Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key
Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside
of Embassies (09-MAY-05, GAO-05-642).				 
                                                                 
U.S. government officials working overseas are at risk from	 
terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have been	 
attacked--23 fatally--by terrorists outside the embassy. As the  
State Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies,
terrorist groups are likely to focus on "soft" targets--such as  
homes, schools, and places of worship. GAO was asked to determine
whether State has a strategy for soft target protection; assess  
State's efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families	 
while traveling to and from work; assess State's efforts overseas
to improve security at schools attended by the children of U.S.  
officials; and describe issues related to protection at their	 
residences.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-642 					        
    ACCNO:   A23699						        
  TITLE:     Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully	      
Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist
Attacks Outside of Embassies					 
     DATE:   05/09/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Americans employed abroad				 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Dependents 					 
	     Embassies						 
	     Employee training					 
	     Facility security					 
	     Foreign policies					 
	     Schools						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 

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GAO-05-642

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO	Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
     and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
                                Representatives

May 2005

                                    OVERSEAS
                                    SECURITY

    State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S.
             Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies

                                       a

GAO-05-642

[IMG]

May 2005

OVERSEAS SECURITY

State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S.
Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies

  What GAO Found

State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S.
officials and their families outside the embassy, including security
briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance
detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that
clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed
to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats
outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of challenges related
to developing and implementing such a strategy. They also indicated that
they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft targets strategy.
As part of this effort, State officials said they will need to address and
resolve a number of legal and financial issues.

Three State initiated investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S.
officials outside of embassies found that the officials lacked the
necessary hands-on training to help counter the attack. The investigations
recommended that State provide hands-on counterterrorism training and
implement accountability measures to ensure compliance with personal
security procedures. After each of these investigations, State reported to
Congress that it planned to implement the recommendations, yet we found
that State's hands-on training course is not required, the accountability
procedures have not been effectively implemented, and key embassy
officials are not trained to implement State's counterterrorism
procedures.

State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but its
scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004,
Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security
vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools.
The multiphase program provides basic security hardware to protect U.S.
officials and their families at schools and some off-compound employee
association facilities from terrorist threats. However, during our visits
to posts, regional security officers were unclear about which schools
could qualify for security assistance under phase three of the program.

State's program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their
residences is primarily designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The
Residential Security program includes basic security hardware and local
guards, which State officials said provide effective deterrence against
crime, though only limited deterrence against a terrorist attack. To
minimize the risk and consequences of a residential terrorist attack, some
posts we visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific
apartment buildings. To provide greater protection against terrorist
attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance detection teams in
residential areas.

                 United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
State Has Not Developed a Strategy to Cover Soft Target Areas; Key

Issues Need to Be Resolved

State Has Not Fully Implemented ARB Training and Accountability
Recommendations to Improve Security for Embassy Personnel

State Develops Soft Targets Program for Schools but Scope Is Not Yet Fully
Defined Issues Related to the Protection of U.S. Officials and Their
Families

at Residences against Terrorist Threats Conclusion Recommendations for
Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

1 3 5

9

10

18

23 27 27 28

  Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 30

Appendix II:	Comments from the Department of State 32 GAO Comments 42

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 44

Figures	Figure 1: Figure 2: Figure 3: Figure 4: Figure 5: Figure 6: Figure
7:

Number of U.S. Officials Killed by Terrorist Attacks
Outside Embassies, 1968-2003 2
Approximate Percentage of Posts by Terrorism Threat
Levels 7
Terrorist Attacks by Location Assessed by the
Accountability Review Boards, 1986-2004 12
Security Courses Available to U.S. Officials and Family
Members 15
New Public Address System Funded by the Soft Targets
Program 20
School Fence to Be Replaced under the Soft Targets
Program 21
Local Guard at Embassy Housing 25

Contents

Abbreviations

AFSA American Foreign Service Association
ARB Accountability Review Board
COM chief of mission
DCM deputy chief of mission
DS Bureau of Diplomatic Security
DSAC Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course
FAH Foreign Affairs Handbook
FAM Foreign Affairs Manual
OBO Overseas Buildings Operations
OSPB Overseas Security Policy Board
RSO regional security officer
SAFE Serving Abroad for Families and Employees

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
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copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

A

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548

May 9, 2005

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

U.S. government officials and their families living and working overseas
are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have
been attacked-23 fatally-by terrorists outside the embassy (see fig. 1).
As the State Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies,
concerns are growing that terrorist groups are likely to focus on "soft"
targets-such as homes, schools, and places of worship.1 Recent terrorist
attacks against housing complexes in Saudi Arabia, a school in Russia, and
places of worship in Turkey illustrate this growing threat.
State-initiated security assessments have further documented this growing
concern and recommended that State develop better measures to protect U.S.
officials and their families in soft target areas.2

1State, in commenting on our draft, stated it had not defined what
constituted a soft target. As a result, we used State Department language
contained in travel warnings concerning potential terrorist attacks. We
further confirmed this description based on similar language contained in
other State documents and discussions with numerous State security
experts. According to the State travel warnings, the State Department
considers soft targets to include places where Americans and other
westerners live, congregate, shop or visit, including hotels, clubs,
restaurants, shopping centers, identifiable Western businesses, housing
compounds, transportation systems, places of worship, schools, or public
recreation events.

2These reviews include (1) the 1985 Report of the Secretary of State's
Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (The Inman Report); (2) Accountability
Review Board reports that followed assassinations of U.S. officials in
1988, 1989, 1995, 2002, and 2003; and (3) the 1999 Report by the Overseas
Presence Advisory Panel (The Crowe Commission).

     Figure 1: Number of U.S. Officials Killed by Terrorist Attacks Outside
                              Embassies, 1968-2003

                 Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.

Because of the large number of U.S. officials and their families living
abroad that are potentially at risk, you requested that we evaluate
State's programs and efforts to protect them from terrorist attacks while
outside the embassy. You specifically asked us to determine whether State
has a strategy for soft target protection; assess State's efforts to
protect U.S. officials and their families against terrorist attacks while
traveling to and from work; assess State's efforts overseas to improve
security at schools attended by the children of U.S. officials;3 and
describe issues related to protection at their residences.

