and Veterans Administration, as well as officials from the Environmental
Protection Agency, the National Aeronautics & Space Administration, the
Terrorist Threat Analysis Center, the White House National Security
Council, and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.

The 15 scenarios include 12 terrorist attacks (incorporating chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive, and cyber attacks) and 3
natural disasters-an earthquake, a hurricane and a pandemic influenza
outbreak. According to DHS, the Homeland Security Council excluded
scenarios for which they considered well-developed and tested response
capabilities to be already available and scenarios where the set of
response capabilities would be a subset of one of the 15 scenarios chosen.
Examples of excluded scenarios are industrial and transportation accidents
and frequently occurring natural disasters, such as floods, the nation's
most frequent natural disaster. According to DHS officials, there was less
concern about planning for natural disasters because there is a tremendous
amount of experience, actuarial data, geographical and seasonal patterns,
and other information that is not available in the context of terrorism.
Officials told us that the department chose to focus the identification of
its concerns on event consequences rather than event probabilities, given
the high degree of uncertainty related to preparing for terrorist events.

Table 1: DHS Suite of National Planning Scenarios

o  Improvised nuclear device attack  o  Major earthquake

o  Aerosol anthrax attack  o  Major hurricane

o  Pandemic influenza  o  Radiological attack with dispersal device

o  Biological attack with plague  o  Improvised explosive device attack

o  Chemical attack with blister agent  o  Biological attack with food
contamination

o  	Chemical attack with toxic chemical  o  Biological attack with foreign
animal agent disease (Foot and Mouth disease)

o  Chemical attack with nerve agent  o  Cyber attack

o  	Chemical attack resulting in chlorine tank explosion

Source: DHS National Planning Scenarios.

According to DHS's National Preparedness Guidance, the planning scenarios
are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale,
catastrophic emergency events for which the nation needs to be prepared.
Some state and local officials and experts in the field of emergency
preparedness said that the scenarios did not appear to reflect an
assessment of risk or a relative ranking related to risk. As a result,
they questioned whether the scenarios were appropriate inputs for
preparedness planning, particularly in terms of their plausibility and the

number of scenarios (12 of 15) that are based on terrorist attacks.11
Officials in DHS's Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness said that the scenarios were not ranked according to risk,
noting that this was unnecessary given the purposes for which the
scenarios were developed. They stated that the 15 planning scenarios are
not meant to be proscriptive, predictive, or exhaustive nor were they
intended to be ranked according to risk. According to DHS's National
Preparedness Guidance, the objective of developing the scenarios was to
provide a minimum number of credible scenarios that covered the range of
response requirements. DHS's executive summaries of the planning scenarios
state that the scenarios were not ranked according to risk and probability
because they were developed to test the full range of response
capabilities and resources for federal, state, and local governments as
well as the private sector, each of which could have different risks and
rankings.

As it moved to the step in the process to develop a sense of preparedness
needs and potential capabilities, DHS created a list of tasks that would
be required to manage each of the 15 National Planning Scenarios. Then, in
consultation with federal, state, and local emergency response
stakeholders, it consolidated the list to eliminate redundancies and
create a Universal Task List of over 1,600 discrete tasks. This list was
further refined to identify critical tasks that would need to be performed
at various levels of government to prevent, protect against, respond to,
and recover from large-scale emergency events. Next, DHS identified target
capabilities that encompassed these critical tasks. The relationship
between the scenarios, tasks, and capabilities is shown in figure 4.

11The scope of our work was focused on the extent to which the actions
taken by DHS to enhance first responder skills and abilities encompassed
all hazards, whether the result of nature, accident, or terrorist action.
Thus, our work did not include assessing either the appropriateness of the
scenarios used to identify needed first responder capabilities or the
appropriateness of the tasks and capabilities developed based on those
scenarios.

Figure 4: Scenarios, Tasks, and Capabilities for the National Preparedness
Goal

Source: DHS Interim National Preparedness Goal.

According to DHS, the Universal Task List is intended to include all
unique, potential tasks at all levels of government that are needed to
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all large-scale
emergency events, although every task would not necessarily be applicable
to each of the 15 planning scenarios and no single jurisdiction or agency
would be expected to perform every task. From this universe of potential
tasks, DHS worked with stakeholders to identify a subset of about 300
critical tasks that must be performed during a large-scale event to reduce
loss of life or serious injuries, mitigate significant property damage, or
are essential to the success of a homeland security mission.

The final step of the first stage of DHS's planning process is to decide
goals, requirements, and metrics. To complete this step, DHS, working with
its stakeholders, developed a Target Capabilities List that identifies 36
capabilities needed to perform the critical tasks for the events
illustrated by the 15 scenarios. An example of a desired outcome for the
target capability of mass prophylaxis-prevention of or protective
treatment for disease-is to effectively reach an entire affected
population in time to prevent loss of life and injury. The relationship
between the Universal Task List, critical tasks, and target capabilities
for the pandemic flu scenario is illustrated in figure 5.

Figure 5: Example of Target Capability Development: Pandemic Influenza
Scenario and Resulting Universal Tasks, Critical Tasks, and Target
Capability

Source: GAO analysis of DHS planning scenarios of pandemic influenza event
Universal Task List and Target Capability List.

The Target Capabilities List, according the National Preparedness Goal,
provides guidance on the specific capabilities and levels of capability
that federal, state, local, and tribal first responders will be expected
to develop and maintain. DHS has defined these capabilities generically
and expressed them in terms of desired operational outcomes and essential
characteristics, rather than dictating specific, quantifiable
responsibilities to the various jurisdictions. In the final version of the
National Preparedness Goal, DHS plans to organize classes of jurisdictions
that share similar characteristics such as total population, population
density,

and critical infrastructure into tiers to account for reasonable
differences in capability levels among groups of jurisdictions. According
to the Interim National Preparedness Goal, the purpose of defining these
groups of jurisdictions is to be able to appropriately apportion
responsibility for development and maintenance of capabilities among
levels of government and across these jurisdictional tiers, because both
the risk and the resource base vary considerably among jurisdictions
across the United States.

According to observations from 12 of the first responder departments we
interviewed, radiological and biological attacks are among potential
emergency events they may face which they are least prepared for and most
concerned about their capabilities. However, because these types of
attacks may require that a greater number of capabilities be exercised
simultaneously or that a greater number or wider variety of first
responders be employed to provide specific capabilities, these
capabilities would necessarily be drawn from regional, federal, or private
resources. In this regard the National Response Plan defines the roles and
responsibilities of federal, state, local, private-sector, and
nongovernmental organizations and citizens involved in support of domestic
incident management, noting particularly that when state resources and
capabilities are overwhelmed, state governors are responsible for
requesting federal assistance when it becomes clear that state or tribal
capabilities will be insufficient or have been exceeded or exhausted.

As we have previously reported, state and local resources alone will
likely be insufficient to meet the terrorist threat, given the specialized
resources that are necessary to address some types of terrorist attacks,
the range of governmental services that could be affected, and the vital
role played by private entities in preparing for and mitigating risks.12
Because no single jurisdiction or agency would be expected to perform
every task, possession of a target capability could involve enhancing and
maintaining local resources, ensuring access to regional and federal
resources, or some combination of the two. DHS encourages planning for
regional cooperation and notes in the NRP that mutual aid agreements
provide mechanisms to mobilize and employ resources from neighboring

12GAO, Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the
Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local
Preparedness, GAO-02-550T, (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002).

jurisdictions to support the incident command. Facilitating effective
regional coordination may present some challenges. For example, our work
in the National Capital Region found that no regional coordination methods
had been developed for planning for the use of 15 of the 16 funding
sources we reviewed.13 While the National Capital Region has experience
with working together for regional emergency preparedness and response,
officials from the National Capital Region told us that they had not
worked together to develop plans and coordinate expenditures for the use
of federal funds.

