Military Training: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to	 
Transform Joint Training (21-JUN-05, GAO-05-548).		 
                                                                 
U.S. forces are conducting more complex operations, requiring	 
increased interoperability between the military commands,	 
services, and other organizations. Department of Defense (DOD)	 
planning guidance calls for transforming military training by	 
increasing the jointness in training. The overall intent of DOD's
Training Transformation Program is to assure commanders that	 
forces deployed to their theater are not experiencing joint	 
operations for the first time. Therefore, the program's strategic
goals focus on providing joint training that meets commanders'	 
needs and links to readiness assessments. Given the significant  
investment planned in the program and the impact it will have on 
the military, this report provides a program overview, including 
(1) DOD's overall management approach and status of key 	 
initiatives, and (2) some significant management challenges that 
have emerged early in the program's implementation.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-05-548 					        
    ACCNO:   A27357						        
  TITLE:     Military Training: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's       
Program to Transform Joint Training				 
     DATE:   06/21/2005 
  SUBJECT:   Combat readiness					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military operations				 
	     Military training					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Training utilization				 
	     Military interoperability				 
	     Program implementation				 
	     DOD Joint Assessment and Enabling			 
	     Capability 					 
                                                                 
	     DOD Joint Knowledge Development and		 
	     Distribution Capability				 
                                                                 
	     DOD Joint National Training Capability		 
	     DOD Training Transformation Program		 

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GAO-05-548

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

                       Report to Congressional Committees

June 2005

MILITARY TRAINING

      Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to Transform Joint Training

GAO-05-548

[IMG]

June 2005

MILITARY TRAINING

Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to Transform Joint Training

  What GAO Found

Currently in its early implementation stages, DOD expects its Training
Transformation Program to be fully operational by 2009, when it has
established a robust network of training capabilities that are integrated
throughout the department to provide enhanced joint individual and unit
training focused on combatant commanders' needs and linked to readiness
assessments. Thus far, the department has established program
accountability and authority by assigning senior leadership management and
oversight roles and responsibilities. DOD has also established three
training transformation initiatives designed to prepare individuals,
units, and staffs for joint operations and to provide enabling tools and
processes to carry out missions. The initiatives are being developed
incrementally, wherein each initiative matures through the "build a
little, test a little" philosophy. DOD plans to complete its first program
assessment later this year.

Two significant challenges that have emerged early and will require
continued focus include:

o  	(1) Establishing effective partnerships with program stakeholders via
comprehensive communication and coordination to gain their full
participation and buy-in to achieve training transformation goals. DOD has
taken positive steps to communicate and coordinate with these
stakeholders, which include DOD's combatant commanders, services, and
training commands, as well as representatives from the Federal
departments, agencies, and organizations that comprise the national
security interagency community. However, GAO found an inconsistent
understanding among some DOD stakeholders of the strategic vision and
rationale behind the implementation and development pace of the
initiatives. DOD has not assessed its communication and coordination
efforts to determine why some stakeholders may not fully understand the
overall vision. Similarly, DOD officials have been proactive in engaging
external stakeholders in identifying potential joint training
opportunities. However, DOD's outreach to the senior-level leadership of
external organizations has been limited to date, thus risking their full
commitment to future planning and implementation of joint training.

o  	(2) Developing joint training requirements-and the specific training
tasks that support the requirements-that meet combatant command mission
needs. Rather than identifying joint training tasks through DOD's
established process called the "Joint Training System" that is used to
translate combatant command needs into training requirements, the
department is developing some joint tasks through a working group process
that does not ensure widespread participation by the combatant commands'
and services' representatives. As a result, the department risks
developing joint training requirements that combatant commands and
services may not fully support.

Both these challenges, if left unaddressed, have the potential for eroding
support among program stakeholders, which in turn places the goals of the
Training Transformation Program at risk.

United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

  Letter

Results in Brief
Background
DOD's Efforts Have Focused on Establishing Plans and Program

Accountability, but Much Remains to be Done to Achieve Full Operational
Capability DOD's Training Transformation Program Faces Two Significant

Management Challenges at This Time Conclusions Recommendations for
Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

                                       1

                                      2 3

                                       6

12 20 21 22

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Related GAO Products

  Tables

Table 1: Planned Fiscal Year 2005 Expenditures, by Training Transformation
Initiative 12 Table 2: Organizations and Locations Included on This
Assignment 26

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
GAO Government Accountability Office
JKDDC Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability
JAEC Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability
JNTC Joint National Training Capability

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United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

June 21, 2005

Congressional Committees

As recently demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. forces are
conducting significantly more complex operations, requiring increased
interoperability between and among the military services, combatant
commands, and other Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD organizations.
In the past, military services experienced some joint operations training
during joint exercises, but most service training focused on individual
service competencies with limited joint context. To successfully conduct
today's joint missions, DOD's planning guidance calls for transforming
military training to better enable joint force operations by increasing
the level of joint context in military training. The overall intent of the
department's Training Transformation Program is to assure combatant
commanders that forces deployed to their theater are not experiencing
joint operations for the first time. The strategic goals of training
transformation are to provide joint training that is (1) focused on
combatant commanders' operational requirements, and (2) linked to
readiness assessments through a robust network of training capabilities
that are integrated throughout the department.

The overall objective of this report is to provide an overview of DOD's
Training Transformation Program and its implementation challenges,
especially given DOD's plans for significant investments in the program
and the impact that training transformation will have on the combatant
commands and the services. Specifically, we (1) determined DOD's overall
management approach and status in implementing the Training Transformation
Program, and (2) identified some significant management challenges that
have emerged early in the program's implementation. We prepared this
report under the authority of the Comptroller General, and are addressing
this report to you because of your committee's oversight in this area.

To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed key departmentwide
documents-including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2004 revised
Training Transformation Implementation Plan- to identify milestones for
each of three training transformation initiatives. Additionally, we met
with key officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Staff, as well as officials from the combatant commands and service
organizations that are affected by the Training Transformation Program's
implementation. We performed our work from June 2004 to May 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government

  Results in Brief

auditing standards. Further information on our scope and methodology
appears in appendix I.

