    Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key
    Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside
    of Embassies (09-MAY-05, GAO-05-642).

    U.S. government officials working overseas are at risk from
    terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have been
    attacked--23 fatally--by terrorists outside the embassy. As the
    State Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies,
    terrorist groups are likely to focus on "soft" targets--such as
    homes, schools, and places of worship. GAO was asked to determine
    whether State has a strategy for soft target protection; assess
    State's efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families
    while traveling to and from work; assess State's efforts overseas
    to improve security at schools attended by the children of U.S.
    officials; and describe issues related to protection at their
    residences.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-642
        ACCNO:   A23699
      TITLE:     Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully
    Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist
    Attacks Outside of Embassies
         DATE:   05/09/2005
      SUBJECT:   Accountability
    	     Americans employed abroad
    	     Counterterrorism
    	     Dependents
    	     Embassies
    	     Employee training
    	     Facility security
    	     Foreign policies
    	     Schools
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Terrorism

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    GAO-05-642

    United States Government Accountability Office

    GAO	Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
         and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
                                    Representatives

    May 2005

                                        OVERSEAS
                                        SECURITY

        State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S.
                 Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies

                                           a

    GAO-05-642

    [IMG]

    May 2005

    OVERSEAS SECURITY

    State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S.
    Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies

      What GAO Found

    State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S.
    officials and their families outside the embassy, including security
    briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance
    detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that
    clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed
    to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats
    outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of challenges related
    to developing and implementing such a strategy. They also indicated that
    they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft targets strategy.
    As part of this effort, State officials said they will need to address and
    resolve a number of legal and financial issues.

    Three State initiated investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S.
    officials outside of embassies found that the officials lacked the
    necessary hands-on training to help counter the attack. The investigations
    recommended that State provide hands-on counterterrorism training and
    implement accountability measures to ensure compliance with personal
    security procedures. After each of these investigations, State reported to
    Congress that it planned to implement the recommendations, yet we found
    that State's hands-on training course is not required, the accountability
    procedures have not been effectively implemented, and key embassy
    officials are not trained to implement State's counterterrorism
    procedures.

    State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but its
    scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004,
    Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security
    vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools.
    The multiphase program provides basic security hardware to protect U.S.
    officials and their families at schools and some off-compound employee
    association facilities from terrorist threats. However, during our visits
    to posts, regional security officers were unclear about which schools
    could qualify for security assistance under phase three of the program.

    State's program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their
    residences is primarily designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The
    Residential Security program includes basic security hardware and local
    guards, which State officials said provide effective deterrence against
    crime, though only limited deterrence against a terrorist attack. To
    minimize the risk and consequences of a residential terrorist attack, some
    posts we visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific
    apartment buildings. To provide greater protection against terrorist
    attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance detection teams in
    residential areas.

                     United States Government Accountability Office

    Contents

      Letter

    Results in Brief
    Background
    State Has Not Developed a Strategy to Cover Soft Target Areas; Key

    Issues Need to Be Resolved

    State Has Not Fully Implemented ARB Training and Accountability
    Recommendations to Improve Security for Embassy Personnel

    State Develops Soft Targets Program for Schools but Scope Is Not Yet Fully
    Defined Issues Related to the Protection of U.S. Officials and Their
    Families

    at Residences against Terrorist Threats Conclusion Recommendations for
    Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    1 3 5

    9

    10

    18

    23 27 27 28

      Appendixes

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 30

    Appendix II:	Comments from the Department of State 32 GAO Comments 42

    Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 44

    Figures	Figure 1: Figure 2: Figure 3: Figure 4: Figure 5: Figure 6: Figure
    7:

    Number of U.S. Officials Killed by Terrorist Attacks
    Outside Embassies, 1968-2003 2
    Approximate Percentage of Posts by Terrorism Threat
    Levels 7
    Terrorist Attacks by Location Assessed by the
    Accountability Review Boards, 1986-2004 12
    Security Courses Available to U.S. Officials and Family
    Members 15
    New Public Address System Funded by the Soft Targets
    Program 20
    School Fence to Be Replaced under the Soft Targets
    Program 21
    Local Guard at Embassy Housing 25

    Contents

    Abbreviations

    AFSA American Foreign Service Association
    ARB Accountability Review Board
    COM chief of mission
    DCM deputy chief of mission
    DS Bureau of Diplomatic Security
    DSAC Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course
    FAH Foreign Affairs Handbook
    FAM Foreign Affairs Manual
    OBO Overseas Buildings Operations
    OSPB Overseas Security Policy Board
    RSO regional security officer
    SAFE Serving Abroad for Families and Employees

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    A

    United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548

    May 9, 2005

    The Honorable Christopher Shays

    Chairman

    Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
    Relations Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives

    Dear Mr. Chairman:

    U.S. government officials and their families living and working overseas
    are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have
    been attacked-23 fatally-by terrorists outside the embassy (see fig. 1).
    As the State Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies,
    concerns are growing that terrorist groups are likely to focus on "soft"
    targets-such as homes, schools, and places of worship.1 Recent terrorist
    attacks against housing complexes in Saudi Arabia, a school in Russia, and
    places of worship in Turkey illustrate this growing threat.
    State-initiated security assessments have further documented this growing
    concern and recommended that State develop better measures to protect U.S.
    officials and their families in soft target areas.2

    1State, in commenting on our draft, stated it had not defined what
    constituted a soft target. As a result, we used State Department language
    contained in travel warnings concerning potential terrorist attacks. We
    further confirmed this description based on similar language contained in
    other State documents and discussions with numerous State security
    experts. According to the State travel warnings, the State Department
    considers soft targets to include places where Americans and other
    westerners live, congregate, shop or visit, including hotels, clubs,
    restaurants, shopping centers, identifiable Western businesses, housing
    compounds, transportation systems, places of worship, schools, or public
    recreation events.

    2These reviews include (1) the 1985 Report of the Secretary of State's
    Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (The Inman Report); (2) Accountability
    Review Board reports that followed assassinations of U.S. officials in
    1988, 1989, 1995, 2002, and 2003; and (3) the 1999 Report by the Overseas
    Presence Advisory Panel (The Crowe Commission).

         Figure 1: Number of U.S. Officials Killed by Terrorist Attacks Outside
                                  Embassies, 1968-2003

                     Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.

    Because of the large number of U.S. officials and their families living
    abroad that are potentially at risk, you requested that we evaluate
    State's programs and efforts to protect them from terrorist attacks while
    outside the embassy. You specifically asked us to determine whether State
    has a strategy for soft target protection; assess State's efforts to
    protect U.S. officials and their families against terrorist attacks while
    traveling to and from work; assess State's efforts overseas to improve
    security at schools attended by the children of U.S. officials;3 and
    describe issues related to protection at their residences.