DHS also issued National Preparedness Guidance in April 2005 that provides
information, instructions and examples on how to prepare for
implementation of the goal at the federal, state and local levels of
government. The guidance identifies the most urgent needs for enhancing
national first responder preparedness capabilities in terms of 7 national
priorities: (1) implementation of NRP and NIMS; (2) implementation of the
interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan; (3) expanding regional
cooperation; (4) strengthening capabilities in interoperable
communications; (5) strengthening capabilities in information sharing and
collaboration; (6) strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass
prophylaxis; (7) strengthening capabilities in detection and response for
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons. Our
review also indicated that the National Preparedness Guidance largely
reflects an all-hazards approach and was developed in a manner that
recognizes a range of possible threats and origins. Six of the 7 national
priorities established and described by the guidance are generally
applicable to all hazards. In addition to implementation of the 7 national
priorities, the guidance identifies other all-hazards planning
requirements for federal, state, and local governments.

13GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the
National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and
Performance Goals,

GAO-04-433, (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004).

DHS's Implementation Plans May Address the Need for a Risk-Based,
Strategic National Approach to Enhancing First Responders' All-Hazards
Capabilities, But It Faces Implementation Challenges

National Preparedness Assessment and Reporting Program Implementation Plan

We reported in our 21st century challenges work that federal investments
in national preparedness have not been guided by a clear, risk-based
strategic plan. The objective of the second stage of DHS's capabilities
based planning process is to develop such a plan by creating a decision
framework that will allow first responders at all levels of government to
assess needs, update preparedness strategies, and allocate resources to
address capability gaps and make the greatest improvements in
preparedness. To support its planning efforts in the second stage of
implementing HSPD-8, DHS has developed program implementation plans for
(1) a national assessment and reporting of capability status, (2) an
approach for balancing national investments in capabilities, and (3)
programs for national training, national exercises, and collection and
dissemination of lessons learned and best practices.

To develop these program implementation plans, DHS established task teams
composed of various stakeholders from within DHS as well as
representatives from state and local first responders and representatives
from their professional associations such as the International Association
of Fire Chiefs and Chiefs of Police, and the International Association of
Emergency Managers. These stakeholder groups, called Integrated Concept
Teams, developed the three program implementation requirement plans.
According to DHS, implementation will be led by designated DHS program
management offices along with stakeholders comprised of federal, state,
local, tribal officials and private sector advisors; operational tasks
will be performed by contractors. DHS plans to issue contracts during
fiscal year 2005, to develop systems to meet the goals of the
implementation plans, and complete implementation of the three national
systems by September 30, 2008.

According to DHS's Assessment and Reporting Implementation Plan, DHS
intends to implement an assessment and reporting system to collect
preparedness data to inform decision-makers at all levels on the
capabilities of the federal government, states, local jurisdictions, and
the private sector. According to the plan, DHS intends to collect data
from all governmental recipients of direct funding, using states to
collect data from local jurisdictions and using federal regulatory
agencies and other appropriate sources to collect private-sector data.
According to DHS, aggregating this data at all levels will provide
information needed to allocate resources, execute training and exercises,
and develop an annual status report on the nation's preparedness. The
purpose of the assessment and reporting system is to provide information
about the baseline status of national preparedness and to serve as the
third stage of DHS's capabilitybased planning approach to ensure that
state and local first responder

capabilities fully support the National Preparedness Goal. The proposed
system is to include the following components:

o  	Capability assessment: Using target capabilities, first responders
would be able to assess their preparedness to identify gaps, excesses, or
deficiencies in their existing capabilities or capabilities they will be
expected to access through mutual aid. In addition, this information is to
measure the readiness of federal civil response assets and the use of
federal assistance at the state and local level and provide a means of
assessing how federal assistance programs are supporting the National
Preparedness Goal.

o  	Compliance assessment: By establishing a mechanism for monitoring
compliance with mandated guidance such as compliance with NIMS, and
conformity with guidance on the preparation of homeland security
strategies and grants, the compliance assessment is intended to serve as a
check and balance on the self-reported information in the capability
assessment.

o  	Performance assessment: By using a standardized reporting that
documents performance in specific tasks relevant to the target
capabilities, first responders will be expected to demonstrate
accomplishments in exercises and real-world operations. Part of the
performance assessment is to include corrective action plans to highlight
and address areas in need of improvement.

As DHS implements the assessment and reporting system, it may encounter
several challenges, which were identified by the assessment and reporting
concept team in developing the implementation plan. These challenges
include:

o  	Determining how to aggregate data from federal state, local, and
tribal governments; private sector owners/operators; non-profit agencies;
and citizen volunteers;

o  	Determining assessment timeframes (i.e., snapshot, annual, real time),
and when and how often they should take place;

o  Integrating self-assessment and external assessment approaches; and

o  	Resolving security classification limitations on information sharing
among participants.

National Balanced Investment Implementation Plan

According to DHS's National Balanced Investment Implementation Plan, DHS
intends to establish an approach to support improved investment
decision-making, using the capability, compliance, and performance
information provided by the assessment and reporting system. The purpose
of the balanced investment program, according to the plan, will be to
direct federal preparedness assistance to the highest priority capability
gaps, balanced by significant risk factors. The proposed system is to
include the following components:

o  	All-Hazards Needs Assessment: Using information on preparedness gaps
and redundancies identified by the assessment and reporting system, DHS
intends to use state-developed needs assessments to identify and quantify
planning, equipment, training and exercises, and other organizational
needs. These needs assessments are to include input from the first
responder community, the private sector, the research and academic
community, citizen groups, and tribal entities. DHS plans to direct the
states to prioritize the needs they identify in the needs assessments
based on various factors, including threats and vulnerabilities, tiers,
universal tasks, probability, impact, risk, and cost/benefit analysis.
Then, DHS expects to use the needs assessments to develop guidance,
specifically tailored to state and local funding recipients, to guide the
allocation of federal funding and resources in order to fill capability
gaps.

o  	All-Hazards Preparedness Strategies: Needs assessments will provide a
consistent basis for developing preparedness strategies for federal,
regional, state, urban area, local and tribal first responders. DHS plans
to develop and provide guidance and requirements so that strategies at all
levels will align with the National Preparedness Goal and facilitate
cooperation, mutual aid, and standardization across jurisdictions.

o  	All-Hazards Decision Framework: DHS intends to design a framework for
allocating resources to implement federal, regional, state, urban area,
local and tribal first responders' strategies. Using a structured process
to estimate the relative impact of alternative investments and identify
the optimal mix of investments for funding, DHS plans to assess,
prioritize and develop optimized ranking of potential investments based on
factors such as population concentrations, critical infrastructure and
other significant risk factors.