To determine how the State Department protects U.S. officials and their
families while outside the embassy, we reviewed State documents,
interviewed State officials in Washington, D.C., and attended security
training and briefings available to State officials. In addition, we
interviewed several members of the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB),
an interagency consultative body that considers, develops, coordinates,
and promotes security policies, standards, and agreements on overseas
security programs that affect U.S. personnel at missions. We also reviewed
documents, conducted interviews, and held roundtable discussions with
State and other agency officials, including family

3Other places could include places of worship, restaurants, and shopping
centers.

members, at five posts in four countries. Post selection was based on a
number of factors, including variety in post size and post terrorism
threat levels. For the purpose of this report, our focus on soft target
protection primarily pertains to U.S. government officials and their
families and other post personnel who fall under chief of mission
authority. To limit the scope of our review, we did not look at post
evacuations, or security advice or assistance provided through the
Overseas Security Advisory Council, the Antiterrorism Assistance Program,
and the consular warden system. Appendix I provides more information on
our scope and methodology. We conducted our evaluation from March 2004
through February 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

Results in Brief	State has a number of programs and activities designed to
protect U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy, including
security briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance
detection (these programs are discussed in more detail later in this
report).4 However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that
clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed
to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats
outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of challenges related
to developing and implementing such a strategy. According to State
officials, they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft target
strategy. As part of this effort, State officials said they will need to
address and resolve a number of legal and financial issues.

State has not fully implemented one of the most important safeguards
against terrorist attacks while traveling to and from work-
counterterrorism training. Three State-initiated investigations into
terrorist attacks against U.S. officials found that, among other things,
the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training to help counter the
attack. In response, the investigations recommended that State provide
hands-on counterterrorism training and implement accountability measures
to ensure compliance with personal security procedures. However, State has
not fully implemented these recommendations. It does not require
counterterrorism training for U.S. officials and their families at high-or
critical-threat posts. In addition, State has not fully implemented

4In instances of imminent threat, State can provide a variety of measures,
including armored vehicles for commuting purposes, protective details,
travel advisories for specific areas, or evacuations of family members and
U.S. officials.

accountability procedures for monitoring and promoting security
procedures. According to State, training has been hindered by limitations
in funding and training capacities. Further, State has asserted that
implementing new accountability procedures globally is a long-term
process. Moreover, State has not been training its ambassadors, deputy
chiefs of mission, and regional security officers on ways to effectively
promote the use of the personal security procedures.

State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but the
scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004,
Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security
vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools. To
respond to this congressional concern, State developed a multiphase
program that provides basic security hardware to protect U.S. officials
and their families at schools and some off-compound employee association
facilities overseas from terrorist threats.5 However, during our visits to
five posts, regional security officers were unclear about which schools
qualified for security assistance under phase three of the program, with
some regional security officers considering whether to fund schools in
which just a few American children were enrolled.

State's program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their
residences is designed primarily for crime, not terrorism. The Residential
Security program includes basic security hardware, such as alarms,
shatterresistant window film, limited access control measures, and local
guards. As the crime threat increases, hardware and guard services can be
correspondingly increased at the residences. State officials said that
while the Residential Security program provides effective deterrence
against crime, it could provide only limited deterrence against a
terrorist attack. To minimize the risk and consequences of a residential
terrorist attack, some posts we visited limited the number of U.S.
officials living in specific apartment buildings. To provide greater
protection against terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used
surveillance detection teams in the residential areas.

We are recommending that the Secretary of State, working with the Overseas
Security Policy Board, develop a comprehensive soft targets

5The schools include American and international schools attended by
dependents of U.S. government officials and American citizens. Some
schools are State Department-sponsored schools, which receive direct
educational grants from State's Office of Overseas Schools.

strategy with OSPB standards that takes funding limitations, training, and
accountability into consideration; develop stronger counterterrorism
training requirements for officials going to high- and critical-threat
posts; and fully implement a personal security accountability system for
all embassy officials, including developing related personal security
standards for the Foreign Affairs Manual.

Background	With the changing security environment and the emergence of
terrorist coalitions that operate across international borders, the threat
of terrorism against U.S. interests and personnel abroad has grown. Over
the past decades, and in particular in response to the 1998 embassy
bombings in Africa, the State Department has been hardening its official
facilities to protect its embassies, consulates, and personnel abroad.
However, as State hardened embassies, the American Foreign Service
Association (AFSA) raised concerns about the vulnerability of soft
targets.6

    Soft Targets, Size, and Scope of American Overseas Diplomatic Presence
    Defined

According to a State Department travel warning, State considers soft
targets to be places, including but not limited to, where Americans and
other westerners live, congregate, shop, or visit. This can include
hotels, clubs, restaurants, shopping centers, housing compounds, places of
worship, schools, or public recreation events. Travel routes of U.S.
government employees are also considered soft targets, based on their
vulnerability to terrorist attacks. The State Department is responsible
for protecting more than 60,000 government employees who work in embassies
and consulates abroad in 180 countries. These government officials at
approximately 260 posts represent a number of agencies besides
State-including the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland
Security, Justice, and the Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service, and the
United States Agency for International Development-and all fall under
chief of mission authority. State officials indicated that only about
one-third of officials at all posts are from the State Department.

6AFSA is the professional representative and labor union of the 23,000
active and retired Foreign Service personnel serving in the Department of
State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Foreign Commercial
Service, Foreign Agriculture Service, and the International Broadcasting
Bureau. AFSA first raised the issue of soft targets during its testimony
before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce,
Justice, State, and the Judiciary, in May 2002. AFSA stated that as
security at posts and missions increases, terrorists could shift their
strategy to include soft targets outside embassy walls.

    Entities Responsible for Protection of U.S. Officials and Their Families
    Abroad

The responsibilities for the protection of U.S. officials and their
families are defined in federal legislation and policies. Under the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, the Department
of State is given responsibility for the protection of U.S. officials and
their families overseas.7 The act directs the Secretary of State to
develop and implement policies and programs, including funding levels and
standards, to provide for the security of U.S. government operations of a
diplomatic nature and establishes within State the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security (DS). The mission of DS is to provide a safe and secure
environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Within DS, there are a
number of offices that address and implement security policies and
practices to protect facilities and personnel at posts.8 At posts abroad,
the chiefs of mission are responsible for the protection of personnel and
accompanying family members at the missions.9 Additionally, regional
security officers (RSOs) administer all aspects of security programs at
posts. The RSOs' responsibilities include providing post officials and
their families with security briefings upon their arrival; designing and
implementing residential security and local guard programs; liaising and
coordinating with the host country law enforcement and U.S. private sector
communities to discuss threat issues; and offering security advice and
briefings to schools attended by dependents of U.S. government officials.