    To determine how the State Department protects U.S. officials and their
    families while outside the embassy, we reviewed State documents,
    interviewed State officials in Washington, D.C., and attended security
    training and briefings available to State officials. In addition, we
    interviewed several members of the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB),
    an interagency consultative body that considers, develops, coordinates,
    and promotes security policies, standards, and agreements on overseas
    security programs that affect U.S. personnel at missions. We also reviewed
    documents, conducted interviews, and held roundtable discussions with
    State and other agency officials, including family

    3Other places could include places of worship, restaurants, and shopping
    centers.

    members, at five posts in four countries. Post selection was based on a
    number of factors, including variety in post size and post terrorism
    threat levels. For the purpose of this report, our focus on soft target
    protection primarily pertains to U.S. government officials and their
    families and other post personnel who fall under chief of mission
    authority. To limit the scope of our review, we did not look at post
    evacuations, or security advice or assistance provided through the
    Overseas Security Advisory Council, the Antiterrorism Assistance Program,
    and the consular warden system. Appendix I provides more information on
    our scope and methodology. We conducted our evaluation from March 2004
    through February 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government
    auditing standards.

    Results in Brief	State has a number of programs and activities designed to
    protect U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy, including
    security briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance
    detection (these programs are discussed in more detail later in this
    report).4 However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that
    clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed
    to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats
    outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of challenges related
    to developing and implementing such a strategy. According to State
    officials, they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft target
    strategy. As part of this effort, State officials said they will need to
    address and resolve a number of legal and financial issues.

    State has not fully implemented one of the most important safeguards
    against terrorist attacks while traveling to and from work-
    counterterrorism training. Three State-initiated investigations into
    terrorist attacks against U.S. officials found that, among other things,
    the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training to help counter the
    attack. In response, the investigations recommended that State provide
    hands-on counterterrorism training and implement accountability measures
    to ensure compliance with personal security procedures. However, State has
    not fully implemented these recommendations. It does not require
    counterterrorism training for U.S. officials and their families at high-or
    critical-threat posts. In addition, State has not fully implemented

    4In instances of imminent threat, State can provide a variety of measures,
    including armored vehicles for commuting purposes, protective details,
    travel advisories for specific areas, or evacuations of family members and
    U.S. officials.

    accountability procedures for monitoring and promoting security
    procedures. According to State, training has been hindered by limitations
    in funding and training capacities. Further, State has asserted that
    implementing new accountability procedures globally is a long-term
    process. Moreover, State has not been training its ambassadors, deputy
    chiefs of mission, and regional security officers on ways to effectively
    promote the use of the personal security procedures.

    State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but the
    scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004,
    Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security
    vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools. To
    respond to this congressional concern, State developed a multiphase
    program that provides basic security hardware to protect U.S. officials
    and their families at schools and some off-compound employee association
    facilities overseas from terrorist threats.5 However, during our visits to
    five posts, regional security officers were unclear about which schools
    qualified for security assistance under phase three of the program, with
    some regional security officers considering whether to fund schools in
    which just a few American children were enrolled.

    State's program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their
    residences is designed primarily for crime, not terrorism. The Residential
    Security program includes basic security hardware, such as alarms,
    shatterresistant window film, limited access control measures, and local
    guards. As the crime threat increases, hardware and guard services can be
    correspondingly increased at the residences. State officials said that
    while the Residential Security program provides effective deterrence
    against crime, it could provide only limited deterrence against a
    terrorist attack. To minimize the risk and consequences of a residential
    terrorist attack, some posts we visited limited the number of U.S.
    officials living in specific apartment buildings. To provide greater
    protection against terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used
    surveillance detection teams in the residential areas.

    We are recommending that the Secretary of State, working with the Overseas
    Security Policy Board, develop a comprehensive soft targets

    5The schools include American and international schools attended by
    dependents of U.S. government officials and American citizens. Some
    schools are State Department-sponsored schools, which receive direct
    educational grants from State's Office of Overseas Schools.

    strategy with OSPB standards that takes funding limitations, training, and
    accountability into consideration; develop stronger counterterrorism
    training requirements for officials going to high- and critical-threat
    posts; and fully implement a personal security accountability system for
    all embassy officials, including developing related personal security
    standards for the Foreign Affairs Manual.

    Background	With the changing security environment and the emergence of
    terrorist coalitions that operate across international borders, the threat
    of terrorism against U.S. interests and personnel abroad has grown. Over
    the past decades, and in particular in response to the 1998 embassy
    bombings in Africa, the State Department has been hardening its official
    facilities to protect its embassies, consulates, and personnel abroad.
    However, as State hardened embassies, the American Foreign Service
    Association (AFSA) raised concerns about the vulnerability of soft
    targets.6

        Soft Targets, Size, and Scope of American Overseas Diplomatic Presence
        Defined

    According to a State Department travel warning, State considers soft
    targets to be places, including but not limited to, where Americans and
    other westerners live, congregate, shop, or visit. This can include
    hotels, clubs, restaurants, shopping centers, housing compounds, places of
    worship, schools, or public recreation events. Travel routes of U.S.
    government employees are also considered soft targets, based on their
    vulnerability to terrorist attacks. The State Department is responsible
    for protecting more than 60,000 government employees who work in embassies
    and consulates abroad in 180 countries. These government officials at
    approximately 260 posts represent a number of agencies besides
    State-including the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland
    Security, Justice, and the Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service, and the
    United States Agency for International Development-and all fall under
    chief of mission authority. State officials indicated that only about
    one-third of officials at all posts are from the State Department.

    6AFSA is the professional representative and labor union of the 23,000
    active and retired Foreign Service personnel serving in the Department of
    State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Foreign Commercial
    Service, Foreign Agriculture Service, and the International Broadcasting
    Bureau. AFSA first raised the issue of soft targets during its testimony
    before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce,
    Justice, State, and the Judiciary, in May 2002. AFSA stated that as
    security at posts and missions increases, terrorists could shift their
    strategy to include soft targets outside embassy walls.

        Entities Responsible for Protection of U.S. Officials and Their Families
        Abroad

    The responsibilities for the protection of U.S. officials and their
    families are defined in federal legislation and policies. Under the
    Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, the Department
    of State is given responsibility for the protection of U.S. officials and
    their families overseas.7 The act directs the Secretary of State to
    develop and implement policies and programs, including funding levels and
    standards, to provide for the security of U.S. government operations of a
    diplomatic nature and establishes within State the Bureau of Diplomatic
    Security (DS). The mission of DS is to provide a safe and secure
    environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Within DS, there are a
    number of offices that address and implement security policies and
    practices to protect facilities and personnel at posts.8 At posts abroad,
    the chiefs of mission are responsible for the protection of personnel and
    accompanying family members at the missions.9 Additionally, regional
    security officers (RSOs) administer all aspects of security programs at
    posts. The RSOs' responsibilities include providing post officials and
    their families with security briefings upon their arrival; designing and
    implementing residential security and local guard programs; liaising and
    coordinating with the host country law enforcement and U.S. private sector
    communities to discuss threat issues; and offering security advice and
    briefings to schools attended by dependents of U.S. government officials.