In the implementation of its balanced investment program DHS intends to
devise a process to prioritize investments in planning, personnel,
equipment, training, and exercises to close capability gaps identified by
the national assessment and reporting system. A key challenge will be
establishing a standardized approach for measuring and reporting the risks

faced by diverse states and localities in order to effectively prioritize
and allocate federal resources. Given that the 15 national planning
scenarios DHS used to identify capability gaps were selected without
regard to relative risk (i.e. probability of occurrence), it is not yet
clear how DHS will prioritize investments in capability gaps on a national
level. We have consistently advocated a risk management approach as a
basis for ensuring that specific programs and related expenditures are
prioritized and properly focused. Although risk management is an evolving
practice, we have encouraged the application of certain key elements of a
risk management approach, including a risk assessment that defines risks
based on the likelihood that they will occur and the consequences of their
occurrence. Another key element of the risk management approach we have
advocated is the identification of risk mitigation alternatives and the
ability to select among those alternatives based on risk, cost, and
effectiveness. The intent of DHS's planned all-hazards decision framework
to prioritize and optimize investments based on population, critical
infrastructure, and other significant risk factors appears to offer the
opportunity for such an approach to managing risk. However, as DHS does
not expect to fully implement its balanced investment program before
October 2008, it continues to operate its federal preparedness assistance
programs without a solid risk-based decision framework, and we were unable
to evaluate whether and the extent to which such a framework will
incorporate these key elements of risk management. For example, it is not
clear how DHS will use the data collected in the all-hazards needs
assessment to consistently and comprehensively prioritize resource
allocations based on national threats and vulnerabilities or how the
department will define acceptable risks as it sets priorities.

National Training and Exercise According to DHS's National Training and
Exercises and Lessons Learned

and Lessons Learned Plan 	Implementation Plan, DHS intends to implement a
system to develop and maintain state and local responders' all-hazards
capabilities. The goal of this system is to provide integrated national
programs for training, exercise, and lessons-learned that will reorient
existing initiatives at all government levels in order to develop,
achieve, and sustain the capabilities that are required to achieve the
National Preparedness Goal. The proposed system is to include the
following components:

o  	National training program: Based on training needs defined by the
Universal Task List, Target Capabilities List, and the National Incident
Management System, the program is intended to provide criteria for
accreditation of training courses, a national directory of accredited
training providers, and a National Minimum Qualification Standards Guide.

o  	National exercise program: This program is intended to reorient the
existing National Exercise Program to incorporate the capabilities-based
planning process and provide standardized guidance and methodologies to
schedule, design, develop, execute, and evaluate exercises at all levels
of government. This program is also intended to provide requirements for
the number and type of exercises that communities of varying sizes should
conduct to meet the National Preparedness Goal.

o  	National lessons-learned program: This program is intended to create a
centralized source for sharing lessons learned information that will be
reviewed and validated at a national level using a standardized reporting
format and process.

DHS faces challenges to coordinate this effort across the many state and
local jurisdictions and among the variety of first responder disciplines.
According to this integrated concept team's meeting minutes, its efforts
were essential in order to develop a management system to ensure there are
standard processes across all agencies. Among other things, DHS faces
challenges related to:

o  Disparate training requirements across disciplines,

o  Different processes to manage training and exercises, and

o  Different terms and definitions among disciplines related to emergency

  Most Preparedness Capabilities Apply to All Emergency Events, but Prevention
  of Terrorist Attacks Requires Unique Capabilities

response functions.

Terrorist attacks share many common characteristics with natural and
accidental disasters. Our analysis of DHS's Target Capabilities List and
our discussions with first responders and other emergency management
stakeholders revealed that the capabilities required to address terrorist
attacks and to address natural and accidental disasters are most similar
for protection, response, and recovery, and differ most for prevention.
More specifically, 30 of the 36 target capabilities yielded by DHS's
capabilities based planning process apply across all types of emergency
events. It is possible that terrorist attacks could be prevented through
actionable intelligence (i.e., information that can lead to stopping or
apprehending terrorists), but there is no known way to prevent natural
disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and tornadoes. Natural or
accidental disasters differ from terrorist attacks in that they are
unintentional and unplanned rather than the result of deliberate, planned
action. It is the deliberate, planned nature of terrorist attacks that
makes preventive efforts for such attacks principally the responsibility
of intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

Terrorist Attacks Share Common Characteristics with Natural and Accidental
Disasters, and Most Preparedness Capabilities are Similar for All
Emergency Events

Because terrorist attacks share many common characteristics with natural
and accidental disasters, many of the capabilities first responders need
to support national preparedness efforts are similar. As shown in table 2,
many terrorist attacks are analogous to natural and accidental disasters.

Table 2: Natural and Accidental Disasters and Terrorist Attacks That Have
Similar Effects

Natural and accidental disasters Terrorist attacks

Fires Arson

Explosions Bombings

Plane/Train Crashes Aviation/Rail Terrorism

Floods Dam/Dike Sabotage

Chemical Spills/Releases Chemical Warfare

Radiological Accidents "Dirty Bombs"

Nuclear Accidents Nuclear Terrorism

Epidemics, Biological Accidents Biological Terrorism

Source: GAO analysis of research and historical information on emergency
events.

For example, chemical attacks would resemble hazardous materials spills
that release similar chemicals on highways or accidents that cause toxic
gases to leak from rail cars, a small-scale biological attack using a
common disease organism would resemble a natural outbreak, the tasks
required to respond following large explosions are analogous to those
necessary for responding to the aftermath of tornadoes, and preparedness
for "dirty bomb" attacks requires practices that responders whose
jurisdictions encompass nuclear power plants regularly exercise, according
to other emergency professionals we consulted and the observations of
selected officials from first responder departments we interviewed. As one
expert explained, managing the Pentagon scene on September 11, 2001,
consisted of five interrelated all-hazards response routines: plane crash,
building fire, collapsed structure, crime scene, and crowd control.
According to DHS officials, their analysis of the Homeland Security
Council's 15 scenarios revealed that approximately 80 percent of necessary
tasks would need to be performed regardless of the scenario. To achieve
the performance of critical homeland security tasks, DHS has adopted an
approach to the implementation of HSPD-8 that centers on building specific
prevention, protection, response, and recovery capabilities within and
among four related homeland security mission areas. Table 3 describes each
mission area.

                    Table 3: Homeland Security Mission Areas

Mission Area Description

Prevent 	Deter all potential terrorists from attacking America, detect
terrorists before they strike, prevent them and their instruments of
terror from entering our country, and take decisive action to eliminate
the threat they pose.

Protect 	Reduce the likelihood of attack on assets or systems and limit
the impact should an attack occur.

Respond 	Implement immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and
meet basic human needs.

Recover 	Develop, coordinate, and execute service-and site-restoration
plans and reconstitute government operations and services through
individual, private sector, nongovernmental, and public assistance
programs.

Source: DHS Target Capabilities List: Version 1.1.

Because of the similarities between the effects of terrorist attacks and
natural or accidental disasters, much of the planning, personnel,
training, and equipment that form the basis of protection, response, and
recovery capabilities are similar across all emergency events, though
certain mission areas are more similar than others. Specifically, our
analysis of DHS's detailed definitions and descriptions of the 36 target
capabilities showed that only 6 of the capabilities are described as being
specific to terrorist attacks. Five of these 6 capabilities fall into
DHS's prevention mission area, and one is in the protection mission area.
The remaining 30 capabilities address preparedness for all hazards. DHS
officials reviewed our analysis and agreed with our assessment of the
relative applicability of the 36 target capabilities to various hazards.
Table 4 lists the 36 target capabilities, the respective homeland security
mission area where the capability is found, and the extent to which the
various components of the capability address preparedness for all
hazards.14

14According to DHS, a capability is comprised of the following 10
components: capability description; expected outcome; emergency support
function/annex; the capabilities' location in the Universal Task List;
associated critical tasks; capability and performance measures; necessary
capability elements (e.g., personnel, planning, and equipment); linked
capabilities; event conditions; and references.