The host nation is responsible for providing protection to diplomatic
personnel and missions, as established by the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations.10 The convention states the host country should take
appropriate steps to protect missions, personnel, and their families,
including protecting the consular premises against any intrusion, damage,
or disturbances.

7Public Law 99-399, codified at 22 U.S.C. 4801 et seq. The act also
establishes the security functions of the Secretary of State, as delegated
to the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security.

8These include the Office of Facility Protection Operations, Office of
Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Office of Physical Security Programs,
and the Office of Training.

9The chief of mission is generally the ambassador, who is also responsible
for the safe and efficient evacuation of U.S. citizens when their lives
are endangered. In the absence of an ambassador at post, the deputy chief
of mission (DCM) assumes this responsibility.

10Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961. A subsequent 1963
convention reinforces the host country protection of diplomatic officials.
See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol, 1963.

The Overseas Security Policy Board, which includes representatives from 19
U.S. intelligence, foreign affairs, and other agencies, is responsible for
considering, developing, coordinating, and promoting security policies,
standards, and agreements on overseas operations, programs, and projects
that affect U.S. government agencies under the authority of the chief of
mission. This responsibility includes reviewing and issuing uniform
guidance for residential security and local guard programs based on threat
levels. The Security Environment Threat List, published semiannually by
State, reflects the level of threat at all posts in six threat categories,
including crime, political violence, and terrorism.11 Over 50 percent of
all posts fall under the terrorism threat ratings of critical or high (see
fig. 2).12 State, in consultation with representatives of the board,
develops security standards, based on threat levels, for U.S. missions
overseas.13

Figure 2: Approximate Percentage of Posts by Terrorism Threat Levels

                                    Critical

High

                                     Medium

            Source: GAO analysis of Department of State information.

Note: Calculations are based on 260 posts abroad. Threat levels indicated
are for transnational terrorism.

11The threat rating in each category can be designated as low, medium,
high, or critical.

12The figure is an approximation since the total number of posts open
abroad fluctuates.

13The OSPB standards for State programs appear in State's Foreign Affairs
Manual (FAM) and Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH).

When a security-related incident occurs that involves serious injury or
loss of life or significant destruction of property at a U.S. government
mission abroad, State is required to convene an Accountability Review
Board (ARB). ARBs are composed of five individuals, four appointed by the
Secretary of State and one by the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. Members investigate the security incident and issue a report with
recommendations to promote and encourage improved security programs and
practices. State is required to report to Congress on actions it has taken
in response to ARB recommendations. As of March 2005, there have been 11
Accountability Review Boards convened since the board's establishment in
1986.

    Appropriations Subcommittee Urges State to Develop a Soft Target Strategy

The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the
Judiciary, in its 2002 and subsequent reports, urged State to formulate a
strategy for addressing, in the short and long term, threats to locales
abroad that are frequented by U.S. officials and their families. This
included providing security enhancements for locations that are affiliated
with the United States by virtue of the activities and the individuals
they accommodate and therefore might be soft targets. In a number of
subsequent reports, the subcommittee has focused its concern about soft
targets on schools, residences, places of worship, and other popular
gathering places. In fiscal year 2003, a total of $15 million was
earmarked for soft target protection, particularly to address security
vulnerabilities at overseas schools.14 Moreover, in fiscal year 2004,
Congress earmarked an additional $15 million for soft targets.15

More recently, the fiscal year 2005 Senate Appropriations Subcommittee
report and the subsequent House Conference Report on fiscal year 2005

14For fiscal year 2003, Congress earmarked "up to" $15 million in the
Overseas Buildings Operations appropriations to address security
vulnerabilities of soft targets, particularly overseas schools. State set
aside $5 million to undertake a review of the security of all overseas
schools attended by children of nonmilitary U.S. government employees.
Additionally, under the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act,
2003, $10 million in new funding was provided for soft target protection
in fiscal year 2003. We discuss State's review of overseas schools
protection, including funding allocation, in a later section of this
report.

15The final amount was $14.8 million after a rescission.

appropriations further stressed the need to protect these areas.16 The
language in the Senate appropriations report directs State to develop a
comprehensive, sustained strategy for addressing the threats posed to soft
targets. Specifically, the report language specifies that a strategy
should be submitted to the committee no later than June 1, 2005. For
fiscal year 2005, Congress earmarked $15 million to secure and protect
soft targets, of which $10 million is for security at overseas schools
attended by dependents of U.S. government employees.

  State Has Not Developed a Strategy to Cover Soft Target Areas; Key Issues Need
  to Be Resolved

State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S.
officials and their families outside of the embassy, including security
briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance
detection (these programs are discussed in more detail later in this
report). Despite these efforts, State has not developed a comprehensive
strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and
resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families from
terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of
challenges related to developing and implementing such a strategy. They
indicated they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft target
strategy. As part of this effort, State officials said they will need to
address and resolve a number of legal and financial issues.

    State Cites Limitations in Developing a Soft Target Strategy

State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy to protect
U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats outside the
embassy. A comprehensive strategy would focus on protection of U.S.
officials and thief families in areas where they congregate, such as
schools, residences, places of worship, and other popular gathering spots.

However, in a number of meetings, State officials cited several complex
issues involved with protecting soft targets and raised concerns about the
broader implications of developing such a strategy. DS officials told us
that the mission and responsibilities of DS continue to grow and become
more complex, and they questioned how far State's protection of soft
targets should extend. They said that providing U.S. government funds to
protect U.S. officials and their families at private sector locations or
to places of

16S. Rpt. No. 108-344, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. 154 (2004); H. Rpt. No.
108-792, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. 828 (2004).

worship was unprecedented and raised a number of legal and financial
challenges, including sovereignty and separation of church and state, that
have not been resolved by the department. They also told us that specific
authorization language would be needed to move beyond a State program that
currently focuses on providing security upgrades to schools and
offcompound employee association facilities abroad. State officials also
indicated they have not yet fully defined the universe of soft targets-
including taking an inventory of potentially vulnerable facilities and
areas where U.S. officials and their families congregate-that would be
necessary to complete a strategy.

Although State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy,
some State officials told us that several existing programs could help
protect soft targets. However, they agreed that these existing programs
are not tied together in an overall strategy. State officials agreed that
they should undertake a formal evaluation of how existing programs can be
more effectively integrated as part of a soft target strategy, and whether
new programs might be needed to fill any potential gaps.