    The host nation is responsible for providing protection to diplomatic
    personnel and missions, as established by the 1961 Vienna Convention on
    Diplomatic Relations.10 The convention states the host country should take
    appropriate steps to protect missions, personnel, and their families,
    including protecting the consular premises against any intrusion, damage,
    or disturbances.

    7Public Law 99-399, codified at 22 U.S.C. 4801 et seq. The act also
    establishes the security functions of the Secretary of State, as delegated
    to the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security.

    8These include the Office of Facility Protection Operations, Office of
    Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Office of Physical Security Programs,
    and the Office of Training.

    9The chief of mission is generally the ambassador, who is also responsible
    for the safe and efficient evacuation of U.S. citizens when their lives
    are endangered. In the absence of an ambassador at post, the deputy chief
    of mission (DCM) assumes this responsibility.

    10Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961. A subsequent 1963
    convention reinforces the host country protection of diplomatic officials.
    See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol, 1963.

    The Overseas Security Policy Board, which includes representatives from 19
    U.S. intelligence, foreign affairs, and other agencies, is responsible for
    considering, developing, coordinating, and promoting security policies,
    standards, and agreements on overseas operations, programs, and projects
    that affect U.S. government agencies under the authority of the chief of
    mission. This responsibility includes reviewing and issuing uniform
    guidance for residential security and local guard programs based on threat
    levels. The Security Environment Threat List, published semiannually by
    State, reflects the level of threat at all posts in six threat categories,
    including crime, political violence, and terrorism.11 Over 50 percent of
    all posts fall under the terrorism threat ratings of critical or high (see
    fig. 2).12 State, in consultation with representatives of the board,
    develops security standards, based on threat levels, for U.S. missions
    overseas.13

    Figure 2: Approximate Percentage of Posts by Terrorism Threat Levels

                                        Critical

    High

                                         Medium

                Source: GAO analysis of Department of State information.

    Note: Calculations are based on 260 posts abroad. Threat levels indicated
    are for transnational terrorism.

    11The threat rating in each category can be designated as low, medium,
    high, or critical.

    12The figure is an approximation since the total number of posts open
    abroad fluctuates.

    13The OSPB standards for State programs appear in State's Foreign Affairs
    Manual (FAM) and Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH).

    When a security-related incident occurs that involves serious injury or
    loss of life or significant destruction of property at a U.S. government
    mission abroad, State is required to convene an Accountability Review
    Board (ARB). ARBs are composed of five individuals, four appointed by the
    Secretary of State and one by the Director of the Central Intelligence
    Agency. Members investigate the security incident and issue a report with
    recommendations to promote and encourage improved security programs and
    practices. State is required to report to Congress on actions it has taken
    in response to ARB recommendations. As of March 2005, there have been 11
    Accountability Review Boards convened since the board's establishment in
    1986.

        Appropriations Subcommittee Urges State to Develop a Soft Target Strategy

    The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the
    Judiciary, in its 2002 and subsequent reports, urged State to formulate a
    strategy for addressing, in the short and long term, threats to locales
    abroad that are frequented by U.S. officials and their families. This
    included providing security enhancements for locations that are affiliated
    with the United States by virtue of the activities and the individuals
    they accommodate and therefore might be soft targets. In a number of
    subsequent reports, the subcommittee has focused its concern about soft
    targets on schools, residences, places of worship, and other popular
    gathering places. In fiscal year 2003, a total of $15 million was
    earmarked for soft target protection, particularly to address security
    vulnerabilities at overseas schools.14 Moreover, in fiscal year 2004,
    Congress earmarked an additional $15 million for soft targets.15

    More recently, the fiscal year 2005 Senate Appropriations Subcommittee
    report and the subsequent House Conference Report on fiscal year 2005

    14For fiscal year 2003, Congress earmarked "up to" $15 million in the
    Overseas Buildings Operations appropriations to address security
    vulnerabilities of soft targets, particularly overseas schools. State set
    aside $5 million to undertake a review of the security of all overseas
    schools attended by children of nonmilitary U.S. government employees.
    Additionally, under the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act,
    2003, $10 million in new funding was provided for soft target protection
    in fiscal year 2003. We discuss State's review of overseas schools
    protection, including funding allocation, in a later section of this
    report.

    15The final amount was $14.8 million after a rescission.

    appropriations further stressed the need to protect these areas.16 The
    language in the Senate appropriations report directs State to develop a
    comprehensive, sustained strategy for addressing the threats posed to soft
    targets. Specifically, the report language specifies that a strategy
    should be submitted to the committee no later than June 1, 2005. For
    fiscal year 2005, Congress earmarked $15 million to secure and protect
    soft targets, of which $10 million is for security at overseas schools
    attended by dependents of U.S. government employees.

      State Has Not Developed a Strategy to Cover Soft Target Areas; Key Issues Need
      to Be Resolved

    State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S.
    officials and their families outside of the embassy, including security
    briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance
    detection (these programs are discussed in more detail later in this
    report). Despite these efforts, State has not developed a comprehensive
    strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and
    resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families from
    terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of
    challenges related to developing and implementing such a strategy. They
    indicated they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft target
    strategy. As part of this effort, State officials said they will need to
    address and resolve a number of legal and financial issues.

        State Cites Limitations in Developing a Soft Target Strategy

    State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy to protect
    U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats outside the
    embassy. A comprehensive strategy would focus on protection of U.S.
    officials and thief families in areas where they congregate, such as
    schools, residences, places of worship, and other popular gathering spots.

    However, in a number of meetings, State officials cited several complex
    issues involved with protecting soft targets and raised concerns about the
    broader implications of developing such a strategy. DS officials told us
    that the mission and responsibilities of DS continue to grow and become
    more complex, and they questioned how far State's protection of soft
    targets should extend. They said that providing U.S. government funds to
    protect U.S. officials and their families at private sector locations or
    to places of

    16S. Rpt. No. 108-344, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. 154 (2004); H. Rpt. No.
    108-792, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. 828 (2004).

    worship was unprecedented and raised a number of legal and financial
    challenges, including sovereignty and separation of church and state, that
    have not been resolved by the department. They also told us that specific
    authorization language would be needed to move beyond a State program that
    currently focuses on providing security upgrades to schools and
    offcompound employee association facilities abroad. State officials also
    indicated they have not yet fully defined the universe of soft targets-
    including taking an inventory of potentially vulnerable facilities and
    areas where U.S. officials and their families congregate-that would be
    necessary to complete a strategy.

    Although State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy,
    some State officials told us that several existing programs could help
    protect soft targets. However, they agreed that these existing programs
    are not tied together in an overall strategy. State officials agreed that
    they should undertake a formal evaluation of how existing programs can be
    more effectively integrated as part of a soft target strategy, and whether
    new programs might be needed to fill any potential gaps.