Table 4: Arrangement of DHS's 36 Target Capabilities by Homeland Security
Mission Area and the Relative Emphasis on Terrorism Preparedness for Each

Homeland security mission area Specific to terrorism Applicable to all
hazards

Capabilities common to all mission 1. Interoperable communications areas

2. Planning

Prevention capabilities 1. 	Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
and explosive detection

2. Terrorism investigation and intervention

3. Information collection and threat recognition

4. Information sharing and collaboration

5. Intelligence fusion and analysis

Protection capabilities 6. Critical infrastructure protection against
terrorist 3. Citizen preparedness and attack participation

4. 	Food and agriculture safety and defense

5. 	Public health epidemiological investigation and laboratory testing

6. Risk analysis

Response capabilities 7. Animal health emergency support

8. 	Citizen protection: evacuation and/or in place protection

9. 	Critical resource logistics and distribution

10. Emergency operations center management

11. Emergency public information and warning

12. Environmental health and vector control

13. Explosive device response operations

14. Fatality management

15. Firefighting operations/support

16. Isolation and quarantine

17. Mass care (sheltering, feeding, and related services)

18. Mass prophylaxis

19. Medical supplies management and distribution

20. Medical surge

21. On-site incident management

 Homeland security mission area Specific to terrorism Applicable to all hazards

22. Public safety and security response

23. Search and rescue

24. Triage and pre-hospital treatment

25. Volunteer management and donations

26. Weapons of mass destruction/hazardous materials response and
decontamination

27. Worker health and safety Recovery capabilities 28. Economic and
community recovery

29. Restoration of lifelines

30. Structural damage assessment and mitigation

Source: GAO Analysis of DHS Target Capabilities List: Version 1.1.

Although almost all target capabilities in the areas of protection,
response, and recovery are similar across emergency events, terrorist
attacks could require that more of the specific prevention, protection,
response, or recovery capabilities be exercised simultaneously, or that a
greater number or wider variety of capability elements (e.g., personnel,
planning, and equipment) could be employed to provide the capability.
Nonetheless, many emergency response representatives we consulted agreed
that substantial overlap exists between capabilities that are needed for
natural and accidental disasters and those that are needed for terrorist
attacks. These shared capabilities would allow for the performance of
broad tasks such as controlling entry to emergency areas, recovering
victims, treating the ill and injured, providing basic living needs for
survivors and their families, transporting the dead, restoring essential
services, handling public inquiries, providing a basis for recovery, and
maintaining law and order.

Prevention Capabilities Differ for Terrorism Because of a Reliance on
Actionable Intelligence

Terrorist attacks differ from natural and accidental disasters because
they are intentionally perpetrated acts that could possibly be prevented
or deterred. As a result, all five of the prevention capabilities on DHS's
target capabilities list focus exclusively on terrorist attacks. Although
first responders from the law enforcement community are active in the
prevention of crime, and all terrorist attacks are crimes, the prevention
of terrorist attacks differs from traditional crime prevention in its
heavy reliance on actionable intelligence-information that can lead to
stopping or apprehending terrorists. Reflecting this reliance within the
prevention

mission area are the capabilities to collect information of value to
counterterrorism and analyze this intelligence for possible threats;
recognize the wider threat picture and potentially harmful patterns that
may emerge from collected intelligence; and share this intelligence across
disciplines and jurisdictions. Reliance on actionable intelligence also is
used within the prevention mission area to support investigation of
terrorist activities and to interdict weapons of mass destruction by
preventing the import, transport, manufacture, or release of chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive materials. During our
interviews, 29 of 52 first responder departments who replied to a question
about the extent to which prevention capabilities differ between terrorist
and other emergencies said that terrorism prevention is either more
different than similar or very different.

Protection Capabilities for Terrorist Attacks and Natural or Accidental
Disasters Are Similar, Even Though DHS Identifies Protection of Critical
Infrastructure in Terms of Terrorist Attacks

Although the Target Capabilities List states that the purpose of
protection capabilities is to reduce the likelihood of attack and to limit
the damage should an attack occur, four of the five capabilities that
compose this mission area could also be applied to limit the damage from
natural and accidental disasters. For example, the protection mission area
includes capabilities such as the identification and prioritization of
hazards, vulnerabilities, and risks; the identification and eradication of
contaminants in the nation's food supply; the investigation of disease
outbreaks, both deliberate and naturally occurring; and the involvement of
citizens in exercises and ongoing volunteer programs.

The only protection capability that DHS links exclusively to terrorist
attacks is Critical Infrastructure Protection.15 This capability is
intended to reduce the threat to and vulnerability of high-risk targets
such as the nation's infrastructure. The capability summary states that
this capability applies to all terrorist attack scenarios. However, many
of the critical tasks that compose this capability are traditional
mitigation activities: pre-event actions that involve lasting, often
permanent reduction of the exposure to, probability of, or potential loss
from a variety of emergency events. These actions could include tasks as
simple as fastening bookshelves to walls to keep them from falling during
earthquakes or as involved as rewriting building codes and zoning
ordinances to minimize

15The Target Capabilities List includes in the Critical Infrastructure
Protection capability those systems and assets, whether physical or
virtual, that are so vital to the United States that their incapacity or
destruction would have a debilitating impact on the country.

future flood damage. These types of actions are applicable to multiple
emergency scenarios-for example, installing shatterproof glass protects
against damage and injury from flying glass in the event of both a heavy
storm and a terrorist bombing. Similarly, taking protective measures to
improve the safety of rail cars in a mass transit system-an example of a
vital system as described in the Critical Infrastructure Protection
capability-could reduce the damage from terrorist attacks while also
mitigating the effects of accidental collisions.

Response Capabilities Apply Across All Emergency Types

DHS's response mission area includes 21 response capabilities that are
each applicable to terrorist attacks and to natural and accidental
disasters. Examples of response capabilities include the ability to:
manage an emergency operations center; relocate affected and at-risk
members of the population to safer areas through emergency evacuation;
advise and update citizens through emergency public information; conduct
and support fire suppression operations; isolate and quarantine
individuals who are ill, exposed, or likely to be exposed during a
contagious disease outbreak; provide mass prophylaxis following the onset
of a biological event; distribute medical supplies and provide adequate
medical evaluation and care during events that exceed the limits of the
normal medical capacity of an affected community-referred to as medical
surge; direct and control an emergency event site through an incident
command system; coordinate and conduct search and rescue operations in
collapsed structures; and protect first responder health and safety during
a response. During our interviews, 37 of 54 first responder departments
who replied to a question about the extent to which response differs
between terrorist incidents and natural or accidental disasters stated
that terrorism response is either more similar than different or very
similar.

For example, the capability to distribute medical supplies and manage a
medical surge could be needed in both a terrorist attack and a natural
disaster. According to the Homeland Security Council, the number of
uninjured or "worried well" who sought medical treatment after the 9/11
World Trade Center attack was approximately 15 times the number of people
who sought medical treatment due to smoke inhalation. According to one
public health official we interviewed, physicians would observe a similar
"worried well" phenomenon in non-terrorism scenarios, for example, among
otherwise healthy patients who incorrectly attribute common symptoms to a
feared severe acute respiratory syndrome or SARS infection.