A senior DS official told us that in January 2005, DS formed a working
group to discuss and develop a comprehensive soft targets strategy to
address the appropriate level of protection of U.S. officials and their
families at schools, residences, and other areas outside the embassy.
According to the DS official, the strategy should be completed and
provided to the Senate Appropriations Committee by June 1, 2005.

  State Has Not Fully Implemented ARB Training and Accountability
  Recommendations to Improve Security for Embassy Personnel

Investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials found that,
among other things, the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training
to help counter the attacks. The ARBs recommended that State provide
hands-on counterterrorism training to help post officials identify
terrorist surveillance and quickly respond to an impending attack. They
also recommended State implement an accountability system to reduce
complacency about following these procedures. After each investigation,
State told Congress it would implement these recommendations, yet we found
that State's hands-on training course is still not mandatory for all
personnel going to posts, and procedures to monitor compliance with
security requirements have not been fully implemented. According to State,
training has been hindered by limitations in funding and training
capacities, and implementing new accountability procedures globally is a
long-term process. We also found that ambassadors, deputy chiefs of
mission, and

RSOs were not trained in how to implement embassy procedures intended to
protect U.S. officials outside the embassies.

    Investigations Identify Key Vulnerability, Recommend Training and
    Accountability Safeguards

Five of the 11 ARB investigations have focused on attacks of U.S.
officials on their way to work (see fig. 3): (1) the June 1988
assassination of a post official in Greece, (2) the April 1989
assassination of a post official in the Philippines, (3) the March 1995
assassination of two post officials in Pakistan, (4) the October 2002
assassination of a post official in Jordan, and (5) the October 2003
assassination in Gaza of three post contractors from Israel.17

17The remaining six ARBs include the April 1988 attack on U.S. facilities
in Honduras, the 1990 attack on a U.S. facility in Bolivia, the 1992
attack on the Ambassador's residence in Peru, the 1995 attack on a U.S.
facility in Saudi Arabia, and the 1998 bombings of U.S embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania. The ARB reports were completed the same year as the
assassinations, except for the Jordan and Gaza ARBs, which were completed
the year following the assassinations.

Figure 3: Terrorist Attacks by Location Assessed by the Accountability
Review Boards, 1986-2004

Number of attacks on U.S. officials going to a work site, 5

Number of attacks on U.S. facilities (nonembassy), 4

Number of attacks against embassies, 2

Total = 11

Source: GAO analysis of ARB reports.

Note: Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Several of these ARBs recommended that State provide better training,
indicating that security briefings were not sufficient to identify
preoperational surveillance by terrorists, or to escape the attack once
under way. In addition, several ARBs found that State lacked monitoring or
accountability mechanisms to ensure that U.S. officials complied with
personal security measures. For example, a recent ARB recommended that
supervisors at all levels monitor their subordinates' implementation of
these countermeasures.

    State Agreed to Implement ARB Recommendations in Reports to Congress, but
    Implementation Is Incomplete

Despite State Agreement that Counterterrorism Training Is Needed, It Is
Still Not Required

Although State agreed with the ARB's recommendations and reported to
Congress that it planned to implement them, many have yet to be fully
implemented.18 For example, State's hands-on training course, which
teaches surveillance detection and counterterrorism driving skills, is
still not required and has been taken by relatively few State Department
officials and their families. State provided posts with some additional
guidance to improve accountability, such as making personal security
mandatory and holding managers responsible for the "reasonable" oversight
of their staff's personal security practices, but we found implementation
in the field to be incomplete. Furthermore, there are no monitoring
mechanisms to determine if post officials are following the new security
procedures.

State reported to Congress that it agreed with the ARB recommendations to
provide counterterrorism training. Specifically, in 1988, it reported that
it "agreed with the general thrust of the recommendations" to provide
handson training and refresher courses. In 1995, State reported that it
"reestablished the Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course (DSAC) for
those going to critical-threat posts to teach surveillance detection and
avoidance, and defensive and evasive driving techniques." In 2003, State
reported it agreed with the recommendations that employees from all
agencies should receive security briefings and indicated that it would use
the OSPB to review the adequacy of its training and other personal
security measures.19

State implemented the board's recommendation to require security briefings
for all staff. In December 2003, the OSPB members agreed that predeparture
security briefings should be mandatory for all officials planning to work
at posts abroad. On March 23, 2004, State notified posts worldwide that,
starting June 1, 2004, personal security briefings would be required for
all U.S. personnel working at posts. State has required that its officials
attend predeparture security briefings, such as Serving Abroad for

18The reports are provided to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

19The Overseas Security Policy Board is responsible for developing,
coordinating, and promoting uniform policies and standards on security
programs and projects that affect U.S. government civilian agencies
abroad, including diplomatic missions.

Families and Employees, since 1987.20 The briefing covers a variety of
postrelated issues, including alcoholism, fires, crime, sexual assaults,
and terrorist surveillance. Once officials arrive at their posts, they
receive country-specific security briefings by the RSO. In addition, RSOs
can provide threat-specific security briefings on a case-by-case basis.
Family members are strongly encouraged to attend both predeparture and
post security briefings. Figure 4 provides additional information on
security briefing and training available to U.S. officials and their
families.

20Before Serving Abroad for Families and Employees, State officials were
required to take the Security Overseas Seminar, a 2-day briefing course
that covered a wide variety of security issues. The Security Overseas
Seminar was combined with another course, Working in an Embassy, to create
Serving Abroad for Families and Employees in early 2004.

Figure 4: Security Courses Available to U.S. Officials and Family Members

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.

However, few officials or family members working at embassies have taken
DSAC. State offers DSAC as an elective to post officials and spouses going
to high-and critical-threat posts. State does not track the number of
officials who have taken DSAC; thus it is not clear how many officials
have received this training. State officials estimate that 10 percent to
15 percent of department officials have taken the course, and this appears
consistent with our findings at the five posts we visited. DSAC consists
of 2 days of surveillance detection training, 2 days of counterterrorism
driving, and 1 day of emergency medical training.