DOD's efforts to implement the Training Transformation Program have
focused on establishing program plans and accountability, but much remains
to be done to achieve full operational capability. While still in the
program's early implementation stages, DOD expects, by 2009, to have
established a robust network of training capabilities that are integrated
throughout the department to provide enhanced joint training focused on
the combatant commanders' needs and linked to readiness assessments. DOD
has taken steps to establish program accountability and authority by
designating an executive agent to carry out specific responsibilities and
functions. DOD's approach to transforming training focuses on three
initiatives designed to prepare individuals, units, and staffs for the new
strategic environment, and to provide enabling tools and processes to
carry out missions. These three training transformation initiatives are
being developed incrementally, wherein each initiative matures through the
"build a little, test a little" philosophy. The most advanced of these
initiatives is focused on providing enhanced collective joint training for
units or other military and defense organizations. Of the department's
planned $1.76 billion investment in training transformation for fiscal
years 2003-11, $1.48 billion has been allocated to this initiative. A
second initiative is intended to enhance individual servicemember joint
training while a third initiative, which has only recently begun, is
focused on continually monitoring program results and identifying
improvements in joint training. While a management structure for each
training transformation initiative has been identified and officials have
begun taking steps towards their respective initiative goals, a great deal
remains to be done to achieve overall program goals.

Two significant challenges that have emerged early in DOD's Training
Transformation Program include (1) establishing effective partnerships
with program stakeholders through comprehensive communication and
coordination and (2) developing joint training requirements that meet
combatant commanders' needs. Establishing effective partnerships with
DOD's combatant commanders, services, and other federal organizations is
important given their key roles in planning, funding, and participating in
training events. Department officials have taken some positive steps to
communicate with DOD stakeholders and address this challenge; however, we
found an inconsistent understanding among some stakeholders of the
strategic vision and the rationale behind the implementation and
development pace of the initiatives. In addition, efforts to collaborate
with

the senior leadership of non-DOD organizations and obtain their full
commitment to training transformation have been limited to date. Without
stakeholders' full understanding and participation, DOD risks not being
able to fully achieve its program goals. Furthermore, DOD is developing
some joint training requirements-and the specific training tasks that
support the requirements-through a working group process and not through
the existing Joint Training System, DOD's established, authoritative
process that translates commanders' needs into training requirements. For
example, the working group identified 43 tactical tasks,1 about half of
which did not originate through the Joint Training System. Many
stakeholders we spoke with expressed reservations about the validity of
some of the tasks developed in this manner. As a result, the department's
approach risks developing joint training requirements that combatant
commands and services may not fully support.

To improve comprehensive communication and coordination, we are
recommending that DOD assess the effectiveness of its efforts in this
regard to facilitate stakeholders' full understanding of the Training
Transformation Program's goals and initiatives. We are also recommending
that, as DOD continues its outreach efforts to non-DOD organizations, it
extend these efforts to include the senior leadership of these non-DOD
organizations. To mitigate the risk of establishing joint training
requirements that may not be fully supported by the combatant commands and
services, we are recommending that DOD use the Joint Training System to
establish all the training requirements at the joint tactical level, which
would promote widespread participation and better opportunities for
stakeholders' acceptance of the requirements. DOD generally agreed with
GAO's recommendations and is planning actions to implement our
recommendations.

Background 	Service military training has historically focused on
individual service competencies, with less emphasis on joint operations
involving joint commands, other services, and emerging operations with
other governmental and nongovernmental agencies and international
partners. While this has allowed the services to meet their core training
responsibilities, it has also contributed to forces entering combat
without having had previous experience or training in joint operations.
For

1 Tactical tasks refer to combat and combat support-level activities that
are normally performed by DOD service components to achieve combat
objectives.

example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, many forces had to be given some
level of basic joint operations training after they had already entered
the Iraqi theater of war, because they were experiencing joint operations
for the first time. In a changing security environment, joint operations
are becoming more important given the complex nature of military
operations. Specifically, this importance is being driven by the combatant
commands' need to combine the capabilities of multiple services to address
the global threat as well as the growing interdependence of capabilities
among the services.

Under Title 10, both combatant commanders and the military services are
given the authority to determine training requirements, plan training
exercises, and execute training activities. Specifically, combatant
commanders oversee all aspects of military operations, joint training, and
logistics using the forces assigned to them,2 while the military service
secretaries are generally responsible for recruiting, organizing,
supplying, equipping, and training their service personnel.3 Furthermore,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff are
responsible for formulating joint training policy and doctrine.4 The Joint
Forces Command is DOD's lead in providing joint warfighting capability
through joint training.

The idea to transform training in the department initially surfaced in
2001, when the department, in its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review,5
recognized that training was a key to dealing with a continuously changing
environment, and emphasized a need to enhance jointness and capitalize on
technology advances. Defense guidance issued shortly thereafter directed
the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, to work with the
services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant
commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command to develop a plan for
transforming military training that would better enable joint force
operations. The department's vision for the Training Transformation
Program is to provide "dynamic, capabilities-based training for DOD in

2 10 U.S.C. S: 164.

3 10 USC S:S: 3013(b), 5013(b), and 8013(b).

4 10 U.S.C. S: 153. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)
3500.01B, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States.

5 The Quadrennial Defense Review is a congressionally imposed DOD effort
to be conducted every 4 years to set defense strategy and goals.

support of national security requirements across the full spectrum of
service, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
operations,"6 and is built upon a foundation of three capabilities.

According to the 2004 Training Transformation Implementation Plan, these
three capabilities, or initiatives, are designed to prepare individuals,
units, and staffs for the new strategic environment, and to provide
enabling tools and processes to carry out missions. Through these three
capabilities, combatant commanders are expected to receive betterprepared
forces that align with their joint operational needs.

o  	The Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) is expected to prepare
forces by providing units and command staffs with an integrated live,
virtual, and constructive training environment.7 This capability would add

enhanced service and combatant command training that emphasizes jointness
and enables global training and mission rehearsal in support of combatant
command operations.

o  	The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) is
intended to prepare future decision makers and leaders to better
understand joint operations and the common operational picture, as well as
respond innovatively to adversaries. Program officials believe this
capability will enhance existing joint individual education with newly
developed courses and make these courses readily accessible through an
expanded knowledge distribution network.

o  	The Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability (JAEC) is expected to
assist leaders in assessing the value of transformational training
initiatives on individuals, organizations, and processes, and link the
impact of the Training Transformation Program to combatant commanders'
readiness requirements. This capability is also supposed to provide the
processes and tools to continuously improve joint training.