    A senior DS official told us that in January 2005, DS formed a working
    group to discuss and develop a comprehensive soft targets strategy to
    address the appropriate level of protection of U.S. officials and their
    families at schools, residences, and other areas outside the embassy.
    According to the DS official, the strategy should be completed and
    provided to the Senate Appropriations Committee by June 1, 2005.

      State Has Not Fully Implemented ARB Training and Accountability
      Recommendations to Improve Security for Embassy Personnel

    Investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials found that,
    among other things, the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training
    to help counter the attacks. The ARBs recommended that State provide
    hands-on counterterrorism training to help post officials identify
    terrorist surveillance and quickly respond to an impending attack. They
    also recommended State implement an accountability system to reduce
    complacency about following these procedures. After each investigation,
    State told Congress it would implement these recommendations, yet we found
    that State's hands-on training course is still not mandatory for all
    personnel going to posts, and procedures to monitor compliance with
    security requirements have not been fully implemented. According to State,
    training has been hindered by limitations in funding and training
    capacities, and implementing new accountability procedures globally is a
    long-term process. We also found that ambassadors, deputy chiefs of
    mission, and

    RSOs were not trained in how to implement embassy procedures intended to
    protect U.S. officials outside the embassies.

        Investigations Identify Key Vulnerability, Recommend Training and
        Accountability Safeguards

    Five of the 11 ARB investigations have focused on attacks of U.S.
    officials on their way to work (see fig. 3): (1) the June 1988
    assassination of a post official in Greece, (2) the April 1989
    assassination of a post official in the Philippines, (3) the March 1995
    assassination of two post officials in Pakistan, (4) the October 2002
    assassination of a post official in Jordan, and (5) the October 2003
    assassination in Gaza of three post contractors from Israel.17

    17The remaining six ARBs include the April 1988 attack on U.S. facilities
    in Honduras, the 1990 attack on a U.S. facility in Bolivia, the 1992
    attack on the Ambassador's residence in Peru, the 1995 attack on a U.S.
    facility in Saudi Arabia, and the 1998 bombings of U.S embassies in Kenya
    and Tanzania. The ARB reports were completed the same year as the
    assassinations, except for the Jordan and Gaza ARBs, which were completed
    the year following the assassinations.

    Figure 3: Terrorist Attacks by Location Assessed by the Accountability
    Review Boards, 1986-2004

    Number of attacks on U.S. officials going to a work site, 5

    Number of attacks on U.S. facilities (nonembassy), 4

    Number of attacks against embassies, 2

    Total = 11

    Source: GAO analysis of ARB reports.

    Note: Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

    Several of these ARBs recommended that State provide better training,
    indicating that security briefings were not sufficient to identify
    preoperational surveillance by terrorists, or to escape the attack once
    under way. In addition, several ARBs found that State lacked monitoring or
    accountability mechanisms to ensure that U.S. officials complied with
    personal security measures. For example, a recent ARB recommended that
    supervisors at all levels monitor their subordinates' implementation of
    these countermeasures.

        State Agreed to Implement ARB Recommendations in Reports to Congress, but
        Implementation Is Incomplete

    Despite State Agreement that Counterterrorism Training Is Needed, It Is
    Still Not Required

    Although State agreed with the ARB's recommendations and reported to
    Congress that it planned to implement them, many have yet to be fully
    implemented.18 For example, State's hands-on training course, which
    teaches surveillance detection and counterterrorism driving skills, is
    still not required and has been taken by relatively few State Department
    officials and their families. State provided posts with some additional
    guidance to improve accountability, such as making personal security
    mandatory and holding managers responsible for the "reasonable" oversight
    of their staff's personal security practices, but we found implementation
    in the field to be incomplete. Furthermore, there are no monitoring
    mechanisms to determine if post officials are following the new security
    procedures.

    State reported to Congress that it agreed with the ARB recommendations to
    provide counterterrorism training. Specifically, in 1988, it reported that
    it "agreed with the general thrust of the recommendations" to provide
    handson training and refresher courses. In 1995, State reported that it
    "reestablished the Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course (DSAC) for
    those going to critical-threat posts to teach surveillance detection and
    avoidance, and defensive and evasive driving techniques." In 2003, State
    reported it agreed with the recommendations that employees from all
    agencies should receive security briefings and indicated that it would use
    the OSPB to review the adequacy of its training and other personal
    security measures.19

    State implemented the board's recommendation to require security briefings
    for all staff. In December 2003, the OSPB members agreed that predeparture
    security briefings should be mandatory for all officials planning to work
    at posts abroad. On March 23, 2004, State notified posts worldwide that,
    starting June 1, 2004, personal security briefings would be required for
    all U.S. personnel working at posts. State has required that its officials
    attend predeparture security briefings, such as Serving Abroad for

    18The reports are provided to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign
    Relations of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

    19The Overseas Security Policy Board is responsible for developing,
    coordinating, and promoting uniform policies and standards on security
    programs and projects that affect U.S. government civilian agencies
    abroad, including diplomatic missions.

    Families and Employees, since 1987.20 The briefing covers a variety of
    postrelated issues, including alcoholism, fires, crime, sexual assaults,
    and terrorist surveillance. Once officials arrive at their posts, they
    receive country-specific security briefings by the RSO. In addition, RSOs
    can provide threat-specific security briefings on a case-by-case basis.
    Family members are strongly encouraged to attend both predeparture and
    post security briefings. Figure 4 provides additional information on
    security briefing and training available to U.S. officials and their
    families.

    20Before Serving Abroad for Families and Employees, State officials were
    required to take the Security Overseas Seminar, a 2-day briefing course
    that covered a wide variety of security issues. The Security Overseas
    Seminar was combined with another course, Working in an Embassy, to create
    Serving Abroad for Families and Employees in early 2004.

    Figure 4: Security Courses Available to U.S. Officials and Family Members

    Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.

    However, few officials or family members working at embassies have taken
    DSAC. State offers DSAC as an elective to post officials and spouses going
    to high-and critical-threat posts. State does not track the number of
    officials who have taken DSAC; thus it is not clear how many officials
    have received this training. State officials estimate that 10 percent to
    15 percent of department officials have taken the course, and this appears
    consistent with our findings at the five posts we visited. DSAC consists
    of 2 days of surveillance detection training, 2 days of counterterrorism
    driving, and 1 day of emergency medical training.