During our visits to five posts, we found significant disparities in the
levels of security briefings and training of post personnel. We held a
variety of

round-table discussions at each of the five posts we visited, including
with senior and junior State Department officials, non-State officials,
and officials from the law enforcement, intelligence, and defense
communities. We found that post officials from law enforcement,
intelligence, and defense communities had generally received rigorous
hands-on training in areas such as surveillance detection,
counterterrorism driving, emergency medical procedures, and weapons
handling. Officials who had completed DSAC-type training agreed that
hands-on training was needed to give people the skills and confidence to
identify and respond to terrorist threats. In contrast, relatively few
other officials, including those from State, had received DSAC-type
counterterrorism training. For example, we found that roughly 10 percent
of State Department officials indicated they had taken hands-on training;
the figure was even smaller for other employees. Officials gave several
reasons for not attending DSAC: they were not aware the course was
offered, did not believe they were eligible, or were under pressure to
quickly transfer to their new posts. They also told us that the course
often conflicted with other training offered by State.

Senior DS officials said they recognize that security briefings, like
Serving Abroad for Families and Employees, are no longer adequate to
protect against current terrorist threats. In response, DS developed a
proposal in June 2004 to make DSAC training mandatory. The proposal would
provide training, at an estimated cost of about $3.6 million, to about 775
officials, including 95 eligible family members, from all agencies working
at criticalthreat posts. DS officials said that DSAC training should also
be required for all officials, but that issues related to costs, adequacy
of training facilities, and the ability to obtain Overseas Security Policy
Board agreement were constraining factors. As of April 18, 2005, the
proposal had not been approved.

Accountability Mechanism Still Although State has agreed on the need to
implement an accountability

Not in Place to Promote Compliance with Personal Security Guidelines

system to promote compliance with personal security procedures since 1988,
there is still no system in place to ensure that post-related personnel
are following personal security practices. Despite ARB recommendations to
implement accountability mechanisms for personal security, it remains
State's position that security outside the post is primarily a personal
responsibility. As a result, there is no way to determine if post
officials are following prescribed security guidelines. Beginning in 2003,
State has tried to incorporate some limited accountability to promote
compliance. However, based on our work at five posts, we found that post
officials are not following many of these new procedures.

In response to the 2003 ARB, State took a number of steps to improve
compliance with State's personal security procedures for officials outside
the embassy, including the following:

o 	In June 2003, State revised its annual assessment criteria, known as
the core precepts, so that rating and reviewing officials could take
personal security into account when preparing performance appraisals.
Posts were notified of this new requirement on July 30, 2003.

o 	On December 23, 2003, State made a number of revisions to its Foreign
Affairs Manual (FAM), such as stating that employees should implement
personal security practices.

o 	On May 28, 2004, State notified posts worldwide on use of a Personal
Security Self-Assessment Checklist.

However, none of the posts we visited were even aware of these key policy
changes. For example, none of the officials we met with, including
ambassadors, DCMs, RSOs, or staff, were aware that the annual ratings
process now includes an assessment of whether staff are following the
personal security measures or that managers are now responsible for the
reasonable oversight of subordinates' personal security activities.
Furthermore, none of the supervisors were aware of the checklist, and we
found no one was using the checklists to improve their personal security
practices.

Furthermore, State's original plan, to use the checklist as an
accountability mechanism, was dropped before it was implemented. In its
June 2003 report to Congress on implementation of the 2003 ARB
recommendations, State stipulated that staff would be required to use the
checklist periodically and that managers would review the checklists to
ensure compliance. However, State never implemented this accountability
mechanism. According to State officials, they dropped the accountability
features out of concern that the review would be too time consuming.

We found that State had not issued any guidance on how these new policies
and practices should be implemented or monitored. For example, the Foreign
Affairs Manual does not specify how managers are to provide for the
"reasonable" oversight of their staff's personal security practices or how
to provide for compliance and oversight. As a result, post staff were not
sure how these new policies should be implemented. In addition, RSOs
lacked guidance on how to promote these new policies. RSOs and

supervisors stated that they have no responsibility or authority to
monitor post employees for compliance with the new security policies, and
the officials we spoke with at five posts said they did not have, and did
not want, this responsibility.

In discussing our preliminary findings with DS officials, they noted a
range of challenges associated with improving security for officials
outside the post. State's primary focus has been, and will continue to be,
protecting U.S. officials inside the post since posts are considered
higher value targets symbolically and because of the potential for mass
casualties. In explaining why posts were not aware of the new personal
security regulations, DS officials noted that posts were often overwhelmed
by work and may have simply missed the cables and changes in the Foreign
Affairs Manual. They also noted that changes like this take time to be
implemented globally.

Nonetheless, improving security outside the embassy is critical and,
according to a number of State officials, improvements in this area must
start with the ambassador and the deputy chief of mission. Yet we noted
that they, along with the RSOs, were not trained in how best to provide
such security before going to post. For example, based on our observations
at the training courses and a review of the course material, the
ambassador, deputy chief of mission, and RSO training courses did not
address how State's personal security guidelines can be best promoted. The
instructors and DS officials agreed that this critical component should be
added to their training curriculum.

  State Develops Soft Targets Program for Schools but Scope Is Not Yet Fully
  Defined

In response to congressional direction and funding, State, in 2003, began
developing a multiphase Soft Targets program that provides basic security
hardware to protect U.S. officials and their families at schools and some
off-compound employee association facilities.21 However, we found that the
scope of the program is not yet fully defined, including the criteria for
school selection.

21The schools include American and international schools attended by
dependents of U.S. government officials and American citizens. Some
schools are State Department-sponsored schools, which receive direct
educational grants from State's Office of Overseas Schools.

State Initiates Multiphase Program to Primarily Protect Schools

In response to direction in both the House Conference report and Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee report, State addressed the issue of providing
security enhancements to overseas schools attended by dependents of U.S.
officials and American citizens. In 2003, State began developing a plan,
known as the Soft Targets program, to expand security for overseas schools
to protect against terrorism. Specifically, State's Office of Overseas
Schools, Overseas Buildings Operations, and DS have been working together
on the program. The program has four proposed phases. The first two phases
focused on department-sponsored schools that have previously received
grant funding from the State Department.22 In phase one of the program,
department-sponsored schools were offered funding for basic security
hardware such as shatter-resistant window film, two-way radios for
communication between the school and the embassy or consulate, and public
address systems (see fig. 7). As of November 19, 2004, 189
department-sponsored schools had received $10.5 million in funding for
security equipment in phase one of the program.

22Department-sponsored schools receive direct financial grants from
State's Office of Overseas Schools. There are over 185
department-sponsored schools worldwide.

Figure 5: New Public Address System Funded by the Soft Targets Program

Source: GAO.