6 DOD, Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training, March 1, 2002, p. 5.

7 Live training refers to live simulations involving real people operating
real systems in a live environment. Virtual training involves virtual
simulations using real people operating simulated systems. Constructive
training refers to simulated people operating simulated systems, often
referred to as war games.

  DOD's Efforts Have Focused on Establishing Plans and Program Accountability,
  but Much Remains to be Done to Achieve Full Operational Capability

Currently in its early implementation stages, DOD expects its Training
Transformation Program to be fully operational by 2009, when it has
established a robust network of training capabilities that are integrated
throughout the department to provide enhanced joint individual and
collective training focused on the combatant commanders' needs and linked
to readiness assessments. Through its 2003 Training Transformation
Implementation Plan, the department established program accountability and
authority by assigning senior leadership management and oversight roles
and responsibilities. While each program initiative has focused on
developing a management structure, defining joint training requirements,
and developing mechanisms and networks to deliver enhanced joint training,
all three still have a great deal remaining to be accomplished to meet
program goals.

    DOD Has Established Training Transformation Program Accountability and
    Authorities

In early 2003, DOD issued its first Training Transformation Implementation
Plan, which established the basic management approach for implementing the
Training Transformation Program. As part of this approach, the department
has taken action to establish program accountability and authority.

The department designated the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness with overall responsibility for implementing the
Training Transformation Program. Furthermore, the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Readiness has been given executive agent responsibility for
training transformation planning, programming, budgeting, and execution
progress. To carry out their responsibilities, these offices use three
standing working groups, as follows:

o  	The Executive Steering Group is made up of senior executive-level
officials-including four star general officers/flag officers and
equivalent senior executive service civilians -and is headed by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. In addition to
high-level program execution oversight, this group, according to program
officials, makes department-level policy decisions and deals with
unresolved issues as it pertains to training transformation.

o  	Subordinate to this executive group, the Senior Advisory Group is led
by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness and consists of
senior-level officials, including three star general officers/flag
officers and equivalent senior executive service civilians. This group,
according to program officials, has directive authority and is responsible
for overseeing the execution and updates to the Training Transformation

Implementation Plan, and the timely allocation, transfer, and execution of
the program's resources.

o  	The Joint Integrated Process Team, being subordinate to the above two
groups, serves as the primary collaborative working forum that provides
input to the oversight groups and responds to their guidance. Led by the
Director of Readiness and Training Plans and Policy, this team consists of
senior analysts, planners, and action officers from staffs, agencies, and
commands contributing to the department's Training Transformation Program.

Each of these groups has representatives from the services, the Joint
Forces Command, the Special Operations Command, the Joint Staff, and a
wide cross-section of department-level offices, such as the Offices of
Program Analysis and Evaluation, and Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics.

DOD is employing an incremental approach to developing and implementing
the Training Transformation Program, designed to reduce development cycle
time and increase the speed at which advanced capabilities are delivered.
According to a DOD official, DOD's approach to developing and implementing
the training transformation initiatives follows a "build a little, test a
little" philosophy that is unlike a more traditional development approach,
where initiatives within a program are developed sequentially with
planning, development, implementation, and assessment phases. Under this
development approach, some elements of the three training transformation
initiatives-the JNTC, the JKDDC, and the JAEC-are developed concurrently,
while other elements are sequentially developed. The department's
expectation is that the three initiatives will work together to
successively build a training environment that meets combatant command
needs in three phases. Phase 1 (2005) focuses on providing combatant
commanders with a steady flow of jointtrained individuals, units, and
staff. Phase 2 (2007) places an emphasis on supporting an innovative
training environment for new joint operational capabilities based on
combatant commanders' demands. Phase 3 (2009) will transition joint
training into a real-time mission planning and rehearsal environment.

Reflective of the iterative implementation approach described above, DOD's
framework for assessing Training Transformation Program performance will
likewise follow the three phases of the program's development. Performance
metrics are being continuously developed during each of these phases to
mirror the actual development and evolution of each initiative's
capabilities. Similarly, formal program

assessments using these metrics to measure training transformation's
impact on joint force readiness and guide subsequent investments in
training transformation capabilities will begin in 2005, at the end of
Phase 1, and occur every 2 years thereafter.

The management of each of the three training transformation initiatives is
carried out largely by joint management offices within each initiative's
sponsoring organization. For example, the JNTC joint management office is
in the Joint Training Directorate of the Joint Forces Command. These
offices serve as the primary focal points for planning, program
preparation, and execution of all resources and events associated with
their respective training transformation capability. The joint management
office directors, having the responsibility to implement their respective
initiative, report directly to the organization sponsoring their
initiative. Each of the joint management offices also reports to the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness through the Joint
Integrated Process Team. The offices are organized functionally to align
with their primary goals and objectives.

    Status and Funding of Training Transformation Initiatives Vary

The implementation status of each of DOD's three initiatives-the JNTC, the
JKDDC, and the JAEC-varies, as program managers are intentionally
staggering the rollout of the initiatives in accordance with the
incremental development approach aimed at reducing development cycle time
and increasing the speed at which advanced capabilities are delivered. The
current and planned funding of these initiatives also reflects this
development plan.

Overall, the three initiatives are designed to prepare individuals, units,
and staffs for a new strategic environment that requires services and
combatant commands to work together, and to provide enabling tools and
processes to carry out missions. These initiatives to transform military
training are expected to result in a robust network of training
capabilities integrated throughout DOD that provides enhanced joint
individual and collective training focused on the combatant commanders'
needs and is linked to readiness assessments. Program managers designated
the JNTC initiative as the leading effort to transform military training,
and thus its progress is further advanced than the other two initiatives.
However, officials responsible for both the JKDDC and JAEC have
established a management structure and initiated a number of efforts to
meet program goals.