The capability to successfully disrupt and dispose of an explosive device,
though generally directed toward an intentional act, is not limited to
terrorism preparedness. Eliminating explosive devices of varying sizes and
sophistication is part of a police department's regular operations, and
many public safety agencies had bomb squads dedicated to this purpose
before the attacks of September, 11, 2001, focused the nation's attention
on terrorism.

One of the capabilities in the response mission area-Weapons of Mass
Destruction/Hazardous Incident Response and Decontamination- explicitly
includes weapons of mass destruction in its title, indicating that the
capability may be terrorism-focused. However, this capability is combined
with the capability to respond to all hazardous materials sites.
Therefore, it is by definition an all-hazards capability. In the case of
weapons of mass destruction, however, depending upon the size of the
weapon, an emergency event could require that a host of related response
and recovery capabilities be exercised simultaneously and that a greater
number or wider variety of first responders be asked to deliver these
capabilities than might typically occur during a natural or accidental
disaster.

Initial awareness of the possibility of terrorist involvement has become
part of first responders' protocols for responding to any event. For
example, officials from 5 first responder departments we met with said
that they have developed protocols for entering the site of an incident
and have heightened their awareness of secondary devices or attacks. These
protocols have increasingly become part of the standard response to any
emergency event because responders must consider attacks that are intended
to kill and injure response personnel and to otherwise impede response
efforts. One fire department official explained that the events of
September 11, 2001, raised the department's general awareness level and
that, in the post-9/11 environment, response personnel are likely to think
of terrorism first when a catastrophic event occurs, which may lead to a
greater assessment of the situation before entering the scene. Moreover,
according to local fire department officials we visited in several
locations, fire departments have long been aware of secondary events, like
explosions or collapsing structures; the difference now is the possible
presence of intent, which means that these secondary events may be
targeted instead of random, and thus may be more likely to kill, injure,
and destroy.

Recovery Capabilities for Terrorist Attacks Apply Across All Emergency
Types

  Federal Funding For Enhancing First Responders' Preparedness Capabilities
  Emphasizes Terrorism but Can Be Applied to All Hazards

There are three capabilities that compose DHS's recovery mission area, and
all three are all-hazards in nature. They consist of the capability to:
conduct damage and safety assessments in public and private structures;
restore transportation, communication, utilities, and other essential
services; and implement short-term and long-term economic and community
recovery processes. During our interviews, 31 of 51 first responder
departments who replied to the question about the extent to which recovery
differs between terrorist incidents and natural or accidental disasters
said that recovery capabilities were either more similar than different or
very similar. For example, a community's buildings would need to be
assessed after an earthquake or after a terrorist attack that topples
multiple structures. The capability to restore transportation services
would also be necessary whether a city's bus service has been suspended
due to a winter storm or to a terrorist bombing. Long-term recovery
processes may be necessary in the case of terrorist events that result in
long-term or permanent evacuation from a geographic area: for example, an
intentional radiological release could contaminate the surrounding area in
the same way that accidental releases have done in past radiological
events. In this way, the aftermath of largescale terrorist events could be
similar to the long-term or permanent evacuation from flood zones and
environmentally-compromised hazardous waste sites.

Federal grant funding since September 11, 2001, has largely emphasized
enhancing first responders' capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks.
Legislative language has directed DHS to use these funds chiefly to
prevent, protect, respond to and recover from acts of terrorism.
Additionally, HSPD-8 directs DHS to take an all-hazards approach to
national emergency preparedness with a special emphasis on terrorism. As a
result, DHS grant guidance has contained, in large part, explicit
direction that state and local grant recipients use the funds to enhance
first responders' capabilities for terrorist attacks. State preparedness
officials and local first responders we interviewed said that DHS's
emphasis for grant funding was too heavily focused on terrorism; rather,
they preferred to invest in dual use equipment and training (i.e., could
be used for all hazards, whether the source was a terrorist act or a
natural or accidental disaster.) In response, DHS promoted flexibility to
allow such dual usage within the grant program requirements for fiscal
year 2005, according to DHS officials. To ensure grant funds are used for
their designated purpose, the states and localities we visited reported
they all have financial controls methods and monitoring procedures in
place designed to ensure that

whatever flexibilities for dual uses exist, they remain within DHS's
program guidelines.

DHS Grant Funding for First Responders Has Focused on Terrorism

DHS grant programs have largely focused on enhancing first responders'
capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks based on HSPD-8 and
legislation that emphasize preparedness assistance for catastrophic
terrorism as the highest priority for federal funding. For example, HSPD-8
directs DHS to take an all-hazards approach to national emergency
preparedness assistance and directs the department to place special
emphasis on terrorism in doing so.16 Moreover, legislative requirements
associated with the larger grant programs for first responders focus on
terrorist attacks, while smaller grant programs focus on all-hazards
preparedness. For example, the legislative requirements associated with
the 3 largest grant programs specify that funds be used for preparedness
against terrorist attacks:

o  	State Homeland Security Grant program funds are to be used to enhance
the capability of state and local jurisdictions to prepare, for and
respond to, acts of terrorism, including those involving the use of
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive weapons.17

o  	Urban Area Security Initiative grant funds are to be used to enhance
high threat, high density urban areas' ability to prepare for and respond
to threats or acts of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.18

16See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8, paras. (5),
(10)-(11), 39 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1822 (Dec. 22, 2003).

17See United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001
S: 1014(a), 42 U.S.C. S: 3714(a).

18See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-10, at 637 (2003); Emergency Wartime
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-11, tit. I, ch. 6,
117 Stat. 559, 583 (Apr. 16, 2003); Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137, 1146 (Oct.
1, 2003); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub.

L. No. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1298, 1309 (Oct. 18, 2004).

o  	The Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program is, as its name
suggests, to provide funds to assist state and local law enforcement
communities in their activities to prevent terrorist attacks.19

The only other first responder grant programs that received an
appropriation of greater than $100 million in fiscal year 2005 were two
long standing programs that have historically had an all-hazards focus:

o  	The Emergency Management Performance Grant program was authorized to
provide emergency management planning and assistance to states for
multi-hazard preparedness and mitigation.20

o  	The Assistance to Firefighters Grant program provides assistance to
fire departments for the purpose of protecting the health and safety of
the public and firefighting personnel against fire and fire-related
hazards, including incidents of terrorism or use of weapons of mass
destruction.21

As shown in figure 6, almost 3 of every 4 grant dollars appropriated to
DHS for first responders in fiscal year 2005 were for 3 primary programs
that had an explicit focus on terrorism. Congress appropriated almost $2.4
billion in fiscal year 2005 for the three largest grant programs: the
State Homeland Security Grant program (about $1.1 billion), the Urban Area
Security Initiative ($885 million) and the Law Enforcement Terrorism
Prevention Program ($400 million). Congress appropriated about $960
million in fiscal year 2005 for all-hazards grant programs: the Emergency
Management Performance Grant program ($180 million), the Assistance to
Firefighters Grant program ($715 million), and other grant programs ($65
million)-such as Citizen Corps and the Metropolitan Medical Response
System.

19See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137, 1146 (Oct. 1, 2003); Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1298,
1309 (Oct. 18, 2004) (both appropriating funds pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S:
3714).