    During our visits to five posts, we found significant disparities in the
    levels of security briefings and training of post personnel. We held a
    variety of

    round-table discussions at each of the five posts we visited, including
    with senior and junior State Department officials, non-State officials,
    and officials from the law enforcement, intelligence, and defense
    communities. We found that post officials from law enforcement,
    intelligence, and defense communities had generally received rigorous
    hands-on training in areas such as surveillance detection,
    counterterrorism driving, emergency medical procedures, and weapons
    handling. Officials who had completed DSAC-type training agreed that
    hands-on training was needed to give people the skills and confidence to
    identify and respond to terrorist threats. In contrast, relatively few
    other officials, including those from State, had received DSAC-type
    counterterrorism training. For example, we found that roughly 10 percent
    of State Department officials indicated they had taken hands-on training;
    the figure was even smaller for other employees. Officials gave several
    reasons for not attending DSAC: they were not aware the course was
    offered, did not believe they were eligible, or were under pressure to
    quickly transfer to their new posts. They also told us that the course
    often conflicted with other training offered by State.

    Senior DS officials said they recognize that security briefings, like
    Serving Abroad for Families and Employees, are no longer adequate to
    protect against current terrorist threats. In response, DS developed a
    proposal in June 2004 to make DSAC training mandatory. The proposal would
    provide training, at an estimated cost of about $3.6 million, to about 775
    officials, including 95 eligible family members, from all agencies working
    at criticalthreat posts. DS officials said that DSAC training should also
    be required for all officials, but that issues related to costs, adequacy
    of training facilities, and the ability to obtain Overseas Security Policy
    Board agreement were constraining factors. As of April 18, 2005, the
    proposal had not been approved.

    Accountability Mechanism Still Although State has agreed on the need to
    implement an accountability

    Not in Place to Promote Compliance with Personal Security Guidelines

    system to promote compliance with personal security procedures since 1988,
    there is still no system in place to ensure that post-related personnel
    are following personal security practices. Despite ARB recommendations to
    implement accountability mechanisms for personal security, it remains
    State's position that security outside the post is primarily a personal
    responsibility. As a result, there is no way to determine if post
    officials are following prescribed security guidelines. Beginning in 2003,
    State has tried to incorporate some limited accountability to promote
    compliance. However, based on our work at five posts, we found that post
    officials are not following many of these new procedures.

    In response to the 2003 ARB, State took a number of steps to improve
    compliance with State's personal security procedures for officials outside
    the embassy, including the following:

    o 	In June 2003, State revised its annual assessment criteria, known as
    the core precepts, so that rating and reviewing officials could take
    personal security into account when preparing performance appraisals.
    Posts were notified of this new requirement on July 30, 2003.

    o 	On December 23, 2003, State made a number of revisions to its Foreign
    Affairs Manual (FAM), such as stating that employees should implement
    personal security practices.

    o 	On May 28, 2004, State notified posts worldwide on use of a Personal
    Security Self-Assessment Checklist.

    However, none of the posts we visited were even aware of these key policy
    changes. For example, none of the officials we met with, including
    ambassadors, DCMs, RSOs, or staff, were aware that the annual ratings
    process now includes an assessment of whether staff are following the
    personal security measures or that managers are now responsible for the
    reasonable oversight of subordinates' personal security activities.
    Furthermore, none of the supervisors were aware of the checklist, and we
    found no one was using the checklists to improve their personal security
    practices.

    Furthermore, State's original plan, to use the checklist as an
    accountability mechanism, was dropped before it was implemented. In its
    June 2003 report to Congress on implementation of the 2003 ARB
    recommendations, State stipulated that staff would be required to use the
    checklist periodically and that managers would review the checklists to
    ensure compliance. However, State never implemented this accountability
    mechanism. According to State officials, they dropped the accountability
    features out of concern that the review would be too time consuming.

    We found that State had not issued any guidance on how these new policies
    and practices should be implemented or monitored. For example, the Foreign
    Affairs Manual does not specify how managers are to provide for the
    "reasonable" oversight of their staff's personal security practices or how
    to provide for compliance and oversight. As a result, post staff were not
    sure how these new policies should be implemented. In addition, RSOs
    lacked guidance on how to promote these new policies. RSOs and

    supervisors stated that they have no responsibility or authority to
    monitor post employees for compliance with the new security policies, and
    the officials we spoke with at five posts said they did not have, and did
    not want, this responsibility.

    In discussing our preliminary findings with DS officials, they noted a
    range of challenges associated with improving security for officials
    outside the post. State's primary focus has been, and will continue to be,
    protecting U.S. officials inside the post since posts are considered
    higher value targets symbolically and because of the potential for mass
    casualties. In explaining why posts were not aware of the new personal
    security regulations, DS officials noted that posts were often overwhelmed
    by work and may have simply missed the cables and changes in the Foreign
    Affairs Manual. They also noted that changes like this take time to be
    implemented globally.

    Nonetheless, improving security outside the embassy is critical and,
    according to a number of State officials, improvements in this area must
    start with the ambassador and the deputy chief of mission. Yet we noted
    that they, along with the RSOs, were not trained in how best to provide
    such security before going to post. For example, based on our observations
    at the training courses and a review of the course material, the
    ambassador, deputy chief of mission, and RSO training courses did not
    address how State's personal security guidelines can be best promoted. The
    instructors and DS officials agreed that this critical component should be
    added to their training curriculum.

      State Develops Soft Targets Program for Schools but Scope Is Not Yet Fully
      Defined

    In response to congressional direction and funding, State, in 2003, began
    developing a multiphase Soft Targets program that provides basic security
    hardware to protect U.S. officials and their families at schools and some
    off-compound employee association facilities.21 However, we found that the
    scope of the program is not yet fully defined, including the criteria for
    school selection.

    21The schools include American and international schools attended by
    dependents of U.S. government officials and American citizens. Some
    schools are State Department-sponsored schools, which receive direct
    educational grants from State's Office of Overseas Schools.

    State Initiates Multiphase Program to Primarily Protect Schools

    In response to direction in both the House Conference report and Senate
    Appropriations Subcommittee report, State addressed the issue of providing
    security enhancements to overseas schools attended by dependents of U.S.
    officials and American citizens. In 2003, State began developing a plan,
    known as the Soft Targets program, to expand security for overseas schools
    to protect against terrorism. Specifically, State's Office of Overseas
    Schools, Overseas Buildings Operations, and DS have been working together
    on the program. The program has four proposed phases. The first two phases
    focused on department-sponsored schools that have previously received
    grant funding from the State Department.22 In phase one of the program,
    department-sponsored schools were offered funding for basic security
    hardware such as shatter-resistant window film, two-way radios for
    communication between the school and the embassy or consulate, and public
    address systems (see fig. 7). As of November 19, 2004, 189
    department-sponsored schools had received $10.5 million in funding for
    security equipment in phase one of the program.

    22Department-sponsored schools receive direct financial grants from
    State's Office of Overseas Schools. There are over 185
    department-sponsored schools worldwide.

    Figure 5: New Public Address System Funded by the Soft Targets Program

    Source: GAO.

    The second phase of the program addresses any additional security
    enhancements that department-sponsored schools could benefit from and
    takes into consideration the local threat level, the nature of the
    vulnerability and measures required to correct the deficiency, and the

    percentage of U.S. government dependent students in the school. Schools
    have requested funding for security enhancements such as perimeter
    fencing, walls, lighting, gates, and guard booths (see fig. 8). As of
    November, 2004, State has obligated over $15 million in funding for
    department-sponsored schools for phase two security upgrades.