The Joint National Training Capability

The JNTC initiative is focused on providing enhanced collective joint
training for units or other military and defense organizations. During the
2002-03 time frame, a joint management office for the JNTC initiative
within Joint Forces Command was established and resourced. Early JNTC
efforts have been targeted at identifying and analyzing combatant
commanders' joint training requirements for an enhanced joint training
environment that will cut horizontally-to improve interoperability among
services-and vertically-to improve joint planning and execution of
training-across various components and command levels. This effort
includes, but is not limited to, analyzing combatant commands'
missionessential tasks; identifying joint training requirements evolving
from operational and prior training experiences; analyzing joint training
required at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of operations;
and setting the framework for accrediting and certifying future joint
training programs and facilities.

Additionally, a considerable portion of the JNTC organization has been
focused on identifying, defining, and developing the facilities and
technologies necessary to develop a global joint training network that can
deliver live, virtual, and constructive joint training capabilities to the
services, combatant commanders, and interagency and multinational
partners. In keeping with training transformation's approach to introduce
capabilities more rapidly, JNTC managers working with the services during
2004 provided an early demonstration of the ability to enhance four
existing exercises with live, virtual, and constructive capabilities by
integrating these capabilities to improve joint horizontal and vertical
training. In October 2004, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Readiness, who has been given executive oversight responsibility for the
Training Transformation Program, deemed the JNTC initiative to be
operationally capable-indicating that the initial infrastructure of
networked sites and systems needed to enhance the joint context of
training exercises was in place. During fiscal year 2005, JNTC managers
plan to incorporate this demonstrated capability in 14 additional service
or combatant command exercises.

Additionally, JNTC managers expect to continue their efforts to enhance
DOD's capability, increasing the level of jointness in military training
by involving joint commands, other services, and federal agencies involved
in current military operations. Among these efforts, JNTC managers would
like to complete development of a permanent network of communications,
instrumentation, and supporting infrastructure to support joint military
training. JNTC managers plan to create a Web-based capability to deliver
joint operational planning and mission rehearsal training. They also plan

The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability

to have the capability to conduct overseas/multinational training events
by fiscal year 2007. Additionally, they plan to continue developing
training requirements that support joint training at all levels, and
accrediting joint training programs and certifying training facilities.
The certification of DOD's training facilities relies on their ability to
meet joint training needs. Although DOD's JNTC initiative is designed to
enhance communication and infrastructure to better simulate a joint
environment, the services continue to face challenges in maintaining
training facilities to meet their own service-specific training
requirements. GAO has just recently completed a review looking at the
current condition of DOD's military training facilities.8 The report
concluded that current training range facilities are deteriorating and
compromise the realism essential to effective training.

The JKDDC initiative is intended to enhance individual servicemember joint
training. Efforts under the JKDDC initiative have been focused on
organizing a management structure, initiating a process for identifying
joint individual training requirements, and establishing an organizational
and technical framework for developing and distributing courses to address
these requirements. In late 2003, a joint management office within the
Joint Staff's Office of the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force
Development was established to manage the JKDDC initiative and oversee the
development of joint individual education and training. Also, in October
2003, the JKDDC Working Group was established to begin identifying and
prioritizing joint individual education and training requirements. During
fiscal year 2004, the JKDDC Working Group identified 38 combatant command
requirements for joint individual courseware. A key milestone for the
JKDDC initiative-identifying the technologies and infrastructure needed to
achieve an interim course materials distribution capability-was reached in
January 2005. As of January 2005, the JKDDC initiative has developed and
distributed two joint individual courses to satisfy some of the combatant
commanders' initial requirements. Another 17 courses are under
development.

JKDDC managers plan to continue identifying and developing joint
individual education requirements and associated courseware. They also
plan to develop a long-term joint individual training continuum and a
global distribution capability for joint education and training that
include

8 GAO, Military Training: Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to
Improve Conditions of Military Training Ranges, GAO-05-534 (Washington,
D.C.: June 10, 2005).

The Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability

Funding of Initiatives Reflects Incremental Rollout Plans

multinational and international partners. A pilot global distribution
capability demonstration is planned for fiscal year 2006, with a mature
joint individual training continuum expected in late 2009.

The JAEC initiative is focused on continually monitoring program results
and identifying improvements in joint training. The JAEC joint management
office was established during fiscal year 2004 under the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Readiness. Most of the early efforts conducted
under this initiative have been focused on planning, assessing, and
developing tools and techniques that can be embedded in the other training
transformation initiatives in order to provide a robust joint assessment
and enabling capability. This effort has resulted in the establishment of
preliminary training transformation performance assessment metrics in
early 2005. The first of three formal periodic program assessments will
occur from April to October 2005 and refinements to the metrics will
continue to be made as this process progresses. Additionally, the JAEC
joint management office is developing a process that would uniformly track
joint training, education, and experience, and ensure this information can
be linked to readiness assessments by 2006. Within this initiative, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff has the lead for evaluating enhancements to DOD's
Joint Training System9 to make it more user friendly and adaptable to
evolving operational concepts and to complete these enhancements by 2009.

Current and future funding also reflect the incremental development
approach DOD is using to implement the program. The JNTC initiative, the
leading effort for transforming military training, accounts for $1.48
billion, or 84 percent, of the total $1.76 billion budgeted for fiscal
years 2003 through 2011. Efforts related to the JKDDC and JAEC (the
trailing initiatives) are collectively budgeted for $284.9 million. For
the first time, in fiscal year 2005, all three training transformation
initiatives prepared program execution plans reflecting what they expected
to spend during that fiscal year, as shown in table 1.

9 Joint Training System is a framework used by the department's joint
community to identify training requirements; develop training plans; and
execute, evaluate, and assess joint training.

Table 1: Planned Fiscal Year 2005 Expenditures, by Training Transformation
Initiative

Dollars in millions

                Initiative Planned fiscal year 2005 expenditures

                                  JNTC $188.0

JKDDC

JAEC

                                  Total $213.4

Source: DOD.