20See Act of Oct. 20, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-74, tit. III, 113 Stat. 1047,
1086 (codified at 42 U.S.C. S: 5195 note).

21See Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974 S:S: 33(b),
34(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. S:S: 2229(b), 2229a(a)(1)(A).

Figure 6: Most Fiscal Year 2005 DHS First Responder Grant Funding Is for
Three Programs that Focus On Terrorism

Emergency Management Performance Grants

Assistance to Firefigthers Grant

Other grants

Urban Area

Prevention Program

Terrorism focus

Source: GAO analysis of fiscal year 2005 congressional appropriations to
DHS programs.

Our analysis of appropriations between fiscal years 2001 and 2005 for
these key first responder grant programs showed that while funding for all
grant programs increased substantially, funding for grant programs with an
all-hazards emergency management focus increased at a lesser rate than
funding for terrorism-specific programs, as shown in figure 7. This
increase in terrorism-focused funding was due mainly to the funding
increases for appropriated programs related to the State Homeland Security
Grant program and the Urban Area Security Initiative grant program, which
increased from about $109 million and $21 million, respectively, in fiscal
year 2001, to almost $1.1 billion and $885 million, respectively, in
fiscal year 2005.22

22For the purpose of this analysis we used the amount of funds
appropriated in fiscal years 2001 and 2002 for the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
program on which the Urban Area Security Initiative program was based,
beginning in fiscal year 2003.

Figure 7: DHS Grant Funding for Terrorism versus All Hazards, Fiscal Years
2001 to 2005 and Projected for Fiscal Year 2006

Grant funding (in millions of dollars)

                                    3,925.0

$4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 (proposed)

Terrorism

All hazards

Combined total

Source: GAO analysis of legislative appropriations to DHS programs and DHS
budget request for fiscal year 2006.

For fiscal year 2006, the Administration has proposed spending almost $3.4
billion for homeland security preparedness grants, continuing DHS's
emphasis on terrorism and spending about 3 of every 4 dollars or about
$2.6 billion for terrorism-focused grant programs.23 About $720 million
would go toward those grant programs with an all-hazards emergency
management focus. The Administration's budget request also proposes to
merge the program activities currently under the terrorism-focused grant
programs by merging the program activities under the Law Enforcement
Terrorism Prevention Program into the State Homeland Security Grant and
the Urban Area Security Initiative. Under this proposal states and
localities would be required to earmark no less than 20 percent of their
spending under these programs toward terrorism prevention activities.
Finally, the fiscal year 2006 budget request reflects a continuation of

23In addition to providing $1.02 billion funding each to the State
Homeland Security Grant program and the Urban Area Security Initiative,
about $600 million is proposed for the creation of a new state and local
homeland security assistance program called the Targeted Infrastructure
Protection Program. This proposed program would provide funding to enhance
security at ports, transit systems and other infrastructure identified by
DHS and would replace the current discretionary grants for ports, rail,
intercity bus and trucking.

decreased funding for the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program. In
fiscal year 2006, the proposed budget for this program is $500 million
compared to $715 million in fiscal year 2005 and $750 million in fiscal
year 2004.

More than 87,000 state and local jurisdictions across the nation are
potentially eligible to receive first responder grants funds. Legislative
funding criteria affect allocation of these funds to states who in turn
allocate funds to local first responders. For example, the fiscal year
2005 Homeland Security Grant Program, allocated a minimum of 0.75 percent
of the available first-responder funding to each state, which accounted
for 40 percent of the total allocations for this program.24 Alternative
approaches for the formula to allocate State Homeland Security Program
grants with varying degrees of attention to the risks and threats of
terrorism and natural or accidental disasters are being considered by
Congress. For example, one proposed change in this formula would focus
mainly on higher population areas with critical infrastructure that may be
more attractive to terrorists. This approach is currently the basis for
the Urban Area Security Initiative program funds that are provided to 50
selected urban areas that are chosen on the basis of population,
population density, presence of critical national infrastructure, threat
and presence of mutual aid compacts.

Some First Responders Disagreed With Emphasis of Federal Grant Programs on
Terror and Expressed Concerns about Current and Future Funding

The priorities of some first responders we interviewed did not align with
DHS's priorities for enhancing capabilities. For example, during our
interviews, 31 of 39 first responder departments who replied to a question
about DHS's training programs, exercise activities and grant funds,
disagreed that these were focused on all-hazards. In addition, officials
from four first responder departments went on to say that DHS required too
much emphasis on terrorism-related activities in requests for equipment
and training-for example, combating weapons of mass destruction and
preventing and responding to terrorist attacks using

24Including the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
along with other territories that receive 0.25 percent under the
allocation formula.

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive materials.25
However, responders said that they had a greater need for assistance
preparing for natural and accidental disasters. During our interviews, 37
of the 69 first responder departments who responded to a question about
the programmatic challenges they face cited the need for additional
flexibility from DHS or state agencies in order to use grant funds to
enhance their ability to respond to events that were more likely to occur
in their jurisdictions. State and local officials said they have been able
to identify uses for most of the training and equipment they receive that
include both terrorism and other hazards. Moreover, local first responder
departments and state officials we interviewed also noted that they
favored dual-use purchases for many reasons: to prevent equipment from
"rotting on the shelf," according to one official; to maintain a level of
comfort and proficiency with equipment on hand for counterterrorism by
using it for everyday responses; and to build stronger all-hazards
capabilities that will allow them to better respond to terrorist attacks.

We have reported in the past that achieving national preparedness and
response goals hinges on the federal government's ability to form
effective partnerships with nonfederal stakeholders.26 By working
collectively with state and local governments, the federal government
gains the resources and expertise of the people closest to the challenge.
Just as partnerships offer opportunities, they also create challenges
based upon the different interests reflected by each partner. From the
federal perspective, there is the concern that state and local governments
may not share the same priorities for use of federal funds. For example,
in 10 first responder departments we interviewed, officials pointed out
that they were much more likely to face the threat of hurricanes, floods,
or wildland fires than an attack by terrorists using weapons of mass
destruction or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive
materials and that their priorities focused on fortifying their efforts to
deal with these natural and accidental disasters. In addition, 61 first
responder departments we

25Planned expenditures for equipment represented 78 percent and 74
percent, respectively, of the state and local first responder grant
activities under both the State Homeland Security Grant and the Urban Area
Security Initiative, while about 10 percent of fiscal year 2004 funds were
used for planning, the next highest category, according to DHS Annual
Report on Preparedness Funding Fiscal Year 2004 (Washington, D.C.,
December 2004). Planned expenditures for equipment were over $1.5 billion
under the State Homeland Security Grant, and over $456 million under the
Urban Area Security Initiative.

26GAO, Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key
to Success, GAO-02-1013T (Washington, D.C.; August 23, 2002).

interviewed reported that their emergency operations plans and procedures
are all-hazards plans and structured around the full range of potential
emergencies, incidents and risks.

In response, DHS promoted flexibility to allow such dual usage within the
grant program requirements for fiscal year 2005, according to DHS
officials. Officials from the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness said that the majority of the assistance
they offer to state and local first responders is required to be linked to
emergency management tasks related to terrorist attacks but that some
authorized equipment, training, and exercises can be used for emergencies
that are not related to terrorism. Officials stated, even prior to fiscal
year 2005, grant requirements allowed for dual usage and state grantees
are responsible for contacting DHS when questions regarding application of
grant guidelines arise. They also said that although the DHS equipment
list was not created with the intention that equipment would be used for
nonterrorism purposes, flexibility for dual use was reasonable,
acceptable, and expected. Given that DHS now defines its targets for
protection, response and recovery capabilities in terms of all-hazards
applicability, approved training and equipment that are intended to
enhance these capabilities of first responders inherently have an
all-hazards applicability.