The second phase of the program addresses any additional security
enhancements that department-sponsored schools could benefit from and
takes into consideration the local threat level, the nature of the
vulnerability and measures required to correct the deficiency, and the

percentage of U.S. government dependent students in the school. Schools
have requested funding for security enhancements such as perimeter
fencing, walls, lighting, gates, and guard booths (see fig. 8). As of
November, 2004, State has obligated over $15 million in funding for
department-sponsored schools for phase two security upgrades.

Figure 6: School Fence to Be Replaced under the Soft Targets Program

Source: GAO.

Phase three of the program plans to address security enhancement needs of
nondepartment-sponsored schools overseas attended by dependents of U.S.
government officials or U.S. citizens. This phase provides funding for
phase one enhancements such as the shatter-resistant window film, radios,
and public address systems. State plans to implement the fourth phase of
the Soft Targets program to include phase two enhancements for
nondepartment-sponsored schools overseas that qualify.

Within the Soft Targets program, State also has focused on enhancing the
security for embassy and consulate employee associations that have
facilities off-compound, such as recreation centers. The Bureau of
Overseas Buildings Operations has been collecting data on the security
needs of these facilities to determine the type of security equipment or
upgrades that would be most beneficial. The facilities, working with the
RSO at post, have been asked to identify physical security vulnerabilities
that could be exploited by terrorists. As of September 2004, 24 of the 34
posts with off-compound employee association facilities had requested a
total of $1.3 million in security upgrades, which includes funding for
perimeter walls and shatter-resistant window film. In fiscal year 2004,
almost $1 million was obligated by State for security enhancements at
offcompound employee association facilities.

Full Scope of School Program RSOs said that identifying and providing
funding for security

                               Not Yet Determined

enhancements at department-sponsored schools for phase one and phase two
security enhancements were straightforward because of the preexisting
relationship with these schools. However, they said it has been difficult
to identify nondepartment-sponsored schools for phase three of the
program. Some RSOs told us they were not sure about the criteria for
approaching nondepartment-sponsored schools in phase three and were
seeking guidance from headquarters on this issue. For example, some RSOs
were not sure what the minimum number of American students attending a
school needed to be for the school to be eligible to receive grant money
for security upgrades. Some RSOs at the posts we visited were considering
offering funding to schools with as few as one to five American students.
Moreover, one RSO was seeking guidance on what constitutes a school and
questioned whether informal facilities attended by children of U.S.
missionaries could qualify for the program.

State officials told us they sent cables to posts in the summer of 2004
with more detailed information on school selection. They explained that
they have asked RSOs to gather data on nondepartment-sponsored schools
attended by American students, particularly U.S. government dependents.
State officials from DS and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
(OBO) acknowledged that the process of gathering data has been difficult
since there are hundreds of such schools worldwide. According to an OBO
official, as of December 2004, only about 81 out of the more than 250
posts have provided responses regarding such schools. OBO officials stated
they will use the data to develop criteria for which schools might be
eligible for funding under phase three and, eventually, phase four of the
program. In anticipation of any future phases of the Soft Targets program,
OBO officials

further explained they have also asked RSOs to identify other facilities
and areas that Americans frequent, beyond schools and off-compound
employee association facilities, that may be vulnerable against a
terrorist attack.

  Issues Related to the Protection of U.S. Officials and Their Families at
  Residences against Terrorist Threats

State's primary program in place to protect U.S. officials and their
families at their residences, the Residential Security program, is
principally designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The program includes
basic security hardware and guard service; as the threat increases, the
hardware and guard services can be correspondingly increased at the
residences. State officials said that while the Residential Security
program, augmented by the local guard program, provides effective
deterrence against crime, it could provide limited or no deterrence
against a terrorist attack. To provide greater protection against
terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance detection teams
in residential areas, despite guidance that limits their use primarily to
the embassy.

    Residential Security and Local Guard Programs Tied to Crime Levels

State has a responsibility for providing a secure housing environment for
U.S. officials and their families overseas. Housing options could include
single-family dwellings, apartments, and compound and clustered housing.23
Each post is responsible for designing and implementing its Residential
Security program based on factors that include host country law
enforcement capabilities, the post-specific threat environment, and
available funding. The Residential Security program includes basic
security hardware, such as alarms, shatter-resistant window film, access
control measures, and local guards. As the threat increases, hardware and
guard services can be correspondingly increased at the residences. The
standards used to determine the minimum acceptable level of residential
security protection are guided by threat ratings established in the
Security Environment Threat List. For the Residential Security program, DS
uses the standards for the threat rating categories of political violence
and crime, though not for terrorism. Standards for residential security
also differ depending on the types of residences.

23According to State's Foreign Affairs Handbook, 12 FAH-8 H-146, each type
of housing has its advantages and disadvantages. We did not undertake a
comprehensive review to determine the most effective housing option to
deter terrorism.

Security at the residences can be augmented by the use of local guards.
Local guard functions vary by threat ratings for crime and political
violence and by the type of residence protected. The local guard program
for residential security may include mobile patrols, quick reaction
forces, and stationary guards. Figure 9 provides an illustration of a
stationary guard at a residence. The mobile patrols are assigned
responsibility for visiting residences periodically, and respond to alarms
at residences or when emergencies arise. All posts we visited utilized
local guards for some aspect of residential security; some posts, due to
the higher threat levels, had more comprehensive local guard coverage than
others. For example, all posts we visited had mobile patrols for
residential neighborhoods, while only two posts had stationary guards at
residential housing. Moreover, some posts with mostly apartment housing
had a guard or doorman stationed at the entrance of the building to
provide a first line of security, primarily against crime.

Figure 7: Local Guard at Embassy Housing

Source: GAO.

Post officials, including RSOs, told us that the Residential Security
program provides effective deterrence against crime and could provide some
deterrence against a terrorist attack, though State officials felt it
could provide little or no deterrence against a terrorist attack. State
and post officials indicated that the biggest concern at residences, when
considering the type of security to implement, has been the threat from
crime.

However, as the threat environment has changed and terrorists have changed
tactics from kidnapping to detonating car bombs outside of residences,
some posts have changed their housing profile. Some posts we visited
limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific apartments or

neighborhoods to minimize the risk and consequences of a residential
terrorist attack. For example, post management at two of the posts we
visited have decided to limit the number of Americans in apartment housing
to 25 percent of the entire building population to minimize the impact of
a car bomb detonated outside residential housing. Some senior DS officials
told us that the best residential scenario for posts is to have a variety
of housing options, including apartments and single-family homes. By
having a mix of housing options, post officials are dispersed, reducing
the number of potential targets.