Resources to manage the Training Transformation Program come from three
primary sources: (1) funding provided directly to and controlled by the
services for service-specific program activities related to the JNTC
initiative; (2) funding provided directly to the Joint Forces Command, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff for their own
training transformation activities; and (3) funding provided directly to
the Joint Forces Command for distribution to the services for
service-specific JNTC program activities. By providing the Joint Forces
Command with this funding, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has
given the command the flexibility to annually fund service activities
deemed critical to the Training Transformation Program, because they
contribute to meeting the goals and objectives identified in the Training
Transformation Implementation Plan.

DOD's Training Transformation Program will likely face some significant
management challenges throughout its implementation. Two significant
challenges that have emerged early and will require continued focus are

(1) establishing effective partnerships with program stakeholders, such as
the services and combatant commands, through comprehensive communication
and coordination; and (2) developing joint training requirements that meet
combatant commands' mission needs. Both these challenges, if left
unaddressed, have the potential for eroding support among program
stakeholders, which in turn places the goals of the Training
Transformation Program at risk.

  DOD's Training Transformation Program Faces Two Significant Management
  Challenges at This Time

    Establishing Effective Partnerships with Stakeholders Is a Significant
    Management Challenge

Program Attributes Make Communication and Coordination Challenging

Establishing effective partnerships through comprehensive communication
and coordination is a significant management challenge and is a key to
obtaining full buy-in and commitment of internal and external program
stakeholders. These include DOD's combatant commanders, services, and
training commands, as well as representatives from the federal
departments, agencies, and organizations that comprise the national
security interagency community. Commitment from the combatant commands and
services is critical in achieving the training transformation goals
because they play a key role in planning and funding training events. The
same commitment is necessary from non-DOD stakeholders given the changing
nature of our military operations, which require more intergovernmental,
interagency, and multinational partners than ever before.

Attributes inherent to transformational programs-such as program
complexity and the need for stakeholders to make cultural adaptations-
along with DOD's limited authority to influence external stakeholders,
make communication and coordination especially difficult. Recognizing the
challenge these elements pose, DOD has taken some positive steps to
communicate and coordinate with training transformation internal and
external stakeholders. However, we found that an inconsistent
understanding of the Training Transformation Program remains among some
internal stakeholders. Additionally, the department's efforts to engage
senior leaders in non-DOD organizations to establish joint training
requirements to collectively respond to the nation's security challenges
across the full spectrum of interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational operations have been limited. These operations may include,
but are not limited to, global war, humanitarian assistance, and disaster
relief.

DOD officials agree that there are several attributes in managing the
Training Transformation Program that make communication and coordination
with stakeholders a challenge. Officials acknowledge that their use of a
rapid, incremental approach to developing and implementing the program
adds a degree of complexity over traditional approaches. Moreover, DOD's
decentralized management of the three program initiatives and dependencies
on integration of separately led combatant command and service training
initiatives introduce additional complexity. Further, encouraging
stakeholders to make the cultural changes inherent to the successful
implementation of governmental and defense transformational programs, such
as the Training Transformation Program, generally also requires focused
management attention to communication and coordination. The Training
Transformation Program's call for

communication and coordination beyond DOD entities may pose an additional
challenge, because of DOD's lack of direct authority over non-DOD partner
organizations.

The complexity of the Training Transformation Program heightens the
communication and coordination challenge. The department's choice to
employ a rapid, incremental development approach provides management with
a process to review, assess, adjust, and redirect actions that
collectively transform training, and, according to DOD officials, is a
contributing factor to the complexity of the program. Some DOD officials
we spoke with referred to the development approach as a "state of constant
change." Furthermore, in an effort to meet the Training Transformation
Program's goals, DOD has assigned separate organizations-the Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and Joint Forces Command-to oversee development of each initiative.
In addition, the ability to leverage evolving and developing technologies
to deliver an integrated live, virtual, and constructive joint training
environment requires the successful integration of separately led
combatant command and service training initiatives. For example, the
Pacific Command and its Navy component, according to command officials,
are developing their own discrete training capabilities that are expected
to eventually link to and enhance the JNTC. Achieving JNTC goals relies
upon existing training events, led and funded by combatant commands and
services. The successful linkage of these efforts will depend on continued
comprehensive communication and coordination.

We have previously reported that transformational programs across
government require particular attention to managing cultural change.10
Within the Training Transformation Program, we believe there are two areas
where communication and coordination will play an important role towards
achieving cultural adaptation. First, the training developed under the
program is expected to respond to combatant commanders' capabilities-based
requirements, moving away from mission-based requirements that are based
on specific threats. A capabilities-based approach focuses on identifying
the capabilities that U.S. forces will need

10 See GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.:
July 2, 2003); and Defense Transformation: Clear Leadership,
Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts
to Transform Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17,
2004).

DOD Proactive in Efforts to Communicate and Coordinate with Internal
Stakeholders, but Inconsistent Understanding Continues

to deter and defeat any potential adversaries, being able to respond
decisively anywhere and anytime to any type of challenge. Second, training
developed under the program will be "joint" in nature and will reflect the
growing need for different services and commands to work together to
achieve common goals. DOD acknowledges, in its Training Transformation
Implementation Plan, that it has to balance the priority to provide the
services with more joint training at the individual and service levels
against the services' priorities to train to their servicespecific core
competencies. The program also emphasizes training across interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational operations, which creates additional
cultural challenges for program stakeholders.