First responders we interviewed also expressed concerns about both current
and sustained future funding for the personnel, training, and equipment
they need to respond to large-scale emergency events. In addition to the
start-up costs-the initial investment in new equipment and training needed
to enhance first responders' capabilities-the costs of maintaining
equipment, providing ongoing training and exercises for responders, and
replenishing perishable supplies and stock are also likely to be
significant. During our interviews, 48 of 69 first responder departments
who replied to a question about challenges said their departments faced
funding challenges for personnel, maintenance, equipment, training, and
multi-year funding sources for sustaining preparedness capabilities. In
addition, in 59 of 69 first responder departments we visited first
responders cited multi-year funding as one of their top program
challenges. For example, officials from three state and local departments
we interviewed observed that a connection exists between multi-year
funding and sustainability because without multi-year funding, local first
responders cannot commit to sustaining the equipment purchased on an
ongoing basis. One first responder official worried that their department
is buying new equipment but were concerned that DHS might not provide
future funding for them to sustain the equipment. In another locality,
officials told us that equipment they had purchased could

not be maintained without continued DHS assistance. In response to these
types of concerns, state and local officials have different options to
ensure that capabilities can be sustained; for example, contracts for
equipment purchases could be designed to include maintenance during the
useful life of the equipment, according to DHS.

States and Localities Report Having Financial Controls and Procedures to
Ensure Compliance with Program Guidelines

The states and localities we visited reported they have financial controls
and procedures in place designed to ensure that whatever flexibilities for
dual uses exist, they remain within DHS's program guidelines. State
governments and local first responders we visited identified various
purchasing controls and monitoring procedures that are in place at
different levels of government to review the purchase of goods and
services. For example, first responder departments that we met with said
they are required to submit their grant requests to other local, state or
regional government bodies, or steering committees. In some cases these
interagency committees were made up of multiple jurisdictions and multiple
first responder disciplines working collaboratively to develop the annual
list of equipment and training programs to be acquired for those
jurisdictions. State preparedness agencies and local first responders also
identified internal review processes that exist within the state's
administrative agency for homeland security grants and local internal
controls. We have previously reported on the management of first responder
grant programs and efforts to improve accountability and have examined
these procedures and processes in greater detail.27 In February

2005, we reported that in fiscal year 2004, DHS completed site visits to
44 of 56 states and territories that received grants as part of its
monitoring of states' grant reporting and state homeland security strategy
implementation. We also reported that in fiscal year 2004 DHS revised its
method of reporting on grant expenditures, moving away from requiring
itemized lists of expenditures toward a more results-based approach where
grant managers must demonstrate how grant expenditures link to larger
projects that support one or more goals in the states' homeland security
strategies. Finally, in the absence of some basic, comparable standards
for first responder performance, it has been difficult to assess the
effect of grant expenditures on first responder capabilities and
performance.

27See GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs
and Efforts to Improve Accountability Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-530T
(Washington, D.C.; April 12, 2005); GAO, Emergency Preparedness: Federal
Funds for First Responders, GAO-04-788T (Washington, D.C.; May 13, 2004);
and GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs
Has Improved, but Challenges Remain,

GAO-05-121, (Washington, D.C.; Feb. 2, 2005).

Concluding Observations

Prior to September 11, 2001, the federal government's role in supporting
emergency preparedness and management was limited primarily to providing
guidance and grants for planning, mitigation, and equipment before
large-scale disasters like floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, and
response and recovery assistance after such disasters. Since September 11,
2001, the federal government has awarded billions of dollars to state and
local governments for planning, equipment, and training to enhance the
capabilities of first responders to respond to terrorist attacks and, to a
lesser extent, natural and accidental disasters. These extensive resources
reflect a growing federal role in promoting emergency preparedness.
However, as we reported in our 21st century challenges work, this federal
financial assistance has not been guided by a clear, risk-based strategic
plan that would provide a basis for realistic budgeting and resource
planning. Ultimately, the federal government must determine how much
developing and maintaining the national emergency preparedness
capabilities needed for homeland security will cost and what the nation's
federal, state and local governments can afford to pay. DHS, as the
primary executive department with responsibilities for national emergency
preparedness efforts, faces the challenge of working with state and local
governments to coordinate preparedness activities and formulate realistic
budgets and resource plans to share these costs and support and sustain
implementation of an efficient and effective an all-hazards national
preparedness program.

DHS's development of an all-hazards national preparedness goal, along with
related products and program implementation plans and requirements, if
properly planned and executed, may help guide the development of realistic
budget and resource plans. However, DHS may confront several challenges in
its attempts to fully realize the preparedness goal and implement the
three programs described by its program implementation plans. For example,
DHS's assessment and reporting implementation plan, intended to accurately
identify the status of capabilities at the state, regional, and local
levels is vital for establishing a baseline and providing an ongoing
feedback loop, upon which decisions at these multiple levels of government
about preparedness needs will rest. However, DHS plans to rely extensively
on self-reported data. Therefore, as the team that devised DHS's
assessment and reporting implementation plan pointed out, it is likely to
be a challenge for DHS to determine how to aggregate data from multiple
governmental and nongovernmental emergency preparedness actors. An
effective assessment system will also have to balance self-assessment
approaches with appropriate external assessment checks in order to provide
consistent and accurate data that can drive these budgeting and resource
planning decisions.

A related challenge DHS may face is in continuing to coordinate efforts to
enhance first responder all-hazards capabilities among and across various
states and jurisdictions and to manage stakeholder expectations. First,
DHS's tiered approach to defining first responders' required capabilities-
either to possess or to secure access-suggests that finding effective
approaches for local jurisdictions to work together to develop funding
plans and coordinate expenditures for the use of federal funds for
regional emergency preparedness and response will be an important step in
the process of developing a realistic budget. However, as our work on
emergency preparedness in the National Capital Region demonstrates,
facilitating effective regional coordination can be particularly
challenging. Additionally, as we have reported, achieving national
preparedness and response goals hinges on the federal government's ability
to work collectively with state and local governments in order to leverage
resources and expertise. Inconsistent expectations about dual use and
concerns about how to coordinate the national training and exercise
program, among other things, illustrate the importance of careful
attention to establishing and maintaining strong nonfederal partnerships.

Finally, DHS's proposal for a national system to balance resource
investments may help to provide a strategic, risk-based approach to
prioritize federal, state and local resource investments, to the extent
that the department uses a systematic, comprehensive risk management
approach. We have consistently advocated such a risk based approach to
guide federal investments in homeland security that would consider
threats, vulnerabilities, and criticalities, as well as the expected value
of investments in developing first responders' capabilities to prevent
terrorist attacks and to protect critical infrastructure balanced with the
potential costs of developing and maintaining capabilities for responding
and recovering from all types of emergency events. Such an approach could
provide a basis to formulate realistic budget and resource plans at the
national level. The intent of DHS's planned all-hazards decision framework
to prioritize and optimize investments based on population, critical
infrastructure, and other significant risk factors appears to offer the
opportunity for such an approach to managing risk; however establishing a
standardized approach for measuring and reporting the risks faced by
diverse states and localities in order to effectively prioritize and
allocate federal resources will be a key challenge. Moreover, as DHS does
not expect to fully implement its balanced investment program before 2008,
it continues to operate its federal preparedness assistance programs
without a solid risk-based decision framework, and it is not yet clear
whether and to what extent, when established, the proposed framework will
incorporate the key elements of risk management that we recommend.