    Figure 6: School Fence to Be Replaced under the Soft Targets Program

    Source: GAO.

    Phase three of the program plans to address security enhancement needs of
    nondepartment-sponsored schools overseas attended by dependents of U.S.
    government officials or U.S. citizens. This phase provides funding for
    phase one enhancements such as the shatter-resistant window film, radios,
    and public address systems. State plans to implement the fourth phase of
    the Soft Targets program to include phase two enhancements for
    nondepartment-sponsored schools overseas that qualify.

    Within the Soft Targets program, State also has focused on enhancing the
    security for embassy and consulate employee associations that have
    facilities off-compound, such as recreation centers. The Bureau of
    Overseas Buildings Operations has been collecting data on the security
    needs of these facilities to determine the type of security equipment or
    upgrades that would be most beneficial. The facilities, working with the
    RSO at post, have been asked to identify physical security vulnerabilities
    that could be exploited by terrorists. As of September 2004, 24 of the 34
    posts with off-compound employee association facilities had requested a
    total of $1.3 million in security upgrades, which includes funding for
    perimeter walls and shatter-resistant window film. In fiscal year 2004,
    almost $1 million was obligated by State for security enhancements at
    offcompound employee association facilities.

    Full Scope of School Program RSOs said that identifying and providing
    funding for security

                                   Not Yet Determined

    enhancements at department-sponsored schools for phase one and phase two
    security enhancements were straightforward because of the preexisting
    relationship with these schools. However, they said it has been difficult
    to identify nondepartment-sponsored schools for phase three of the
    program. Some RSOs told us they were not sure about the criteria for
    approaching nondepartment-sponsored schools in phase three and were
    seeking guidance from headquarters on this issue. For example, some RSOs
    were not sure what the minimum number of American students attending a
    school needed to be for the school to be eligible to receive grant money
    for security upgrades. Some RSOs at the posts we visited were considering
    offering funding to schools with as few as one to five American students.
    Moreover, one RSO was seeking guidance on what constitutes a school and
    questioned whether informal facilities attended by children of U.S.
    missionaries could qualify for the program.

    State officials told us they sent cables to posts in the summer of 2004
    with more detailed information on school selection. They explained that
    they have asked RSOs to gather data on nondepartment-sponsored schools
    attended by American students, particularly U.S. government dependents.
    State officials from DS and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
    (OBO) acknowledged that the process of gathering data has been difficult
    since there are hundreds of such schools worldwide. According to an OBO
    official, as of December 2004, only about 81 out of the more than 250
    posts have provided responses regarding such schools. OBO officials stated
    they will use the data to develop criteria for which schools might be
    eligible for funding under phase three and, eventually, phase four of the
    program. In anticipation of any future phases of the Soft Targets program,
    OBO officials

    further explained they have also asked RSOs to identify other facilities
    and areas that Americans frequent, beyond schools and off-compound
    employee association facilities, that may be vulnerable against a
    terrorist attack.

      Issues Related to the Protection of U.S. Officials and Their Families at
      Residences against Terrorist Threats

    State's primary program in place to protect U.S. officials and their
    families at their residences, the Residential Security program, is
    principally designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The program includes
    basic security hardware and guard service; as the threat increases, the
    hardware and guard services can be correspondingly increased at the
    residences. State officials said that while the Residential Security
    program, augmented by the local guard program, provides effective
    deterrence against crime, it could provide limited or no deterrence
    against a terrorist attack. To provide greater protection against
    terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance detection teams
    in residential areas, despite guidance that limits their use primarily to
    the embassy.

        Residential Security and Local Guard Programs Tied to Crime Levels

    State has a responsibility for providing a secure housing environment for
    U.S. officials and their families overseas. Housing options could include
    single-family dwellings, apartments, and compound and clustered housing.23
    Each post is responsible for designing and implementing its Residential
    Security program based on factors that include host country law
    enforcement capabilities, the post-specific threat environment, and
    available funding. The Residential Security program includes basic
    security hardware, such as alarms, shatter-resistant window film, access
    control measures, and local guards. As the threat increases, hardware and
    guard services can be correspondingly increased at the residences. The
    standards used to determine the minimum acceptable level of residential
    security protection are guided by threat ratings established in the
    Security Environment Threat List. For the Residential Security program, DS
    uses the standards for the threat rating categories of political violence
    and crime, though not for terrorism. Standards for residential security
    also differ depending on the types of residences.

    23According to State's Foreign Affairs Handbook, 12 FAH-8 H-146, each type
    of housing has its advantages and disadvantages. We did not undertake a
    comprehensive review to determine the most effective housing option to
    deter terrorism.

    Security at the residences can be augmented by the use of local guards.
    Local guard functions vary by threat ratings for crime and political
    violence and by the type of residence protected. The local guard program
    for residential security may include mobile patrols, quick reaction
    forces, and stationary guards. Figure 9 provides an illustration of a
    stationary guard at a residence. The mobile patrols are assigned
    responsibility for visiting residences periodically, and respond to alarms
    at residences or when emergencies arise. All posts we visited utilized
    local guards for some aspect of residential security; some posts, due to
    the higher threat levels, had more comprehensive local guard coverage than
    others. For example, all posts we visited had mobile patrols for
    residential neighborhoods, while only two posts had stationary guards at
    residential housing. Moreover, some posts with mostly apartment housing
    had a guard or doorman stationed at the entrance of the building to
    provide a first line of security, primarily against crime.

    Figure 7: Local Guard at Embassy Housing

    Source: GAO.

    Post officials, including RSOs, told us that the Residential Security
    program provides effective deterrence against crime and could provide some
    deterrence against a terrorist attack, though State officials felt it
    could provide little or no deterrence against a terrorist attack. State
    and post officials indicated that the biggest concern at residences, when
    considering the type of security to implement, has been the threat from
    crime.

    However, as the threat environment has changed and terrorists have changed
    tactics from kidnapping to detonating car bombs outside of residences,
    some posts have changed their housing profile. Some posts we visited
    limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific apartments or

    neighborhoods to minimize the risk and consequences of a residential
    terrorist attack. For example, post management at two of the posts we
    visited have decided to limit the number of Americans in apartment housing
    to 25 percent of the entire building population to minimize the impact of
    a car bomb detonated outside residential housing. Some senior DS officials
    told us that the best residential scenario for posts is to have a variety
    of housing options, including apartments and single-family homes. By
    having a mix of housing options, post officials are dispersed, reducing
    the number of potential targets.