    Use of Surveillance Detection Program at Residences

To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, most posts we
visited used surveillance detection teams in the residential areas. The
Surveillance Detection program was implemented in response to the U.S.
Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The
mission of the program is to enhance the ability of all posts to detect
preoperational terrorist surveillance directed against primary diplomatic
facilities, such as the embassy. According to State's Surveillance
Detection Operations Field Guide and the Foreign Affairs Handbook,
surveillance detection units can be used to cover other facilities, such
as off-compound employee association facilities and residences, only if
there is a specific threat directed against such areas.24 In addition,
surveillance detection can be used to cover large official functions.

At many of the posts we visited, the RSOs were routinely utilizing
surveillance detection units to cover areas outside key embassy
facilities, such as residences, school bus stops and routes, and schools
where U.S. embassy dependents attend. RSOs told us that the Surveillance
Detection program is instrumental in providing deterrence against
potential terrorist attacks. Furthermore, some RSOs told us that the use
of surveillance detection at school bus stops and outside schools provides
a sense of comfort for post officials and their spouses who have
dependents in international or American schools. During our post visits,
some RSOs argued that the current program guidelines are too restrictive
and that State should allow flexibility in using surveillance detection
for areas

24Department of State, Surveillance Detection Management and Operations
Field Guide Version 2.0, FY 2002 and 12 FAH-7 H-530.

outside the embassy deemed appropriate by the RSO.25 Senior State
officials told us, while the use of the surveillance detection in soft
target areas could be beneficial, the program is labor intensive and
expensive and any expansion of the program could require significant
funding.

Conclusion 	The State Department is responsible for protecting more then
60,000 employees and their families who work overseas. Recent terrorist
attacks and threats have heightened demands that State provide adequate
safety and security outside embassy compounds. We found that State has not
yet developed a strategy addressing the appropriate level of protection
needed for schools, places of worship, and private sector recreation
facilities where employees and families tend to congregate. State
officials are concerned about the feasibility and costs associated with
providing protection for these "soft targets."

Prior investigations into attacks against U.S. officials have resulted in
recommendations that State implement improvements to protect U.S.
officials against terrorist attacks. However, our analysis indicated that
State has not fully implemented several of these recommendations related
to training and accountability mechanisms designed to improve personal
safety. Overall, we believe State should develop a strategy to protect
U.S. officials and their families, and as part of this effort, undertake
an assessment of the level of protection to be afforded to officials and
their families while commuting, and at residences, schools, and other
community-based facilities. We also believe that State should provide
adequate counterterrorism training and fully implement its accountability
mechanisms to afford greater awareness and implementation of security
safeguards for U.S. officials and their family members while outside the
embassy compounds.

Recommendations for We recommend that the Secretary of State, working with
the Overseas Executive Action Security Policy Board, take the following 11
actions:

o 	Include in the current development of a comprehensive soft target
strategy information that (1) determines the extent of State's

25The guidelines allow posts to use surveillance detection to observe
other areas besides the embassy and key residences, but only if there are
specific threats present at these locations.

responsibilities for providing security to U.S. officials and their
families outside the embassy; (2) addresses the legal and financial
ramifications of funding security improvements to schools, places of
worship, and the private sector; (3) develops programs and activities with
FAM standards and guidelines to provide protection for those areas for
which State is deemed responsible for; and (4) integrates into the embassy
emergency action plan elements of the soft targets program.

o 	Mandate counterterrorism training and prioritize which posts,
officials, and family members should receive counterterrorism training
first; track attendance to determine compliance with this new training
requirement; and add a "soft target protection" training module to the
ambassadorial, deputy chief of mission, and RSO training to promote the
security of U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy.

o 	Fully implement the personal security accountability system that State
agreed to implement in response to the 2003 ARB for all embassy officials,
and develop related accountability standards for the Foreign Affairs
Manual that can be used to monitor compliance.

  Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

The Department of State provided written comments on a draft of this
report (see app. II). State generally agreed with most of our report
recommendations and said it would examine the others. Specifically, State
agreed to incorporate a soft target training module into RSO training, and
stated that the department would ensure that similar training be developed
and added to the ambassadorial and deputy chief of mission training to
promote the security of U.S. officials and their families outside the
embassy. The department also agreed to track attendance with the
counterterrorism training course if it becomes a requirement, and noted
that, as of March 2005, all diplomatic security courses are now tracked
for enrollment and attendance. With regard to the recommendation to fully
implement the personal security accountability system, State agreed to
reiterate, through additional notifications and guidance, the
accountability requirements and other tools available to improve personal
security. Regarding our recommendation that State develop a comprehensive
strategy, State indicated that it was prepared to examine, in conjunction
with the OSBP, the contents and recommendations of the report as they
relate to their security programs, but did not indicate whether they would
incorporate any of the specific elements of the recommendations into its
new soft targets security strategy.

State expressed concern that our draft report mischaracterized the
department's responsibility to protect Americans living abroad, and
implied that State was responsible for providing these Americans a similar
level of protection provided to diplomats and their families. We have
clarified the scope and methodology and text of the report to focus on
State's roles and responsibilities to protect U.S. diplomats and their
families, and have deleted references to how State provides safety and
security support to U.S. citizens abroad.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 1 day from the
report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
interested
congressional committees and to the Secretary of State. We will also make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me
at (202) 512-4268 or at [email protected]. Another contact and staff
acknowledgments are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Jess T. Ford
Director, International Affairs

and Trade

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

To determine how the State Department protects U.S. officials and their
families while outside the embassy, we reviewed State documents and
conducted interviews with State officials in Washington, D.C. In addition,
we reviewed documents, conducted interviews, and held roundtable
discussions with State and other agency officials at four U.S. embassies
and one consulate overseas. In Washington, D.C., we reviewed the
Diplomatic Security sections of State's Foreign Affairs Manual and Foreign
Affairs Handbook and read numerous State cables pertaining to personal
security and other security practices. In addition, we reviewed eight
Accountability Review Board (ARB) reports and State's responses to
Congress based on these ARBs, and met with the Chairman of the Amman,
Jordan ARB. We interviewed officials from a number of State bureaus and
offices. We met with officials from State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(DS), including officials from the Office of International Programs,
Office of Facility Protection Operations, Office of Physical Security
Programs, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Office of Regional
Directors, Office of Countermeasures, and DS Training. We also met with
officials from State's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Office of
Management Policy, Office of Overseas Schools, Office of Commissary and
Recreation Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, and Office of the Inspector
General. Moreover, we met with representatives of the Overseas Security
Policy Board. To better understand the support for the Soft Targets
program, we met with executive members of the American Foreign Service
Association and also reviewed a number of congressional reports that
mention the protection of soft targets.