DOD recognizes that program complexity and adaptation to cultural change
are inherent to training transformation, and DOD has taken some positive
steps to communicate and coordinate with internal stakeholders, as
illustrated by the following actions:

o  	According to DOD officials, at program inception, DOD designated a
single integrating authority under the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness with oversight responsibility to
coordinate strategy within and among the training transformation
initiatives, as well as into other DOD transformational efforts to achieve
the desired integration.

o  	DOD prepares and presents the Training Transformation Program
strategic plan, implementation plan, and road map at regularly scheduled
working-level meetings, with the intent to update stakeholders and
generate discussion. In addition, the department created an interactive
program Web site containing a repository of these documents, which allows
stakeholders to comment on materials directly.

o  	Under the leadership of the Joint Staff, the Joint Lessons Learned
Program expanded the existing lessons learned concept by establishing
joint lessons-learned specialists' positions at all combatant commands and
services.11 The physical presence of these program specialists serves to
increase the understanding of the Training Transformation Program, as well
as improve the collection, analysis, and feedback processes for lessons
learned.

o  	DOD has begun an outreach campaign with the aim of better facilitating
the collection of training requirements from combatant commands and
services. A Joint Forces Command official, acknowledging a need for

11 The U.S. Coast Guard does not have a Joint Lessons Learned Specialist
but works closely with the Joint Center for Operational Analysis and
Lessons Learned to further their ability to share joint lessons.

better marketing of the JNTC, has visited with some stakeholders such as
the European and Pacific combatant commands. Representatives under the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, with
the intent of outreach and communicating joint integration and development
issues, also visited every combatant command this past year, and intend to
continue this practice on a periodic basis.

Despite DOD's efforts to communicate and coordinate with training
transformation internal stakeholders, during our interviews with services
headquarters and command staffs we found an inconsistent understanding
among some program stakeholders regarding the strategic vision and the
rationale behind the implementation and development timing of different
components of the program. For example, representatives from three of the
command staffs we visited viewed the JNTC as Joint Forces Command's
attempt to impose additional requirements on existing service and
combatant command exercises rather than providing enabling capabilities to
enhance existing training exercises. Also, general consensus among all
stakeholders attending the Joint Integrated Process Team meeting in
December of 2004 was that they did not fully understand the Training
Transformation Program's accreditation and certification processes-which
are designed to ensure the joint content of military training programs and
the adequacy of supporting facilities-because of the complexity of the
processes as well as the lack of clear definitions during its initial
implementation. In addition, stakeholders from a service headquarters and
a command staff that we spoke with described the JKDDC as an initiative
limited to the development of joint training courses. It appears that
these stakeholders did not have a full understanding of the larger
strategic vision of the initiative to leverage evolving technologies that
will provide or distribute education and training needed anytime and
anywhere, across the full spectrum of forces. Also, some stakeholders from
two service headquarters and a command staff expressed a lack of
understanding of the program managers' decision to iteratively develop the
JAEC, as they develop metrics and perform assessments of the JNTC and
JKDDC. In particular, some of the stakeholders associated with the JNTC
and JKDDC initiatives expressed discomfort about being measured against
specified outcomes when they were not initially provided with standards to
measure results. We found this overall lack of understanding evident
mostly at the service level, among representatives of headquarters and
command staffs.

Our discussion with training transformation officials indicated that they
were not specifically aware of this level of inconsistent understanding of
training transformation's concepts and initiatives. However, they did

DOD Is Communicating and Coordinating with External Stakeholders, but
Efforts to Engage Senior Non-DOD Leaders Have Been Limited to Date

indicate that the program's complexity and development approach could
easily lead to inconsistent understanding among stakeholders. We found
that they had not assessed the extent to which their communication and
coordination efforts have impacted stakeholders' comprehension of the
overall concept and vision of the Training Transformation Program. This
lack of understanding risks not obtaining stakeholders' buy-in and
commitment needed to fully implement the goals of the program.

While DOD has been proactive in engaging interagency, intergovernmental,
and multinational partners in identifying common areas for potential joint
training opportunities, their outreach has not yet been elevated to
senior-level leadership to ensure their full cooperation. Some DOD
missions-strategic defense, homeland defense, and civil support-have
already been identified as potential areas where DOD could consider future
training opportunities with the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of State, and the Department of Energy. Within the Training
Transformation Program, the Training Transformation Interagency
Intergovernmental Multinational Mission Essential Tasks effort was
launched to develop capabilities and tasks for conducting broader, more
inclusive joint operations, such as reestablishing order and promoting
stability in other nations with multinational partners. Starting in early
2005, the department began engaging members of the external stakeholder
community in collaboratively identifying tasks for conducting broader,
more inclusive joint operations with interagency community partners. These
efforts are mostly focused on building a task force and determining what
is required for communication, cooperation, coordination, collaboration,
and interoperability among the interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational partners at this time.

The most recent Training Transformation Interagency Intergovernmental
Multinational Mission Essential Tasks conference, in February 2005,
consisted of more than 150 operators, planners, strategists, and policy
developers from 40 organizations, including different non-DOD agencies and
departments across the U.S. government, as well as from the United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the International Committee of
the Red Cross. While the effort has significant upper-level support within
DOD, the level of effort to gain support and participation among the
external stakeholders' senior-level management has been limited. Some DOD
officials we spoke with acknowledged that, as the effort moves forward
into planning and implementation, it will require increasing levels of
participation from non-DOD stakeholders. They also believe that, without
equally significant support from upper-level leadership among those
agencies and organizations that DOD has no direct

authority over, DOD may face challenges in maintaining a collaborative
environment and successfully achieving future planning and implementation
outcomes for training with those partners. The extent to which the
leadership at non-DOD partner organizations is committed to defense
training transformation is unknown, because of DOD's limited efforts to
engage these individuals to date. DOD officials acknowledge the importance
of reaching out to the leadership of external organizations and recognize
that their efforts in this regard have been very limited to date.

    Developing Joint Training Requirements That Meet Combatant Commands' Needs
    Is a Significant Challenge

Joint Forces Command's new process for developing tactical-level joint
training requirements-and the specific training tasks that support the
requirements-does not ensure that these tasks necessarily reflect
combatant command needs nor does it ensure buy-in from internal
stakeholders-combatant commanders, services, and training commands. In the
past, joint training tasks were primarily focused at the command level12
and were identified through DOD's authoritative process that built
requirements by translating combatant commander inputs into training
requirements. Training transformation has expanded joint training
requirements to include those at the tactical level in addition to joint
command-level training. The current process Joint Forces Command is using
to develop these joint tactical-level tasks does not build these
requirements starting with the combatant commands' analysis of training
needs. Rather, the requirements are based on Joint Forces Command's
analysis of perceived training deficiencies. In addition, Joint Forces
Command's process for identifying and validating these tasks does not
ensure widespread participation among the combatant commands and service
representatives. Some internal stakeholders have expressed reservations
about the validity of some recently developed joint tasks, because the
tasks did not evolve through the established Joint Training System process
in which they originated as combatant command requirements. Thus, DOD
risks developing training requirements that may not be accepted as valid
or necessary to meet combatant command training needs.