Agency Comments 	We provided a draft of this report to DHS, which had no
comments or concerns with the information included in this report. DHS
also provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate.

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days from the date of this letter. We then plan to provide copies of this
report to the Secretary of DHS. Copies of this report will also be made
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-8777 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this
report is listed in appendix IV.

William O. Jenkins Jr. Director, Homeland Security

and Justice Issues

Page 46 GAO-05-652 Homeland Security

                      Page 47 GAO-05-652 Homeland Security

                      Page 48 GAO-05-652 Homeland Security

                      Page 49 GAO-05-652 Homeland Security

                      Page 50 GAO-05-652 Homeland Security

                      Page 51 GAO-05-652 Homeland Security

                      Page 52 GAO-05-652 Homeland Security

Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 8

Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 8

Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 8

Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 8

Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 8

Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 8

Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 8

Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 8

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope and Methodology

This report addresses the following questions: 1) What actions has DHS
taken to provide policies and strategies that promote the development of
the all-hazards emergency management capabilities of first responders?

2) How do first responders' emergency management capabilities for
terrorist attacks compare to capabilities needed for natural or accidental
disasters? 3) What emphasis has DHS placed on funding awarded to state and
local first responders to enhance all-hazards emergency management
capabilities?

To address these questions, we met with local first responder officials in
ten states (California, Florida, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Washington) and 31
local jurisdictions with a total of 69 first responder departments. We
selected states and localities to reflect variations in dimensions such
as: geographic diversity; population density including metropolitan and
nonmetropolitan locations; fiscal capacity differences between states;
critical infrastructure issues such as ports and international borders;
governmental structure differences at the local level (local focus versus
strong county government structure); differences in the states' homeland
security/emergency management organization and leadership models; and a
sample of states containing sovereign American Indian tribal lands. Within
each state we selected a sample of two to three localities, such as a
combination of jurisdictions for our visits, in order to maximize the
range of dimension described above. For example, we visited one of the
large urban areas within the state along with an adjacent suburban
jurisdiction. We also visited medium, small cities, rural jurisdictions or
Indian tribes. These local site visits included seven localities that
received Urban Area Security Initiative funding for fiscal years 2004 and
2005-Detroit, Michigan; Charlotte, North Carolina; Kansas City, Missouri;
San Diego, California; Tampa, Florida; New York, New York; and Seattle,
Washington-that we identified after selecting which states to visit. At
the local jurisdictions we visited, we requested to meet with first
responder officials from the following departments: fire and emergency
medical services, law enforcement, emergency management, public health and
public works. We also selected two American Indian tribes that possessed
their own public safety departments-police and fire-to identify some of
the challenges and issues that these jurisdictions face. Our selection of
localities was to some extent dependent on the availability of officials
to meet with us, travel schedule limitations, and our effort to avoid any
respondent's bias due to overlaps with recent and current GAO engagement
teams. Because of the manner in which we selected our locations, our
results, however, cannot be generalized beyond the individual locations.

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope and Methodology

Using a structured interview guide, we solicited local first responder
officials' insights and perspectives on a variety of topics, including:
the extent to which DHS uses an all-hazards approach in assisting state
and local first responders' emergency management capabilities, how DHS
coordinates its activities, how locations use federal homeland security
grant funds, what mechanisms DHS has in place to ensure that grant funds
are spent in accordance with grant guidelines, how local departments
assess and report their preparedness status, what gaps, if any, they
believe exist between current and needed capabilities in selected
locations, and what challenges, if any, they face in their emergency
management responsibilities.

Using a similar structured interview guide, we asked similar questions to
states' office of emergency management, their homeland security office,
their State Administrative Agency point of contact who is the official
recipient of DHS grants, and state-level public health officials.

In addition, we met with officials from various professional organizations
that represent state government organizations and first responders to
capture their insights and perspectives on the extent to which DHS has
used an all-hazards approach in assisting state and local first
responders' emergency management capabilities, and how DHS coordinates
these activities externally with state and local first responders.

To determine what actions DHS has taken to provide policies and strategies
that promote the development of the all-hazards emergency management
capabilities of first responders, we reviewed DHS products developed to
comply with Presidential Homeland Security Directives 5 and

8. We reviewed the final documents for the National Incident Management
System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP). We also obtained and
analyzed documents related to the development of the National Preparedness
Goal and its related products that were developed by DHS and the Office of
State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness in order to
implement HSPD-8. These documents include the National Planning Scenarios,
Universal Task List and Target Capabilities List, the Interim National
Preparedness Goal, National Preparedness Guidance and program
implementation plans for balancing national investments and resources,
training and exercises, and assessment and reporting. Our work did not
include assessing either the appropriateness of the scenarios used to
identify needed first responder capabilities or the tasks and capabilities
developed based on neither those scenarios, nor DHS's process and
resulting work on the three program implementation plans.

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope and Methodology

In addition, we met with DHS officials from the Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness, including the Office for
Domestic Preparedness. We also met with officials from DHS's Emergency
Preparedness and Response directorate, which includes the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. Finally, we met with officials from 3 of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's 10 regional offices- Atlanta, Kansas
City and Seattle-selected in order to capture one regional office in an
eastern, central and western location, and selected based on the states
and localities we selected for our site visits.

To determine how first responders' emergency management capabilities for
terrorist attacks differ from capabilities needed for natural or
accidental disasters, we reviewed relevant research on homeland security
and domestic preparedness developed by professional organizations and
other subject matter experts and research organizations. We also reviewed
the documents developed by DHS's Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness designed to establish a National
Preparedness Goal. These included various drafts of the National
Preparedness Goal and Guidance, the Target Capabilities List, the
Universal Task List, and the National Planning Scenarios. We also met with
officials from first responder departments and professional associations,
as described above, to address this question.

To determine the emphasis on grant funding awarded to state and local
first responders to enhance all-hazards emergency management capabilities,
we reviewed DHS budget information and authorizing and appropriations
legislation. We also asked first responders a series of questions related
to DHS funding and their perceptions of DHS grant guidance and, at our
meetings with the professional organizations that represent state
government organizations and first responders, we asked similar questions
to obtain their views on these issues.

We conducted our work from May 2004 through May 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact William O. Jenkins Jr. (202) 512-8777

Acknowledgments 	Mr. Christopher Keisling was the Assistant Director for
this report. In addition to the contact named above, David A. Brown, James
Cook, Alice Feldsman, Kathryn Godfrey, Wil Holloway, Dawn Locke, Nettie
Richards, and John Vocino made key contributions to this report.

  GAO's Mission

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies;
and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help
Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's
commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts newly
released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To have
GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates."

Order by Mail or Phone 	The first copy of each printed report is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out
to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25
percent. Orders should be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: 	Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061

  To Report Fraud, Contact:

Waste, and Abuse in Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: [email protected] Programs Automated answering system: (800)
424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4400Congressional U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street
NW, Room 7125 Relations Washington, D.C. 20548

Public Affairs 	Paul Anderson, Managing Director, [email protected] (202)
512-4800 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548

                           PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
*** End of document. ***