To obtain firsthand experience of security and antiterrorism training
available to State and non-State personnel, we attended a number of
training courses and briefings. We attended the 2-day Security Overseas
Seminar, the 5-day Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course, and Regional
Security Officer security in-briefings at posts we visited. We also
attended sections of the Ambassadorial Seminar and the Regional Security
Officer Training to better understand how the issue of protecting U.S.
officials and their families outside the embassy was addressed.

We conducted fieldwork at five posts-four embassies and one consulate- in
four countries.1 We chose the posts based on a number of factors,
including variety in post size and post terrorism threat levels. At each
of the posts, we generally met with the Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of
Mission,

1For sensitivity reasons, we have not identified the posts we visited.

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

DS and other State officials, and post officials representing other U.S.
government agencies, including personnel from the law enforcement,
intelligence, and defense communities. We also held roundtables, at all
posts, with State and non-State officials as well as spouses of post
officials, to obtain information on their security awareness and training.
At most of the posts we visited, we met with representatives of the post's
Emergency Action Committee and the host nation police. In addition, we met
with representatives of the Overseas Security Advisory Council at some
posts. To better understand the Soft Targets program, we met with school
officials at American or international schools in each country. Finally,
we observed residential security measures at post housing at each post we
visited.

To assess the reliability of the funding data for the Soft Targets
Program, we asked State officials to respond to a standard set of data
reliability questions. Based on their responses and follow up discussions,
we determined that the data used in the report for Soft Targets funding is
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Our focus on soft target protection pertains primarily to U.S. government
officials and their families and other post personnel who fall under chief
of mission authority and not to the entire American community abroad. To
limit the scope of our review, we did not assess the security advice or
assistance provided through the Overseas Security Advisory Council, the
Antiterrorism Assistance Program, the consular warden system, or
evacuations. We also did not undertake a comprehensive review of
residential housing to determine which residential option provides the
most effective deterrent against terrorist attacks.

We conducted our work from March 2004 through February 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

                                  Appendix II

                     Comments from the Department of State

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of State

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of State

                                 See comment 1.

                                 See comment 2.

                                 See comment 3.

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of State

                                 See comment 4.

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of State

Now on p. 4.

                                 See comment 5.

Now on p.1.

                                 See comment 6.

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of State

Now on p. 1. See comment 7.

Now on p. 2.

See comment 8.

Now on p. 3.

See comment 9.

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of State

Now on p. 5.

See comment 10.

Now on p. 9.

See comment 11. Now on pp. 8 and 9.

See comment 12.

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of State

Now on p. 11.

                                See comment 13.

Now on p. 27.

                                See comment 14.

                               Now on pp. 27-29.

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of State

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of State

                                  Appendix II
                     Comments from the Department of State

    The following are GAO's comments on State's letter dated April 18, 2005.

  GAO Comments 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

We agree that State does not have an official definition of soft targets
and modified the text, where appropriate, to make this clear. Given this
absence, we relied upon a State Department travel warning that included
the specific language used in the draft report.

State indicated that, had we used a narrower definition of soft targets,
it could have dramatically changed the conclusions of our work. We
disagree. Our report focuses on State Department efforts to protect U.S.
officials and their families from terrorist threats, at their homes,
recreation centers, schools, commuting, and living outside the embassy
compounds.

Although State, in its comments, indicated that it has long had a
"security strategy" to protect U.S. officials and their families outside
the embassy, it was never able to produce such a document. In addition,
while State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect
U.S. officials and their families at soft target areas, senior DS
officials agreed that these programs are not tied together in an overall
strategy. In January 2005, State agreed that it should develop a
comprehensive soft target strategy, and as part of that effort, undertake
a formal evaluation of how existing programs can be more effectively
integrated and whether new programs might be needed to fill any potential
gaps. State said it planned to complete the strategy by June 1, 2005.

We have taken out reference to "other Americans" throughout the report,
except in reference to the Soft Targets Program, which covers U.S.
children and teachers who have no affiliation with the U.S. government. We
have also modified the scope and methodology to show that our focus is
"primarily" on the protection of U.S. government officials and their
families.

We have clarified the sentence by indicating that RSOs were unclear about
which schools could qualify for security assistance under phase three of
the Soft Targets Program. Phase three, because it can encompass all
schools in a country with one or more Americans, can potentially include
vastly more schools than in phase one or two of the program. We recognize
that the department's Soft Targets Working Group is currently defining
parameters for which schools could qualify under phase three, in addition
to identifying other vulnerable off-

Appendix II
Comments from the Department of State

compound facilities. We believe that a soft target strategy could help
identify which schools most urgently need security improvements.

6.	We clarified the report to stipulate that these reports focused on the
security of U.S. officials.

7.	See GAO comment 1. We have also changed the word "defines" to
"considers."

8.	It is not uncommon for GAO to clarify, add specificity and thus make
adjustments or changes to a requested engagement, provided that these
adjustments and changes are discussed and agreed upon by the requester. We
informed State of these changes.

9. See GAO comment 4.

10. See GAO comment 1.

11. See GAO comment 4.

12. The appropriations subcommittee report language is within the scope of
the GAO review because it covers U.S. officials and their dependents,
which is the primary focus of our review. Moreover, this language was
based on testimony provided by AFSA out of concern that the department was
not providing adequate security for U.S. diplomats and their families
while they are outside of the embassy compound. GAO agrees that the
subcommittee report language is not binding and we are not judging the
department's performance against this language. However, we agree with the
subcommittee, as State has, that State should develop a comprehensive soft
targets strategy.

13. In our draft, we noted that the officials were attacked on their way
to work, either in their driveway or as they drove to a work site. The
Gaza attack occurred while the officials were on their way to the work
site.

14. See GAO comment 4.

We have incorporated technical comments in the report where appropriate.

Appendix III

                     GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts	Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128 Diana Glod, (202) 512-8945

Staff 	In addition to the above named individuals, Edward George and
Andrea Miller made key contributions to this report. Joe Carney, Martin De
Alteriis,

Acknowledgments	Etana Finkler, Ernie Jackson, Elizabeth Singer, and
Michael Derr provided technical contributions.

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