12 Command-level training includes the operational and strategic theater
levels of training which are designed to provide training to unified
command and joint task force headquarters staff.

Command-Level Joint Training Requirements Rely on the Joint Training
System

Combatant Command and Service Representatives Have Expressed Reservations
about the Validity of Some Joint Tasks

Since fiscal year 1994, the Joint Training System has been DOD's
authoritative process for collaboratively gathering each combatant
command's mission analysis and translating it into command-level training
requirements that the services must include in their training events.
Historically, joint training requirements have only been targeted to
command-level training.

The command-level joint training tasks developed by the Joint Training
System are referred to as joint mission essential tasks, and are derived
from a common, universal joint task list that has been used or suggested
by the combatant commands and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. The Joint Training System is further supported by the annual
worldwide joint training conference, where combatant command and service
representatives discuss the list of joint mission-essential tasks to which
the services must train. This collaboration ensures that the services
understand what they must include in their training to meet combatant
command joint training requirements.

The Training Transformation Program has brought an emphasis on joint
training at the tactical level in addition to the command-level tasks
discussed above. Training at the tactical level was typically a service
responsibility prior to training transformation. Today, however, Joint
Forces Command, as directed in the Training Transformation Implementation
Plan, develops joint tasks, which include joint tasks at the tactical
level in addition to command-level tasks.

Rather than identifying joint tactical tasks directly through the
established Joint Training System, whose outputs are approved by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Forces Command relies on a
working group process to identify and validate these tasks.13 The
identification of these joint training tasks is based primarily on the
working group's analysis of perceived training deficiencies in combatant
command and service training, rather than being based on the combatant
commands' analyses of training needs. Any working group participant may
submit a joint task to be considered for inclusion in future joint
training, but the submission

13 The working group is chaired by Joint Forces Command and is composed of
service, combatant command, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Personnel
and Readiness), Joint Staff, and Joint Forces Command representatives,
each of whom are invited to attend meetings and vote on the inclusion of
specific joint training tasks into training events that meet mission
requirements. Service component representatives are encouraged to
participate, but are not voting members.

must be sponsored by a voting member. After a task is approved by the
working group, it is validated by performing the task at one or two
training events and then resubmitted to the working group for approval as
a new or revised task. Throughout the working group process, service and
combatant command representatives who participate have the opportunity to
voice concerns regarding any of the candidate joint tasks. For example,
the Joint Forces Command working group approved 43 joint tasks in October
2004 that they believe the services should include in their training to
meet combatant command training requirements. Of these joint tasks, 21 of
them (49 percent), as identified by one service command, were new
tactical-level tasks that had not been previously identified through the
existing Joint Training System, and as such have not been derived from a
combatant command's mission analysis.

Although combatant command representatives are invited to attend working
group meetings, the working group process does not ensure the same level
of widespread participation that the established Joint Training System
achieves, and Joint Forces Command risks developing training requirements
that lack widespread combatant command and service support.
Representatives from service commands and combatant commands staff with
whom we spoke expressed reservations about the validity of tasks developed
in this manner, because they did not come from the Joint Training System,
which systematically builds requirements based on combatant commanders'
needs, nor were they vetted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the services, and the combatant commands. Combatant commands'
representatives said that they have provided little input into the
original development of the tasks identified by the Joint Forces Command's
working group to date. Because of the process used, they questioned how
many of these joint tasks actually reflect the combatant commands'
training needs.

Conclusions 	The Training Transformation Program is a multifaceted effort
that touches nearly everyone associated with the joint training community.
With complex initiatives being developed and employed at various stages of
maturity, comprehensive communication and coordination are critical to
establish effective partnerships. Until DOD assesses its approach to
communicating and coordinating training transformation initiatives and
takes additional steps to ensure full understanding among joint training
stakeholders at all levels-from combatant commands to services, and from
headquarters to training commands-DOD risks not building the effective
partnerships necessary to gain stakeholders' buy-in and commitment to
fully implement training transformation. This lack of

understanding of the complexities and potential benefits associated with
the training transformation initiatives would likely impair DOD's efforts
to enhance joint training that will enable troops to better carry out
combatant commanders' missions.

The department's transformation effort also encompasses the way training
can be integrated with all levels of government as well as with allies and
coalition partners. Enhanced coordination at interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational levels will promote increased
cooperation, more rapid response, and the ability to conduct seamless
operations. Although senior leadership support for this effort exists
within DOD, in the absence of a targeted effort to ensure equally
significant senior leadership support from non-DOD agency and organization
partners, DOD is at risk of not being able to maintain a collaborative
environment with its external stakeholders and to implement interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational training outcomes successfully.

The department has an established, authoritative process to develop joint
training requirements in the Joint Training System, which relies on the
combatant commands to align training requirements with their assigned
missions. By not fully utilizing this system to develop the training
requirements to support the JNTC component-based, tactical-level joint
training, DOD may risk the services and combatant commands not fully
accepting these training requirements as valid. If such requirements are
not embraced as combatant command-generated training requirements, the
services and combatant commands may not completely support the need to
enhance joint training at the tactical level, thus potentially
underutilizing the capability being developed by the JNTC.