        Use of Surveillance Detection Program at Residences

    To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, most posts we
    visited used surveillance detection teams in the residential areas. The
    Surveillance Detection program was implemented in response to the U.S.
    Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The
    mission of the program is to enhance the ability of all posts to detect
    preoperational terrorist surveillance directed against primary diplomatic
    facilities, such as the embassy. According to State's Surveillance
    Detection Operations Field Guide and the Foreign Affairs Handbook,
    surveillance detection units can be used to cover other facilities, such
    as off-compound employee association facilities and residences, only if
    there is a specific threat directed against such areas.24 In addition,
    surveillance detection can be used to cover large official functions.

    At many of the posts we visited, the RSOs were routinely utilizing
    surveillance detection units to cover areas outside key embassy
    facilities, such as residences, school bus stops and routes, and schools
    where U.S. embassy dependents attend. RSOs told us that the Surveillance
    Detection program is instrumental in providing deterrence against
    potential terrorist attacks. Furthermore, some RSOs told us that the use
    of surveillance detection at school bus stops and outside schools provides
    a sense of comfort for post officials and their spouses who have
    dependents in international or American schools. During our post visits,
    some RSOs argued that the current program guidelines are too restrictive
    and that State should allow flexibility in using surveillance detection
    for areas

    24Department of State, Surveillance Detection Management and Operations
    Field Guide Version 2.0, FY 2002 and 12 FAH-7 H-530.

    outside the embassy deemed appropriate by the RSO.25 Senior State
    officials told us, while the use of the surveillance detection in soft
    target areas could be beneficial, the program is labor intensive and
    expensive and any expansion of the program could require significant
    funding.

    Conclusion 	The State Department is responsible for protecting more then
    60,000 employees and their families who work overseas. Recent terrorist
    attacks and threats have heightened demands that State provide adequate
    safety and security outside embassy compounds. We found that State has not
    yet developed a strategy addressing the appropriate level of protection
    needed for schools, places of worship, and private sector recreation
    facilities where employees and families tend to congregate. State
    officials are concerned about the feasibility and costs associated with
    providing protection for these "soft targets."

    Prior investigations into attacks against U.S. officials have resulted in
    recommendations that State implement improvements to protect U.S.
    officials against terrorist attacks. However, our analysis indicated that
    State has not fully implemented several of these recommendations related
    to training and accountability mechanisms designed to improve personal
    safety. Overall, we believe State should develop a strategy to protect
    U.S. officials and their families, and as part of this effort, undertake
    an assessment of the level of protection to be afforded to officials and
    their families while commuting, and at residences, schools, and other
    community-based facilities. We also believe that State should provide
    adequate counterterrorism training and fully implement its accountability
    mechanisms to afford greater awareness and implementation of security
    safeguards for U.S. officials and their family members while outside the
    embassy compounds.

    Recommendations for We recommend that the Secretary of State, working with
    the Overseas Executive Action Security Policy Board, take the following 11
    actions:

    o 	Include in the current development of a comprehensive soft target
    strategy information that (1) determines the extent of State's

    25The guidelines allow posts to use surveillance detection to observe
    other areas besides the embassy and key residences, but only if there are
    specific threats present at these locations.

    responsibilities for providing security to U.S. officials and their
    families outside the embassy; (2) addresses the legal and financial
    ramifications of funding security improvements to schools, places of
    worship, and the private sector; (3) develops programs and activities with
    FAM standards and guidelines to provide protection for those areas for
    which State is deemed responsible for; and (4) integrates into the embassy
    emergency action plan elements of the soft targets program.

    o 	Mandate counterterrorism training and prioritize which posts,
    officials, and family members should receive counterterrorism training
    first; track attendance to determine compliance with this new training
    requirement; and add a "soft target protection" training module to the
    ambassadorial, deputy chief of mission, and RSO training to promote the
    security of U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy.

    o 	Fully implement the personal security accountability system that State
    agreed to implement in response to the 2003 ARB for all embassy officials,
    and develop related accountability standards for the Foreign Affairs
    Manual that can be used to monitor compliance.

      Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

    The Department of State provided written comments on a draft of this
    report (see app. II). State generally agreed with most of our report
    recommendations and said it would examine the others. Specifically, State
    agreed to incorporate a soft target training module into RSO training, and
    stated that the department would ensure that similar training be developed
    and added to the ambassadorial and deputy chief of mission training to
    promote the security of U.S. officials and their families outside the
    embassy. The department also agreed to track attendance with the
    counterterrorism training course if it becomes a requirement, and noted
    that, as of March 2005, all diplomatic security courses are now tracked
    for enrollment and attendance. With regard to the recommendation to fully
    implement the personal security accountability system, State agreed to
    reiterate, through additional notifications and guidance, the
    accountability requirements and other tools available to improve personal
    security. Regarding our recommendation that State develop a comprehensive
    strategy, State indicated that it was prepared to examine, in conjunction
    with the OSBP, the contents and recommendations of the report as they
    relate to their security programs, but did not indicate whether they would
    incorporate any of the specific elements of the recommendations into its
    new soft targets security strategy.

    State expressed concern that our draft report mischaracterized the
    department's responsibility to protect Americans living abroad, and
    implied that State was responsible for providing these Americans a similar
    level of protection provided to diplomats and their families. We have
    clarified the scope and methodology and text of the report to focus on
    State's roles and responsibilities to protect U.S. diplomats and their
    families, and have deleted references to how State provides safety and
    security support to U.S. citizens abroad.

    As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
    this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 1 day from the
    report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
    interested
    congressional committees and to the Secretary of State. We will also make
    copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
    available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

    If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
    me
    at (202) 512-4268 or at fordj@gao.gov. Another contact and staff
    acknowledgments are listed in appendix III.

    Sincerely yours,

    Jess T. Ford
    Director, International Affairs

    and Trade

    Appendix I

    Scope and Methodology

    To determine how the State Department protects U.S. officials and their
    families while outside the embassy, we reviewed State documents and
    conducted interviews with State officials in Washington, D.C. In addition,
    we reviewed documents, conducted interviews, and held roundtable
    discussions with State and other agency officials at four U.S. embassies
    and one consulate overseas. In Washington, D.C., we reviewed the
    Diplomatic Security sections of State's Foreign Affairs Manual and Foreign
    Affairs Handbook and read numerous State cables pertaining to personal
    security and other security practices. In addition, we reviewed eight
    Accountability Review Board (ARB) reports and State's responses to
    Congress based on these ARBs, and met with the Chairman of the Amman,
    Jordan ARB. We interviewed officials from a number of State bureaus and
    offices. We met with officials from State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security
    (DS), including officials from the Office of International Programs,
    Office of Facility Protection Operations, Office of Physical Security
    Programs, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, Office of Regional
    Directors, Office of Countermeasures, and DS Training. We also met with
    officials from State's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Office of
    Management Policy, Office of Overseas Schools, Office of Commissary and
    Recreation Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, and Office of the Inspector
    General. Moreover, we met with representatives of the Overseas Security
    Policy Board. To better understand the support for the Soft Targets
    program, we met with executive members of the American Foreign Service
    Association and also reviewed a number of congressional reports that
    mention the protection of soft targets.