Recommendations for 	To promote effective partnerships and mitigate the
risk of implementing Training Transformation Program components that are
not fully supported

                                Executive Action

by the combatant commands, services, and other federal agencies, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense take the following three
actions:

o  	direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to assess the effectiveness of their communication and
coordination efforts of the training transformation initiatives and take
additional steps to enhance stakeholders' understanding of the program's
goals and initiatives;

o  	direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to elevate outreach efforts to senior leadership within non-DOD
agencies and organizations to ensure these stakeholders' full
understanding, buy-in, and commitment; and

o  direct the Joint Forces Command to use the Joint Training System to

  Agency Comments
  and Our Evaluation

establish all training requirements at the joint tactical level in order
to promote widespread participation and better opportunities for
stakeholders' acceptance of the requirements.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
first two recommendations and partially concurred with the third. DOD
concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to
assess the effectiveness of their communication and coordination efforts
of the training transformation initiatives and take additional steps to
enhance stakeholders' understanding of the program's goals and
initiatives. DOD stated that in addition to its continued effort to
communicate and coordinate through Training Transformation Joint
Integrated Process Team, the Senior Advisory Group and Executive Steering
Group, it will be placing Joint Forces Command personnel within key
Service and Combatant Command training organizations to improve
understanding of training transformation. Additionally, DOD stated it
would evaluate the effectiveness of the program's overall communication
and coordination in its first and subsequent assessments of the training
transformation program.

DOD also concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to elevate outreach efforts to senior leadership within non-DOD
agencies and organizations to ensure these stakeholders' full
understanding, buy-in, and commitment. In its response, DOD stated that an
initiative led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) will
address this recommendation by the end of fiscal year 2006. DOD partially
concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Joint Forces Command to use the Joint Training System to establish all
training requirements at the joint tactical level in order to promote
widespread participation and better opportunities for stakeholders'
acceptance of the requirements. DOD stated that the Joint Forces Command
uses the Joint Training System to develop its Joint Training Plan as
required by DOD directive. Nevertheless, DOD also acknowledged that GAO is
correct in its assessment that some joint training requirements may not be
documented in the Joint Training System or recognized by some users of the
Joint Training System. In this regard, they further stated that USJFCOM
has been directed to submit these

training requirements that are derived from joint tactical tasks for
inclusion in the Joint Training System and that the Joint Staff consider
them in future updates.

We agree with DOD's comments concerning Joint Forces Command's role and
responsibilities in developing training requirements. However, we continue
to believe that the services' and combatant commands' commitment and
ownership of these tactical training tasks would be enhanced if they
originated from the combatant commands' annual training needs analysis,
which is an integral part of the Joint Training System, and not just
included in the system after the fact. As stated in our report, if such
requirements are not embraced as combatant commandgenerated training
requirements, the services and combatant commands may not completely
support the need to enhance joint training at the tactical level, thus
potentially underutilizing the capability being developed by the joint
national training capability.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Commander,
U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4402. Key contributors to this report are listed
in
appendix III.

Janet St. Laurent, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management

Congressional Committees

The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine DOD's overall management approach and status in implementing
the Training Transformation Program, we reviewed relevant DOD plans,
policies, guidance, and other documents pertaining to training
transformation. We discussed training transformation issues with a variety
of officials at DOD, service headquarters offices, several combatant
commands, and other stakeholders that are involved with the Training
Transformation Program (see table 2). Specifically, we did the following:

o  	To determine the DOD's overall management approach in implementing the
Training Transformation Program, we reviewed key documentation related to
the management responsibilities, development approach, status of each
initiative, and resource allocation among the three initiatives.

o  	To determine the DOD's overall status in implementing the Training
Transformation Program, we conducted interviews with key officials
supporting each initiative.

o  	To better understand the roles, responsibilities, and funding profiles
within the Training Transformation Program, we reviewed and analyzed key
documentation, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2004
revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2003 JNTC
Implementation Plan, the September 2004 DOD directive on military
training, and available program execution plans prepared by the joint
management offices from fiscal years 2002 through 2005.

                       Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

 Table 2: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment Organization
                                   Locations

Army Headquarters, Army Collective Training Division, Washington, D.C.

Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va.

Air Force Headquarters, Air Force Operational Training Division,
Washington, D.C.

Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va.

        Air Education and Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Tx.

Coast Guard Headquarters, Office of Workforce Performance, Training and
Development, Washington, D.C.

Marine Corps Headquarters, Marine Corps Training and Education Command,
Quantico, Va.

Navy Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Ranges and Fleet Training Branch,
Washington, D.C.

Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Naval Education Training (N00T),
Human Performance and Acquisition Assessment Division, Arlington, VA

Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Va.

Special Operations U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force
Base, Fla.

Joint Organizations The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Force
Transformation, Washington, D.C.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Readiness and Training Policy and
Programs, Washington, D.C.

- Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability Joint Management Office,
Alexandria, Va.

- Readiness Programming and Assessment, Washington, D.C.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.

- Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate, Washington,
D.C.

- Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability Joint Management
Office, Alexandria, Va.

U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Va.

- Joint National Training Capability Joint Management Office, Suffolk, Va.

- Joint Training Directorate and Joint Warfighting Center, Suffolk, Va.

U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii

- U.S. Army Pacific, Hawaii

- U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, Hawaii

- U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Hawaii

- U.S. Pacific Fleet, Hawaii

- U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific, Hawaii

Source: GAO.

To identify significant management challenges that have emerged early in
the program's implementation, we again reviewed relevant DOD plans,
policies, guidance, and other documents pertaining to training
transformation and interviewed many of the same officials indicated in

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

table 2. We reviewed and analyzed some additional key documents, including
DOD's 2003 Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, the 2002
Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training, the 2003 Transformation
Planning Guidance, the 2004 Training Capabilities Analysis of Alternatives
Final Report, various Joint Integrated Process Team briefs, and prior GAO
reports. To better understand some of the management challenges, we
attended meetings of the JKDDC working group, the Joint Integrated Process
Team, and the Training Transformation Interagency, Intergovernmental, and
Multinational Mission Essential Tasks Task Force. We also obtained and
reviewed all the minutes from the working groups and task force meetings
that we attended. Additionally, to assess the challenge in developing
joint training requirements that met combatant commands' mission needs, we
obtained a list of approved joint tasks developed by the Joint Forces
Command working group and solicited feedback from combatant command and
service representatives.

We performed our review from June 2004 through May 2005 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402

Acknowledgments 	In addition to the person named above, Laura Durland,
Fred Harrison, Marie Mak, Todd Dice, Gwyneth Blevins, Jonathan Clark, and
R.K. Wild also made major contributions to this report.

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