    To obtain firsthand experience of security and antiterrorism training
    available to State and non-State personnel, we attended a number of
    training courses and briefings. We attended the 2-day Security Overseas
    Seminar, the 5-day Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course, and Regional
    Security Officer security in-briefings at posts we visited. We also
    attended sections of the Ambassadorial Seminar and the Regional Security
    Officer Training to better understand how the issue of protecting U.S.
    officials and their families outside the embassy was addressed.

    We conducted fieldwork at five posts-four embassies and one consulate- in
    four countries.1 We chose the posts based on a number of factors,
    including variety in post size and post terrorism threat levels. At each
    of the posts, we generally met with the Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of
    Mission,

    1For sensitivity reasons, we have not identified the posts we visited.

    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

    DS and other State officials, and post officials representing other U.S.
    government agencies, including personnel from the law enforcement,
    intelligence, and defense communities. We also held roundtables, at all
    posts, with State and non-State officials as well as spouses of post
    officials, to obtain information on their security awareness and training.
    At most of the posts we visited, we met with representatives of the post's
    Emergency Action Committee and the host nation police. In addition, we met
    with representatives of the Overseas Security Advisory Council at some
    posts. To better understand the Soft Targets program, we met with school
    officials at American or international schools in each country. Finally,
    we observed residential security measures at post housing at each post we
    visited.

    To assess the reliability of the funding data for the Soft Targets
    Program, we asked State officials to respond to a standard set of data
    reliability questions. Based on their responses and follow up discussions,
    we determined that the data used in the report for Soft Targets funding is
    sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

    Our focus on soft target protection pertains primarily to U.S. government
    officials and their families and other post personnel who fall under chief
    of mission authority and not to the entire American community abroad. To
    limit the scope of our review, we did not assess the security advice or
    assistance provided through the Overseas Security Advisory Council, the
    Antiterrorism Assistance Program, the consular warden system, or
    evacuations. We also did not undertake a comprehensive review of
    residential housing to determine which residential option provides the
    most effective deterrent against terrorist attacks.

    We conducted our work from March 2004 through February 2005 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

                                      Appendix II

                         Comments from the Department of State

    Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
    end of this appendix.

    Appendix II
    Comments from the Department of State

    Appendix II
    Comments from the Department of State

                                     See comment 1.

                                     See comment 2.

                                     See comment 3.

    Appendix II
    Comments from the Department of State

                                     See comment 4.

    Appendix II
    Comments from the Department of State

    Now on p. 4.

                                     See comment 5.

    Now on p.1.

                                     See comment 6.

    Appendix II
    Comments from the Department of State

    Now on p. 1. See comment 7.

    Now on p. 2.

    See comment 8.

    Now on p. 3.

    See comment 9.

    Appendix II
    Comments from the Department of State

    Now on p. 5.

    See comment 10.

    Now on p. 9.

    See comment 11. Now on pp. 8 and 9.

    See comment 12.

    Appendix II
    Comments from the Department of State

    Now on p. 11.

                                    See comment 13.

    Now on p. 27.

                                    See comment 14.

                                   Now on pp. 27-29.

    Appendix II
    Comments from the Department of State

    Appendix II
    Comments from the Department of State

                                      Appendix II
                         Comments from the Department of State

        The following are GAO's comments on State's letter dated April 18, 2005.

      GAO Comments 1.

    2.

    3.

    4.

    5.

    We agree that State does not have an official definition of soft targets
    and modified the text, where appropriate, to make this clear. Given this
    absence, we relied upon a State Department travel warning that included
    the specific language used in the draft report.

    State indicated that, had we used a narrower definition of soft targets,
    it could have dramatically changed the conclusions of our work. We
    disagree. Our report focuses on State Department efforts to protect U.S.
    officials and their families from terrorist threats, at their homes,
    recreation centers, schools, commuting, and living outside the embassy
    compounds.

    Although State, in its comments, indicated that it has long had a
    "security strategy" to protect U.S. officials and their families outside
    the embassy, it was never able to produce such a document. In addition,
    while State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect
    U.S. officials and their families at soft target areas, senior DS
    officials agreed that these programs are not tied together in an overall
    strategy. In January 2005, State agreed that it should develop a
    comprehensive soft target strategy, and as part of that effort, undertake
    a formal evaluation of how existing programs can be more effectively
    integrated and whether new programs might be needed to fill any potential
    gaps. State said it planned to complete the strategy by June 1, 2005.

    We have taken out reference to "other Americans" throughout the report,
    except in reference to the Soft Targets Program, which covers U.S.
    children and teachers who have no affiliation with the U.S. government. We
    have also modified the scope and methodology to show that our focus is
    "primarily" on the protection of U.S. government officials and their
    families.

    We have clarified the sentence by indicating that RSOs were unclear about
    which schools could qualify for security assistance under phase three of
    the Soft Targets Program. Phase three, because it can encompass all
    schools in a country with one or more Americans, can potentially include
    vastly more schools than in phase one or two of the program. We recognize
    that the department's Soft Targets Working Group is currently defining
    parameters for which schools could qualify under phase three, in addition
    to identifying other vulnerable off-

    Appendix II
    Comments from the Department of State

    compound facilities. We believe that a soft target strategy could help
    identify which schools most urgently need security improvements.

    6.	We clarified the report to stipulate that these reports focused on the
    security of U.S. officials.

    7.	See GAO comment 1. We have also changed the word "defines" to
    "considers."

    8.	It is not uncommon for GAO to clarify, add specificity and thus make
    adjustments or changes to a requested engagement, provided that these
    adjustments and changes are discussed and agreed upon by the requester. We
    informed State of these changes.

    9. See GAO comment 4.

    10. See GAO comment 1.

    11. See GAO comment 4.

    12. The appropriations subcommittee report language is within the scope of
    the GAO review because it covers U.S. officials and their dependents,
    which is the primary focus of our review. Moreover, this language was
    based on testimony provided by AFSA out of concern that the department was
    not providing adequate security for U.S. diplomats and their families
    while they are outside of the embassy compound. GAO agrees that the
    subcommittee report language is not binding and we are not judging the
    department's performance against this language. However, we agree with the
    subcommittee, as State has, that State should develop a comprehensive soft
    targets strategy.

    13. In our draft, we noted that the officials were attacked on their way
    to work, either in their driveway or as they drove to a work site. The
    Gaza attack occurred while the officials were on their way to the work
    site.

    14. See GAO comment 4.

    We have incorporated technical comments in the report where appropriate.

    Appendix III

                         GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

    GAO Contacts	Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128 Diana Glod, (202) 512-8945

    Staff 	In addition to the above named individuals, Edward George and
    Andrea Miller made key contributions to this report. Joe Carney, Martin De
    Alteriis,

    Acknowledgments	Etana Finkler, Ernie Jackson, Elizabeth Singer, and
    Michael Derr provided technical contributions.

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